Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1961–1963

Volumes XIII/XIV/XV

Western Europe; Berlin

Microfiche

Supplement

Editor Charles S. Sampson
General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie

Department of State
Washington
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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, *et seq.*).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government, including facts that contributed to the formulation of policies and records that provided supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching

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a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

The General Editor of the series and the editor of this supplement, which was compiled in 1989 and 1990 (Western Europe) and 1990 and 1991 (Berlin), are convinced that it meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing. Although these documents record policies and events of more than 30 years ago, the statute of October 28, 1991, allows the Department until 1996 to reach the 30-year line in the publication of the series.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This supplement is part of a triennial subseries of volumes and supplements of the *Foreign Relations* series. This subseries documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the 3 years (1961–1963) of the administration of John F. Kennedy. The editors chose to present the official record of U.S. foreign affairs with respect to Europe, the Soviet Union, and Canada in six print volumes and one microfiche supplement.

Volume V, Soviet Union, includes documentation on U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. Volume VI, Kennedy–Khrushchev Exchanges, presents the comprehensive record of correspondence between President Kennedy and Soviet Chairman Khrushchev. Volume XIII, West Europe and Canada, documents U.S. policy regarding European economic and political integration, U.S. participation in NATO, and U.S. bilateral relations with Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, and Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963, document U.S. involvement in the continuing Four-Power negotiations over divided Germany and the status of the Western-occupied sectors of Berlin. (This microfiche publication supplements volumes XIII, XIV, and XV.) Volume XVI, Eastern Europe, presents the basic record of U.S. relations with Austria, Finland, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, as well as documentation on general U.S. policy toward the Eastern European region and U.S. efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem.

The statute of October 28, 1991, requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on all the major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It fur-

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ther requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors judge that volumes XIII, XIV, and XV and this supplement were prepared in complete accordance with the standards and mandates of this statute.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

In planning and preparing the volumes and this microfiche supplement documenting U.S. foreign policy regarding Europe during the Kennedy administration, the editors concluded that the records of the Department of State would constitute the central core of the published record. The Department of State historians have enjoyed complete and unconditional access to all records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized (lot) files of the policymaking levels; the files of the Department of State's Executive Secretariat, which comprehend the official papers created by or submitted to the Secretary of State; the files of all overseas Foreign Service posts and U.S. special missions; and the official correspondence with foreign governments and with other Federal agencies. Any failure to include a complete Department of State record in the *Foreign Relations* series cannot be attributed to constraints or limitations placed upon the Department historians in their access to Department records, information security regulations and practices notwithstanding.

The editor of this supplement fully researched the papers of President Kennedy and other White House foreign policy records. These Presidential papers have become a major part of the official record published in the *Foreign Relations* series. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All of this documentation has been made available for use in the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the consent of these agencies and the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. Particular thanks are due to officials at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library for their assistance.

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The editor also had complete access to the papers of General Maxwell Taylor at the National Defense University, which proved to be a valuable source for the formulation of policy under President Kennedy. In addition, the editors reviewed the body of declassified JCS files at the National Archives and Records Administration. Copies of individual classified JCS materials were obtained from the Joint Staff on a request basis.

Since 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency has provided expanded access to Department historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records still in the custody of that Agency. Department historians' access is arranged by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. This access arrangement began with the research of volumes for the 1961–1963 triennium, including volumes XIII, XIV, and XV. No CIA documents obtained under that access are included here. Department of State and CIA historians continue to work out the procedural and scholarly aspects of this access, and the variety of documentation made available and selected for publication has expanded.

The List of Sources, pages 1–6, identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of the print volumes and the supplement.

Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, Volumes XIII, XIV, and XV, Microfiche Supplement

Documents included in this supplement were initially considered by the editors for inclusion in print volumes XIII, XIV, and XV. The principles of selection followed by the editors for those volumes are described in the prefaces of those volumes. Those print volumes present complete and accurate records of U.S. policies toward European political and economic integration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and individual Western European nations (volume XIII) and U.S. management of the East-West confrontation in Berlin. The records in this supplement include fuller documentation on aspects of U.S. policies toward European integration and NATO and toward U.S. policy in Berlin, add details that could help readers better understand complex transactions and situations, and provide background to the preparation of policies.

The categories of documents included in this supplement are the same as those presented in the print volumes. The sources are also the same. The documents included here were

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not felt to be essential to the print volume. In preparing this supplement, the editors intended, to the extent possible within available resources and time, to make more broadly available to the users of the *Foreign Relations* series the records collected and declassified in the course of preparing volumes XIII, XIV, and XV.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

The documents are numbered at the top of the first page of the document. The List of Documents is ordered according to these numbers. The documents are not annotated nor is there any other editorial apparatus. Material not declassified has been blacked out; for each document not declassified, a page has been inserted that shows a title, date, classification, number of pages, and source citation.

The List of Documents, which includes title, date, participants (for memoranda of conversation), from/to information, classification, number of pages, and source citation, as well as a brief summary of the document, is included in this printed guide and appears on the first microfiche card. The printed guide also includes Lists of Sources, Abbreviations, and Persons.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under Title IV of the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act, amended on October 28, 1991, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and assists with any access and/or clearance problems that arise. Time constraints prevent the Advisory Committee from reviewing all volumes in the series.

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Declassification Review

The declassification review of this supplement, which was completed in 1993, resulted in the decision to withhold slightly more than 2 percent of the documents originally selected by Department of State historians and proposed for inclusion.

The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this supplement. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

1) military plans, weapons, or operations;

2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;

3) foreign government information;

4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;

5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;

6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;

7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;

8) cryptology; or

9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

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Acknowledgements

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the National Archives and Records Administration's John F. Kennedy Library, in particular Suzanne Forbes, who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume.

Under the supervision of former Editor in Chief John P. Glennon, Charles S. Sampson collected and selected the material in this supplement. General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the final steps in the editorial and publication process. Rita M. Baker, Vicki E. Futscher, and Thomas B. Martin prepared the List of Documents. Barbara-Ann Bacon of the Publishing Services Division (Natalie H. Lee, Chief) oversaw the production of the microfiche publication.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

November 1994

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List of Sources

Department of State

Decimal and Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files: One of the principal sources of documentation for the print volumes and this supplement was the indexed central files of the Department of State. Many of the documents were selected from the following files:

110-RU: Secretary of State Rusk's travels abroad
375: NATO
375.800: West European regional questions
396.1: International conferences
611.41: U.S.-U.K. relations
611.42: U.S.-Canadian relations
611.31: U.S.-French relations
611.53: U.S.-Portuguese relations
611.61: U.S.-Soviet relations
611.65: U.S.-Italian relations
762.00: German political affairs
762.0221: German territorial issues; the status of Berlin
862.16 ...: internal travel in Germany
962.72: air transportation in Germany; access to Berlin

In February 1963 the Department of State changed to a subject-numeric system. Under this system, the most significant files for these volumes and the supplement were:

DEF (MLF): U.S. policy toward the Multilateral Force
DEF NATO: U.S. policy toward NATO
ECIN EEC: U.S. policy toward the Common Market
NATO: NATO meetings and organizational questions
POL 7 US/Kennedy: general correspondence of the President
POL 7 US/Merchant: trips of Ambassador Merchant
POL 28 BERLIN: the status of Berlin
POL 38-9 and 10: access to Berlin
POL US-USSR: general U.S.-Soviet relations
POL W EUR: political developments in Western Europe

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Lot Files: Documents from the centralized files have been supplemented by materials from decentralized office files, the lot files of the Department of State. A list of the major lot files used or consulted for the print volumes and this supplement follows:

Ball Files: Lot 74 D 279

Files of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961–1967.

Berlin Desk Files: Lots 91 D 305, 306, and 313

Master files of the Berlin Task Force, basic documents on Germany and Berlin, and various files pertaining to Live Oak planning on Berlin, 1944–1977.

Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379

Files of Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, 1942–1971.

Bruce Files: Lot 64 D 327

Diaries of Ambassador David K.E. Bruce, 1948–1974.

Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State for 1961, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State for 1961–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State for 1961–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. This lot includes records of the President's trips to Europe in 1961 and 1963.

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EUR/CE Files: Lot 86 D 339

Files relating to Germany and Berlin, 1955–1972.

G/PM Files: Lot 69 D 258

Papers and documents of the Office of Political-Military Affairs for 1961–1963.

Hillenbrand Files: Lot 88 D 325

Files of Ambassador Martin J. Hillenbrand primarily relating to Berlin and Germany, 1950–1975.

INR–NIE Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research containing copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates, including the NIEs and SNIEs for 1961–1963.

Italian Desk Files: Lot 68 D 436

Papers and documents of the Italian Desk of the Bureau of European Affairs for 1961–1963.

PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for 1957–1961.

PPS Files: Lot 69 D 121

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for 1962.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and the Secretary of State with the heads of government and foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and certain other countries for 1953–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 476

Correspondence of the Presidents with various heads of state for 1961–1966.

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Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163

Correspondence of the Presidents with the Chairman of the Soviet Union and other high officials of the two countries for 1961–1969.

Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149

Memoranda of the President's conversations for 1956–1964.

Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192

Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk including texts of speeches and public statements, miscellaneous correspondence, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone conversations for 1961–1969.

S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2

Files of Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson, 1961–1964.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330

Memoranda of the Secretary's and Under Secretary of State's conversations for 1961–1964.

S/S Files: Eyes Only Telegrams

Microfilm reels of incoming and outgoing telegrams slugged Eyes Only, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438

Files of the Executive Secretariat on the Cuban missile crisis, 1962.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265

Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council meetings including policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents, but not the minutes of the meetings themselves, for 1961–1966, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316

Master files of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) for 1961–1968.

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S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, for 1961–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–S Files: Lot 66 D 219

Miscellaneous records of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State for 1961–1963.

National Archives and Records Administration

Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCS Files

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470

Files of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara for 1961–1968.

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382

General and country files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1961.

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501

General and country files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1962.

OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542

Records of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their special assistants for 1962.

OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489

Miscellaneous records of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their special assistants, 1951–1966.

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National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

Lemnitzer Papers

Papers of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1959–1960; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1960–1962.

Taylor Papers

Papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, the President's Military Representative, 1961–1962; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962–1964.

Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Burke Papers

Papers of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, 1955–1961.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Norstad Papers

John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts

Ball Papers
National Security Files

Chester V. Clifton Series
Aides Files
Countries Series
Departments and Agencies
Meetings and Memoranda Series

President's Office Files

Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas

National Security File
Rusk Appointment Books
Vice Presidential Security File

Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

Bowles Papers

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List of Abbreviations

ABC, atomic, biological, chemical
ACA, Allied Control Authority
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACE, Allied Command Europe
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFL–CIO, American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFMED, Air Force, Mediterranean
AID, Agency for International Development
APAG, Atlantic Policy Advisory Group
APC, armored personnel carrier
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ASAF, Asian/African
ASCS, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
ATC, Allied traffic control
AUA, Austrian Airlines
AUS, active unit status
AV, Aviation Bureau, Department of State
B, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
BAOR, British Army on the Rhine
BASC, Berlin Air Safety Center
Benelux, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg
BERCON/MARCON, Berlin contingency/maritime contingency
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
BOP, balance of payments
BQD, Berlin Quadripartite Document
BTF, Berlin Task Force
Busec, series indicator for telegrams to the Mission to the European Regional Organizations
CAP, common agricultural policy
CD, Christian Democrat, Christian Democratic Party
CDU, Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CEMA, Council for Economic Mutual Assistance
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
CF, Central Files; Conference Files

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ChiCom, Chinese Communist
ChiNat, Chinese Nationalist
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINC, Commander in Chief
CINCHAN, Commander in Chief, Channel
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, Europe
CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CINCMED, Commander in Chief, Mediterranean
COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group, based in Paris, consisting of nations seeking to control the export of strategic goods to Communist countries
CONUS, Continental United States
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CVA, attack aircraft carrier
CVS, antisubmarine warfare aircraft carrier
cxt, common external tariff
DAG, Development Assistance Group
DC, Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party)
DCI, Director for Central Intelligence
DDE, Dwight D. Eisenhower
DDG, guided missile destroyer
DDR, Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)
DefSec, Defense Secretary
Deptel, Department of State telegram
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
DM, Deutschemark
DOD, Department of Defense
DOS, Department of State
Ecbus, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to European Regional Organizations
ECE, Economic Commission for Europe
ECSC, European Coal and Steel Community
EEC, European Economic Community
EFTA, European Free Trade Area
EMA, European Monetary Agreement
Embtel, Embassy telegram
ENI, Ente Nazionale degli Idrocarburi (Italian National Hydrocarbon Trust)
E/OT(F), Office of External Trade and Finance, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EPC, European Political Community

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EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Euratom, European Atomic Energy Community
Exdis, exclusive distribution
EX-IM, Export-Import Bank
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDP, Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FedRep, Federal Republic
FLN, Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front)
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
GA, United Nations General Assembly
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G/B, Germany/Berlin
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GER, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
GFR, German Federal Republic
GOB, Government of Belgium
GOC, Government of Canada
GOF, Government of France
GOP, Government of Portugal
GOS, Government of Spain
G/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs
GSFG, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
HMG, Her Majesty's Government
HQ, headquarters
IAA, International Access Authority
IANF, interallied nuclear forces
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
ICC, International Control Commission

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ICG, Interdepartmental Coordinating Group
ICJ, International Court of Justice
IDA, International Development Association
ILO, International Labor Organization
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile
IS, International Staff
ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
IZT, interzonal trade
JCAE, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JFK, John F. Kennedy
JS, Joint Staff
JSSC, Joint Strategic Survey Committee
L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LBJ, Lyndon B. Johnson
LDC, less developed country
limdis, limited distribution
L/S, Division of Language Services, Department of State
M, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP, military assistance program
MATS/TAC, Military Air Transport Service/Tactical Air Command
MC, military committee, memorandum of conversation
MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance
memcon, memorandum of conversation
MFN, most favored nation
MLF, multilateral force
MLM, Military Liaison Mission
MOD, Ministry of Defense
MP, military police
MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile
MRP, Mouvement Republicain Populaire (Popular Republican Movement)
mytel, my telegram
NAC, North Atlantic Council

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NADGE, NATO air defense ground environment
NAP, non-aggression pact
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP, New Democratic Party
NDU, National Defense University
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NFP, NATO Force Planning
niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NNF, NATO nuclear forces
noforn, no foreign dissemination
NORAD, North Atlantic Air Defense Command
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
OAS, Organization of American States
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTF, Office of International Trade and Finance, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
ourtel, our telegram
P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PCI, Partito Communista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PermRep, Permanent Representative
PJDB, Permanent Joint Defense Board
PM, Prime Minister
POLAD, political adviser
Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PPS, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
PRI, Partito Republicano Italiano (Italian Republican Party)
PriMin, Prime Minister
QBAL, Quadripartite Berlin airlift
QR, quantitative restrictions
R, research and development
RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
reftel, reference telegram
RFE, Radio Free Europe
RG, Record Group

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RIAS, Radio in the American Sector
RPE, Office of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
RPM, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
S, Office of the Secretary of State
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
S/AE, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space
SAM, surface to air missile
S/B, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
SC, United Nations Security Council
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his delegation at international conferences
SED, Sozialistsche Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
septel, separate telegram
SETAF, Southern European Task Force
SET/MC, Secretary's European trip/memorandum of conversation
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SHLO, SHAPE Liaison Office
S/MF, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for NATO Multilateral Force Negotiations
SOV, Soviet; Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party)
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SSB(N), SSN(B), ballistic missile submarine, nuclear powered
S/S–RO, Reports and Operations Staff of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State
STR, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
SYG, Secretary-General
TAC, U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command
Tagg, series indicator for telegrams from the GATT delegation at Geneva

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TASS, Telegraphnoe Agentsvo Sovietskogo Soʻuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
TB, test ban
TEA, Trade Expansion Act
tel, telegram
Topol, series indicator for telegrams to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State or his delegation at international conferences
TTD, temporary travel document
U, Office of the Under Secretary of State
UKG, United Kingdom Government
UKMLM, U.K. Military Liaison Mission
UN, United Nations
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USAFE, United States Air Force, Europe
USAREUR, United States Army, Europe
USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USCOB, United States Commandter), Berlin
USEC, United States Mission to the European Communities
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USIS, United States Information Service
USN, United States Navy
USRep, United States Representative
USRO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
Vopo, Volkspolizei (People's Police)
WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
WEU, Western European Union
WM, war memorial
Z, Zulu time zone

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List of Persons

Abrasimov, Pyotr A., Soviet Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic

Acheson, Dean, former Secretary of State and Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on NATO

Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 1963

Adzhubei, Alexei L., Editor in Chief of *Izvestiia* and Khrushchev's son-in-law

Akalovsky, Alexander, Department of State interpreter

Alphand, Hervé, French Ambassador to the United States

Amrehn, Franz, Deputy Mayor of Berlin

Armstrong, Willis C., Minister in Canada until August 1966; thereafter Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Ausland, John C., member of the Berlin Task Force, Department of State

Bahr, Egon, Press Chief of the Berlin Senat

Baker, Major General William C., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Europe

Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State

Beaudry, Robert M., Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Behrendt, Heinz, Head of the Office of Inter-German Trade in the German Democratic Republic Ministry of Foreign and Inter-German Trade

Beigel, Edgar J., Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Blue, William L., Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until July 1961; Director until January 1962

Blumenthal, W. Michael, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations from December 1962

Bohlen, Charles E., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until September 1962; thereafter Ambassador to France

Bolshakov, Georgi N., editor of *USSR* magazine

Bowie, Robert, Director of the Center for International Studies

Bowles, Chester B., Under Secretary of State until December 1961

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Brandt, Willy, Governing Mayor of Berlin
Brasseur, Maurice P., Belgian Minister of Trade
Brentano, Heinrich von, German Foreign Minister until October 1961; thereafter Chairman of the CDU faction in the Bundestag
Brosio, Manlio, Italian Ambassador to the United States until May 1961
Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom from March 1961
Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Burdett, William C., Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until September 1962; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., Chief of Naval Operations until August 1961
Burris, Colonel Howard L., Military Assistant to the Vice President
Butler, Richard A., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from October 1963
Butterworth, W. Walton, Representative to the European Communities until October 1962; thereafter Ambassador to Canada

Cabell, General Charles P., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Caccia, Sir Harold, British Ambassador to the United States until October 1961
Calhoun, John C., Minister and Assistant Chief of Mission at Berlin from May 1963
Carstens, Karl, State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry
Cash, Frank E., Jr., Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Castiella y Maiz, Fernando Maria, Spanish Foreign Minister
Chayes, Abram, Legal Adviser, Department of State, from February 1961
Clarke, General Bruce C., Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, until May 1962
Clay, Brigadier General Lucius D., President's Special Representative in Berlin until May 1962; thereafter Special Consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Cleveland, Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from February 1961

Cleveland, Stanley M., Director of the Office of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from August 1962

Clifton, Major General Chester V., Jr., Military Aide to the President

Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister

Creel, Robert C., Director of the Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Davis, Richard H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Day, Arthur R., member of the Berlin Task Force, Department of State, until June 1962; thereafter Political Officer at Berlin

de Gaulle, Charles, President of France

de Staercke, André, Belgian Permanent Representative to NATO

Debré, Michel, French Prime Minister until April 1962

Diefenbaker, John G., Canadian Prime Minister until April 1963

Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury

Dobrynin, Anatoli F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States from March 1962

Dowling, Walter C., Ambassador to Germany until April 1963

Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961

Eckhardt, Felix von, State Secretary in the German Press and Information Office

Elbrick, C. Burke, Ambassador to Portugal until August 1963

Erhard, Ludwig, German Vice Chancellor and Minister for Economic Affairs until October 1963; thereafter Chancellor

Fanfani, Amintore, Italian Prime Minister until April 1963

Feldman, Myer, Deputy Special Counsel to the President

Fenoaltea, Sergio, Italian Ambassador to the United States from May 1961

Fessenden, Russell H., Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1962; thereafter Minister in Brussels

Finletter, Thomas K., Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council from March 1961

Foster, William C., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

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Fowler, Henry H., Under Secretary of the Treasury
Franco, General Francisco, Chief of the Spanish State
Freeman, Orville L., Secretary of Agriculture
Freeman, General Paul L., Jr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, from May 1962
Freshman, C. Arnold, Officer in Charge of German Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Furnas, Howard E., Executive Director of the MLF Negotiating Team

Gaitskell, Hugh T.N., Leader of the British Labour Party
Galbraith, J. Kenneth, Ambassador to India, April 1961–July 1963
Gammon, Samuel, Officer in Charge of Italian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from July 1962
Garrigues, Antonio, Spanish Ambassador to the United States from June 1962
Gavin, James M., Ambassador to France, March 1961–September 1962
Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense
Globke, Hans, State Secretary in the Office of Chancellor Adenauer
Gorbach, Alfons, Austrian Chancellor
Gray, Major General David W., Head of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Green, Howard C., Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs until April 1963
Grewe, Wilhelm, German Ambassador to the United States until September 1962
Gromyko, Andrei I., Soviet Foreign Minister
Gronchi, Giovanni, President of the Italian Republic until May 1962
Guthrie, John C., Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Hallstein, Walter, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community
Hare, Raymond A., Ambassador to Turkey from March 1961
Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador at Large, February–November 1961; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, November 1961–March 1963; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 1963
Hassel, Kai-Uwe von, German Minister of Defense from 1962

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Heath, Edward, British Lord Privy Seal
Heeney, Arnold D.P., Canadian Ambassador to the United States until April 1962
Heller, Walter W., Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers
Herter, Christian A., Special Representative for Trade Negotiations from December 1962
Hillenbrand, Martin J., Director of the Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until July 1963; thereafter Minister to Germany
Hodges, Luther H., Secretary of Commerce
Holloway, Jerome K., Jr., Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Home, Alexander Frederick Douglas, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until October 1963; thereafter Prime Minister
Hood, Viscount Samuel, British Minister to the United States
Horsey, Outerbridge, Deputy Chief of Mission to Italy until November 1961
Hulick, Charles E., Jr., Deputy Assistant Chief of Mission at Berlin

Imhof, Johannes V., Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President of the United States, January 20, 1961–November 22, 1963; thereafter President
Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from May 1961

Kaysen, Carl, President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Kennan, George F., Ambassador to Yugoslavia from May 1961
Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from January 21, 1961, until his death on November 22, 1963
Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General of the United States
Khrushchev, Nikita S., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
King, James E., senior analyst, Institute for Defense Analysis, 1961
Kissinger, Henry A., member of the National Security Council staff from November 1961
Kitchen, Jeffrey C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from May 1961 and from December

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1962, Chairman of the Steering Group on Implementation of the Nassau Decisions

Klein, David, member of the National Security Council staff

Klein, Gunther, Berlin Senator for Federal Affairs

Knappstein, Karl H., German Ambassador to the United States from October 1962

Knight, William E., II, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Kohler, Foy D., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until August 1962; thereafter Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Komer, Robert, member of the National Security Council staff

Konev, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan S., Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, until 1962

Kornienko, Georgi M., Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United States

Kranich, Robert H., Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Krapf, Franz, Minister of the German Embassy in the United States until September 1961

Kreisky, Bruno, Austrian Foreign Minister

Kroll, Hans S., German Ambassador to the Soviet Union until September 1962

Kuznetsov, Vasili V., Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister

Laloy, Jean, Minister of European Affairs, French Foreign Ministry

Lazarev, Colonel, Soviet Deputy Political Adviser in Berlin

Lebel, Claude, French Minister-Counselor to the United States

Lee, Rear Admiral John M., member of the MLF Negotiating Team, 1963

Legere, Colonel Lawrence J., Assistant to the President's Military Representative

Lemnitzer, Lieutenant General Lyman L., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until October 1962; thereafter Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Leone, Giovanni, Italian Prime Minister, July–December 1963

Leopold, Kurt, Head of the German Interzonal Trade Office in Berlin

Lilienfeld, Georg von, German Minister to the United States

Lightner, E. Allen, Jr., Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission at Berlin

Lucet, Charles, Director of Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry

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Luns, Joseph, Netherlands Foreign Minister

Lyon, Cecil B., Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in France

MacArthur, Douglas, II, Ambassador to Belgium from February 1961

Macmillan, Harold, British Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury until October 1963

Magill, Robert N., Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until February 1962

Manning, Robert J., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Mansholt, Sicco L., Vice President of the Commission of the European Economic Community

Marjolin, Robert E., Vice President of the Commission of the European Economic Community

Martin, Paul, Canadian Minister of External Affairs from April 1963

Mattei, Enrico, Chairman of the Italian State Oil Corporation (ENI), until 1962

Matthews, H. Freeman, Jr., Second Secretary in the Embassy to Spain from September 1963

Mautner, Karl F., member of the Berlin Task Force, Department of State

McBride, Robert H., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until June 1961; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission to Spain

McCloy, John J., former High Commissioner for Germany and President's Adviser on Disarmament

McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence from November 1961

McGhee, George C., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from December 1961; Ambassador to Germany from May 1963

McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense

McNaughton, John, General Counsel in the Department of Defense

Meloy, Francis E., Jr., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from June 1962

Mende, Erich, Chairman of the West German Free Democratic Party and Minister for All-German Questions from October 1963

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Menshikov, Mikhail A., Soviet Ambassador to the United States until December 1961

Merchant, Livingston T., Ambassador to Canada, March 1961–May 1962; Head of the MLF Negotiating Team, 1963

Messmer, Pierre A., French Minister of Defense

Mikoyan, Anastas I., First Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

Millar, Sir Frederick Hoyer, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Moro, Aldo, Secretary of Italian Christian Democratic Party, 1961–1963; Italian Prime Minister from December 1963

Morris, Brewster H., Minister in Germany until 1963

Murrow, Edward R., Director of the United States Information Agency from March 1961

Nenni, Pietro, Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, 1961–1963; Vice President of Council of Ministers from December 1963

Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from January 1961

Nogueira, Alberto Franco, Portuguese Foreign Minister

Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., Deputy Chief of the Mission to the European Communities

Norstad, Lieutenant General Lauris, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, until December 1962

Ormsby Gore, Sir William David, British Ambassador to the United States from October 1961

Owen, Henry D., member of the National Security Council staff until December 1961; thereafter Deputy Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State

Pearson, Lester B., Canadian Prime Minister from April 1963

Pelen, Pierre, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States

Pereira, Pedro Theotonio, Portuguese Ambassador to the United States from August 1961

Pervukhin, Mikhail G., Soviet Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic

Piccioni, Attilio, Italian Foreign Minister, May 1962–December 1963

Pisani, Edgard, French Minister of Agriculture

Pitblado, David D., Economic Minister in the British Embassy in the United States

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Polk, Major General James H., U.S. Commander in Berlin from January 1963

Pompidou, Georges J.R., French Prime Minister from May 1962

Popper, David H., Director of the Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from September 1962

Ramsbotham, Peter E., Counselor in the British Foreign Office

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, Ambassador to Italy from May 1961

Reinkemeyer, Albert, Deputy Director, Division II, German Foreign Ministry

Rey, Jean, European Economic Community Commissioner for External Relations

Ricketts, Admiral Claude, Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Ritchie, Charles, Canadian Ambassador to the United States from May 1962

Roberts, Sir Frank, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union until November 1962

Rostow, Walt W., Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until December 1961; thereafter Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State

Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, President of the Council of Ministers of Portugal

Salinger, Pierre E.G., President's Press Secretary

Saragat, Giuseppe, Italian Foreign Minister from December 1963

Schaetzel, J. Robert, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until September 1962; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs

Scheyven, Louis, Belgian Ambassador to the United States

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., Special Assistant to the President

Schroeder, Gerhard, German Foreign Minister from November 1961

Schuetz, Klaus, Berlin Senator for Bundestag Affairs

Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission

Segni, Antonio, Italian Foreign Minister until May 1962; thereafter President of the Italian Republic

Semenov, Vladimir S., Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister

Seydoux, François, French Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

Shuckburgh, Sir Evelyn, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Smirnov, Andrei A., Soviet Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

Smirnovsky, Mikhail N., Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United States

Smith, Bromley, Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council until August 1961; thereafter Executive Secretary

Smith, Gerard C., Consultant to the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, and, in 1963, member of the MLF Negotiating Team

Solovyev, Colonel A.I., Soviet Commandant in Berlin

Sorensen, Theodore C., President's Special Counsel

Spaak, Paul-Henri, Secretary General of NATO until February 1961; thereafter Belgian Foreign Minister

Spiers, Ronald I., Director of the Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from November 1962

Steele, Christopher, British Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

Stevenson, Adlai E., Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Stikker, Dirk U., Secretary General of NATO from April 1961

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, April 1961–July 1963

Strauss, Franz Joseph, German Minister of Defense until October 1961

Sukhodrev, Victor, Soviet interpreter

Sweeney, Joseph, Officer in Charge of United Kingdom-Ireland Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, July 1961–August 1962

Taylor, General Maxwell D., President's Military Representative, July 1961–July 1962; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Thant, U., United Nations Secretary-General

Thompson, Llewelyn E., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until July 1962; thereafter Ambassador at Large

Thomson, John A., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States

Thorneycroft, George Edward Peter, British Minister of Defense from 1962

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

Trezise, Philip H., Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from October 1961

Tuthill, John W., Representative to the European Communities from October 1962

Tyler, William R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until August 1962; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Ulbricht, Walter, Chairman of the German Democratic Republic Council of State and of the Socialist Unity Party

Van Hollen, Christopher, Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Van Roijen, J.H., Netherlands Ambassador to the United States

Vine, Richard D., Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until July 1963

Watson, Major General Albert, II, U.S. Commandant in Berlin from May 1961

Weiss, Leonard, Director of the Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, September 1961–February 1963

Weiss, Seymour, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from November 1961

Westrick, Ludgar, State Secretary in the German Economics Ministry

Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Winckler, Jean-Claude, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States

Wormser, Olivier B., Director General of Economic Affairs, French Foreign Ministry

Yakubovsky, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan I., Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, from 1962

Zorin, Valerian A., Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister

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Summary of Print Volume XIII

Following is a summary of the contents of print volume XIII, West Europe and Canada. Parenthetical citations are to numbered documents in the text. Volume XIII, published in 1994, is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Economic and Political Integration

During the Kennedy Presidency, the United States strongly supported the idea of Western European economic and political integration, initially as a broad concept, then after the British application for membership in the Common Market (EC) as a specific development, and finally returning to support of the general concept following French President de Gaulle's veto of the British application on January 14, 1963. U.S. enthusiasm for European economic integration was occasionally dampened by increased tariffs and other discriminatory Common Market practices, but never extinguished.

Support for European integration was a major topic in U.S. discussions with every European political leader who visited Washington in 1961 as well as an integral part of conversations between U.S. and European representatives on the continent. President Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, and Under Secretary of State Ball reiterated this position in countless meetings with their counterparts, and U.S. missions in Europe carefully and extensively reported conversations and developments concerning the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

U.S. representatives also discussed the question with officials from neutral countries in Europe, who feared the impact of a greater community on their trade, assuring them that they would benefit over the longer term if the larger economic unit came into being. By the beginning of the summer President Kennedy had gone even further, suggesting to Prime Minister Macmillan that the United Kingdom apply for membership in the Common Market. (9) The President justified this suggestion by noting that the EC had made great strides in uniting Western Europe, but that only British membership could complete the project.

British application for membership in the Common Market, formally announced by Macmillan on July 31, 1961, was openly

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espoused by the United States. In instructions to U.S. missions, the Department of State stressed that its political objective with respect to an enlarged EC was the creation of a tightly knit group of European powers united within an economic union sharing the same political goals. At the same time policymakers were searching for a way to meet the economic problems of the EFTA members without incurring trade disadvantages for the United States, fearing the creation of preferential trade agreements. (17, 20, 23) The United States also feared the "possible erosive effects of association" on the political content of the EC, and repeated its concept that political integration would emerge from economic integration. (25)

U.S. relations with the Common Market were not helped by its increase of the tariffs on carpets and glass imported into the United States. (29–31) Although these increases adversely affected primarily Belgium (a compensation agreement was reached with the United Kingdom, which had also been affected), the whole EC became seized of the matter when Belgium appealed to it for relief in the form of retaliatory levies. (42) The question continued to simmer into the summer of 1962, when the Common Market put into effect retaliatory levies. Although the United States considered this move both unfortunate and unwise, particularly since it had been prepared to grant Belgium compensation in the form of other tariff concessions, it finally decided not to retaliate in kind.

By the summer of 1962 British discussions with the Common Market had bogged down over the question of Commonwealth preferences and, as seen from France, British unwillingness to change its trading patterns with the old empire. At this point the Department of State asked the European missions whether the United States should enter into the negotiations. They responded that such interference would do more harm than good, and the Department abided by their reactions. (48) EC ambivalence to the British application, however, continued to grow.

In November German Chancellor Adenauer also began to have doubts about British membership. Although he assured President Kennedy of a favorable disposition toward the application in a meeting on November 15, he also made clear that he felt the United Kingdom was not paying sufficient attention to how it handled the question. (52) By December even "good Europeans" were having doubts. All this occurred before President

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Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan met at Nassau at the end of December. The resulting U.S. decision to offer Polaris submarines to the United Kingdom, even though subsequently extended to France, apparently was the final straw for President de Gaulle, who at a press conference on January 14, 1963, vetoed British membership in the Common Market and turned down the Polaris offer. Combined with the signature of the Franco-German treaty on January 22, this seriously set back the hopes for Western European integration along the lines the United States had been promoting.

Reaction in Washington was swift. Senior officials in the Kennedy administration called in French and German representatives and made clear their concern that France and Germany were establishing a new directorate in Europe that might operate outside of NATO. (60) In a letter to the German Foreign Minister on January 28, Secretary of State Rusk made plain his contention that France was trying to eliminate the American presence in Europe and undermine the intimacy of trans-Atlantic relations. (62)

European policy also underwent a thorough review by the National Security Council at the end of January and the beginning of February. (64, 69) Based on the NSC discussions, President Kennedy instructed Ambassador Bruce to review U.S. policy toward Europe in the light of recent events. (70) Based on the NSC discussions, President Kennedy instructed Ambassador Bruce to review U.S. policy toward Europe in the light of recent events. (70) Bruce's report, February 9, concluded that European integration was still in the U.S. interest and was "an imperative of modern history," that the United Kingdom should be encouraged to take whatever steps might assist in the process, and that attacking de Gaulle's veto or the Franco-German treaty would not serve U.S. policy objectives. (72) The remainder of the year saw the United States attempt to implement Bruce's recommendations.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The incoming Kennedy administration believed that NATO relied too heavily on nuclear deterrent and attempted to convince the Alliance to expand its conventional forces. This effort dominated the 18 months of its policy toward the organization. By late 1962, and especially in 1963, the United States became more concerned about creating a multilateral nuclear force.

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These two issues, plus reports on the North Atlantic Council meetings, a replacement for Secretary General Spaak, and general discussions of military strategy comprise the documentation in this chapter.

NATO became an immediate focal point for the Kennedy Presidency, both within the administration and in discussions with the diplomatic and political leaders of the Alliance. On February 1, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk met with the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Norstad, and senior U.S. officials to confirm that NATO was "more than fundamental" to the new administration. (92) At this meeting, in conversations with foreign Ambassadors, and in messages to Heads of State, Kennedy administration officials stressed that the Alliance was the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.

President Kennedy nonetheless wanted a full-scale review of U.S. policy toward Europe, and Rusk invited former Secretary of State Acheson to undertake the reexamination. Acheson met with the President on March 7 and 14 to discuss his ideas, and the resulting report was considered by the National Security Council on March 29. Revised in light of this discussion, the President approved the Acheson report on April 21. (100)

Divided into political, military, and economic sections, the report stressed the importance of non-atomic forces, but also stated that the United States should maintain nuclear weapons in Europe at their current level. Acheson charged the North Atlantic Council with working out the specifics of a control system for the weapons, provided for the detailing of five U.S. Polaris submarines to NATO, and finally, suggested that all British nuclear forces be placed under NATO command.

Acheson personally presented the report to the North Atlantic Council on the same day that the President approved it. In a meeting presided over by new Secretary General Stikker, who had replaced Spaak in April, he outlined the new policy. The U.S. Mission to NATO reported that Acheson's presentation was well received and that the Permanent Representatives were particularly impressed by the frankness with which the United States had addressed NATO problems. (102) Consideration of the implications of the report and its implementation continued through the two North Atlantic Council meetings in 1961. The NAC meeting held at Athens May 4–6, 1962, marked the end of this discussion.

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Even while the Council debated the plan, the United States had begun to consider expanding NATO participation in the formulation of nuclear strategy. On April 18, 1962, President Kennedy approved NSAM No. 147, which specifically called for instituting measures to give NATO greater information on nuclear strategy and for the development of a multilateral sea-based MRBM force which would include some mixed manning of vessels. (135) The latter proposal was initially explained by Secretary of Defense McNamara at the Athens Council meeting and drew mixed reviews. Even within the U.S. delegation there were skeptics, and General Norstad, in particular, expressed his reservations about such a force on military grounds.

The Kennedy administration pressed ahead with the idea, and Secretary of State Rusk promoted it in conversations during his trip to Europe in June. (140, 143–146) As expected, the Germans and the Italians favored the concept, while the British and French expressed varying degrees of skepticism. On the other hand the idea of greater sharing of information about nuclear strategy was readily accepted.

By the end of 1962 the question of mixed manning had taken a back seat to the problem created by the cancellation of the Sky Bolt missile and British entry into the Common Market. When the British accepted Polaris submarines in place of the Sky Bolt, and President de Gaulle refused a similar offer and, on January 14, 1963, vetoed British membership in the EC, the United States realized that something more must be done to involve NATO in the control of nuclear weapons.

De Gaulle's actions forced the United States to review its policy toward Europe. The reexamination began at a meeting of the National Security Council on January 22 (168), and continued at an Executive Committee meeting of the NSC 3 days later. (169) To President Kennedy it appeared that de Gaulle "was trying to run us out of Europe, and preparing to break up NATO." The President asked the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Treasury to examine the situation and prepare plans for any contingency.

Discussion within the U.S. Government evolved along two lines. Ambassador Bruce prepared a report on the political and economic aspects of the problems (72), while attempts to deal with the military aspects led to the idea of the creation of a multilateral force (MLF) of surface ships. Further meetings of the Executive Committee and at the Cabinet level in February (173–

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175) produced a memorandum from the President to Ambassador Merchant asking him to visit Europe to discuss the idea of an MLF with the NATO partners. (172) Merchant toured Europe February 22–March 17, 1963. His report of March 20 concluded that "a substantial element of the leadership of important members of the alliance wants an MLF." (183) While this might have been true in Germany and Italy, France wanted no part of the idea and the United Kingdom expressed serious reservations. In a second trip in April Merchant took further soundings and again found sufficient interest to warrant the establishment in October of an MLF Working Group in Paris consisting of representatives of Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Italy, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

While the MLF talks were taking place, the Alliance also was considering the role of an Inter-Allied Nuclear Force (IANF). This was the name given to national nuclear forces that were or would be assigned to NATO. In 1963 this consisted of U.S. and U.K. forces specifically committed to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. It was an evolutionary development in NATO rather than a new departure such as the MLF, but French disdain was a common factor. The size and composition of these forces were still evolving at the end of 1963.

France

French-U.S. relations during the Kennedy administration were dominated by the strong personality of President de Gaulle. The relationship suffered particularly because of differing perceptions of France's role as a nuclear power, the configuration of a unified Europe, and the French demand for trilateral consultations with the British on the world situation.

The first 6 months of 1961 set the tone for the remainder of the period as France continually urged the United States to establish a U.S.-U.K.-French consultative machinery, an idea that it had espoused since 1958. (223–225) While willing to engage in close consultations of this kind, the Kennedy administration refused to formalize trilateral discussions because it feared repercussions within the NATO Alliance, especially from Germany and Italy. The United States maintained this position throughout the period.

Tripartitism was not raised in the talks between President Kennedy and President de Gaulle during the former's visit to Paris May 31–June 2, 1961, but the differences between the two

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countries were generally aired in a frank but cordial series of conversations. The rather considerable disagreements over the continuing interest and presence of the United States in Europe came to the fore as did the disparity in the perceptions of the value of the French nuclear deterrent. (230)

The problem of French nuclear forces and U.S. assistance to them were also an irritant in the bilateral relationship. The U.S. position had been under review before the President went to Paris. Ambassador Gavin argued that the U.S. policy of not aiding the French nuclear program should be reconsidered. (227) On some specifics Secretary of Defense McNamara supported this position, but in general the Departments of State and Defense and the White House insisted on preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. (229) This was the U.S. position throughout the Kennedy administration, although after the meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau in December 1962, the United States did offer France nuclear-capable Polaris submarines. (262) President de Gaulle declined even this offer of assistance. (263)

Scores of other problems frequently surfaced during meetings between President Kennedy and visiting French officials. National Assembly President Chaban-Delmas in March 1961 (225), former Premier Faure in February 1962 (240), Minister of State Malraux in May 1962 (24), and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville twice in 1963 (271, 275) all stressed French sensitivity to the U.S. position on questions like Algeria, Tunisia, and disarmament. The United States on the other hand considered particularly irritating French refusal to pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union on Berlin.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the relationship was encumbered only by tensions and disagreements. In April 1961 President Kennedy warmly congratulated de Gaulle on foiling the coup attempt in Algeria (226), and in November 1962 de Gaulle sent his congratulations on the U.S. handling of the Cuban missile crisis. (261) Even de Gaulle's veto of the British application for membership in the EC and refusal to accept Polaris submarines in January 1963, events that caused great consternation in the United States and resulted in high-level discussions that McGeorge Bundy described as "stiff," could not hide the fact that U.S. and French interests generally coincided. Although the relationship generated a great deal of

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friction on many specific issues, the Soviet threat was sufficient to overcome scores of tactical differences.

Italy

The issue of the entry of the Italian Socialist Party into a governing coalition dominated relations between the United States and Italy during the years 1961–1963. Both Italian supporters and opponents of the "Opening to the Left" sought the public backing of the Kennedy administration for their respective positions. The U.S. Government was also divided on the question of the impact of the "opening" on Italian foreign and domestic policy. The Department of State advocated that the United States maintain a position of non-involvement. (282, 296) But Presidential Adviser Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., proposed vigorous backing for the "opening." (283)

President Kennedy adopted the policy favored by the Department of State, declining to become involved in an essentially internal Italian political matter. In their private talks with Italian officials, U.S. representatives, however, definitely stressed the need for the Italian Socialist Party to commit itself clearly to supporting NATO prior to entering a governing coalition. The ruling Christian Democratic Party fully agreed with the United States on this position. Ultimately the "Opening to the Left" took place on terms negotiated between the Italian political parties and included an unambiguous Socialist commitment to NATO.

Italy's role as a key member of the NATO Alliance was reinforced by negotiations with the United States over the replacement of land-based Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles by seaborne Polaris missiles and discussions over the creation of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF). Italian officials supported both initiatives, but expressed concern over the timing of the Jupiter replacement program and about certain technical aspects of the MLF. (310) Exchanges between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Fanfani and President Segni helped to clarify the issues in a manner satisfactory to both sides. (284, 312, 315, 318)

Personal diplomacy also played a large role in U.S.-Italian relations. Prime Minister Fanfani visited the United States in June 1961 (284–286) and January 1963 (312–314) for talks with the President and senior U.S. officials. President Kennedy made a State visit to Italy in July 1963. (318–320) During these visits Italian and U.S. officials conducted wide-ranging discussions on

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international political, economic, and military topics. The Kennedy visit to Italy also enabled the President to meet with the major figures in opposition, including the Socialist Party leader, Pietro Nenni.

Portugal

The question of Portugal's territorial possessions dominated relations with the United States in the early 1960s. In March 1961 the new Kennedy administration instructed Ambassador Elbrick to approach Prime Minister Salazar and urge him to make "major adjustments" in Portuguese overseas policy to avoid increasing criticism within the United Nations. (324) On June 18, NSAM No. 60 confirmed this policy. (327) Despite this pressure Portugal showed no inclination to accommodate the United States, and the increasing tension between India and Portugal over Goa sparked a lively debate between Ambassadors Elbrick and Galbraith over the proper policy to follow in attempting to defuse the situation. (331–333) This discussion became moot in December when India invaded Goa.

Although Goa ceased to be an issue at the end of 1961, the question of the remaining Portuguese colonies continued to exacerbate relations with the United States in 1962 and 1963. The Portuguese Ambassador to the United States, Portugal's Representatives at the United Nations, and its Foreign Minister accused the United States of assisting rebels in Angola, or of not helping to defeat resolutions critical of Portugal in the United Nations, charges repeatedly denied by the United States.

Relations reached their nadir at the end of July 1963, when Under Secretary of State Harriman, acting on instructions from President Kennedy, called in the Portuguese Ambassador and informed him that the President was outraged by the accusation that the United States was behind the most recent U.N. resolution on Portugal's overseas territories. (352)

Following this, the President sent Under Secretary of State Ball to Lisbon in order to explore personally with Salazar relations between the two countries, particularly the problems raised by Portugal's colonial possessions in Africa. Ball spent August 29 and 30 and September 6 and 7 in talks with the Prime Minister and other leading Portuguese officials. (356–358) These conversations contributed to some improvement in U.S.-Portuguese relations.

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The friction generated by the problem of overseas territories endangered the renewal of U.S. base rights in the Azores. Renewal of the 1953 base agreement had become so problematical by the summer of 1963, that on July 31 President Kennedy asked Secretary of Defense McNamara to develop contingency plans for the eventual loss of the base. (353) However, by the end of 1963, Portugal had granted a temporary extension of the agreement.

Spain

U.S. relations with Spain during 1961–1963 were generally amicable, featuring Secretary of State Rusk's visit to Madrid in 1961 and the extension of agreements on bases and military assistance in 1963. Conversations between U.S. and Spanish officials early in 1961 emphasized that relations between the two countries had steadily improved during the 1950s, and this perception was confirmed during Rusk's visit to Spain on December 16 when he talked for 1-1/2 hours with General Franco. The conversation consisted mainly of a tour d'horizon, and the atmosphere was cordial. (366)

Preparations and discussions of the bases and military assistance agreements consumed most of 1962 and 1963. By the spring of 1963 U.S. efforts had solicited no specifics for the terms of extension, but merely a Spanish expression for undefined concessions. On May 27, 1963, NSAM No. 247 asked the Secretaries of State and Defense to report on the military and political necessity of maintaining the bases and what price should be paid if total or partial retention of them was necessary. (374) Their joint report on June 16 stressed the need to maintain the bases and the hope that military assistance alone would be sufficient payment. (375) Following the delivery of a 64-page memorandum of Spanish desiderata on July 22, negotiations began in Washington and reached accord on a Joint Declaration and exchange of notes on September 26, extending the bases agreement and providing for further military assistance.

United Kingdom

Frequent meetings between the Heads of State characterized the relations between the United States and the United Kingdom during the Kennedy administration. Defense and economic questions dominated these Anglo-American discussions, although by 1963 the scandals that rocked the British Government

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had also become an issue. Conversations on other problems not specifically bilateral in nature are mentioned in this compilation, but documentation on U.S.-U.K. discussions of issues like Berlin, disarmament, and Laos is presented in other volumes.

Beginning in April 1961 (381) Prime Minister Macmillan and his successor Lord Home visited Washington at least once every year. In December 1961 (387) and 1962 (402–404) President Kennedy and the Prime Minister also met at Bermuda. In June, following his summit meeting with Soviet Chairman Khrushchev at Vienna, and in the summer of 1963, as part of his trip to Europe, Kennedy visited London. These meetings generated an enormous number of talking points and briefing papers on every topic that might arise, and both sides found the exchanges at the meetings beneficial in resolving problems, clarifying positions, and understanding the other's point of view.

Because of these frequent meetings a cordial relationship developed between Kennedy and Macmillan that belied their age differences and differing appreciations of some questions. In addition to these meetings, the President and the Prime Minister exchanged nearly 300 letters and messages, a correspondence duplicated by Secretary Rusk and his counterparts. The President and the Prime Minister also talked by telephone on many occasions. All these contacts contributed to a "special relationship."

Defense issues were the major bone of contention between the two countries during the Kennedy Presidency. In the face of the increasing Soviet threat, the United States expanded its defense budget and military commitments around the world and expected its allies to take similar measures. But financial difficulties forced the British to curtail their global commitments and realize cuts in their defense budget. As early as February 1962, President Kennedy raised the question of these cutbacks with the Prime Minister and expressed his deep concern at their consequences for Western defense. (389) But the most significant defense issue with the British was whether the United States should continue development of the Sky Bolt missile in order to help the United Kingdom.

Following the cancellation of its ICBM (Blue Streak) in 1960, the United Kingdom had relied for its defense on long-range bombers and the expectation that the United States would sell it Sky Bolt missiles when they came into production. By the fall of 1962, however, Secretary of Defense McNamara began to

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have second thoughts about the development of Sky Bolt because of rising costs and dubious test performances. In November he informed the United Kingdom along these lines, but made it clear that alternatives to the missile were available. (399)

When McNamara visited London in December, cancellation of the missile had become known, and the British demanded to know what would be substituted for it. (401) At their Nassau meeting later in the month the President and the Prime Minister worked out a deal that provided Polaris submarines to the British, an offer that was also extended to France. The Nassau conversations are the capstone of this compilation. (402–404)

Canada

U.S. relations with Canada during the Kennedy administration began on a happy note with the visit of Prime Minister Diefenbaker to Washington in February 1961, but questions about North American defense and accusations of U.S. interference in the domestic Canadian political scene produced growing tension between the two countries, which was only dissolved by the victory of the Liberal Party in the 1963 election.

Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker became the first Head of State to visit the White House following President Kennedy's inauguration. In a series of wide-ranging conversations on February 20, 1961, they discussed the world situation and topics specific to U.S.-Canadian relations, and the President agreed to visit Ottawa. (418) In his analysis of the meeting Ambassador Merchant told the President how pleased the Canadians were with the results, and the President in turn told Merchant how much he liked the Prime Minister. (419) The President's return visit to Ottawa in May 1961 was equally successful. (421–425)

The amicable relations generated by the exchange of visits soon became overshadowed by differing perceptions in Washington and Ottawa on the nature of North American defense. At the beginning of 1962 Ambassador Merchant pointed out that the single outstanding problem between the United States and Canada was the latter's failure to face up to the question of nuclear warheads, both their acquisition and storage. (429) The Prime Minister's remarks to Parliament on the subject on February 27 led to increasing tension between the two countries and to a threat by Diefenbaker to make public a U.S. document on the objectives of the President's 1961 visit to Canada, which had mistakenly been left behind by the U.S. delegation. This

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problem was resolved at a meeting between Merchant and the Prime Minister on May 13, 1962, at which Diefenbaker retracted his threat. (435) This convinced the American Ambassador that the crisis in U.S.-Canadian relations had passed.

Merchant's sanguine analysis did not stand the test of time. Diefenbaker was annoyed at the short shrift given to Canada in the consultations during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 (441), and in another address to the House of Commons on January 25, 1963, he badly distorted the course of U.S.-Canadian negotiations on the control and storage of nuclear weapons in Canada. His address forced the United States to issue a press statement giving its version of the talks, which was sharply at issue with the Prime Minister's. (444)

The question of defense immediately became part of Canadian politics and the foremost issue in the 1963 national elections. The resulting victory of the Liberal Party, led by Lester Pearson, and his meetings with President Kennedy on May 10 and with President Johnson on November 25, 1963, helped return U.S.-Canadian relations to a more amicable state. (449, 454)

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Summary of Print Volume XIV

Following is a summary of the contents of print volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962. Parenthetical citations are to numbered documents in the text. Volume XIV, published in 1994, is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

The crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union over Berlin had persisted since November 1958. On January 28, 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned President Kennedy that the Soviet Union would be returning to the Berlin question. (2) The Soviets first raised the issue when Premier Nikita Khrushchev discussed it at some length with Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson on March 9. (8) On this occasion, Khrushchev reiterated his desire to sign peace treaties with the two Germanies and the United States and stressed that such treaties would mark a great improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Thompson replied that the new administration was still studying the problem, but would have to consult with its Allies before reaching any conclusions.

Discussions with the Allies proceeded in March, April, and May, while at the same time U.S. officials tried to develop contingency plans to anticipate a crisis over the city. Following the agreement for a Khrushchev–Kennedy summit meeting in Vienna, the United States finally completed a position paper on Berlin. (26) Formulated as a paper for the summit meeting, this document, PMK–B/1, May 25, recommended that the President tell Khrushchev that the new administration had been studying the problem, but it was difficult to see how basic changes could be made. The situation in Berlin was "abnormal" because the situation in Germany was "abnormal." One problem could not be solved without solving the other, and the Soviet Union and the United States held widely differing views on a solution to the German question. The paper concluded that it was "absolutely vital" for the Soviet Union to understand the paramount importance of Berlin to the United States. French President Charles de Gaulle seconded this policy in conversations with the President on May 31, when Kennedy visited Paris on his way to the Vienna summit. (30–31)

At the Vienna summit on June 4, Khrushchev told the President that the Soviet Union wanted to draw a line under World War II by signing a peace treaty. He preferred to do this with

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the Western Allies and both Germanies, but if the West demurred, he would sign with the German Democratic Republic alone. This would invalidate all commitments and rights stemming from Germany's surrender, including the Western rights of occupation in Berlin. (32) In response Kennedy told the Premier that the United States was not in Berlin at Soviet or East German sufferance, but by contractual rights. If the United States were expelled from the city, no one would have confidence in U.S. commitments anywhere. The United States could not agree to East Germany exercising Western rights in the city. Nor would it accept a Soviet ultimatum or agree to unilateral Soviet abrogation of Four-Power agreements. Finally, a peace treaty denying U.S. rights in Berlin would be considered a belligerent act. A second conversation on June 4 only brought reiteration of these positions with Khrushchev maintaining that the Soviet decision to sign a peace treaty was "firm and irrevocable." (33) The Soviet view was formalized in an aide-mémoire delivered to the U.S. delegation that day.

Following the summit, the Western Allies began to draft a reply to the aide-mémoire, and the United States began consideration of steps that would strengthen its position in Berlin. The process of preparing a reply continued through the rest of June before three similar, but not identical, replies were agreed. The White House, however, found the Department of State draft unsatisfactory, and the President asked Theodore Sorensen to prepare a shorter, less legalistic reply. (54) Delivery of this draft was further delayed by the need to consult with the NATO Allies, and it was not presented to the Soviet Union until July 17. (73)

On another front, contingency planning for the Berlin crisis began at an interdepartmental coordinating group meeting on June 16. At this meeting, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy D. Kohler informed the participants that the West was facing a new crisis over Berlin and that the President had asked former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to prepare a study on contingency planning. Acheson believed that only a hard line would deter the Russians and that a military build-up and determination to use nuclear weapons were necessary. (42) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and General Norstad, the Supreme Commander, Europe, supported his views. (44, 47, 48)

Acheson submitted his formal study on contingency planning to the President on June 28. It reviewed the nature of the

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problem; stated that the United States must convince the Soviet Union that it was "earnest" about defending Berlin; and suggested military, economic, and political steps that could be taken immediately and for the long term. Finally it discussed what Soviet actions would constitute a casus belli. (49) The National Security Council considered the study the following day and, based on its discussion, ordered the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Treasury to prepare detailed reports on the specifics of Acheson's study. (52, 53)

But the White House believed that these initial efforts were not sufficient. On July 7, the President's Special Assistant, Arthur Schlesinger, sent him a memorandum pointing out issues that Acheson had not addressed. (57) The next day, the President voiced his dissatisfaction with the state of contingency planning and asked the State Department to prepare a political program for Berlin and the Defense Department to produce a plan in case access to the city was denied. (63) A meeting of the NSC on July 13 helped to focus the discussion of contingency planning. (66, 67)

Secretary of State Rusk submitted the political program, "Outline on Germany and Berlin," on July 17. This paper described the vital U.S. interests in Berlin, postulated what the Soviet Union wanted from the crisis, and concluded that the United States must undertake "action on a broad front to convince Khrushchev of U.S. and Western determination to defend these vital interests at all costs." A paper on the military build-up, attached to the outline, proposed a "low key" approach, avoiding mobilization for the time being. (71) The President approved the outline the same day. (72)

While these developments were taking place, the President began work on an address to the American people. Kennedy outlined the points that he would make in this speech in letters to German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and French President Charles de Gaulle on July 20. (79) At 10 p.m. on July 25, the President addressed the nation, first reviewing the course of events since the summit meeting, then stressing the grave nature of the threat to Berlin, and finally summarizing the military steps the United States would take to meet the crisis. (81) Not surprisingly the tone of the address provoked an angry reaction from Khrushchev who, in a "strong emotional tone," stated that the United States had "declared preliminary war" on the Soviet Union. (84)

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At the end of July, Secretary of State Rusk prepared to take the U.S. position on Berlin to Europe for discussions with his British, French, and German counterparts. At a meeting on August 3, he told the President that he hoped to reach agreement on a military build-up, complete preparations for economic sanctions in the event of a blockade of Berlin, and coordinate a NATO propaganda effort in support of the Western position on the city. (92) Assistant Secretary of State Kohler preceded Rusk to Europe heading the U.S. delegation to a Four-Power working group which met August 2–4. It succeeded in hammering out a report to the Foreign Ministers that outlined Soviet intentions and reached general agreement on opening negotiations with the Soviet Union before it signed a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic. The working group also reached a consensus for a total embargo of the Soviet Union in the event of a blockade, but no agreement was achieved on military contingency planning. (93)

The Foreign Ministers considered the working group report in quadripartite meetings at Paris August 5 and 6. (94–98) Rusk reported to the President that he was gratified at the "demonstration of unity and seriousness of purpose" achieved in the meetings. (99) On August 8, the Foreign Ministers recorded their agreement in a seven-point paper that called for negotiations with the Soviet Union, endorsed a progressive military build-up of Western forces, called for a further examination of economic sanctions with particular attention to the difference between an embargo and blockade of the Soviet Union, and instructed a Quadripartite Ambassadorial Steering Group to "put into precise form the sequence of governmental decisions required in the course of the developing crisis over Berlin." (101)

On the morning of August 13, the German Democratic Republic introduced control measures restricting or closing access to East Berlin from West Berlin. The barbed wire and other obstacles used to effect the closing eventually became the "Berlin Wall." Since allied contingency planning had focused on a blockade of access to Berlin, this move caught the Allies unprepared. (104) When written protests by the Western powers made no change in the situation, the President asked Secretary of State Rusk what could be done and how far the United States should push the issue. (109) At its meeting on August 15, the Berlin Steering Group recommended reinforcement of the Berlin garrison and psychological and propaganda campaigns in support of

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the city. (111) Secretary Rusk also proposed redeployment of U.S. forces in Berlin closer to the Brandenburg Gate. (116)

On August 17, Kennedy approved these measures as well as the dispatch to the city of Vice President Johnson and former Berlin Commandant General Lucius Clay to demonstrate U.S. defense of its rights in the city. (118) The President informed Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt of these decisions on the following day. (120) These measures proved highly successful in restoring the morale of the West Berliners, which had been badly shaken by the closing of the sector borders.

The unexpected isolation of West Berlin also prompted President Kennedy to ask Secretary of State Rusk for a report on contingency planning in the event the Soviet Union interfered with air access to the city, new contingencies arising from the division of the city, and action to be taken in the event of an East German revolt. (132) The reply to the first question coincided with a warning to the Soviet Chargé in Washington that interference with Western air access would be considered an aggressive act. (135, 136)

Early in September, however, the United States decided to investigate the possibility of negotiating a settlement on Berlin. At a meeting on September 12, the President approved a program for negotiations that proposed that Ambassador Thompson open the talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Moscow based on a Western peace plan. (147) Kennedy and Rusk then discussed the idea with the British, Germans, and French, with only the French questioning the wisdom of negotiating under duress. (151–153)

Having consulted with its Allies, the United States opened talks on Berlin with the Soviet Union at a meeting between Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York on September 22. In a conversation lasting nearly 3 hours, each side formulated at length its position on Germany and Berlin without deviating from previously outlined proposals. (156) A second meeting on September 27 continued the conversations with more probing for specific details of each side's position, but no new ideas were forthcoming. (160) In the third and final session in New York, Gromyko displayed some interest in fixing the borders of the two Germanies and in discussing the general question of European security. (164)

In summarizing the talks, U.S. officials told President Kennedy that the Soviet Union seemed willing to settle the access

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question if Germany's borders were recognized, the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic respected, and West Berlin became a free city. (169) Gromyko confirmed this analysis in a conversation with the President in Washington on October 6. Kennedy, however, told Gromyko that it was unacceptable to the United States since it meant "trading an apple for an orchard," that is, accepting Soviet demands without getting any satisfaction on Western desiderata. (170)

These conversations seemed to calm the situation in Berlin, but General Clay raised the possibility that the Friedrichstrasse crossing point into East Berlin might be closed, thus reviving tensions in the city. (178) On October 18, the Department of State instructed Clay on how to meet such a closing, including the use of force as an option. (180) Five days later, the East Germans tried to stop U.S. Minister Felix Lightner from entering the Soviet Zone without showing identification. On this occasion he proceeded anyway. (186) On October 29, however, he required an armed military escort when he left the U.S. Zone. It seemed that Berlin was about to explode.

Discussions with the Soviet Commandant for Berlin (192) and then with Gromyko in Moscow (194) were unable to resolve the crisis. By October 27, both the United States and the Soviet Union had moved tanks up to the checkpoint, and U.S. troops in Berlin were put on partial alert. (195) Both sides quickly moved back from the brink. Washington ordered a cessation of probes into East Berlin, and the Soviet tanks withdrew from the checkpoint during the morning of October 28. (196)

Apparently the explosive confrontation at the Friedrichstrasse had a sobering effect on both sides. For the next 2 months the United States held nearly continuous talks with its three Allies in an attempt to achieve an agreed Western position based on negotiations with the Soviet Union. The British were no problem, as they also pressed for negotiations believing it "was becoming rather dangerous to wait much longer." (206) But the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, advised him that the West Germans and the French were not convinced of the need to negotiate. (215)

Chancellor Adenauer made this reluctance clear to the President during his visit to Washington November 20–22, expressing his view that in such talks Moscow would call on the United States to make concessions without offering anything in return. (216, 218) The President and Secretary Rusk weighed in

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heavily for the need to clarify the Soviet position, and by the end of his visit the Chancellor reluctantly agreed to negotiations as long as the Western position in the talks was "as flexible as possible." (219)

The President took a more optimistic view of the outcome of his talks with Adenauer, telling Prime Minister Macmillan in a November 22 letter that the Chancellor was "clearly in favor of negotiations," and that he would do his best to convince President de Gaulle. (222) However, meetings of both Macmillan and Adenauer with de Gaulle did not change the French disinclination to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

When the four Western Foreign Ministers met at Paris December 10–12, they still had not agreed on the need for negotiations. At these meetings, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville stated bluntly that talks with the Soviets under pressure would be neither "realistic nor useful." (234, 236) He also maintained that Moscow would demand concessions on Germany and Berlin from the West, which would lead to German neutralization. Arguments to the contrary by his three colleagues failed to move him. In their final meeting on December 12, Couve modified his position somewhat, indicating that France would not object to the West taking "soundings" in Moscow, but France would not participate in them. (238) A personal telephone call from President Kennedy to President de Gaulle on the question produced no further concession. (239)

Armed with this qualified endorsement, the United States prepared to undertake talks with the Soviet Union and drafted an instruction for Ambassador Thompson. President Kennedy discussed the draft with Prime Minister Macmillan at their meeting in Bermuda on December 21. He said that the United States wanted to raise two points in the first meeting with Gromyko: 1) access and 2) the idea of an international access authority. When Macmillan asked whether the United States expected its approach to be successful, Ambassador Bohlen replied that the initial probe probably would not be. (243) Macmillan expressed strong support for negotiations, saying that the United Kingdom "would never go to war unless there had been negotiations first," but Secretary of State Rusk pointed out that the United States was not convinced that the Soviet Union even wanted to negotiate. During a second meeting the next day, no further changes were made in the instruction, and the President told the Prime Minister that he did not want to coordinate it

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with the French and Germans, since further discussion would only slow up the process. (244)

On December 28, the Department of State transmitted the 11-point instruction to Moscow, informing Thompson that it was meant to be the basis for engaging Gromyko in a series of discussions with the object of finding out whether and in what area a basis for negotiation could be found. Repeating what the President had told the Prime Minister, the focus of the first talk should be access to Berlin including the possibility of establishing an international access authority for the city. (248) In a telegram the next day, Rusk advised Thompson that the instruction offered little room for maneuver, but Washington wanted to show public opinion that it had made every effort to negotiate. (149)

In his meeting with Gromyko on January 2, 1962, Thompson made an almost literal presentation based on the instruction, but to no avail. (151) In his report to Washington, the Ambassador stated that there was no give in the Soviet position, but he was struck by the fact that Foreign Minister Gromyko seemed in no hurry to end the talks. (252) The Department of State transmitted new instructions to Thompson on January 9, this time including a draft charter for the access authority. (259)

At their second meeting 3 days later, Gromyko countered with a draft statute for a free city of Berlin including a protocol of guarantees for the city. (264) Thompson told him that this appeared to be a step backwards since the West had always opposed the idea of a free city, but each side agreed to study the other's proposals. In Washington the White House believed the conversations were getting nowhere. The President suggested it might be time to open them up to topics other than access (268), but Bundy told the National Security Council on January 17 that even though no progress had been made, it was wise to keep talking. (271)

Although the first two sessions were unproductive, the Department of State sent Thompson yet another set of instructions on January 29. Since virtually nothing had been agreed up to that point, the new ones instructed the Ambassador to put aside the unagreed questions and try to find common ground on practical matters, focusing in particular on the international access authority. (279) But the third meeting on February 1 was no more successful than the previous two (228), and Thompson

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advised Washington that the United States should wait for Gromyko to call the next one. (280)

Foreign Minister Gromyko renewed the talks on February 9 presenting Thompson with a 15-page declaration on Berlin. The ensuing conversation, focusing primarily on the Soviet idea of a free city, merely restated previous positions. (284) On February 12, Thompson commented that the declaration appeared to be drafted with an eye to publication and suggested that the United States draft a similar document. (288) Although the meetings in Moscow had now degenerated into a "formalistic ritual," the Department of State instructed Thompson on March 1 to try one more time. The fifth meeting 5 days later produced no agreement, and the Ambassador cabled that he expected no more talks in Moscow. (314)

While the conversations in Moscow were proceeding, the Soviet Union turned up the heat in Berlin by interfering with Western air access to the city. Beginning on February 7, the Soviet controller at the Berlin Air Safety Center announced that the Southern air corridor would be reserved the following day for Soviet flights. (281) This threat to access brought an immediate Western response with the White House approving General Clay's idea to send two military flights through the corridor. (285) Although similar Soviet announcements on the following days failed to disrupt regular air service to Berlin, they kept the heat on. (289) By February 14, Clay was recommending fighter escorts for all civilian flights, but approval was only given to orbit Western fighters at the entry to the corridors. (291)

On the same day, the Soviet Union upped the ante. Following threatening statements about the corridors, it increased the number of its fighters flying in them. (293) Soviet attempts to preempt air space continued throughout the month with Clay requesting authority for stronger reactions to each incident. (307) Because of the seriousness of the situation, Thompson was instructed to tell Gromyko that Soviet efforts to alter established procedures in the Berlin air corridors "threatened to create a highly dangerous situation." (309) Gromyko, however, insisted that the West had created the tension in the air corridors. (314)

The question of unrestricted Western air access to Berlin remained unresolved by mid-March 1962, the period covered by this volume. Volume XV documents the resolution of the issue through 1963.

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Summary of Print Volume XV

Following is a summary of the contents of print volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963. Parenthetical citations are to numbered documents in the text. Volume XV, published in 1994, is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

As Secretary of State Rusk prepared to go to Geneva on March 10, 1962, for a meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, President Kennedy instructed him to draw out Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on the Soviet policy toward the West. On Berlin the President authorized Secretary of State Rusk to table a draft modus vivendi on the city even though he had reservations about some of its particulars, which he believed "might shock our Allies." (1) To prevent a split with the Western allies, Rusk was to brief them orally on its provisions.

In his first meeting with Gromyko at Geneva on March 12, Rusk began to unfold the proposal. Although Gromyko reiterated the Soviet position on Berlin, he commented that the idea of establishing some general principles for Berlin was a new concept that might prove to be the first step toward reaching an agreement. (8) At a meeting the next day, Rusk continued to develop the modus vivendi, and Gromyko still showed interest in it. (10) On March 19, Gromyko handed Rusk a Soviet paper on "General Principles" that might be applicable to a Berlin settlement. Rusk characterized them as essentially a restatement of the basic Soviet positions on Germany and Berlin. In a telegram to the President that day Rusk reported his "deep regret" at the lack of progress. (17)

Further discussions on March 20 and 22 brought no narrowing of the differences between the two sides, but on March 23 Rusk informed President Kennedy that Gromyko showed no inclination to break off the talks. (22) A final unproductive meeting on March 26 brought this phase of the negotiations on Berlin to a close. Two days later Rusk reported to the National Security Council (NSC) on the Geneva talks, stating that although the United States and the Soviet Union were no closer to an agreement on Berlin, there had been a change in the tone of the talks, which had been "courteous and sober." (29)

On April 7 President Kennedy approved a revised Berlin paper and discussion of it with the Western Allies. (32) Almost

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immediately resistance came from the Federal Republic of Germany, which opposed the idea of an International Access Authority (IAA) for Berlin, the idea of mixed East and West German commissions, and the fact that the paper seemed to register only disagreements on the status of Berlin. (35) The paper was leaked to the press in Bonn, setting off a crisis in U.S.-West German relations. On April 14, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Kohler called in the West German Ambassador and informed him that the leak was a serious problem that had shocked both the President and the Secretary of State. (36, 38)

To calm the troubled waters, Chancellor Adenauer sent Heinrich von Brentano, the majority leader in the Bundestag, to Washington. At a meeting with the President on March 30, Brentano expressed regret over the leak, and the President tried to explain the difficulties it had created in trying to negotiate with the Soviet Union. He told Brentano that if the United States and the Federal Republic could not agree on Berlin, it would be impossible to proceed with further talks with the Soviet Union. He ended the meeting by suggesting that Brentano and Kohler go over the U.S. paper in detail. (44) Their meeting and other discussions that Brentano had with U.S. officials revealed the continuing extreme West German concern about the IAA and the mixed commissions. (46) The situation was finally resolved at a meeting between Chancellor Adenauer and U.S. Ambassador Dowling at Bonn on May 14, and sealed by an exchange of letters between the President and the Chancellor on May 16 and 25. (53, 58)

Following resolution of the U.S.-West German rift, Secretary of State Rusk called in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on May 30 to review the Berlin situation. As on previous occasions, Dobrynin focused on the elimination of the occupation regime in West Berlin and the need for the West to recognize the German Democratic Republic, while Rusk asked the Ambassador to take another look at the U.S. proposals made at Geneva. (59) After consulting with Moscow, Dobrynin met again with Rusk on June 18 and, reading from a prepared statement, informed the Secretary that the United States had merely repeated its previous position without taking into account Soviet concessions. Rusk countered that the Soviet Union had done the same thing and said he found it difficult to understand why Moscow attached such importance to the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. The meeting concluded without any progress. (64)

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A conversation between Dobrynin and John J. McCloy on July 3 proceeded along similar lines. (72) Two days later Chairman Khrushchev sent President Kennedy a letter nagging him for failing to react positively to the various proposals and concessions offered by the Soviet Union. (73)

On July 12, Dobrynin returned to the charge, again proposing the abolition of the occupation regime in West Berlin and recognition of the German Democratic Republic, but adding a U.N. mandate for West Berlin that would eventually disappear leaving West Berlin as a free city. While Secretary Rusk did not comment in detail on the new Soviet proposals, he told the Ambassador that they seemed to be merely a variation on the old theme of eliminating any Western presence in Berlin. (76) President Kennedy expanded on this U.S. reaction in his reply to Khrushchev's July 5 letter. Writing to the Chairman on July 17, the President noted that Dobrynin's plan ran directly contrary to the position and prestige of the United States. (78)

Two further meetings between Gromyko and Rusk in Geneva on July 22 and 24 produced no movement. (83, 85, 86) The United States then broached the possibility of a deputy Foreign Ministers conference on Berlin, an idea that Dobrynin rejected on August 13. (94) At the end of the month, in response to several incidents in Berlin, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, noted that the Berlin question seemed to be warming up and might get worse. (103) President Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, and other key advisers discussed this appreciation on August 29 and concluded that the West must reduce any Soviet presence in West Berlin in order to dampen the growing tension. (107) Accordingly the Department of State instructed the U.S. Mission in Berlin to proceed slowly toward controlling and eliminating Soviet movement in West Berlin. (108)

In the fall of 1962, the Cuban missile crisis eclipsed Berlin as the primary focus of U.S. foreign policy. Secretary of State Rusk's meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations on October 6 provided the forum for a general review of U.S. and Soviet positions on the city, but neither side advanced any new ideas. (129) A conversation between Chairman Khrushchev and Ambassador Kohler in Moscow 10 days later proved equally uneventful (133), as did Gromyko's discussions with President Kennedy and Rusk in Washington on October 18 at the very moment that the Cuban crisis began. (135, 136)

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By October 23, as the Cuban crisis deepened, U.S. policymakers began to consider the possibility that the Soviet Union might blockade Berlin in retaliation for the U.S. blockade of Cuba. (139) On that day the Executive Committee of the NSC established a Berlin-NATO Subcommittee to focus on the relationship between Cuba and Berlin. In a series of papers drafted at the end of the month, the subcommittee explored possible Soviet moves in Berlin and the Western reaction to them, focusing primarily on the rapid deployment of forces in the face of any Soviet countermeasures. (142, 143)

By the end of the month, however, policymakers concluded that it was becoming less likely that the Soviet Union would "push hard on Berlin to offset their Cuban losses." (144) But President Kennedy also realized that Berlin was a potential tinderbox, and on October 29 he tasked the subcommittee with drafting alternative solutions to the Berlin problem. (146) The subcommittee's report attempted to evaluate the new elements in the Berlin situation following the Cuban crisis and suggested that the Soviet Union was likely to initiate diplomatic and political measures to counter the effect of its backdown in Cuba. (149)

Events did not bear out the subcommittee's evaluation. For the next few months, Berlin remained undisturbed as Soviet foreign policy went through a period of reassessment. U.S.-Soviet conversations on the subject in November and December revealed that the Soviet Union continued to adhere to previous positions on Berlin and Germany, but showed no interest in exacerbating the situation in the city. (152, 158, 159) In a letter to President Kennedy on December 11, Khrushchev reiterated that Berlin was still the main question, called for its resolution, but issued no threats or ultimatums. (162)

The new year saw the resumption of more substantive talks on the city when Foreign Minister Gromyko told Ambassador Kohler that he assumed the United States was still interested in discussing the question. (170) This approach was followed by a formal proposal on January 26 for resumption of U.S.-Soviet talks. (171) U.S. policymakers, however, were in no hurry to respond to this overture. President Kennedy worried about its impact on France and West Germany, but Secretary Rusk argued that talks "were necessary if only to keep the Berlin situation under control." (175) A compromise was reached when Kohler was instructed not to reply to Gromyko until further soundings had been taken with the Germans.

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After securing West German support for renewed talks, Kohler met with Gromyko on February 25 for an hour with both sides expressing the desire to reach an agreement on Berlin. (179) Further conversations continued at a leisurely pace in Moscow and Washington, but no resolution could be found to the problem of maintaining Western forces in West Berlin. By early summer, against a background of easing tension in Berlin, even these talks ceased.

The Berlin question remained quiet during the summer and fall of 1963. The signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August ushered in a period of calm in U.S.-Soviet relations that was reflected in the easing of tensions in Berlin. Even the occasional harassment of U.S. convoys transiting the German Democratic Republic failed to disturb the situation.

While Secretary of State Rusk was in Moscow at the beginning of August for the signing of the Test Ban Treaty, he discussed Berlin with both Chairman Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Gromyko. Both sides recognized that the question of Germany and Berlin was fundamental to relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but Rusk stressed that over the past year the tensions in Central Europe had declined, a view that Soviet officials did not dispute. At their final meeting on August 9, Khrushchev suggested that the Berlin question be put aside since he did not believe that his and Rusk's efforts "would be sufficient to resolve the problem." (204, 207, 208)

In October, the now annual conversations between Rusk and Gromyko at the United Nations and between Gromyko and President Kennedy in Washington continued the discussion of Berlin in a frank, but reasonable atmosphere without threats or ultimatums. On October 3, Gromyko asked Rusk about the possibility of interim arrangements or a fresh look at the problem. (216) One week later he rhetorically asked the President what steps the Soviet Union should take after the signing of the Test Ban Treaty, and answered that the first of these should be a solution to the Berlin problem. The ensuing discussion indicated that no change had taken place in the Soviet position, and Kennedy repeated U.S. evaluation that the situation had eased over the past months. The President concluded the discussion by assuring Gromyko that the United States would continue to seek a solution to the question. (219)

The harassment of U.S. convoys going to Berlin at the end of October provided a brief flurry of activity, but did not seri-

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ously raise the temperature in Berlin. (234, 235, 237) The year ended with Chancellor Erhard's visit to the LBJ Ranch where conversations on December 28 and 29 showed that relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany remained close. (248–251, 254)

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List of Documents

No.	Document Description

Western Europe

May 1961

1 Telegram Secto 15 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 8. Agenda item I—review of international situation. Secret; Priority. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-OS/5-861.

2 Telegram Secto 19 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 9. Agenda item I—review of international situation. Secret; Niact. 11 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-OS/5-961.

3 Telegram Secto 29 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 10. Agenda item I—review of international situation. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-OS/5-1061.

4 Telegram Secto 30 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 10. Agenda item I—review of international situation. Secret; Niact. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-OS/5-1061.

5 Telegram Secto 31 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 10. Agenda item II—annual political appraisal: discussion of Sixes and Sevens. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-OS/5-1061.

6 Telegram Secto 32 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 10. Agenda item III—long-term planning. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-OS/5-1061.

7 Telegram Secto 33 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 10. Agenda item III—long-term planning. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-OS/5-1061.

8 Telegram Secto 34 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 10. Agenda item III—long-term planning: summary of Rusk's statement. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-OS/5-1061.

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No.	Document Description
9	Telegram Secto 44 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 10. Agenda item III—long-term planning. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1860.
10	Telegram Secto 45 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 10. Agenda item IV—special economic problems of Greece and Turkey. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-OS/5-1061.
December 1961	
11	Telegram Polto 787 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 13. Agenda item I—East-West relations and Berlin. Secret; Limit Distribution. 9 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1361.
12	Telegram Polto 788 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 14. Agenda item I-A—Berlin. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. 7 pp. DOS, Conference Files, Lot 65 D 366, CF 2007.
13	Telegram Polto 789 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 14. Agenda item I-B—review of international situation. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1461.
14	Telegram Polto 793 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 14. Agenda item I-B—review of international situation. Secret; Priority. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1461.
15	Telegram Polto 792 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 14. Highlights of NAC discussion of agenda item II—military questions. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 375/12-1461.
16	Circular telegram Polto 73 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 14. Agenda item II-A-3—intelligence briefing by McNamara and analysis of military implications resulting therefrom. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1561.
17	Telegram Polto 791 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 14. Report of very grave leak of McNamara's intelligence briefing. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1461.

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No.	Document Description
May 1962	
18	Telegram 1195 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 4. Summary of disucssion at Defense Ministers May 3 meeting. Secret. 9 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-AT/5-462.
19	Telegram Secto 40 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 5. Review of international situation: East-West relations. Secret. 11 pp. DOS, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2104.
20	Telegram Secto 36 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 5. Agenda item I—review of international situation. Secret; Priority. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-AT/5-562.
21	Telegram Secto 43 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 6. Agenda item I—review of international situation. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-AT/5-562.
22	Telegram Secto 56 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 6. Agenda item I—review of international situation. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-AT/5-662.
23	Telegram Secto 59 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 6. Discussion of Secretary General's annual political appraisal. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-AT/5-662.
24	Telegram Secto 58 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 6. Proposed Institute of Science and Technology. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-AT/5-662.
25	Telegram Secto 60 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 6. Not declassified. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-AT/5-662.
26	Telegram Secto 83 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 6. Agenda item III—special problems of the less-developed member countries: Greece and Turkey. Confidential; Niact. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-AT/5-662.

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No.	Document Description
December 1962	
27	Memorandum of conversation among the President, Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy, December 10. Review before NATO meeting of Skybolt, the Azores, and the multilateral deterrent. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President.
28	Telegram Polto 691 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 14. First session—Cuban crisis, arms control, Berlin. Confidential. 9 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1462.
29	Airgram CA-6800 to the Embassies in the NATO capitals, December 21. Rusk's December 13 remarks to NATO Ministerial meeting. Secret. 14 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-2162.
30	Telegram Polto 692 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 14. Second session—Cuban crisis and aftereffects. Confidential. 10 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1462.
31	Telegram Polto 697 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15. Text not declassified. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1562.
32	Telegram Polto 698 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15. Third session discussion—agenda item II—military questions. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1562.
33	Airgram CA-7291 to Embassies in NATO Countries, January 10. Rusk's December 14 remarks to NATO Ministerial Meeting. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/1-1063.
34	Telegram Polto 700 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15. Fourth session—political discussion. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1562.
35	Telegram Polto 699 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15. Fourth session—agenda item II—military questions. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1562.

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No.	Document Description
36	Telegram Polto 703 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15. Fifth session—final issues and communiqué. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-PA/12-1562.
February 1963	
37	Bruce Report, February 9. Discussion of U.S. objectives in Europe, obstacles to attaining these objectives, U.S. strategy required to overcome these obstacles, and tactical steps to carry forward this strategy. Secret. 10 pp. DOS, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265.
May 1963	
38	Telegram Secto 8 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 23. First session—defense policy. Confidential. 7 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 CAN(OT).
39	Telegram Secto 12 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 23. Second session—defense questions. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 CAN(OT).
40	Telegram Secto 13 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 23. Rusk's remarks to meeting. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 CAN(OT).
41	Telegram Secto 14 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 24. Erkin (Turkey) and Home (U.K.) remarks to meeting. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 CAN(OT).
42	Telegram Secto 17 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 24. Review of international situation. Confidential. 8 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 CAN(OT).
43	Telegram Secto 18 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 24. Secretary General summing up and adoption of final communiqué. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 CAN(OT).
44	Memorandum of telephone conversation, May 27, between McGeorge Bundy and Rusk. Multilateral force (MLF). No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 92.
45	Memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, May 27. MLF and letter to Macmillan. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, MLF.

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December 1963

46 Telegram Secto 5 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15. Rusk's December 14 interview with Secretary General Stikker. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 FR(PA).

47 Telegram Polto 864 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 17. First session—East-West negotiations. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 FR(PA).

48 Circular telegram Polto 49 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 17. Second session—international situation. Confidential. 10 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 FR(PA).

49 Telegram Polto Circular 50 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 17. Third session—military questions. Secret; Priority. 8 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 FR(PA).

50 Telegram Polto Circular 51 from the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 17. Military questions. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 FR(PA).

51 Airgram CA-6354 to the Embassies in the NATO capitals, December 20. Rusk and McNamara's remarks at NATO Ministerial meeting, December 17. Top Secret. 12 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 FR(PA).

52 Airgram CA-6352 to the Embassies in the NATO capitals, December 20. Rusk's remarks to NATO Ministerial Meeting and final communiqué. Secret. 14 pp. DOS, CF, NATO 3 FR(PA).

Berlin

January 1961

53 Memorandum from Stoessel to Brig. Gen. Goodpaster, January 18. Encloses briefing paper on Berlin for Eisenhower's meeting with President-elect Kennedy. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 711.11-KE/1-1861.

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No.	Document Description

February 1961

54 Memorandum from McGhee to Kohler, February 27. Assignment to prepare report for the President on the political and military aspects of the Berlin crisis and a position on Germany for possible four-power negotiations. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.00/2-2761.

March 1961

55 Memorandum of conversation, March 8. Meeting of Four-Power Working Group on Germany including Berlin. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/3-861.

56 Telegram 1414 from Bonn, March 8. Report from Harriman on his meeting with Adenauer. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only for President and Secretary. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 611.62A/3-861.

57 Memorandum of conversation, March 14, among Rusk, Brandt, et al. Berlin, position of West Berlin in the event of a Soviet-East German peace treaty, relations between East and West Germany. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.022/3-1461.

April 1961

58 Memorandum from Dean Acheson to Kennedy, April 3. Analysis of the Berlin situation. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/4-361.

59 Memorandum for the record, April 3. Military briefing for Acheson on Berlin. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382.

60 Memorandum of conversation, April 4, among Rusk, Lord Home, et al. U.S.-U.K. exchange of views on Berlin. Secret; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/4-461.

61 Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, April 4. Summary of a memorandum on Berlin by Acheson. Top Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.

62 Memorandum of conversation, April 12, among Rusk, Adenauer, von Brentano, et al. U.S.-FRG exchange of views on Berlin. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

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No.	Document Description
63	Memorandum from Bundy to McNamara, April 17. Request for DOD and JCS studies for the President on military contingencies in case of a blockade of Berlin. Top Secret. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
May 1961	
64	Telegram Secto 13 from Rusk at Oslo, May 8. Summary of a conversation on Berlin among U.S., U.K., French Foreign Ministers prior to quadripartite meeting. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/5–861.
65	Memorandum from Owen to Bundy, May 17. Comments on DOD submission on conventional forces. Secret. 1 p. JFK Library.
66	Telegram DA 996303 from JCS to Gen. Norstad, May 20. Request for estimate of forces required to restore ground access to Berlin against GDR operation. Top Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
June 1961	
67	Memorandum of conversation, June 12, between Kennedy and Italian Prime Minister Fanfani. Exchange of views on Vienna talks and Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/6–1261.
68	Memorandum from Bundy to McNamara, June 12. Request for studies re Berlin contingency planning for Acheson; description of studies attached. Secret. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
69	Memorandum from Battle to U. Alexis Johnson, June 13. Coordination of Berlin contingency plans. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762A.00/6–1361.
70	Memorandum of conversation, June 14, among NATO Secretary General Stikker, Rusk, Bowles, Acheson, et al. Discussion of draft reply to Soviet aide-mémoire re Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/6–1461.
71	Memorandum from Llewllyn E. Thompson to Rusk, June 19. Analysis of the Berlin and German question and Khrushchev's position. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/6-1961.

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No.	Document Description
72	Memorandum from Veliotes to Brubeck, June 22. Report on status of Berlin contingency planning. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762A.00/6–2261.
73	Note from Lord Hood to Rusk, June 25. Encloses message from Foreign Secretary Home on Berlin and Soviet proposals. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.
74	Memorandum from Rostow to Kennedy, June 26. Analysis of Khrushchev's foreign policy strategy. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos, General.
75	Memorandum from Nitze to Bundy, June 26. Encloses JCS studies on Berlin contingency planning. Top Secret. 7 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
76	Memorandum for the record, June 27. Kohler-Grewe meeting: exchange of views on Berlin. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/6–2761.
77	Memorandum of conversation, June 30. Meeting of Four-Power Working Group on Germany including Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/7–361.
July 1961	
78	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, July 6. Berlin planning organization. Unclassified. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, 34 Berlin File.
79	Memorandum from Bowles to Kennedy, July 7. Thoughts on Acheson's paper on Berlin; U.S. objectives and courses of action. Secret. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/7–761.
80	Note from Col. Legere to Gen. Taylor, July 10. Encloses draft memorandum from Kissinger to Bundy on general war aspect of Berlin contingency planning. Top Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, 34 Berlin File.
81	Letter from Gavin to Bowles, July 10. Berlin and Spain; encloses letters from Mehnert to Gavin, June 27, and from Bowles to Gavin, July 22. Secret; Official-Informal. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/7–1061.
82	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, July 10. Views of Lovett and Murphy on the Acheson report. Secret. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.

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No.	Document Description
83	Memorandum of conversation, July 12, between Menshikov and Bowles. Exchange of views on Berlin. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/7–1261.
84	Memorandum from Murrow to Rusk, July 12. USIA planning and action on Berlin. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF 762.00/7–1261.
85	Memorandum from Gen. Taylor to Air Force Secretary Zuckert, July 12. Request for estimate of capabilities for airlift. Secret. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, 34 Berlin File.
86	Memorandum from Robert Johnson to Rostow, July 12. Not declassified. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
87	Memorandum from Owen to Bundy, July 12. Briefing for July 13 NSC meeting regarding Berlin. Secret. 4 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, 35 6B NATO.
88	Memorandum for the record of July 13 NSC meeting, July 15. Departmental planning regarding Berlin and attitudes toward Acheson program. Secret. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, 6A Berlin.
89	Paper by Gen. Taylor, July 13. Suggested remarks at close of July 13 NSC meeting re planning for Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Deaprtments and Agencies Series, NSC Meetings, 1961.
90	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, et al., July 13. Paper for discussion at meeting on military options in Berlin planning. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Berlin File.
91	Memorandum from Fowler to U. Alexis Johnson, July 17. Treasury comments on NSAM No. 59—Economic sanctions if access to Berlin is blocked. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/7–1761.
92	Memorandum from Air Force Secretary Zuckert to Gen. Taylor, July 17. Berlin airlift. Secret. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, 6A Berlin.
93	Memorandum of conversation, July 17, between Rostow and Menshikov. Exchange of views on Berlin. Confidential. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.

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No.	Document Description
94	Memorandum from Sorensen to Kennedy, July 17. Exposition of the alternatives before the President on Berlin. No classification marking. 5 pp. JFK Library, President's Office Files, Germany.
95	Memorandum of telephone conversation, July 20, between Rusk and Sorensen. Eight items Rusk would mention in President's TV address. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
96	Memorandum from Rostow to Kennedy, July 20. Finding a theme to unify the Free World's response to the Berlin problem. Confidential. 3 pp. JFK Library, President's Office Files, Germany.
97	Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, July 20. Nuclear weapons and Berlin. Secret. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
98	Memorandum from Gen. Taylor to Kennedy, July 21. Berlin airlift. Top Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
99	Memorandum, July 21. Memorandum on measures for dealing with the Berlin situation. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1940.
100	Letter from Rusk to McNamara, July 21. Relationship of Berlin program to NATO discussions of long-range strategy and defense planning; participation by NATO allies. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 B 3464.
101	Memorandum from Rostow to Kennedy, July 22. A "High Noon" stance on Berlin; the question of allied participation. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, President's Office Files, Germany.
102	Telegram 73 from Berlin to Bonn (87 to Department), July 24. Embassy's reading of East Germany's refugee problem. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/7–2461.
103	Memorandum by Bundy, July 25. Record of the July 24 meeting of the Interdepartmental Steering Group. Top Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Steering Group.

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No.	Document Description
104	Memorandum of conversation, July 25. Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin in anticipation of meetings of the Working Group and Foreign Ministers. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/7–2561.
105	Letter from Gen. Taylor to Rusk, July 31. Possible approach to Berlin negotiations. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1946.
August 1961	
106	Memorandum from Gen. Taylor to Kennedy, August 2. Briefing for meeting with the Berlin Steering Group. Top Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Steering Group.
107	Memorandum from Kissinger to Bundy, August 4. Comments on telegram 531 from Paris containing Kohler's idea about access procedures. Secret. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
108	Memorandum from Bundy to Gen. Taylor, August 10. Berlin political planning. Secret. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, 6A Berlin.
109	Record of meeting, August 11, among Gen. Taylor, Bundy, Rostow, Kissinger, and Owen. Possibilities on Berlin needing further study. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Staff Memos, Bundy.
110	Memorandum from Rostow to Kennedy, August 11. Relationship between Laos and Berlin. Secret. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos General.
111	Memorandum from Kissinger to Bundy, August 11. Exposition of more options for the President. No classification marking. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Staff Memos, Kissinger.
112	Memorandum from Col. Burris to Vice President Johnson, August 11. Status of planning for Berlin. Top Secret. 2 pp. LBJ Library, Vice President Security File, Memos to VP from Burris, Jan. 1961–June 1962.
113	Telegram 176 from Berlin, August 13. GDR's drastic control measures to contain its refugees. Confidential; Niact. 1 p. DOS, CF, 862.181/8–1361.

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No.	Document Description
114	Message to Kennan in Yugoslavia, August 14. Instructions to talk with Soviet colleague about U.S. desire to find peaceful solution to Berlin crisis. Top Secret; Personal; Eyes Only for the Ambassador. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8–1461.
115	National Security Action Memorandum No. 70, August 15. Request for a report on NATO's commitment of troops to Berlin. Secret. 1 p. DOS, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316.
116	Telegram 452 to Moscow, August 16. Report on quadripartite meeting. Secret; Priority. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8–1661.
117	Telegram 360 to Bonn (127 to Berlin), August 16. Request for assessment whether Berliners would be reassured by strengthening Allied garrisons, increasing patrols in East Berlin, or deployment of Allied forces on borders of Western sectors. Secret; Priority. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.0221/8–1661.
118	Message from Gen. Lemnitzer to Gen. Norstad, August 16. Instructions to begin detailed planning on a unilateral basis to apply non-nuclear military power. Top Secret. 2 pp. DDE Library, Norstad Papers, Berlin–Live Oak.
119	Telegram 701 from London, August 16. Bruce's call for less extreme measures in Berlin. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8–1661.
120	Telegram 226 from Berlin (199 to Bonn), August 17. Comments on three options for increased military presence. Secret; Priority. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/8–1761.
121	Telegram 232 from Berlin (205 to Bonn), August 17. Mission vehicles stopped by GDR guards. Confidential; Priority. 1 p. DOS, CF, 862.181/8–1761.
122	Minutes and assignments of August 17 meeting of Berlin Task Force. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464.
123	Memorandum from Owen to Bundy, August 17. Kohler's points concerning the Brandt letter. No classification marking. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.

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No.	Document Description
124	Telegram 250 from Berlin (223 to Bonn), August 18. Question of Western compliance with four-power arrangements. Confidential; Priority. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8–1861.
125	Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, August 18. Transmits contingency orders being sent to the Commander of the Battle Group in Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8–1861.
126	Memorandum from Rostow to Kohler, August 18. Suggestions for Vice President Johnson's trip to Germany. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762A.00/8–1861.
127	Telegram 907 from Paris, August 18. Transmits message from de Gaulle to Kennedy agreeing to join with Macmillan in a common declaration on Berlin; includes proposed text of statement. Secret; Limit Distribution; Eyes Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8–1861.
128	Memorandum from Kissinger to Bundy, August 18. Berlin and German unification. Secret. 8 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Staff Memos, Kissinger.
129	Memorandum from Gen. Taylor to Kennedy, August 18. Further information on troop movement to Berlin. Top Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
130	Note from Lord Hood to Kennedy, August 18. Encloses message from Macmillan to Kennedy on draft tripartite declaration. Secret; Eyes Only. 4 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.
131	Telegram JCS 1185 from JCS to USCINCEUR, August 19. Objective of augmenting Berlin garrison by one U.S. Army battle group and instructions for dealing with harassment or opposition. Top Secret; Niact. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/8–1961.
132	Memorandum from Bohlen to Rusk, August 21. Report on Vice President Johnson's trip to Germany. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 033.1100–JO/8–2161.
133	National Security Action Memorandum No. 78 from Kennedy to Gates, August 21. Berlin crisis—NATO buildup and planning. Secret. 1 p. DOS, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316.

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No.	Document Description
134	Telegram 229 from Belgrade, August 21. Kennan's comments on Yugoslav reaction to the Berlin situation. Top Secret; Eyes Only for the President. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8-2161.
135	Memorandum from Bowles to Kennedy, August 22. Comments on obtaining support among neutral nations. Top Secret. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8-2261.
136	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk, August 22. Organization for mobilizing world opinion. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.00/8-2261.
137	Letter from Kennan to Rusk, August 22. Report of meeting with Soviet Amb. to Yugoslavia Yepishev. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 611.61/8-2261.
138	Memorandum of telephone conversation, August 23, between Rusk and Bohlen. Berlin. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
139	Note from Stevenson to Kennedy, August 23. Encloses memorandum about neutral countries' positions regarding Berlin. Secret; Limited. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
140	Record of meeting of the Berlin Steering Group, August 23. Discussion of Berlin situation. Top Secret. 3 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Steering Group.
141	Telegram 610 from New Delhi, August 24. From Galbraith to Kennedy: obtaining support from neutrals. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8-2461.
142	Memorandum from McNamara to Kennedy, August 25. Status of Berlin planning and buildup. Top Secret. 3 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
143	Memorandum of conversation, August 26, between Rusk and Alphand. French position on Berlin. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8-2661.
144	Telegram 333 from Berlin (296 to Bonn), August 26. Report of meeting between U.S. Commandant, Gen. Watson, and Soviet Commandant, Col. Solovyev. Confidential; Priority. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 726.0221/8-2661.

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No.	Document Description
145	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, August 28. Issues to be settled with Gen. Clay as President's Special Representative in Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Clay Cables.
146	Telegram 1152 to Paris (476 to Bonn, 1011 to London), August 28. Ambassadorial Group agreement on advance transmission of instructions to Gen. Norstad re Berlin military planning; includes text of instructions. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Cables.
147	Message from Gen. Norstad to Gen. Lemnitzer, August 28. Comments on situation in Berlin and military options. Secret. 4 pp. DDE Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak.
148	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, August 28. Exposition of issues on Berlin negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. JFK Library, President's Office Files, Germany.
149	Telegram 1103 from Paris, August 29. Report of Gavin-Couve de Murville meeting on Berlin. Secret; Priority. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8-2961.
150	Memorandum from Col. Legere to Gen. Taylor, August 29. Not declassified. No classification marking. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, 38 Negotiations.
151	Letter from Adenauer to Kennedy, August 29. Concerns about Berlin. Personal and Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.
152	Polto 243 from Paris, August 31. Comments on military planning re Berlin. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/8-3161.
153	Memorandum of conversation, August 31, between Rusk and Caccia. Delivery of message from Home requesting U.S. statement putting onus on Soviets for lack of progress in negotiations. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8-3161.
154	Memorandum from Kennedy to McNamara, August 31. Request for report on progress of U.S. military build-up. Secret. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, 6B NATO.

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No.	Document Description
September 1961	
155	Memorandum from Gen. Clarke to Gen. Taylor, September 1. Report of a meeting with Kennedy. No classification marking. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, Berlin Overflow.
156	Telegram JCS 1342 from JCS to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, CINCNELM, September 1. Orders to plan for reprisal measures against Soviet and GDR shipping if Allied rights in Berlin restricted. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489.
157	Telegram 1200 from Paris, September 2. De Gaulle pledge of French support. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. 1 p. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.
158	Telegram 400 from Belgrade, September 4. Kennan's report of delivery of Soviet memorandum on Berlin and Southeast Asia; establishes channel of communication. Top Secret; Eyes Only for the Secretary. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/9–461.
159	Telegram 423 from Berlin (376 to Bonn), September 5. Report of meeting between U.S. Commandant, Gen. Watson, and Soviet Commandant, Col. Solovyev. Confidential; Priority. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/9–561.
160	Telegram 576 to Bonn (1312 to Paris, 1186 to London, 264 to Berlin), September 5. Instructions to Norstad in event civil air access to Berlin is impeded. Top Secret; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Cables.
161	Memorandum of telephone conversation, September 6, between Rusk and Grewe. Rusk's concern at release of information in Kennedy's letter to Adenauer. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
162	Memorandum of telephone conversation, September 6, between Bundy and Rusk. Arrangements for Steering Group meeting; Kennedy's concern about Berlin situation. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.

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No.	Document Description
163	Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, September 7. Briefing for the September 8 White House meeting on Berlin negotiations. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1-WA/9-761
164	Telegram 438 from Belgrade, September 7. Report of Kennan's meeting with Soviet Ambassador on Berlin and Laos. Top Secret; Eyes Only for the Secretary. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/9-761.
165	Telegram 1341 from Paris, September 8. Norstad's belief that further consideration be given to more aggressive course of action to force entry at Friederichstrasse. Top Secret. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Cables.
166	Letter from Sulzberger to Kennedy, September 10. Covering letter to transmit message from Khrushchev to Kennedy. Secret. 1 p. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D '63.
167	Note from Lyon to Brown (WE), September 10. Transmits letter from Lyon to Sorensen and record of September 5 Sulzberger-Khrushchev meeting. Top Secret; Official-Informal; Eyes Only. 5 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.
168	Memorandum from Kennedy to Rusk and McNamara, September 11. Berlin contingency planning. Secret. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, 505 Berlin Contingency Planning.
169	National Security Action Memorandum No. 93 from Bundy to McNamara, September 12. Berlin Buildup. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316.
170	Memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, September 13. Suggestions pertaining to Gen. Clay's mission to Berlin. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762A.00/9-1361.
171	Memorandum from Col. Legere to Kohler, September 13. Reference of Berlin items raised at the September 13 White House staff meeting. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/9-1361.
172	Telegram 330 to Berlin, September 14. Transmits decisions taken at White House on action to be taken in event of difficulties at Steinstucken and Friedrichstrasse. Top Secret; Priority. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Cables.

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No.	Document Description
173	Memorandum from McCloy to Rusk, September 15. Report of conversation with Amb. Menshikov re negotiations. Confidential; Eyes Only. 2 pp. DOS, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1950.
174	Memorandum of telephone conversation, September 16, between Rusk and Kohler. Thoughts about recalling Amb. Thompson for briefing. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
175	Memorandum of telephone conversation, September 17, between Stevenson and Rusk. Discussion with Menshikov re Soviet position; discussion of U.S. position for the press. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
176	Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, September 18. Report from Kissinger on his discussions with Soviet scientists re Berlin. Confidential. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
177	Memorandum from McNamara to Kennedy, September 18. McNamara and Gen. Norstad's comments on Kennedy's questions about military buildup and possible action in Europe. Top Secret. 19 pp. DOS, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316.
178	Memorandum from Gen. Taylor to Kennedy, September 19. Not declassified. Top Secret. 5 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, 30 500 A Air Access.
179	Memorandum from Robert Kennedy to President Kennedy, September 19. Encloses memorandum on Berlin by Katzenbach. Secret. 5 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
180	Polto 354 from Paris, September 19. Finletter's comments on the North Atlantic Alliance and the Berlin crisis. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 6 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Cables.
181	Memorandum from Kohler to the Acting Secretary, September 22. Encloses Kissinger's memorandum of conversation with Soviet delegates September 13–16. Official Use Only. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 611.61/9–2261.

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No.	Document Description
182	Memorandum from Kaysen to Kennedy, September 22. Results of Berlin political-military game at Camp David. Top Secret. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
183	Memorandum from Salinger to Kennedy and Rusk, September 24. Record of conversation between Khalarmov, Bolshakov, and Salinger. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.
184	Memorandum of conversation, September 25, between Bowles and Menshikov. U.S.-Soviet relations, especially Berlin. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/9–2561.
185	Memorandum from Gen. Lemnitzer to Gen. Taylor, September 27. Briefing on Berlin for interview on political subjects with Kennedy, September 28. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, 6A Berlin.
186	Telegram 640 from Berlin (567 to Bonn), September 29. From Gen. Clay to Rusk: access to East Berlin. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/9–2961.
187	Memorandum of conversation, September 29, between Grewe and Kohler. Germany and Berlin. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/9–2961.
October 1961	
188	Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, October 2. Transmits draft paper by Nitze on analysis of SACEUR and JCS proposals for Berlin military planning. Secret; With Top Secret Attachment. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10–261.
189	Memorandum for the record, October 2. Gen. Norstad's discussions with the JCS, October 2. Top Secret. 5 pp. DDE Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File, Memorandum for Record II, 1960–1961.
190	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, October 3. Briefing for meeting with Gen. Norstad. Top Secret. 3 pp. JFK Library, President's Office Files, Norstad Meeting.
191	Memorandum of conversation, October 3, among Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, Gen. Taylor, Gen. Norstad, JCS, Allen Dulles, et al. Berlin military planning. Top Secret. 8 pp. JFK Library, President's Office Files, Norstad Meeting.

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No.	Document Description
192	Telegram 1811 from Paris, October 4. Improved relations with France and de Gaulle. Secret; Eyes Only President and Secretary. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-461.
193	Memorandum of conversation, October 4, among Grewe, Rusk, et al. Reunification and European security. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 726.00/10-461.
194	Telegram 674 from Berlin (595 to Bonn), October 5. From Gen. Clay to Rusk: access to East Berlin and importance of Soviet participation if Friedrichstrasse is closed. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-561.
195	Telegram 589 from Belgrade, October 6. Kennan's comments on section in revised four-power working group paper on Soviet motives. Secret; Priority. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-661.
196	Telegram 1990 to Paris, October 6. French association with Germany-Berlin problems. Secret; Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-661.
197	Memorandum of conversation, October 6. Tripartite (Rusk-Hood-Alphand) meeting; decisions by governments to execute Allied military plans on Berlin. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-661.
198	Memorandum from Owen to Bundy, October 9. Comments on Gen Taylor's paper on Berlin contingency planning. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
199	Telegram 1893 to London, October 9. Transmits letter from Macmillan to Kennedy on Berlin. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only; Verbatim Text. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-961.
200	Message from Gen. Norstad to Gen. Lemnitzer, October 10. Transmits message from Gen. Clay to Gen. Norstad: Clay will not accept restrictions on expression of his views. Secret. 2 pp. DDE Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak 1961, 1 Sep-31 Dec.
201	Memorandum from McNamara to Kennedy, October 10. Actions to increase non-nuclear military power in Europe while maintaining options in Berlin. Top Secret. 3 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.

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No.	Document Description
202	Memorandum from Gen. Lemnitzer to McNamara (JCSM-728-61), October 13. Preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict. Top Secret. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 091 Germany.
203	Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, October 16. French position on quadripartite consultation. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 611.51/10-1661.
204	Telegram 2080 from Paris, October 17. U.S. relations with France after de Gaulle's refusal to enter negotiations with Soviets. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-1761.
205	National Security Action Memorandum No. 107 from Bundy to Rusk, October 18. Course of action re Friedrichstrasse crossing point. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316.
206	Telegram 1088 to Bonn, October 18. Transmits letter from Kennedy to Adenauer regarding Gilpatric visit. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. 4 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.
207	Memorandum from Maj. Smith to Bundy, October 19. Covering memorandum for background material for October 20 Berlin meeting. No classification marking. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
208	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, October 20. Briefing for Berlin meeting. Top Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
209	Letter from Thompson to Kennan, October 20. Comments on Berlin. Secret; Personal; Informal. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-2061.
210	Letter from Adenauer to Kennedy, October 21. Response to Kennedy's October 14 letter; talks with Gromyko on Berlin. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.
211	Letter from de Gaulle to Kennedy, October 21. Response to Kennedy's October 14 letter; talks with Gromyko on Berlin. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

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No.	Document Description
212	Message from Gen. Norstad to Gen. Lemnitzer, October 23. Lightner refused entry to East Berlin at Friedrichstrasse. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Cables.
213	Memorandum from Komer to Kennedy, October 23. Impact on Soviet Union of U.S. military buildup in Berlin crisis. Secret. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Staff Memos, Komer.
214	Telegram 585 to Berlin, October 25. From Kohler to Gen. Clay: possible incorporation of West Berlin into FRG. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-2061.
215	Telegram 840 from Berlin (741 to Bonn), October 25. U.S. vehicle denied entry into East Berlin at Friedrichstrasse. Secret; Niact. 1 p. DOS, CF, 862.181/10-2561.
216	Telegram 824 from Berlin (727 to Bonn), October 25. From Gen. Clay to Rusk: courses of action after armed escort effects passage of U.S. vehicle through Friedrichstrasse. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.0221/10-2561.
217	Message from Dowling to Gen. Watson, October 25. Use of military force to protect rights of access to East Berlin. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-2561.
218	Message from Dowling to Rusk, October 25. Conclusion that United States must be firm in light of incidents. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 p. DOS, CF, 761.00/10-2561.
219	Telegram 2273 from Paris, October 25. Relations with France and de Gaulle. Secret; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 611.51/10-2561.
220	Message from Gen. Norstad to Gen. Lemnitzer, October 25. U.S. vehicle stopped by GDR at Friedrichstrasse. Top Secret. 3 pp. DDE Library, Norstad Papers, Berlin-Live Oak 1961, 1 Sep-31 Dec.
221	Telegram 835 from Berlin, October 26. From Gen. Clay to Rusk: request for comments on military probe. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.0221/10-2661.

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No.	Document Description
222	Message from Gen. Norstad to Gen. Lemnitzer, October 26. Extract of message from Gen. Watson describing situation in Berlin as of 1600Z October 26. Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
223	Message from Gen. Watson to Gen. Norstad, October 27. Results of Gen. Clay-Kennedy discussion: no more U.S. civilians will enter East Berlin, no military probe. Secret; Emergency. 1 p. DDE Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak 1961, 1 Sep–31 Dec.
224	Telegram JCS 2026 from Gen. Lemnitzer to Gen. Norstad, October 27. Results of White House meeting on Friedrichstrasse. Secret; Exclusive. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 75 A 6489.
225	Message from Col. Legere to Bundy, October 27. Results of Berlin Task Force meeting on Friedrichstrasse. Secret. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, 6A Berlin.
226	Telegram 1388 from Moscow, October 28. Thompson's comments on U.S. courses of action in Berlin. Secret; Priority. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-2861.
227	Telegram 1398 from Moscow, October 29. Meeting between Thompson and Kuznetsov and delivery of U.S. aide-mémoire. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only for Ambassadors. 5 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Cables.
228	Telegram 883 from Berlin (783 to Bonn), October 30. From Gen. Clay: record of conversation with Brandt; exchange of views. Secret; Priority. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-3061.
229	Telegram 884 from Berlin, October 30. From Gen. Clay: analysis of events and Soviet actions. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-3061.
230	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, October 30. Situation at Friedrichstrasse as of 4 p.m. Secret. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
231	Telegram 896 from Berlin, October 31. From Gen. Clay: response to Gen. Norstad's recommendations. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/10-3161.

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No.	Document Description
November 1961	
232	Telegram 653 from Berlin to Paris (916 to Department for Rusk), November 1. From Gen. Clay to Gen. Norstad and Stoessel: distress at lack of Allied unity. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/11-161.
233	Telegram 1443 from Moscow, November 3. Thompson's comments on lack of Allied unity. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 662.001/11-361.
234	Telegram 953 from Berlin, November 6. From Clay: comments on barring of Soviets from West Berlin. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.0221/11-661.
235	Telegram 1881 from London, November 7. Meeting between Bruce and Home: incident at Friedrichstrasse. Secret; Eyes Only for Secretary. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.00/11-761.
236	Memorandum for the record, November 7. Meeting among Kennedy, McNamara, Gen. Norstad, Gen. Taylor on Berlin situation. Top Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, 109 Norstad.
237	Letter from Sorensen (Embassy in Rome) to Bundy, November 7. Comments on Berlin after talks with Gen. Clay, Gen. Watson, Lightner, et al. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Official-Informal. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
238	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, November 9. Bundy's meeting with Gen. Clay. No classification marking. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin, Clay.
239	Memorandum to Kennedy, November 11. Delivery of messages from Khrushchev to Kennedy via Bolshikov. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.
240	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCloy and Rusk, November 13. Possible Adenauer visit. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
241	Letter from Thompson to Kohler, November 13. Thompson's defense of his opinion on Berlin. Secret; Personal. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/11-1361.

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No.	Document Description
242	Letter from Gen. Norstad to Kennedy, November 16. Encloses Gen. Norstad's instructions to SHAPE planners. Top Secret. 7 pp. JFK Library, President's Office Files, NATO, Norstad.
243	Telegram 1017 from Berlin, November 17. From Gen. Clay to Rusk and Dowling: defense of West Berlin. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/11-1761.
244	Memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, November 18. Transmits paper on objectives in connection with Adenauer visit and talking points. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 033.62A11/11-1861.
245	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, November 20. Acheson's position on forcing access to East Berlin. No classification marking. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
246	Memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, November 20. Comments on possible meeting with Khrushchev in Berlin. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/11-2061.
247	Memorandum of conversation, November 21, among Kennedy, Rusk, Adenauer, Schroeder, et al. Berlin contingency planning. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 4 pp. DOS, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1994.
248	Letter from Kohler to Thompson, November 25. Response to Thompson's November 13 and 16 letters. Secret; Personal. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.00/11-2561.
December 1961	
249	Letter from Gen. Clay to Rusk, December 2. Gen. Clay proposes his resignation. No classification marking. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin, Clay.
250	Telegram JCS 2465 from JCS to Gen. Norstad, December 5. Request for views on study on the military implications of the U.S. and Allied policy objective of maintaining the viability of West Berlin. Top Secret; Priority. 3 pp. WNRC, OSD Files: FRC 77 A 131, Berlin, Special Working Group.
251	Telegram 787 to Berlin (1616 to Bonn), December 6. For Gen. Clay: FRG-West Berlin relations and status of West Berlin. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/12-661.

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No.	Document Description
252	Telegram 1378 from Bonn, December 7. Military movements in Germany to maintain unrestricted use of Autobahn. Secret; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/12–761.
253	Memorandum from Maj. Smith to Gen. Taylor, December 11. Not declassified. Top Secret. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, Clay Cables.
254	Memorandum for the record, December 12. Record of Kennedy–de Gaulle telephone conversation in attempt to get de Gaulle agreement on Allied unity. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, President's Office Files, France/Security.
255	Telegram Secto 28 from Rusk at Paris, December 13. Transmits letter from Gen. Clay agreeing to stay in Berlin. Confidential; Priority; Eyes Only for the President. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/12–1361.
256	Memorandum from Bohlen to Rusk, December 13. Comments on negotiations with the Soviets and closing of BASC. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762A.00/12–1361.
257	Telegram 364 from Rusk at Paris to Bonn (Secto 43 to Department), December 15. From Rusk to Dowling: De Gaulle's refusal to join negotiations with Soviets; instructions to inform Adenauer and seek his advice. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 396.1–PA/12–1561.
January 1962	
258	Memorandum from Gen. Lemnitzer to Gen. Taylor (CM–489–62), January 4. Publicity concerning rotation of Berlin units. Top Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, 38 501C Ground Access.
259	Telegram 1582 from Bonn, January 6. Comments on negotiations with the Soviets. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/1-662.
260	Memorandum from Battle to Bundy, January 9. Transmits INR paper on assessment of current Soviet intentions in the Berlin crisis and analysis of January 2 Thompson–Gromyko talk. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/1-962.

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No.	Document Description
261	Note from Owen to Brady, January 10. Comments on the progress of the negotiations in Moscow and instructions for Thompson. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Gromyko Talks.
262	Telegram 1762 to Brussels (pouched to Moscow), January 11. Department comments on Soviet December 27 memorandum. Secret; Priority. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/1-1062.
263	Telegram 1334 from Berlin, January 13. From Gen. Clay to Rusk: questions U.S. policy in Berlin: a strong stand or Allied unity? Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. DOS, CF, 762.0221/1-1362.
264	Letter from Rusk to Dowling, January 13. Relationship between Gen. Clay and Dowling. Personal; Eyes Only. 2 pp. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
265	Telegram 1338 from Berlin, January 15. From Gen. Clay: concern at withdrawal of troops. Secret; Priority. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.0221/1-1562.
266	Telegram 1346 from Berlin, January 16. From Gen. Clay to Rusk: change in convoy schedule. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.0221/1-1662.
267	Telegram 3493 from Paris, January 18. Comments on de Gaulle's refusal to participate in negotiations. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/1-1862.
268	Telegram 1988 from Moscow, January 19. Thompson's comments on his negotiations with Gromyko. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only Secretary. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/1-1962.
269	Substance of discussion at State–JCS meeting, January 19. Berlin: Thompson-Gromyko talks; troop rotation in Europe. Top Secret. 10 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121.
270	Memorandum of conversation, January 22, between Kohler and Alphand. Leak of Kennedy–de Gaulle correspondence. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
271	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, January 31. Possible points to make to Adzhubei on Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.

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No.	Document Description
February 1962	
272	Telegram 1428 from Berlin (1275 to Bonn), February 2. Account of Luebke–Lightner meeting on Berlin. Confidential; Priority. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/2–262.
273	Telegram ECJCJ 9-01888 from Gen. Norstad to JCS, February 3. Orders for troops in Berlin concerning refugees. Secret; Priority. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Cables.
274	Telegram JCS 3198 from JCS to Gen. Norstad, February 7. Orders for two unarmed U.S. military transports to conduct flights in the south air corridor to Berlin on February 8. Secret. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Cables.
275	Memorandum from Gen. Taylor to Kennedy, February 9. Recommendations to deal with Gen. Clay's January 30 letter to Rusk. Confidential. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Clay Cables.
276	Telegram 1897 from Bonn, February 14. Adenauer's state of mind. Secret; For the Secretary. 1 p. DOS, CF, 110.11-RU/2-1462.
277	Telegram 3881 from Paris, February 14. From Stoessel. Gen. Norstad does not have authority to order fighter protection of transport in Berlin air corridors. Secret; Niact. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 967 [illegible]-1462.
278	Memorandum from Weiss (G/PM) to U. Alexis Johnson, February 14. Status of situation in Berlin air corridors. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.00/2-1462.
279	Memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, February 14. Recommendations for response to Soviet action regarding air corridors. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316.
280	Memorandum from Weiss (G/PM) to U. Alexis Johnson, February 15. Status of situation in Berlin air corridors. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/2-1562.
281	Telegram 2282 to Bonn, February 19. Instructions for meeting with Adenauer on February 20. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only for Ambassador. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 611.62A/2-1962.

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No.	Document Description
282	Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, February 19. Briefing for meeting with Kennedy on Allied responsibilities and intentions to support German access to Berlin. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/2–1962.
283	Memorandum of telephone conversation, February 20, between Rusk and Acheson. Acheson's comments on Thompson-Gromyko talks. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
284	Telegram 1094 to Berlin (2332 to Bonn), February 22. Suggestions for Robert Kennedy's talk with Adenauer. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only for Attorney General from Secretary. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 711.5612/2–1762.
285	Memorandum from Kaysen to Bundy, February 22. Suggestion to counter Soviet pattern of behavior in the air corridors. Secret. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
286	Telegram 2337 to Bonn, February 23. Supplemental instructions for Robert Kennedy. Secret; Eyes Only Attorney General and Ambassador. 1 p. DOS, CF, 611.62A/2–2362.
287	Telegram 4033 from Paris, February 27. Report on Attorney General's visit and meeting with de Gaulle. Confidential; Priority. 1 p. DOS, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2045.
288	Telegram 2290 from Moscow, February 27. Possible Soviet moves after encountering Western firmness in air corridors. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 962.72/2–2762.
March 1962	
289	Letter from Kennedy to Gen. Clay, March 1. "We continue to count on you." No classification marking. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Clay Cables.
290	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, March 3. Comments on record of conversation between Kennedy and Grewe. No classification marking. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
291	Telegram 1688 from Berlin (1526 to Bonn), March 8. Appraisal of Soviet motives in air corridors. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 962.72/3–862.

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No.	Document Description
292	Memorandum from Col. Legere to Gen. Taylor, March 9. Comments on Modus Vivendi provisional arrangements. Secret. 5 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, 38 Negotiations.
293	Telegram 2473 to Bonn (1150 to Berlin), March 10. Presidential authority to seek Ambassadorial Group agreement to delegate authority to Gen. Norstad to fly over 10,000 feet in Berlin air corridors. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 962.72/3-862.
294	Telegram SHLO 5-DO199 from U.S. Element Live Oak to JCS, March 11. Not declassified. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 962.72/3-1162.
295	Memorandum of conversation, March 11 (noon), between Rusk and Schroeder. Berlin and related subjects. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/3-1162.
296	Memorandum of conversation, March 11 (2 p.m.), among Rusk, Schroeder, et al. Berlin. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/3-1162.
297	Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, March 12. Briefing for March 13 Rusk-Gromyko meeting. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/3-1262.
298	Memorandum of telephone conversation, March 14, between Gen. Lemnitzer and Ball. Gen. Clay's plan to fly in Berlin air corridors over 10,000 feet. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
299	Memorandum of telephone conversation, March 14, between Bundy and Ball. Rusk's plans for his meeting with Gromyko on March 15. No classification marking. 3 pp. JFK Library, Ball Papers.
300	Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, March 14. Gen. Norstad's views on corridor situation. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 962.72/3-1462.
301	Telegram Tosec 34 to Rusk at Geneva, March 14. Submission to Rusk of position on resort to the Security Council re the question of Berlin air corridors. Secret; Priority. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 962.72/3-1462.
302	Memorandum of conversation, March 15, between Kohler and Semenov. Berlin and Germany. Secret; Limited Distribution. 17 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/3-1562.

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No.	Document Description
303	National Security Action Memorandum No. 137 from Bundy to Rusk, March 15. Restrictions on East German athletes. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 316.
304	Telegram Secto 56 from Rusk at Warsaw, March 17. Report of Rusk–Rapacki discussion of Berlin and Germany. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2060.
305	Memorandum from Col. Burris to Vice President Johnson, March 20. Air corridors. Secret. 1 p. LBJ Library, Vice President's Security File, Memos to VP from Burris, Jan 61–June 62.
306	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, March 20. Comments on the Soviet "General Principles" paper on Berlin issue. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Staff Memos, Klein.
307	Telegram 2582 to Bonn, March 21. Conclusions following quadripartite study on air access. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 962.72/3–3162.
308	Telegram 1798 from Berlin (1627 to Bonn, 85 to Geneva for Rusk), March 23. From Gen. Clay: recommendation to USAREUR in case of shooting on U.S. Mission vehicle. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/3–2362.
309	Telegram 2300 from Bonn (97 to Geneva for Rusk), March 24. Quotes March 23 message from Gen. Clarke re status of Military Liaison Mission. Secret; Priority. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/3–2462.
310	Memorandum of conversation, March 26, among Kohler, Bohlen, Semenov, et al. Germany and Berlin. Secret; Eyes Only. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/3–2662.
311	Memorandum for the record, March 28. Gen. Clay–Gen. Taylor private conversation on Berlin. Top Secret. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, Clay Cables.
312	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, March 28. Postmortem on Soviet chaff drops in the Berlin air corridors. Secret. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Staff Memos, Klein.
313	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, March 29. Status of Potsdam mission. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Staff Memos, Klein.

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No.	Document Description
314	Memorandum of conversation, March 29. Tripartite (Kohler–Hood–Alphand) review of Geneva talks on Berlin for quadripartite Ambassadorial meeting. Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/3–2962.
315	Letter from Gen. Clay to Rusk, March 29. Berlin contingency planning. Personal and Confidential. 2 pp. JFK Library, President's Office Files, Germany.
316	Letter from Lightner to Kohler, March 29. Impact of Gen. Clay's possible resignation. Secret; Official; Informal. 3 pp. JFK Library, President's Office Files, Germany.
317	Telegram 5245 to Paris, March 30. French approval of U.S. countermeasures for Soviet action in air corridors. Secret; Priority. 1 p. DOS, CF, 962.72/3–3062.
April 1962	
318	Telegram 1867 from Berlin (1692 to Bonn, 1330 to Paris), April 1. From Gen. Clay to Rusk: possible meeting with Soviet Commander. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.0221/4–162.
319	Telegram 5307 to Paris, April 3. Plans for dealing with harassment of Allied convoy. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/4–362.
320	Memorandum of conversation, April 3, between Kennedy and Grewe. Gen. Clay's situation in Berlin. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 p. DOS, CF, 740.5/4–362.
321	Memorandum of conversation, April 3, between Kennedy and Grewe. Views of Adenauer and Strauss. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
322	Telegram 1261 to Berlin (2753 to Bonn), April 5. Possible reduction in frequency of armed convoys. Secret; Priority. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/4–562.
323	Telegram 1264 to Berlin, April 6. Message from Rusk to Gen. Clay. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/4–662.
324	Memorandum of conversation, April 6, between Kohler and Grewe. Berlin and related subjects. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/4–662.

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No.	Document Description
325	Telegram from Gen. Norstad to Gen. Lemnitzer, April 9. Reduction in convoy movements. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
326	Memorandum of telephone conversation, April 13, between Grewe and Kohler. Leaks to the press. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/4-1362.
327	Memorandum of conversation, April 14, among Nitze, Brandt, Lightner, et al. Negotiations with the Soviets; relations between East and West Berlin; access. Secret. 3 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series.
328	Memorandum of telephone conversation, April 14, between Rusk and Kohler. The leak to the press. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
329	Telegram 1946 from Berlin (1762 to Bonn), April 16. Report on Brandt–Schroeder meeting on Berlin. Secret; Limit Distribution; Eyes Only. DOS, CF, 762.00/4–1662.
330	Telegram 2863 to Bonn, April 17. U.S. position on holding Bundestag meeting in Berlin. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762A.00/3-2462.
331	Memorandum from Col. Burris to Vice President Johnson, April 17. Adenauer's reaction to latest Berlin proposals. Secret. 1 p. LBJ Library, Vice President's Security File, Memos to VP from Burris, Jan 61–June 62.
332	Telegram 1971 from Berlin, April 20. East-West relations as seen from Berlin. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/4–2062.
333	Telegram 2557 from Bonn, April 26. Question of Bundestag meeting in Berlin. Confidential; Priority. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762A.00/4–2662.
334	Telegram 1986 from Berlin, April 27. From Gen. Clay to Rusk: Bundestag meeting in Berlin. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762A.00/4-2762.
May 1962	
335	Memorandum of conversation, May 6. Quadripartite (Rusk, Lord Home, Couve de Murville, Schroeder) meeting on Berlin. Secret; Limit Distribution. 8 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2095.

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No.	Document Description
336	Telegram Secto 29 from Rusk at Athens, May 4. Changes in French position on negotiations on Berlin. Secret; Eyes Only for President and Acting Secretary. 1 p. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2104.
337	Memorandum from Bundy to Gen. McHugh for Kennedy, May 4. Bohlen report on possible peace talks. Secret. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
338	Telegram 2648 from Bonn, May 7. Soviet military activity in Berlin. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762B.00/5-762.
339	Telegram 2666 from Bonn, May 8. Report of Brentano's visit to Washington. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 033.62A11/5-862.
340	Memorandum from Salinger to Kennedy, May 9. Summary of Salinger–Schroeder meeting. Confidential. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany
341	Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk and Ball, May 16. Visits to Bonn. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 110.12-BA/5-1662.
342	Telegram 2077 from Berlin (1871 to Bonn), May 17. Report of Watson–Solovyev meeting in Potsdam. Confidential; Priority. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.61/5-1762.
343	Memorandum from Hilsman (INR) to Rusk, May 19. Comments on Salinger–Khrushchev conversation. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/5-1962.
344	Telegram 2863 to Rome, May 21. Purpose of Ball's visit to Bonn. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only for Under Secretary and Ambassador from Secretary. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 110.11-RU/5-2162.
345	Telegram 2858 from Bonn, May 23. Report of meeting among Ball, Adenauer, and Dowling. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only for the Secretary. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 110.12-BA/5-2362.
346	Telegram 2859 from Bonn, May 23. Report of meeting between Ball and Schroeder. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 110.12-BA/5-2362.
347	Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, May 31. Moving ahead on the "Principles Paper"; Draft Principles, Procedures, and Interim Steps reflecting German comments attached. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/5-3162.

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No.	Document Description
June 1962	
348	Telegram 3286 from Bonn (Topol 1857 to Paris), June 4. Travel by East German athletes. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 862.181/5–962.
349	Memorandum of telephone conversation, June 6, between Rusk and Kohler. Rusk's possible trip to Bonn. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
350	Memorandum of conversation. June 8, among Kennedy, Gen. Taylor, Strauss, Grewe, et al. Berlin; military buildup in Europe; national nuclear capabilities; de Gaulle. Secret. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 033.62A11/6–862.
351	Memorandum of conversation, June 9, among Rusk, Ball, Strauss, Grewe, et al. Strategy of Western alliance and Berlin. Secret. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 375/6–962.
352	Position paper for Rusk's European trip, June 12. Recommended U.S. position on Berlin and Germany. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2126.
353	Memorandum of conversation, June 14, among Rusk, Grewe, Kohler, et al. "Principles paper" and "Access paper." Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/6–1462.
354	Background paper for Rusk's European trip, June 16. U.S. handling of Berlin problem since Vienna meeting. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2156.
355	Telegram Secto 10 from Rusk at Paris, June 20. Report on Rusk's discussion with NATO representatives. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/6–2062.
356	Memorandum of conversation, June 22, among Rusk, Dowling, Schroeder, von Eckhardt, et al. U.S. "Principles paper" and the International Access Authority. Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 110.11–RU/6–2262.
357	Memorandum of conversation, June 22, among Rusk, Dowling, Schroeder, von Eckhardt, et al. German-American relations and matters for discussion with the French. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 110.11–RU/6–2262.
358	Memorandum of conversation, June 24, among Rusk, Bruce, Macmillan, Lord Home, et al. Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2123.

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No.	Document Description
July 1962	
359	Telegram 2 from Berlin to Bonn (2 to Department), July 1. Autobahn convoy procedures. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.54/7–162.
360	Memorandum from Col. Legere to Gen. Taylor, July 16. Narrative account of recent Berlin ground access developments. Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, 501C.
361	Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, July 19. Suggestions for Rusk's talks in Geneva on Berlin; paper on "Possible New Twist for Geneva in Extremis" attached. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/7–1962.
362	Memorandum from Col. Burris to Vice President Johnson, July 19. Berlin situation. Secret. 2 pp. LBJ Library, Vice President's Security File, Memos to VP from Burris, July 62–Apr. 63.
363	Memorandum from Nitze to McNamara, July 20. Summary of BERCON, MARCON, and Live Oak plans. Top Secret. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542.
364	Telegram 98 from Berlin (85 to Bonn), July 26. Analysis of Soviet motives and possible future actions. Secret; Priority. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/7–2662.
365	Telegram 100 from Berlin (87 to Bonn), July 26. Possible Soviet moves. Secret; Priority. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/7–2662.
366	Memorandum from Gen. Lemnitzer to McNamara (JCSM-556-62), July 28. Reappraisal of the Berlin situation. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542.
August 1962	
367	Memorandum of conversation, August 2, between Dobrynin and Tyler. Get-acquainted meeting; Berlin; non-proliferation. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8–262.
368	Memorandum of conversation, August 8, among Rusk, Dobrynin, et al. Proposal for Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting on Germany. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/8–862.

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No.	Document Description
369	Telegram CAP 5360-62 from Bromley Smith to Capt. Shepard, August 11. For the President's information: Observance of the anniversary of construction of the Berlin Wall. Confidential; Operational Immediate. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
370	Telegram 155 to Bonn, August 11. Possible Soviet/GDR actions in Berlin and on access routes. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 661.62B/8-862.
371	Telegram JCS 5719 from Gen. Lemnitzer to Gen. Norstad, August 16. Request for suggestions on unprovocative military actions to demonstrate firmness of policy. Secret; Exclusive. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542.
372	Letter from McNamara to Rusk, August 17. Summary of the JCS review of the Berlin situation. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/8-1762.
373	Telegram ALO 704 from Gen. Norstad to Gen. Lemnitzer, August 18. Possible military actions in Berlin. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 B 3542.
374	Memorandum from Klein to Gen. Clifton, August 20. Shooting of refugee at the Berlin Wall. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
375	Telegram 545 from Bonn, August 22. Report of Dowling-Schroeder meeting; U.S.-FRG relations. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only for the Secretary. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.62A/8-2262.
376	Telegram 270 from Berlin, August 25. Question of showing military IDs at border crossings. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 762.54/8-2562.
September 1962	
377	Memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, September 1. Incorporation of West Berlin into the FRG; includes memorandum by EUR. Secret. 9 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/9-162.

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No.	Document Description
378	Telegram 350 from Berlin (327 to Bonn), September 5. Record of informal September 4 Commandant and Deputies meeting to discuss Berlin contingency planning. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 9 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/9-562.
379	Telegram 1406 from Paris, September 20. Not declassified. Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 375/9-2062.
380	Telegram 438 from Berlin, September 25. Brandt's interpretation of the Berlin situation. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only for Secretary and Ambassador. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/9-2562.
381	Memorandum of conversation, September 27, among Franklin D. Roosvelt, Jr. (U.S. Representative to the German Industries Fair), Tyler, et al. Roosevelt's report on his trip to West Berlin. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/9-2762.
382	Polto 366 from Paris, September 28. Report of September 27 NAC discussion of Berlin contingency planning. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/9-2862.
October 1962	
383	Telegram 359 to Berlin, October 3. Plan to reduce Communist activities in West Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.0221/8-3062.
384	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, October 9. Problems with the French in dealing with Berlin. Secret. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, France.
385	Telegram 517 from Berlin, October 11. Advantages and disadvantages of West Berlin plebiscite. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-1162.
386	Memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, October 11. Memorandum of conversation between Thompson and Alphand on Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762A.00/10-1162.
387	Memorandum of conversation, October 17, among Schroeder, Bundy, Dowling, et al. Visa problem; Chancellor's visit; West Berlin plebiscite; civilian access to Berlin. Secret. 3 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.

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No.	Document Description
388	Memorandum from William Y. Smith to Gen. Taylor, October 18. Berlin contingency plans; includes memorandum summarizing papers under development dealing with contingency planning. Top Secret. 5 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, 505 Berlin Contingency Planning.
389	Telegram 1396 from USUN, October 22. Need to decide how to react if the Soviet Union interferes with access to Berlin. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.00/10-2262.
390	Memorandum from Kaysen to Bundy, October 31. Discussion of a U.S.-Soviet summit directed at reaching agreement on Berlin and disarmament. Secret. 5 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Aides Files, Kaysen.
November 1962	
391	Memorandum from Col. Legere to Bundy, November 1. Report on paper by the Nitze Group on supplemental Berlin planning. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
392	Memorandum of conversation, November 7, between Knappstein and Rusk. Adenauer's forthcoming visit to Washington. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 033.62A11/11-762.
393	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, November 9. Briefing for meeting about the Chancellor's visit. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Chancellor Visit.
394	Airgram CA-5154 to Berlin, November 8. Question of future action to assist wounded refugees. Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 762B.00/11-862.
395	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, November 9. Report on meeting on Berlin between Nitze and his group and Rostow and his group, and suggestions for future action. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
396	Memorandum of conversation, November 26, among Lord Hood, Hillenbrand, et al. Khrushchev's proposal on the presence of Western troops in West Berlin under UN flag; relation of Cuba to Berlin. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/11-2662.

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No.	Document Description
397	Telegram 2251 from Paris, November 28. Not declassified. Secret; Priority. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.54/11-2862.
398	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, November 28. Transmits Department of State paper on "Future Negotiations on Berlin." Secret. 11 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
399	Memorandum from Weiss (G/PM) to Kitchen (G/PM), November 29. Advanced notification for convoys on the Autobahn. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 762.00/11-2962
400	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, November 29. Outstanding Berlin contingency problems. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
December 1962	
401	Memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, December 5. Improving organization and improvement of Berlin contingency planning. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
January 1963	
402	Telegram 761 from Berlin, January 12. Summary of outlook for coming months in Berlin. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 762A.00/1-1263.
403	Memorandum of conversation, January 24, between Kornienko (Soviet Embassy) and Hillenbrand. Discussion of Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 762.00/1-2463.
February 1963	
404	Letter from Rusk to Dean Acheson, February 3. Franco-German reconciliation. Private and Confidential. 1 p. DOS, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
405	Memorandum of conversation, February 4, between Dobrynin and Tyler. Berlin. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 28 BERLIN.
406	Memorandum of conversation, February 9, among Rusk, Tyler, Alphand, et al. Discussions with the Soviets over Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 28 BERLIN.
407	Telegram 4344 to London (1892 to Bonn, 1705 to Moscow, 3912 to Paris, 589 to Berlin), February 14. Report on Ambassadorial Group meeting. Secret; Eyes Only. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 28 BERLIN.

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No.	Document Description
408	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, February 14. Adenauer's complaint to Gilpatric on Berlin. Secret. 3 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
409	Memorandum of conversation, February 19, between Schnippenkoetter (FRG Embassy) and Hillenbrand. German suspicions of U.S. re resumed discussions with the Soviets. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 28 BERLIN.
410	Memorandum of conversation, February 20, between Alphand and Llewellyn Thompson. Resumption of bilateral talks with the Soviet Union on the German question. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 28 BERLIN.
411	Telegram 917 from Berlin, February 25. Renewal of Soviet pressure on Allied rights in Berlin. Secret; Priority. 3 pp. DOS, CF, AV 13 GER.
412	Memorandum of conversation, February 25, among Rusk, Tyler, von Hassel, Knappstein, et al. Tour d'Horizon. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, POL GER-US.
413	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, February 26. Comments on telegram 917 from Berlin on Soviet harassment. Secret. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
414	Telegram 617 to Berlin, February 27. Comments on Soviet actions in Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, AV 13 GER.
March 1963	
415	Telegram 4631 to Paris, March 29. Inappropriate to hold Bundestag session in Berlin. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15-2 WGER.
May 1963	
416	Telegram 1122 from Berlin, May 1. Planning for Presidential visit to Berlin. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 7/US-KENNEDY.
417	Letter from Stevenson (USUN) to Cleveland (IO), May 16. The UN's role in Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 28 BERLIN.

No.	Document Description
418	Telegram 3102 from Bonn, May 17. Possible invitation to Kennedy to address Bundestag. Confidential; Operational Immediate. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 7/US-KENNEDY.
419	Memorandum of conversation, May 17, between Kissinger and Adenauer. Exchange of views. Personal; Confidential. 5 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Staff Memos, Kissinger.
June 1963	
420	Memorandum from Kaysen to Kennedy, June 21. Materials and briefing for Kennedy's meeting with Erhard. Secret. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Weekend Papers.
421	Memorandum of conversation, June 24, among Kennedy, Rusk, Adenauer, Schroeder, et al. Trade and fiscal policy matters. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2275.
July 1963	
422	Telegram Tosec 68 to Rusk at Rome, July 1. Question of retaliation for establishment of security strip in Berlin. Secret; Priority. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 38-10.
423	Telegram 24 from Berlin, July 5. Exposition of specific issues in Berlin and planning. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 38.
August 1963	
424	Telegram 5 from Salzburg to Bonn (9 to Department), August 5. Record of meeting among Brandt, McNamara and Nitze. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 16 E GFR.
425	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, August 9. Comments on Gromyko's "Partial Measures" proposal. Secret. 1 p. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
426	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, August 15. Reorganization of the Berlin garrison. Secret. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.

No.	Document Description
427	Memorandum from Clifton to Klein, August 16. Kennedy's comments on consultation with the FRG Government re the change of the Berlin garrison. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin.
September 1963	
428	Memorandum of conversation, September 20, among Rusk, Llewellyn Thompson, Schroeder, Knappstein, et al. German attitude toward Western initiatives with the Soviets. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL US-USSR.
429	Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, September 23. Briefing for Schroeder's visit. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
430	Memorandum of conversation, September 24, among Kennedy, Ball, Schroeder, Knappstein, et al. Negotiations with the Soviets. Secret. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
October 1963	
431	Memorandum of conversation, October 8, among Kennedy, Kiesinger, et al. Situation in Germany after Adenauer's retirement. Confidential. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
432	Memorandum of conversation, October 10, between Semenov and Tyler. Germany and Berlin, includes October 3 memorandum of conversation between Semenov and Scott (U.K. Foreign Office). Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 28 BERLIN.
433	Telegram 1297 from Bonn, October 11. Request for Department guidance after three U.S. convoys detained at the Berlin Autobahn checkpoints. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 38–8.
434	Telegram 1033 to Bonn (1795 to Paris, 2350 to London, 1158 to Moscow, 279 to Berlin), October 11. Report on 9:30 a.m. Ambassadorial Group meeting on Autobahn incidents. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 38–8.
435	Telegram 1052 to Bonn (1177 to Moscow, 2380 to London, 1823 to Paris, 285 to Berlin), October 11. Report on 3 p.m. Ambassadorial Group meeting. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 38–8.

No.	Document Description
436	Memorandum of conversation, October 15, between Rusk and Alphand. The incident in the Berlin corridor. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 38.
437	Memorandum from Rostow (S/P) to Rusk, October 16. Analysis of second Berlin access incident when British convoy held up. Secret. 3 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
438	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, October 17. Analysis of Autobahn convoys incidents. Secret. 4 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin Autobahn.
439	Memorandum for the record by Gen. Taylor, October 17. Discussion of Berlin convoy procedures with McNamara and Gen. Clay. Top Secret. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, 6A.
440	Telegram 1132 from Berlin, October 18. Assessment of Soviet behavior and intentions in Autobahn incidents. Secret; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 38–10.
441	Memorandum from William Y. Smith to Bundy, October 22. Report on quadripartite meeting on Berlin convoy procedures. Secret. 2 pp. JFK Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
442	Memorandum for the record, October 22. Report on meetings of the Ambassadorial Group, the Coordinating Group, and the State–ISA–JCS working group of the Berlin Task Force: Status of Berlin convoy matters. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 67 A 4564.
November 1963	
443	Telegram 2224 from Paris, November 5. Bohlen–de Gaulle discussion of the Berlin situation and the Common Market. Secret; Limit Distribution. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 38–10.
444	Memorandum from Read to Bundy, November 19. Transmits INR Research Memorandum RSB–153, "Soviet Motives in the Recent Autobahn Incidents." Secret; No Foreign Dissemination. 10 pp. DOS, CF, POL 38–10.
445	Memorandum from Cline (CIA) to Tyler, November 8. Transmits CIA memorandum on Soviet motivations and objectives in Autobahn harassments. Secret; Eyes Only; Limited Distribution. 6 pp. DOS, CF, POL 38–10.

No.	Document Description
December 1963	
446	Airgram A–388 from Berlin, December 13. Transmits memorandum of conversation between McGhee and Soviet Amb. to GDR Abrasimov. Confidential. 7 pp. DOS, CF, POL 1 US–USSR.
447	Telegram 2065 from Bonn, December 9. Brandt–McGhee meeting: Christmas passes; East-West talks; Berlin. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 1 US–W GER.
448	Telegram 850 from Berlin, December 24. Long-run implications of Christmas pass policy. Secret; Limit Distribution. 7 pp. DOS, CF, POL 36 GER.
449	Memorandum from Klein to Bundy, December 26. Christmas passes for West Berliners to visit the Eastern sector. Confidential. 3 pp. LBJ Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany–Berlin, Vol. 2.
450	Memorandum of conversation, December 28, between Erhard and Tyler. Erhard's views on various European problems. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 36 GER.

END

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FROM: OSLO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 15, MAY 8, 8 PM (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 15, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL 4.

POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS AND GENEVA

PASS DEFENSE

NAC MINISTERIAL MEETING, MAY 8.

AGENDA ITEM 1 -- REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

SECRETARY RUSK OPENED DEBATE WITH ONE-HOUR PRESENTATION OF NEW ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO WORLD SITUATION, RECEIVED WITH GREATEST ATTENTION BY MINISTERS.

HE NOTED COMPLETE PICTURE OF NEW ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY NOT YET FULLY EMERGED BECAUSE OF PRIORITY TO DOMESTIC LEGISLATION, CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS NOT YET SPOKEN OF SINCE OCCASION HAD NOT YET REQUIRED IT, AND STRESSED ATTEMPT OF NEW ADMINISTRATION TO RE-ESTABLISH LINE OF COMMUNICATION WITH USSR THROUGH BILATERAL TALKS HAVE NOT YET DEALT WITH ANY MAJOR MATTERS.

SAID IT WAS CARDINAL POINT OF ADMINISTRATION THAT POLITICAL NEXUS BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE IS UTTERLY FUNDAMENTAL TO US FOREIGN POLICY. SAID NATO IS PRINCIPAL EXPRESSION OF THIS COALITION OF FREE PEOPLES, AND PLEDGED US TO JOIN WITH ALLIES IN MOVEMENT TOWARDS GREATER UNITY AND STRENGTH TO HELP BUILD VITAL FREE-WORLD SECURITY ATLANTIC AREA. BEFORE TURNING TO SPECIFIC ISSUES, HE INVITED QUESTIONS

396.1-03/5-961 HB3

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FROM NAC ON ANY AND ALL POINTS WITHOUT RESERVATION.

EAST - WEST RELATIONS

HE EXPRESSED GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH C-M(61)28, AND STRESSED SOVIETS NOT JOKING WHEN THEY SAY CO-EXISTENCE IS ALL-OUT STRUGGLE. ON OTHER HAND, KHRUSHCHEV SEEMS CONVINCED SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH COMBINED WITH POLITICAL ACTION WILL GIVE HIM MAJOR GAINS, EXUDES CONFIDENCE WHICH SECRETARY WARNED CAME PARTLY FROM SIGNS OF DISUNITY IN FREE WORLD. ON OTHER HAND, SOVIETS AWARE THAT IN NUCLEAR AGE THERE MUST BE ELEMENT OF CAUTION AGAINST EXCESSIVE RISKS, ALTHOUGH QUESTION WAS WHAT RISKS WOULD BE DEEMED EXCESSIVE. KHRUSHCHEV WANTED TO EXPAND SOVIET POWER SHORT OF UNACCEPTABLE RISKS OF GLOBAL CONFLICT, THOUGH HERE AGAIN QUESTION WAS WHAT ARE UNACCEPTABLE RISKS... HE TRIES TO CONSOLIDATE GAINS IN ADVANTAGEOUS SITUATIONS, IS ALERT TO NEW OPPORTUNITIES, AND PRESSES FOR CONCESSIONS IN NEGOTIATIONS IN ATTEMPT TO ERODE WESTERN POSITION, AND AT SAME TIME TO PORTRAY SOVIET IN PEACEFUL LIGHT. SINCE NEW US ADMINISTRATION IS UNCERTAIN FACTOR TO HIM, HE HAS TRIED NOT TO JEOPARDIZE POSSIBILITIES OF GAINS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

HOWEVER, MILITANT LINE OF CCP MEETING VIGOROUSLY EVIDENCED IN CONGO, SEA, AND CUBA. US DEEPLY CONCERNED AT BLOC EFFORTS TO USE PROCESS OF HISTORICAL EVOLUTION (NATIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT), WHICH ARE REALLY WESTERN IDEAS AND EXPLOIT THEM FOR HIS PURPOSES. HE SEEKS PORTRAY WEST, ESPECIALLY US, AS GUARDIAN OF STATUS QUO. FREE WEST MUST DO WHAT IT CAN TO RECOVER LEADERSHIP OF THIS REVOLUTION, AND THEREFORE US STRESSING NEED FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORM IN ORDER TO ENLIST LOYALTIES OF PEOPLE IN UNDER-DEVELOPED AREAS.

KHRUSHCHEV'S SKILLFUL MIX OF APPARENT REASONABLENESS AND MILITARY AGGRESSIVENESS REQUIRES US TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS IN EACH AREA NOT IN ISOLATION BUT AS PART OF OVER-ALL PATTERN. ANY SOVIET ADVANCE, NO MATTER HOW FAR REMOVED GEOGRAPHICALLY, IS THREAT TO WHOLE FREE WORLD.

SECRETARY

SECRETARY THEN CRITICIZED KHRUSHCHEV'S ATTACK ON STRUCTURE OF UN, ATTRIBUTING IT TO DOCTRINAL DETERMINATION TO UNDERMINE PEACEFUL ADJUSTMENTS OF DISPUTES.

RECOGNIZING RECENT GAINS FOR SOVIET BLOC, HE STRESSED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISABUSE KHRUSHCHEV OF ANY IDEA WEST WOULD ACCEPT ADDITIONAL SETBACKS, SINCE KHRUSHCHEV MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED TO BE MORE AGGRESSIVE ELSEWHERE THINKING THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL RISK. ON THIS SCORE, WHAT NATO DOES AND SAYS AS A GROUP WILL BE MOST CONVINCING. KHRUSHCHEV CONSIDER NATO (OR SOMETIMES US) AS ONLY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENT TO SOVIET POWER. WE MUST MAKE OUR DEFENSES INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE. US IS DETERMINED TO KEEP IN POSITION TO MEET SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER, AND PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT POWER IS COMMITTED TO NATO FOR DEFENSE. RUSSIANS ALSO ARE MAJOR CONVENTIONAL POWER, AND NATO MUST ALSO BE ONE, FOR WHICH REASON PRESIDENT HAS GIVEN ASSURANCES US FORCES IN NATO WILL NOT BE WITHDRAWN.

SOVIETS ALSO NOW PRESENT MAJOR ECONOMIC THREAT TO FREE WORLD, PARTICULARLY IN UNDER-DEVELOPED AREAS, AND FREE WORLD MUST ORGANIZE TO MEET THIS OFFENSIVE. US MAY SEEK FURTHER AID FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT, BUT AT MOMENT HAS FOCUSED ON LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM TO PERMIT LONG-TERM LOANS.

RUSK

MB

NOTE: MR. SMITH (RA) AND MR. HARTLEY (SS) NOTIFIED 8 PM, 5/8/61. CWO-M.

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FROM: OSLO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 15, MAY 8, 8 PM (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 15, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL 4.

POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS AND GENEVA

PASS DEFENSE

BERLIN AND GERMANY

SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY INCREASE TENSION OVER BERLIN, POSSIBLY DURING SUMMER, MOST LIKELY IN FORM OF THREAT OF SEPARATE PEACE TREATY. DEPENDING ON HOW ISSUE IS RAISED, NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE DESIRABLE, AND WEST SHOULD PROMPTLY REVIEW POSITION TO BE TAKEN. IF THEY THREATEN TO SIGN SEPARATE TREATY, MUST BE CLEAR WE CONSIDER SUCH A TREATY VIOLATION OF A LEGAL SITUATION. IF THEY PROCEED NEVERTHELESS WE MUST INSIST ON WESTERN ACCESS RIGHTS, AND MAKE CLEAR WESTERN RIGHTS NOT AFFECTED UNILATERALLY. WE MUST CONVINCE SOVIETS WE ARE PREPARED TO RESIST ENCROACHMENT ON BERLIN. HOPE TO REPORT ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING TO NAC SOON.

NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION

SECRETARY RESUMED SITUATION, SAYING PROSPECTS NOT BRIGHT. SOVIETS INSISTENCE ON TRIPARTITE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL MAY BE OBSTRUCTIONIST OR PART OF FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINE. WE HAVE TABLED REASONABLE TREATY, BUT CANNOT ACCEPT UNWORKABLE TREATY. PUBLIC MUST BE LED TO ACCEPT WE ARE WORKING FOR DECENT WORLD ORDER UNDER LAW, AND CANNOT ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR BEING VICTIMS OF A HOAX WHERE STAKES MAY BE SURVIVAL OF FREEDOM. WE HAVE MADE NO DECISION TO RESUME TESTS, BUT ARE DISTURBED AT UNREQUITED

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MORATORIUM AND GRADUAL EROSION OF POSTURE RE INSPECTION AND CONTROL.

DISARMAMENT

TALKS WITH SOVIETS IN JUNE OR JULY WILL BE ON BASIS OF CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES. THEY WILL DEAL WITH FORUM AND GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF TALKS, BUT WE DO NOT CONTEMPLATE MAKING SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS. HOPE TO CONCLUDE OUR REVIEW BEFORE JULY 31, TO ENABLE FULLEST POSSIBLE CONSULTATION THEREON. DISARMAMENT CANNOT BE VIEWED IN ISOLATION, APART FROM WORLD STRUGGLE AND UNRESOLVED POLITICAL ISSUES, BUT IS ONE ELEMENT IN OUR GOAL TOWARD PEACEFUL WORLD COMMUNITY.

OUTER SPACE AND SCIENCE

SECRETARY SPOKE OF COMMANDER SHEPARD, PLANS FOR MANNED ORBITAL FLIGHT BEFORE END OF YEAR, OTHER LONG-RANGE GOALS, WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH EUROPEAN SCIENTIFIC EFFORT, PARTICULARLY IN FORM OF USING OUR LAUNCHERS, AND URGED FULLEST DEVELOPMENT SCIENTIFIC RESOURCES OF COMMUNITY.

LAOS

HAS BEEN POLICY OF ADMINISTRATION TO SEE LAOS AS NEUTRAL AND UNATTACHED BUFFER FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND US NOT LOOKING FOR MILITARY BASES OR ALLY. US DEEPLY DISTURBED AT COMMUNIST SUPPORT OPENING WAY TO PENETRATION SEA. NOTING IN DETAIL MILITARY GAINS BY COMMUNISTS, SECRETARY SAID THEY COULD CAPTURE MAJOR CITIES WITHIN FEW DAYS IF NOT MET BY PROMPT MILITARY ACTION BY SEATO. CRITICIZED COMMUNIST STALLING ON CEASE-FIRE WHICH STRENGTHENED THEIR POSITION AND MADE OUR BARGAINING POSITION AT CONFERENCE TABLE WEAK. ' WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED AT GRAVITY OF SITUATION SINCE RLG AT MERCY OF COMMUNISTS IF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE NOT BROUGHT TO BEAR. NOT ONLY LAOS BUT ALL OF SEA JEOPARDIZED. LAOS COVERED BY SEATO PROTOCOL, AND HOW WE LIVE UP TO IT CAN BE OF WORLDWIDE EFFECT.

IF CEASE

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IF CEASE-FIRE BROKEN, THERE WILL BE VERY SERIOUS QUESTIONS FOR SEATO, NATO AND UN. WORLD SECURITY NOT DIVISIBLE. MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION SIMULTANEOUSLY BY SEATO AND UNSC. WILL KEEP NATO INFORMED ON CONSULTATIVE BASIS.

VIET-NAM

SECRETARY REVIEWED DETERIORATING SITUATION, AND ALLUDED BROADLY TO MEASURES WE ARE TAKING.

CONGO

AFTER REVIEWING ELEMENTS WHICH GIVE SOME GROUND FOR OPTIMISM, SECRETARYRE-STATED OUR POLICY IN GENERALLY-KNOWN LINES.

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FROM: OSLO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 15, MAY 8, 8 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 15, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL 4.

POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS AND GENEVA

PASS DEFENSE

CUBA

SECRETARY EXPANDED ON DEEP CONCERN OF AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT CUBA IS BASE FOR PENETRATION WESTERN HEMISPHERE, REJECTING ANY INFERENCE THAT OUR ATTITUDE BASED ON APPROACH TOWARDS SOCIAL PROGRAMS OF CASTRO, SEIZURE OF US COMPANIES, ETC. DESCRIBED REASON FOR APRIL 17 EFFORT AND US SUPPORT IN TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY. IF ALL WENT WELL, MIGHT SPARK INTERNAL EFFORT OF OTHER CUBANS. IF NOT, MIGHT REINFORCE GUERILLAS. QUESTION WAS WHETHER TO LET GROUP DO WHAT THEY THEY WANTED TO DO AND ACCEPT THAT SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY. MISJUDGMENT WAS AS TO READINESS AND ABILITY OF CUBANS TO MOVE, AND PERHAPS IN LATE CALLING FOR GUERILLA ACTIVITY. DECISION WAS TAKEN DELIBERATELY AND SOBERLY. FAILURE HAS ENTRENCHED CASTRO MORE FIRMLY THAN EVER. MAY DAY SPEECH MAKES CLEAR CUBA NOW MEMBER OF COMMUNIST BLOC. LATIN AMERICA OPINION NOW CRYSTALIZING AS TO SERIOUSNESS THREAT, AND MOST LA GOVERNMENTS PUBLICALLY OR PRIVATELY ANTAGONISTIC TO CASTRO REGIME. WE ARE CONSULTING WITHIN IA SYSTEM ON MULTILATERAL STEPS. BELIEVE REGIME SHOULD BE ISOLATED POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND, TO EXTENT FEASIBLE, PSYCHOLOGICALLY, SINCE IS BASE FOR PENETRATION AND MAY HAVE TO TAKE MEASURES TO BLOCK ACTION FROM CUBA RE CARIBBEAN AREA. US HAS NOT AND DOES NOT PLAN ARMED ATTACK ON

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-2- SECTO 15, MAY 8, 8 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE), FROM OSLO

ATTACK ON CUBA. HOPE THAT THROUGH NAC CONSULTATION CAN GET COMMON ASSESSMENT OF THREAT, AND THAT BASED THEREON NATO MEMBERS WILL USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA ON THIS SITUATION. STRESSING THAT PROXIMITY TO US NOT KEY FACTOR, BUT RATHER THAT PROBLEM IS ONE OF PENETRATION WESTERN HEMISPHERE, SECRETARY STRESSED NEED FOR HELP FROM FRIENDS LEST US PREOCCUPATION AFFECT OUR EFFORTS IN OTHER PARTS OF WORLD.

CONCLUDING, SECRETARY SAID NATO MOVING INTO NEW AREA IN LIGHT WORLDWIDE NATURE OF COMMUNIST THREAT WHICH IS NO LONGER PURELY MILITARY. WHAT HAPPENS IN ONE PART OF FREE WORLD AFFECTS ANOTHER. DEFENSE OF NATO REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF WORLDWIDE PROBLEMS LEST WE BE OUT-FLANKED AND LOSE FREEDOM OF ACTION.

SARPER (TURKEY) SAID SITUATION HAD DETERIORATED SINCE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING IN LIGHT CONTINUED SOVIET TOUGH LINE AND SUCCESSES CONGO AND LAOS. CUBA THREAT NOT ONLY TO US BUT ALLIES AND FREE WORLD. EXPECTED INCREASED PRESSURE BERLIN AND GERMANY. FORESAW INCREASED SOVIET AID TO UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WITH RESULTANT PENETRATION. APPROVED C-M(61)28. NO CHANGE ULTIMATE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES, AND FLEXIBILITY ONLY IN THEIR TACTICS. WEST, IN VIEW ITS WAY OF LIFE AND TRADITIONS, NOT READY TO MEET THREAT OF STRUGGLE FOR COMMUNIST DOMINATION AND MUST ADAPT ITSELF TO DO SO.

WEST MUST ALSO PROTECT ITS SECURITY AS SOVIETS ARE FORMIDABLE POWER. WE MUST MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE MILITARY STRENGTH AND READINESS. ANY REVISION OF OUR POLICY TO INDICATE HESITATION AT THE THRESHHOLD WILL TEMPT SOVIETS TO DANGEROUS ADVENTURES AND EVEN INVITE AGGRESSION. PRESENT POLICY OF IMMEDIATE RETALIATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED.

AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD BE PREPARD TO DEAL WITH SOVIET METHODS IN NON-MILITARY AREA AND IMPROVE OUR UNITY AND SOLIDARITY.

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 19, MAY 9, 4 AM, (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

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SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 19, PARIS TOPOL 8

POUCHED ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS AND GENEVA

NAC MINISTERIAL MEETING, MAY 8-- AFTERNOON SESSION

AGENDA ITEM I -- REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

DISCUSSION ON GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WAS RESUMED WITH BRENTANO (GERMANY) EMPHASIZING NECESSITY FOR ALLIANCE TO CONTINUE TO REVIEW AND ANALYZE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. RE NATO BLOC IN U.N., STRESSED THERE IS NO QUESTION OF MONOLITHIC BLOC, BUT OF COMMUNITY OF NATIONS WITH RIGHT TO SPEAK WITHOUT HINDRANCE. WITHIN NATO, EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SHOULD NOT INVOLVE ANY NATIONAL, GEOGRAPHIC OR CONTRACTUAL LIMITATIONS ON CONSULTATION. ALLIANCE SHOULD DISCUSS ALL PROBLEMS IN FULL FRANKNESS. NATO SOLIDARITY MUST BE BASED ON FREE WILL OF PARTNERS AND PURSUIT OF COMMON OBJECTIVES. BRENTANO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF APPROACH KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND GREAT SATISFACTION WITH HIS DECLARATION THAT NATO SHOULD FORM CORNERSTONE OF U.S. POLICY. THIS SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, REMAIN UNILATERAL DECLARATION. GERMANY FOR ITS PART SHARED FEELING OF SOLIDARITY IN NATO WHICH REMAINS BASIS OF GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY.

TURNING TO BERLIN, BRENTANO STRESSED SPECIAL OBLIGATION OF WEST GERMANY TO BERLIN'S POPULATION AS WELL AS OBLIGATION TAKEN BY ALL MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE IN DECEMBER 1958 COMMUNIQUE.

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BERLIN SHOULD BE CAPITAL OF FREE, DEMOCRATIC AND REUNIFIED GERMANY.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY CHANGE IN SOVIET INTENTIONS AND TACTICS WHICH IS TO WEAKEN WESTERN WILL TO RESIST. FEBRUARY 17 MEMORANDUM OF KHRUSHCHEV REVEALED DETERMINATION TO PERPETUATE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND MAKE SEPARATE PEACE TREATY. BRENTANO STRESSED THAT IF SOVIETS CAME TO BELIEVE FREE WORLD WOULD NOT RISK ARMED CONFLICT OVER BERLIN, SOVIET TAKE OVER WOULD OCCUR. BRENTANO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF U.S. STATEMENT OF APRIL 26 TO NATO, AND ESPECIALLY OF PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS TO MAINTAIN U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE AND TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF NECESSARY TO DEFEND EUROPE, WHICH GOES FAR BEYOND DEMANDS OF NATO TREATY. BRENTANO CONCLUDED HIS STATEMENT BY REJECTING SOVIET DEFINITION OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. GENEVA CONFERENCE REVEALED INSINCERITY OF KHRUSHCHEV DEMAND FOR GENERAL AND TOTAL DISARMAMENT. SUGGESTED WEST OPPOSE THIS WITH CALL FOR "GENERAL AND TOTAL PEACE".

SPAAK (BELGIUM) DREW PESSIMISTIC PICTURE OF DETERIORATING WESTERN POSITION IN ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA. SUBVERSIVE SOVIET ACTIVITY COVERING WHOLE WORLD REVEALS THAT DESPITE SUCCESS OF ALLIANCE IN KEEPING PEACE, STILL CONFRONTED WITH STRONG SOVIET THREAT. TO OPPOSE THIS SUCCESSFULLY, NATO SHOULD ADAPT ITSELF TO REALITIES OF PRESENT SITUATION. SPAAK STRESSED CERTAINTY OF BERLIN AND GERMAN PROBLEM BEING POSED AGAIN, AND URGED NATO NOT TO AWAIT CRISIS BEFORE PUTTING FORWARD COUNTER PROPOSALS. AS REGARDS CUBA, SPAAK SUGGESTED WOULD BE USEFUL FOR U.S, TO PREPARE WHITE BOOK AS AID TO EUROPEAN ALLIES IN EXPLAINING TO ITS PEOPLE HOW SITUATION DEVELOPED AND WHY U.S. ABSOLUTELY FORCED TO TAKE MEASURES AGAINST CASTRO.

MAJOR PORTION OF SPAAK'S STATEMENT DIRECTED TO AFRICAN PROBLEM. FELT MOST RECENT REPORT OF AFRICAN EXPERTS (C-M(61)35) WAS NOT GOOD ENOUGH, AND ESPECIALLY FAILED TO SAY THAT WHAT SHOULD BE UN POSITION IN AFRICA. SPAAK REPEATED FAMILIAR LINE CURRENT UN POLICY IN AFRICA RAISING MANY DOUBTS IN HIS MIND AND FELT

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ACTIONS TAKEN HAD BROUGHT UNHAPPY RESULTS. SPAAK RAISED POSSIBILITY UN AND KASAVUBU MIGHT TAKE UNITED ACTION AGAINST KATANGA AS RESULT RECENT RECONCILIATION. SAID RECENT EVENTS INVOLVING TSHOMBE MIGHT MAKE RECONCILIATION IMPOSSIBLE AND PERHAPS PRODUCE CHAOS IN KATANGA. URGES THOSE COUNTRIES HAVING INFLUENCE IN UN TO ENCOURAGE LATTER TO TAKE MORE CIRCUMSPECT APPROACH, AND THUS PREVENT COOPERATION BETWEEN UN AND KASAVUBU GOVERNMENT FROM CAUSING CHAOS IN KATANGA. SUGGESTED THESE QUESTIONS BE DISCUSSED IN PERMANENT COUNCIL OR POLAD. NATO CONSULTATION SHOULD NOT CONFINE ITSELF TO FACT-FINDING. IF THIS WERE CASE, BELGIUM MIGHT HAVE TO SEEK FIRMER BASIS OF CONSULTATION IN SOME OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. BELGIUM CANNOT SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS ALONE AND MUST BE ABLE TO COUNT ON MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE. IF NATO ALLIES FIND THEY CANNOT GIVE SUPPORT, THEN NATO SHOULD NOT COMPLAIN IF BELGIUM TRIES TO GET THIS SUPPORT IN ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUM.

SPAAK COMPLAINED PARTICULARLY OVER UN ACTION IN ARRESTING FIVE BELGIAN ADVISERS OF TSHOMBE, TWO OF WHOM STILL DETAINED. FELT UN HERE WAS FAR EXCEEDING ITS COMPETENCE. INDICATED BELGIAN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF FEBRUARY 21 UNGA RESOLUTION, AND HAD INFORMED UNSYG IT IS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW BELGIAN ADVISERS IN AGREEMENT WITH KATANGA, AND IS EVEN PREPARED TO CONSIDER REMOVING THOSE WHO MIGHT BE IDENTIFIED BY UN. HOWEVER STATED IN INTEREST OF PREVENTING CHAOS AND BLOODSHED IN KATANGA, BELGIUM HAD INFORMED UN THAT BELGIANS COULD NOT BE WITHDRAWN UNLESS REPLACED BY OTHER TECHNICIANS AND GIVEN ASSURANCE ORDER WOULD BE MAINTAINED. IN CONCLUSION URGED AGAIN MORE CONSULTATION IN NATO ON AFRICAN PROBLEMS.

LUNS (NETHERLANDS) EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR SECRETARY'S CLEAR AND SOBER EXPOSE OF WORLD SITUATION. EMPHASIZED UNLESS NATO COORDINATED ATTITUDES OF ITS MEMBERS, MAY BE FACED WITH MORE SOVIET FAITS ACCOMPLIS, ESPECIALLY IN BERLIN. SUPPORTED SPAAK VIEWS RE CONSULTATION ON CONGO AND FELT BELGIUM ENTITLED TO KNOW VIEWS OF ITS ALLIES AND TO HAVE THEIR SUPPORT. AS

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LIKEWISE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN POLITICAL COHESION WITH ALLIANCE. AGREED WEST SHOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH SOVIETS AND TO PROBE THEIR INTENTIONS. EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, ANY SUMMIT CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY PREPARED AND OFFER POSSIBILITIES OF SUCCESS. SHARED MISGIVINGS OF GERMAN GOVERNMENT RE SOVIET INTENTIONS RE BERLIN AND URGED EARLY NATO CONSULTATION ON THIS MATTER. IN THIS CONNECTION, URGED STUDY OF ECONOMIC COUNTER MEASURES GO FORWARD.

AGREED THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SOVIET INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE ON DISARMAMENT WITH ANY SINCERITY. FELT, HOWEVER, WEST SHOULD CONTINUE DEVELOP POSITIVE POLICIES ON DISARMAMENT AND SHOW CLEARLY IT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT DISARMAMENT WITH EFFECTIVE CONTROLS. RE UN, NATO MEMBERS SHOULD CONTINUE RESOLUTELY TO OPPOSE SOVIET POSITION ON TRIUMVIRATE AND SHOW UNSYG THAT NATO MEMBERS STILL HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN HIM AND IN UN. IN LESS-DEVELOPED AREAS WHERE SOVIETS ATTEMPTING TO UNDERMINE WESTERN POSITIONS LUNS URGED STUDY OF MEANS TO HELP DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRIES OF THESE AREAS AND WHERE POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARE INVOLVED TO ATTEMPT TO REACH COMMON POSITION. NETHERLANDS IS PREPARED TO ASSIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THESE COUNTRIES.

KRAG (DENMARK) POINTED TO CHALLENGE OFFERED TO WEST IN DEFENDING POSITIONS AMONG UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES. AFRO-ASIAN BLOC IN UN HAD COME TO PLAY MAJOR POLITICAL ROLE. TO MEET NEW SITUATION FELT WEST SHOULD SUPPORT AND NOT WEAKEN UN, MUST NOT EXPECT UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES TO JOIN WESTERN ALIGNMENT, AND SHOULD BE READY TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF THESE COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN ECONOMIC FIELD. IN ORDER TO SATISFY UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES DESIRE FOR REPRESENTATION IN SUCH UN INSTITUTIONS AS SECURITY COUNCIL AND ECOSOC, WEST SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE IN SECURING REDISTRIBUTION OF SEATS SO LONG AS PROBLEM OF COMMUNIST CHINA PREVENTED INCREASE IN MEMBERSHIP OF THESE BODIES.

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RE DISARMAMENT KRAG RECOGNIZED HEAVY BURDENS OF NEGOTIATING COUNTRIES, BUT ASSERTED DENMARK IS WILLING TO DO UTMOST TO HELP SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. EXPLAINED DANISH SPONSORSHIP OF DANISH-GERMAN PROPOSAL IN NAC FOR SECURING INFORMATION FROM NEGOTIATING POWERS THROUGH EXPERTS MEETINGS WAS DESIGNED FOR THIS PURPOSE. EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR COUNCIL'S AGREEMENT TO THIS PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD ASSIST DANISH GOVERNMENT IN UNDERSTANDING DISARMAMENT PROBLEM AND EXPLAINING WESTERN DISARMAMENT IDEAS TO ITS CITIZENS. KRAG CONCLUDED BY EMPHASIZING WEST SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS AT SUMMIT LEVEL, BUT URGED SUCH MEETING BE PROPERLY PREPARED.

NOGUEIRA (PORTUGAL) AGREED ATTITUDES PROVOKING CRISES IN NATO SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AND PORTUGAL IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE. FELT NATO COUNTRIES MUST FACE UP TO REALITIES OF SITUATION IF CATASTROPHE TO BE AVOIDED. ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT SITUATIONS THAT OF UN WHICH COMMUNISTS ATTEMPTING TO MAKE INSTRUMENT OF ITS POLICIES. AT PRESENT TIME UN IS AN INSTITUTION THROUGH WHICH DELEGATES FROM AFRO-ASIAN AREA WHICH REPRESENT NEITHER PEOPLE NOR NATIONS EXERT INFLUENCE ON WORLD POLICY BUT PRINCIPALLY WITH VIEW TO ENHANCING OWN MATERIAL INTERESTS RATHER THAN MORAL VALUES. UN COULD NOT CONTINUE ALONG THIS PATH AND WESTERN ATTEMPTS TO GAIN FRIENDSHIP THESE STATES GENERALLY INTERPRETED AS SIGNS OF WEAKNESS. NATO MEMBERS WHO CURRENTLY CONTRIBUTE ONE-HALF OF

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ONE-HALF OF UN BUDGET WOULD DO BETTER TO SPEND THESE SUMS TO IMPROVE NATO MILITARY POSTURE. NOGUEIRA REPEATED FAMILIAR VIEWS ON ANTI-COLONIALISM AS LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR IN UN WHICH CONCEIVED AS PRINCIPAL ROLE SECURING INDEPENDENCE AND INFLUENCE FOR NEWLY EMERGING COUNTRIES. PORTUGAL IN ITS AFRICAN POLICY DID NOT INTEND TO SACRIFICE ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS TO THOSE OF GREAT POWERS. IN THIS POLICY PORTUGAL FEELS IT IS DEFENDING INTERESTS OF FREE WORLD AS WELL AS ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. AFTER LONG STATEMENT DESCRIBING DIFFERENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN VARIOUS AREAS OF AFRICA STRESSED UN IS UNABLE TO SOLVE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA. FELT SITUATION GENERALLY CALLED FOR DRASTIC REVISION OF THE STRUCTURE OF UN WHICH HE RECOMMENDED NATO MEMBERS UNDERTAKE. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO SEE HOW SOME NATO COUNTRIES FELT THEIR POLICIES COULD BE SUBORDINATED TO UN. POINTED OUT EVEN SOVIET BLOC DID NOT DO THIS. CONCLUDED BY COMMENTING THAT IF WEST FAILED TO WORK FOR COMPLETE CHANGE IN UN STRUCTURE IT WOULD ONLY BE EXPOSED TO MORE BITTER ATTACK AND TO STEADILY DETERIORATING INFLUENCE.

AVEROFF (GREECE) ALSO PAINTED PESSIMISTIC PICTURE OF SITUATION IN AFRICA, ASIA AND EVEN IN EUROPEAN AREAS FROM INCREASING SOVIET INFILTRATION. WITH REFERENCE TO BERLIN SITUATION WONDERED WHAT MILITARY SITUATION REALLY IS AND IF WEST IS PREPARED TO OPPOSE SOVIET MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CITY. ALSO SAW IN SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM FURTHER DETERIORATION OF SITUATION TO ADVANTAGE OF SOVIETS. RE CUBA POINTED TO FEELING OF AMERICAN PEOPLE REGARDING THREAT FROM THAT AREA. FELT THIS SITUATION WHICH AFFECTED US IS BY THAT FACT DANGEROUS FOR FREE WORLD. LATIN AMERICA IS IMPORTANT FOR SECURITY OF US. THEREFORE CUBA PROBLEM IS OF DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE INTEREST TO NATO MEMBERS.

RE BERLIN AVEROFF SHARED VIEWS OF GERMAN GOVT REGARDING POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET ACTION AND FELT THIS MIGHT DEPEND ON WESTERN READINESS TO HAVE WAR TO SAVE BERLIN.

AVEROFF EMPHASIZED ESPECIALLY POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ASPECTS OF SITUATION. REITERATED FAMILIAR GREEK VIEW ON THEIR EXPOSED POSITION TO SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC PENETRATION, CITING INCREASE OF GREEK EXPORTS TO SOVIET BLOC FROM

SOVIET BLOC FROM 11 PER CENT IN 1955 TO 27 PER CENT IN 1960. STRESSED THIS DEGREE OF GROWING ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET BLOC IS THREAT TO GREECE. POINTING TO SOVIET PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CONDUCTED AGAINST GREECE, RECALLED GREEK SUGGESTION FOR SETTING UP EXPERT GROUP TO DEAL WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ESPECIALLY BY FORMULATING ARGUMENTS IN REPLY TO SOVIET PROPAGANDA. URGED NATO ENCOURAGE TRAINING IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND SUGGESTED THIS MIGHT BE DONE THROUGH ATLANTIC INSTITUTE. AVEROFF IN CONCLUSION PROPOSED AGAIN NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING FOR PURPOSE OF REVIEWING GENERAL SITUATION AND POSSIBILITY FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATION WITH SOVIETS.

GREEN (CANADA) DID NOT SHARE PESSIMISM OF PREVIOUS SPEAKERS. FELT NATO SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE DETERRENT FORCE OF ALLIANCE WHICH HAD BEEN FACTOR IN HALTING SOVIET ADVANCE IN EUROPE. AGREED WITH US VIEW ON NEED TO BUILD UP CONVENTIONAL FORCES. HOWEVER FELT IMPORTANT POINT OF SOVIET POLICY WAS ALSO TO EXPLOIT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WEST AND NEW COUNTRIES. LONG TERM NATO AIM THEREFORE SHOULD BE TO CONVINCE NEW COUNTRIES THERE IS NO INTEREST IN ALIGNING THEMSELVES WITH SOVIET BLOC AND FOR THIS UN IMPORTANT. GREEN REPEATED FAMILIAR VIEW THAT IN DEALING WITH DANGEROUS SITUATIONS IN PERIPHERAL AREAS PEACE-MAKING MACHINERY OF BROADLY BASED ORGANIZATIONS LIKE UN SHOULD BE RELIED ON. NATO THEREFORE SHOULD ASSIST AND SUPPORT UN WHOSE ACTIONS ARE ENTIRELY CONSONANT WITH NATO OBJECTIVES OF MAINTAINING PEACE. UN HAD PLAYED IMPORTANT ROLE IN AVOIDING GREAT POWER MILITARY ACTION IN THESE AREAS. REGARDING SPECIFIC LAOS QUESTION INDICATED CANADA SUPPORTED CONCEPT OF UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND NEUTRAL LAOS WITHOUT FOREIGN TROOPS OR BASES. INDICATED THAT IF LAOS WERE TO BE BUILT UP WOULD NEED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE SOME INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY. AGREED SOUTH VIETNAM PROBLEM SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN UP-COMING GENEVA CONFERENCE BUT SUGGESTED IF LAOS AGREEMENT REACHED, COMMUNISTS MIGHT BE LED TO REAFFIRM INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA. RE CONGO GREEN EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR UN ACTION WHICH IS BEST MEANS OF PROTECTING LEGITIMATE WESTERN INTERESTS. UN HAS ALREADY DONE IMPORTANT WORK IN PREVENTING COMPLETE COLLAPSE OF CONGO AND SHOULD PLAY CONTINUING ROLE WITH ACTIVE WESTERN

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SUPPORT. ON DISARMAMENT GREEN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF US ACTION IN RECENT UNGA. FELT IT IMPORTANT HOWEVER FOR WEST TO HOLD INITIATIVE IN VIEW UP-COMING SIXTEENTH GA. AGREED WESTERN POSITION RE COMPOSITION OF DISARMAMENT FORUM AND PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE FORMULATED EARLY. CALLED ATTENTION TO CANADIAN PROPOSAL FOR COMPOSITION IN ITS UNGA RESOLUTION AND TO COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS COMMUNIQUE AS USEFUL BASIS FOR APPROACHING QUESTION OF PRINCIPLES. FELT IT WAS NOT TOO EARLY FOR WESTERN NEGOTIATING POWERS TO ALSO BEGIN WORK ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. AGREED WITH VIEW WEST SHOULD NOW BEGIN STUDY OF NEW GERMAN PROPOSALS IN VIEW SOVIET THREAT TO BERLIN AND SHOULD CONSULT IN COUNCIL ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING. AS REGARDS CUBA, GREEN STATED HE WAS INPRESSED WITH SECRETARY'S REVIEW OF SITUATION WITH WHICH HE GENERALLY AGREED. EXPRESSED DOUBT HOWEVER RECENT MAY DAY STATEMENT OF CASTRO INDICATED COMPLETE ADHERENCE OF CUBA TO SOVIET BLOC. FELT THERE IS STRONG ELEMENT OF NATIONALISM STILL OPERATING THERE. CUBAN PEOPLE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CHOOSE OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT WITHOUT INTERFERENCE. FELT ANY ACTION NECESSARY SHOULD BE TAKEN BY LATIN AMERICAN STATES. HOPED PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATION HAD NOT BEEN RULED OUT.

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ANDREOTTI (ITALY) SPOKE PRIMARILY TO SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA. STRESSED IMPORTANCE IN MIDDLE EAST OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM WHICH SHOULD BE KEPT SEPARATE TO PREVENT THEIR BEING UNITED AGAINST WEST. IN AFRICA THERE IS SAME DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM. NEW STATES THERE ARE NATIONALIST AND ANTI-COLONIALIST BUT NOT COMMUNIST. SOVIETS GENERALLY EXPLOIT THIS NATIONALIST FEELING RATHER THAN ATTEMPT TO BUILD UP COMMUNISM WHICH IS BASICALLY UNPOPULAR IN THESE AREAS. ITALY WELCOMED GRADUAL PROGRESS OF THESE AFRICAN STATES TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE. RE CUBA ANDREOTTI FELT CASTRO HAD DECLARED ALLEGIANCE TO SINO-SOVIET BLOC AND SITUATION THERE SHOULD BE WATCHED CLOSELY.

LORD HOME (U.K.) STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF UNQUALIFIED US AFFIRMATION OF ITS SUPPORT FOR WESTERN EUROPE. NUCLEAR DETERRENT SHOULD BE KEPT AT WHATEVER LEVEL NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN BALANCE OF POWER. FELT DISCOURAGEMENT REFLECTED BY PREVIOUS SPEAKERS WAS NOT JUSTIFIED. FELT MOSCOW CONFERENCE HAD GIVEN INDICATION SOVIETS NO LONGER HAD IDEA OF USING MILITARY FORCE IN EXPANDING THEIR CONTROL. SHOULD BE EXPECTED HOWEVER SOVIETS WILL EXPLOIT LOCAL SITUATION AND DIFFERENCES. AGREED SITUATION IN LAOS, CONGO, CUBA, AND PERHAPS EVEN IN IRAN SERIOUS. ANSWER IS NOT TO DESPAIR BUT TO DO ALL POSSIBLE IN ALLIANCE TO FRUSTRATE SOVIETS. SOVIETS CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO OBSTRUCT MEANS OF

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INTERNATIONAL PACIFICATION IN UN AND OTHER BODIES. WEST THEREFORE CANNOT ACCEPT SOVIET POSITION ON A TRIUMVIRATE. FELT THAT IF QUESTION BROUGHT BEFORE UN BY WEST, COUNTRIES WOULD ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY REJECT IT AND SOVIETS WOULD BE ISOLATED. TURNING TO DISARMAMENT LORD HOME EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT US AND USSR TO DISCUSS SITUATION. IN VIEW COMMUNIST ATTITUDE IN GENEVA NUCLEAR TEST TALKS HE DOUBTED COMMUNISTS WOULD BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO WESTERN DISARMAMENT PLANS. STRESSED HOWEVER IF COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES AND MEMBERS OF THE THREE ALLIANCES AND FRIENDS SHOULD GET TOGETHER THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO PUT SOVIETS IN DIFFICULT POSITION IN UN. ON AFRICAN MATTERS LORD HOME COMMENTED ON STRONG RACIAL AND NATIONALISTIC TRENDS OPERATING IN THE AREA. ADMITTED PORTUGAL CONFRONTED WITH DIFFICULT SITUATION THERE BUT REFRAINED FROM COMMENTING ON PORTUGUESE POLICY WITH WHICH UK CANNOT AGREE. STRESSED IMPORTANCE HOWEVER OF DISCUSSING AFRICAN PROBLEM IN NATO AND SECURING TO GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE COMMON THINKING AND ACTION IN UN. EMPHASIZED UK LEADING ITS DEPENDENT TERRITORIES TOWARD INDEPENDENCE BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY UN RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING DATELINE FOR INDEPENDENCE SINCE THIS COULD ONLY CREATE CHAOS IN AFRICA. IN SOME AREAS UK REQUIRED TEN TO TWELVE YEARS TO BRING COUNTRIES TO INDEPENDENCE. FINALLY LORD HOME STRESSED NECESSITY OF LOOKING FOR AREAS OF AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS BUT MUST NOT LET WESTERN CASE GO BY DEFAULT. MUST INDICATE CLEARLY TO SOVIETS HOWEVER ISSUES ON WHICH WEST DOES NOT PROPOSE TO COMPROMISE. WEST MOREOVER MUST DETERMINE ECONOMIC MEASURES TO MAXIMIZE ITS ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND THUS MAINTAIN STABLE EXPANSION. WEST MUST ALSO IMPROVE ITS COUNTER-PROPAGANDA AND COUNTER-SUBVERSION, ESPECIALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ABOVE ALL MUST FIND GREATER UNITY IN ALLIANCE.

COUVE DE MURVILLE (FRANCE) COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON LAOS SITUATION EMPHASIZING OBJECTIVES OF UNITED, INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN LAOS WHICH MUST BE ATTAINED BY POLITICAL NEGOTIATION. SOLUTION BY FORCE SHOULD BE AVOIDED. RE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT ON DANGERS OF PL GAINING KEY AREAS COUVE FELT SOMEWHAT MORE OPTIMISTIC IN VIEW

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IN VIEW FACT SOVIETS ARE READY TO DISCUSS SITUATION RE SOUTH VIETNAM THOUGH THIS WAS SPECIAL SITUATION MARKED BY CONTRASTS BETWEEN RELATIVELY STABLE AND ECONOMICALLY PROSPEROUS SOUTH VIETNAM AND A NORTH VIETNAM WHERE SITUATION WAS STEADILY DETERIORATING. FELT DIFFICULTY OF SOUTH VIETNAM SITUATION IS FACT GOVERNMENT DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE "EAR OF POPULATION".

COUVE COMMENTED ON SERIOUS CRISIS SITUATION IN ALL PARTS OF WORLD BUT MADE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THOSE ON PERIPHERY AND THOSE WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED CENTRAL. CRISES ON PERIPHERY SUCH AS LAOS, CONGO, ETC DID NOT ENDANGER DIRECTLY SOVIET POWER AND WHILE RUSSIANS ARE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT THESE SITUATIONS TO EXTENT POSSIBLE THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES 100 PER CENT AS SHOWN BY THEIR QUICK WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CONGO. FUNDAMENTAL CRISES ARE THOSE HOWEVER WHICH LIKE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956 DIRECTLY AFFECT SOVIET NATIONAL INTERESTS. GERMANY AND BERLIN REPRESENT CURRENT CRISES OF THIS NATURE. FELT SOVIETS WOULD TAKE INITIATIVE TO SETTLE THIS PROBLEM IN THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST, RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS THEREFORE SHOULD BEGIN TO THINK ABOUT PROBLEMS AFTER WHICH THEY SHOULD COME TO NATO TO EXCHANGE VIEWS. COUVE POINTED OUT THERE WERE TWO ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION: 1) TAKE INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING NEGOTIATIONS OR 2) WAIT UNTIL RUSSIANS TAKE THEIR ACTION, PROBABLY IN FORM OF PEACE TREATY AND THEN CONSULT RE WESTERN REACTION. AGREED WITH VIEW ATLANTIC COUNCIL SHOULD STUDY THIS QUESTION CAREFULLY.

RUSK

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Control: 5580
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1:31 AM

FROM: OSLO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 29, MAY 10, 6 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 29, PARIS TOPOL 12

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NAC MINISTERIAL MEETING, MAY 9 - CONTINUATION AGENDA

ITEM I - REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

LANGE (NORWAY) OPENED MORNING SESSION WITH TRIBUTE TO SECRETARY RUSK FOR HIS ASSURANCE OF CONTINUED US CONTRIBUTION TO NATO SHIELD FORCES INCLUDING NUCLEAR COMPONENTS AND FOR EXPRESSION US SOLIDARITY WITH ALLIANCE. THIS CONSTITUTED GOOD BACKGROUND FOR MEETING, HE THOUGHT. WE HAVE A "SUFFICIENCY OF TROUBLE SPOTS", AND THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT GROWING CONFIDENCE OF SOVIET BLOC, BUT AS STIKKER SAID, WE HAVE PREPONDERANCE OF POWER IF WE USE IT TOGETHER. IF WE MAINTAIN POWER AND SHOW WILLINGNESS TO USE IT IF NECESSARY, EVENTUAL SOLUTIONS WILL BE FOUND AT CONFERENCE TABLE.

LANGE ALSO WELCOMED SECRETARY'S ASSURANCE THAT US DID NOT INTEND USE ITS FORCES IN CUBA.

LANGE THOUGHT NAC SHOULD RESUME DISCUSSION ABOUT BERLIN AND THAT THREE RESPONSIBLE POWERS AND FEDREP SHOULD REVIEW CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR REPORT TO PERMANENT NAC.

LANGE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN DISARMAMENT QUESTION, SAYING HE THOUGHT COMPOSITION OF NEGOTIATING MACHINERY SHOULD FIRST BE

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FIRST BE SUBJECT FOR CONSULTATION AMONG NATO MEMBERS PRIOR TO TAKING UP POINTS WITH SOVIETS.

TURNING TO REMARKS MADE PREVIOUS DAY BY HIS PORTUGUESE COLLEAGUE, LANGE WELCOMED LATTER'S FRANKNESS AND THOUGHT WE SHOULD ALL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 400 YEARS' OLD TRADITION OF PORTUGAL OVERSEAS. NORWAY DOES NOT OBJECT TO FULLEST CONSULTATION ON THESE ISSUES, BUT DOES TAKE DIFFERENT VIEW FROM THAT OF PORTUGAL. IN NORWEGIAN EYES AFRICAN PROVINCES OF PORTUGAL ARE DEPENDENT TERRITORIES ABOUT WHICH GREAT WIND OF CHANGE BLOWING, AND NORWAY CANNOT CLOSE ITS EYES.

AS TO UN, LANGE CAME OUT AGAINST NATO BLOC IN UN APPEARING TO ACT IN DEFENSE WHITE SUPREMACY AND WELCOMED SPAAK'S ASSURANCE ABOUT BELGIAN COOPERATION WITH UN IN CARRYING OUT 21 FEBRUARY RESOLUTION. UN HERE TO STAY IN LANGE'S VIEW, AND DESPITE DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM CHANGES IN VOTING PATTERNS AND INEXPERIENCE OF NEW MEMBERS, HE THOUGHT WE MUST COOPERATE WITH THEM ON BASIS OF RESPECT FOR THEIR NON-ALIGNMENT POLICY. FACT THAT SOVS ATTACK UN MEANS THAT UN OBSTACLE IN THEIR PATH. WE SHOULD KEEP OLD FRIENDS BUT WIN NEW ONES. UN ONLY CAPABLE ORGANIZATION IN FIELD OF EMERGING NATIONS AND IS ESSENTIAL LINK FOR COOPERATION WITH THEM IN SOLUTION THEIR PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY FOR SMALLER WESTERN NATIONS.

LANGE CONCLUDED ON NOTE THAT ALL WILL BE ALL RIGHT IF WE MAINTAIN OUR POWER.

SECRETARY THEN SPOKE BRIEFLY. HE EMPHASIZED WE HOPE HAVE AVAILABLE BEFORE LONG REPORT TO NAC ON STATUS OUR BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND THAT IN RESPONSE SPAAK'S SUGGESTION THAT WE PREPARE WHITE PAPER ON CUBA, HE HAD INSTRUCTED WASHINGTON ISSUE SUCH A DOCUMENT. RE NATO UN BLOC, SECRETARY SAID IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN OUR FEELING THIS WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE BUT THAT ON OTHER HAND WE SHOULD SEEK THROUGH CONSULTATION HARMONIZE VIEWS ON UN QUESTIONS TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. HE REALIZED THAT UN DISCUSSION ON SOME POINTS MIGHT BE PAINFUL TO ONE OR ANOTHER NATO MEMBER,

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NATO MEMBER, BUT THAT IN FACT NATO NATIONS HAVE SHOWN ON MOST ISSUES SOLIDARITY WITH VAST MAJORITY ON UN AND THAT UN WAS PLACE WHERE WE COULD CONFRONT COMMUNIST BLOC WITH "THE REST." NEW UN MEMBERS INEXPERIENCED AND NAIVE, BUT THEY NEED HELP AND GUIDANCE OF KIND ONLY WE CAN GIVE. THIS IS GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR OUR LEADERSHIP. SECRETARY WARNED AGAINST ATTITUDES OR STEPS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO NATO-UN CONFRONTATION. THIS WOULD NOT BE WELL RECEIVED BY AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION.

REFERRING TO SPAAK'S REMARKS ON CONGO, SECRETARY STATED HE WOULD LIKE TO GET VIEWS OF NEW BELGIAN GOVERNMENT ON THIS QUESTION WHICH HE THOUGHT NOW WOULD BE CLOSER TO OUR OWN.

SECRETARY SAID THAT HIS OPENING STATEMENT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO SENSE OF GLOOM, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE REMARKABLE OPPORTUNITIES OPEN TO US AND MANY REASONS FOR CONFIDENCE AND HOPE. HE LIKED NERVE HIS UK COLLEAGUE. COMMUNIQUE SHOULD NOT SHOW SENSE OF PESSIMISM OR LACK OF CONFIDENCE. AS TO QUESTION OF PERIPHERAL VERSUS CENTRAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY HIS FRENCH COLLEAGUE, FACT THAT US WAS INVOLVED AROUND THE GLOBE NATURALLY AFFECTS US POINT OF VIEW. HOWEVER, UNDERLYING FACT WAS THAT CONTEST IS GLOBAL AND MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM SO-CALLED PERIPHERAL QUESTIONS ARE ALSO CRITICAL. OUTFLANKING AND UNDERMINING ACTIONS IN OTHER AREAS AFFECT NATO, AND THOUGH WE HAVE DIFFERENT RESPONSIBILITIES, WE SHOULD ALL BE CONCERNED.

SARPER (TURKEY) THEN SPOKE ON MIDDLE EAST. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THOUGH AREA CALM SINCE LAST MEETING, PROBLEM OF SOV THREAT NO LESS SERIOUS AND TURKISH ESTIMATE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN SOVIET METHODS IN MIDDLE EAST. SUBVERSION AND PROPAGANDA CONTINUE. THOUGH UAR MAY HAVE DIFFERENT MOTIVES FROM SOVS, THEIR POLICIES SERVE SOV PURPOSES. INTERRELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED SOMEWHAT, AND UAR FOLLOWING MORE MODERATE COURSE IN THIS RESPECT, THOUGH SARPER SAID THIS NOT A SIGN THAT PLANS FOR ARAB UNION GIVEN UP. SLOGAN OF IRAQ FOR ARAB SOLIDARITY HAS SOME APPEAL AND HAS ATTRACTED FAVORABLE ATTENTION IN JORDAN, TUNISIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND YEMEN. [illegible] IRE IRAN, SARPER SAID SOV PRESSURE TO OVERTHROW PRESENT REGIME OR DIVORCE IT FROM WEST IS STRONG. TURKEY BELIEVES WEST SHOULD SUPPORT IRAN AND KEEP IT IN CENTO.

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IT IN CENTO. SHAH IS FACTOR OF STABILITY AND SHOULD BE SUPPORTED MORALLY AND MATERIALLY. ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS HAVE CONTINUED TO HARDEN. AFGHAN BEGINNING TO REALIZE RISK INVOLVED IN ACCEPTANCE SOVIET AID THEIR CURRENT 5-YEAR PLAN, AND WEST HAS OPPORTUNITY BLUNT SOVIET ECONOMIC PENETRATION BY HELPING AFGHANS THEMSELVES. JORDAN NOW LESS ISOLATED, AND WEST SHOULD CONTINUE SUPPORT OF HUSSEIN. CENTO PLAYING IMPORTANT ROLE IN CHECKING SOVIET PENETRATION IN AREA.

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SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 29, PARIS TOPOL 12.

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NOGUEIRA (PORTUGAL) TALKED AT SOME LENGTH ON AFRICA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT REPORT OF AFRICAN EXPERTS CONVEYED TRUE OR WHOLE PICTURE AND INDICATED PORTUGUESE HAVE FROM THEIR FIRST-HAND EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA AUTHORITATIVE VIEWS ON THAT CONTINENT. NOGUEIRA SURVEYED AFRICA ALMOST COUNTRY BY COUNTRY WITH PESSIMISTIC EVALUATION IN ALMOST EVERY CASE INSOFAR AS SINO-SOVIET BLOC PENETRATION CONCERNED. REFERRING TO IDEA OF SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT WEST SHOULD ENDEAVOR INFLUENCE SITUATION IN AFRICA AND BRING AFRICANS TO HIGH MORAL AND MATERIAL STANDARDS, NOGUEIRA THOUGHT THIS WAS IMPRACTICABLE SINCE WESTERN VALUES AND IDEALS TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN AFRICA. AFRICAN SOCIETY RULED BY MINORITIES, AND THEY DID NOT TAKE TO PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERNMENT. THIS CREATED KINSHIP WITH SOVIET SYSTEM. WHEN NEW GENERATION TAKES OVER FROM PRESENT WESTERN-TRAINED LEADERS, SITUATION WILL BE EVEN WORSE SINCE NEW MEN ARE COMMUNIST-TRAINED AND INSPIRED. AFRICANS APPEAR TO ACCEPT SINO-SOVIET LINE THAT COMMUNISM IS MERELY A TECHNIQUE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

PORTUGAL AGREES THAT WHAT HAPPENS IN LATIN AMERICA AFFECTS US SECURITY AND THEREFORE SECURITY OF EUROPE. IT WOULD ONLY ADD THAT SECURITY OF AFRICA PLAYS SAME ROLE VIS-A-VIS EUROPE AND THUS IN

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THUS IN AMERICA.

AVEROFF (GREECE) SAYING HIS OPENING COMMENTS HAD BEEN CONSIDERED TOO PESSIMISTIC BY SOME COLLEAGUES, SAID HE HAD ONLY WISHED TO INSPIRE A SPIRIT OF DECISION AND THAT WHILE LORD HOME HAD THAT SPIRIT, HE COULD NOT AGREE WITH LATTER'S OPTIMISM. GREECE SIMPLY DID NOT BELIEVE KHRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENT ON WAR. WHILE THERE WAS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV AND STALIN, THAT DIFFERENCE NOT VERY IMPORTANT. KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON CUBA WAS CITED HERE. WHAT COULD ONE CONCLUDE FROM AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF SITUATIONS IN LAOS, AFRICA, GERMANY AND BERLIN AS COMPARED WITH YEAR AGO? THERE WAS INTERFERENCE IN IRAN, PRESSURES ON GERMANY, NOT TO MENTION GREATER PRESSURE IN THIRD AREA, I.E., THREAT OF BULGARIAN ARMY. THERE MUST BE REASONS FOR BULGARIAN BUILDUP. IN LAST FIVE YEARS GREEK AUTHORITIES HAVE ARRESTED 300 BULGARIAN SPIES, WELL-EQUIPPED AND TRAINED. IT IS ONLY WITH US HELP THAT GREEK ARMY CAN BE STRENGTHENED.

AVEROFF REITERATED HIS FAMILIAR THEME OF NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROPAGANDA IN WEST AND POINTED TO FACT THAT BELGIAN GIFT OF FREEDOM TO CONGO NEVER PROPERLY EXPLOITED FROM VIEWPOINT OF POSITIVE PROPAGANDA. WHILE GREECE NOT TOO HAPPY ABOUT UN, IT STILL VIEWS UN AS ONLY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION WHERE WE CAN COUNTERACT SOV ACTIONS AND PROPAGANDA. THAT IS WHY SOVS TRYING TO DESTROY UN. FUTURE WILL BELONG TO WEST IF IT CAN OVERCOME PRESENT OBSTACLES, FOR LONG-TERM FACTORS IN OUR FAVOR IF PROPERLY USED.

HOME (UK), WHILE AGREEING WITH PORTUGUESE COLLEAGUE RE COMMIE PENETRATION OF AFRICA, SAID ACCOUNT MUST ALSO BE TAKEN OF RIVALRIES THROUGHOUT THAT CONTINENT AND CITED UN VOTES AS SHOWING CONSIDERABLE DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS AMONG AFRICAN MEMBERS.

AFTER A BRIEF REFERENCE TO AFRICA BY SARPER (TURKEY), COUVE DE MURVILLE (FRANCE) STATED OUR TROUBLES NOT ONLY DUE TO COMMUNISM AND THAT

AND THAT MANY PROBLEMS AND CRISES IN THE WORLD WOULD ARISE ANYWAY FROM SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. RUSSIA USES ITS IDEOLOGY AS A WEAPON AND EXPLOITS OUR DIFFICULTY. BRIEFLY ALLUDING TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR BERLIN, COUVE AGREED WITH HIS US AND UK COLLEAGUES THAT NAC SHOULD BE KEPT CONSTANTLY INFORMED. HOWEVER, THESE PLANS SHOULD BE GIVEN SECONDARY IMPORTANCE. REAL PROBLEM IS NOT THE LOCAL MILITARY SITUATION, BUT WHAT OUR POSITION SHOULD BE REGARDING GERMANY IN THE FACE OF RUSSIAN INTERESTS AND POLICIES CONCERNING GERMANY.

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS PRINCIPAL POINTS MADE BY SYG STIKKER IN SUMMING UP AGENDA ITEM 1.

RUSK

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NAC MINISTERIAL MEETING, MAY 9 -- AGENDA ITEM 1 -

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

STIKKER WOUND UP DISCUSSION UNDER THIS HEADING ALONG FOLLOW LINES:

1) HE THOUGHT THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON BACKGROUND PAPERS AND THAT CRITICAL POINTS RAISED BY SPAAK AND NOGUEIRA ON AFRICAN PAPER JUSTIFIED. HE THOUGHT THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT SUCH PAPERS SHOULD BE PREPARED ON BASIS GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTIONS TO EXPERTS.

2) RE GENERAL WORLD SITUATION, WHILE FEW VOICES RELATIVELY OPTIMISTIC, THERE WERE MORE INDICATIONS ON OTHER SIDE RANGING FROM CONCERN TO ALARM. SITUATION APPEARED TO BE ONE OF DETERIORATION AND DANGER. HE WOULD CALL PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO STATEMENT OF SECRETARY RUSK ABOUT DANGER OF USSR UNDERESTIMATING STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION OF WEST AND NOT KNOWING WHEN TO STOP.

3) ON BERLIN, HE THOUGHT THERE WERE THREE CATEGORIES OF PROBLEM CONTINGENCY PLANNING, ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES AND NEGOTIATIONS. HE ASKED IF FOUR GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED COULD GIVE NAC SOME

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INDICATION OF WHAT WAS BEING DONE IN THESE THREE FIELDS.

4) DISARMAMENT QUESTION SHOULD BE HANDLED IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH NAC, AND THIS CONNECTION ATTENTION CALLED TO SECRETARY RUSK'S STATEMENT IN CONTEXT NUCLEAR TEST NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE MUST NOT YIELD POSITIONS ESSENTIAL TO FREE WORLD'S SECURITY.

5) THERE SEEMED TO BE WIDE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT THAT OBJECT OF FORTHCOMING GENEVA CONFERENCE ON LAOS WAS TO ACHIEVE AN INDEPENDENT NON-ALIGNED LAOS FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. STIKKER EXPRESSED HOPE THIS AIM CAN BE REALIZED AT GENEVA.

6) STIKKER THOUGHT THAT POSTION DESCRIBED BY SPAAK RE CONGO WAS NOT ONLY BELGIAN, BUT COULD BE DESCRIBED AS THE WESTERN POSITION, THAT IS, AN INDEPENDENT CONGOLESE FEDERATION IN WHICH WESTERN INTERESTS SAFEGUARDED AND WITH UN PLAYING PROPERLY CIRCUMSCRIBED ROLE.

7) STIKKER REFERRED TO PORTUGUESE AND UK STATEMENTS RE AFRICA IN GENERAL, STRESSING NOGUEIRA'S REMARKS ON EXPLOITATION OF SITUATION BY SOVIETS AND HOME'S COMMENTS ABOUT PREMATURE INDEPENDENCE.

8) CUBA - SINCERITY AND FRANKNESS OF SECRETARY RUSK'S STATEMENT APPRECIATED AS WELL AS FACT HE ACKNOWLEDGED MISTAKES HAD BEEN MADE. GENERAL FEELING ON ALLIANCE IS THAT WE ARE WEAKENED AS A WHOLE BY WEAKENING OF US POSITION IN LATIN AMERICA. HE TOOK NOTE OF SECRETARY'S ALLUSION TO GREAT INTEREST US PUBLIC OPINION IN CUBAN EVENTS AND RELATIONSHIP THIS MIGHT HAVE TO US INTERESTS OUTSIDE HEMISPHERE. HE WAS GLAD TO NOTE THAT US WOULD ISSUE WHITE PAPER ON CUBA, AND HE THOUGHT MATTER SHOULD BE KEPT UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW.

9) IRAN. STIKKER SIMPLY NOTED REMARKS OF HOME AND SARPER.

10) UN. HE REFERRED TO STRONG WESTERN POSITION IN UN AND FACT THAT WE MUST HAVE SUPPORT OF UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES. HE

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CONSIDERED IT AGREED THAT NATO WOULD NOT ACT AS BLOC WITHIN UN.

11) STIKKER THOUGHT AVEROFF NOTE OF ALARM ON PSYCHOLOGICAL FRONT WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO NATO COMMITTEE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION.

12) STIKKER SUGGESTED THAT QUESTION OF NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING MIGHT BE STUDIED BY PERMANENT NAC.

13) CONSULTATION - DISCUSSION HAD SHOWN THERE WERE NO GEOGRAPHIC TABOOS ON CONSULTATION. NOTED US HOPE FOR COMMON ASSESSMENT OF THREAT RE CUBA AND THAT THIS MIGHT BE THROUGH SUPPORTING ACTIONS. THIS HAS SHOWN THAT REAL CONSULTATION NOT A ONE-WAY STREET.

STIKKER CONCLUDED HIS SUMMING UP BY SAYING HE AGREED WITH SECRETARY RUSK THAT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD REFLECT HOPE AND CONFIDENCE, NOT GLOOM. HE ASSUMED HE COULD SAY THAT MINISTERS HAD TAKEN NOTE OF HIS OBSERVATIONS AND ASK NAC TO GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO VARIOUS POINTS.

RUSK

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FROM: Oslo

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NO: SECTO 31, May 10, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 31, REPEATED INFORMATION BRUSSELS 6, OTTAWA 7, COPENHAGEN 65, PARIS 72, BONN 19, ATHENS 1, REYKJAVIK 10, ROME 10, LUXEMBOURG 1, THE HAGUE 19, LISBON 5, ANKARA 1, LONDON 320

Subject: NAC Ministerial meeting: morning session: May 9: Agenda.

Item II (annual political appraisal) (discussion of sixes and sevens).

Although subject sixes and sevens note expected to come up at NAC Ministerial Meeting, Danish Foreign Minister Krag raised it under agenda Item II. (This was only subject discussed under item II). Krag said that Danish Government must be interested in progress toward European economic integration and had strongly favored talks between the EEC and EFTA to this end. Danish Government has always maintained that a split between the six and seven would be very detrimental to European economic cooperation and would have very serious political implications as well. Denmark would welcome UK negotiating with the EEC countries on the basis of the Rome treaties. If these negotiations led toward UK adherence to six, Denmark would also want to initiate negotiations with six. Further important question requiring attention relates to other EFTA countries, not members of NATO, is is important not to "let down" the neutral EFTA countries and they should be allowed to participate in the negotiations. Denmark feels that lasting, health European economic integration is very important to the entire Atlantic community, to the OECD and to NATO. Krag concluded by recommending that the NATO communique contain a specific

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a specific reference to the importance of European Economic Integration and to the importance of an early solution.

Spaak (Belgium) said that his government was of course happy to welcome any development which strengthens European and Atlantic community. His government strongly supports movement toward integration of six and hopes that it would lead to complete or very full integration as soon as possible. Spaak pointed out that the participation of other countries raises may very serious problems which must be given due account. Acceptance of the treaties means acceptance of such fundamental powers as weighted voting. Accepting essential points of Rome treaties is very major step. Spaak also pointed out that Rome treaties should not be regarded as end in themselves (it should be understood that six country integration movement has further political goals beyond more specific economic objectives in Rome treaties. These are basic questions which those who are thinking of joining Rome treaties should be carefully in mind.) In afternoon session Spaak later noted reservation re putting discussion EEC questions in OECD. These discussions concern six primarily and should take place between six and other countries directly concerned.

RUSK

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NO: SECTO 31, May 10, Noon (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 31; REPEATED INFORMATION BRUSSELS 6, OTTAWA 7, COPENHAGEN 65, PARIS 72, BONN 19, ATHENS 1, REYKJAVIK 10, ROME 10, LUXEMBOURG 1, THE HAGUE 19, LISBON 5, ANKARA 1, LONDON 320.

Lord Home (UK) said that he would like it understood first of all that his government welcomed formation of Six. HMG favors more United Europe. Nevertheless, division in Europe does exist and UK wants to see it healed. UK understands that Rome Treaties do involve political considerations. One further point: UK does intend to take account of interests of its colleagues in EFTA and in Commonwealth.

Chairman (Stikker) then suggested that council merely take note of statement by Mr. Krag and pointed out that there were other forums for discussion this question. Stikker then called for comments on Krag's specific suggestion that statement on further European economic integration be included in communique.

Lange (Norway) thought would be unfortunate to include item in communique. Might be difficult to agree on language.

Regarding forum for discussing question, Norway feels OECD is most suitable, where US, Canada and other interested countries can participate. Home supported exclusion of item from communique. Luns (Netherlands) also agreed re-exclusion, although agreeing question raised by Mr. Krag one of highest importance. Brentano (Germany) also agreed

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regarding exclusion from communique, saying that question was too delicate for inclusion in communique. Green (Canada) also agreed exclusion from communique, stressing OECD is forum for dealing with substance of question.

Krag then withdrew suggestion for inclusion in communique after which Stikker said probably best not only drop from communique but also not to mention to press at all that subject had been discussed. Krag said Danish Government felt that subject should be mentioned at NATO Meeting, largely because it was important politically. He stressed that he had no intention of "taking anything away" from OECD but felt it important for NATO discussion because of its political importance. He said that he would have to reserve with respect to informing Danish press at least to extent of saying that he himself had raised it. (Agreed NATO ground rules provide that each Foreign Minister is responsible for informing his own press about what he himself has said).

In Afternoon session Secretary spoke on same subject during his statement on long-term planning, economic aspects. Secretary said he did not wish his silence during morning discussion reported above to imply any unclarity with respect to US position. Stated US believes that OECD should provide forum within which common economic problems of Atlantic Community can be discussed and common approach found. Said he would like to make clear, since several delegates had referred to position of their governments on Rome Treaty, that US Government position of long-standing support for principle of European economic and political integration along lines of Six in treaty of Rome, remains unchanged. United States Government considers that OECD should provide and excellent framework for forging of increased economic unity and policy coordination in Atlantic Community which will minimize problems of those countries unable to undertake far-reaching commitments and obligations of Rome Treaty.

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Control: 5729
Rec'd: MAY 10, 1961
6:53 AM

FROM: OSLO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 32, MAY 10, 11 AM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1961 MAY 10 PM 21

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 32, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS IOPOL 14.

POUCHED ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS.

NAC MINISTERIAL MEETING, MAY 9.

AGENDA ITEM III, LONG TERM PLANNING.

DISCUSSION THIS ITEM OPENED BY HOME (UK) WHO COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON SOME POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PROBLEM. HOME OBSERVED COMMUNIST THREAT INCREASINGLY BECOMING ONE OF SUBVERSION IN ALL WORLD AREAS AND THUS HAS UNIVERSAL REPERCUSSIONS. HAD COME TO CONCLUSION THEREFORE NATO SHOULD DEVELOP HABIT OF CONSULTATION ON MATTERS OUTSIDE NATO AREA. SHOULD AVOID, HOWEVER, GIVING APPEARANCE NATO INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OTHER COUNTRIES. WHILE AIM SUCH CONSULTATION SHOULD BE GREATEST POSSIBLE RECONCILIATION OF VIEWS AMONG ALLIES, MUST RECOGNIZE UNITY OF VIEWS CANNOT ALWAYS BE ACHIEVED. RE POSSIBLE MACHINERY FOR IMPROVING CONSULTATION, MENTIONED FAMILIAR UK PROPOSAL FOR ATLANTIC ADIVISORY GROUP COMPOSED OF PLANNING OFFICIALS FROM FOREIGN MINISTRIES.

RE MILITARY PLANNING, HOME STATED PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL STUDY WHICH SHOULD BE CARRIED ON IN PERMANENT COUNCIL. OBJECT SHOULD BE NOT TO ALTER STRATEGIC CONCEPTS BUT TO DETERMINE HOW OUR FORCES CAN BE UTILIZED MOST EFFECTIVELY. RE NUCLEAR MISSILES AND WEAPONS PROBLEMS, HOME STATED PRESENT MEETING NOT TIME TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN UP IN MILITARY STUDY. MINISTERS AT F

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THIS TIME SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON ESTABLISHING STUDY PROGRAM WHICH WOULD PERMIT RESULTS TO BE CONSIDERED AT DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING. SUGGESTED STUDIES MIGHT BE COMPLTED BY SEPTEMBER AND REFERRED TO DEFENSE MINISTERS BEFORE CONSIDERATION BY MINISTERIAL MEETING IN DECEMBER.

HOME DREW ATTENTION TO BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DIFFICULTIES OF THOSE COUNTRIES LIKE UK WHICH MAINTAIN LARGE FORCES OUTSIDE OF THEIR TERRITORY AND SPEND LARGE AMOUNTS IN AID TO LDCS. EMPHASIZED BURDENS OF ALLIANCE SHOULD BE SHARED AND NOT PERMITTED TO LEAKEN ANY COUNTRY. PROPOSED STUDY OF THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN CONCURRENTLY WITH STUDY OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

SARPER (TURKEY) SPOKE TO MILITARY PLANNING, DEVELOPING FAMILIAR TURKISH THEME THAT CURRENT THINKING ON FORCE CONCEPTS, LIMITED WAR, AND NATO STRATEGY RISKED LIMITING NATO DEFENSE CAPACITY TO ADVANTAGE OF SOVIETS. UNLESS IN ADDITION TO AND NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR PRESENT POLICY, PROPOSAL TO RAISE THRESHOLD WOULD REFLECT UNTESTED POLICY WHEREAS PRESENT POLICY PROVIDES SUCCESSFUL DETERRENT WHICH WE ALL WANT. SARPER STATED MC-70 GOALS ESTABLISHED IN FRAMEWORK OF NUCLEAR DETERRENT. RAISING THRESHOLD WOULD INCREASE EXPENDITURES AS WELL AS CREATE HOST OF OTHER PROBLEMS. EMPHASIZED THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE NATO MILITARY STRATEGY MIGHT RISK REMOVING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST SOVIET PRESSURE AND ENCROACHMENTS. ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT WEAKNESSES OF PROPOSALS IS THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE DEFINITION OF CIRCUMSTANCES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER ACTION ALL-OUT WAR OR LIMITED AGGRESSION. THIS COULD ONLY GIVE RISE TO SERIES OF SOVIET FAITS ACCOMPLIS WHICH WEST WOULD BE COMPELLED TO ACCEPT. UPSHOT MIGHT BE COLLAPSE OF ENTIRE NATO DEFENSE SYSTEM.

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LUNS (NETHERLANDS) STRESSED NECESSITY OF USING SYSTEM OF CONSULTATION TO FULL IN INTEREST GREATER NATO SOLIDARITY AND UNITY. PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT GOVERNMENTS CONSULT BEFORE FIXING NATIONAL POLICIES. GOVERNMENTS SUBMITTING PROBLEMS FOR CONSULTATION MUST BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT CRITICISM AND MUST REALIZE ALLIES MIGHT NOT AGREE WITH ITS VIEWS. LUNS ALSO STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF LARGER POWERS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT INTERESTS OF SMALLER MEMBERS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING IN DECISIONS. SUPPORTED IDEA OF CONSULTATION ON MATTERS OUTSIDE NATO AREA AND OF ATTEMPING TO COORDINATE VIEW IN UN. LUNS ALSO SUPPORTED PROPOSAL FOR SELECT COMMITTEES WHICH HE FELT SHOULD BE OPEN TO PARTICIPATION OF ALL MEMBERS. DOUBTED USEFULNESS OF ATLANTIC ADVISORY GROUP AS PUT FORWARD BY US BUT AGREED WITH UK APPROACH. LUNS CONCLUDED THAT IF DETERMINED EFFORT MADE TO IMPROVE POLITICAL CONSULTATION, NATO WOULD BE ABLE FACE FUTURE WITH CONFIDENCE.

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Control: 6154
Rec'd: MAY 10, 1961 2:51 PM

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FROM: OSLO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 33, MAY 10, 7 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 33, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL 15.

POUCHED ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS AND GENEVA

NAC MINISTERIAL MEETING: MAY 9 -- AFTERNOON SESSION

AGENDA ITEM III -- LONG TERM PLANNING

BRENTANO (GERMANY) GAVE FULL APPROVAL TO PERMANENT COUNCIL REPORT ON POLITICAL CONSULTATION. SUPPORTED MORE RESORT TO COMMITTEES, AS SUGGESTED BY UB, ON UNDERSTANDING MEMBERSHIP WOULD REMAIN OPEN-ENDED. SUGGEST POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES MIGHT BE ADDED TO PRESENT TERMS OF REFERENCE OF EXPERT COMMITTEES. ALSO SUPPORTED UK PROPOSAL FOR MEETINGS OF POLICY PLANNING EXPERTS OF FOREIGN MINISTRIES. INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH US COMMENT IN MORNING SESSION ON BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING, AND EXPRESSED HOPE FOR EARLY DISCUSSION IN PERMANENT COUNCIL, SO ALL ALLIES COULD BE INFORMED.

BRENTANO ALSO FAVORED ADOPTION OF COMMON POLICIES TO MEET SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE, TO GREATEST POSSIBLE EXTENT, AND RECOMMEND COUNCIL GIVE DETAILED STUDY TO MATTER IN COMING MONTHS. WHILE APPROVING REPORT ON CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING, CALLED FOR FURTHER STUDY BY COUNCIL ON BASIS OF GERMAN PROPOSALS, WITH POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DISCUSSION AT MINISTERIAL MEETING DECEMBER. ALSO CALLED FOR MORE ACTIVITY IN FIELD OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND CREATING FAVORABLE PUBLIC OPINION FOR WESTERN POLICIES, FOR EXAMPLE WITH RESPECT TO WESTERN AID OF UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS. FINALLY, SUGGESTED IN THIS CONNECTION WESTERN ADOPTION OF SLOGAN "GENERAL AND TOTAL PEACE

KRAG

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KRAG (DENMARK) MADE PLEA FOR ADOPTION BY NATO COUNTRIES OF COMMON MUTUAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY. PROTECTIONISM STILL PREVAILS AND NATO INITIATIVE TO REVERSE TREND WOULD STRENGTHEN GENERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION. DENMARK SUPPORTS DUTCH PROPOSAL THAT INTRA-WESTERN AVIATION POLICIES BE STUDIED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH DISCUSSIONS OF COMMITTEE RECENTLY PROPOSED TO EXAMINE ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SOVIET BLOC. IF PRESENT PROTECTIONIST TREND CONTINUES SOME SMALLER COUNTRIES FACE PROSPECT TERMINATION THEIR AIR SERVICES. NATO PROPER FORUM FOR DISCUSSION THIS PROBLEM, IN AD HOC COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD SUGGEST MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BY RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS. ON POLITICAL CONSULTATION, COMMENDED EXCELLENT STATEMENTS PREVIOUSLY MADE AND ACCEPTED WITH SOME CAUTION IS RECOMMENDATION FOR AD HOC COMMITTEES AND BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR MEETINGS OF POLICY PLANNERS, ON CONDITION MEMBERSHIP OPEN-ENDED. STRESSED IMPORTANCE CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING BOTH FOR CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENT AND NEEDED PROTECTION IN WAR TIME. WORK NEEDED PARTICULARLY TO DEVELOP WAR TIME AGENCIES.

GREEN (CANADA) COMMENDED PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION REPORT AND NOTED WILLINGNESS MEMBERS AT THIS MEETING SPEAK FRANKLY ON QUESTIONS ARISING ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. NOW UP TO MEMBERS TO TAKE PART IN PROCESS OF CONSULTATION TO LIVE UP TO PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN REPORT, WHICH GO AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME. REJECTED IDEA OF ATLANTIC ADVISORY GROUP ALTHOUGH HE REALIZED HE MIGHT BE FLOGGING DEAD HORSE. THOUGHT UK PROPOSAL FOR MEETINGS OF POLICY PLANNERS MIGHT BE WORTH FURTHER STUDY BUT WOULD NOT GO FURTHER AT THIS TIME. SEES SOME MERIT IN US PROPOSED COMMITTEES IF SECRET AND OPEN-END IN MEMBERSHIPS. THROUGH PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO IMMEDIATE RESPONSIBILITIES, ESPECIALLY BERLIN AND DISARMAMENT. THOUGHT COUNCIL STUDIES ON DISARMAMENT, PERHAPS THROUGH MECHANISM RECENTLY ESTABLISHED COMMITTEE PROPOSED BY GERMANS AND DANES, COULD BE HELPFUL TO COUNCIL AND TO NEGOTIATING GOVERNMENTS. SUPPORTS PROPOSAL FOR NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING AFTER CAREFUL PREPARATION, HOPEFULLY BEFORE END OF THIS YEAR. SUCH MEETING WOULD HELP STRENGTHEN WESTERN COHESION AND PURPOSES OF ALLIANCE GENERALLY. 301

ANDREOTTI

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-3- SECTO 33, MAY 10, 7 PM FROM OSLO

ANDREOTTI (ITALY) AGREED WITH GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION REPORT AND THOUGHT MEMBERS SHOULD AIM FOR HARMONIZATION OF POLICIES AT MINIMUM IN ORDER STRENGTHEN ALLIANCE POLITICAL SOLIDARITY. FAVOR ANY NEW PROPOSAL FOR PROCEDURAL IMPROVEMENT PROVIDING COUNCIL COMPETENCE TO TAKE DECISIONS MAINTAINED. STRESSED WILL TO CONSULT BEFORE TAKING DECISIONS AS FUNDAMENTAL POINT, URGING MORE FRANKNESS AND AIRING OF DIFFERENCES IN COUNCIL THAN PREVIOUSLY. GAVE SUPPORT TO COMMON ECONOMIC POLICY THROUGH OECD AND TO NATO COORDINATION OF POLICIES OF EAST-WEST TRADE, BASED ON EQUALITY AND PARITY IN RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NATO MEMBERS. NATO SHOULD NOT INTERFERE DIRECTLY IN ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARD MEETING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. AGREED WITH OTHERS THERE SHOULD BE INCREASED EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION, PARTICULARLY IN UNCOMMITTEE COUNTRIES.

ANDREOTTI AGREED MILITARY STRATEGY QUESTIONS SHOULD BE STUDIED IN APPROPRIATE BODIES BUT MADE POINT THAT MEMBERS SHOULD AVOID PUBLIC STATEMENTS BEFORE FULL DISCUSSION SINCE PREMATURE DISCUSSION OF ANY STRATEGY CHANGES MIGHT HAVE ADVERSE EFFECT ON MORALE OF ALLIANCE ARMED FORCES. SAID ITALY PREPARED TO TAKE PART IN DISCUSSIONS ON USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS [redacted] ALLIANCE NEEDS FLEXIBLE RESPONSE CAPABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO PROTECT TREATY AREA BY ALL MEANS. NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID TO LEAD ENEMY TO THINK THERE IS A WEAKNESS AT ANY POINT IN OUR DEFENSE.

SCHAUS (LUXEMBOURG) ADVOCATED PERMANENT COOPERATION AMONG ATLANTIC COUNTRIES AND READINESS OF ALL GOVERNMENTS TO SATISFY LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES IN PROBLEMS WITH WHICH THEY ARE DEALING. INTENT SHOULD BE TO REACH AGREEMENT IN CONSULTATION RATHER THAN "AGREEING TO DISAGREE". SUPPORTED COMMITTEE IDEA UNDER CONDITIONS STATED BY OTHERS. FAVORED A NATO ECONOMIC DIRECTIVE

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DIRECTIVE AND PERHAPS AN ECONOMIC STUDY GROUP WHICH COULD RECOMMEND NATO INITIATIVES IN MEETING SOVIET ECONOMIC CHALLENGE WHICH OECD WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO DO. COUNCILS OF TWO ORGANIZATIONS COULD AVOID DUPLICATION. ALSO SUPPORTED RECOMMENDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION AND CIVIL DEFENSE.

THE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK WHICH CAME AT THIS POINT WILL BE SUMMARIZED IN SEPARATE CABLE. SECOND PART OF AFTERNOON SESSION WILL ALSO BE REPORTED IN SEPARATE MESSAGE.

RUSK

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FROM: OSLO - CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 34, MAY 10, 7 PM

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NAC MINISTERIAL MEETING: MAY 9 -- AFTERNOON SESSION

AGENDA ITEM III - LONG TERM PLANNING

SUMMARY OF STATEMENT BY SECRETARY

1. POLITICAL QUESTONS

SECRETARY ENDORSED CONCLUSIONS OF PERMANENT COUNCIL REPORT ON LONG-TERM PLANNING. CITING UNANIMOUS TESTIMONY OF COUNCIL TO VALUABLE GUIDELINES PROVIDED BY THREE WISE MEN OF 1956, STATED US RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTORY JUDGMENT OF MOST OF COUNCIL OPPOSING ADVISORY GROUP US HAD PROPOSED, AS KIND OF CONTINUING WISE MEN'S OPERATION.

STRESSED POLITICAL TIE BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE, THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, AS FOUNDATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY. COHERENCE AND STRENGTH OF NATO AS PRINCIPAL FORM OF THIS COALITION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. FOR FRANK CONSULTATION AS MEANS TO THIS END, AND WILLINGNESS ALTER POLICIES IN LIGHT OF DISCUSSIONS. CITED ALLIANCE SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING CONSENSUS RE DIRECT EAST-WEST RELATIONS, BUT POINTED TO DIFFICULTY OF ACHIEVING CONSENSUS ON ISSUES AFFECTING OTHER AREAS OF WORLD. ON COLONIAL ISSUE, PERHAPS SINGLE ISSUE ON WHICH ACUTE DIFFERENCES, US BELIEVES CANNOT TURN BACK TIDE OF NATIONALISM. CANNOT DEAL WITH PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN GENERAL TERMS, BUT US PREPARED SIT DOWN WITH OUR FRIENDS AND TRY TO AGREE ON HOW HANDLE CONCRETE PROBLEMS. IF WE CANNOT AGREE,

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SHOULD AT LEAST THROUGH CONSULTATION AND EFFORT MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AVERT DAMAGE TO WESTERN COALITION. POINTED TO PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN CONSULTATION PROCESS. CANNOT EFFECTIVELY CONSULT ON SWIFT-MOVING OPERATIONS OR TACTICAL SITUATIONS IN UN, BUT THOROUGH PRIOR CONSULTATION ON POLICY ISSUES WILL ENABLE GOVTS DEAL WITH EACH OTHER MORE QUICKLY WHEN A CRISIS ARRIVES.

US APPRECIATES DESIRABILITY OF CONSULTING MORE FREQUENTLY, BUT IS NO AGREEMENT ON HOW THAT CAN BEST BE DONE. AT TIMES HARD TO SAY IF A GOVERNMENT WISHES TO BE CONSULTED OR NOT. ALSO, US "DECISION-MAKING" PROCESS COMPLEX, DIFFICULT TO CONSULT DURING PROCESS, WHILE AT ITS END POSITIONS FAIRLY WELL FIXED. WOULD APPRECIATE OTHER GOVERNMENTS, WHICH IN GENERAL AWARE OF PROBLEMS WE FACE, TAKING INITIATIVE TO EXPRESS OPINIONS AND ADVICE AT EARLY ENOUGH STAGE OF PROCESS TO MAKE IMPACT.

ALSO SUGGESTED MIGHT BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN NAC REVIEW EACH FALL OF ITEMS ON UN AGENDA, TO SEE WHERE MORE CONSULTATION AMONG NATO GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

2. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

US ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OECD ROLE IN ATLANTIC COMMUNITY COOPERATION, INCLUDING HELP TO LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. IN REFERENCE TO POINT ON ROME TREATY MADE BY KARG (DENMARK) IN MORNING SESSION, SECRETARY SAID HE DID NOT WISH INFERENCE TO BE DRAWN FROM HIS SILENCE THAT US GOVERNMENT HAS IN ANY WAY CHANGED ITS POSITION OF LONG-STANDING SUPPORT FOR PRINCIPLE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND POLTICAL INTEGRATION ALONG LINES OF SIX IN TREATY OF ROME. US CONSIDERS THAT OECD SHOULD PROVIDE AN EXCELLENT FRAMEWORK FOR FORGING OF INCREASED ECONOMIC UNITY AND POLICY COORDINATION IN ATLANTIC COMMUNITY WHICH WILL MINIMIZE PROBLEMS OF THOSE COUNTRIES UNABLE TO UNDERTAKE FAR-REACHING COMMITMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF ROME TREATY.

NATO HOWEVER HAS IMPORTANT ROLE IN ECONOMIC FIELD. CONFIDENT ANY JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS WILL BE RESOLVED WITH EXPERIENCE.

NATO

NATO SHOULD BE CONCERNED WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF COMMON DEFENSE, ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF MEMBERS WITH SINO-SOVIET BLOC, AND SPECIAL EMERGENCY MEASURES TO COUNTER SPECIFIC SINO-SOVIET THREAT IN A LESS-DEVELOPED AREA. AS URGENT MATTER ALSO SEE INCREASING NEED FOR ALLIANCE ESTABLISH FACTS AND CONSULT BOARDLY ON SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE, AND TO DEVELOP, AMONG NATO MEMBERS, DETERMINATION TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE.

3. MILITARY QUESTION

TOUCHED ON DEFENSE QUESTIONS GENERALLY AND BRIEFLY, IN VIEW OF IMPORTANCE OF SUBJECT, THOUGH NOT ON AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION AT THIS MEETING.

REAFFIRMED IMPORTANCE US ATTACHES TO STRENGTHENING OF NATO'S DEFENSE POSTURE THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE INTERPRETATION OF EXISTING STRATEGY, ALONG LINES ALREADY PRESENTED TO COUNCIL. WE HOPE INITIAL US VIEWS WILL BE DISCUSSED FULLY IN COUNCIL, TOGETHER WITH VIEWS OF OTHERS, AND THAT MANY SPECIFIC PROBLEMS INVOLVED WILL FIND ANSWERS. MUST BE ANSWERED CONVINCINGLY IN ORDER MAINTAIN WILL AND ABILITY TO RESIST EFFECTIVELY THREATS OF AGGRESSION IN NATO AREA. US INTENDS TOWARDS THIS END TO MAINTAIN OUR OWN FORCES AND SUPPORTING UNITS IN EUROPE, AND TO MAINTAIN IN EUROPEAN AREA AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY FOR USE OF OUR OWN AND OTHER NATO FORCES IF NEED SHOULD ARISE. ALSO TO SERVE THIS PURPOSE WE BELIEVE NATO MUST INCREASE STRENGTH OF ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO PERMIT FLEXIBILITY OF RESPONSE AND TO ENSURE THAT OUR OVER-ALL DETERRENT POSTURE IS CREDIBLE, BOTH TO OUR OWN PEOPLE AND TO OTHER SIDE. FINALLY, TO MEET NEEDS OF ALLIANCE STRENGTH WE WILL COMMIT POLARIS SUBMARINES TO NATO, HOPING THAT THIS WILL LEAD TOWARD FURTHER MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN NORTH ATLANTIC AREA DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF NATO, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO EXAMINE NEW POLITICAL METHODS WHICH NATO MIGHT ADOPT WITH RESPECT TO USE OFF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO FORCES.

WE RECOGNIZE MANY PROBLEMS INVOLVED, WHICH MUST BE ANSWERED IN DETAIL, AND URGE PERMANENT COUNCIL, IN CONJUNCTION WITH NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, TO PROCEED WITH MATTER VIGOROUSLY, AND DEVELOP

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-4- SECTO 34, MAY 10, 7 PM, FROM OSLO - CORRECTED COPY

DEVELOP POLICY GUIDANCE FOR NATO DEFENSE PLANS AND PROGRAMS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.

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Conference Files: Lot 65D366, CF1460

[redacted]

Spaak (Belgium) expressed reservations on questions relating EEC in OECD, reported separately. Turning from economic questions to political consultations, he deplored lack of progress this area since Wise Men's Report and warned cannot meet Soviet threat if consultations confined to matters within area of Alliance. While expressing attachment to "ideals" of U.N., concerned that countries with legitimate interests are not supported by NATO Allies in U.N. Mentioned specifically Belgium, Portugal and U.K. and said one day even U.S. may find itself in this position. While he agreed there should not EET not be NATO bloc in U.N., said there was important gap between formation NATO bloc in U.N. and nothing at all, which had not been filled in NATO consultations.

Spaak urged improvement political consultations by establishing permanent committees with precise terms of reference and select

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[redacted] gational for

[redacted] patient. He

[redacted] open-ended committees,

[redacted] Council should be

included. [redacted] committees no nothing more than experts and without adequate power delegate decisions or follow-up common policy. However, said he did not [redacted] absolutely hostile UN JTE to U.S. proposals and might accept them, but Council should look more deeply into matter.

On NAT consideration LDC's outside Europe, Spaak said all countries knew NATO was discussing Asia and Africa, therefore no need to fear adverse reaction if regional committees established.

Amaroff (Greece) urged NAC consultation prior to firm policy decisions. Suggested Permanent Council lay down guidelines, particularly in defense field, on which NATO countries could agree. Agreed with Italy Alliance must make large effort in field of conventional weapons to be in position repel attack. Above all, U.S. divisions wanted in Europe, along with U.S. and possibly British nuclear deterrent.

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[redacted] allowing to special problem [redacted] comparability claims to Soviet Union should promptly ground out [redacted]. Suggested attention fund studies to infrastructure program in which Greece would participate on small scale. Stressed importance continuation American defense support costs.

Averoff stressed importance of psychological aspects support for Alliance among people of NATO countries and said this desire had been expressed to Atlantic Institute in Milan.

Luns (Netherlands) made brief affirmative statement on Council report, at same time indicating preference for greater degree unanimity in Parts 2, 3, and 4. Expressed satisfaction with report as positive achievement, particularly Part 1, in which agreement reached on what NATO should do. He said he saw important role in economic field for NATO, without overlapping work of new organizations, particularly OECD. Made relatively lengthy statement in support of Danish statement on need for liberal civil aviation policies and urged Council consultations promote [redacted] solidarity on liberal aviation policies. Expressed hope for

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

[redacted] should
[redacted] by sending suppressions on civil aviation
among countries of Ukiasma.

Hoss (U.K.) made brief, low-keyed but firm reply to Spaak statement, making clear NATO not faced with procedural difficulties on special ad hoc committees on which Spaak had dwelt. Said practical thing to do is to set up each ad hoc committee as needed and keep it as long as necessary. On Congo or Africa, Spaak could have committee tomorrow if he wanted it. U.K. prepared go along with any variety of hoc committees on geographical basis, or Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, committees on LDC's, or representatives from Foreign Offices.

Spaak (Belgium) reiterated he saw a big difference between ad hoc and permanent committees, but if would not quibble and if ad hoc committees were [redacted]

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since

he had not known

(2) [redacted] experts should

meet twice a year, as suggested by Group of Seven, and that original U.S. suggestion on Atlantic advisory group had been practically withdrawn;

(3) On subject considered, this needs further study. He thought it had been agreed that it was wise to set these up on ad hoc basis, to continue each committee as long as necessary. Mentioned committees on Congo and Africa as first priorities. The task of these committees would be to make recommendations, not necessarily on basis of unanimity, to full Council;

(4) Psychological proposals accepted by several delegations and same was true for civil emergency planning. Later on, when various aspects of civil emergency planning studied, Canada may provide further discussion their proposals;

(5) Military item not formally on agenda and he agreed with Secretary that Ministerial meeting can go no further at this time

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[redacted] Ministers on their [redacted]

[redacted] on civil aviation and special fund proposed by Greece to provide help to financially countries in their military engagements, meeting would take note there no decision had been reached. These are problems which have to be referred back to Council.

After reading of draft resolution, which originally included two points on NATO information program, Brentano and Cosmo questioned meaning and advisability these points which recognized national responsibilities for information and reaffirmed more vigorous information policies. Stikker agreed elimination these points from resolution.

Spaak then questioned how far Ministers had gone on consultation problem since there was no mention in long-range planning report on special committees and no conclusion on this subject. Stikker replied it was his understanding there was general agreement in principle that ad hoc committees should be established and that it had been agreed to set up two such committees on Congo and Africa. Further work is needed by Council on terms of reference. In reply question from Spaak as to

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EUR/RA:MKupinsky:pld

Approved by EUR/RA:WSassoon

Clearance: Mr. Irvin Tobin

S/S: Mr. [redacted]

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4:39 PM

FROM: OSLO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 45, MAY 10, 9 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 45, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL 20

POUCHED ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS AND GENEVA

NAC MINISTERIAL MEETING: MAY 9 - AFTERNOON SESSION - SECOND PART

AGENDA ITEM IV - SPECIAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF GREECE AND TURKEY

SARPER (TURKEY) OPENED DISCUSSION WITH FULL AND FAMILIAR STATEMENT TURKISH ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROBLEMS. REFERRED TO TURKISH ECONOMIC PLAN EXPECTED READY FOR IMPLEMENTATION BEGINNING 1963. CHARACTERIZED PLAN'S OBJECTIVES AS REMOVAL OF UNCERTAINTIES, ESTABLISHMENT PRIORITIES FOR INVESTMENT, AND AVOIDANCE BOTH INFLATION AND DEFLATION. MADE USUAL PLEA FOR QUICK, CONCENTRATED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY IN SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AND SAID THAT IF ADEQUATE AMOUNT OF INVESTMENT IN TURKEY NOT EXPLOITED NOW, TURKISH "TAKE-OFF" PERIOD IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WILL FAIL.

SARPER EXPRESSED FULL AGREEMENT WITH PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON ECONOMIC MISSION TO GREECE AND TURKEY IN REPORT BY COUNCIL. CONVINCED THAT THE MISSION WOULD REMOVE DOUBTS ON HOW TO CARRY OUT PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION CM(60)142. EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR COMMITTEE REPORT AND SAID PARTICULARLY INDEBTED TO GREGH AND HIS COMPETENT STAFF, AND REFERRED TO CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE OF SPAAK WHEN SECRETARY GENERAL. AVEROFF (GREECE) FULLY SUPPORTED SARPER'S PRESENTATION AND COUNCIL REPORT, STATING GREECE IS AS INTERESTED IN STABILITY OF TURKEY AS IN STABILITY OF GREECE.

RUSK (US) MADE BRIEF STATEMENT EXPRESSING WHOLEHEARTED ACCORD WITH DECISION THAT GROUP OF THREE EXPERTS OF HIGH INTERNATIONAL

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STANDING BE FORMED UNDER NATO AUSPICES TO MAKE SURVEY OF BASIC CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR BALANCED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GREECE AND TURKEY. FAVORED MODIFYING EUROPEAN FUND TO ENABLE USE PART OF THESE FUNDS TO HELP SATISFY IN PART URGENT REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT AID. SAID THAT WE ENVISAGE THAT FUND WOULD ACT JOINTLY WITH MEMBER COUNTRIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PROVIDING SUCH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING HOPE THAT PLANS ALL THESE ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE RELEVANT AND GOOD AND SAID WE WOULD HOPE MAKE A STRONG CONTRIBUTION TO THEM.

GREEN (CANADA) SAID THAT CANADA HAD SUPPORTED THE REPORT ON SPECIAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF GREECE AND TURKEY IN THE COUNCIL. HE GAVE ASSURANCES THAT CANADA WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXAMINE REPORTS OF MISSION CONSTRUCTIVELY AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP.

HOME (UK) NOTED THAT TERMS OF REFERENCE OF MISSION HAD BEEN CAREFULLY DRAWN SO THAT OVERLAPPING WITH OTHER BODIES IN THE AID FIELD HAS BEEN AVOIDED. HE GAVE UK SUPPORT TO THE REPORT.

COUVE DE MURVILLE (FRANCE) GAVE FULL APPROVAL TO THE COUNCIL REPORT, NOTING THAT FRANCE WAS FULLY COGNIZANT OF ECONOMIC SITUATION OF GREECE AND TURKEY AND REALIZED POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT GREEK-TURKISH PROBLEM OF DEVELOPMENT ARISES IN OTHER FRAMEWORKS, PARTICULARLY IN OECD, AND THAT IT IS GOOD THING COUNCIL SUPPORTS THIS REPORT.

BRENTANO (GERMANY) CONFIRMED GERMAN SUPPORT FOR COUNCIL REPORT AND STRESSED NEED ASSURE ADEQUATE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BASE IN ALL COUNTRIES WHICH BEAR HEAVY ECONOMIC BURDENS IN MAKING DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION. THIS PROBLEM NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED FROM ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT, MENTIONING GERMAN AID TO GREECE AND TURKEY. BRENTANO STRESSED GENERAL NEED INTENSIFY ASSISTANCE THESE COUNTRIES AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT BILATERAL MEASURES CAN ONLY BE A PRELUDE TO OTHER MEASURES ON MULTILATERAL LEVEL. SAID HE HOPED SUCH AID WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.

SPAAK

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SPAAK (BELGIUM) MADE SNAPPY COMMENT TO EFFECT THAT COUNCIL REPORT WAS PROGRESS, WAS GOOD REPORT, GOOD RECOMMENDATION, AND HE APPROVED IT.

ANDREOTTI (ITALY) APPROVED REPORT.

AVEROFF (GREECE) EXPRESSED ANXIETY HIS EARLIER REMARKS MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED AS COMPLAINTS ABOUT NATO ALLIES AND SAID HE WOULD NOT WISH TO LEAVE THIS IMPRESSION. EXPRESSED APPRECIATION ALLIED HELP, PARTICULARLY FROM US, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND SIX. CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT TREATY WITH SIX HAD BEEN INITIALED AND THAT WITH COMPREHENSION OF SIX WILL BE SIGNED. ASSOCIATION WITH SIX WILL CHANGE THE TREND OF GREEK EXPORTS WHICH HAS BECOME SO DANGEROUS RECENTLY.

SARPER (TURKEY) ASSOCIATED WITH GREEK REMARKS.

STIKKER (SECRETARY GENERAL) SUMMARIZED CONCLUSION AS MINISTERS APPROVAL MISSION OF EXPERTS TO GREECE AND TURKEY AS LAID DOWN IN TERMS OF REFERENCE IN COUNCIL REPORT IN PARAGRAPHS 9, 10, AND 11 OF C-M(61)34.

RUSK

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 787, DECEMBER 13, 9 PM (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 787; INFORMATION BONN POLTO 149, LONDON POLTO 152, MOSCOW POLTO 98, BERLIN POLTO 83

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IN OPENING REMARKS FIRST NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING THIS MORNING HONORARY PRESIDENT SARPER STRESSED NEED TO MAINTAIN SOLIDARITY OF ALLIANCE AND UNITY OF PURPOSE AGAINST COMMUNIST THREAT. STIKKER THEN STRESSED NEED FOR CLEAR AND FORCEFUL NATO COMMUNIQUE AND OBTAINED APPROVAL FOR DRAFTING COMMITTEE TO BE HEADED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND TO BE CONSTITUTED BY BELGIANS GERMANS, ITALIANS, FRENCH, NORWEGIANS, BRITISH AND AMERICANS. OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IF THEY WISHED.

SECRETARY BEGAN DISCUSSION OF AGENDA ITEM IA-EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND BERLIN - BY NOTING THAT ATLANTIC COMMUNITY WAS STRONGER NOW THAN A YEAR AGO BOTH IN TERMS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH AND POLITICAL CONSULTATION. HE WOULD NOT ATTEMPT SPEAK FOR ALL FOUR COUNTRIES WHOSE MINISTERS HAD BEEN MEETING PAST FEW DAYS, BUT WOULD PRESENT US VIEWPOINT. HIGHEST DEGREE OF UNITY REQUIRED IN APPROACH TO DIFFICULT AND DELICATE PROBLEM OF BERLIN. PROBLEM MUST BE SEEN IN CONTEXT OF SINO-SOVIET PROGRAM OF WORLD REVOLUTION BACKED BY GROWING RESOURCES OF BLOC. VIBRANT AND SUCCESSFUL FREE SOCIETY PROVIDED BEST ANSWER TO THIS THREAT. SOVIET PRESSURE ON BERLIN CONTINUED UNABATED AND THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN SOVIET POSITION SINCE EARLY SUMMER.

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EARLY SUMMER. IN SEPTEMBER DISCUSSIONS WITH GROMYKO CERTAIN PROCEDURAL IMPROVEMENTS HAD EMERGED SUCH AS RECOGNITION DISCUSSION MUST BE BETWEEN WESTERN POWERS AND SOVIETS AND NOT WITH GDR. TENSIONS HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT REDUCED WITH LIFTING YEAR-END DATE FOR PEACE TREATY. HOWEVER, SOVIETS STILL INSISTED ON THEIR BASIC AND UNACCEPTABLE SUBSTANTIVE DEMANDS.

TO UNDERSTAND PRESSURES ON US, SECRETARY CONTINUED, WE MUST UNDERSTAND PRESSURE ON SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY THOSE ARISING OUT OF GDR FAILURE TO COMPETE SUCCESSFULLY WITH FREE GERMANY AND WEST BERLIN. SOVIETS DESIRED TO CONSOLIDATE SATELLITE REGIMES. WE IN WEST HAVE OTHER VIEWS AS TO GERMANY'S FUTURE. OUR GOAL IS REUNIFICATION THROUGH SELF-DETERMINATION. THIS NOT OBTAINABLE NOW OR BY FORCE BUT SOMETHING WHICH WE DARE NOT ABANDON. DIVIDED GERMANY IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH PEACE AND STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

AS TO WEST BERLIN SECRETARY BELIEVED IT ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT EROSION WEST BERLIN, TO SUSTAIN HOPE OF BERLINERS AGAINST DESPAIR, AND TO PROVIDE FREE ACCESS FOR THEM, INCLUDING UNCENSORED RIGHT TO TRAVEL TO AND FROM WEST. THEY MUST ALWAYS HAVE FREE CHOICE OF INSTITUTIONS, LAWS AND RELATIONS WITH OTHERS. CLOSE RELATIONS WITH FEDERAL REPUBLIC SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. KHRUSHCHEV PROPOSALS ON BERLIN, AS NOW STATED, AND MINIMUM ELEMENTS OF WESTERN POSITION, WERE NOT NEGOTIABLE. THIS CREATED PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS SITUATION TO MEET WHICH WEST MUST FOLLOW TWO CENTRAL THEMES OF POLICY IN ACTION:

(A) ALLIANCE MUST BE FIRM AND DETERMINED IN DEFENSE OF WEST BERLIN. DISUNITY WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE IN KHRUSHCHEV CLASSICAL ERROR OF DICTATORS TO INTERPRET DEMOCRATIC DEBATE AND EXPRESSION OF DIFFERENCES AS EVIDENCE WEAKNESS OF WILL.

IT WAS,

IT WAS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT TO CLOSE RANKS SO HE WILL KNOW WHAT NOT TO GAMBLE ON. SECRETARY SAID HE FELT THERE COULD BE KIND OF CONSULTATION AMONG US WHICH WOULD ASSURE THIS UNITY. HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO MEASURES OF MILITARY NATURE WHICH ALLIANCE HAD ALREADY TAKEN AND HAD IMPRESSION THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD BEEN MORE CAUTIOUS SINCE LAST SUMMER. RECENT SPEECHES OF MENSHIKOV AND KHRUSHCHEV, AS FAR AS BERLIN CONCERNED, WERE LARGELY REPETITIVE OF STANDARD POSITIONS AND MIGHT IN PART BE NORMAL SOVIET ATTEMPT AT INTIMIDATION PRIOR TO NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING. THIS FIRMNESS OF WEST IS IN INTERESTS OF PEACE. CHANCES OF WAR IS ENHANCED WHEN EACH SIDE THINKS OTHER WILL NOT FIGHT.

(B) THERE MUST BE READINESS THROUGH RESPONSIBLE CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS TO SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS. IF BERLIN ENGAGES VITAL INTERESTS OF WEST WHICH ARE CASUS BELLI, IT IS IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH CONTACTS WITH OTHER SIDE TO KEEP CRISIS FROM DEVELOPING TOO FAR.

SECRETARY SAID HE DID NOT KNOW IF WE COULD HAVE NEGOTIATIONS IN CLASSIC SENSE, BUT MUST MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE CONTACT TO SEE IF PEACEFUL SOLUTION POSSIBLE. WE NEED NOT FEAR THAT IN NEGOTIATIONS WE MUST GIVE AWAY THAT FOR WHICH WE OTHERWISE PREPARED TO FIGHT. WEST CAN SAY NO. WE SHOULD LOOK, THEREFORE, TO BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS. THESE DID NOT APPEAR IN GROMYKO TALKS, BUT CERTAIN QUESTIONS WERE LEFT DANGLING WITHOUT CATEGORICAL ANSWERS AND WAY LEFT OPEN FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION. AT MOMENT CAUTION REQUIRED REGARDING CONVOKING FULL-SCALE MAJOR NEGOTIATION ENGAGING PRESTIGE OF ALL INVOLVED, BUT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO BRING ABOUT SYSTEMATIC NEGOTIATION AS SOON AS REASONABLE BASIS CAN BE FOUND. THIS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY SYSTEMATIC PROBES THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS ON AGREED BASIS. WE ON OUR SIDE DID NOT INTEND TO LEAVE OPEN TO CHANCE OR A GAMBLE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS. IT IMPORTANT TO CLARIFY POSITIONS SOONER RATHER THAN LATER LEAVING INITIATIVE ENTIRELY TO OTHER SIDE. THEREFORE WE URGED FULL NATO UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH CENTRAL ELEMENTS OUR APPROACH. SOME HAVE THOUGHT THERE HAS BEEN

TOO MUCH

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TOO MUCH BELLIGERENCE AND FIRMNESS ON OUR SIDE, BUT VITALS OF WEST ARE INVOLVED. WE ARE NOT BEGGING FOR WAR BUT IT IMPORTANT THAT SOVIETS KNOW WE ARE DETERMINED. US NOT HAVE IN MIND GIVING AWAY VITAL POSITIONS OF WEST. WE VALUE VIEWS OF GOVERNMENTS PROVIDED BY DISCUSSIONS OF PAST FEW MONTHS, AND BELIEVE WE CAN ESTABLISH A COMMON POSITION AND BY PROBING SEE IF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION POSSIBLE.

FINLETTER

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NO: POLTO 787, December 13, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 787, INFORMATION BONN POLTO 149, LONDON POLTO 152, MOSCOW POLTO 98, BERLIN POLTO 83

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GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER SCHROEDER SAID HIS COUNTRY HOPED FOR PEACEFUL FUTURE AND WAS PREPARED TO STAND BY ALLIANCE. HE BRIEFLY REVIEWED DEVELOPMENT OF BERLIN CRISIS SINCE NOVEMBER, 1958 WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON SOVIET TACTICS. WHILE NATO HAD BECOME STRONGER, EVENTS OF AUGUST 13 PREVENTED COMPLACENCY. HE AGREED ALLIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE ONLY IF SOVIETS DID NOT INSIST ON UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS AND THERE WAS A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS. TALKS WITH GROMYKO HAD PROVIDED NO SUBSTANTIVE BASIS BUT CERTAIN FLEXIBILITY RE PROCEDURES HAD EMERGED. RECENT INTENSIVE EFFORTS ON WESTERN SIDE HAD ACHIEVED LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT. HE DID NOT SEE ANY FINAL SOLUTION COMING FROM NEGOTIATIONS BUT AT BEST A MODUS VIVENDI MAIN POINT OF WHICH WOULD BE TO IMPROVE ACCESS. GERMANY WOULD PREFER THAT ONLY THIS SUBJECT BE DISCUSSED, BUT SOVIETS WOULD RAISE STATUS QUESTION. IT HIGHLY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL VIABILITY OF WEST BERLIN. SYMBOLIC ASSOCIATION WITH FREE WEST WAS ESSENTIAL. THERE COULD BE NO DE JURE OR DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF GDR BUT FEDREP WAS PREPARED TO ESTABLISH TECHNICAL LEVEL CONTACTS TO HELP WITH ACCESS PROBLEMS. BASIS WESTERN RIGHTS COULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE QUESTIONED. FRONTIER QUESTION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY SHOULD NOT BE PART OF ANY BERLIN ARRANGEMENT, BUT REITERATION OF GUARANTEE ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACTS COULD BE CONSIDERED. NARROW NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT INVOLVE ABANDONMENT OF REUNIFICATION POLICY AND HE HOPED GERMANS COULD COUNT ON NATO SOLIDARITY IN THIS MATTER. SCHROEDER THEN DESCRIBED DETERIORATING

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SITUATION IN EAST GERMANY WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR REGIME. HIS CONCLUSION WAS THAT WEST MUST, THEREFORE, CONTINUE NON-RECOGNITION POLICY.

ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SEGNI STRESSED SUPPORT FOR GERMAN ALLY AND ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH "COMMON TREAT" TO SEEK SOLUTION TO BERLIN PROBLEM THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. WESTERN POWERS SHOULD RESUME CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS SOONEST TO ESTABLISH BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. AGREEMENT SHOULD ENABLE WEST TO SAFEGUARD VITAL INTERESTS BOTH OF GERMANY AND OF WEST AS WHOLE.

KRAG OF DENMARK BELIEVED WESTERN APPROACH TO BERLIN SITUATION SO FAR CORRECT IN AVOIDING HASTE AND SUGGESTING THAT CONCESSIONS GOING TO BE MADE. WE WERE NOW ENTERING A PHASE, HOWEVER, WHERE KHRUSHCHEV WOULD REAP GREATEST BENEFIT FROM LACK OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS TIME TO TAKE INITIATIVE AND RELY MORE ON POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY THINKING WITHOUT OF COURSE WEAKENING DEFENSES. AFTER STRESSING NEED TO MAINTAIN BERLIN ECONOMY, LANGE REITERATED DANISH SUPPORT FOR POSSIBLE MOVE THERE CERTAIN UN AGENCIES AND FOR PROPOSAL THAT UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN BECOME WORLD UNIVERSITY. WHILE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD IDEALLY BE CONFINED TO STATUS AND ACCESS PROBLEMS HE DOUBTED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID DISCUSSION OF WIDER SECURITY PROBLEMS AS IN 1959. IDEA OF A NON-AGGRESSION PACT TO WHICH SCHROEADER HAD REFERRED DESERVED FURTHER CONSIDERATION. HE NOTED THAT SOVIETS ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO FORMALITIES ND THAT TALKS COULD NOT BE KEPT AT AN INFORMAL LEVEL INDEFINITELY.

KRAG THEN REVIEWED FINNISH DEVELOPMENTS EXPRESSING GRAVE CONCERN AS TO SOVIET PURPOSES. KEKKONEN'S VISIT HAD PROVIDED TEMPORARY RELIEF BUT SOVIETS MIGHT RESUME OFFENSIVE AT ANY TIME. PURPOSE WAS TO HOLD CLUB OVER SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES. IN DENMARK, KHRUSHCHEV'S THREAT HAD HAD EFFECT OPPOSITE TO THAT INTENDED. DANES HAD NEVER SUPPORTED NATO SO STRONGLY AS NOW. HE REFERRED TO ACCEPTANCE OF A UNIFIED BALTIC COMMAND BY 149 TO 13 VOTE OF PARLIAMENT AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT DANISH DEFENSE FORCES COULD BE STRENGTHENED, BUT THIS PRESUPPOSED CONTINUATION US ASSISTANCE. HE REFERRED TO RECENT SOVIET STATEMENT WARNING DENMARK ON BALTIC COMMAND, CLAIMING THIS VIOLATED 1946 DANISH ASSURANCES AT TIME OF SOVIET EVACUATION BORNHOLM.

FINLETTER

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 787, December 13, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 787, INFORMATION BONN POLTO 149, LONDON POLTO 152, MOSCOW POLTO 98, BERLIN POLTO 83

FROM USDEL

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BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SPAAK SAID HE BELIEVED CHOICE HAD TO BE MADE AS TO WHETHER NATO TO CONTINUE WITH PASSIVE FOREIGN POLICY OR EMBARK ON MORE POSITIVE ACTION. SOME SAID THERE COULD BE NO DISCUSSIONS UNDER THREAT. THIS HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND. SOVIETS HAD RAISED BERLIN ISSUE THREE YEARS AGO. HE DOUBTED TIME WORKING IN WESTERN FAVOR. POLITICAL SITUATION IN NATO WAS NOT IMPROVING AND KHRUSHCHEV HAD ACHIEVED 75 PERCENT OF HIS GOAL THROUGH ERECTION OF WALL. CONTINUATION OF PRESENT SITUATION WOULD CAUSE BERLIN TO LOSE FAITH AND START MASS EXODUS FROM CITY. BELGIANS FAVOR NARROW NEGOTIATIONS SINCE SITUATION NOT FAVORABLE TODAY FOR SOLUTION OF GERMAN PROBLEM. HOWEVER, BASIS POSITION ON THIS PROBLEM COULD NOT BE ABANDONED. IF THIS PRINCIPLE ACCEPTED, WEST SHOULD BE ABLE FORMULATE ITS POSITION WITHOUT TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY. FURTHER DELAY WOULD ONLY MEAN THAT THIS POSITION WOULD LEAK OUT IN ADVANCE IN DISASTROUS FASHION. NO ONE BEGINS NEGOTIATIONS BY STATING FULL POSITION IN ADVANCE AS WAS HAPPENING. HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT EXPRESSION "PROBING POLICY" MEANT. WHAT WAS LEFT TO PROBE AND WHO WAS LEFT TO PROBE? SOVIETS WERE NOT LIKELY TO EXPOSE THEIR FINAL POSITIONS IN ANY PROBE. ONE SHOULD NOT CONFUSE THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATION WITH SUCCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE IS NO SIGN OF WEAKNESS. TO BE WEAK IS TO WEAKEN IN NEGOTIATIONS.

SOME FEAR NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE THEY MIGHT POSSIBLY FAIL. IF THEY DO SITUATION WILL OBVIOUSLY NOT IMPROVE, BUT CHOICE IS NOT BLACK OR WHITE. LACK OF NEGOTIATIONS LEAVES INITIATIVE TO SOVIETS AND ENSURES EROSION OF WESTERN POSITION. IF FORCE MUST EVENTUALLY BE USED, PRESENT DRIFT WAS WORSE PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION FOR WESTERN PEOPLES.

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NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER LUNS PLACED USUAL STRONG DUTCH STRESS ON DANGERS OF DISENGAGEMENT URGING THAT THIS SUBJECT ONLY BE CONSIDERED WITHIN CONTEXT OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION AS IN 1959 PEACE PLAN. ALTHOUGH NOT LIKELY WEST GERMANY WOULD CHANGE ORIENTATION, THIS WAS SOVIET AIM. AREA OF NEGOTIATIONS MUST THEREFORE BE NARROW BUT WEST SHOULD TRY TO ACHIEVE LESSENING OF TENSIONS AROUND BERLIN WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO UNWANTED CONFLICT. NETHERLANDS BELIEVED THAT ACTION TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN SSOON. HE COULD SEE LOGIC IN NOT NEGOTIATING UNDER DURESS, BUT WEST COULD NOT SIT WATCHING FURTHER DETERIORATION OF SITUATION INSURING EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE ON EVEN WORSE BASIS FOR WEST.

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER WENT OVER MUCH SAME GROUND REPORTED AT LENGTH IN SECTO 11. HE ARGUED THAT, IF SOVIETS WILLING TO RISK NUCLEAR WAR, WESTERN POWERS COULD NOT DO MUCH ABOUT IT AS 20 YEARS AGO. FRENCH DID NOT BELIEVE THIS TO BE CASE AND FELT WESTERN TACTICS MUST BE ADOPTED ACCORDINGLY. DESPITE THREATS AND DEADLINES SOVIETS HAD ALWAYS POSTPONED ACTION. WEST MUST RESPOND WITH FIRMNESS AND DIGNITY MAKING CLEAR IT WILL MAINTAIN ITS ESSENTIAL INTERESTS. FRENCH HAVE NEVER SAID IT WAS BAD IN PRINCIPLE TO SEEK NEGOTIATIONS WHICH NORMAL WAY TO SETTLE PROBLEMS. QUESTION IS TO KNOW UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE. THERE WERE TWO CRITERIA: TO REFUSE NEGOTIATE UNDER THREAT OF BLACKMAIL, AND TO KNOW WHAT ONE IS GOING TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT. NEITHER OF THESE CONDITIONS OBTAINED AT PRESENT. HE DID NOT THINK SOVIET POSITION HAD CHANGED BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN NO NEGOTIATIONS. RECENT MENSHIKOV STATEMENT RE-ITERATING POSITION OFFERED LITTLE PROSPECT OF ANY AGREEMENT.

AS TO BERLIN, COUVE CONTINUED, ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS WERE MAINTENANCE OF POLITICAL FREEDOM, FREEDOM OF ACCESS AND WESTERN PRESENCE. SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF WESTERN POWERS COULD NOT BE THROWN AWAY. HE HAD SEEN MAYOR BRANDT YESTERDAY. LATTER HAD ASKED IF WEST WERE GOING TO NEGOTIATE.

COUVE SAID HE HAD RESPONDED THAT, IF THERE WERE NEGOTIATIONS, BERLINERS WOULD BE EVEN MORE ANXIOUS THAN AT PRESENT BECAUSE NO ONE KNEW WHAT KIND OF AGREEMENT WOULD EMERGE. IF NEGOTIATIONS COLLAPSED THIS WOULD CAUSE PANIC IN CITY. ANY NARROW NEGOTIATIONS ON BERLIN ALONE MEANT COMING TO

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AGREEMENT ON SOME COMPROMISE BETWEEN SOVIET DEMANDS AND PRESENT STATUS. IF, HOWEVER, FEELING OF PRESENT NATO MEETING WAS THAT CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS WERE NECESSARY TO CLARIFY PROBLEM, FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT OPPOSE THEM. IT WAS AN ILLUSION TO SAY, AS SOME DID, THAT PROBLEM IS ESSENTIALLY WITHIN ALLIANCE AND THAT, IF AGREEMENT REACHED AND NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, EVERYTHING WOULD BE SETTLED. IMPORTANT THING IS NOT AGREEMENT AMONG ALLIES BUT WITH SOVIETS. WE HAD SAME INTERESTS. SOVIETS ARE OUR OPPONENTS. SURVIVAL OF AT LEAST PART OF EUROPE IN FREEDOM IS AT STAKE AND ONLY POSITIVE POSITION FOR WEST, IS UNITY AND FIRMNESS.

CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GREEN SAID HE CONCURRED THAT IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS BUT WAS SOMEWHAT PUZZLED AS TO HOW TO GET STARTED. IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO ARGUE THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNDER THREAT, SINCE THREATS UNLIKELY TO DISAPPEAR OR EVEN DIMINISH. IF WE ALLOW TIMING OF NEGOTIATIONS TO BE DETERMINED BY HARSHNESS OR SOFTNESS OF SOVIET POSITION WE FORFEIT INITIATIVE.

TIME NOT ON OUR SIDE IN BERLIN AND THERE WAS NOT ANY REAL ALTERNATIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS SINCE SOVIETS COULD SIGN PEACE TREATY AT ANY TIME. IF DEADLINE, WHICH HAD BEEN LIFTED, WERE RESTORED, NATO GOVERNMENTS FACED RISK OF WAR. CHANCES OF GETTING PUBLIC SUPPORT WOULD BE ENHANCED IF POSSIBILITY NEGOTIATIONS EXHAUSTED. HE ALSO FELT PRESENT PROPITIOUS TIME FOR NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THROUGHOUT WORLD IMAGE OF SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN DAMAGED BY SUCH RECENT EVENTS AS NUCLEAR TEST RESUMPTION. HE, THEREFORE, HOPED WESTERN POWERS COULD AGREE INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS, AND FRANKLY COULD NOT SEE ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "NEGOTIATIONS", "PROBES" OR "CONTACTS". GREEN REITERATED CANADIAN SUPPORT FOR SOME UN ROLE IN BERLIN TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ELEMNT OF STABILITY, AND STATED ENTIRE NON-COMMITTED WORLD LOOKING TO NATO FOR LEADERSHIP TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS ON BERLIN.

FINLETTER

UMT

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Conference Files Lot 65 D 328 (Secret)

[redacted]

[redacted] September 13.

Summary

NAC concluded first discussion on Berlin question after hearing statements by Norway (Lange), UK (Home), Turkey (Sarper) and Greece (Averoff). Stikker gave brief preliminary summary and suggested Ministers resume discussion Berlin after completion of other items on international situation and after completion related military discussion under agenda item 2. Lange also commented briefly re Finland. End Summary.

Norway (Lange) advanced series of arguments for negotiating now on Berlin. Felt present hardening of Soviet position makes negotiations more urgent. Reciprocal hardening of public positions by both sides may make constructive talks impossible. Time not on side of West. Morale Berlin people likely to decline with city emptying

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Mr. Kohler (in draft)
S/P-J.T.Rogers

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Norway favors "narrow" negotiation, sees danger in tying [illegible] tie Berlin too tightly to an all-German settlement. Looking realistically, there is no early prospect of an all-German settlement. Any effort to tie Berlin with a larger settlement makes it that much more difficult work out some accommodation on Berlin.

As substance of position on Berlin, Norway believes there are four essentials: (a) West Berlin must remain free to choose its political and economic destiny; (b) there must be Western military presence in Berlin; (c) there must be freedom of civil and military access; (d) the city must be economically viable, with the people of West Berlin confident of the future of their city. Norway prepared to go along with Canadian-Danish comments re UN presence in some form, although

[redacted]

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[redacted] and Soviet [redacted] pending of Soviets [redacted] essential.

In Finland, Lange associated himself with Danish (Krag) comments. Said Norwegians had been given copy of note by Soviets which they had delivered Danes. Lange said there were clearly ominous overtones in Soviet note. It clearly represents renewal threat Scandinavian countries. Appears that existing relaxation of threat at recent Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting has been short-lived. Lange said with great seriousness that one say for Norway that this form of Soviet blackmail has effect on Norwegian public opinion exactly opposite of that intended by Soviets. [redacted]

UK (Lord Home) first gave general setting of Communist threat today, pointing to Communist nation program of military

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[redacted] three [redacted] element of [redacted] element of [redacted] [redacted] new elements [redacted] threat. Now have two [redacted] we must maintain the balance of power [redacted]. This means more than nuclear capability; it includes also conventional forces, so that there will be no vacuum into which Soviet forces can move. (S) At the same time we must exploit areas of agreement or "tolerance" to determine possibilities of negotiations. These two complement each other. People are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice of going to war with all that that means today, but only after every avenue of peaceful settlement has been explored.

Re Berlin, Home said that he agreed with the French that Berlin was a problem in the larger setting of Germany and Europe. He also agreed that the Western substantive position should contain the three key elements. Finally, UK also believed there was one fundamental rule in any negotiations: that is, to avoid making any concessions unless we get some significant compensating advantage from Soviets. We have learned a great deal about negotiating with the Soviets and it is within the competence of

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give him [redacted] interest in signing [redacted] The explanation for this may be Russian suggestion that they can get fewer countries than they had hoped to sign such a pact shortly.

In summary, Rome considered time not on side of West. Clearly desirable negotiate with Soviets. Morale West Berlin excellent. Agreed with Spaak that there is no weakness in negotiate; any weakness can come only in negotiation. Agreed also with undesirability negotiating in midst of very serious crisis. Therefore UK "firmly on right path in cold blood now". We should "choose our ground" but at same time "give no ground". Also felt all Allies must together accept responsibility for undertaking [redacted] negotiation. Singly or in smaller groups it would be dangerous and undesirable. Rome expressed hope communiqué of meeting would leave no doubt.

Turkey (Sarper) expressed agreement majority other views, including Turkey, although not in favor negotiations at [redacted]

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[redacted] negotiating from strength.

[redacted] question of Berlin discussion, [redacted] felt [redacted] to come to definite conclusions [redacted] and suggested members go on discuss international situation [redacted] other areas and complete discussion of military items [redacted] tomorrow, which will have some bearing on Berlin consideration. [redacted] stated that same arguments had been used again and again, [redacted] other speakers. He was struck by fact that there [redacted] differences most in analysis of Soviet intentions. [redacted] limited to the appraisal of Soviet objectives, [redacted] conclusion that no compromise appears possible. [redacted] among members of the Alliance enter the picture when [redacted] question of what we do next is considered. One group [redacted] opposed to substantive negotiations on basis [redacted] although not opposed to bilateral talks with the Soviets [redacted] earlier. A group of other countries believes we should negotiate now on a narrow basis involving the Berlin situation. [redacted] other group also favors negotiations, but does not draw such a sharp line between a narrow negotiations confined to

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NATO 144/1 (13) SECRET Ministerial Mtg

Action EUR

Control: 8582
Rec'd: Dec 14, 1961
3:11 pm

Info SS SR G SP L H CO AF FE NEA IO P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR RMR

FROM: Paris (17)

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 789, December 14, 2 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 789 INFORMATION BONN POLTO 151 LONDON POLTO 154 BRUSSELS POLTO 27 LEOPOLDVILLE MOSCOW BERLIN POLTO UNNUMBERED

POUCHED ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS.

FROM USDEL.

NATO Ministerial meeting, afternoon December 13.

Item IB - review of international situation.

Spaak (Belgium) opened consideration item IB with discussion of Congo situation, pointing out recent UN actions had had serious anti-American impact on Belgian population, evidenced by recent anti-American demonstration which first in fifteen years. With reference to paragraph 129 of Africa committee report (C-M-61) (112) expressed disagreement with assertion UN had leading role to play in solution of Congo problem with which West should cooperate. Spaak reiterated his long standing position that UN effort to settle Congo problem is dangerous and that UN should restrict its efforts to maintaining peace. After reviewing past history of his efforts to comply with UNSC resolutions on Congo, emphasized most recent UNSC resolution not directed to question of strengthening central government or peaceful means to settle problem but purely to use of force against mercenaries. Felt UN action consequent to this resolution no longer police actfon but military or war operation characterized by bombings of bridges, industrial centers and supply installations. Spaak

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questioned interest which UN could have in unified Congo which incorporated ruined and destroyed Katanga. Felt it was necessary for NATO Government's to agree on UN policy regarding Congo or otherwise divisive forces in NATO would develop, as a consequence of which present feeling of confidence and friendship in alliance could not survive. Present differences among NATO allies on Portuguese colonies and West New Guinea as well as Congo were dangers for solidarity of alliance. Recommended that NATO review situation and try to act jointly, especially in the matter of getting a solution in the Congo based on constitution and respect for UN charter.

Home (UK) spoke next to express UK concern with the developments in the Congo, especially in view of implications for Central and East Africa. Pointed out in these areas where tribal influences still strong withdrawal of whites from positions of authority in police and administration could only create vacuum. Any thought therefore of granting independence within a year or so in territories such as Ruanda-Urundi, Angola and Kenya would certainly result in belt of complete chaos across center of Africa. As regards Congo, Home expressed fear that with white population now joining Katanga gendarmerie there was danger of long conflict. UN by antagonizing population had gotten itself into position of no longer being conciliator but itself now had to appeal for conciliation between UN and Katanga people. Saw, as source of this situation, disposition in UNSC of countries going along with prejudiced and emotional resolutions rather than risk disruption regular UN procedures. Implied there should be greater willingness to risk unpopularity as UK had done in voting against de-colonization resolution in UNGA. Home concluded by agreeing with Spaak on advantages of discussing Congo situation in NATO.

FINLETTER

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NATO 144/3

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 789, December 14, 2 A.M. (Section Two of Two)

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 789, INFORMATION BONN POLTO 151, LONDON POLTO 154, BRUSSELS POLTO 27.

POUCH ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS AND AMEMBASSY LEOPOLDVILLE, AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, US MISSION BERLIN POLTO UNNUMBERED.

FROM USDEL.

Secretary spoke briefly, first paying tribute to Spaak for his efforts to cooperate with UN in Congo. While not trying to justify what going in Congo, fear we must see clearly what we are trying to do. We are concerned with failure all governments in Congo to work with danger Katanga secession, leaving Congo to be taken over by Gizengists and thus giving Communists greatest single jewel in Africa. Despite our attempts to find ways and means briefing Adoula and Tshombe together not much headway made. Tshombe, while expressing desire for conciliation, had devoted efforts to securing arms and aircraft from outside and conducting well-financed propaganda activities abroad. Moreover, with or without knowledge of Katangan Government, action had been taken by Katanga against UN forces as revealed by road blocks, murder and abduction of UN officers, etc. We do not think, however, UN should try to impose solution in Congo by force and believe it is beyond duty of UN to do anything but defend itself. It is our hope that within day or so, fighting can be stopped and some form of conciliation resumed. We are aware of gap between attitudes and action of UN in Congo and New York and hope that with arrival of Bunche this gap may be closed. However, unless problem of Katanga secession solved, only Gizenga will gain

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will gain and forces hostile to West may come to power.

Couve (France) reviewed briefly background of France's opposition to UN actions in Congo. Disagreed entirely with UN military operations, feeling task of UN was to help those who are divided and not to impose solution directly by UN and through UN. France convinced UN resolutions were decided on basis of national interest and prejudice and thus lacked objectivity. Shared Secretary's opinions Congo settlement rested with people, whose efforts should be supported. If, however, more than this is attempted, results will be catastrophic. France recognized importance of Tshombe cooperation but for humanitarian and political reasons most important thing now was to end military operations.

Luns (Netherlands) expressed hope hostilities in Congo could be brought to end which would set in motion peaceful developments in Congo so desired by Belgium. Averoff (Greece) expressed his country's interest in problems along familiar lines of large number of Greek citizens in area and interest in early truce. Stikker closed discussion of Congo by expressing hope for success of efforts to secure cease-fire and agreeing that Congo problem had impact on solidarity of NATO and therefore should be subject of further discussion in permanent council.

Luns then spoke briefly on West New Guinea problem, commenting recent UNG majority for Brazzaville-Togoland resolution had strengthen position of the Netherlands. Drew particular attention to fact 17 Afro-Asian states had voted for resolution while 4 others had abstained. Luns expressed particular appreciation for support NATO allies had given in their notes and statements to Netherlands position. While we hoped UN vote would also have deterrent influence against Indo attack on West New Guinea, felt danger of aggression still existed. He was grateful for political deterrant exercised by U. S. on Indo and believed this had had effect on Sukarno. Nevertheless felt current Indian threat to Goa might have impact on Indo action re West New Guinea.

/ Urged strongly

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-3- POLTO 789, December 14, 2 A.M. from Paris (Section two of two)

Urged strongly therefore India should be prevailed upon to desist from any action contemplated against Goa.

Averoff (Greece) commented briefly on situation as regards its three northern neighbors. Voiced well-known Greek view, split between Soviets and Albanins attributable to Yugoslav rapproachement with USSR. As regards Bulgaria, brought up again charge Greek guerrillas who firmly had taken refuge in Czechoslovakia, USSR, etc., now being sent to Bulgaria with implication of threat to Greece.

Further discussion item I-B to be continued after discussion item II military affairs.

FINLETTER

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FROM Paris

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: POLTO 793, December 14, MIDNIGHT (SECTION 1 of 2)

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ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 793, INFORMATION BONN POLTO 152, LISBON POLTO 18, OSLO POLTO 14, LONDON POLTO 155, BRUSSELS POLTO 28

POUCHED ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS AND EMBASSIES LEOPOLDVILLE, MOSCOW, BERLIN AND USUN POLTOS UNNUMBERED

FROM USDEL

NATO Ministerial Meeting, Afternoon December 14 Item I-B--Review of International Situation.

Summary: Continuation ministerial discussion Item I-B highlighted by (1) statements of Lange (Norway) and Green (Canada) expressing support for UN position in Congo and unhappiness at press stories alleging US isolated; and (2) long Portuguese statement which pointed up global nature of Communist attack against free world which in Portuguese view could be combatted only by global solidarity of alliance. In this connection he made familiar references to problems confronting Portugal in overseas territories and UN. Discussion Item I-B will be continued December 15 session. End summary.

Full report. Lange (Norway) opened discussion by referring to press accounts yesterday's meeting which depicted all NATO governments except US as opposed to current UN action in Congo. Stated this account has apparently been given by NATO spokesman to press and therefore requested NATO spokesman give equal publicity to his

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publicity to his statement. In Lange's view essential to avoid giving impression NATO, as alliance, is adopting negative attitude toward UN in Congo.

Lange associated himself fully with views expressed by Rusk on Congo situation. There was no alternative to decisive UN role in Congo or rather only other alternative to UN role was full-fledged conflict between east and west on Congo soil. Emphasized only possibility of solution lay in strong western support for UN operations. Assumed there was agreement on basic aims; i.e., pressure for conciliation and cessation of hostilities. As regards UN generally, admitted situation not always satisfactory, but could only become worse if we fail to continue efforts to utilize UN and with great energy. Felt activities in NATO and UN were complementary not contradictory.

Green (Canada) concurred, pointing out difficulties in which yesterday's press report of Congo discussion placed Canada as member of UN Congo Committee. While all not satisfactory in Congo, Rusk statement of yesterday, with which Canada concurred fully, described situation. Did not believe Home's appeal for cease-fire yesterday intended for all NATO members. Canada felt place to make direct representation on this matter in New York. Not for NATO as such to ask or suggest UN action. While all agreed Congo situation unsatisfactory and that UN role should be one of conciliation, agreed with Rusk that present fighting in Congo not sought by UN but imposed on latter by need to protect its supply and communication lines. UN task in Congo is to promote negotiated settlement and to prevent foreign intervention particularly on part of mercenaries. Canada hoped hostilities would end soon and pledged to do its part as member of Congo Committee. Agreed with Rusk key objective in Congo is not to let area become cockpit for struggle of rival powers and thus permit Russia to secure advantage from situation.

Brief exchange

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Brief exchange followed between Spaak and Lange re latter's request NATO press spokesman give his statement full publicity, Spaak stating in that case, he would demand full publication of his own statement. Stikker denied responsibility NATO press spokesman for newspaper stories. Discussion of matter ended with Secretary's statement expressing appreciation for Lange and Green statements and indicating US, UK and France with cooperation of Secretary General, had dicussed problem of how to bring about conciliation and ceasefire in Congo. Hoped for success of these efforts.

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 793, December 14, MIDNIGHT (SECTION 2 of 2)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 793, INFORMATION BONN POLTO 152, LISBON POLTO 18, OSLO POLTO 14, LONDON POLTO 155, BRUSSELS POLTO 28.

POUCHED ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS AND EMBASSIES LEOPOLDVILLE, MOSCOW, BERLIN, AND USUN POLTO UNNUMBERED

FROM USDEL

RMR

Nogueira (Portugal) then made lengthy statement on world situation along familiar Portuguese lines. Emphasized Berlin problem must be viewed in general framework of east-west struggle and of Communist attempt to secure world domination. Portugal disagreed with those who shared view strength in west was increasing, indicating it was always Soviets who take initiative and west continually on defensive. Soviets, assured west will not launch preventative war, are increasing their power and influence in world by taking actions falling short of war. West has tendency to claim victory whenever it succeeds in maintaining status quo. Hence there has been no loss to Soviets of areas taken over by them but to contrary Communists have extended their own control over other areas.

Nogueira emphasized Communist attack is global attack on world-wide scale. Portugal felt strongly inherent weakness of alliance is tendency to face global attack of Communists with partial unity instead of global unity. Nogueira emphasized

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emphasized particularly necessity of unity in UN where respect for spirit of UN Charter is being flouted. Portugal could abide by majority in that organization only in those cases such as war and peace, economic aid, et cetera, in which all UN members had general interest. Portugal, however, could not submit its vital national interest to the will of the UN majority on other problems. Portugal emphasized need for solidarity of alliance in these UN matters since country against whom some allies had tendency to cast votes would necessarily be hurt and would react, not through urge for retaliation, but as means of exerting pressure. Believed all this could be avoided if there were unity in west which, with necessary blocking one-third in UN, could defend its interest if it has no fear of being in minority. Turning to specific issues Nogueira expressed disagreement with UN Congo policy arguing problem was internal matter. Also expressed concern for Katanga right of self-determination. Nogueira passed over Angola problem to speak briefly on Goa expressing appreciation for Luns' statement of yesterday indicating India had rejected all Portuguese offers of negotiation. Concluded by informing council that, according to Portuguese information, Indian military attack on Goa could be expected either tonight or tomorrow.

After Stikker had expressed his concern over Goan situation, Secretary stated US had made strong representations in New Delhi urging that force not be used. Home stated UK had made similar representation but news was not good. Nogueira expressed appreciation for US and UK attitude and wondered whether these attitudes would have influence on other members of alliance.

Continuation of discussion Item I-B carried over to December 15 ministerial session.

FINLETTER

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August 4, 1975

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 792, December 14, noon (SECTION I OF II)

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POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS POLTO UNNUMBERED

FROM USDEL

FOLLOWING WERE HIGHLIGHTS OF MINISTERS DISCUSSION ITEM II, MILITARY QUESTIONS, ON MORNING DEC 14:

1. STIKKER REFERRED TO MINISTERS DEFENSE RESOLUTION AT OSLO NOTING THAT WHILE PERMREPS HAD HELD MANY DISCUSSIONS, ISSUES WERE VERY COMPLEX AND STUDIES NOT COMPLETE. IN VIEW OF BERLIN SITUATION, NAC HAD DEFERRED CONTINUATION OF STUDY TEMPORARILY. NOTED UK AND US MEMOS WHICH LED INTO EXAMINATION OF STRATEGY AND CONSIDERATION USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. STRESSED THAT PERMREPS HAD REAFFIRMED VALIDITY OF POLITICAL DIRECTIVE AND STRATEGIC CONCEPT THOUGH RECOGNIZED PERHAPS MORE FLEXIBLE INTERPRETATION. STATED PERMREPS DISCUSSION INDICATED TWO BASIC PROBLEM AREAS. FIRST, ROLE AND ORGANIZATION OF SHIELD FORCES. SECOND, POLITICAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ARMS.

2. CONCERNING PRESENT STATUS OF THE NATO MILITARY EFFORT, CHAIRMAN STANDING GROUP PROVIDED ORAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING ON SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES. COUNCIL NOTED ORAL REPORT AS WELL AS MILITARY COMMITTEE'S REPORT ON MILITARY PROGRESS OF NATO (M-C 5/16). SECRETARY GENERAL THEN PROVIDED OVERALL SUMMARY APPRAISAL (C-M(61)128).

IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR COUNTRY COMMENTS ON THE NATO MILITARY EFFORT, FOREIGN MINISTER SCHROEDER, GERMANY, LED OFF DISCLAIMING INTENT TO RAISE STRATEGIC QUESTION OF PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. STATED FEDREP STRONG SUPPORTER ARMS CONTROL, WELCOMED IRISH RESOLUTION, BUT MUST RECOGNIZE SOVIET POWER THREAT REQUIRES POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR DETERRENT BY ADEQUATE

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NUCLEAR POWER. REFERRING US APRIL 26 PAPER AND TO PRESIDENT'S OTTAWA PROPOSAL ON SEABORNE MULTILATERAL FORCE, SCHROEDER POINTED OUT FEDREP WILLING TO COOPERATE ON PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTION, HAD MADE PROPOSAL FOR NATO CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN MAY, AND CONCLUDED WITH SUGGESTION COUNCIL MINISTERS INSTRUCT PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES CONSIDER THIS AND ANY OTHER COUNTRY PROPOSALS AND REPORT IN FRAMEWORK OF LONG-RANGE PLANNING. STRAUSS FOLLOWED SCHROEDER, POINTING OUT THAT THEORY MUST BE BALANCED WITH REALISM. THUS, ALTHOUGH FRG HAS ALWAYS OBJECTED TO DETERRENT BEING EXCLUSIVELY NUCLEAR AND WANTED BALANCED CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WE STRESSED OVER-EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES WOULD ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT TOTAL DETERRENT. POINTED OUT ONE INCONGRUITY BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE WAS NATO LIGHTWEIGHT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM IN WHICH ONLY ITALY AND GERMANY PARTICIPATING, WHILE OTHERS DID NOT SEEM TRYING BUILD UP CONVENTIONAL AIR. STATED FEDREP CONCEPT OF EFFECTIVE

DETERRENT WOULD BE BALANCED NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES OVER WIDE SPECTRUM, BUT THAT IN VIEW ENEMY'S VAST CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY PRESENT STRATEGIC CONCEPT (MC 14/2) MUST REMAIN. WITHOUT NUCLEAR FORCES LAND BRIDGE-HEAD IN CENTRAL EUROPE COULD NOT BE DEFENDED WITHOUT LOSS TERRITORY. WE ASSERTED THAT IN ADDITION TO CREDIBLE DETERRENT MUST HAVE FORCES AND WILL TO COPE WITH ATTACK. IN THIS RESPECT NATO CANNOT RELY ON PRECISE PRE-ARRANGED PLANS TO DEAL WITH ENEMY ACTION. STRAUSS POINTED OUT THAT EUROPE THREATENED BY SOVIET MRBMS, BUT NOT US, AND ACCORDINGLY FEDREP SUPPORTED NORSTAD'S MC-96 MRBM REQUIREMENTS, BELIEVING VTOL AIRCRAFT ALONE NOT ADEQUATE SUCCESSOR PRESENT AIRFORCE FOR DEALING WITH THESE TARGETS. TODAY WESTERN STRATEGIC FORCES CAN POSSIBLY DESTROY SOVIET MRBMS BUT AS TECHNOLOGY MAKES CERTAIN SYSTEMS VULNERABLE, OTHERS MUST REPLACE, INCLUDING MRBMS. IF FORCE NOT ESTABLISHED ON MULTILATERAL BASIS, NATIONALISTIC FORCES IN EUROPE WILL STRIVE FOR MRBMS ON NATIONAL BASIS. ALSO IF SUCH FORCES INCREASINGLY EXTERNALIZED WOULD TEND WORK AGAINST INDIVISIBILITY OF DEFENSE. WE RECOGNIZED POLITICAL PROBLEMS BUT THOUGHT THESE COULD AND SHOULD BE SOLVED AND IN THIS SPIRIT FEDREP NOW PROPOSING THAT IN ADDITION TO MILITARY COMMITTEE STUDY, NAC ESTABLISH POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP TO STUDY CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTRODUCTION MRBMS IN EUROPE. WE STATED NATO JUST BE GRATEFUL FOR AMERICAN OFFER AND WOULD HOPE NATO COULD WORK OUT SOLUTIONS IN 1962 SINCE PROBLEM MUST BE SOLVED BEFORE NUCLEAR PARITY ACHIEVED.

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NETHERLANDS REVIEWED BUILD-UP EFFORT, CONCLUDED MILITARY COMMITTEE APPRAISAL NOT REASSURING, AND ASSERTED MILITARY MEASURES FOR BERLIN CRISIS CANNOT BE DEALT WITH IN ISOLATION. SUPPORTED FRG IN VIEW THAT MC-96 REQUIREMENTS WITHOUT MRBMS WOULD NO LONGER BE BALANCED, AND HOPED PERMANENT COUNCIL COULD STUDY EARLIEST. ON SUBJECT NUCLEAR CONTROL, ALTHOUGH RECOGNIZING DELICATE PROBLEMS INVOLVED, CONSIDERED MC-95 GOOD START ON MILITARY ASPECTS. STATED ONE MAJOR ISSUE WOULD BE NEED FOR QUICK NUCLEAR REACTION (PERHAPS 2 TO 15 MINUTES) AS AGAINST TIME NECESSARY MAKE POLITICAL DECISIONS. IN WHOLE FIELD NUCLEAR CONTROL AND MRBM, DUTCH PREFER MULTILATERAL INTEGRATED SOLUTIONS. IN CONCLUSION, NETHERLANDS REP SUGGESTED COUNTRIES REVIEW WORK OF NMSSA WITH VIEW TO PROVIDING ADEQUATE INSTRUCTIONS TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ORDER TO MAKE OPERATION MORE EFFECTIVE. THE ITALIAN ADDRESSED HIMSELF EXCLUSIVELY TO ITALY'S EFFORTS FOR BERLIN BUILD-UP. RECITING INCREMENT FOR ARMY, NAVY AND AIRFORCE, HE EMPHASIZED THIS ACCOUNTED FOR 10 PERCENT INCREASE IN DEFENSE BUDGET. ALTHOUGH ADMITTING THEY HAD NOT DONE EVERYTHING REQUESTED BY SACEUR, THEY CONSIDERED THEMSELVES DOING WELL IN LIGHT THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. STATED ITALY AGREES IN PRINCIPLE WITH NATO NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE.

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: POLTO 792, December 14, noon (SECTION II OF II)

11

POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS POLTO UNNUMBERED

FROM USDEL

SARPER, TURKEY, ASSERTED NATO DISCUSSIONS ON STRATEGY HAD REACHED NO CONCLUSIONS THUS FAR. TURKEY WISHED TO MAKE ITS POSITION CLEAR THAT IT DESIRED PRESENT STRATEGIC DOCTRINE REMAIN IN FULL FORCE, AND THAT NO INTERPRETATION OF SUCH DOCTRINE BE PERMITTED WHICH WOULD IN FACT MODIFY DOCTRINE. HE ASSERTED THAT IF CONCEPT OF "LIMITED WAR" INTRODUCED INTO NATO STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, WOULD PRESAGE GREAT DANGER FOR NATO DEFENSE. HE CLOSED BY WARNING AGAINST INTERPRETATION VITIATING PRESENT DOCTRINE. DANISH REP COMMENDED MILITARY COMMITTEE AND SECGEN ON THEIR REPORTS, REFERRED TO ESTABLISHMENT BALTIC COMMAND, AND INDICATED COMMANDERS TO BE NOMINATED NEAR FUTURE. HE THEN REVIEWED DANISH EFFORTS FOR MILITARY BUILD-UP EMPHASIZING CERTAIN DEFICIENCIES AND DIFFICULTIES COUNTRY WITH ITS RESOURCES WILL HAVE TO IMPLEMENT LONG-TERM MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WITHOUT ASSISTANCE. HOPED TO IMPROVE SOME OF THESE DEFICIENCIES BUT STATED IT POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE RAISE SOLDIERS' SALARIES FOR PRESENT. THANKED US AND CANADA FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

MESSMER, SPOKE FOR FRANCE, RECOGNIZED NEED FOR INCREASED CONVENTIONAL FORCES BUT ALSO FOR NUCLEAR WHICH RAISED PROBLEM PRIORITIES IN USE LIMITED RESOURCES. INCREASED CONVENTIONAL FORCES EVEN THOUGH JUSTIFIED, RAISES FINANCIAL PROBLEMS.

EXPLAINED FRANCE NOT COMMITTED TO CONCEPT PRIORITIES THAT INVOLVED EXCLUSION EITHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL BUILD-UP AT EXPENSE OTHER. STATED, HOWEVER, THAT COUNTRYS' CONCEPT PRIORITIES MUST RELATE TO PRESENT STATE ITS MILITARY BUILD-UP. FRANCE DOES NOT BELIEVE INCREASE IN CONVENTIONAL NATO FORCES CAN BE CARRIED TO POINT TO COPE WITH ENEMY'S CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH. ALSO BELIEVES NATO CONVENTIONAL

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FORCES NOT STRONG ENOUGH PROVIDE ALLIANCE WITH TIME TO MAKE POLITICAL DECISION USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (PAUSE CONCEPT). CONSEQUENTLY ALLIANCE MUST REACT EARLY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS EVEN AGAINST ENEMY'S LARGE-SCALE CONVENTIONAL FORCES. INDICATED FRENCH EXPENDITURES NOW EMPHASIZING NUCLEAR FORCE PROGRAM, BUT WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT WILL ALSO BUILD UP CONVENTIONAL FORCES. HE CONCLUDED THAT WE MUST NOT DEVOTE RESOURCES FOR FORCES OR WEAPONS FOR BERLIN BUILD-UP WHICH MIGHT BECOME OBSOLETE. SHORT RANGE MILITARY MEASURES FOR BERLIN MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH LONG-RANGE NATO PLANNING.

AT REQUEST STIKKER, GENERAL LEMNITZER, CHAIRMAN MC, SPOKE TO STRAUSS PROPOSAL WHICH CIRCULATED (FOLLOWS IN SEPARATE AIRGRAM). HE EXPLAINED MC HAD ASKED STANDING GROUP TO STUDY BUT THAT IT HAD NOT, REQUESTED REPORT BE SUBMITTED TO NEXT MEETING MC IN SPRING 1962. REFERENCE CONTROL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HE EXPLAINED THAT MC-95 REPRESENTED STUDY OF MILITARY ASPECTS PROBLEM WHICH HAD BEEN PASSED TO NAC. NEXT STEP WAS TO OBTAIN POLITICAL GUIDANCE FROM NAC.

IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION ON HOW TO HANDLE STRAUSS PROPOSAL, UK EMPHASIZED IT NECESSARY TO REVIEW AND DECIDE NATO STRATEGY BEFORE SETTLING MRBM QUESTION. LANGE, NORWAY, RECOMMENDED THAT STRAUSS PROPOSAL BE REFERRED TO PERMREPS. BOTH US AND UK SUPPORTED NORWEGIAN PROPOSAL WITH SECRETARY RUSK MAKING CLEAR THATTHIS IN NO WAY SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS LACK US INTEREST. BOTH STRAUSS AND STIKKER TOOK ISSUE WITH WATKINSON'S CONCEPT OF MAKING STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS PRECEDENT TO CONSIDERATION OF MRBM FORCE. STRAUSS ALSO TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SUGGEST THAT US MUST GO FURTHER THAN INVITE EUROPEAN PROPOSALS. HE ASSERTED JOB REQUIRED COLLECTIVE PARTICIPATION INCLUDING US. STIKKER INDICATED HIS AGREEMENT WITH STRAUSS'S OBJECTIVE OF HASTENING CONSIDERATION PROBLEM. HE REPORTED INTERNATIONAL STAFF WAS PREPARING PAPER ISOLATING IMPORTANT QUESTIONS PERTINENT TO STUDY PROBLEM.

AFTER SCHROEDER, FRG, AGREED TO REFER TO THE PERMREPS, COUNCIL TOOK THAT ACTION AND ALSO NOTED ALL DOCUMENTS INVOLVED IN ABOVE DISCUSSIONS. SECRETARY RUSK CLOSED THIS PHASE OF THE DISCUSSION BY REFERRING TO STRAUSS'S SUGGESTION CONCERNING US PARTICIPATION. HE EXPLAINED THAT ALLIANCE MEMBERS EMBRACED DIFFERENT VIEWS, THAT US DID NOT WISH TO BE EITHER REFEREE NOR DICTATOR, AND HAD THUS SOUGHT TO HAVE CONSENSUS OF EUROPEAN ALLIES' VIEWS MADE KNOWN TO IT.

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3. ON SUBJECT COOPERATION IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, UK COMMENDED ARMS COMMITTEE ON ITS REPORT POINT OUT THAT OF ORIGINAL 28 PROJECTS, QY HAVE NOW RECEIVED NATO MILITARY APPROVAL. HE STATED PROJECT NOW MOVING FROM INITIAL STAGES TO POINT WHERE DECISIONS BY GOVERNMENTS MUST BE MADE. STATED ALSO THAT UK ON ITS PART HAD GOOD RECORD OF BUYING ABROAD AND HOPED OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD ESTABLISH SAME. CANADA SPOKE TO PROBLEM POINTING OUT THAT AS EXPENSES MOUNTING EVER MORE NEED FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION. FOR ITS PART, IT SUPPORTS "20 PROJECTS" PROGRAM BUT SUGGESTED NATO MUST DECIDE WHETHER TO CONTINUE, EXPAND, OR DISCONTINUE PROGRAM. IS HAS DONE GOOD JOB AND CANADA WOULD RECOMMEND IF DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN 1962 THEY SHOULD REVIEW NATO R&D PROGRAM AS ITEM ON AGENDA.

4. OTHER BUSINESS. GREEK REPRESENTATIVE MADE HIS EXPECTED PLEA FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO HELP MEET GREEK DEFENSE EXPENSES. EXPLAINED AT SOME LENGTH ITS INVESTMENT PROGRAM FOR PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, EMPHASIZINGTHAT PRESENT LEVEL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES MAINTAINED ONLY THROUGH EXTERNAL BORROWING. THIS NOT HEALTHY SITUATION AND SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND. HE PAID TRIBUTE TO US AID IN PAST AND REPORTED IT WOULD SUBMIT SHORTLY TO NAC PROPOSAL FOR A NATO JOINT INVESTMENT FUND TO ASSIST POOR NATIONS.

SARPER, TURKEY, ENDORSED GREEK PROPOSAL REVIEWING DIFFICULTIES TURKEY ALSO HAS WITH ITS DEFENSE EFFORT. STIKKER, REFERRING TO PROBLEM OF GREECE AND TURKEY, REPORTED THAT COMMITTEE OF THREE EXPERTS' STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS IN GREECE AND TURKEY EXPECTED SOON. THESE PROBLEMS VERY SERIOUS AND NAC SHOULD CONSIDER REPORT PROMPTLY. SECRETARY RUSK PRAISED GREECE AND TURKEY FOR THEIR MILITARY EFFORTS, EXPRESSED VIEW THAT OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS NOW IN POSITION TO HELP POOR NATO COUNTRIES. CONSEQUENTLY US WILL WELCOME EARLY DISCUSSION THIS NATURE.

COUNCIL DECIDED SPRING FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING TO BE IN ATHENS MAY 3-5.

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO CIRCULAR 73, December 14, 11 p.m.

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FROM USDEL

AGENDA ITEM II-A-3, AFTERNOON SESSION, DEC PM, DECEMBER 14.

MEETING LIMITED TO FOREIGN MINISTERS, DEFENSE MINISTERS, PERMREPS AND CHIEFS OF STAFF OF 15 DELEGATIONS PLUS FIVE MEMBERS INTERNATIONAL STAFF, TWO FROM MILITARY COMMITTEE-STANDING GROUP, AND SACEUR, SACLANT AND CINCHAN IN PERSON.

SECRETARY MCNAMARA OPENED WITH STATEMENT CONSISTING OF (1) INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING AND (2) ANALYSIS OF MILITARY IMPLICATIONS RESULTING THEREFROM. SECRETARY RUSK FOLLOWED WITH COMMENTS ON POLITICO-MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S STATEMENT. COPIES BOTH STATEMENTS AIRMAILED SEPARATELY.

SYG COMMENTED HAD NEVER BEFORE HEARD SUCH FORCEFUL OR IMPORTANT STATEMENT ON MILITARY MATTERS IN COUNCIL. SAID HE COULD NOT DENY ACCURACY SECDEF'S STATEMENTS OF DEFICIENCIES, NOTABLY NATO FAILURE ACCOMPLISH TRUE FORWARD STRATEGY AS STATED BY SACEUR FEW DAYS AGO TO MILITARY COMMITTEE. SYG ADDED HE ASSUMED MINISTERS WOULD NOT WANT COMMENT NOW BUT WOULD WANT HAVE FULL GOVERNMENTAL STUDY OF DOCUMENT BEFORE SUBMITTING COMMENTS TO NAC.

SEEMED AT FIRST SYG WAS RIGHT AND THAT NO ONE WOULD SAY ANYTHING ABOUT TWO STATEMENTS. WAS PLAIN IMPACT OF TWO

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STATEMENTS HAD BEEN POWERFUL AND FOR A WHILE THERE WAS SILENCE. THEN SOME MINISTERS SPOKE UP. FROM WHAT THEY SAID AND FROM COMMENTS I HEARD AFTER MEETING FROM STRAUSS AND FROM VARIOUS PERMREPS, IT WAS CLEAR THAT RECEPTION WAS EXTREMELY FAVORABLE TO TWO U.S. STATEMENTS.

GREEK FONMIN AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA FINALLY SPOKE UP AND PAID TRIBUTE TO TWO STATEMENTS, AND SAID GREEK GOVT ENCOURAGED BY NEWS IT HAD RECEIVED AND WAS IN CONSEQUENCE ENCOURAGED TO DO MORE FOR COMMON DEFENSE. FONMIN SARPER THEN SAID VERY MUCH SAME THING, ADDING NATO GOVERNMENTS MUST STUDY HOW TO SOLVE MANY PROBLEMS DESCRIBED IN TWO STATEMENTS. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT SOMEHOW OR OTHER EFFECT SHOULD BE GIVEN IN FINAL COMMUNIQUE TO IMPLICATIONS OF STATEMENTS.

FONMIN SPAAK THEN SPOKE AT GREATER LENGTH. HIS POINTS WERE: 1) HE AGREED THESE STATEMENTS WERE IMPRESSIVE, THAT THEY WERE ENCOURAGING IN MANY RESPECTS, NOT LEAST OF WHICH WAS AFFIRMATION, WHICH WAS UNNECESSARY, OF STRENGTH OF DEVOTION OF U.S. TO NATO ALLIANCE. 2) HE SAID QUESTION NOW WAS WHAT TO DO WITH THESE STATEMENTS. THEY RAISED VERY IMPORTANT QUESTIONS, AND NAC SHOULD STUDY THEM, SEE WHERE THEY LEAD, THEN REPORT BACK TO MINISTRIES. NOT EVERY PART OF TWO STATEMENTS WAS ENCOURAGING; THERE WERE SOME DISCOURAGING SUGGESTIONS OF DEFICIENCIES AND THE LIKE. 3) WE HAVE HEARD OF DEFICIENCIES BEFORE; INDEED WE HAVE HEARD OF THESE SAME DEFICIENCIES. BUT WE NEVER DO ANYTHING ABOUT THEM. THIS TIME LET US RESOLVE TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THEM AND ABOUT THE OTHER VERY IMPORTANT POINTS MENTIONED IN THESE TWO DOCUMENTS. 4) HE WOULD MAKE AN OFFICIAL PROPOSAL. LET SYG GET BUSY WITH THESE PROBLEMS AND SEE TO IT THEY ARE

DEALT WITH BY NAC. PERHAPS HE SHOULD BRING DEFENSE MINISTERS BACK AGAIN, IN SAY THREE MONTHS, TO REVIEW WHAT NAC HAD DONE. PROBLEMS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BY NAC IN CONJUNCTION WITH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF ALLIANCE.

SYG CLOSED MEETING WITH STATEMENT THAT NAC WOULD GET BUSY ON ALL THESE PROBLEMS IMMEDIATELY.

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 791, December 14, 11 p.m.

POUCHED ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS POLTO UNNUMBERED

FROM USDEL

AT RESTRICTED SESSION MINISTERIAL COUNCIL THURSDAY AFTERNOON DEC 14, SYG SAID HE HAD TO REPORT VERY GRAVE LEAK WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE. LARGE PORTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN AT THURSDAY MORNING MEETING BY MR. MCCONE HAD ALREADY APPEARED IN NEWSPAPERS. SYG SAID HE CHECKED WITH TAPE RECORDINGS OF STATEMENTS ISSUED BY PRESS OFFICERS OF INTERNATIONAL STAFF AND NONE OF THESE HAD CONTAINED ANY INDISCRETION WHATSOEVER. THEREFORE LEAK HAD COME FROM DELEGATIONS. HE ASKED EACH DELEGATION TO INQUIRE FROM ANY OF ITS MEMBERS WHO HAD HAD CONTACT WITH PRESS TO DETERMINE WHAT HAD BEEN SAID AND TO REPORT BACK TO INTERNATIONAL STAFF.

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FROM: ATHENS

TO: Secretary of State

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DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION AT DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING, ATHENS, MAY 3, 1962:

SECRETARY GENERAL STIKKER OPENED MEETING, WELCOMING OPPORTUNITY FOR MINISTERS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND REVIEW ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF PAST TWO YEARS ON COORDINATED R&D AND PRODUCTION IN NATO, AS WELL AS TO AGREE ON NEXT STEPS.

MINISTERS AGREED NOT TO ISSUE SEPARATE DEFENSE COMMUNIQUE, BUT AUTHORIZED STIKKER TO INFORM PRESS OF DISCUSSIONS ON BROAD BACKGROUND BASIS. STIKKER OUTLINED IN BRIEF THE WORK OF THE ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE AS DISCUSSED IN CM(62)31, EMPHASIZING NECESSITY FOR COORDINATION BECAUSE OF GREAT DEMAND ON TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO NATIONS ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.

STIKKER STATED THAT CLEAR DECISION IS NOW NEEDED ON THE V/STOL RECONNAISSANCE STRIKE AIRCRAFT, SINCE EVALUATION OF ALL STUDIES SHOULD BE COMPLETED SHORTLY. COMMON INTEREST SHOULD BE OVERRIDING AND DECISION TAKEN WITHIN TWO MONTHS AT THE MOST. STIKKER STATED THAT ONLY LIMITED RESULTS

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HAVE BEEN OBTAINED IN THE FIELD OF SHORT-TERM REQUIREMENTS, CITING MAIN BATTLE TANK AS EXAMPLE. IN SPITE OF FACT NO AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE ON SINGLE TANK, BECAUSE OF TWO DIFFERENT CONCEPTS, HE ASKED FOR AGREEMENT TO PRODUCE EITHER ONE OR TWO TANKS BASED ON THE SEPARATE CONCEPTS. IN CLOSING, STIKKER ASKED MINISTERS TO ACCEPT THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE REPORT.

WATKINSON, MOD U.K., EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR WORK DONE BY ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE, AND CRITICISM FOR SOME ASPECTS OF PROGRAM, CITED NECESSITY FOR MINISTERS TO CONSIDER NEXT STEPS. NOTED INSUFFICIENT PROGRESS TO PROVIDE WEAPONS NEEDED IN PROPER TIME FRAME. PROGRESS BLOCKED IN SOME INSTANCES BY INABILITY TO AGREE ON JOINT DOCTRINE. WHILE MUCH WORK DONE, RESULTS NOT PARTICULARLY IMPRESSIVE, NOTING COMMITTEE STATEMENT OF OWN INABILITY TO AGREE ON AT LEAST 3 NBMR'S. HE POSED TWO QUESTIONS INDICATING STANDARDS NEEDED: (1) ARE WE IN SIGHT OF THE FORMULATION OF AGREED MILITARY REQUIREMENTS? AND (2) WILL OUR END PRODUCT RESULT IN SERVICEABLE WEAPONS READY FOR USE IN THE TIME FRAME REQUIRED? WATKINSON CITED THREE SAMPLES TO SHOW WHAT IS REQUIRED:

(A) THE DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING AGREED BASIC MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE MAIN BATTLE TANK. INSTEAD OF ONE, EUROPE WILL HAVE 3 DIFFERENT TANKS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS, RESULTING FROM LACK OF AGREEMENT ON BASIC TANK PHILOSOPHY.

(B) NBMR NO. 3, V/STOL STRIKE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. WHILE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, DIFFICULTY ARISES IN EVALUATING STUDIES.

(C) NBMR NO. 4, V/STOL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. CITED DIFFICULTY DETERMINING EXACT NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND THE DANGER OF PROCEEDING WITH SEPARATE PROJECTS.

STUDY OF

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STUDY OF REPORT LED WATKINSON TO CONCLUDE THREE AREAS FOR WORK:

(A) GREATER EFFORT TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON PHILOSOPHY LEADING TO AGREED BMRS.

(B) WATKINSON RECOMMENDED SETTING A FIRM TIME LIMIT FOR DECISION ON BMR NO. 3 COUNTRIES TO ACCEPT OR REJECT THE ALTERNATIVE OFFERED BY 1 SEPT. FAILING GENERAL AGREEMENT, MOD'S WOULD MEET AGAIN TO DETERMINE WHAT FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

(C) RECOMMENDED SIMILAR HANDLING OF BMR NO. 4, WITH END CY 62 AS TIME LIMIT FOR FINAL DECISION.

VISSER, MOD NETHERLANDS, EXPRESSING DUTCH AGREEMENT WITH PHILOSOPHY OF COORDINATED R, D AND P, STATED THAT NATO WOULD BE STRENGTHENED AND INTEGRATION ENHANCED BY FURTHER EFFORTS. SMALLER PARTNERS LOOK TO FAIR TREATMENT AND SHOULD SHARE RESPONSIBILITIES AND ADVANTAGES EQUITABLY. NETHERLANDS GRATIFIED BY RELATIVE SUCCESS OF 20 PROJECTS EXERCISE. IN SOME GROUPS, REAL PROGRESS MADE, E. G., V/STOL AND DATA HANDLING EQUIPMENT. OTHER GROUPS HAVE ONLY EXCHANGED INFORMATION, BUT THIS USEFUL IN ITSELF. IN CERTAIN CASES LESS URGENCY FOR FREQUENT MEETINGS, SOME ITEMS SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM LIST. OTHER ITEMS SHOULD BE ADDED TO LIST IF PROSPECTS FOR EARLY PRODUCTION ARE FAVORABLE. NOTED DIFFICULTY IN HANDLING SHORT-TERM REQUIREMENTS. WHEN PRODUCTION STAGE IS REACHED, GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS ARE REQUIRED; THESE ARE DIFFICULT FOR GOVERNMENTS BUT CRUCIAL FOR THE ALLIANCE. GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ADHERE TO DECISIONS MADE BY WORKING GROUPS ON WHICH THEY ARE REPRESENTED. LARGER NATIONS SHOULD RETAIN PRIME RESPONSIBILITY BECAUSE SMALLER NATIONS CANNOT HANDLE BY THEMSELVES, BUT BEFORE DECISIONS ARE MADE, POLITICAL AND LOGISTICAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. FOR THE FUTURE, WE SHOULD MAKE EFFORTS TO AVOID WASTEFUL DUPLICATION. CITED TWO CONDITIONS FOR FUTURE WORK. FIRST, REQUIREMENT FOR CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN MILITARY AUTHORITIES, SCIENTISTS AND INDUSTRY, WITH FREE

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FLOW OF INFORMATION BETWEEN THE GROUPS. SECOND, WE SHOULD ATTEMPT SIMPLE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH CAN CONSIDER TASK ON A PROJECT BY PROJECT BASIS, ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY IN ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES.

HARKNESS, MOD CANADA, RECOGNIZED LIMITED PROGRESS MADE, BUT RECOMMENDED CONTINUATION ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES. ENDORSED WATKINSON'S PROPOSALS FOR TIME LIMIT ON SELECTED ITEMS. STATED THAT THERE SHOULD BE WIDE INTERCHANGE IN THE PRODUCTION PHASE. CITING CANADIAN EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE ITS FORCES, HE STATED CANADA LOOKED FORWARD TO INCREASED PARTICIPATION BY CANADIAN INDUSTRY IN THE PRODUCTION FIELD. STATED NEED FOR FULLY COORDINATED BMRS WITH MILITARY AUTHORITIES TAKING INITIATIVE AND AD HOC WORKING GROUPS TAKING PART AT EARLY STAGE. COMMENDING IS, HE STATED ESSENTIAL THAT IS PROVIDE CLOSER COORDINATION AND CENTRALIZED DIRECTION.

SANCAR, MOD TURKEY, EXPRESSED TURKISH INTEREST IN ALL ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO INCREASE NATO STRENGTH, PARTICULARLY THOSE FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION. TURKISH TASKS DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF THE GEOPOLITICAL AND STRATEGIC POSITION. TURKEY TRIES TO PROVIDE LOGISTICS SUPPORT BUT ITS RESOURCES ARE NOT ADEQUATE. TURKEY NEEDS LARGE SCALE AID. EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE AID OF ITS "FRIEND AND ALLY", THE UNITED STATES, AND NOTES ITS INDEBTEDNESS TO ALL NATO ALLIES. DEFENSE EFFORT RELATED TO TURKISH ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND TURKEY APPRECIATES NATO INTEREST THIS AREA. TURKEY WILL PARTICIPATE TO THE LIMIT OF ITS CAPABILITIES AND CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE EXCEPT IN THE ELECTRONICS FIELD. CITED POSSIBILITIES FOR PARTICIPATION OF TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY. EXPRESSED GRATITUDE TO GREECE FOR HOSTING SPRING MEETING.

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5:24 AM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1962 MAY 7 PM 7 25

FROM: ATHENS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1195, MAY 4, 1 AM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1195; INFORMATION PARIS 163, USRO PARIS, CINCLANT UNNUMBERED.

PARIS FOR STOESSEL

CINCLANT FOR POLAD

DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE

HANSEN, MOD DENMARK, CITED DANISH INTEREST IN COORDINATED RD&P AS MEANS OF MAKING BEST USE OF LIMITED SCIENTIFIC AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES. NOTED DANISH PARTICIPATION IN PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES AND INTENTION TO PLAY MORE ACTIVE PART IN THE FUTURE. ENDORSED FIVE RECOMMENDATIONS ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE REPORT, NOTING DIFFICULTIES ARE INVOLVED, CONSIDERABLE WORK ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED, HOPE THAT WORK WILL CONTINUE AND MORE PROGRESS WILL BE REALIZED. EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF GRANTING LEADERSHIP ON SPECIFIC PROJECTS TO SMALL COUNTRIES WHERE POSSIBLE.

AMBASSADOR ALESSANDRENI, SPEAKING FOR MOD ADREOTTTI, WHO WAS DELAYED BECAUSE OF ITALIAN ELECTIONS, REPORTED IMPORTANCE ITALY ATTACHES TO PROGRESS IN SELECTED PROJECTS. CITED SPECIFIC ITALIAN PARTICIPATION AND FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROGRAM.

SEGERS, MOD BELGIUM, NOTED THAT DEFENSE POTENTIAL OF ALLIANCE HAS INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS WHICH CAN AND SHOULD BE EXPLOITED. PLED CASE FOR PRODUCTION BY SMALL COUNTRIES, NOT

CONTINGENT

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CONTINGENT ON PRIOR PARTICIPATION IN EARLIER STAGES, AND STRESSED BELGIAN POTENTIAL THIS FIELD.

PROTOPAPADAKIS, MOD GREECE, MADE STRONG STATEMENT CONCERNING GREEK SACRIFICE FOR NATO. NOTED THAT 6 PERCENT GNP AND 3.3 PER CENT OF POPULATION "SERVED NATO STRATEGY". GREEK ECONOMIC EFFORT HAMPERED BY DEFENSE BURDEN. WHILE OTHER COUNTRIES "ENJOY" AID, GREECE FORCED TO USE AID FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NECESSARY FOR GREEK DEFENSE. STATING PARTICULARLY NECESSARY TO PROVIDE DEFENSE BUDGET SUPPORT BY PLACING ORDERS NOT CONTINGENT ON PARTICIPATION IN PRIOR R&D ACTIVITIES. STATED GREECE WANTED NO PRIVILEGED TREATMENT RE QUALITY OR PRICE OF PRODUCTION. EXPRESSED AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WITH ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, BUT GREEK PARTICIPATION IS LIMITED MAINLY TO PRODUCTION STAGE.

SECRETARY MCNAMARA STATED THAT HE SHARED CONCERN EXPRESSED BY OTHERS, DOUBTING THAT PROGRESS MADE HAD BEEN SATISFACTORY. CITING 23 ITEMS IN THE R&D PHASE, PART I OF REPORT, NOTED THAT APPROXIMATELY 18 HAD BEEN UNDER STUDY FOR TWO YEARS, AND NONE YET PROPOSED FOR JOINT DEVELOPMENT. IF WE DEPEND ON THIS PROGRAM, WE WILL SOON HAVE OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT. HE EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH WATKINSON'S PROPOSAL ON TIME LIMITATION. SUGGESTED SMALL AD HOC GROUP TO REVIEW WORK DONE THE PAST TWO YEARS AND DETERMINE HOW IT COULD BE ACCELERATED. POINTED UP NECESSITY FOR JOINT DEVELOPMENT OR ELIMINATION OF ITEMS FROM CONSIDERATION.

STRAUSS, MOD GERMANY, STATED THAT GERMANY AGREED WITH PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE REPORT. COORDINATED PRODUCTION SHOULD BE EXTENDED. NOTED THAT BILATERAL OR TRILATERAL HANDLING MORE EFFECTIVE THAN WHEN MANY NATIONS ARE INVOLVED. RECOMMENDED THAT THE AD HOC COMMITTEE AND ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE BASE THEIR CONSIDERATION ON FOLLOWING SCHEDULE:

(A) EARLY DEFINITION OF OPERATION CHARACTERISTICS AND TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS, WITH OBJECTIVE OF OBTAINING AGREED BMR BY ALL INTERESTED NATIONS.

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(B) DEVELOPMENT PHASE, PARTICIPATED IN BY 2 OR 3 NATIONS HAVING STRONGEST INTEREST. THIS PHASE TO EXTEND THROUGH DEVELOPMENT OF PROTO-TYPE.

(C) FINAL PRODUCTION PHASE. ALLL NATIONS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IF THEY HAVE A REQUIREMENT FOR THE EQUIPMENT CONCERNED.

STATING SOME COMPROMISE ALWAYS REQUIRED, WE SHOULD STRIVE TO DEVELOP AGREED NATO, RATHER THAN NATIONAL, BMR TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF COOPERATIVE EFFORTS. RECOMMENDED THAT 3 TO 5 URGENT PROJECTS BE SINGLED OUT FOR EXPEDITED ATTENTION, WITH TIME LIMITS FOR COMPLETION. SUGGESTED, IN LINE WITH FOURTH CONCLUSION OF REPORT, THAT TOP LEVEL AUTHORITIES SHOULD TAKE MORE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION THAN IN PAST. SUGGESTED A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF MOD'S, WORKING WITH ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE, TO DRAFT WORKING PROCEDURES FOR FUTURE HANDLING, RESULTS TO BE CONSIDERED BY MOD'S AT NEXT MEETING. STATED DIFFICULTIES FOR SMALLER NATIONS TO PARTICIPATE, BECAUSE OF GREAT EXPENSES REQUIRED AND HIGH COSTS OF LIMITED PRODUCTION. AS A RESULT, GAP BETWEEN FORCE GOALS, AND REALITY IS INCREASING, RESULTING IN SERIOUS PROBLEM.

MESSMER, MOD FRANCE, EXPRESSED AGREMENT OVER LACK OF CONCRETE RESULTS ATTAINED ON 20 PROJECTS. SLOWNESS REFLECTS TOP HEAVINESS OF THE ORGANIZATION. WHILE WATKINSON PROPOSAL FOR TIME LIMITS IS SATISFACTORY FOR SPECIFIC PROJECTS, EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR THE FUTURE. STAED MUST RECOGNIZE BENEFITS OF BILATERAL OR TRILATERAL AGREEMENT AND NECESSITY FOR ACTION. STATED WE NEED LESS DISCUSSION AND MORE RESULTS.

WATKINSON ENDORSED MCNAMARA'S SUGGESTION SUBJECT TO APPOINTMENT OF COMPETENT COMMITTEE. ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF STRAUSS PROPOSAL, NOTING ALL WANT TO TAKE ACTION BUT QUESTION IS HOW BEST TO DO SO. OFFERED POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER WORK ON FOURTH RECOMMENDATION RE MEETING OF SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS.

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IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR FURTHER DETAILS HIS PROPOSAL, SECRETARY MCNAMARA SUGGESTED THAT MINISTERS REQUEST SECRETARY GENERAL TO OUTLINE THE COMPOSITION OF AN AD HOC GROUP FOR WHICH PERMANENT COUNCIL COULD DEVELOP TERMS OF REFERENCE. CONTEMPLATED A TEMPORARY GROUP TO REVIEW ACTIONS TAKEN THE PAST TWO YEARS AND TO DETERMINE HOW THE EFFORT COULD BE ACCELERATED. MINISTERS THEMSELVES SHOULD BE MORE ACTIVE, SINCE THEY ALONE CAN MAKE MAJOR DECISIONS. IF DECISIONS ARE NOT MADE, DELAY RESULTS.

SUMMARIZING, STIKKER EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR WORK OF THE ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM, MUCH USEFUL SPADE WORK HAS BEEN DONE AND COMMITTEE HAD EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TASK. HOWEVER, WORK SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO DRAG. MINISTERS SHOULD KNOW NEXT STEP THAT IS REQUIRED. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, STIKKER OUTLINED FOLLOWING POINTS FOR DECISION:

A. THAT MINISTERS NOTE REPORT OF THE ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE AND OF STATEMENTS MADE BY MINISTERS DURING DISCUSSION, SEVERAL OF WHICH NEED FURTHER ATTENTION.

B. THAT MINISTERS ACCEPT RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE REPORT.

C. THAT MINISTERS INVITE ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE TO SUBMIT COUNTRY PROPOSALS FOR COORDINATED PRODUCTION OF V/STOL AIRCRAFT.

D. THAT MINISTERS INVITE ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF DRAWING UP PRODUCTION PLANS FOR ONE OR MORE MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

E. THAT MINISTERS INVITE ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE TO SUBMIT CONCRETE, CORDINATED PRODUCTION PLANS FOR NBMR NO. 4 BY END OF CALENDAR YEAR 1962.

F. THAT MINISTERS REQUEST PERMANENT COUNCIL TO ESTABLISH AN AD HOC WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE MEANS OF EXPEDITING DECISIONS AND INSTITUTING

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COORDINATED PRODUCTION OF BMR'S. STIKKER NOTED BENEFITS OF SOME EFFORTS ON A BILATERAL OR TRILATERAL BASIS, PROVIDED OTHER NATIONS ARE BROUGHT IN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. HOWEVER, IF BILATERAL OR TRILATERAL WORK IS INSTITUTED, INTERNATIONAL STAFF SHOULD BE INFORMED OF PROGRESS IN ORDER TO PREVENT DUPLICATION BY NATIONS NOT INVOLVED THAT STAGE.

G. THAT MINISTERS INVITE NAC TO ENSURE AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE THAT PRODUCTION IS SHARED BY THE LARGEST NUMBER OF NATIONS.

IN CLOSING, STIKKER VOLUNTEERED TO HAVE IS IN CONSULTATION WITH NATIONS WHO HAD MADE SUGGESTIONS DRAFT TEXT OF AN AGREED STATEMENT FOR SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT BY MINISTERS IN ATHENS.

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Based on uncleared report of meeting.

NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 4--Review of International Situation: East-West Relations

With exception Iceland, all FonMins spoke to this item which took up morning and large part of afternoon session. With exception France, all expressed, with varying nuances, support for continuation talks with Soviets re Berlin and for Western positions taken in Geneva disarmament negotiations including nuclear test talks.

Secretary Rusk opened discussion with broad-brush review of East-West relations including Berlin, disarmament and Sino-Soviet conflict. Re Berlin, Soviets up to present had made no significant move to meet Western point of view regarding its vital interests, i.e. continued presence of Western forces, free access and maintenance relations between West Berlin and FedRep. Certain broader questions such as diffusion of nuclear weapons and joint committees for certain technical questions mentioned but not developed on either side since both recognized Berlin as heart of matter. Soviets seem to desire continuation talks and not to move Berlin toward military crisis or diplomatic impasse. Discussions with Soviets had taken place on three levels: (1) permanent

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solution of German question which Soviets view in terms of drawing line under World War II based on their proposals for free city and to which West opposed German reunification on basis free elections; (2) facets of the situation on which Soviets stress existence of two Germanies and to which West responds in terms of Western responsibility for Berlin, the presence of Western forces there and Western access. Believed we had made some progress in getting across to Moscow West determined to preserve its vital interests in Berlin. Latest discussions indicate some possibility of third level of discussion based on finding means of dealing with fact of disagreement, i.e. setting aside points of disagreement and recognizing points of agreement. Soviets had shown some, but not much, interest in this approach but coming weeks might indicate whether anything in nature of modus vivendi possible. US believes effective contact should be maintained with Soviet Union. We would also like to keep in close touch with Allies on matters which come up for discussion.

Re nuclear tests, Secretary stated one of our keenest disappointments was failure to achieve nuclear test ban agreement. US policy continued to be based on President March 2 statement that (1) in absence of satisfactory test ban treaty would be necessary for US to resume testing and (2) we would prefer to stop all testing and would do so as soon as satisfactory test ban agreement could be achieved. After protracted efforts of US and UK at Geneva to achieve test ban treaty which failed due largely to unyielding Soviet attitude on international inspection, emphasized difficulty of seeing any headway on nuclear testing or disarmament so long as

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Soviets committed to be obsessed with secrecy.

On general disarmament problems, Secretary emphasized US desire to make some beginning to work disarmament and reviewed our proposals for 30% reduction in US and for ceiling; these based on view what we could accept without interfering with US capacity to project its power into Eurasian land mass. In passing from Stage I to Stage II, however, grave decisions would have to be made as to whether world ready for that degree of disarmament. US recognizes considerable negotiations ahead and that impact of significant disarmament steps upon others would also have to be negotiated to be certain that, in total situation, reductions result in balanced forces and give no military advantage to either side. US would follow this problem closely with its allies.

Re Sino-Soviet conflict, Secretary Rusk stated he was not sure what relations are between Moscow and Peiping and not even sure that latter knew. Similarly he was not sure free world could derive any comfort from this conflict which in fact [illegible] view as to how Communist world could get on toward objective of world domination.

Secretary concluded we seem to be in period where atmosphere changed with respect to techniques, methods, tactics and discussions. US underscored that worldwide reaction to resumption of tests not as violent as would have been expected which showed some understanding of problem confronting US and would not be misled by any XXXXXXX atmosphere of detente. Understanding

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[illegible] policies of Soviet side remain same, build-up of Soviet strength is continuing [illegible] transform West must still look to strength which is necessary for its security.

Krag (Denmark) prefaced statement with congratulatory remark to France on [illegible] agreement and hope for fruitful relations between France and Algeria which would be to advantage to Alliance. On Berlin, expressed gratitude for manner in which US conducting difficult contacts with Soviets. Unsolved Berlin situation might prove dangerous to live with. Sense negotiated settlement without compromising Western principles best solution.

Denmark supported Western proposals on discontinuance atomic tests under [illegible] control. Also prepared to accept non-aggression declaration if this would be achieved without compromising issues fundamental to FedRep. Restated Danish rejection of denuclearized zones unless part of actually balanced system agreed between Western allies and Soviet Bloc. Denmark would welcome summit meeting if reasonable chances for success but not pressing for this particular proposal.

[illegible] of necessity for his immediate return to Denmark, Krag also at this [illegible] on defense matters. Denmark found discussion of guidelines in [illegible] Council useful and felt formula in SecGen's report best solution which could be expected under existing circumstances. Also approved UK suggestion for Council continue to receive nuclear information and welcomed US and UK assurances on use of nuclear weapons. On establishment of Allied Command, pointed out there no threat to which countermeasures since December 15 note and general feeling was

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that pressure against Scandinavian countries had decreased. Expressed confidence in resolve of Finnish government to maintain balance of power in Baltic area and requested NATO understanding of Finland's difficult situation and necessity of avoiding any move in support of Finland in formal public statements or otherwise since Finnish policy based on concept that in prevailing situation Finland must be left to help herself by means at her disposal without [redacted] to assistance of others. Denmark felt it essential, however, that [redacted] European trade arrangements give Finland means for maintaining and possibly [redacted] its trade with Western countries.

Krag concluded with note on Danish defense effort for which Danish government intended to ask new and increased appropriations. Emphasized, however, importance of continued assistance from US and Canada. While Denmark regarded as reasonable US view Western Europe should shoulder a greater proportion of its defense burdens, nevertheless due geographic position and strategic importance believed it common interest of all NATO countries to place modern material at disposal Danish defense.

[redacted]n (UK) spoke briefly to express general agreement with US views on talks [redacted]. Stated there was no evidence Soviets abandoning line laid down Moscow [redacted]. Believed, however, series of difficulties might be leading Soviets to modify policy for tactical reasons. In this connection cited agricultural difficulties confronting Khrushchev, and differences in Communist alliance including Sino-Soviet conflict. Expressed West could derive little satisfaction

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strained
from [redacted]/relations between China and USSR which revolved in part around doctrinal differences on risks that might be taken. Believed these factors among others might be tending to induce Soviets to seek lull in cold war. On disarmament, UK not surprised at Soviet intransigence and rejection of international inspection re nuclear testing due to emphasis on secrecy. Suggested Soviet refusal to agree to placing surprise attack item on Geneva agenda due to fact it would involve observers on GDR territory which no more acceptable than having such observers on Soviet territory. Felt generally Soviets did not want disarmament now but nevertheless West should continue to press disarmament discussions since point might be reached when Soviets find strain of rearmament so great they might be willing to contemplate some form of inspection. In conclusion, Home stated firm but unprovocative posture on part of West is showing some dividends. For first time there are some signs Soviets uncertain as to how to proceed. Believed that Soviets might want a lull in cold war and if so West should exploit it with "sweet reasonableness". Should continue discussions with Soviets regarding Basic disarmament and after series of tests are over, attempt to see if nuclear test ban agreement can be achieved.

Spaak (Belgium) spoke briefly to express support for US policies in discussions with Soviets and for US proposals on disarmament. Schroeder (Germany), after thanking US for efforts in conducting "probes" observed that Soviet objectives remained unchanged. Germany, however, prepared to go along with modus vivendi on

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Berlin if acceptable to Allies but West should move cautiously in this matter. Also approved idea of access authority on condition proposed Board of Governors be so composed as to avoid access authority being hamstrung. Likewise Germany agreed to NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression declaration if this could be done without recognition GDR. Germany did not object to agreement on non-transfer [illegible] out Germany did not intend to go beyond its 1954 statement re ABC weapons. Regarding disarmament warned of danger of proposals for demilitarized zone. [illegible] interested only in zone in central Europe along lines Rapacki Plan with intention to make Germany subject of special military regime designed to further [illegible] of NATO.

Green (Canada) warmly supported US efforts in talks re Berlin and hoped US proposals would enable West to seize initiative and get [illegible] agreement which would protect Western rights and at same time avoid military crisis. Regarding disarmament, Canada felt reduction of armaments met concrete needs of Alliance. Failure to reach agreement would handicap attainment of solution political problems and could also be obstacle to economic development. Major question was how [illegible] security by balanced progress of disarmament. Felt US proposals constituted [illegible] in right direction. Canada also convinced positive Western approach to [illegible] necessary to maintain and strengthen influence in neutral and world opinion. Green emphasized Canada had made clear many times its opposition to nuclear testing although it understood compulsion for US and UK resumption of [illegible]

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believed security could not be achieved through [redacted] and therefore effort must be made to reach agreement on this matter. In conclusion Cassin suggested, as means of contributing to solving disarmament problem, that (1) Permanent Council be asked to consider [redacted] at Geneva, especially surprise attack measures and non-[redacted] and (2) that Ministerial Meeting communique reaffirm [redacted] at Geneva and desire for NSC acting [redacted]

Lunn (Netherlands) approved statement [redacted] however, discussions had gone beyond normal [redacted] of Council. Reported extension of discussions to [redacted] and non-aggression declarations had been without prior consultation in Council, although he appreciated need to set [redacted] flexibility. [redacted] be found within [redacted] opportunity to [redacted] believed [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] ment could [redacted] Soviets [redacted] Suhman (Luxembourg) emphasized fact cold war had [redacted] but was [redacted] real achievement. Also felt improved climate of [redacted] taking suggested some progress in method and procedure.

Erkin (Turkey) took somewhat pessimistic view of developments stating that

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while atmosphere of relative relaxation of tensions had appeared none of the fundamental political problems had been settled. Moreover, developments in other areas such as Laos and Viet Nam revealed that "cold war" still going on and Communists consistently trying to extend spheres of influence. NATO therefore should consider ways and means of strengthening its own military posture.

Couve de Murville (France) claimed international press was not reporting objectively French position on Berlin. It was not question whether or not to negotiate with Soviets. Following December meeting majority of Council agreed, with no objection from France, to discuss Berlin situation with Soviets. Full Rusk statement on progress of these discussions presented nothing new since Council had been kept regularly informed. Exploratory talks had not really revealed any change in position of Soviets who still stressed their intention to draw up peace treaty with GDR. Soviet position in fact had hardened re presence of Western troops. However, Rusk suggestion to continue talks and attempt to reach "modus vivendi" on basis disagreement not far from approach initially advocated by French who had always believed understanding must be reached on basis disagreements. As US view of continuing talks with Soviets to enable continuation of existing situation without running risk of "dramatic events", it seemed to France best way of avoiding clash was through being firm. Military preparations of West had played important role in calling halt to Soviet harassments. Couve concluded one must be careful conversations I do not lead in fact to negotiations.

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Continuing talks hold danger of bing drawn into discussion of certain principles and making concessions which involved certain risks. Two dangers to be kept in mind are recognition of GER and neutralization of Germany which involved in demilitarized zone concept.

Lange (Norway) expressed strong support for seeking modus vivendi with Soviets. Although suspicious of non-aggression declarations, prepared to accept this as part of Berlin arrangement. On disarmament agreed that should press for GCD as well as partial measures but nothing should be done to upset balance of military strength of two sides or compromise Western defense posture. Agreed with Danish appreciation of Finnish situation.

Averoff (Greece) repeated familiar Greek view disarmament for Soviets was merely propaganda weapon. Expressed skepticism of value of any NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression declaration. Re Berlin cautioned against accepting any compromise involving sacrifice of principles since such concession could snowball to affect other areas and problems. Mentioned somewhat cooler Yugoslav-Greek relations due raising of Macedonian minority problem, and sharp improvement of Yugoslavia's relations with USSR. In this connection cited Yugoslavia's recent receipt of Soviet tanks and modern artillery.

Nogueira (Portugal) made lengthy statement pointing out danger of any non-aggression pact in terms of false impression of relaxation of tension, possible step toward recognition of GER and possible undermining of NATO strength. Re Berlin stated that while US-USSR contacts undoubtedly gave opportunity to explain to

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[redacted] points on which no concessions could be given, there was some danger in pressing negotiations too far.

Ambrosetti (Italy) concluded discussion this item with expression of support for further contacts to find basis for solution of Danish problem within framework safeguarding rights of Germans and for US proposals for discussion, under discussion at Geneva.

[redacted]

Drafted by: [redacted]/Williams/mal
5/1/52

Authorized by: Mr. Kohler

Concurrences: Mr. Feaucien
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3:25 a.m.

FROM: Athens

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 36, May 5, 1 a.m.

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PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO AND STOESSEL

NATO Ministerial Meeting -- Item I -- Afternoon Session, May 4

During discussion on Far East, Luns spoke on WNG, sharply attacking Indonesia and criticizing US, in thinly veiled references, for its role in dispute. Began by asserting Indonesian claims totally unfounded and that unfortunately some of Netherland's best allies gave credence to certain of these claims. Said Dutch have consistently supported self-determination of WNG and have progressively prepared Papuans for self-determination. Cited various steps to this end taken over years and progress achieved. Said representatives of independent African states recently visited WNG and concluded Papuans now ready for self-determination. Inconceivable that WNG should be turned over to administration of a foreign people. Said Dutch ready to accept international administration for territory provided self-determination guaranteed. Luns then said that since invasion of Goa, Sukarno had doubled his threats and aggressive actions toward WNG. Gave detailed account of various Indonesian landing attempts and protective measures taken, stating that thanks to help of Papuans these Indonesian efforts had been contained. Said Indonesian ships and other equipment obtained from Dutch allies, but wanted to thank those

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-2- SECTO 36, May 5, 1 a.m., from Athens

thank those allies who had forbidden export of arms to Indonesia. Observed that action of one ally had nearly made impossible reinforcement of forces in WNG by air, but that French and Portuguese had readily helped Dutch and repeated thanks to them. Luns said as result Dutch can now face all military eventualities and will not sacrifice principles to expediency.

Turning to negotiations, Luns said Dutch under increasing pressure by "a certain side" to transfer WNG administration to Indonesia after brief period of UN administration. This would involve great dangers since Sukarno had not upheld any of agreements reached at round-table conference on Indonesia. Said US, which chaired this conference, had made no move to prevent these violations by Indonesia, and that we would not have reached present impass if there had been firm dealing with Indonesia on previous occasions. Stated Papuans have expressed great concern at terms proposed for transition arrangement. Characterized Indonesian political situation and administrative system in highly derogatory terms and anticipated that hordes of Indonesians would replace Papuans in WNG administration to insure against free-exercise of self-determination.

Luns referred to argument that Sukarno must be "appeased" to turn him away from communism, but said this was spurious, citing strength of Indonesian Communist Party and Sukarno increasing flirtations with Communist bloc. Said West could not hope to outbid Communist bloc for influence in Indonesia.

Luns concluded by stating Dutch will support any proposal which will guarantee full freedom of choice for Papuans. Dutch policy fully in accord with UN Charter and NATO policies re Berlin and Germany. Said problem involved the essentials of NATO alliance. If Dutch sacrificed moral principles, no political gain will make up for it and if they succumb to current pressures, NATO alliance will be major loser.

Couve de Murville said he had heard Luns statement with sympathy and

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NATO 151/3

SECRET

-3- SECTO 36, May 5, 1 a.m., from Athens

sympathy and understanding and agreed with Dutch support of principle self-determination. Referred to "outside interference" of which said everyone is aware and hoped Dutch would be able to settle problem alone Schaus (Luxembourg) thanked Luns for statement and expressed hope principle of self-determination would be maintained. Defense Minister Andriotti representing Italy expressed hope solution would be reached by peaceful means and on basis self-determination. Said Dutch would have Italian good wishes in pursuing this objective. Spaak indicated sympathy and support for Dutch approach. Said they had gone to maximum of accomodation and hoped all would support Dutch approach. Schroeder hoped for peaceful solution and one that takes account of right of self-determination.

(Comment: Significant that other five members of Six spoke up in general support of Dutch, as if pre-arranged. Other countries did not comment.)

The Secretary prefaced his remarks on Far East situation by referring to Luns statement and said hoped for time tomorrow for additional comment. Important to know implications for future of Luns observations. With reference to Luns indication US not cooperative re WNG military reinforcements the Secretary said full facts of US actions, including landing permissions granted as well as those refused, should be made available to Council. However, he did not wish to pursue matter further at that time.

The Secretary then turned to Laos and Vietnam reported by separate telegram.

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Note: Advance copy S/S-O- 5/5/CWO. JRL.

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SECRET

Control: 4028
Rec'd: May 6, 1962
8:17 a.m.

FROM: ATHENS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 43, MAY 5, 7 P.M. (SECTION 1 OF 11)

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 43, INFORMATION BONN 30, PARIS 178, LONDON 52.

PARIS PASS USRO AND STOESSEL

POUCHED ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS

BASED ON UNCLEARED REPORT OF MEETING.

SUBJECT: NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AGENDA ITEM 1 - AFTERNOON SESSION, MAY 4

FOLLOWING EAST-WEST DISCUSSION, ERKIN (TURKEY) SPOKE ON SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST. REFERRING TO CONTINUING FERMENT THROUGHOUT AREA, HE SAID DISTURBANCES IN SYRIA MOST IMPORTANT. DESCRIBED SYRIAN DEVELOPMENTS AND CURRENT POWER BALANCE IN SOME DETAIL. CONCLUDED THAT, ALTHOUGH SITUATION FAR FROM STABLE, STRENGTH OF RIGHT-WING ARMY GROUP, WHICH FAVORS SYRIAN INDEPENDENCE, GIVES HOPE FOR FUTURE. ASKED THAT NATO GOVTS SEIZE ALL OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT SYRIAN INDEPENDENCE, BUT EMPHASIZED NEED FOR CAUTION AND TACT.

RE AREA AS WHOLE, ERKIN THOUGHT MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR WAS GENERAL DETERIORATION RESULTING FROM CONTINUING UNREST. WEST HAD LOST GROUND IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, BOTH OF WHOM HAD DEVELOPED CLOSER MILITARY RELATIONS WITH SOVIET BLOC. PROGRESS BEING MADE IN IRAN AND WEST SHOULD LEND GREATER MATERIAL AND MORAL SUPPORT TO IRAN. ECONOMIC AID TO PAKISTAN HAS IMPROVED WESTERN POSITION THERE. WE SHOULD SHOW GREATER SYMPATHY FOR PAKISTAN'S INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. CENTRAL

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-2- SECTO 43, MAY 5, 7 P.M., (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM ATHENS

AREA REMAINS TARGET OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA ATTACKS BUT CENTO COUNTRIES HAVE STOOD FIRM AND COUNTERACTED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. CONCLUDED THAT DRIVE OF COMMUNISM UNRELENTING AND ATTACHES SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE THESE COUNTRIES UNDERPRIVILEGED AND STRATEGICALLY LOCATED. UNFILLED ASPIRATIONS OF THESE PEOPLES MAKE THEM ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE. MOST IMPORTANT THAT ADEQUATE WESTERN ECONOMIC AID BE PROVIDED ON SELECTIVE BASIS TO AVOID UNRELIABLE COUNTRIES AND CONCENTRATED IN SUPPORT OF THOSE ATTACHED TO IDEALS OF FREE WORLD. LUNS SPOKE NEXT ON WEST NEW GUINEA (REPORTED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE).

THE SECRETARY, AFTER COMMENTING ON WGN, CHARACTERIZED LAO SITUATION AS STILL TROUBLED AND DANGEROUS. SAID OBJECTIVE THERE, AGREED BY AT LEAST THREE NATO MEMBERS, IS NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. FELT GENEVA CONFERENCE HAD LAID BASIS FOR AGREEMENT THAT COULD ACHIEVE THIS AND THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE CONCLUDED PROMPTLY IF COALITION GOVERNMENT COULD BE FORMED. SITUATION NOW HUNG UP BY FAILURE TO FORM COALITION. NO REAL NEGOTIATIONS YET CARRIED OUT BETWEEN LAO FACTIONS, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF ATTITUDE OF ROYAL LAO GOVT. US HAS BEEN DOING ITS BEST TO PERSUADE PHOUMI TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. US DOES NOT HAVE PRE-CONCEPTION ON EXACT PATTERN OF COALITION GOVT BUT BELIEVE SATISFACTORY CABINET MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WITH SERIOUS EFFORT.

THE SECRETARY SAID ALTERNATIVES TO SUCCESSFUL COALITION NOT ATTRACTIVE. ON ONE HAND, IF WE SHOULD ABANDON LAOS, COUNTRY WOULD BE QUICKLY OVERRUN BY PATHET LAO WITH VIETMINH SUPPORT AND THREAT WOULD MOVE TO OTHER SEA COUNTRIES. OTHER ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO PUT WESTERN FORCES INTO LAOS. THIS WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS GEOGRAPHICALLY AND DANGER OF ESCALATION GREAT, BUT MORE IMPORTANT IS LACK OF REAL CONCERN FOR INDEPENDENCE BY LAO PEOPLE THEMSELVES. FORMATION OF COALITION GOVT AND REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY ELEMENTS WOULD ENABLE LAO TO WORK OUT THEIR OWN INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND BE GOOD NEIGHBORS. HOWEVER, WE MAY IN FUTURE BE FACED WITH SERIOUS DECISION RE QUESTION OF PUTTING FORCES INTO LAOS OR INCREASING AID.

/ON SOUTH

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-3- SECTO 43, MAY 5, 7 P.M., (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM ATHENS

ON SOUTH VIETNAM, THE SECRETARY DISTINGUISHED SITUATION FROM THAT IN LAOS AND SAID US HAD GREATLY INCREASED AID TO HELP SOUTH VIETNAMESE WIN THEIR OWN WAR. HE DESCRIBED FUNCTIONS OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL. SAID THESE PERSONNEL ARE INEVITABLY FINDING THEMSELVES IN COMBAT SITUATION, ALTHOUGH RESULTING CASUALTIES NOT LIKELY TO BE LARGE AT ANY ONE TIME. NOT EASY TO JUDGE HOW SUCCESSFULLY THE OPERATION IS GOING AT PRESENT TIME. HAVE HAD BOTH SUCCESSES AND DEFEATS. US PLEASED AT HELP EXTENDED BY OTHER GOVTS, FOR EXAMPLE, PROVISION BY UK OF EXPERIENCE RE MALAYA GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AND AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC AID. THIS AID HELPS TO ASSURE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. RECOGNIZED DIEM HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR HIS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES. WE BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN HIS INTERNAL POLICIES ALTHOUGH HE STILL HAS LONG WAY TO GO. WE SEE NO SIGNIFICANT ALTERNATIVE TO HIM IN NEAR FUTURE. DIEM'S CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM SHOULD MAKE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE. US COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM DIFFERENT THAN RE LAOS BECAUSE: MILITARY FACTORS MORE FAVORABLE AND VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES HEAVILY INVOLVED. THIS SHOULD MAKE GREAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF OUTSIDE AID.

THE SECRETARY LED OFF DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA. SAID HE WISHED TO MENTION TWO ASPECTS OF SITUATION. FIRST, IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CASTRO-TYPE COMMUNISM. AT PUNTA DEL ESTE, IT WAS EVIDENT BOTH PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS OF HEMISPHERE HAD GONE THROUGH GREAT SHIFT IN OPINION DUE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA AND ACTIONS OF CUBAN LEADERS, E.G., THEIR PUBLIC COMMITMENTS TO COMMUNISM. ALSO INFLUENCED BY COMMUNIST USE OF CUBA AS BASE FOR DIRECT INTERVENTION ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA. HOWEVER, TENSION REMAINS IN LATIN AMERICA ON CUBAN QUESTION. AT PUNTA DEL ESTE, DESPITE UNANIMITY ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT POINTS, WAS UNFORTUNATE DISAGREEMENT REGARDING WAY IN WHICH CASTRO CUBA SHOULD BE ELIMINATED FROM INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM. DIFFERENCE WAS NOT WIDE BUT VERY DEEP OVER ALTERNATIVES OF IMMEDIATE OPERATION VERSUS GRADUAL DIVORCE AND DISAGREEMENT WAS NOT SOLVED. HOWEVER, WE DO BELIEVE CASTRO COMMUNISM BEING ISOLATED IN HEMISPHERE AND STEPS BEING TAKEN TO COUNTER CASTRO INTERVENTION.

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CORRECTION ISSUED: 5/7/62, 3 AM

Control: 4024

Rec'd: May 6, 1962 10:55 a.m.

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FROM: ATHENS - CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 43, MAY 5 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 43, INFORMATION BONN 30, PARIS 178, LONDON 52.

PARIS PASS USRO AND STOESSEL

POUCHED ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS.

SECRETARY SAID SECOND ASPECT WAS ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS WHICH CAUSING U.S. GREEK LABOR AND SOME CONCERN BECAUSE, IF IT MOVES RAPIDLY TENSIONS WILL DEVELOP WITHIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND BETWEEN THEM AND U.S. THESE TENSIONS WILL RESULT FROM DISRUPTION OF PRIVILEGED POSITION OF LIMITED FEW AND REORIENTATION OF BASIC POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS. WE HOPE ADJUSTMENTS WILL BE BY DEMOCRATIC MEANS BUT THEY WILL TAKE MUCH TIME AND INVOLVE CONTROVERSY. THERE WILL ALSO BE TENSION RESULTING FROM COMPETITION FOR ALLOCATION OF U.S. FUNDS. U.S. CANNOT COMMIT LARGE SUMS WITHOUT DEMONSTRATION OF CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS ON UNDERTAKINGS MADE AT PUNTA DEL ESTE LAST YEAR, ALTHOUGH PROGRAM WILL BE OVERSUBSCRIBED FOR THIS YEAR. WE HOPE EUROPE WILL GIVE INCREASING ATTENTION TO LATIN AMERICA, NOT ONLY IN AID, BUT IN TRADE AND WIDE RANGE OF OTHER RELATIONS SO AS TO TIE AREA CLOSER TO EUROPE. NORTH-SOUTH TIES IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE ARE STRONG BUT H HAVE SOME FLAVOR OF ARTIFICIALITY AND EAST-WEST TIES ACROSS ATLANTIC ARE MORE NATURAL.

DEFENSE MINISTER AND REOTTI (REPRESENTING ITALY) COMMENDED EXPERTS' REPORT ON LATIN AMERICA BUT SAID DID NOT CONTAIN MANY POINTS OF ENCOURAGEMENT. FELT MORE OPTIMISM JUSTIFIED BY LONG RANGE VIEW, TAKING ACCOUNT OF STRONG MORAL FORCES OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM. THESE

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-2- SECTO 43, MAY 5, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM ATHENS

COMMUNISM. THESE ARE IMPORTANT AND SHOULD BE ASSESSED BY EXPERTS. ALSO ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF AREA CONSIDERABLE AND "VITAL GERMS" OF DEMOCRACY WIDELY SOWN. ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS NEEDED TO CORRECT GREAT IMBALANCE IN SOCIETY AND ITALY HOPES THIS EFFORT WILL BE CARRIED OUT WITH COURAGE AND FORESIGHT. REFERRED TO LATIN AMERICAN CONCERNS RE EFFECT OF COMMON MARKET ON TROPICAL PRODUCTS BUT BELIEVED DIFFICULTIES TRANSITIONAL AND THAT COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SURMOUNT THEM. APPEALED FOR CLOSER EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA AND SYMPATHETIC, IMAGINATIVE APPROACH TO PROBLEMS.

SPAAK OPENED ON AFRICA. THANKED ALL NATO GOVTS FOR HELP IN UN TALKS ON RUANDA URUNDI PROBLEM. REVIEWED UN RESOLTUION AND ADDIS ABABA CONFERENCE. SPAAK SAID THAT IF RUANDA URUNDI WHEN INDEPENDENT DID NOT WANT BELGIAN TROOPS, THEY WOULD LEAVE. HOWEVER, IN THIS CASE, BELGIAN CIVIL SERVANTS WOULD ALSO DEPART FOR FEAR OF PUBLIC DISORDER AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COULD NO LONGER BE ADMINISTERED. ASKING COUNCIL TO HANDLE THIS COMMENT DISCREETLY, SPAAK THEN SAID THAT UN SECGEN AND SECRETARIAT DID NOT SHARE VIEW OF UN COMMISSION ON BELGIAN TROOPS AND THAT SECGEN WOULD BE UNWILLING TO HAVE UN ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTENANCE ORDER IN AREA IF BELGIAN TROOPS WITHDRAWN. SPAAK FORESAW SOME POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE AND EXPRESSED HOPE FOR CONTINUED HELP FROM NATO COUNTRIES TO ACHIEVE ORDERLY TRANSITION. ON CONGO, SPAAK SAID FATE HANGS ON TALKS BETWEEN ADOULA AND TSHOMBE. DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHERE THEIR NEGOTIATIONS STAND AND WHAT THEY REALLY WANT. THEIR APPROACH ESCAPES WESTERN LOGIC. HE THOUGHT ADOULA BASICALLY RIGHT BUT SHOULD ACCEPT PROVISIONAL SOLUTION UNTIL TSHOMBE CAN ACCEPT BASIC LAW. SITUATION NOT IMPROVING AND CONGO BEING EXHAUSTED. MONETARY REFORM BADLY NEEDED. GENERAL POLICY FOR CONGO SHOULD BE DEVELOPED. INCREASING RECOGNITION IN UN THAT CONGO NEEDS BELGIAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND BELGIAN GOVT WANTS TO COLLABORATE WITH UN IN THIS AREA. CONGOLESE REQUESTING INCREASED BELGIAN ASSISTANCE. CONGOLESE ALSO ASKING BELGIAN OFFICERS TO RETURN FOR TRAINING PURPOSES BUT BELGIANS WILL TREAD CAREFULLY IN THIS FIELD AND WILL MOVE ONLY WITH APPROVAL OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. PRIMARY QUESTION IS WHETHER EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF CONGO IS JUSTIFIED BY PROSPECTS OF EVENTUAL SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING POLITICAL STABILITY WHICH IS BASIC NEED. WE HAVE

REACHED DECISIVE

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-3- SECTO 40, MAY 5, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM ATHENS

REACHED DECISIVE TURNING POINT AND MAY HAVE TO INTERVENE, ALBEIT CAUTIOUSLY, FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION. SAID BELGIAN POLITICAL RAPPORT WITH CONGO NOW GOOD BUT PROBLEMS GREATER THAN BELGIANS CAN ASSUME ALONE.

LORD HOME SAID SPAAK HAD POINTED OUT DILEMMA FACING ALL GOVTS TRYING TO BRING THEIR TERRITORIES TO INDEPENDENCE. UK IS FACED WITH SIMILAR PROBLEMS IN KENYA AND THEN SOUTH AFRICAN FEDERATION AND IS TRYING TO OBTAIN SUPPORT FOR POLICIES LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE IN ORDERLY WAY. UK HAS DECIDED TO TRY OBTAIN UN SUPPORT IN COMMITTEE OF 17 NATIONS BUT PROSPECT IS NOT ENCOURAGING BECAUSE COMMUNISTS ARE WORKING OVERTIME IN AFRICA. UK WILL BE FACED WITH RESOLUTIONS ON NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN RHODESIA IN COMMITTEE OF 17 WHICH UK CANNOT ACCEPT. HOWEVER, UK WILL PERSEVERE IN EFFORTS OBTAIN UN SUPPORT. RE CONGO PROBLEM, ONLY ONE ANSWER AND THAT IS FOR BELGIANS TO RETURN IN LARGE NUMBERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOPES FOR UN SUPPORT TO THIS END. ALTERNATIVE IS CHAOS.

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

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Control: 4054
Rec'd: May 6, 1962
8:30 a.m.

FROM: Athens

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 56, May 6, 4 a.m.(Section I of II)

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 56, MOSCOW 54, INFORMATION PARIS 180, BONN 33, LONDON 55, LISBON 2

Ministerial Meeting, Morning Session, May 5 -- Review of International Situation.

Review of international situation concluded with Portuguese statement directed primarily to "colonialism" and Secretary General's usual summary of discussion.

Nogueira (Portugal), in opening remarks, painted unrelived picture of deterioration western position in all areas uncommitted world and especially Africa. In Africa saw Guinea and Mali already in Communist camp and Ghana aligned with Soviet bloc in both its internal and external policies. Situation in Congo highly unsatisfactory with country's administration virtually in hands UN which increasingly corrupt and hated by native population. Alleged Indian Government pursuing plans for colonization 20 million Indians in Congo. Only positive note in Nogueira expose was agreement with view NATO countries should make effort strengthen ties with Latin American countries in which he felt Portugal, along with Spain, could play important role.

Major part Nogueira's remarks directed toward new concept of colonialism which he saw developing in UN. To basic view of majority UN members that very existence of colony constituted threat to international peace and security now added more extreme view existence of colony represents unprovoked aggression against which it is legitimate to react in self defense. This position now taken by UNCA-

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-2- SECTO 56, May 6, 4 a.m., from Athens (Section I of II)

has two principal consequences: (1) Assumption that aggression attributed to holders of colonies has taken place against international community as whole and (2) that since no objective criteria exist for determining victim of aggression, determination is purely subjective and arbitrary. In effect victims of aggression in this colonial sense are those with sufficient strength and material means to enforce this concept. In other words, concept serves as pretext for strong to attack weak. This basically what took place in Goa and what is now happening in West New Guinea where Netherlands applying principles of UN Charter and alliance but is meeting with difficulties from some of its allies simply because latter attempting to engage in "popularity contest" with Soviet bloc in false hope winning support uncommitted countries.

Nogueira concluded majority in UNGA no longer guided by principles of Charter but by interests of certain great powers and power groups which invite others to cooperate with UN in name of principles which they themselves do not observe. West now faced with new chaotic concept of international society which if not halted in time will have repercussions on other problems and areas.

Only response to Nogueira made by Home (UK) who stated could not support view Ghana gone over to Soviet bloc and rejected allegation India's planning massive colonization of Congo. Also pointed out that in painting depressing picture Western position in Africa, Nogueira had not taken into consideration such states as Nigeria and former French colonies which sympathetic to West.

In summarizing ministerial review international situation, Stikker pointed out area of agreement much broader than in last December's ministerial meeting. Certain subjects creating difficulties at that time had been resolved and, with few exceptions, no new areas of divergence.

Re general situation East/West relations, Stikker agreed

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-3- SECTO 56, May 6, 4 a.m., from Athens (Section I of II)

with Home that despite appearance decrease of tensions, clear Soviets had not abandoned basic doctrines and objectives and therefore important West not relax vigilance. Agreed Secretary little comfort for West in Sino-Soviet differences. While Green (Canada) had urged exploitation of current "lull" in cold war to secure agreements on Berlin and disarmament, felt general sentiment of Ministers one of caution and skepticism.

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FROM: Athens

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 56, May 6, 5 a.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 56, MOSCOW 54, INFORMATION PARIS 180, BONN 33, LONDON 55, LISBON 2.

On Berlin, Stikker observed there was no divergence with Secretary's analysis of situation and general approval given US approach in contacts with Soviets, altho French had expressed fear of negotiations leading to piece-meal concessions to Soviets and Netherlands some concern that discussions had passed beyond narrow limits of Berlin. Felt there was no basic agreement with four principles which west must adhere to as stated by Germany: Continuation western presence, free access, maintenance ties between West Berlin and FEDREP, and final settlement of German problem on basis reunification. Most Ministers believed it useful to continue US -USSR contacts and all agreed on necessity maintaining western military strength and need to use it if necessary.

Stikker noted with satisfaction that all Foreign Ministers, including Canada and Norway, expressed understanding US resumption nuclear testing. Re disarmament, recognized US proposals had placed west in good tactical position at Geneva but little reasonable hope for disarmament agreement in view Soviet rigidity on inspection and controls. Expressed satisfaction with Secretary's statement re thirty percent reduction in armaments as not lessening US capacity to act and urge intensification NATO consultation on disarmament.

Turning

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-2- SECTO 56, May 6, 5 a.m. from Athens (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

Turning to other areas, Stikker pointed out many NATO members agreed with Netherlands position on self-determination for West New Guinea, including those associated with six-power grouping. Recognizing, however, divergences existed on matter, emphasized his duty as Secretary General to see spirit of solidarity of alliance not impaired. Re Latin America, noted US appeal for European members to strengthen influence in this area which he regarded as further important stage in US thinking and should not go unheeded. Also expressed view Belgian appeal for support in Ruanda-Urundi problem should not go unheeded. Majority governments concerned by somber situation existing in Africa, against background of which Portuguese policy and divergences in alliance must be understood. Urged these divergences not affect solidarity of alliance.

Secretary Rusk concluded discussion with comment on question of NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression declaration. Did not see this as early development and could come up only after many other points actively under discussion. US recognized that if question on non-aggression declaration became actual matter of discussion, it would have to be taken up by all fifteen NATO members.

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Control: 4083
1962 MAY 7 AM 8:09 Rec'd: May 6, 1962 11:27 a.m.

FROM: Athens

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 59, May 6, 1 a.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 59, MOSCOW 56, INFORMATION BONN 36, BRUSSELS 14, LONDON 58, PARIS 183, ANKARA, COPENHAGEN, OSLO, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, OTTAWA, ROME, REYKJAVIK UNNUMBERED

PARIS PASS USRO

Based on uncleared report of meeting.

NATO Ministerial meeting, morning session, May 5 - discussion of Secretary General's "annual political appraisal"

Secretary Rusk made opening statement which consisted of (1) congratulations to Stikker on completion his first year in office, (2) remarks on political consultation, and (3) remarks on proposed international institute of science and technology.

Political consultation: Secretary stated US has attempted to keep Council informed of US thinking and consult closely in Council whenever occasion demanded on Berlin, disarmament other subject of direct interest to the alliance, and other political problems outside immediate NATO area. Referring to fact that number of top US officials had visited Council during past year fonujvxnf* discussion some US policies still in formulative stage, Secretary expressed hope that in future "we can in this and other ways increase the number of such valuable close exchanges between the policy-making officials of our governments".

In noting there is still room for improvement in NATO political

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-2- SECTO 59, May 6, 1 a.m. from Athens

consultation, the Secretary remarked on recent establishment by NAC of Atlantic policy advisory group, purpose of which is "to lift our collective sights above the immediate current political scene and to look and plan ahead so that NATO will be better equipped to anticipate problems which will face the alliance in the coming years". Other Foreign Ministers did not address themselves to this aspect of Stikker's report. Most of discussion under this item addressed to proposed science institute which is reported in separate cable.

In concluding discussion under this item Stikker noted that most of remarks had been addressed to proposed science institute and indicated some disappointment that there had been no discussion Section III of his report dealing with "economic cooperation".

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*As received, will be serviced upon request.

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Athens dispatch 58

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1962 MAY 7 AM 8 10

Control: 4079
Rec'd: May 6, 1962
10:03 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1/24

FROM: Athens

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 58, May 6, 7 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 58, MOSCOW 55, INFORMATION PARIS 182, BONN 35, BRUSSELS 49, LONDON 57, Ankara, Copenhagen, Luxembourg, Oslo, Ottawa, Reykjavik, Rome, The Hague unnumbered
DEPARTMENT PASS WIESNER WHITE HOUSE

PARIS FOR USRO

Based on uncleared report of meeting

NATO Ministerial meeting, morning session, May 5 - proposed Institute of Science and Technology (Killian report)

396.1-AT/5-662

Most of discussion under item II, SYG political appraisal, addressed to Killian report. Discussion was in response to Section VI, scientific and technical cooperation, of SECGENs report, C-M (62)47

Secretary Rusk opened discussion by concurring with statement in SECGENs report that Institute proposal "perhaps one of the most stimulating and significant features emerging over the past year." He reiterated US support of recommendations made by distinguished group of scientists from many NATO countries headed by Killian. In view of this distinguished group of scientists, establishment of a central institution possibly related to affiliated institutes, as envisaged in the report, would probably be most effective way to achieve significant results. US Government has also concurred that such an institution would be most effective vehicle for direct US participation in such an enterprise.

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO	EUR/RPM	ACTION TAKEN	SECRET	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	File
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	C. Van Hollen	DATE OF ACTION	5-9-62		

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-2- SECTO 58, May 6, 7 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Athens

The Secretary continued that there will, of course, have to be further discussion among our experts to refine the proposal and to seek consensus of agreement on best way to proceed. He expressed hope coming months will see further progress toward realization of objectives set by Killian group. Such progress could mean great deal for education of scientific talent and growth of scientific accomplishment in west.

Schroeder (Germany) stated no final decision as yet taken by GFR. However, in principle all authorities concerned consider proposed institute useful means of contributing to western scientific resources. Expressed hope that final GFR position can be made known in near future.

Couve de Murville (France) said that since subject had come up, he wished to make statement to avoid misunderstanding as to French position. He wished to make clear French Government so far had adopted no position on Killian report. He called attention in particular to paragraph 69 of Stikker's report which mentioned establishment of working group of permanent representatives which is preparing terms of reference for an independent inter governmental group to draft a convention establishing a new mechanism for international scientific cooperation. He reiterated in this connection that France has not accepted principle of creation of an international science institute. French Government, he went on, continues to study matter to find most practical and economical ways of facing up to problems in this field, but is not entirely convinced creation of new institute is best way of doing so.

Luns (Netherlands) expressed support for Killian report,

particularly

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-3- SECTO 58, May 6, 7 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Athens

particularly for perspective in which it dealt with western efforts in scientific research. He stated it is not possible to commit his government to effort recommended by the report but observed that in development of institute proposal we should guard against duplication of effort of existing research centers, should seek to remove barriers to scientific cooperation and avoid exaggerated international centralization. Concluded by saying that in view of unanimity of all members in regard to objectives of Killian report it should be possible to agree here and now to terms of reference for establishment of the institute as recommended in the report.

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Note: Relayed to White House 5/6/62

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1962 MAY 7 AM 8

Control: 4086
Rec'd: May 6, 1962
10:56 a.m.

NAID 155/4

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FROM: Athens DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 58, May 6, 7 a.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 58, MOSCOW 55, INFORMATION BONN 35, BRUSSELS 13, LONDON 57, PARIS 182, ANKARA, COPENHAGEN, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, ROME, THE HAGUE UNNUMBERED

DEPARTMENT PASS WEISNER WHITE HOUSE

PARIS FOR USRO

Hansen (Denmark) observed that recurring section of SECGENs report on scientific and technical cooperation normally passed over because of more urgent matters but worth at least passing attention in Ministerial meeting. Congratulated those concerned with NATO scientific effort, especially as it is one way of fulfilling article two of NATO treaty which Denmark has consistently supported. Joined US and others in support of Killian group proposal. Danish Government and scientists have studied various proposals put forth in this field, intends to give support to working group of permanent representatives, and hopes for progress by next meeting.

Andreotti (Italy) stated Italian Government approves Killian report. Is aware of other proposals but sees centralized institute as providing scientific advantages and on political level striking example of western community cooperation. Italian Government approves that part of draft terms of reference laid before permanent representatives working group which recommends that independent inter-governmental panel should carry effort forward. Italian Government willing to participate in working group and can already state it is willing to have institute set up in Italy.

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO: EUR/RAM	ACT. SECRET TAKEN Rostow	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL: E. Van Hollen	DATE OF ACTION: 5-7-62	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: File

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-2- SECTO 58, May 6, 7 a.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Athens

Lord Home (UK) stated UK firmly supports main purpose underlying report of Killian group -- namely that steps should be taken to encourage international cooperation in post-graduate teaching and research of an interdisciplinary character. UK has some doubts whether concentration such activities in single institution located in one place in Europe would be best method. UK has therefore already put forward alternative suggestion that under new authority to be established there should be internationally assisted centers for advanced research and post-graduate teaching set up in connection with existing universities or similar institutions. Believe this to be preferable way to achieve objectives of Killian report. UK will gladly take part in further discussion among experts of these and other proposals that might be put forward in order, As Secretary Rusk had said, "to refine the proposal and seek a consensus as to the best way to proceed". Concluded by saying he feels sure that in this way we shall be able to arrive jointly at a solution with respect to this proposal, which in general UK firmly supports.

Green (Canada) expressed surprise that this matter had advanced so rapidly. If it were to move forward, it would require serious decisions by government probably involving substantial sums of money and therefore requires careful study by national representatives. Canada had no member of Killian group and is likewise not represented on the permanent representatives working group. Not having been closely involved in developing the project, the Canadian Government is not now in a position to express a view on it. The important question for the moment is what forum will be entrusted with further consideration of the project.

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-3- SECTO 58, May 6, 7 a.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Athens

Since permanent representatives have not fully considered it, Canada would prefer that NAC should be the forum. Canada is, however, prepared to go along with suggestion made by some others favoring an independent group provided that all governments that may be involved will have a full chance to participate in development of the project.

Stikker in conclusion ventured to sum up the discussion by saying he detected quite some degree of consensus favoring the concept that inspired Killian report and that some kind of international mechanism should be developed. He had particularly noted the statement by Couve (France) with regard to working group is only to see what kind of terms of reference could be passed on to an international body that would carry the venture forward. With regard to point made by Green (Canada) he would be glad to have reconsideration of membership of permanent representatives working group. Only action that could be taken by Council was to take note of remarks made. Working group would continue to examine the matter. He would see if its membership could be enlarged and make sure that it takes into account points made in this discussion.

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Note: Relayed White House 5/6/62

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Secto 60 From the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting

to the Department of State

Athens, May 6, 1962, 9 a.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-AT/5-662. Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

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Athens dispatch 83

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Control: 4157
Rec'd: May 7, 1962
4:39 a.m.

FROM: ATHENS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 83, MAY 6, 11 PM

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 83, INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL 22, ANKARA 100.

POUCHED ALL OTHER OECD CAPITALS.

MAY 5 NATO MINISTERS SESSION: ITEM III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE LESS-DEVELOPED MEMBER COUNTRIES: GREECE AND TURKEY

1. STIKKER OPENED DISCUSSION WITH SUMMARY BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION GREEK-TURKISH RESOLUTIONS, REFERRED TO GENEROUS AID EXTENDED IN PAST TO GREECE AND TURKEY BY MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE; AND ENDORSED IDEA OF APPROACH ON MULTILATERAL BASIS RECOMMENDED IN WISEMEN'S REPORT. NOTED THESE COUNTRIES NOT IN POSITION FINANCE THEIR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, BOTH END ITEMS AND SUPPORTING NEEDS, AND REQUIRE CONTINUED EXTERNAL AID. CONGRATULATED WISEMEN ON REPORT AND URGED MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS FOLLOW-UP CONCLUSIONS. STATED IF NATO RECEIVES CREDIT FOR IMPETUS AID TO GREECE AND TURKEY "ALL THE BETTER," BUT FROM PURELY ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT, WILL BE SATISFIED IF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS PLAY EXECUTIVE ROLE IN GREEK-TURKISH AID PROGRAM.

396.1-AT/5-662

2. OPENING COUNTRY STATEMENTS MADE BY TURKEY AND GREECE. TURKEY (ERKIN) PRAISED WISEMEN'S REPORT, PAID TRIBUTE TO STIKKER AND GREGH FOR THEIR ELABORATION OF REPORT. PRESENTED BRIEF OUTLINE TURKEY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN, STRESSING SELF-HELP, AND NEED FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE ACHIEVE PLAN'S OBJECTIVES. REFERRED TO MAY 18 MEETING IN ANKARA WITH

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IBRD AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND INVITED INTERESTED COUNTRIES PARTICIPATE. SAID MEETING WILL NOT BE LIMITED EXCHANGE INFORMATION, BUT TURKEY HOPES BENEFIT FROM TECHNICAL ADVISE AND INCORPORATE GUIDANCE RECEIVED IN PLAN. CONCLUDED BY URGING GOVERNMENTS OF ALLIANCE GIVE INSTRUCTIONS THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN ORGANIZATIONS WHICH WILL HAVE EXECUTIVE ROLE AID PROGRAM TO ENSURE ESTABLISHMENT CONSORTIA WITHOUT DELAY.

3. GREECE (AVEROFF) SAID HOPED WOULD BE POSSIBLE "ONE DAY" TO TALK ABOUT AID BY GREECE TO OTHER COUNTRIES. AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, GREECE NEEDED PLEAD ITS OWN CASE FOR AID, HAD RIGHT TO AID. THANKED U.S. AND U.K. FOR SPECIAL HELP IN PAST, THOUGH "AMERICAN FRIENDS" HAVE OBLIGATION HELP GREECE. RECOGNIZED U.S. HAS ITS OWN DIFFICULTIES AND U.S. DEFENSE IS BACKBONE ALLIANCE SECURITY.

CRITICIZED WISEMEN'S REPORT ALONG SAME LINES BILATERAL CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY. SAID IF ALL DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN GREEK AID RESOLUTION TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, NATO RESOLUTION CAN BE USEFUL. MADE POINT THAT GREECE IN ASSOCIATION WITH COMMON MARKET HAD RELINQUISHED EASY PATH OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND HAD CHOSEN HARD ROAD OF REORGANIZING ECONOMY TO BECOME COMPETITIVE.

4. ITALY (SEGNI) ENPHASIZED IMPORTANCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NEED PURSUE DEFENSE EFFORT. EXPRESSED ITALIAN SUPPORT FOR CONSORTIA TO PROMOTE COMMON EFFORT AND PROMISED WOULD PARTICIPATE IN CONSORTIA FOR GREECE AND TURKEY TO BE ESTABLISHED APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION OUTSIDE NATO.

5. FRANCE (COUVE DE MURVILLE) ASSOCIATED FRANCE WITH ITALIAN REMARKS. NOTED WITH EXAMINATION GREEK-TURKISH AID QUESTION NATO HAD COME INTO FIELD NEW FOR THAT ORGANIZATION, JUSTIFIED BY SPECIAL POSITION THESE TWO COUNTRIES. RECOMMENDED ALLIANCE TAKE NOTE OF WISEMEN'S REPORT AND SEE THAT IT IS FOLLOWED UP.

/6. GERMANY

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-3- SECTO 83, MAY 6, 11 PM FROM ATHENS

6. GERMANY (SCHROEDER) NOTED BILATERAL ASSISTANCE BY FED REP TO GREECE AND TURKEY; ENDORSED MULTILATERAL AID APPROACH, STATING FED REP WOULD CONTINUE BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO THESE COUNTRIES IN FUTURE ON ASSUMPTION THIS ASSISTANCE WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN CONTRIBUTIONS TO MULTILATERAL AID PROGRAM. APPROVED USING OTHER ORGANIZATIONS FOR OPERATING PURPOSES, NOTED EXCEPTIONAL URGENCY GREEK-TURKISH NEEDS AND PROPOSED ESTABLISHING TIME LIMITS FOR COMPLETION ADDITIONAL STUDIES AND ACTION.

7. LUXEMBOURG (SCHAUS) EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS ASSIST IN INITIATIVES AND OFFERED COOPERATE WITHIN ITS MEANS.

8. UNITED KINGDOM (HOME) CONSIDERED GREEK-TURKISH AID REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED OECD FOR FURTHER THOUGHT AND CONSIDERATION. U.K. SUPPORTS RESOLUTIONS BUT CANNOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT FOR GOVERNMENT ON FINANCIAL SIDE.

9. NETHERLANDS (LUNS) REFERRED TO DUTY OF MEMBERS ALLIANCE HELP LESS-DEVELOPED MEMBERS. SUPPORTED RESOLUTIONS BUT COULD NOT MAKE COMMITMENT ON FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES. URGED THERE BE NO DELAY IN INPLEMENTING RESOLUTIONS.

10. NORWAY (LANGE) SUPPORTED RESOLUTIONS BUT BECAUSE DIFFICULT NORWEGIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF PAYMENTS POSITION, ENVISAGED CONTINUE AT LEAST NEXT TWO YEARS, NORWAY NOT IN POSTION ENTER INTO COMMITMENT TAKE PART IN CONSORTIA.

11. CANADA (GREEN) APPROVED WISEMEN'S REPORT AND SUPPORTED RESOLUTIONS. SAID NATO SHOULD NOT COORDINATE AID BUT COORDINATION SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AS OECD, DAC, IMF, OR IBRD.

12. DENMARK (KRAG) STATED STUDY OF NATO REPORTS NOT YET COMPLETED IN COPENHAGEN. SUPPORTED RESOLUTIONS EXPRESSING VIEW BALANCED ECONOMIC GROWTH SHOULD BE COMMON CONCERN MEMBERS ALLIANCE.

/13. BELGIUM

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-4- SECTO 83, MAY 6, 11 PM FROM ATHENS

13. BELGIUM (SPAAK) PROMISED BELGIUM WOULD DO ITS UTMOST IN SUPPORT RESOLUTIONS.

14. ICELAND (GUDMUNDSSON) SUPPORTED RESOLUTIONS EXPRESSING PREFERENCE FOR OECD OVER NATO TO COORDINATE AID.

15. STIKKER SUMMED UP BY EXPRESSING UNDERSTANDING COUNTRIES INABILITY MAKE FINANCIAL COMMITMENT AT THIS MEETING BUT ENCOURAGED BELIEVE SYMPATHETIC REACTIONS WERE GOOD OMEN. URGED JOINT ACTION BE TAKEN SHORTLY TO IMPLEMENT DECISIONS. SAID HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH SECRETARY GENERAL OECD ON GREEK-TURKISH QUESTION AND BELIEVES BOTH NATO AND OECD MOVING ON SAME COURSE ON THIS MATTER.

16. FOLLOWING APPROVAL RESOLUTIONS, TURKEY AND GREECE EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION NATO ACTION AS REFLECTING SPIRIT OF SOLIDARITY OF ALLIANCE. TURKEY SINGLED OUT SPAAK FOR SPECIAL APPRECIATION, CREDITING HIM WITH INITIATING EFFORTS LEADING TO ACTION TAKEN AT THIS NATO MEETING.

RUSK

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3.7 Meeting Memo

NATO 1-8/1
Mtg. 11 Jr.

(27)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 13, 1962

SECRET

Last conversation with the President before NATO meeting of December 1962

Time: Monday, December 10, 11:00 a.m.

Participants: The President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and McGeorge Bundy

The two Secretaries brought to the President three questions which required last-minute review: Skybolt, the Azores, and the multilateral deterrent.

On Skybolt, Secretary McNamara explained that he would go first to London for talks with Thorneycroft. He intended to present the strongest possible case for the technical decision which was anticipated, and he proposed to offer the United Kingdom three alternative means of meeting its requirements. The British could meet the remaining development cost of Skybolt themselves and buy what they wanted for their own use; an adaptation of Hound Dog might be developed and supplied; or there might be UK participation in a multilateral system of some sort.

Mr. McNamara did not believe that the British would be pleased by any one of these three alternatives, at least at first. He indicated his substantial agreement with a suspicion I had expressed earlier, to the effect that the British might not have bought Skybolt, in the end, anyway. What he thought we might consider, at some stage in the negotiations, was a proposal to give the British access to a more up-to-date weapons system on the condition that the venture become multilateral if and when a multilateral force should be developed. Such a course might conceivably be taken, for example, with Polaris.

The Secretary of State, while not disagreeing with Mr. McNamara's presentation, indicated his own deep concern with the difficulties that would be posed for the British by a cancellation of Skybolt. He appeared to incline toward a major effort to assist them in meeting the remaining development costs, so that the cost of Skybolt to them would not be prohibitive, and they would at least have a fair shot at obtaining what they had been counting on.

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Kennedy Library, National Security files, meetings with the President

The President indicated his general approval of Secretary McNamara's proposal, and said that he was not eager to join in a large share of further development costs for a weapon to be supplied only to the British.

On the Azores, the Secretary of State reported his strong conviction that it was important now to emphasize to the Portuguese that the United States could not allow itself to become a satellite of Portugal because of any base, even the Azores. The Secretary intended to say to the Portuguese that if the current Portuguese attitude was sustained, the United States would have to begin to comment more strongly on Portuguese behavior in various ways. The Secretary warned that this course of action might possibly lead to an unreasoning Portuguese decision to end the Azores agreement entirely. The Secretary of Defense and Mr. Bundy indicated their belief that this result was quite improbable, and the Secretary of Defense said that while it would be most inconvenient for a period of time, the Armed Forces could in fact survive such a blow, though the Joint Chiefs would probably not agree. The President approved the Secretary's planned position.

On the problem of the multilateral nuclear deterrent, it was agreed that Secretary McNamara would begin discussions in directing the attention of Mediterranean NATO members away from the existing obsolescent missile system and toward better arrangements. The Secretary of Defense planned to begin with the Italian Minister of Defense, Andreotti, and to continue with the Turkish Defense Minister. As the discussion developed, it was agreed that in the light of the uncertainties surrounding the problem of multilateral and seaborne deterrents, it might be well to begin the conversations simply with an effort to clear up the problem of the Jupiters itself, since any arrangement that would remove them would clearly be a step forward for the Alliance as a whole. The Secretary planned to point out to the Italians and the Turks that the Cuban experience had brought it home to us how dangerous these soft, vulnerable, first-strike weapons are. They are expensive as well as dangerous, and all the countries concerned could better apply the resources which they require to other military or civil undertakings. The Secretary of Defense planned to offer to the Italians, in this connection, an opportunity to participate in the manufacture of the M113 armored vehicle, and he proposed to discuss with the Turks the possibility of certain further deployments of fighter aircraft. It was agreed that he would also be ready to consider the problem of a strengthened Mediterranean deterrent -- perhaps initially in terms of a rearrangement of Polaris deployments.

In the course of this discussion there was also conversation about the planned speeches of the two Secretaries at Paris. Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara indicated that comments and suggestions from the President could well be sent later in the week, and so there was no detailed discussion of the draft texts. The President did raise the question whether the planned argumentation for conventional forces was really well based, except in the context of Berlin. He wondered whether, absent the problem of Berlin, there would really be a need for large-scale conventional forces along the main lines dividing Europe. He suggested that after all, any incursion across this line would in fact lead promptly to nuclear warfare, and that for that reason the nuclear deterrent would be effective. Mr. McNamara answered that he himself would argue that the additional conventional forces would be needed even without Berlin. He thought the Soviets could find many other opportunities in Europe over a period of years, which would not seem worth a thermonuclear war to the West and against which the only safe deterrent would be adequate conventional strength. The President did not seem persuaded, but he did not press his point.

McG. B.

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Control: 8403
Rec'd: DECEMBER 15, 1962
12:03 P M

FROM: PARIS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 691, DECEMBER 14, 2 A M (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

FROM USDEL

FIRST SESSION, 30TH NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, DEC. 13 A.M.

SUMMARY:

NO UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS. SECRETARY OPENED WITH OBSERVATIONS ON SIGNIFICANCE OF CUBAN CRISIS, STATUS REPORT, AND SERIES OF QUESTIONS ON SOVIET MOTIVES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS APPROPRIATE FOR NAC CONSIDERATION. DEPRECATED PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS ON OTHER EAST-WEST ISSUES BEFORE FULLER RESOLUTION OF CUBAN CRISIS, ESPECIALLY RE BERLIN AND ARMS CONTROL. PRESSED FOR WORK ON IMPROVEMENT OF NATO CONSULTATION PROCEDURES BEFORE SPRING MINISTERIAL MEETING. CONCLUDED ON MODERATELY HOPEFUL NOTE, COMPARING FREE WORLD PROSPECTS FAVORABLY WITH BLOC OUTLOOK.

396.1-PA/12-1462

Declassified by NLN

ERKIN (TURKEY) URGED ALLIANCE FOLLOW FIRM POLICY TOWARD BLOC, WHILE ALLIED MISSILE ARSENAL SHOULD BE MODERNIZED AND STRENGTHENED, THERE MUST BE NO WEAKENING OF DEFENSIVE CAPACITY, EVEN TEMPORARILY, AT ANY POINT. DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS MUST NOT BE COVER FOR WEAKENING ALLIED BASE OR REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

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-2-, POLTO 691, DECEMBER 14, 2 A. M. (SECTION ONE OF THREE) FM Paris

PICCIONI (ITALY) WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC RE EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS ON BERLIN AND OTHER PROBLEMS. SUGGESTED STEPPED UP CONTINGENCY PLANNING, WITH INCREASE FROM TWO TO FOUR MINISTERIAL MEETINGS ANNUALLY. SUPPORTED US ADVOCACY OF STRENGTHENED CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND STUDY OF MULTILATERAL MRBM FORCE. SCHROEDER (GERMANY) BELIEVED CUBA HAD SHOWN NEED FOR COMPLETE SPECTRUM OF ALLIED MILITARY RESPONSES. IN LIGHT SOVIET DEFEAT ON CUBA, OPPOSED ANY WESTERN INITIATIVE TO NEGOTIATE ON BERLIN.

DETAILS:

1. IN BRIEF OPENING STATEMENT LORD HOME, ASSUMING POST OF PRESIDENT, NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH NOTHING SPECTACULAR EXPECTED FROM MEETING, IT TOOK ON SPECIAL INTEREST BECAUSE TIMED IN AFTERMATH OF CUBAN CRISIS.

2. AFTER AMENITIES ACTING SECGEN COLONNA STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF FAVORABLE PRESS TREATMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. REQUESTED DELEGATION BRIEFING OFFICERS LIMIT THEIR REMARKS TO STATEMENTS OF THEIR OWN DELEGATIONS, AVOIDING COMMENT ON OTHERS', SO AS NOT TO GIVE IMPRESSION CONFUSION OR DISARRAY AND NOT TO PREJUDICE TERMS OF COMMUNIQUE. LATTER TO BE DRAFTED BY WORKING GROUP UNDER CHAIR-

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NATO 159/3

MANSHIP ASST. SECGEN HOOPER, FIRST MEETING THIS AFTERNOON.

3. ON INVITATION COLONNA, SECRETARY MADE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE 40-MINUTE STATEMENT/ TEXT FOLLOWS WITHOUT MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE DECEMBER 12 DRAFT POUCHED RPH-SPIERS). COMMENCED WITH TRIBUTE TO UNITY OF NATO AND OAS IN CUBA CRISIS, ABSENCE OF WHICH MIGHT HAVE RESULTED IN QUITE DIFFERENT SOVIET REACTION. NOTED NEUTRALISM OF NON-ALIGNED STATES TENDED TO FADE IN MOMENT OF GREATEST DANGER. REVIEWED SOME BASIC FACTORS IN CUBAN SITUATION: FIRST, THAT CRISIS NOT OUTGROWTH OF OPPOSITION TO CASTRO REGIME BUT OF SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT MRBM'S INCLUDING IMMINENT ADDITION OF AT LEAST 72 MRBM'S AND IRM'S. BASIC ISSUE WAS POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN BALANCE OF POWER WE CULD NOT IGNORE. SECOND, CLEAR SOVIETS INTENDED BY DELIBERATE DECEPTION TO ESTABLISH CUBAN MISSILE SITES AS PRELUDE TO RAISING ISSUES SUCH AS BERLIN IN ATMOSPHERE OF ULTIMATUM-- MANEUVER OUR REACTION DISARRANGED. THIRD, ELEMENT OF SURPRISE GAINED THROUGH LINKING DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION RE MISSILES WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OUR REMEDIAL ACTION WAS ITSELF CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE. FOURTH, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HANDLE PROBLEM AS WESTERN HEMISPHERE MATTER TO REDUCE PROSPECT OF CHAIN REACTIONS ELSEWHERE. FIFTH, WE THOUGHT IT PRUDENT TO GIVE SOVIETS OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW WEAPONS BEFORE DIRECT MILITARY MEASURES WERE

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-4-, POLTO 691, DECEMBER 14, 2 A.M.(SECTION 1 of 3) FROM PARIS

ADOPTED. FINALLY, UN ACTION WAS IMPORTANT IN SOFTENING COMMITMENTS OF PRESTIGE AND SOMEWHAT FACILITATING PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

SECRETARY THEN SUMMARIZED PRESENT SITUATION IN CUBA, CITING WAR MATERIEL REMOVED AND PERSONNEL (AT LEAST 12,000) AND MATERIEL REMAINING. DOUBTED PRESENT UN DISCUSSIONS WOULD BRING CUBAN QUESTION TO CONCLUSION, AND NOTED ABILITY TO GIVE FORMAL US PLEDGE NOT TO INVADE IN ABSENCE OF FAR-REACHING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST SOVIET AND CUBAN OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN THE FUTURE.

FINLETTER

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4:22 AM

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 691, DECEMBER 14, 2 AM (SECTION II OF III)

FROM: USDEL

FIRST SESSION, 30TH NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, DEC. 13 A.M.

EPISODE, SEC CONTINUED, RAISED CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS. FIRST, HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE FOR SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO SUPPOSE MOVEMENT OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INTO CUBA WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT MOST VIOLENT REACTION. SECOND, WHAT LED SOVIET LEADERS TO RECTIFY THEIR MISTAKE PROMPTLY WHEN CONFRONTED WITH PROSPECT OF MILITARY RESISTANCE. THIRD, WHAT DID SOVIET INABILITY TO RESPOND ON THE SPOT EXCEPT THROUGH NUCLEAR ACTION PORTEND RE RANGE OF CHOICES NATO GOVERNMENTS WOULD HAVE BEFORE THEM IN CRISES ELSEWHERE. FOURTH, HOW IMPORTANT WAS IT TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ADVERSARY TO REVERSE A SERIOUS MISTAKE. FIFTH, WHAT ARE IMPLICATIONS OF CUBA FOR NATO'S ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT ESPECIALLY IN VIEW DIFFICULTIES OF QUICK COMMUNICATION AMONG NATO ALLIES AND BETWEEN US AND USSR. SIXTH, CAN THERE BE ANY SERIOUS COMMUNIST-FREE WORLD CONFRONTATION ANYWHERE WHICH IS NOT OF VITAL INTEREST TO NATO.

SECRETARY THEN MADE POINT PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION OTHER EAST-WEST ISSUES MUST AWAIT FULLER RESOLUTION OF CUBAN CRISIS. IN PARTICULAR WE THINK NATO-WARSAW PACT RELATIONS BEST APPROACHED THROUGH PRACTICAL STEPS FOR DISARMAMENT. RE BERLIN, SECRETARY STRESSED CENTRAL ISSUE PREVENTING ANY SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION IS SHARP DIFFERENCE ON ISSUE OF PRESENCE OF WESTERN TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN.

ON DISARMAMENT, SECRETARY WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. FELT WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION HAD BEEN IMPROVED.

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-2- POLTO 691, DECEMBER 14, 2 AM (SECTION II OF III) FROM PARIS

IMPROVED, AND POSSIBILITY EXISTED SOME DAY COMMON INTEREST IN BRINGING ARMS RACE UNDER CONTROL WOULD EXERT ITSELF. MEANWHILE, CERTAIN LIMITED ARMS CONTROL MEASURES MIGHT PRESENT OPPORTUNITY FOR EARLY PROGRESS, THOUGH NO SIGN SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT NECESSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION FOR TEST BAN.

ON LONGER RANGE MATTERS, SECRETARY STRESSED SERIOUSNESS OF INTRA-BLOC PROBLEMS, CONTRASTING THEM WITH OPPORTUNITIES FOR WEST BUILD-UP THROUGH ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, US TRADE EXPANSION ACT, AND OUTWARD-LOOKING COMMON MARKET ACTIVITIES. STATED ALLIANCE COULD IMPROVE ITS EFFECTIVENESS BY MODERNIZING NATO CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES AND EXTENDING CONTINGENCY PLANNING. HOPED SENIOR POLICY-MAKING OFFICIALS OF RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS COULD INITIATE PLANNING AND CONSULTATIVE DIALOGUE. SUGGESTED USING TIME BEFORE NEXT MINISTERIAL MEETING TO FORMULATE NEW PROCEDURES THROUGH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AMONG PERMREPS. ALSO STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING MEETINGS IN INFORMAL ATMOSPHERE. CONCLUDED WITH STATEMENT ALLIANCE COULD DRAW FROM RECENT DEVELOPEMENTS A SENSE OF ANTICIPATION ON ACTION FREE WORLD CAN TAKE TO MARSHAL NEW SOURCES OF STRENGTH, IN FAVORABLE CONTRAST TO SITUATION IN COMMUNIST WORLD.

4. ERKIN (TURKEY) NOTED ALLIANCE HAD AGAIN PROVED ITS COHESION AND RESOURCEFULNESS DURING CUBAN CRISIS. URGED NATO AVOID ANY ACTION GIVING IMPRESSION OF WEAKNESS OR RELAXATION; SOVIET DOUBTS OF OUR DETERMINATION IN BERLIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN FACTOR ENCOURAGING SOVIETS TO CREATE CRISIS IN CUBA. AS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLACED ON ALLIED TERRITORIES, IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE MORE MODERN TYPES OF ROCKETS TO REPLACE OLD ONES AND ALSO TO DEVELOP CONCEALMENT AND MOBILITY FOR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS. IF A SEA-BORNE NUCLEAR FORCE COULD BETTER MEET ALLIED NEEDS, PLANS MIGHT BE REVISED ACCORDINGLY. BUT NECESSARY TO INSURE ALLIED DEFENSIVE CAPACITY OVERALL AND FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL STATE REMAINED INTACT. THERE MUST BE NO HIATUS BETWEEN PRESENT AND FUTURE SYSTEMS, AND IN DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS ALLIANCE MUST AVOID UNFORTUNATE PUBLIC IMPACT. IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS ACTION ON ROCKETS MUST BE AVOIDED UNTIL MORE PROPITIOUS MOMENT.

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REVIEWING EXPERTS' REPORTS, ERKIN MAINTAINED DIVERGENT SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST GOALS WOULD PERPETUATE DISSENSION WHICH WEST COULD EXPLOIT; BUT IF HOT WAR SHOULD OCCUR BLOC WOULD REGAIN UNITY. SOVIET COUNTER-ACTION AFTER CUBA, IF IT CAME, WOULD NOT NECESSARILY TAKE PLACE IN BERLIN; IT MIGHT HAPPEN AT SOME OTHER POINT WHERE SUCCESS MORE LIKELY. BUT CUBA TAUGHT SOVIET UNION IT MUST NOT PUT WEST IN INTOLERABLE POSITION, AND THUS MAY HAVE PROMOTED TENDENCY TOWARD SOVIET MODERATION, ONLY BY FIRM LINE ON BERLIN, DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTING CAN WEST ASSESS SOVIET INTENTIONS. WEST MUST BE ON GUARD AGAINST SOVIET REGIONAL SECURITY PROPOSALS WHOSE ONLY EFFECT IS TO WEAKEN WEST BY PREVENTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT, ALLOWING SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO EXERCISE FULL WEIGHT, HAMPERING GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIANCE ARRANGEMENTS ON BASES BE MAINTAINED UNIMPAIRED EXCEPT AS PART OF GCD UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.

FINLETTER

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Control: 8239
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5:48 A.M.

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 691, DECEMBER 14, 2 A.M., (SECTION 3 OF 3)

FROM: US DEL

FIRST SESSION, 30TH NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, DEC. 13 A.M.

5. IN CAUTIOUSLY PHRASED STATEMENT PICCIONI (ITALY) HELD CUBAN AFFAIR SHOWED SOVIETS INTENDED TO PROBE WESTERN FRONT FOR WEAKNESS, RETAINING ABILITY TO WITHDRAW WHEN HARD RESISTANCE APPEARED. WELCOMED PRIVATE RATHER THAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BY PRESIDENT AND KHRUSHCHEV. INSISTED DOOR MUST BE LEFT OPEN FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, DECRYING BOTH EXCESSIVE OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM. NEGOTIATIONS WERE NECESSARY FOR SETTLEMENTS SINCE WE REJECTED WAR, BUT EXPERIENCE SHOWED WE MUST BE FIRM WITH SOVIETS. CUBAN EXPERIENCE SHOWED IT UNREALISTIC TO ARGUE FOR OR AGAINST NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS; INSTRUMENTALITIES AND TIMING NOW IMPORTANT. NAC SHOULD STUDY QUESTION WHAT WE WOULD COMPROMISE AND WHAT WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE, THEN CARRY ON NEGOTIATIONS. BERLIN PROBLEM HAD LOST SOME OF ITS URGENCY SINCE SOVIETS NOW MORE FLEXIBLE. IF SOVIETS HAVE SAME CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE ON BERLIN THEY HAVE IN CUBA WE COULD EMBARK WITH CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM ON GENERAL EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS.

CONTINUING, PICCIONI STATED CUBA EXPERIENCE SHOULD STIMULATE GREATER ALLIANCE POLITICAL AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS. IN CRISIS WHERE ADVANCE CONSULTATION WAS NOT POSSIBLE, BUT CONTINGENCY PLANNING, AS UNDERSEC BALL HAD RECENTLY INDICATED, WAS DEFINITELY USEFUL. SEVEN YEARS AGO NATO "WISE MEN" HAD MADE RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONSULTATION WHICH WERE NOT THEN IMPLEMENTED; WE NEED TO LOOK AGAIN AT "WISE MEN" RECOMMENDATIONS, SPECIFICALLY PROPOSAL FOR FOUR RATHER THAN TWO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS ANNUALLY. THESE WOULD HAVE NO FIXED AGENDA, WOULD BE INFORMAL; AND WOULD PRODUCE

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PRODUCE NO COMMUNIQUE; THUS WOULD PERMIT WIDER EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. MOREOVER MOST IMPORTANT NATO STRENGTHEN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL OR SPIRITUAL SIDE, TO COUNTER-BALANCE IMPROVEMENTS IN ECONOMIC STATUS OF MEMBERS. IN THIS REGARD CONSULTATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE WERE SOFTEST SPOTS IN ALLIANCE, NOT UP TO ITS STATE OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS. ITALY AGREED WITH US VIEW ON NEED TO BOLSTER NATO CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE ITS SHARE. NATO SHOULD ALSO BEGIN STUDY OF MULTILATERAL MRBM FORCE.

6. SCHROEDER (GERMANY) ALSO DISCUSSED LESSONS OF CUBA, NOTING SOVIETS HAD NOW BEEN CONVINCED US WAS READY TO RUN GREATEST RISKS IN DEFENSE ITS VITAL INTERESTS; LATIN AMERICA AND US WERE UNITED IN CRISIS; AND IMPORTANCE OF A COMPLETE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY ALTERNATIVES, CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR, HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED. MOST IMPORTANT WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET POWER. HOWEVER SOVIETS TRIED TO CONCEAL IT, CUBA WAS A DEFEAT FOR THEM. CHINESE ATTACK ON INDIA ALSO HARMFUL TO USSR; LIMITED ITS ACTION, AS DID ECONOMIC CONTINGENCY. WESTERN FIRMNESS WOULD PREVENT WAR.

ON BERLIN, SCHROEDER VERY MUCH DOUBTED PROSPECTS FOR MODUS VIVENDI HAD IMPROVED. DID NOT BELIEVE SOVIET AIMS HAD CHANGED. TALKS HAD NOT RESULTED IN ANY BASIS FOR SERIOUS BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS. TO PROTECT OWN VITAL INTEREST, WEST SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE IN OFFERING A BERLIN SETTLEMENT. SUCCESS OF FUTURE WESTERN POLICY IN BERLIN DEPENDED UPON MAINTAINING SUPPORT AND VIABILITY OF WEST BERLIN POPULATION. EAST GERMAN SITUATION HAD NOT IMPROVED. POPULATION RESISTANCE WAS INCREASING, SHORTAGES CONTINUED, EAST GERMAN PEOPLE OPPOSED EXPANSION OF INTERZONAL TRADE BECAUSE IT WOULD BENEFIT GOVERNMENT AND NOT THEM. FRG INCLINED TO INCREASE INTERZONAL TRADE NOT FOR ECONOMIC REASONS BUT TO MODERATE BARRIER EFFECT OF BERLIN WALL.

7. WINDING UP SESSION, COLONNA ANNOUNCED CANADIAN OFFER HOLD SPRING MINISTERIAL MEETING IN OTTAWA. EXACT DATE TO BE SET LATER.

FINLETTER

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Dec 21 6 32 PM '62

FROM Secretary of State DATE

SUBJECT Secretary Rusk's Remarks to NATO Ministerial Meeting.

REF

Following for information of addressees is text Secretary's remarks at NAC Ministerial Meeting, Paris, Dec 13, under agenda item "Review of the International Situation".

"Mr. Chairman and fellow Ministers,

It is a very great pleasure for me to meet again with my NATO colleagues after the eventful period since our last meeting in Athens.

May I, at the very beginning, pay my personal tribute to our retiring Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Norstad, whose professional skill and dedication have played a most important part in strengthening the military position of our Alliance over the past six years. As an American, I have noted with deep satisfaction the respect and admiration and affection which he has earned from the Alliance and he knows that our good wishes go with him.

I am confident that in General Lyman Lemnitzer, the Alliance has found a worthy and distinguished successor.

We also regret the absence of our able Secretary General Dirk Stikker. I was very happy to have a chance to visit with him in Washington, at a point when it was clear that he was on the way to a good and full recovery from his illness. We can look forward to having him back shortly after the first of the year, but meanwhile, Ambassador Colonna, we have all very deeply appreciated the capable way in which you have been conducting the organization of our business in his absence.

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396.1-MA/12-2162

This meeting of NATO convenes during what might be described as the second phase of the sharpest East-West confrontation which has occurred since the Korean War. I am, of course, referring to Cuba and I must add that changes in weapons systems since Korea clothe the Cuban crisis with perhaps unprecedented problems and dangers.

Let me say now to my colleagues here in NATO that the United States deeply appreciates the prompt and steady support which we have had during the past two months from all members of NATO. I am convinced that the unity of NATO and the Organisation of American States was a major contribution to peace, in that it must have made a timely and deep impression upon leaders in Moscow. Had there been dissension here in this organisation or in the Organisation of American States, differences among us might well have led Moscow to make quite different conclusions. And might I also say that during the period of greatest tension, we were impressed by the fact that there was relatively little neutrality in the world.

It was my privilege to brief some sixty ambassadors from non-aligned countries on that first day of the President's speech on Cuba and I was struck on that occasion, as I had been at the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, with the fact that, at the moment of danger, something happens to neutralism and I think that those of us around this table can take considerable encouragement and assurance from the fact that the un-aligned countries, by and large, wish us well, because they understand the difference between our commitments around this table and commitments of another sort. A crisis like the Cuban experience might well be reviewed both in terms of how it looked at the time and how it shapes up in retrospect. The removal of missiles and bombers from Cuba without violence could not have been surely predicted on 22nd October, the date of President Kennedy's address to the nation. Perhaps you would let me go back to the week-end immediately preceding his address and the announcement of the action that we felt compelled to take, to give you an idea of some of the things which were then in our minds. Firstly, crisis did not arise out of the known rejection of the Castro régime by all the other members of the Inter-American system. President Kennedy had been cautioning our own people against extreme views regarding developments in Cuba up until the very moment when the first clear evidence became available that MRBMs were, in fact, being established in Cuba, contrary to the most solemn warning given by the President some weeks before on weapons of that kind. This unprecedented and reckless action by the Soviet government, which carried with it the imminent addition of at least 72 MRBMs and IRBMs, created wholly different issues of the most

far-reaching

far-reaching importance. It transformed the problem of Castro into the basic issue of a potentially significant shift in the balance of power. We were fully aware that the Soviet Union already had a serious capability for a nuclear strike against the United States and the Strategic Air Command with ICBMs, submarines and bombers, but this substantially augmented capability of striking at the principal nuclear deterrent of the Alliance had to be viewed with the utmost seriousness. At least so it seemed to us. Therefore, one of the alternatives which we felt that we could not face was doing nothing, both on military and political grounds. I leave it to you to judge what the effect of doing nothing might have been on alliances throughout the world.

Second, we would not properly understand the crisis, without noting the deliberate deception practiced by the Soviet Union, prior to our own discovery of the missiles themselves. We had been told, in the most specific terms and on the authority of Chairman Khrushchev, in early October, that there was not and would not be in Cuba any missile capable of reaching the United States. Fortunately, we became aware of the missile sites themselves at an early stage, even though the mobile character of the MRBMs made it possible to install them in a very short period.

Mr. Chairman, if any of the Ministers or their Representatives would like to have a somewhat detailed briefing on the actual military effort made in Cuba since, say August, we would be prepared to provide that, if you would ascertain their possible interest in your own way, and indicate a room and time where that might occur. We provided such a briefing to the Military Committee and found that they found it of considerable interest. But we must conclude that Mr. Khrushchev intended to establish his operational missile sites in Cuba, prior to his projected visit to the United Nations in late November and before a probable talk with President Kennedy at that time. We can now suppose that he was planning to raise such issues as Berlin, in the most insistent form, and to attempt to use the presence of Cuban missile bases in support of something in the nature of an ultimatum. The disarrangement of any such time-table was, of course, a clear gain for the West.

Third, we felt that it was critically important that the first disclosure of the information which was being rapidly accumulated during the week prior to October 22nd, be accompanied by an

announcement

announcement of remedial action. Otherwise, the entire Western Hemisphere would have reacted, with the most tempestuous and unpredictable results. Further, a disclosure of the information, without an announcement of the necessary action, might have allowed the Soviet Union to interpose an ultimatum of some sort which could have greatly increased the chances of war.

We believe that the Soviet Union was, in fact, surprised by the nature of the action taken, and I suspect that the surprise itself was a contribution to peace.

Fourth, we held it important to try to handle the problem as a Western Hemisphere problem, if possible, in order to reduce the likelihood of a Soviet response in some other part of the world. Obviously, if the United States finds itself under the necessity of challenging the Soviet Union on so grave a matter in any part of the world, there are severe risks affecting all of our Allies. In this respect, we were deeply conscious that it is not really possible for the United States to take strictly unilateral action, because others with whom we are closely related are seriously affected. Nevertheless, we thought that emphasis upon the hemispheric character of a given crisis, might at least reduce the prospect of chain reactions elsewhere. Thus it seems to us that although the missiles and bombers would have to be forced out of Cuba if necessary, it was common prudence to give the Soviet Government an opportunity to reverse its mistake and to withdraw them before direct military measures were adopted. We were, of course, pleased that this in fact occurred, although there were moments of high tension, before it was known that this would in fact be the result. The escalation of violence was a very likely possibility, avoided by Soviet decisions during the critical period.

I should also like, in the most realistic terms, to note the importance of United Nations machinery in the management of the crisis. By the end of 23rd October, the day after the President's speech, Moscow had apparently made at least two decisions, first not to launch an immediate first nuclear strike and second, to take the matter up in the United Nations. There is little doubt in my own mind but that the United Nations forum served to soften the commitments of prestige, and to make it somewhat easier to find a solution by peaceful means. Although U Thant was not able to accomplish what he and others hoped he might accomplish, in terms of specific results, his activities during the days of crises served to restrain, slow down, the surge of events.

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The present situation with respect to Cuba may be summarized as follows. We are reasonably confident that all MRBM and IRBM missiles have in fact been removed from Cuba. The figures given us by the Soviet Union were very close to our own information and estimates. We are even more confident that the IL 28 light jet bombers have departed. The numbers taken out coincided exactly with our own observations and we are reasonably confident that assembled bombers would be discovered by continuing surveillance. The Soviets have stated categorically that there are no nuclear warheads in Cuba. Quite frankly we do not know whether this is the case, because they are relatively easy to hide. We are intrigued by the fact that we have never been able to see or identify nose cones or other nuclear warheads actually on the island, but we have assumed that some at least were there. We just do not know what was interrupted in terms of further shipments at the time of the quarantine itself, but there remains in Cuba a substantial number of Soviet military personnel, estimated at at least 12 thousand and some of these are organized into small but heavily armed combat groups. The surface-to-air and aircraft missiles remain and are operated by Russian personnel, a number of MIGS are present and some of these at least are flown by Russians. The Soviets have indicated that military elements who were manning and servicing and guarding offensive weapons would be removed. The out-movement of military personnel apparently continues. But we must be concerned about the retention in Cuba of any significant Soviet military presence, as a matter of hemispheric policy among the states of the OAS.

It does not appear today that the Cuban question will be easily brought to a full conclusion in present discussions at the United Nations. No arrangements have been possible so far for continuing safeguards in Cuba against the presence or re-introduction of offensive weapons. Failing effective safeguards, over-flights will have to continue, and these may at any time lead to armed encounters. President Kennedy has gone about as far as he can go in present circumstances in stating that we do not intend to invade Cuba, but the Soviet Union is seeking far more categorical and formal assurances than can prudently be given in the face of so much future uncertainty.

We cannot give assurances which modify in any way our inter-American treaty commitments, or which create a sanctuary for Castro's interference with neighboring countries or which recognize a Soviet military presence or political intervention

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in the Western hemisphere. We have no desire or intention to invade Cuba - it would be costly and bloody - but formal assurances in the absence of far-reaching safeguards against Soviet and Cuban offensive action in the future are quite another and much more difficult matter, and so we cannot report today that the Cuban crisis is in any real sense finished; that is why I refer to it as in its second stage.

It is perhaps too early to assess the full implications of the weeks through which we have just lived. I would suggest, however, that the North Atlantic Council might wish to give some intensive attention to this episode in order that we in NATO might examine together a series of questions which might both illuminate the recent past and give us some valuable guide lines for the future. There are many such questions; I would not wish to take undue time, but I would suggest a few.

How was it possible for Soviet leadership to suppose that a massive movement of offensive weapons into Cuba could be accomplished without the most violent reaction? The obvious military and political gains to them and the success of such a venture could explain a certain risk-taking, but how could they have so grossly miscalculated what was possible? I suggest that this is a very complex question in which we all have both a share and a stake in terms of the signals which go from the free world to Moscow, a question which needs thorough examination. What led Soviet leaders to rectify their mistake promptly when confronted with the prospect of immediate military action? Were these considerations special to Cuba, its geographical location, or do they have wider application? Are the lessons of Cuba transferable to other situations or must we examine the others with full awareness of the differences. As you may know, we have been ourselves reluctant to draw generalised conclusions about the Cuban episode in too sweeping terms.

In the Cuban situation, it was the Soviet Union which had to face the fact that perhaps only serious military reposte in Cuba, that is, which it could make on the spot, would have required nuclear action, in which it would have to take the initiative. Although we could not surely know, we did not believe that they would destroy the Soviet Union over Cuba, even though in the process they could inflict grievous damage upon all the rest of us. But what does this mean with respect to the range of choices which NATO heads of government ought to have before them in the event of crises elsewhere, with respect to the nature of forces in being, to contingency planning and to strategic doctrine?

How important

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How important was it in the Cuban matter to plan for an opportunity for the adversary to reverse a serious mistake?

In Cuba, controlled military pressure was applied immediately, including naval quarantine and precautionary military movements but these were of a type which did not demand an immediate response. Escalation was delayed, at least for a brief period unless the other side elected to escalate immediately. Would the result have been the same had there been an automatic ultimatum, a sudden strike against missile sites and military installations in Cuba or declaration of war against Cuba? Who can know?; but I think some thought on the subject might be helpful. It will be revealing, I believe, to reflect on the record of the Cuban crisis from the point of view of crisis management. I do not in any sense cite it as an example but simply as a relevant recent experience which has some bearing on NATO conduct in the face of another crisis in another situation. The inter-play of information, communications, decisions, co-ordination and operations within the framework which was quite literally shifting from hour to hour, leads me to believe that crisis management within the Alliance needs urgent attention, including such obvious facilities as the most effective possible communications among governments, because even in a situation where two capitals were playing the central roles, communications between the two, in the normal channels, threatened not to be able to keep up with the pace of events, and communications became concentrated on public statements, in the interest, I think, of time primarily.

Then, is there any serious question of Communist-Free World confrontation anywhere in the world which is not of vital interest to NATO. I suggested at my first NATO Ministerial Meeting in 1961 that NATO could not be uninterested in any such question anywhere, even though it was not a matter of NATO Treaty obligations. I believe this is inherent in the threat from which NATO wishes to secure itself, because the threat is world-wide. But, and this has been underlined in recent weeks, it also results from the fact that some members of NATO necessarily carry important commitments and burdens in other parts of the world. Two are members of CENTO and another is closely associated with it. Three are members of SEATO, two are members of the Commonwealth, one is a member of the Inter-American System and four others are geographically present in that hemisphere. However, much as we tried to treat Cuba as a hemispheric problem, we were deeply conscious of the fact that

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NATO could be involved by chain reaction and I am certain that my colleagues at the table were very much aware of that possibility at the time. Could we not in our own discussions and consultations at least disregard the myth that the struggle between Freedom and Communism is sharply divisible along geographic lines and take up, as NATO allies, the nature of the worldwide struggle which is vital to our own survival and freedom?

I might say just a word here because I think the press has led to some misunderstanding. I might say just a word about references to other and broader questions entering into private and public exchanges with the Soviet Union in the course of the Cuban crisis. In those exchanges, reference was made to the hope that if the Cuban crisis could be peacefully resolved, attention could be turned to other matters also requiring the interest of Governments. But it has been our view that that crisis should be well behind us before we can expect any serious or profitable discussion with the Soviet Union on other matters.

There is some reason to think that the Soviet Union has been looking at it in much the same way. Mr. Mikoyan, for example, made it clear in Washington that he was not there to negotiate on matters other than Cuba. There were brief exchanges in New York about disarmament in connection with the resumption of the Geneva talks but these have not yet pointed to any serious progress.

References to Berlin by both sides simply reaffirmed existing positions in the most general terms, with no indication by either side that urgent negotiations were either promising or desired. There has been no elaboration, in private, of the general language used in public exchanges about relations between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviets apparently have in mind their old idea of a pact between the two. In our minds, this is a matter which can best, in the immediate future, be approached through practical steps in disarmament. I should like to add a few remarks about Berlin. I think it would be dangerous for us to think that the Cuban experience has necessarily created a situation more favourable to the resolution of this major point of confrontation in Europe. We do not really know whether the Soviets will be induced to change their course or will simply maintain the same old line. Mr. Khrushchev's speech of yesterday seemed to point to the latter. But despite some relatively mild utterances by Mr. Ulbricht, for example, these indications have not been particularly clear or encouraging. At any event, NATO Ministers are

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aware that the central issue which has emerged between us and the Soviets over the past 18 months is whether Western troops are to continue to remain in West Berlin. Unless the Soviets are willing to abandon the position they have taken on this crucial point, nothing else can easily fall into place. So to a considerable extent, the initiative for new proposals, which could provide a basis for fruitful discussions, must rest with the Soviets because of that central point. And so we cannot afford to relax or to assume that any easy solution of the Berlin problem is possible. We must continue to develop our plans to meet all contingencies and to maintain the unity of the Alliance in the face both of Soviet threats and divisive tactics.

We are reviewing the political attitudes of the West in the ambassadorial group in Washington but the dilemma with respect to political initiatives in the West is a very serious and a very simple one. We have not found the Soviet Union in the last 18 months prepared to think of any solution or any combination of ideas that rested upon the continued presence of the Western forces in West Berlin. But as they have rejected almost any suggestion that does not include that element, the removal of Western forces, we see no possibility of taking the initiative on proposals that remove or weaken the position of Western Forces in West Berlin. At some point that central issue has to be resolved. If it is resolved, then many things become possible. But fresh initiatives that keep turning back to that point have not seemed this far very promising. Another indication of Soviet indications may well be afforded by the Soviet attitude on disarmament and arms control negotiations. Again the current negotiations in Geneva have in general confirmed that not much real progress can be expected in this area in the immediate future. As NATO knows from periodic reports, both the Soviet resistance to reasonable inspection arrangements and the inherent complexity of the subject makes it imprudent to approach general disarmament talks with great expectations. On the public opinion front, we have to some extent neutralised the advantage which the Soviets gained from their espousal of general and complete disarmament.

I think it is fair to say that they are no longer outbidding the West, I think our position is now sounder in many parts of the world and I am confident that it is more fully thought out than the Soviet position. Eventually, I am convinced, the East-West interest in bringing the arms race under control will assert itself and we shall have a real basis for beginning steps in disarmament.

It may be

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It may be rash to say so, but I believe that the leadership of the Soviet Union does recognise a national interest on their part in imposing limits upon what might otherwise so easily become an unlimited arms competition. So I think it is not hopeless to suppose that somehow these real and practical interests will take hold, although how soon that will occur no-one can say. But we have felt that these negotiations in Geneva are useful because they do educate key leaders regarding the problems. There will be less interest in superficially appealing generalities, less susceptibility to slogans as approaches to the problem in the United Nations and elsewhere. Also the Geneva meeting represents a continuing forum in which, to use a sports term, we can "play for the breaks", seizing opportunities which might arise for agreement either on small points or large points.

But I think these negotiations have brought to light in a very concrete way the willingness of the West to explore seriously and in depth, alternatives to the arms race consistent with the security of us all and that is why we have urged that the 18-nation Disarmament Committee be recognised as a continuing body and not as a short-term enterprise, despite the fact that the prospects for early progress are not encouraging. There are certain limited measures of our arms control which may present an opportunity for early progress. These are (1) an agreement, which would not require inspection, to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons in outer-space: not a major step but perhaps a useful step; (2) an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons to national governments not now possessing them.

This would, in our view, require the adherence of Communist China and that does not appear likely at the moment and it would not and should not preclude the formation, should the Alliance wish to proceed along those lines, of a truly multilateral nuclear force in NATO. We envisage measures to reduce the risk of war through arrangements for the exchange of military missions and for advance notice of major military movements and for improvement in East-West communications systems and these have been discussed in some detail in NAC.

We do propose, in the framework of disarmament discussions, to explore them with the other side with full Alliance consultations. So these questions all are of interest to all of us in NATO. Success in these efforts is certainly not a foregone conclusion but we think the effort has to be made, not only in terms of Atlantic security but as a contribution toward a more stable world. For

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again, the prospect of an endless and unlimited arms race is something which must concern us all. Perhaps a nuclear test ban still represents the most likely area of agreement, despite many setbacks to our hopes. The Soviet Union's interest in this subject may be reviving although it is too early to be sure, after a clear cooling-off in 1960 and 1961, possible because of their own rearmament needs and possibly under Chinese Communist pressure. But we continue to believe it is in the Free World's interest to achieve a nuclear test cessation further because it would inhibit the spread of national nuclear weapons capabilities; but such an agreement would have to be consistent with our military security - and that would mean adequate inspection arrangements. The Soviets still apparently refuse to accept on-site inspection but I do not believe we should rule out the possibility of some further revision in the Soviet position; and we intend to keep working at this matter. The Soviets accepted inspection in principle up until 1961. We know of no technical developments which make inspection unnecessary. Full safeguards against the misuse of inspection for espionage purposes are provided in the proposals which we and the British have made.

We see no reason from any legitimate security standpoint for the Soviets not to accept these proposals; and we do believe that if the Soviets find that we have reached the limits of our ability to find real compromises, they may then make a significant change in their own position.

Looking ahead for a moment, it seems to us that the Alliance must give continued attention to the longer-range questions of East-West relations. The situation is changing - it could change to our advantage if we move to cause it to do so. There is no question in our minds but that Soviet leadership faces some very serious problems - in the Soviet Union, within the Bloc and in relations with the rest of the world. Differences with Peiping appear to be real and have not yet run their course. De-Stalinization continues and seems to be in part in response to the pressures of public opinion with which we are not unfamiliar. A trend which is, I think, to the advantage of peace and of stability.

Critical economic problems present Soviet leaders with formidable issues of the allocation of resources. The bloom of Communist propaganda seems to be fading in important parts of the world. The Communist parties themselves seem to be confused and distraught in many countries. I mention these problems on the other side of the curtain to introduce what is even more important - that is, the opportunities opening up to us in the Free World. To get on with our great tasks ourselves and to demonstrate decisively that it is freedom that is the wave of the future as it has been the great tide of history.

We have

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We have been discussing, as we should, the political and military aspects of the Alliance, but the cohesion and vitality of NATO depend equally on our success in working together in the economic field. We can harm one another and weaken the very fabric of our common purpose by our economic actions, or we can recognise the fact of economic interdependence and act in this great Atlantic Community in a fashion calculated to build the common prosperity. We hope that we can all adopt the latter course. Our own capacity to do so is to be found in the new trade expansion act, and we do wish to work with the members of the Alliance of the North Atlantic in a co-operative endeavour to open and expand the channels of trade. Not just for the 15 nations seated here, but for the Free World as a whole. Further, we have expressed our keen interest in seeing that the common agricultural policy of the Common Market evolves along liberal lines. I recognise that this is not a NATO problem, but it is one which is very important to us and to the co-operation between the two sides of the Atlantic.

We assume and welcome the fact that European nations will wish to discuss these economic problems with us, agricultural problems, price levels, trade practices, just as we wish to consult with Europe. But the point I wish to emphasise is that we can and must work at these problems together. There can be no doubt that we are well into a world in which the economies of the advanced countries have become part of a seamless weld. I hope very much that we can all have in the front of our minds the importance of political impact of success in our economic arrangements and the potentially catastrophic effect of failure. We do hope that in NATO we can continue to try to improve the effectiveness of our political consultation: and if we have been doing better, that we can do better still. Just as we seek by advance military planning to prepare ourselves to meet sudden acts of aggression, so we can by further advanced political planning create a common foundation of policy which facilitates decisions.

I think we must devote the most serious attention to the problem of adapting the procedures of NATO consultation to two considerations: the foreshortened time scale of modern military technology and the global nature of the Communist threat. I think we have been carrying out advance consultation quite satisfactorily in the case of Berlin, in a closely co-ordinated operation involving the North Atlantic Council. In this matter, a catalogue of plans and procedures has been prepared to meet a broad range of political and military contingencies. Maybe we should consider using similar methods for other problems in other areas. Of course, in times of crisis, events will never follow precisely the prepared

scenario,

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scenario, but our ability to adjust quickly and intelligently in a fast-moving situation will depend in large measure on the depth of understanding and policy agreement we have achieved during the process of such advanced consultation. So we would hope that senior policy making officials of our representative governments could reinforce our Permanent Representatives from time to time to stimulate and carry forward a planning and consultative dialogue which may be usefully translated into agreed policy action within the Alliance as a whole.

We might consider using the time between now and our next meeting to formulate additional procedures. One possible step would be an exchange of views among the Permanent Representatives and we might report their suggestions for improved consultation at our Spring meeting.

I would like to stress the importance that we attach to periodic meetings between planning advisers, such as the recent meeting of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, for these exchanges can take place in an informal atmosphere and can help to define the responsibilities which we may jointly or separately exercise in the treatment of these objectives.

Mr. Chairman, I have already spoken longer than I intended, but I would like to conclude, if I may, with a remark or two about the confidence which we are entitled to have in this Alliance. We have some problems, Mr. Khrushchev has some problems. I am quite sure that we are better off with our problems than we would be with his. I think we do face a period in which effort on our part - political, military, economic - could give the Free World a major lift in its relations with the Communist bloc.

I am more concerned at the moment that we take advantage of our opportunities, than that we give expression to our fears, because, in one field after another, I think it is being recorded that the competitive capacity of the Soviet bloc has severe limitations and that the competitive capacity of the Free World has not, in any sense, reached its limits and, as this Alliance reaches this 30th Ministerial Meeting, as we have shared common dangers since '49, as we have lived through recurring cold war shocks of new sort or another, we have continued to build the unity and strength of this Alliance and NATO has come to be a part of the fundamental commitments within the fabric of this association of free nations. So we would draw from the experience of recent weeks a certain sense of anticipation, a reaction which

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we, in the Free World, can have, to move into new chapters of strength in our competition with the East. I think it would be good if it could be clear to everyone else that, with the initiatives that are opening up for us in the West, it would be the East who would have to do the greater part of the worrying. Thank you, Mr. Chairman."

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Control: 8123
Rec'd: DECEMBER 14, 1962
1:58 PM

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 692, DECEMBER 14, 2 PM (SECTION I OF III)

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 692; INFORMATION NATO POLTO UNNUMBERED

FROM USDEL

SUBJECT: SECOND SESSION, THIRTIETH NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, DECEMBER 13

SUMMARY: STATEMENTS BY TEN FONMINS IN AFTERNOON SESSION DEC 13 INDICATED APPROVAL US HANDLING OF CUBAN EPISODE. MAJORITY AGREED THAT AS RESULT WESTERN POSITION WAS STRONGER THAN IT HAD BEEN IN RELATION TO COMMUNIST BLOC, BUT PORTUGAL EMPHASIZED THAT SITUATION AFTER CRISIS WAS AS DANGEROUS AS BEFORE BECAUSE OF COMMUNIST REGIME IN CUBA; THERE WERE STATEMENTS TO EFFECT THAT SOVIETS MIGHT BE RE-APPRAISING THEIR POSITION, BUT THAT THEIR OBJECTIVES HAD NOT CHANGED. DIVISION OF OPINION ABOUT DESIRABILITY OF BROAD EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS IN NEAR FUTURE WAS EVIDENT, WITH BELGIUM AND CANADA ADVOCATING WESTERN INITIATIVE TOWARD SUCH NEGOTIATIONS AND UK AND FRANCE URGING THAT WEST SHOULD WAIT FOR FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY.

DETAILS: AFTERNOON SESSION OPENED WITH STATEMENTS ON FAMILIAR THEMES BY LUXEMBOURG AND DANISH FONMIN WHO LATTER SAID WEST MUST HOLD TO ITS POSITION IN BERLIN, BUT NOT GIVE UP HOPE OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT. ALSO SPOKE IN FAVOR OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF EEC.

NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER LUNS SAID OVER-ALL NATO POSITION BETTER THIS YEAR, BUT NO CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDE RE BERLIN,

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DISARMAMENT

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-2- POLTO 692, DECEMBER 14, 2 PM (SECTION 1 OF 111) FROM PARIS

DISARMAMENT, OR NUCLEAR TESTS. USSR MAY CHANGE ITS IDEAS, AND WEST SHOULD NOT TAKE INITIATIVE UNTIL SEES GOOD POSSIBILITIES. SPOKE IN FAVOR OF NATO EXAMINATION OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS RE BERLIN AND INCREASE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

CANADA (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS GREEN) BEGAN BY CONGRATULATING WORK OF COLONNA AND STAFF AND EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT NEXT MEETING WOULD BE HELD IN CANADA. US REACTION TO SOVIET CHALLENGE IN CUBA WAS TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE; FACT THAT IT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE CONTRIBUTED TOWARD SATISFACTORY RESULT. US REACTION CAME AS SURPRISE TO SOVIET LEADERS, BUT IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THEY WOULD WITHDRAW UNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES, AND PARALLEL CANNOT BE DRAWN BETWEEN CUBA AND BERLIN. ONE OF MOST SIGNIFICANT RESULTS OF CUBAN CRISIS WAS HOPE OF SETTLING OTHER ISSUES, SUCH AS NUCLEAR TESTS, DISARMAMENT, BERLIN AND GERMANY. WESTERN DIPLOMATIC PETITION HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED, AND WE MUST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS TO TAKE INITIATIVE WITH SOVIET BLOC. FOR NATO THIS MEANS URGENT REVIEW OF WESTERN POSITION ON NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF BERLIN, TAKING ALL WESTERN INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT. HOPED TALKS BETWEEN US AND USSR ON BERLIN WOULD BE RESUMED AS SOON AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, AND NATO COULD AT SAME TIME STUDY BROADER POLITICAL ACTION THAN COUNTER-MEASURES TO BERLIN CRISIS. WE MUST KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT COURSES ARE OPEN TO US AND HAVE READY CATALOGUE OF POLITICAL PLANS. POLAD OR SOME OTHER BODY MIGHT REVIEW EUROPEAN SECURITY PROPOSALS OF YEAR AGO, REVISED WESTERN PEACE PLAN, AND SPAAK PROPOSALS OF LAST YEAR. WE MUST ALSO PRESS FOR PROGRESS ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING INTERNAL SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION TO DETECT UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS, MEASURES FOR CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT, AND COLLATERAL MEASURES SUCH AS THOSE TO REDUCE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL WAR AND NON-DISSEMINATION AND NON-ORBITING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. UN ANOTHER POINT OF CONTACT WITH USSR WHICH SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN. HOPED OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD JOIN CANADA IN ATTACHING USSR FOR COLONIAL PRACTICES. RE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT, SAID CHINESE MIGHT HAVE ONLY

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LIMITED OBJECTIVES, BUT QUESTION OF FAR EASTERN LEADERSHIP IS AT ISSUE. MAY BE CHANGE IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY, BUT HARD FOR INDIA TO ABANDON NON-ALIGNMENT AND THERE MAY EVEN BE ADVANTAGES TO WEST IN RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN AND ASIAN STATES IF INDIA MAINTAINS THIS POSITION. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL SCENE GIVES GROUND FOR CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM.

FINLETTER

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Action: EUR

Control: 8247
Rec'd: DECEMBER 15, 1962
6:12 A.M.

Info: SS SR C SP L H SAL BIF NEA IO DAC SCI E P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR RMR

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 692, DECEMBER 14, 2 P.M. (SECTION 1 OF 3)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 692; INFORMATION NATO CAPITALS POLTO UNNUMBERED.

FROM USDEL

SUBJECT: SECOND SESSION, THIRTIETH NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, DECEMBER 13 P.M.

BELGIUM (FOREIGN MINISTER SPAAK) NOTED TWO DIFFERENT TRENDS OF THINKING AMONG NATO MEMBERS, ONE IN FAVOR OF ACTIVE POLICY FOR EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS AND ONE PREFERRING TO WAIT FOR SOVIET INITIATIVE. HE FAVORED ACTIVE POLICY, CITING PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 27 RE BROADER DISCUSSIONS AFTER SATISFACTORY AND COMPLETE SETTLEMENT OF CUBAN CRISIS. URGED WE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FAVORABLE WINDS, SINCE WESTERN POSITION HAD IMPROVED AND USSR WAS TROUBLED WITH PROFOUND AGRICULTURAL CRISIS AND STRAIN OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT. EUROPEAN ACHIEVEMENTS OF COMMON MARKET WOULD CONSTITUTE POLE OF ATTRACTION FOR USSR. WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE WHILE OPPONENT SHOWS HIS WEAKNESS, RATHER THAN WAIT FOR HIM TO FIND HIS STRENGTH. CANNOT IGNORE IDEAS EXPRESSED RECENTLY BY KHRUSHCHEV, SUCH AS CONTINUED PRESENCE WESTERN TROOPS IN BERLIN AND UN ROLE THERE. BELIEVES PROBING OF SOVIET INTENTIONS THROUGH US-SOVIET TALKS HAS HAD SOME RESULTS, BUT IS NOT ADEQUATE METHOD IN ITSELF AND CAN ONLY PREPARE WAY FOR SOMETHING MORE CONCLUSIVE. PERHAPS WE SHOULD NOT TAKE SPECTACULAR INITIATIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUT MUST PREPARE OUR POSITIONS AND BE READY TO MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATION. KHRUSHCHEV MAY NOT BE ABLE TO RESIST INDEFINITELY INTERNAL PRESSURES ON HIM FOR SIGNATURE EAST GERMAN PEACE TREATY. RE NEED TO EXAMINE MACHINERY FOR CONSULTATION, REFERRED TO REPORT OF THREE WISE

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-2- POLTO 692, DECEMBER 14, 2 P.M. (SECTION II OF III) FROM: PARIS.

MEN IN 1958 AND EMPHASIZED DISTINCTION BETWEEN INFO AND CONSULTATION, LATTER INVOLVING EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION AND ACCEPTANCE OF COMMON RESPONSIBILITY.

UK (LORD HOME) POINTED BUT THAT TWO GREATEST COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN ON MOVE AT SAME TIME, THOUGH NOT IN COLLUSION. BOTH ATTEMPTS AT EXPANSION DERIVE FROM COMMON DOCTRINE APPROVING WARS OF LIBERATION, BUT RUSSIAN INTERPRETATION IS THAT AGGRESSION MUST STOP SHORT OF WORLD WAR. CHANGES ARE WORKING INSIDE RUSSIA AND WILL INEVITABLY BE SEEN IN EXTERNAL POLICY. RE CUBA, BELIEVED KHRUSHCHEV WANTED TO REDRESS MILITARY IMBALANCE WITH US BY SHORT-CUT, BUT MADE UNUSUAL MISCALCULATION OF US REACTION. THIS SHOWS WE SHOULD LET SOVIETS KNOW EVEN MORE CLEARLY THAN WE GENERALLY DO WHAT POINTS ARE NOT NEGOTIABLE. IMPORTANT QUESTION IS WHETHER THERE IS CHANGE OF MOOD OR POLICY IN USSR OF WHICH WE CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE. KHRUSHCHEV WILL WANT A PAUSE BEFORE ANOTHER TRIAL OF STRENGTH, IF ONLY TO MAKE HIS OWN DETERRENT MORE CREDIBLE. SOVIETS MUST BE CONSIDERING WHETHER ECONOMY CAN STAND STRAIN OF MISSILE DEVELOPMENT SUFFICIENT TO COVER US AND AT SAME TIME RAISE RUSSIAN STANDARD OF LIVING. LORD HOME BELIEVES THAT HEAVY SOVIET DEFENSE BUDGET, COMBINED WITH LACK OF FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE RE DISARMAMENT AND BERLIN AND FACT THAT DICTATORS CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE FACE, INDICATE THAT WE SHOULD EXPECT LULL, RATHER THAN DETENTE. KHRUSHCHEV COULD NOT RESPOND NOW TO WESTERN INITIATIVE WITHOUT GIVING HIS OWN PEOPLE AND CHINESE IMPRESSION OF ANOTHER SURRENDER. BUT WEST NEED NOT BE IMMOBILE. LORD HOME SHARES SPAAK'S ANXIETY, BUT DOES NOT SEE WHAT INITIATIVE WEST CAN TAKE NOW. CONTACTS WITH USSR MUST BE KEPT OPEN. DOUBTS THAT CUBA AND BERLIN CAN BE EQUATED, BECAUSE FORMER WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US AND ONLY MARGINAL IMPORTANCE TO USSR, WHILE LATTER IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO BOTH. DOES NOT SEE WHAT INITIATIVE CAN BE TAKEN NOW RE BERLIN, BUT KHRUSHCHEV MAY TURN LATER TO SOME MODUS VIVENDI. IN THIS CONNECTION SAID THAT AMBASSADOR ROBERTS WAS SURE HE HAD NOT GIVEN MISTAKEN ACCOUNT OF KHRUSHCHEV REMARKS RE

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-3- POLTO 692, DECEMBER 14, 2 P.M. (SECTION II OF III) FROM: PARIS.

CONTINUATION WESTERN TROOPS IN BERLIN, EVEN THOUGH SOVIET AMBASSADOR SUBSEQUENTLY CHECKED AT LORD HOME'S REQUEST AND SAID THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD SPECIFIED SUCH TROOPS MUST BE TEMPORARILY UNDER UN COMMAND AND THEN WITHDRAWN. PERHAPS KHRUSHCHEV WILL COME BACK TO SUCH IDEAS. AGREED THAT PROPOSALS MENTIONED BY OTHER COLLEAGUES (BERLIN, MODUS VIVENDI, ETC.) SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED AND BROUGHT UP TO DATE, BUT ON CONDITION THAT ANY REVISED PROPOSALS MUST GIVE BERLIN NO WORSE POSITION THAN AT PRESENT. RE SOVIET ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES AND DISARRAY IN COMMUNIST ALLIANCE, SAID THESE MUST BE CONSTANT CONCERN TO KHRUSHCHEV AND WE MUST OBSTRUCT SOVIET PURPOSE TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR SATELLITE COUNTRIES TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES. ALL ATTRACTIONS PULL THEM TO WEST, AND MANNER IN WHICH FEDERAL REPUBLIC HAS HANDLED CREDITS AND TRADE WITH EAST GERMANY IS VERY GOOD. RE CHINESE ATTACK ON INDIA, SAID MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO HUMILIATE INDIA; THIS HAD HAPPENED AND CHINESE WERE DERIVING SOME ADVANTAGES FROM IT, BUT ON OTHER HAND IMAGE OF CHINESE AS UPHOLDING PEACE HAD BEEN CRACKED. COMMUNIST PARTIES ARE IN CONFUSION THROUGHOUT WORLD, CHINESE ATTACK ON NEHRU HAS CUT GROUND FROM UNDER NEUTRALS, AND INDIA IS NOW COMMITTED TO WESTERN WORLD EVEN THOUGH NONALIGNED. IF KHRUSHCHEV LOOKS TOWARD EAST, HE MUST SEE VERY BLEAK PROSPECT; ALL PULL IS TOWARD WEST. THESE FACTORS MAY OPERATE TO TURN LULL INTO DETENTE, AND LORD HOME FEELS BETTER ABOUT NATO POSITION THAN HE DID LAST YEAR. NO DOUBT THAT RUSSIANS ARE REACTING TO US, RATHER THAN WE TO THEM, AND SOVIETS MAY EVEN LOOK TOWARD WEST FOR FIRST TIME.

FINLETTER

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Info SS SR G SP - H S/S STF ARA NEA IO DAC SCI E P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR RMR

Control: 8288
Rec'd: DECEMBER 15, 1962 8:18 AM

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 692, DECEMBER 14, 2 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INR/DDC 59 NOV 15 AM 8:59

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 692, INFORMATION NATO CAPITALS POLTO UNNUMBERED.

FROM USDEL

SUBJECT: SECOND SESSION, THIRTIETH NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING,

DECEMBER 13 P.M.

GREECE (FOREIGN MINISTER AVEROFF) SAID THAT CUBAN CASE ILLUSTRATED IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNIST BASE, FOR WITHOUT CASTRO THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO ROCKETS. ALTHOUGH MOSCOW HAD RETREATED FROM CUBA, MUST NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT IT HAD JUST MOVED FORWARD WITH GREAT AUDACITY ON NEW GROUND AND WITHDRAWAL IS NOT COMPLETE. SOVIET AIMS REMAIN SAME AND DANGER OF WAR PERSISTS; CONTINUED VIGILANCE IS ESSENTIAL. CUBAN EPISODE WAS FIRST TIME SOVIET LEADERS HAD FACED US IN CONCRETE SITUATION OF DETERMINATION NOT TAKE RISKS, AND THIS GAVE HOPE FOR FUTURE. CUBAN CRISIS DEMONSTRATED IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND WEST MUST HAVE SUFFICIENT SUPPLY, BECAUSE THEY CANNOT BE IMPROVISED QUICKLY. ANY FALLING BACK IN BERLIN WOULD BE DISASTROUS THROUGHOUT WORLD, AND QUESTION

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WOULD ARISE WHETHER SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE SUCH AS THAT IN GREECE COULD BE MAINTAINED.

NORWAY (FOREIGN MINISTER LANGE) SAID IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHAT SOVIET INTENTIONS ARE FOR FUTURE OR HOW RELATIONS IN COMMUNIST WORLD WILL SHAPE UP. STRUGGLE BETWEEN USSR AND CHINA MAY BRING SOVIETS CLOSER TO WEST, BUT MAY LEAD CHINA TO ADOPT EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES. SEES NO MATERIAL CHANGE IN SOVIET POSITION ON BERLIN, THOUGH TIMING HAS BEEN PUT OFF. WEST MUST EXERT CONSIDERABLE CAUTION, AND HE DID NOT SEE EARLY POSSIBILITY OF BROAD AND FORMAL NEGOTIATION, BUT URGED THAT EXISTING CONTACTS WITH SOVIET UNION BE MAINTAINED, THAT WE WATCH FOR ANY OPENING WHICH WOULD PERMIT INITIATIVE ON OUR SIDE, AND THAT WE PREPARE OURSELVES POLITICALLY AND DIPLOMATICALLY TO ACT QUICKLY AND FIRMLY NOT ONLY IN CRISES BUT WHEN INITIATIVE BECAME POSSIBLE. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV HAD RAISED EXPECTATIONS IN OUTSIDE WORLD THAT PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE TOWARD BROAD NEGOTIATIONS, AND MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE MUST NOT GIVE IMPRESSION OF IMMOBILISM OR NEGATIVISM.

PORTUGAL (FOREIGN MINISTER NOGUEIRA) GAVE APPRAISAL OF CUBAN CRISIS WHICH EMPHASIZED CONTINUATION OF DANGER. SOVIETS MAY BE

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REAPPRAISING TACTICS AND STRATEGY, BUT THEIR AIMS ARE UNCHANGED. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WAS NOT GOING AGINST SOVIETS, BUT HAD BROUGHT THEM TO CARRIBBEAN SEA, AND WEST MUST BE PREPARED FOR CONTINUOUS CONFRONTATION. SOVIET MOVE IN CUBA WAS SERIOUS THREAT TO US AND WESTERN HEMISPHERE, AND THREAT HAD TO BE REMOVED. HOWEVER, DANGER PERSISTS AND MAY CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME. ENTRENCHED COMMUNIST POSITION IN CUBA MAY BE MORE SERIOUS IN LONG RUN THAN MISSILES. US SUCCESS GREATLY APPRECIATED, BUT PORTUGAL IS CONCERNED OVER RESORT TO QUARANTINE WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS; IT WAS DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONS DEPENDENT ON SEA COMMUNICATIONS. WOULD NOT BE EASY TO SAY THAT CUBA HAD VIOLATED UN CHARTER; LEGAL BASIS FOR NATO SUPPORT OF US ACTION WAS WEAK, BUT SUPPORT WAS GIVEN AND RIGHTLY SO. NATO SOLIDARITY MUST BE APPLIED GLOBALLY AND IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT ALLIANCE IS IN PROPER SHAPE TO MEET OTHER CRISES.

FRANCE (FOREIGN MINISTER COUVE DE MURVILLE) NOTED EXTRAORDINARY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRESENT SESSION AND THAT OF YEAR AGO. SAID THAT RECENT EVENTS HAD BROUGHT US BACK TO REALITY AND THAT IN FINAL ANALYSIS EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON BALANCE OF FORCES. THIS IS OFTEN CONCEALED BY DIPLOMACY AND MULTILATERAL PROCEDURES BUT IS DEMONSTRATED WHEN GREAT POWERS ARE CONFRONTED WITH GRAVE SITUATIONS SUCH AS CUBA. CAUSES OF SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT MAY BE LESS

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IMPORTANT THAN CONSEQUENCES WHICH WILL RESULT. THERE WAS FRONTIER QUESTION, BUT CHINA WISHED TO ASSERT ITSELF AND HUMILIATE INDIA. HERE MAJOR PHENOMENON WHICH MAY CHANGE BALANCE OF FORCES IS CONFLICT BETWEEN USSR AND CHINA. US MUST FINALLY SETTLE CUBAN EPISODE AND WEST MUST NOT BE TOO QUICK TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS. MUST WAIT AND SEE WHETHER THERE WILL BE CHANGE WHICH WE CAN EXPLOIT TO PUT RELATIONS ON MORE NORMAL BASIS.

GREAT CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED SINCE LAST YEAR AND MAY AGAIN BEFORE NEXT YEAR'S MEETING.

IN CONCLUSION SECRETARY THANKED NOGUEIRA AND COUVE FOR EMPHASIZING RESIDUAL ELEMENT OF CUBAN QUESTION, SINCE PROBLEMS REMAINING AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF MISSILES ARE GREAT PREOCCUPATION OF PEOPLE OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE. QUOTED PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT THAT TWO POINTS IN CUBAN SITUATION WERE NOT NEGOTIABLE I.E. MILITARY TIE WITH USSR AND INTERESTS OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES UNDER RIO TREATY. SINCE CUBA HAD NOT DENOUNCED TREATY OR PULLED OUT OF OAS, HE WOULD SAY THAT SURVEILLANCE OVERFLIGHTS ARE NOT IN VIOLATION OF CUBAN RIGHTS BUT RATHER DISCHARGE OF AN OBLIGATION WHICH CUBA OWES UNDER TREATY.

FINLETTER

JTC

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(31)

Polto 697 From the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting

to the Department of State

Paris, December 15, 1962, 1 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1562. Secret. 5 pages of source text not declassified.]

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CORRECTION ISSUED: 12-16-62 7 PM MGG

FROM: PARIS -- CORRECTED PAGE 1

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 698, DECEMBER 15, 1 AM

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USDEL

396.1-PA

THIRD SESSION, 30TH NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, DECEMBER 14 AM (CONTINUED).

FOLLOWING COMMANDERS' BRIEFING, REPORTED IN PREVIOUS MESSAGE, SECRETARY RUSK MADE OPENING STATEMENT UNDER TRIENNIAL REVIEW SECTION OF AGENDA ITEM II "MILITARY QUESTIONS."

NOTING THAT TRIENNIAL REVIEW HAD HIGHLIGHTED SHORTFALLS OF GREAT MAGNITUDE, ASKED WHETHER GOVERNMENTS COULD FEEL SECURE IF SOME ALLIES LAGGED BEHIND IN PROVIDING THEIR SHARE OF ALLIANCE MILITARY FORCES. ALSO ASKED WHETHER SOME COULD IGNORE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF DEFENDING HIGH COST MILITARY PROJECTS WHILE OTHERS DOING MUCH LESS. NOTED THAT FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PROBLEM OF ALLIANCE WAS TWO-FOLD: ON ONE HAND, TIME WAS RIPE FOR THOROUGH-GOING RE-EXAMINATION OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE; ON OTHER HAND ALLIANCE MUST CONSIDER WHETHER, WITH RESULTS OF RE-EXAMINATION, WAY COULD BE FOUND TO MEET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WHICH WILL THEN HAVE EMERGED.

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WITH REGARD QUESTION OF NATO STRATEGIC POLICY, SAID NATO FORCES PRESENTLY IN BEING IN CASE OF EMERGENCY TENDED TO PROPEL US TOWARD AWESOME CHOICE BETWEEN THERMONUCLEAR HOLOCAUST AND SURRENDER. US BELIEVED THAT ALLIANCE MUST PROGRESS BEYOND AUTOMATIC RELIANCE UPON USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM OUTSET AND TOWARD CAPABILITY FOR WIDE RANGE OF RESPONSES. US SUGGESTED ANALYSIS BE UNDERTAKEN WHICH COULD GO FORWARD DURING CURRENT YEAR AND IN WHICH ALL NATO MEMBERS SHOULD PARTICIPATE, WITHOUT BROAD CONSENSUS RE MILITARY

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MILITARY STRATEGY, NATO CANNOT OBTAIN REQUIRED MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. RECOMMENDED THAT NATO EXAMINATION OF STRATEGY COULD BEGIN IN CONNECTION WITH FORTHCOMING STUDY IN MILITARY COMMITTEE OF LONG-THREAT ASSESSMENT UPON WHICH WOULD BE BASED NE FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR END 1969.

CONTINUING, SECRETARY SAID THAT EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH STRATEGIC CONCEPT WOULD BE FRUITLESS IF ALLIANCE DID NOT AT SAME TIME MOVE TO CLOSE GAP BETWEEN NATO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND NATIONAL FORCE PROGRAMS. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE ATTAINMENT CURRENT FORCE GOALS. ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE WILL EMERGE AS STRATEGIC PROBLEM REVIEWED. AT MINIMUM, GOVERNMENTS CANNOT PERMIT PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT DEVOTED TO DEFENSE TO DECLINE. IF NATO COLLEAGUES SOMETIMES BELIEVED US LACKED UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS FACING OTHER GOVERNMENTS, SHOULD BE REMEMBERED US ITSELF MAINTAINED MILLION MEN IN UNIFORM OUTSIDE US, WHO SUFFERED CASUALTIES ALMOST EVERY WEEK FROM COMMUNIST ARMS AND WHO WERE MAINTAINED BY COMPULSORY CONSCRIPTION.

SECRETARY SAID NATO WOULD HAVE FULL PARTICIPATION OF US IN SEEKING SOLUTION ITS PROBLEMS AND US WOULD CONTINUE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON NATURE AND PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE, AS BASIS FOR STRATEGIC THINKING WITH REGARD TO BOTH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR FORCES. US COMPLETING PREPARATIONS FOR STILL MORE DETAILED PRESENTATION NUCLEAR DATA.

REFERRING TO NEED FOR CONSULTATION AND ADVANCE PLANNING, SECRETARY SAID US TECHNICAL EXPOSITION OF CONCEPT OF MULTILATERAL SEA-BORNE MRBM FORCE SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THIS CONTEXT. US BELIEVED SEA-BORNE MRBM FORCE MULTILATERALLY MANNED, OWNED AND CONTROLLED REPRESENTED USEFUL AND RESPONSIBLE DAY EFFECTIVELY TO DEPLOY MRBMS WHILE MAINTAINING ALLIANCE COHESION. WOULD BE NORMAL EXPECTATION THAT MULTILATERAL FORCE WOULD BE NATO FORCE WITH US PARTICIPATION. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, LOOK WITH SYMPATHY UPON MULTILATERAL EUROPEAN FORCE IF OUR ALLIES PREFERRED BUT FORCE SHOULD OF COURSE BE INTIMATELY COORDINATED WITH ALL NATO DETERRENT FORCES SINCE WE COULD NOT CONCEIVE SEPARATE NUCLEAR

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ACTION WITHIN ALLIANCE. ANY SUCH FORCE WOULD BE EXPENSIVE AND WHILE US WOULD BEAR COST OF ITS OWN PARTICIPATION, MAJOR BURDENS WOULD BE BORNE BY OTHER STATES. MOREOVER SINCE MRBM FORCE COULD NOT BE SUBSTITUTE FOR ADDITIONAL NON-NUCLEAR FORCES NEEDED TO MEET NATO REQUIREMENTS, EXPENDITURES OF MRBM FORCE WOULD BE AN ADDITION TO ALLIANCE MILITARY BUDGET.

MORNING SESSION CONCLUDED WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S REMARKS DESCRIBING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALLIANCE POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGY, DEFENSE BUDGETS, AND MILITARY FORCE. BURDEN OF MCNAMARA'S FIFTY MINUTE PRESENTATION WAS THAT ALLIANCE MUST INCREASE ITS CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY AND ESTABLISH MORE EQUITABLE METHOD OF SHARING DEFENSE BURDEN. REMARKS NOT SUMMARIZED IN THIS MESSAGE BECAUSE THEY FOLLOWED IN SUBSTANCE THOSE PREPARED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON. FULL TEXT WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE ON RETURN.

FINLETTER

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33

Jan 10 6 06 PM '63

FROM: Secretary of State

DATE:

SUBJECT: Secretary Rusk's Remarks to NATO Ministerial Meeting.

REF:

Following for information of addressees is text of Secretary's remarks at NAC Ministerial Meeting, Paris, Dec 14, under agenda item "Military Questions".

"Mr. Chairman:

This meeting embarks on its discussion of military problems confronting the Alliance with the benefit of a most valuable briefing by our military colleagues' very useful documentation arising from the new Triennial Review procedure for 1962.

Clearly NATO cannot be content with the present position. Some progress has of course been made in strengthening our military posture over the last two years; but it must be recognized that our Communist opponents have certainly not been standing still. They have been pressing their own build-up -- modernizing and improving their forces in many ways.

We must determine whether we have or have not strengthened security relative to the threat directed against it. We must measure our accomplishments against the military requirements which arise from that threat, and not against our military strength as it was two or three or five years ago.

The Triennial Review has highlighted shortfalls of great magnitude. Depending on each other as we do for military strength, can any of our Governments feel secure if, for whatever reason, some of the Allies lag behind in providing their share of the Alliance military forces? And can we ignore the practical political problem of defending high military budgets in our Parliaments, while others do so much less?

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These questions assume increasing importance as we move into the year 1963. For 1963 could prove to be a critical year — a year of major decisions in issues affecting the Alliance across the board.

In the military field it seems to us that NATO, next year, must come to grips with what we would all agree is the fundamental military problem of the Alliance. In a sense, it is a two-fold problem: On the one hand, the time is ripe for a thoroughgoing re-examination of the strategic doctrines of the Alliance. On the other, consistent with the results of that re-examination, we must find ways and means of meeting the military requirements which will then have emerged.

Let me turn first to the question of NATO strategic policy.

In recent weeks our views in this matter have undergone at least one test of a sharp East-West confrontation. That experience has fortified our feeling that the Alliance needs to review its strategy. For NATO forces presently in being tend to propel us, in moments of emergency, toward the awesome choice between alternatives which we must make every effort to avoid, thermonuclear holocaust and surrender.

We believe that the Alliance must progress beyond what is, practically speaking, an automatic reliance upon the use of nuclear weapons from the outset and toward a capability for a wide range of responses to provide the military force needed to do the job that must be done, at a bearable and rational cost if enemy decisions make it possible.

This cannot mean lowering our guard in the nuclear field or our will to use nuclear weapons when required. It does mean improving our operational capabilities in the conventional field.

We must, therefore, sit down together and have a look at military doctrine in the light of current conditions. Until we decide what realistic contingencies we are likely to be facing and how the military operations they provoke may develop, our planning will be based on theoretical speculation. For this purpose we would suggest an exercise of investigation and analysis which could go forward during the current year and in which we should all participate unreservedly. Without a broad consensus on means and ends in the area of military strategy, NATO simply cannot attain its required military effectiveness.

In this respect I would lay particular stress on the planning cycle which the NATO military authorities are about to begin. The end results of the study in the Military Committee, starting with the

long-term

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long-term threat assessment, will be to work out new force requirements for the end of 1969. Here I think we have one of the basic resources for an examination of the NATO strategic concept.

Our efforts will be fruitless if we do not at the same time move to close the gap between NATO military requirements and national force programs. The Secretary-General's Summary Appraisal of the results of the 1962 Triennial Review makes it very clear that the present military strength of the Alliance gives cause for grave concern about the future. There is a wide margin between the lowest NATO estimates of what we need and what we have, in manpower, training, equipment, reserves and infrastructure projects. 1963 should be a year in which we make a determined effort to overcome the deficiency. Our immediate objective should be to attain the current force goals; our ultimate objective will emerge as we proceed with our review of the strategic problem.

We clearly need to give further thought to the development of techniques for comparing the present defense efforts and the capabilities of the various Allies. For the Allies as a group have an obligation to demonstrate to each other and to the world that every member is pulling its weight. Throughout our great Alliance our governments and our peoples must be satisfied that all nations, as they improve their economic status, devote a fair share of their growing resources to our collective defense against possible communist assault. Further, our common and individual effort will affect the signals we send to Moscow about our unity and determination. A central problem for a democracy, and an Alliance of democracies, is how to get dictatorships to understand in time that democracies will defend themselves and our vital interests -- how to avoid the crime of tempting thieves.

It is in this light that NATO should now proceed to elaborate standards and procedures for ensuring that enough is done to keep NATO strong and make it stronger, and that all of us assume our fair share in this enterprise. At the very least it seems clear to us that at a time when defense becomes increasingly expensive, governments can hardly permit the percentage of their gross national product devoted to defense to decline. Indeed, we think that as national production increases and living standards rise, we attain a margin which can be used progressively to decrease the presently existing disparities between the burden of defense expenditures in different countries of the Alliance.

I am not suggesting that we work out inflexible ratios here and now, or that we refuse to take into account the problems that each of us has in raising the level of our defense expenditures. What I am saying is that it is necessary fully and frankly to examine our

respective

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respective capabilities and to work out arrangements under which each of us will furnish what we can reasonably be expected to provide to reach the indicated goals. If our colleagues sometimes believe that we in the United States are too insistent and too lacking in understanding of the political problems facing other governments, I would only comment that we ourselves maintain a million men in uniform outside the U.S. who are taking casualties almost every week from communist arms, and maintain these forces by compulsory conscription of men who would prefer to do something else and support these forces by taxes upon <u>every</u> citizen who would like to spend their money for some other purpose. Quite frankly, we too have a political problem -- and an important part of it turns upon what others are doing.

NATO will have the full participation of the United States in seeking a solution for these problems. In this connection we shall continue to provide information on the nature and problems of nuclear defense, as a basis for strategic thinking with regard to both nuclear and non-nuclear forces. We are completing the preparations for a still more detailed presentation of nuclear data.

We recognize that there are political as well as military aspects to matters of nuclear strategy. In this frame of reference all of us have a central interest in maintaining the effectiveness and the reliability of NATO's strategic nuclear strength.

In my remarks yesterday, I referred to the need for consultation and advance planning in areas of concern to the Alliance. Such consultation could comprehend the exchange of information and planning for the strategic deterrent.

Our technical exposition of the concept of a multilateral sea-borne MRBM force should be viewed in this context. For we recognize that our Allies may wish to play a larger role in nuclear matters and that such a role is logically centered, to a considerable degree, on MRBMS.

We believe that a sea-borne MRBM force which is multilaterally manned, owned and controlled represents a useful way responsible and effectively to deploy MRBMS while maintaining allied cohesion. All interested NATO countries could participate in such a force, without causing critically difficult problems within the Western Alliance.

It would be a normal expectation that a multilateral force would be a NATO force with U.S. participation, as are other NATO forces. We would, however, look with sympathy upon a genuinely multilateral European force, if our Allies preferred that. The force should of course be intimately coordinated with all NATO deterrent forces since we can not conceive separate nuclear action within this Alliance. We

are prepared

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are prepared to consider seriously whatever arrangements concerning control of such a force our Allies may prefer.

The force would be expensive, as Secretary McNamara has pointed out. The U.S. would bear the costs of its own participation, but major burdens would clearly have to be borne by other states. Moreover, since an MRBM force could not be a substitute for the additional conventional forces needed to meet NATO requirements, expenditure on a MRBM force would seem to us to be necessarily an addition to the Alliance military burden.

At the conclusion of our discussion on military problems we will be expected to approve the 1962 resolution on Defense. The United States will be glad to approve this resolution, subject to the observations I have made. We would urge that wherever divergencies still exist between country plans and NATO military requirements, nations take steps to eliminate the shortfalls and close the gap. Further, our approval of the 1962 resolution adopting goals and plans would of course be subject to any revision of force programs which might result from a review of NATO strategic doctrine in the months ahead.

Secretary McNamara will present in more detail the United States positions on these matters. In making our comments here today, both of us do so in fulfillment of the desire of our government and people for a strong and united NATO which will carry us safely through the storms ahead, as it has protected us through the crises we have surmounted thus far."

RUSK

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 700, DECEMBER 15, 2 PM

396.1-PA

FROM USDEL

FOURTH SESSION, 30TH MINISTERIAL MEETING, DEC 14, PM
COMPLETION POLITICAL DISCUSSION, ITEM 1B.

1. SITUATION IN AFRICA. SPAAK (BELGIUM) SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH REVIEWING HISTORY CONGO DEVELOPMENTS OVER PAST YEAR. DESCRIBED PARTIAL SUCCESS THANT EFFORTS THROUGH CONCILIATION PLAN, COMMENTING NEITHER PARTY IN CONGO HAD DONE ALL IT COULD TO PROMOTE SUCCESS. POINTED TO DETERIORATION SITUATION PAST TWO WEEKS AND PRESENT DANGERS. SAID, HOWEVER, TSHOMBE LETTER YESTERDAY TO UN REP ELISABETHVILLE AGREEING TO UMHK MAKING PAYMENTS TO CENTRAL GOVT AND REQUESTING ISSUANCE AMNESTY SEEMED TO BE DECISIVE STEP. AT PRESENT MOMENT, HE CONCLUDED, PAST EFFORTS SEEM FOR FIRST TIME TO BE SHOWING RESULTS AND TO OFFER HOPE OF AVOIDING GRAVE DANGERS OF ALTERNATIVES TO CONCILIATION.

NOGUEIRA (PORTUGAL) EXPRESSED VIEW COMMUNIST PENETRATION AFRICA FAR DEEPER THAN GENERALLY BELIEVED IN WEST. SAID CONGO MOST TROUBLED COUNTRY IN AREA, PRAISED KATANGA AS STABLE AND POSSESSING GOOD GOVT. USE OF FORCE IN KATANGA WOULD HAVE MOST DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCE. THOUGHT CONGOLESE SHOULD BE LEFT ALONE TO SETTLE OWN PROBLEMS. REFERRING RECENT LETTER FROM THANT ASKING PORTUGUESE GOVT IN FAIRLY EMPHATIC TERMS FOR SUPPORT OF UN IN CONGO, SAID THIS "GOES BEYOND THE LIMIT". STATING THAT CONGO GOVT BACKING TERRORISTS IN ANGOLA, HE SAID PORTUGAL NOT BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT UN IN CONGO WHEN CONGOLESE GOVT IS SUPPORTING ELEMENTS HOSTILE TO PORTUGAL IN ANGOLA. CLOSED BY STATING UN NOW WORKING AGAINST LEGITIMATE WESTERN INTERESTS IN AFRICA AND IN FAVOR INTERESTS USSR, ADDING THAT SOVIET UNION TAKING

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FULL ADVANTAGE PRESENT SITUATION.

IN ONLY REBUTTAL, HOME (UK) SAID HE COULD NOT AGREE WITH NOGUEIRA'S SOMBER OUTLOOK FOR FUTURE OF AFRICA. RE CONGO, STRESSED UK CONSISTENT INTEREST IN PEACEFUL SOLUTION. EXPLAINING, HE STATED BELIEF HIS GOVT THAT FORCE WOULD NOT WORK AND SAID UN RESOLUTIONS AUTHORIZING FORCE IN CONGO TO EFFECT INTEGRATION RAISED DIFFICULT QUESTIONS OF PRECEDENT IN NYASA-LAND AND KENYA.

SECRETARY PAID TRIBUTE TO DILIGENCE AND COURAGE OF SPAAK IN WORKING TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN CONGO.

2. SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST. DISCUSSION UNDER THIS TOPIC LIMITED TO LENGTHY RECITAL BY ERKIN (TURKEY) OF DEVELOPMENTS PAST YEAR IN AREA. RE YEMEN RECOMMENDED AGAINST HASTY RECOGNITION REVOLUTIONARY GOVT ON GROUND COULD LEAD TO OTHER DANGEROUS SITUATIONS IN MIDDLE EAST. UNDERLINED RECENT DEVELOPMENT FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN SYRIA AND TURKEY AND / POINTED WITH PRIDE TO TURKISH ROLE AS CONCILIATOR IN RECENT INDO-PAKISTAN DIFFICULTIES.

3. SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA. PICCIONI (ITALY) SPOKE ON THIS TOPIC, STRESSING DEMONSTRATION OF SOLID OAS SUPPORT FOR US IN CUBA CRISIS. POINTING TO SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, PICCIONI SAID EUROPE COULD HELP IN MAKING ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS SUCCESS THROUGH GIVING IMPETUS TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION BY EXAMPLE OF EEC AND THROUGH AIDING DEVELOPMENT POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. WE MUST LET LATIN AMERICA KNOW, HE SAID, THAT WESTERN EUROPE IS SYMPATHETIC WITH THEIR PROBLEMS AND WANTS TO HELP. THOUGHT SPIRITUAL AFFINITY LATIN AMERICA WITH WEST AS DEMONSTRATED IN RECENT WEEKS WEIGHED HEAVILY WITH MOSCOW IN RECENT DECISIONS.

SECRETARY THANKED PICCIONI FOR HIS STATEMENT REFERRING TO CLOSE TIES BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA AND STATING

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-3-, POLTO 700, DECEMBER 15, 2 P M, FROM PARIS

WISHED BE SURE NATO FRIENDS UNDERSTAND WE SUPPORT STRENGTHENING OF THOSE TIES.

4. SITUATION IN FAR EAST. NO COMMENTS WERE MADE.

SUMMARIZING POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS, COLONNA SAID HE WAS STRUCK BY LARGE AREA OF AGREEMENT THESE TOPICS. HE FOUND SOLID SUPPORT FOR US HANDLING OF CUBAN CRISIS AND FULL CONFIDENCE THAT US WOULD CONTINUE PURSUE POLICIES WITH COURAGE, FORESIGHT AND MODERATION.

HE TERMED THIS A "MEETING OF RELATIVE OPTIMISM, RARE IN RECENT YEARS."

FINLETTER

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FROM USDEL

FOURTH SESSION 30TH NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, DEC 14 PM. CONTINUATION DISCUSSION AGENDA ITEM II "MILITARY QUESTIONS."

1. THRONEYCROFT UK AGREED WITH MCNAMARA ALLIANCE SHOULD TAKE FRESH LOOK AT DEFENSE SITUATION. GAVE SPECIAL THANKS TO ROLE OF US IN DEVELOPMENT NATO. POINTED OUT THAT NATO'S ONLY PART OF MUCH WIDER EFFORT IN RESISTANCE COMMUNISM. WITH BATTLE NOT CONFINED TO MILITARY OPERATIONS. FROM THIS HE DREW TWO CONCLUSIONS: (1) THERE IS TANGIBLE LIMIT TO RESOURCES WHICH WEST CAN OR SHOULD DEVOTE TO DEFENSE. BEYOND CERTAIN LEVEL TOO HEAVY DEFENSE EXPENDITURES BECOME COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, JEOPARDIZING SOUND ECONOMIC BASE AND GREAT TASK OF HELPING UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. WOULD BE FOOLISH FOR EUROPE TO SPEND 15 PERCENT OF GNP FOR DEFENSE AS USSR SAID TO BE DOING. UK HOPES TO MAINTAIN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AROUND 7 PERCENT OF GNP, BUT WILL NOT GO SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THIS FIGURE; (2) EUROPE IS NOT ONLY AREA SUBJECT TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND CERTAIN NATIONS MUST MAINTAIN CAPACITY TO RESIST COMMUNIST ATTACK OR INFILTRATION IN OTHER AREA OF FLANKS AND REAR ARE TO BE GUARDED. UK FORCES AS EXAMPLE NOW FIGHTING IN NORTH BORNEO. WEST MUST HAVE CAPACITY TO ACT SWIFTLY IN THESE AREAS AND PROPER APPORTIONMENT RESOURCES BETWEEN THESE TASKS AND NATO DEFENSE IN EUROPE MUST BE MADE. WHAT IS TRUE OF MONEY IS ALSO TRUE OF MANPOWER. THERE IS LIMIT BEYOND WHICH EFFORT BECOMES COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

TURNING TO QUESTION OF NUCLEAR VERSUS CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES, THORNEYCROFT POINTED OUT THAT MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE

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HAVE DEMANDED EXPANSION CONVENTIONAL FORCES, EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR FORCES, AND SOMETIMES BOTH, BUT ALL DEMANDS BASED ON STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1957. NATO MUST FACE FACTS THAT PLANS ARE BASED ON FORCES WHICH COUNTRIES ARE NOT GOING TO RAISE; WE TEND TO MAKE POLICIES DIVORCED FROM CONSIDERATION OF RESOURCES. WITHOUT WISHING TO ARGUE PRECISE BALANCE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES, PROPER BALANCE MUST BE ACHIEVED. IT IS PREMATURE TO DECIDE FINAL ALLOCATION AMONGST COUNTRIES AND RESOURCES. FIRST STEP IS TO PRESS FORWARD WITH STANDING GROUP STUDY IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY THREAT AND PRECISE FORCES NEEDED TO COUNTER-THREAT. MC-26/4 STUDY IS NOT FINAL ANSWER. REALISTIC DEFENSE CAN ONLY BE BASED ON FORCES THAT WILL BE AVAILABLE, NOT ON THOSE WE WISH AVAILABLE. THIS IS UNFAIR TO MILITARY COMMANDERS. WE NEED CONFRONTATION BETWEEN MILITARY COMMANDER AND DEFENSE MINS TO RECONCILE STRATEGY AND FORCES. EITHER NATO MUST BE CONTENT WITH LAP, OR RECONCILE STRATEGY WITH RESOURCES AVAILABLE.

2. ANDRIOTTI, ITALIAN DEFENSE MINISTER, OPENED HIS REMARKS BY POINTING OUT ITALY FAVORED MULTI-LATERAL MRBM FORCE CONCEPT. THEN REVIEWED ITALIAN DEFENSE EFFORT POINTING OUT CONVENTIONAL BUILDUP FOLLOWING 1961 BERLIN CRISIS PROCEEDING WELL, BUT ITALY HAD PROBLEMS IN RECRUITING SPECIALISTS AND LONG TERM ENLISTMENTS. NAVY AND AIR FORCE FACED PROBLEMS OF MODERNIZATION WHICH NOT CASE OF AIR FORCE BEING MET PARTLY BY PROGRAM FOR ACQUISITION 125 F-104G AIRCRAFT. GAP BETWEEN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES WHICH WOULD AMOUNT 6,300 BILLION LIRE IN 1963-64 WAS CONSTANT SOURCE ANXIETY BUT ITALY WORKING ON TECHNICAL FINANCIAL PLAN TO ALLEVIATE IT. CONCERNING USE OF GNP AS YARDSTICK FOR MEASURING DEFENSE EFFORT, ANDRIOTTI STRESSED LOW PER CAPITA GNP OF ITALY ($624) AND IN LINE THIS 4 PERCENT OF GNP DEVOTED TO DEFENSE WAS REASONABLE. HE AGREED WITH PRECEEDING SPEAKERS NEED TO BRING NATO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND NATIONAL PLANS INTO BETTER BALANCE, AND SUPPORTED NAC EXERCISE TO DETERMINE EQUITABLE SHARING OF DEFENSE SOURCES.

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-3- POLTO 699, DECEMBER 15, 2 A.M. (SECTION 1 OF 11) FROM: PARIS.

3. NETHERLAND REP ACCEPTED COUNTRY CHAPTER ANALYSIS OF NETHERLANDS DEFENSE EFFORT AS GENERALLY FAIR, BUT SUGGESTED CERTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS WENT TOO FAR. DETAILED DIFFICULTIES, PECULIAR TO NETHERLANDS, IN WAY OF INCREASING DEFENSE EFFORT, ALTHOUGH APPRECIATING THORNEYCROFT'S COMMENTS ON LIMITS HE WARNED THAT FAILURE TO REACH ESTABLISHED GOALS WILL HAVE ENORMOUS MILITARY AND MORAL CONSEQUENCES. HE AGREED WITH MCNAMARA STATEMENT THAT THERE MUST BE GREATER EFFORT TO INCREASE FORCE WEVTS#BY AWLUANE#AS WHOLE. TO IMPROVE SITUATION THERE MUST BE EITHER GENERAL INCREASE IN COUNTRIES' EFFORTS OR GREATER COLLECTIVE EFFORT MUST BE ACHIEVED THROUGH SAVINGS RESULTING FROM MILITARY INTEGRATION. IN DETERMINING COMPARATIVE LEVELS OF EFFORT HE DECRIED GNP PERCENTAGE FORMULA AS HAVING LIMITED VALUE. NO SIMPLE FORMULA FOR COMPARISON AVAILABLE BUT MUST BE NOTED THAT CERTAIN COUNTRIES HAVING MAJOR RND PROGRAMS IN NUCLEAR, MISSILE AND SPACE CRAFTS WEAPONS HAVE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL ADVANTAGES ACCRUING TO THEIR ECONOMIES. ON MILITARY INTEGRATION HE SUGGESTED SLOW PROGRESS IF NOT IN FACT A BACKWARD DRIFT. POINTING TO IMPASSE ON NADGE AND POSSIBLE WASTE INVOLVED IN DEVELOPMENT OF VSTOL HE PLEAD FOR INTEGRATION IN WHICH SMALLER NATIONS COULD FULLY PARTICIPATE. IT WAS IN THIS AREA NETHERLANDS BELIEVED THAT COLLECTIVE EFFORT COULD BEST BE ENHANCED.

4. GERMAN REP VON MERKATZ EULOGIZED GENERAL NORSTAD, WELCOMED GENERAL LEMNITZER AND POINTED UP IMPORTANCE OF BOTH COMMANDERS AND SECY MCNAMARA'S PRESENTATIONS. HE ENDORSED ALL PROPOSALS FOR CLARIFYING STRATEGY BUT QUESTIONED WHETHER FORWARD STRATEGY, WITH WHICH FEDREP VERY MUCH CONCERNED, COULD BE AFFECTED WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ALONE. HE DREW ATTENTION TO GENERAL NORSTAD'S ASSERTION THAT POST 1964 PLANS CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT MRBMS. MC-39/14 EMPHASIZES URGENT NEED SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, SUGGESTING IF PROBLEM NOT SOLVED IN PRESENT TERMS ALTERNATIVE MUST BE FOUND. IN CLOSING, STRESSED AGAIN NECESSITY FORWARD STRATEGY.

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Control: 8566
Rec'd: DECEMBER 16, 1962
1:31 A.M.

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 699, DECEMBER 15, 2 A.M. (SECTION II OF II)

FROM USDEL

5. SARPER, TURKISH REP SPOKE VERY BRIEFLY ASSERTING TURKEY'S INTENTION SPARE NO EFFORT MAINTAIN NECESSARY DEFENSE EFFORT, HOWEVER EMPHASIZED THAT TURKEY LACKS INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY PRODUCE MODERN ARMAMENT AND THEREFORE ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON OUTSIDE HELP TO MODERNIZE EQUIPMENT AND PROVIDE SPARE PARTS. UP TO NOW US HAS BORNE ALMOST ENTIRE BURDEN SUCH SUPPORT. TURKEY BELIEVED FUTURE CONTINUATION THIS SUPPORT NOT EXORBITANT PRICE IN VIEW NATURE THREAT AND TURKEY'S POSTURE FACING SUCH THREAT.

6. CANADIAN REP AGREED WITH PREVIOUS MINS WHO HAD STRESSED NEED FOR INCREASED STRENGTH AND FLEXIBILITY OF FORCES. AGREED COUNCIL SHOULD WORK OUT FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM TO SUPPORT STRATEGY BUT INDICATED CANADA HAD YET NO FIRM POSITION ON MRBM QUESTION. REFERRING TO THORNEYCROFT COMMENTS ON LIMITS TO DEFENSE EFFORTS, POINTED OUT SPECIAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM CANADA NOW HAS WHICH IN PART AGGRAVATED BY NEED FOR SMALL COUNTRIES WITH NARROW INDUSTRIAL BASE TO PURCHASE INCREASING COMPLICATED WEAPONS FROM ABROAD. SUGGESTED THAT THERE MUST BE OFFSETTING ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY LARGE COUNTRIES CAN BUY FROM NATIONS LIKE CANADA. IN DRAWING ATTENTION TO CUT IN CANADA'S DEFENSE BUDGET ASSERTED THAT THIS IN NO WAY HAD AFFECTED CANADA'S FORCE COMMITMENTS TO NATO. GNP PERCENTAGE NOT AS IMPORTANT AS THESE PHYSICAL COMMITMENTS AND ON THIS SCORE CANADA'S RECORD IS GOOD. NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SEEM SATISFIED AND NATO CAN BE ASSURED CANADA WILL CONTINUE TO DO ITS PART.

17.

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-2- POLTO 699, DECEMBER 5, 2 A.M. (SECTION II OF II) FROM: PARIS

7. BELGIAN DEFENSE MIN RECOGNIZED CONSIDERABLE GAP BETWEEN NATO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND COUNTRIES PROGRAMS. SUGGESTED THAT MODEST INCREASE IN EFFORT DURING 1962 MUST BECOME STILL LARGER IN 1963. POINTED OUT THAT BELGIUM DEFENSE BUDGET WAS AT ONE TIME HALF BORNE BY US AID. ALTHOUGH BELGIUM GAVE FIRST PRIORITY TO MEETING CONVENTIONAL FORCES IT VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN MULTILATERAL MRBM FORCES. DID NOT BELIEVE BELGIUM COULD AFFECT BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THUS MUST BE CLEAR RESOLUTION THIS ISSUE. ALL COUNTRIES SHOULD MAKE MAXIMUM EFFORT TO MAINTAIN FORCES ASSIGNED TO NATO. INTEGRATION OF FORCES MUST BE PURSUED AND IN THIS CONNECTION BELGIUM'S GRATEFUL TO NORSTAD FOR MOBILE FORCES CONCEPT AND HOPED LEMNITZER WOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP IT. SAID BELGIUM HEARTILY APPROVED THORNEYCROFT STATEMENT AND HOPED DEFENSE MINS COULD HAVE FRANK MEETINGS NEXT YEAR AT WHICH ALL THE TRUTHS OF NATO DEFENSE PICTURE, INCLUDING THOSE UNSPOKEN THUS FAR, COULD BE FRANKLY AIRED.

8. SECRETARY GENERAL COLONNA SUMMARIZED THE DISCUSSIONS VERY BRIEFLY BY INDICATING THAT THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES AS WELL AS THE DEFENSE MINS HAD GONE FAR BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE TRIENNIAL REVIEW, EVEN BEYOND MC-26.15 IN THEIR CONSIDERATIONS TODAY. HE THEN PROPOSED AND COUNCIL AGREED TO ADOPT RESOLUTION ON DEFENSE 1962 AS DRAFTED INCLUDING RESERVATION BY GREEK GOVT. IN SO DOING HE POINTED OUT THAT NAC SHOULD BE GUIDED BY MINS' STATEMENTS ON TRIENNIAL REVIEW MADE TODAY IN CARRYING OUT INJUNCTION IN PARA 8 OF RES.

(GREEKS INDICATED THAT AS SOON AS AID PROBLEM SETTLED THEY WOULD NOTIFY SHAPE OF FIRM FORCE GOALS FOR 1963.)

9. COUNCIL NOTED NATO MILITARY ACTIVITIES REPORT NO. 15 WITHOUT COMMENT AND COLONNA INVITED COUNTRIES TO NOTE PARTICULARLY WEAKNESSES SET FORTH IN PARA 7, SECTION 1, OF REPORT.

10. COUNCIL NOTED SECY GENERAL'S STATUS REPORT ON NATO DEFENSE POLICY, CM(62)149, WITHOUT COMMENT.

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12:26 A.M.

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FROM: PARIS

Info SS SR G SF L H NEA OIC AID P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR OEP RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 703, DECEMBER 15, 4 P.M.

FROM USDEL

FIFTH SESSION 30TH NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, DECEMBER 15 AM

1. COUNCIL AGREED HOLD SPRING OTTAWA MEETING 21, 22 AND 23 MAY, NOTING THAT MINISTER LANGE OF NORWAY WOULD BE ABSENT.

2. CHAIRMAN COLONNA THEN READ GREETINGS FROM SECRETARY GENERAL STIKKER.

3. IN CONSIDERING ITEM II OF AGENDA, COUNCIL HEARD COLERIDGE ON IS REVIEW DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING IN NATO. COUNCIL NOTED 1962 CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING YEARLY REVIEW - CONCISE REPORT (C-M(62)117) WITHOUT COMMENT.

4. GREEK DEFENSE PROBLEM, ITEM II C.

CHAIRMAN COLONNA REVIEWED HISTORY OF NATO ACTIVITIES RE AIDING GREECE TO MEET ITS REDUCED DEFENSE GOALS AND REPORTED SPECIAL WORKING GROUP HAD WITHIN LAST FEW DAYS ARRANGED SOLUTIONS INVOLVING ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL EFFORT FROM GREEKS ($13.6M. IN 1963 AND $21 M. IN 1964 SUPPLEMENTED BY AID FROM OTHER NATO COUNTRIES ($39.3 M. IN 1963 AND $38.2 M. IN 1964). REPORTED THAT 23.5 M. PLEDGED FROM OTHER COUNTRIES SO FAR AND THAT GREEKS HAVE STATED THEY WILL INCREASE THEIR BUDGET BY $6M. (ABOVE $155 M.) IF ECONOMIC SITUATION WARRANTS. COLONNA INDICATED FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE PURSUED BILATERALLY, (IT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY AGREED THAT $5 M. TO BE CONTRIBUTED BY FRANCE WAS ON A PROJECT BASIS THEREFORE THIS BEING HANDLED BILATERALLY) AND NOTED BOTH HIS AND STIKKER'S HIGH REGARD FOR THIS NEW EXPRESSION OF COMMON NATO EFFORT.

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-2- POLTO 703, DECEMBER 15, 4 P.M. FROM: PARIS

SCHROEDER SUPPORTED WORK OF CONSORTIUM, PLEDGING $8 M. AID FROM GERMANY FOR 1963. EXPRESSED HOPE OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD DO ENOUGH TO MEET COMMON OBJECTIVE, WHICH HAD BOTH POLITICAL AND DEFENSE SIGNIFICANCE.

UK INDICATED IT WOULD DEFINITELY MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS, ALTHOUGH SMALL.

TURKEY STATED AID PROJECT VITAL AND NECESSARY STEPS.

GREEK REPRESENTATIVE THANKED OTHER NATO MEMBERS FOR ASSISTANCE, PRAISING HIGH POLITICAL AND MORAL VALUE THIS COLLECTIVE AID EFFORT. WENT ON TO DESCRIBE DIFFICULTY COUNTRY LIKE GREECE HAS TRYING TO CARRY ON BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, AND HOW COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES THIS RESPECT EXPLOITED BY COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA IN GREECE. FINALLY, AFTER ARGUING THAT GNP PERCENTAGE FORMULA NOW REALLY INDICATIVE OF POOR COUNTRY'S EFFORT, HE ENDED ON NOTE OF THANKS TO ALLIANCE.

COUNCIL APPROVED RESOLUTION ON GREEK ASSISTANCE (C-M(62)154) AFTER ADDING WORDS "IN 1963") TO SUBPARA (11)OF PARA (2).

5. COUNCIL APPROVED FINAL COMMUNIQUE WITH MINOR LANGUAGE REVISIONS, WHICH BEING SENT SEPARATELY. LORD HOME EXPRESSED SENTIMENTS OF COUNCIL IN COMPLIMENTING CHAIRMAN COLONNA ON HIS EXCELLENT HANDLING OF THE MEETING.

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Annex Report

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Bruce Report

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NATO 164/1

February 9, 1963

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INTRODUCTION

I would like today to discuss four subjects:

First: Our objectives in Europe.

Second: The obstacles which recent events have interposed to the attainment of these objectives.

Third: The basic US strategy required to overcome these obstacles.

Fourth: Some specific tactical steps which should now be taken to carry forward this strategy.

I. Our Objectives

I turn first to the matter of our objectives in Europe.

The most fundamental of them has always been to deny Europe to Communist control.

It was that objective, more than any other, which moved us to launch the Marshall Plan and NATO.

As these economic and military programs achieved their purposes, we conceived a second objective: to mobilize our resources in combination with Europe to serve the whole free world.

It soon became apparent, however, that this second objective could not be fulfilled without greater progress toward European unity. Only a united [redacted] to generate the confidence, the sense of responsibi[redacted] resources required to project its power outside of Eu[redacted]

European unity [redacted] from the early days of the Marshall Plan and NATO, the most effective framework within which to contain and provide a creative outlet for a West Germany which might be tempted to seek reunification with East Germany through bilateral arrangements with Moscow, or otherwise prove a disruptive element in the world power balance.

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We recognised that an integrated Europe would pose dangers, if it struck off on its own, seeking to play a role independent of the US. To minimise the chances of such a split, and to ensure that the resources of a uniting Europe were used to best effect, we sought to strengthen the instruments of partnership between Europe and the US, e.g., NATO and OECD, at the same time as we promoted and encouraged the process of European integration.

The first task of my review, as I conceived it, was to estimate whether these goals of European unity and Atlantic partnership are still valid.

As to European integration: Are the reasons still sound which persuaded us that attainment of this goal was in the US interest? And is that attainment still feasible?

The US needs European resources to promote the defense, security, and trade of the free world. And it remains true that only a united Europe is likely to generate adequate resources. Individual European countries see their national contributions, at best, as being [redacted] to be worth while; a resulting sense of futility discourages them [redacted] additional effort.

The goal of European unity thus remains in our interest. But is it feasible?

My own belief is that the process of European integration is an imperative of modern history.

We have seen the process gather strength steadily over the last fifteen years -- gather strength not only in terms of institutions and programs but, more importantly, of European attitudes.

I believe that the process will continue to gather strength, because it is solidly grounded in both European needs and European thinking.

Europe needs unity to enhance its security, its well-being, and its sense of purpose on the world scene. These needs are recognised in the thinking of the broad mass of European peoples, for whom national symbols have lost much of their appeal, in the wake of two disastrous world wars.

A US policy which backed away from the goal of European integration because of fear that it was not feasible would be based on a misreading of the main trends at work in Europe today.

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As to our second goal: that of US-European partnership: Is it still feasible and in our interest to seek a close US connection with Europe?

It is certainly in our interest.

We cannot accept the prospect of the US and Europe going their separate ways. Such a split would endanger both of our overriding postwar objectives: that of denying Europe to the Soviets, and that of mobilizing European resources for common tasks.

Moreover, no matter how deep our withdrawal, our national interest would continue to be profoundly affected by what happened in Western Europe. A fragmented or adventurist Western Europe might make all manner of trouble for us, quite aside from the danger of Communist takeover. In a nuclear age, especially, we must have a voice and play a stabilizing role in European affairs.

As to feasibility: There is, of course, considerable anti-Americanism in Europe. I shall speak shortly of its bases, and what it suggests as to our own actions. But we should recognize that this feeling is outweighed and overshadowed by a deeper European feeling of [redacted] values and interests with the US. A close US-European tie is not made inevitable by this deeper feeling, but it is at least brought within our reach.

To say that it is still practical and desirable to pursue both of our operational goals -- European unity and US-European partnership -- is not to say that we should stand, without change, on the course we were following before recent events.

For it is clear that these events have created new obstacles to our pursuit of these goals. Shifts of emphasis and tactics are required to deal with such obstacles.

II. Obstacles

De Gaulle has created three obstacles to the attainment of our objectives: he has excluded Britain from the Common Market; thrown a block across the Common Market as a route to European political unity; and placed before Europe an image of intra-European and Atlantic relationships contrary to our interest and conceptions.

Playing upon the European desire for a larger voice in world affairs, he has, in fact, proposed that Europe be built around a Paris-Bonn axis

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which he expects to dominate, to which Italy and the other continental powers might attach themselves as satellites, and from which U. S. power and influence would be progressively withdrawn. As that withdrawal proceeds, he undoubtedly looks to an accretion of resources from Europe in support of a French Continental System, including the Force de Frappe.

In prosecuting this effort, de Gaulle has both liabilities and assets.

His liabilities include the fact that European desires for early U. S. military and political withdrawal from Europe are weak, if non-existent; and that Europe -- including West Germany -- does not show a willingness to accept de Gaulle's hegemony.

His assets include the fact that there are strong European desires for a larger European voice in nuclear affairs, in broader military strategy, in East-West negotiations, and in political policy in regions outside the NATO area. The present predominant US role in all these fields is increasingly resented; a professed US intent to share this role with Europe, if it unites, is thought to be belied by our current actions. There is a growing fear that we may want to control a strong and united Europe by smothering it in the Atlantic Community. This resentment of our role, and distrust of our ultimate intentions, breeds anti-Americanism which de Gaulle can exploit.

It also, paradoxically enough, breeds a sense of dependence on the US which makes it more difficult to move Europe to expanded effort; and the absence of this European effort, in turn, creates a necessity for unilateral US action, which intensifies European resentment.

Thus the greatest need in framing a policy which would successfully outflank de Gaulle, and move us toward our goals, is twofold:

First -- To be more clear than we have to date our willingness to [illegible] Europe as an equal partner, provided it is prepared to [illegible] the burdens involved.

Second -- To break the deplorable interaction between present European dependence and US predominance, a consequence of which is enhanced European frustration, anti-Americanism, and unwillingness to assume enlarged responsibility in money, men, and political commitment.

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III. Proposed Strategy

A strategy to this end requires that in the areas of initiative open to us -- mainly in fields where the US and European countries must act together -- we move forward in a demonstration that the vicious circle can be broken and a true partnership can be built. The two critical areas (aside from trade negotiations) are:

First: the multilateral mixed manned Force, which holds real promise as a response to European aspirations for a greater nuclear role.

Second: Political consultation, as it derives directly from the multilateral force, and in other respects.

It is essential that, while moving forward with these Atlantic actions, we also dramatize more successfully our willingness -- indeed, our desire -- to see a united Europe eventually act as an equal partner with the U. S.

To make this willingness credible, we should do two things:

First: We should support, in every way we can, the movement toward European unity. Basically, of course, progress toward unity must depend on the Europeans themselves. Still our own influence is considerable; we have put that influence to good use in support of European integration over the past ten years, and we should continue to do so. This has implications for our posture toward the UK and toward any sound new initiatives which supporters of European integration may propose, e.g., a European Parliament.

Second: We should leave open -- in the fields of nuclear policy and political consultation -- the possibility of arrangements in which an effectively unified Europe would play a larger role than will be possible so long as these arrangements must run between the US and [illegible] European nations.

In nuclear policy, this means making more explicit our eventual willingness to consider allowing a united Europe to buy out the US share in the multilateral mixed manned force. This underlines the importance of setting up the force in a way that it is so integrated, through mixed manning and other means, as to preclude national withdrawal or any national use of elements of the force.

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In political consultation, this means making clear our willingness eventually to replace a five or six member NATO Executive Committee with a two member committee -- the US and Europe.

The broad strategy outlined above is designed to frustrate de Gaulle's efforts to convince the Europeans that immediate Atlantic cooperation and progress towards European unity are mutually antithetical. This is the heart of his case to Europe.

It is also designed to break the interaction, already mentioned, between European weakness and US predominance which is frustrating movement toward both European unity and Atlantic partnership.

And it is designed to maintain allied cohesion for constructive purposes in the period immediately ahead, while holding out to de Gaulle the opportunity to rejoin the Western coalition on terms which would meet those of his aspirations that are most widely shared, thus permitting renewed progress toward European unity -- which cannot, in the long run, be achieved without France.

Two of these de Gaulle concerns, evident since 1958, are worth particular note: his desire to end the US nuclear monopoly, and his desire for a larger European voice in a process of political consultation extending beyond the NATO area. If, through the multilateral force and various devices of political consultation, we can demonstrate to de Gaulle that we are drawing Europe, and especially Germany, into these two areas of activity on an Atlantic basis, he will be faced with the following choices:

1. To attempt by veto and other means to disrupt these Atlantic ventures;

2. To maintain his isolation passively, while these ventures move forward; or

3. To find a dignified way to come to terms.

If he seeks to disrupt NATO, at the present stage of European dependence on U. S. military strength, he will almost certainly run into much more severe reactions in Europe, and even in France, than he faced as a result of his recent actions. We should be prepared to face such tactics with confidence.

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If he remains in passive isolation, his bargaining position will become progressively weaker, to the extent that Atlantic arrangements gather momentum and prove successful. This success will depend, as indicated above, on a clear US indication that the end goal is to create a sounder basis for a partnership of equals between the US and a uniting Europe, not to blanket Europe indefinitely in wider Atlantic arrangements.

Despite de Gaulle's stubbornness and loyalty to his own vision of affairs, it is not altogether to be ruled out that, if the multilateral force succeeds in drawing Germany wholeheartedly into the nuclear business, and if the various processes of political consultation gain substance, he will decide that he should pursue his objectives within the club rather than outside.

But this will only happen if we now move vigorously to carry out the strategy outlined above, without being diverted from this course by:

-- an attempt to mount punitive or harassing action against de Gaulle, or

-- an excessive anxiety to come to terms with him before this strategy has created conditions more conducive to reasonable negotiations than those now existing.

If this is the strategy to be followed, it is essential that all our actions -- in Washington and Europe, in both the political and economic fields, in both the State and Defense Departments, and at every level of both Departments -- be geared to this strategy. We must act with consistency of purpose, and minimise disturbing pronouncements and initiatives capable of misinterpretation. We must ensure that proposed military moves are carefully reviewed from a political standpoint before being taken. We cannot make progress toward complex objectives in the face of major obstacles created or compounded by de Gaulle without an effort which is as persistent and consistent, over a sustained period of time, as his own.

IV ACTIONS

In execution of this strategy we need to mount certain specific actions. In discussing them, I will follow the general division indicated

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in the President's instruction to me:

1. Multilateral Force:

(a) We should set a target date for completion of Ambassador Merchant's negotiations with the multilateral force's initial prospective members -- Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the UK. These negotiations should seek a Preliminary Executive Agreement, which would permit training and other low-cost activities to begin. This date should be before the Italian elections in later April.

(b) Even before we clarify our policy toward intensified political consultation with Europe, we should begin regularly to demonstrate that we shall seek before the event understanding, and, if possible, consensus with Europe on proposed US actions, where vital European interests are involved.

2. Foreign Economic Policy:

(a) We should speed up the Trade Expansion Act negotiations, both by exploring ways to reduce time-consuming preparations on our side and by beginning talks soon with the UK and the Common Market on how the negotiations will be conducted.

(b) We should not now establish a definitive U.S. position on UK "association" proposals. My present view is that the kind of "association" likely to be acceptable to France in existing circumstances would not be to the advantage of the U.S. or UK. If a serious proposal, appearing to meet genuine British economic and political needs were offered, we should consider it in the light of whether our own broad interests could be fully protected.

(c) We should re-examine recent US restrictive actions. We must seek to resist or accommodate the demands of domestic pressure groups in ways which do not throw excessive burdens on our European policy at this critical juncture.

3. Negotiations with the Soviets:

We should, in whatever manner seems appropriate, manifest U.S. determination to protect the freedom of West Berlin -- if necessary, by unilateral action. At the same time, we must scrupulously preserve,

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through consultation, the closest understanding with our interested allies.

The wisdom, at this time, of our putting forward any new proposals in regard to Berlin seems to me highly questionable -- in the absence of clear evidence of Soviet concessions on the basic issues.

4. Germany:

(a) The President should send a letter to the Chancellor centering on this theme: the continuity of our joint commitment to a close U.S. relationship with a uniting Europe. The letter would emphasize these specific points:

(i) U.S. determination to maintain forces in Germany as long as the threat remains.

(ii) Strong endorsement of the Merchant mission; the importance of an early Preliminary Agreement; and U.S. willingness to remain a full participant in the multilateral force so long as this is desired by the other participants.

(iii) Reiteration of U.S. support for continuance of efforts to bring the UK fully into Europe.

(b) We should not make an attempt to prevent ratification of the Franco-German treaty. We should, on the other hand, make absolutely clear to Adenauer, his government, and Parliament that the stability of U.S.-German relations requires unambiguous German commitment, in words and deeds to: 1. NATO; 2. the multilateral force -- rather than to national or Franco-German nuclear programs; and 3. British accession to the Common Market.

[redacted] port should be extended for a Bundestag Resolution to t[redacted] to accompany passage of the Treaty.

5. United Kingdom

(a) We should quickly reach agreement with the British on the necessity for close, unobtrusive consultation between us as they chart their course, so that we will not be faced with fait accompli.

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(b) We should encourage the British to consider what unilateral adjustments they might make to bring their economy into conformity with developments in the EEC, so that if later an opportunity is presented for them to enter the Common Market, many of the former impediments will have been removed.

(c) While assuring the British of our support, we should do nothing publicly to reinforce the appearance of special ties.

(d) We should encourage the UK to exploit whatever opportunities may exist for closer ties with the continent, and leadership in the process of European integration. More specifically, we should encourage the UK to play a substantial and active part in the multilateral mixed manned force. Such questions as the political activation of the WEU should be left for the European countries to resolve.

(e) We should suggest that the British Government, by whatever means appear effective, do whatever it can to mitigate excessive British hostility to the Germans. In short, the British should stop being beastly to the Germans.

6. France.

I recommend no immediate positive actions in regard to France. It is important that our posture be one of impeccable politeness without indulgence in recrimination or threats, while making clear the basic contrast between our goals and those of de Gaulle. No effort either to isolate France or to seek a U.S.-French accommodation should now be made; moves toward such an accommodation would almost certainly fail at this stage, and would only demoralize the other European countries. Our tactic with France must be to provide a counter-attraction aimed at France, but at the legitimate ambitions of others. The opportunity for France to join in these efforts must always remain open. In the meantime, we should have well-informed contingency plans against a de Gaulle assault on NATO, our trade negotiations, or our balance of payments.

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FROM: OTTAWA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 8, MAY 23, 1 AM (SECTION 1 OF 11)

Action Department Secto 8 all NATO Capitals Unnumbered

1. THIRTY-FIRST NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING OPENED THIS MORNING WITH CEREMONIAL SESSION IN HOUSE OF COMMONS CHAMBER FOLLOWED BY BUSINESS SESSION ON DEFENSE POLICY IN MAIN CONFERENCE ROOM. LATTER REVEALED LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON MAJOR MILITARY MATTERS COVERED IN SECGEN SPECIAL DEFENSE REPORT (CM(63)30)--NAMELY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR IANF, PROGRESS REPORT ON MLF AND APPROVAL FOR STUDY OF DEFENSE POLICY PROBLEMS IN NAC AND INTERNATIONAL STAFF.

2. CEREMONIAL SESSION DEVOTED LARGELY TO AMENITIES. IN OPENING STATEMENT PRIME MINISTER PEARSON STRESSED NOTE OF INTERDEPENDENCE. STATED NATO MUST COVER BROADER FIELD THAN DEFENSE IF IT IS TO SURVIVE, AND MUST THEREFORE CONCERN ITSELF WITH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MATTERS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE NATO AREA. RECOGNIZING PROGRESS MADE BY NATO IN DETERRING AGGRESSION, HE MAINTAINED NATO NATIONS MUST MORE URGENTLY SEEK SETTLEMENT OF EAST-WEST PROBLEMS, IF ONLY FOR ULTIMATE SURVIVAL. MEANWHILE, EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE REQUIRES INTEGRATED MILITARY POWER. HENCE ATLANTIC NATIONS MUST JOIN IN A SINGLE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY; EUROPE SHOULD HAVE EQUAL STATUS WITH NORTH AMERICA IN ALLIANCE BUT NOT HAVE A SEPARATE ROLE. THIS OBJECTIVE REQUIRES REDEFINITION OF ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS, INCLUDING RE-CASTING OF NATO DEFENSE POLICY IN WHICH PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL POWER STUDIED TOGETHER. SIMILAR STUDY REQUIRED ON POLITICAL CONSULTATION AND DECISION-MAKING IN ALLIANCE, AND FOR HARMONIZATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES.

3. SPEAKING AS PRESIDENT OF MINISTERIAL COUNCIL LORD HOME HAILED NATO SUCCESS IN AFFORDING SECURITY FOR MEMBER STATES AND APPEALED

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APPEALED FOR UNITY, GIVE AND TAKE AND COOPERATION. HELD NATO STRENGTH HAD CAUSED SOVIETS TO SHIFT TO DOCTRINE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. NEVERTHELESS NATO MUST MAINTAIN STRENGTH, AS CUBAN CRISIS AND PRESENT COMMUNIST CHINESE VIEWS PROVED. NATO'S ROLE SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED MERELY TO MAKING WAR UNPROFITABLE BUT ALSO EXTENDED TO CONVINCING WORLD THAT PEACE IS WORTHWHILE. ALLIANCE MUST TRY TO CONTRIVE A COEXISTENCE WHICH IS GENUINE.

4. AS LAST SPEAKER, STIKKER PAID TRIBUTE TO CANADIAN ROLE IN NATO AND TO PEARSON AS ORIGINAL NATO STATESMAN. REMARKED THAT DANGER TO ALLIANCE TODAY PERHAPS GREATER BECAUSE LESS APPARENT. CUBA ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS DANGER, WHICH US HAD MET WITH FIRMNESS AND FLEXIBILITY. REMINDED MINISTERS THAT THOUGH BERLIN QUIET IT REMAINED A SENSITIVE AREA; SITUATION IN LAOS WAS PRESENTLY DELICATE; AND NUMBER OF OTHER POTENTIAL CRISIS AREAS EXISTED. IT WAS IMPORTANT NATO NOT WEAKEN ITS EFFORTS AT MOMENT WHEN WHOLE WORLD WATCHING SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT. COMPETITION THESE TWO SYSTEMS MIGHT CONFRONT WEST WITH SERIOUS THREAT. TURNING TO NATO DEFENSE POLICY, STIKKER STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF ATTAINING PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES; REVIEWED SITUATION REGARDING IANF AND MLF; AND ENDED ON NOTE THAT NATO MUST NOT ONLY INCREASE ITS INTERNAL SOLIDARITY BUT CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL, TO GREATEST POSSIBLE DEGREE, ERADICATE SPECTRE OF WAR.

5. AT BUSINESS SESSION STIKKER OPENED WITH PLEA FOR FAVORABLE PRESS TREATMENT AND FORCEFUL COMMUNIQUE. OBTAINED AGREEMENT TO IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION SPECIAL DEFENSE REPORT, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS PERSONAL DOCUMENT SUMMARIZING DEVELOPMENTS AND NOT ENGAGING NAC OR INDIVIDUAL STATES. ADDED TWO POINTS TO MATERIAL COVERED IN REPORT: FIRST, NOTED MULTILATERAL FORCE QUESTION FAR FROM FULLY EXPLORED AND DIFFERING VIEWS ON ITS PERSISTED; SECOND, REFERRED TO UK AND US STATEMENTS ON ASSIGNMENT OF V-BOMBERS AND POLARIS SUBMARINES AND NOTED DISCUSSIONS CONTINUING BETWEEN SACEUR AND UK ON TECHNICAL DETAILS OF ASSIGNMENT.

6. LORD

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6. LORD HOME POINTED OUT NEITHER EUROPE ALONE NOR NORTH AMERICA ALONE COULD GUARANTEE ALLIANCE SECURITY; NUCLEAR DEFENSE OF NATO MUST COVER WHOLE AREA OR NONE. DIFFICULTIES ARISE IN SEEKING TO ESTABLISH PARTNERSHIP OF EQUALS IN NATO WHEN POWER UNEQUALLY DIVIDED. BETTER TO INTERNATIONALIZE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE EXISTING NATIONAL NUCLEAR CAPACITIES THAN TO MULTIPLY NATIONAL CAPABILITIES; THIS INVOLVES AGREEMENT BY THOSE NOT POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO SHARE THE TRULY CRUSHING RESPONSIBILITY NOW DEVOLVING ON THOSE WHO DO. NUCLEAR POWERS ON THEIR SIDE MUST AGREE TO ADMIT OTHERS TO THEIR COUNCILS ON THESE MATTERS. OBJECTIVE IS A NUCLEAR FORCE IN WHICH EACH ALLY EXERCISES DUE INFLUENCE AND EUROPE MOVES TOWARD STATURE AND CONTRIBUTION EQUAL TO UNITED STATES. UK SUPPORTED STIKKER DEFENSE REPORT PROPOSALS. ON IANF THIS WAS MORE THAN A RE-SHUFFLE; ASSIGNMENT OF V-BOMBERS AND, LATER UK POLARIS SUBMARINES REPRESENTED COLOSSAL INCREASE IN SACEUR STRENGTH. V-BOMBERS COULD PENETRATE INNERMOST SOVIET OFFENSES AND INFLICT UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES ON USSR. FORCE HAD COST UK ONE BILLION POUNDS. UK HAD TODAY GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO ASSIGN V-BOMBERS, AND SACEUR HAD ACCEPTED FORCE PURSUANT TO CM(55)82 AND CONSISTENT WITH NASSAU AGREEMENT. IT WAS RIGHT THAT ADDITIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER SACEUR AND THAT SHAPE AND OMAHA LIAISON NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE MORE BROADLY ALLOCATED AMONG ALLIED OFFICERS. ON REMAINING QUESTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL, NATO NUCLEAR COMMITTEE INCLUDING ALL ALLIES SHOULD BE GIVEN MORE NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND SHOULD BE CONSULTED BEFORE NEW WEAPONS ACCEPTED OR NEW DEPLOYMENTS MADE IN EUROPE. FINALLY, HOME DESCRIBED MLF AS A BOLD IDEA PUT FORWARD WITH HIGHEST POLITICAL MOTIVES BUT STATED IT RAISED FORMIDABLE PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY OF COST. STRESSED MLF WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL AT THIS MEETING.

7. OPENING FOR US, SECRETARY DELIVERED PREPARED STATEMENT (DOCUMENT MLO-D-5). STRESSED US COMMITMENT TO DEFEND EUROPE INCLUDED BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS; DESCRIBED AND APPROVED CURRENT IANF ARRANGEMENTS, NOTING US HAD ASSIGNED THREE POLARIS SUBMARINES TO SACEUR; OUTLINED STATUS OF MLF DISCUSSIONS AND EXPRESSED HOPE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR MLF TREATY

NEGOTIATIONS

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NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SOON BE READY. REAFFIRMED US WILLINGNESS TO JOIN WITH OTHERS AS MAJOR PARTICIPANT IN MLF. WHILE RECOGNIZING NO FINAL GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT POSSIBLE UNTIL TECHNICAL TALKS ARE CONCLUDED, HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO UNDUE DELAY IN MOVING ONWARD TO GIVE NATO A POWERFUL AND POLITICALLY USEFUL INTEGRATED FORCE. SECRETARY CONTINUED THESE DEVELOPMENTS MUST BE COMPLEMENTED BY GRAPPLING WITH PROBLEMS OF NATO STRATEGY AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS AS PROPOSED BY STIKKER FOR POST-OTTAWA PERIOD. POINTED OUT US BELIEVED EXISTING SITUATION CONTAINED ELEMENTS OF INEQUITY CAUSING US POLITICAL PROBLEMS; ANALYSIS NEEDED TO PLACE DEFENSE STRUCTURE OF ALLIANCE ON FIRMER FOOTING.

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8. CONTINUING US PRESENTATION, SECRETARY MCNAMARA DELIVERED PREPARED STATEMENT NOTING WE SHOULD CONTINUE MAKE NUCLEAR INFORMATION AVAILABLE AND WOULD SEEK SUMMIT NEW 144(A) AGREEMENT PERMITTING EXPANDED EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND BROADER DISTRIBUTION. ADDITIONAL DATA WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR USE BY SHAPE INTERNATIONAL STAFF AND NON-US OFFICERS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN SHAPE LIAISON AT OMAHA. SECRETARY MCNAMARA STATED SUCCESS IN DETERRENCE IN NUCLEAR WAR REQUIRED INTEGRATED APPLICATION OF ALL FORCES INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL. CAPABILITY REPRESENTED BY MC-26 FORCE GOALS WOULD CONFRONT SOVIETS WITH CHOICE BETWEEN ALL-OUT ATTACK AND NO ATTACK AT ALL AND GIVE ALLIANCE NECESSARY STRATEGIC OPTIONS. THEREFORE US SUPPORTS SECGEN'S VIEWS ON URGENCY OF ATTAINING PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORCE REQUIREMENTS, STRATEGY AND BUDGETS. SECRETARY HOPED STIKKER WOULD REQUEST NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO ANALYZE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF EXISTING FORCES OF NATO ALLIES INCLUDING ALL RELEVANT FACTORS SUCH AS SIZE, SUPPORT FACILITIES, TRAINING AND RESERVES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TIME NEEDED TO ALERT AND DEPLOY FORCES AND PERIOD OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. FURTHER SUGGESTED SECGEN ESTABLISH A GROUP DRAWN FROM INTERNATIONAL STAFF AND NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO EVALUATE FORCE PROGRAMS AND BUDGETS OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBER COUNTRIES PROJECTED FORWARD, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR NEXT FIVE YEARS, AND REPORT ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLANNED CONTRIBUTIONS AND MC-26/4 FORCE GOALS, AS RELATED TO ALLIANCE STRATEGIC CONCEPTS. SECRETARY EXPRESSED HOPE THESE STUDIES COULD BE COMPLETED AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE.

9. FOR CANADA, DEFENSE MINISTER HELLYER [redacted] NOTED CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE WOULD BE SET UP TO EXAMINE CANADIAN DEFENSE POLICY BUT DID NOT ENVISAGE IMPORTANT CHANGES. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER MARTIN NOTED [redacted] MLF PROPOSALS OF GREAT INTEREST TO CANADA. AT PROPER TIME CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD

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CONSIDER TERMS FOR INTEGRATION OF CANADIAN FORCES IN IANF. CANADA ALSO APPROVED SECGEN'S PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH PROBLEM OF BALANCED NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. CANADA'S CONTRIBUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH CANADIAN CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES AND COULD ONLY BE FINALIZED IN LIGHT RESULTS OF CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE STUDY. RE MLF, CANADA WOULD BE IN BETTER POSITION TO COMMENT AFTER FORTHCOMING MERCHANT MISSION. CLOSED BY SUGGESTING REFERENCE TO "TARGETING" IN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE BE REMOVED AND FINAL SENTENCE OF IANF SECTION OF COMMUNIQUE BE ALTERED TO REPLACE WORD "AMONG" BY WORDS "TO CONTROL".

10. IN RPIFT STATEMENT FOR FEDREP, SCHROEDER STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF INTERDEPENDENCE CONCEPT; PRAISED ATHENS GUIDELINES; AND NOTED WITH APPROVAL US MOVE TO SHARE NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITY. DEFMIN VON HASSEL EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ALLIED HELP IN GERMAN MILITARY BUILDUP. MAINTAINED DETERMINATION OF FUTURE NATO STRATEGY SHOULD PROCEED FROM MILITARY STUDIES OF THREAT ASSESSMENT AND APPRECIATION OF MILITARY SITUATION IN 1970. SAID MCNAMARA PROPOSALS VALUABLE. WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY TO DISCUSS WAYS OF MEETING ALLIANCE NUCLEAR PROBLEMS AND IN THIS RESPECT WE WELCOMED IANF ARRANGEMENTS. EXPECTED STAFF CHANGES IN SHAPE TO BE APPLIED IN SIMILAAR FASHION IN SUBORDINATE NATO COMMANDS. CLOSED WITH STATEMENT THAT IN FUTURE GERMANY WILL PARTICIPATE WITH OTHER ALLIES IN WORKING TO OVERCOME PROBLEMS OF ESTABLISHING MLF; GERMANY CONFIDENT OF OUTCOME.

11. ERKIN (TURKEY) WELCOMED MCNAMARA RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUPPORTED SECGEN SPECIAL DEFENSE REPORT. STRESSED NEED FOR STRONG CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR FORCES ABLE TO OPERATE ALONG ALL NATO BORDERS TO DISCOURAGE AGGRESSION. NEED ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO STATES UNDER ECONOMIC STRESS REQUIRED TO GUARD FRONTIERS. FAVORED FLEXIBLE, MULTI-PURPOSE USE OF NUCLEAR STRIKE UNITS SCHEDULED FOR INCLUSION IN IANF.

12. FOR NETHERLANDS, LUNS WELCOMED IANF ARRANGEMENTS AND EXPRESSED GRATTITUDE FOR GREATER FLOW OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION NOW PLANNED. HOPED IT WOULD LEAD TO GREATER MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND COHESION AND PROVIDE STIMULUS FOR MORE EXTENSIVE POLITICAL CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION. NETHERLANDS WOULD HAVE SUPPORTED RESOLUTION ON IANF BUT WILL AGREE TO COMMUNIQUE LISTING ARRANGEMENTS. COMMUNIQUE MIGHT NOTE IANF WOULD LEAD TO GREATER EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, AND ALSO THAT

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A EUROPEAN OFFICER WOULD BE APPOINTED AS NUCLEAR DEPUTY. NETHERLANDS DEFMIN VISSER EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER GAP BETWEEN EXISTING FORCE LEVELS AND FORCE REQUIREMENTS. SUPPORTING PRINCIPLE OF FORWARD STRATEGY, HE URGED MORE EFFICIENT PROGRAMMING ON NATO-WIDE BASIS AS FOUNDATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE PLANS. NATO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS MUST BE ANALYZED AND PRIORITIES DETERMINED, SINCE GAPS COULD NOT BE QUICKLY FILLED. THIS WAS ONLY WAY TO MAKE REALISTIC PROGRESS TOWARD GRADUAL REDUCTION OF GAP AND EQUITABLE SHARING OF BURDENS. NETHERLANDS WAS INCREASINGLY AWARE OF IMPORTANCE OF INTERDEPENDENCE: ONE ENCOURAGING EXAMPLE WAS RECENT NAC SUCCESS IN BEGINNING TO COPE WITH AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM. IN THIS AS IN OTHER MILITARY FIELDS GREATER DEGREE OF INTEGRATION WAS NEEDED.

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SECOND SESSION NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, AFTERNOON MAY 22 - DEFENSE QUESTIONS CONTINUED

COUVE DE MURVILLE (FRANCE) CAREFULLY DETAILED THOSE DECISIONS TAKEN OR ABOUT TO BE TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH SACEUR'S NUCLEAR FORCE. FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO ASSIGNMENT OF BRITISH V-BOMBERS AND US POLARIS TO SACEUR, NOR WAS IT OPPOSED TO ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN SACEUR'S COMMAND OR IN SHAPE LIAISON GROUP TO GHANA. IN SPECIFYING THESE ACTIONS, HOWEVER, HE CLEARLY STRESSED THEY WOULD NOT CHANGE PRESENT MISSION OF SACEUR NOR FACT THAT DECISION TO USE V-BOMBERS AND POLARIS, REMAINS WITH NATIONAL AUTHORITIES. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE ALSO REFERRED TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARMED WITH US WARHEADS. IN DESCRIBING STAFF CHANGES, HE STRESSED THAT NUCLEAR DEPUTY WILL ADVISE SACEUR ON NUCLEAR MATTERS AND HAS NO COMMAND FUNCTION. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT PRESENT STAFF, NOW COMPOSED MAINLY OF AMERICANS WOULD BE ALTERED TO PROVIDE GREATER EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. TOTAL EFFECT COUVE'S PRESENTATION CONSISTENT WITH EXPECTED FRENCH POSITION OF STRESSING IANF DOES NOT INVOLVE ESTABLISHMENT NEW FORCE ENTITY. HE DID NOT TOUCH ON MLF OR STIKKER PROPOSAL FOR SPECIAL REVIEW.

HAEKKERUP (DENMARK) DETAILED STEPS BEING TAKEN WITH HELP US AND CANADA TO IMPROVE DANISH CONVENTIONAL MILITARY POSTURE. HE CHARACTERIZED VALUE OF CURRENTLY PROPOSED NUCLEAR CHANGES AS LIMITED AND STRESSED THAT ALTHOUGH DENMARK WOULD NOT OBJECT, NO DANISH MILITARY CONTRIBUTION COULD BE EXPECTED. BELIEVED EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS WITH US MAINTAINING BULK NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITY SATISFACTORY AND POLICY RE USE

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NUCLEAR FORCES ON DANISH TERRITORY REMAINED UNCHANGED.

AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (GREECE) SPOKE CHIEFLY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT OF DEFENSE PROBLEM, WARNING THAT COMMUNISTS WERE EXPLOITING DIFFERENCES IN STRATEGIC VIEWS WITHIN ALLIANCE. COMMUNISTS ARE SAYING US WOULD NOT RISK NUCLEAR WAR TO DEFEND EUROPE AND THIS RAISED QUESTION OF RELATIONSHIP CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN ORDER ACHIEVE FULL RANGE OF DEFENSE CAPABILITY. ALLIANCE SHOULD STUDY SIGNIFICANCE OF INCREASING MOBILITY ENEMY'S MISSILE CAPABILITY AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR US GUARANTEES OF NUCLEAR COVERAGE. HE WARNED THAT IF GHOSTS OF WHICH SECRETARY RUSK SPOKE WERE NOT EXERCISED BY FRANK DISCUSSION, EUROPEAN DOUBT THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE USED WILL GROW. GREECE AGREED WITH MR. MCNAMARA'S PROPOSAL FOR SPECIAL REVIEW OF COUNTRY FORCE PROGRAMS AND NEED TO ACHIEVE ADEQUATE BALANCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. HE CHARACTERIZED IANF AS NOT ESSENTIALLY NEW BUT EULOGIZED MLF DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD INCREASE EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY AND GREATER PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR MATTERS.

SCHAUS (LUXEMBOURG) EXPRESSED APPROVAL OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE AS REPORTED IN THE SECRETARY-GENERALS REPORT. STRESSING INDIVISIBILITY OF DEFENSE AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, HE POINTED OUT THAT NUCLEAR COOPERATION WOULD FOSTER BOTH EUROPEAN UNITY AND ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP.

HARLEM (NORWAY) ASSERTED THERE WERE ENOUGH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALLIANCE ARSENAL AND ATTENTION SHOULD NOW BE TURNED TO STRENGTHENING CONVENTIONAL FORCES. NORWAY WOULD CONCENTRATE ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, AND WILL INCREASE DEFENSE BUDGET FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE PROPOSED CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN DEFENSE AND FINANCE MINISTERS WHEN CONSIDERING CLOSING GAP BETWEEN FORCES AND GOALS. HE STATED THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR QUESTIONING US COMMITMENT TO EUROPE. US HANDLED CUBA WITHOUT RESORT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE THANKED UK FOR ITS V-BOMBER CONTRIBUTION, BUT POINTED OUT THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS UNFORTUNATELY DO NOT INCRESE CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH.

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SPAAK (BELGIUM), REFERRED TO SECTION SECGEN'S REPORT COVERING QUESTION OF PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, AND AGREED MINISTERS NOT READY TO DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVELY AT THIS MEETING. WHEN PROBLEM OF FORCE MIX CONSIDERED BY NAC, IT MUST NOT BE CONSIDERED FROM PURELY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. HE URGED PERMREPS IN CONSIDERING POLITICAL CHARACTER OF ALLIANCE AND NATURE OF SOVIET THREAT TO KEEP FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES IN MIND: (1) ALLIANCE IS NOT TRANSITORY THING, BUT PERMANENT INSTITUTION AND MUCH MORE THAN JUST MILITARY ALLIANCE; (2) DEFENSE OF ATLANTIC AREA IS INDIVISIBLE; EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA NEED EACH OTHER AND, (3) EUROPEAN ROLE IN ALLIANCE MUST BE ONE OF PARTNERSHIP AND NOT INDEPENDENT THIRD POWER. HE CONCLUDED BY ACCEPTING STIKKER SPECIAL REPORT ON BEHALF BELGIUM.

DEFENSE MINISTER SEGERS (BELGIUM) REAFFIRMED NEED FOR ATLANTIC COHESION AND EXPRESSED BELGIAN APPROVAL OF GREATER NUCLEAR ROLE FOR EUROPE. BELGIUM ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF IANF [redacted] BUT ALTHOUGH BELGIANS WOULD FOLLOW WITH GREAT INTEREST DEVELOPMENT MLF, SHE COULD NOT MAKE CONTRIBUTION, SINCE ALL RESOURCES WERE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN AND MODERNIZE CONVENTIONAL FORCES. COUNTRIES WITH LIMITED RESOURCES MUST MAKE CHOICE AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THEM TO HAVE GUIDANCE ON THIS IN LIGHT REAPPRAISAL STRATEGIC CONCEPTS.

NOGUEIRA (PORTUGAL) ASSERTED THAT PROBLEM OF SHARING NUCLEAR POWER CAN BE A FACTOR FOSTERING EITHER UNITY OR DIVISION WITHIN ALLIANCE. WELCOMED INCREASED EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, AND CHARACTERIZED THIS AS MANIFESTATION OF GROWING EQUALITY IN ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. HE STRESSED THAT TRUST BETWEEN US AND EUROPE OVER NUCLEAR MATTERS MUST BE REESTABLISHED. EUROPE MUST TRUST US TO DEFEND EUROPE, AND ON OTHER HAND, US MUST TRUST EUROPE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOT TO RISK NUCLEAR WAR ANY MORE THAN WOULD US . HE WELCOMED FURTHER STUDIES TO BETTER RELATE STRATEGY AND FORCES IN ALLIANCE.

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Control: 19323
Rec'd: MAY 23, 1963
10:16 P.M.

FROM: OTTAWA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 12, MAY 23, 9 P.M. (SECTION 2 OF 2)

PRIORITY

POUCHED PARIS FOR USRO AND ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS

DEFENSE MINISTER THORNEYCROFT (UK) SPOKE TO MECHANICS OF SPECIAL FORCE REVIEW PROPOSED BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA. HE FULLY ENDORSED NEED FOR SUCH REVIEW IF "PROPERLY CARRIED OUT". WARNED THAT IT WAS NATURE OF THINGS FOR MILITARY BUDGETS TO RISE FASTER THAN GNPS AND THAT KEY TO PROBLEM WAS TO HAVE "RIGHT STANDARDS AND PRIORITY". ALLIANCE CANNOT DO EVERYTHING. HE SUGGESTED THAT REVIEW SHOULD LOOK BEYOND GOALS ESTABLISHED IN MC 26/4 SINCE THESE BASED ON END 1966 AND NOTHING THAT NATO CAN DO WILL MATERIALLY AFFECT THINGS BETWEEN NOW AND THAT TIME. CITED MRBM AND VSTOLS WHICH NOW LARGELY BYPASSED AS FORMER REQUIREMENTS. HE SUGGESTED LOGICAL PROCEDURE FOR STUDY WOULD BE:

(1) TO AGREE ON NATURE THREAT; (2) TO DEVISE STRATEGY; (3) TO DETERMINE LEVEL OF FORCES, BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL; (4) TO ASSESS PRESENT RESOURCES AVAILABLE; (5) TO DETERMINE EXTENT TO WHICH RESOURCES WOULD SUPPORT STRATEGY; AND, (6) TO MAKE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN STRAGEGY, FORCES, AND RESOURCES. STANDING GROUP STUDIES (MC-100 AND MC-100/1) WERE GOOD START UPON WHICH TO BUILD, AND US SUGGESTIONS WILL ALSO HELP. IN CONCLUSION HE PROPOSED (1) TO PROJECT STUDY TO 1967-1968 PERIOD; (2) TO TAKE FULLER ACCOUNT OF STANDING GROUP STUDIES WHICH SHOULD PERMIT INITIATION OF EXERCISE IN AUTUMN; AND, (3) TO FACE SQUARELY WITHOUT FLINCHING PROBLEM OF PRIORITIES. SUBJECT TO ABOVE, UK WOULD ACCEPT PROPOSALS FOR TYPE REVIEW ADVOCATED BY SECGEN AND ENDORSEMENT BY MCNAMARA.

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-2- SECTO 12, MAY 23, 9 P.M. (SECTION 2 OF 2) FROM: OTTAWA

IN ADROIT SUMMATION, SECGEN STIKKER REVIEWED MINISTERS' COMMENTS ON THREE PROBLEMS TREATED IN PARA 20 HIS REPORT:

(1) RE PROBLEM CONVENTIONAL FORCES, HE STATED CONSENSUS THIS MEETING NOT TO GO INTO SUBSTANCE BUT THAT RPT THAT MINISTERS WERE IN BROAD AGREEMENT ON NEED TO HAVE CLOSER ALIGNMENT OF STRATEGY, FORCES, AND BUDGETS. HE URGED THAT PROPOSED REVIEW GIVE DUE REGARD TO POLITICAL BALANCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FLEXIBLE STRATEGY AND RESOURCES AVAILABLE. DEFENSE PLANNING MUST BE CONDUCTED ON MULTILATERAL BASIS AND PROJECTED OVER LONGER TERM THAN EXISTING FORCE GOALS. INTERNATIONAL STAFF WOULD PREPARE DOCUMENT POSING POSSIBLE TIME SCHEDULES AND VARIOUS PROCEDURES TAKING INTO ACCOUNT VIEWS OF MINISTERES EXPRESSED HERE; (2) MULTILATERAL FORCE - HE NOTED INTEREST OF SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS IN CREATION OF MLF, PARTICULARLY GERMANS. INAPPROPRIATE FOR COUNCIL AT THIS TIME DEBATE ISSUES INVOLVED IN MLF AND FUNCTION OF REPORT WAS MERELY TO NOTE STATUS WHICH AMPLIFIED FURTHER BY COMMENTS FROM US MINISTERS; AND , (3) IANF - MOST COUNTRIES DURING DISCUSSION DID NOT OBJECT TO USING NAME IANF, ALTHOUGH SOME BELIEVE THIS MISREPRESENTS ACCOMPLISHMENTS SINCE NO NEW FORCE CREATED. HE WISHED TO AVOID EXERCISE IN SEMANTICS AND RECOUNTED PRECISELY EXACT STEPS BEING TAKEN WHICH APPEARED ACCEPTABLE TO COUNCIL. MENTIONED LORD HOME'S STATEMENT RE ASSIGNMENT V-BOMBERS, DETAILS OF WHICH STILL TO BE WORKED OUT. [redacted] RE REORGANIZATION, HE NOTED COUNCIL EXPRESSION OF DESIRABILITY OF FLOW OF GREATER NUCLEAR INFORMATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL AUTHORITIES OF THE ALLIANCE, AS WELL GREATER ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN NUCLER PLANNING AND TARGETING. HE ASKED NAC TO CONSIDER LORD HOME'S PROPOSAL THAT CONSULTATIVE FUNCTION OF NATO NUCLEAR COMMITTEE BE STRENTHENED. FINALLY, HE WELCOMED FORTHCOMING REVISED TEXT FOR US "144-B AGREEMENT" WITH NATO.

IN CONCLUSION, HE ASKED MINISTERS NOT TO APPROVE HIS REPORT, BUT TO LET RECORD INDICATE IT CONSTITUTED "FAIR SUMMING

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-3- SECTO 12, MAY 23, 9 P.M. (SECTION 2 OF 2) FROM: OTTAWA

UP OF SITUATION" AS THEY SAW IT. HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT IN LIGHT MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS TODAY THERE WERE NO BASIC DISAGREEMENTS, BUT SIMPLY DIFFERENT DEGREEES OF EMPHASIS. AFTER MINISTERS HAD NODDED ASSENT. (INCLUDING COUVE DE MURVILLE WHO WAS BEING WATCHED BY MOST) STIKKER STATED THAT CM63/30 COULD NOW BE CONSIDERED AS BASIS FOR MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO GET AHEAD WITH ORGANIZATION OF SACEUR'S NUCLEAR FORCES.

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NATO 17/1

Control: 19339
Rec'd: MAY 23, 1963
11:26 PM

FROM: OTTAWA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 13, MAY 23, 1Ø PM

PBUCHED INFORMATION ALL NATO CAPITALS

SECRETARY OPENED MORNING SESSION NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING MAY 23 WITH REMARKS DRAWN LARGELY FROM PREPARED STATEMENT (DOCUMENT MLG/D-6). COMMENTING ON PUBLIC IMPRESSION OF DISARRAY IN NATO, NOTED SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN HAD ASKED HIM MAY 18 WHAT WAS AT BASIS OF DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN NATO; DOBRYNIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD NATO WAS BASICALLY UNITED AND THEREFORE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND QUARRELING AMONG ITS MEMBERS. SECRETARY REAFFIRMED US SUPPORT FOR BASIC OBJECTIVES OF ALLIANCE, REPUGNANCE TO US OF IDEA OF AMERICAN DOMINATION OF EUROPE, AND INDIVISIBILITY OF DEFENSE. EMPHASIZED THAT SOLIDARITY BETWEEN US AND EUROPE WAS MATTER OF INTEREST, NOT SENTIMENT, AND THAT AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE MADE US A PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN MILITARY POWER. STRESSED THEME OF INTERDEPENDENCE IN MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FIELDS, AND NEED FOR CLOSER CONSULTATION ON PROBLEMS BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE NATO TREATY AREA. URGED OTHER NATO MEMBERS ASSIST IN ADVANCING ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, NOT ONLY WITH FINANCIAL SUPPORT, BUT BY STRENGTHENING SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA. RE US DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS, SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THESE WERE CONCERNED WITH SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, I.E., BERLIN, LAOS, NUCLEAR TEST BAN, AND NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THAT CONVERSATIONS WERE NOT CONCERNED WITH AND DID NOT HOLD OUT PROSPECT OF ANY BROAD DETENTE WITH SOVIETS. IN CONCLUDING PREPARED STATEMENT, MENTIONED WE COULD NOT REALISTICALLY TAKE COMFORT FROM CURRENT IMMOBILITY OF SOVIET POLICY, SINCE IT COULD BE FOLLOWED BY HARDER LINE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND PRESENT PERIOD IS ONE OF CONSIDERABLE DANGER.

SECRETARY THEN

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SECRETARY THEN TURNED TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN MAY 18. LATTER RETURNING TO MOSCOW FOR CONSULTATION, AND IN RESPONSE SECRETARY'S INQUIRY STATED HE WOULD BE ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY POINTS ON WHICH AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND WEST. SOVIET AUTHORITIES WOULD BE EAGER HAVE THIS INFO IN CONNECTION WITH RE-EXAMINATION OF POLICY CURRENTLY UNDER WAY IN MOSCOW.

SECRETARY WENT ON TO STATE KHRUSHCHEV HAS NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING ON QUESTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING, BUT HAS DWELT ON TWO POINTS WHICH WE THINK ARE CAPABLE OF FACTUAL RESOLUTION. ONE IS THAT NATIONAL MEANS OF NUCLEAR DETECTION ARE ADEQUATE AND THEREFORE ON-SITE INSPECTION IS UNNECCESSARY; SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT KHRUSHCHEV MAY THINK THIS IS TRUE OF US, WHICH IS OPEN SOCIETY, BUT IT IS NOT TRUE FOR US, SINCE SOVIET UNION IS CLOSED SOCIETY AND WE COULD NOT POSSIBLY KNOW WHETHER OR NOT CLANDESTINE UNDERGROUND TESTING BEING CONDUCTED. POINT COULD BE CLEARED UP ON FACTUAL BASIS IF, FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIETS HAD DETECTION INSTRUMENTS SURPASSING OURS WHICH THEY WOULD SHARE WITH US. SECOND POINT ON WHICH KHRUSHCHEV HAD INSISTED WAS THAT ON-SITE INSPECTIONS WERE FORM OF ESPIONAGE; WE HAVE URGED SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE ON INSPECTION PROCEDURES IN COURSE OF WHICH THEY COULD BE CONVINCED ESPIONAGE WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED. SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT (1) SOVIET IMMOBILITY ON THIS SUBJECT MIGHT BE RELATED TO DECISION ON THEIR PART TO INCREASE NUCLEAR STRENGTH AND TO CONDUCT NUCLEAR TESTS IN NEAR FUTURE FOR THIS PURPOSE; OR (2) IT MIGHT BE UNTIMELY FOR SOVIETS TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH WEST PENDING TALKS WITH CHINESE.

SECRETARY STATED DOBRYNIN HAD REAFFIRMED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR PEACEFUL AND NEUTRAL LAOS, BUT SAID SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE HAVING DIFFICULTY EXERTING INFLUENCE IN THAT AREA. NOTED DOBRYNIN HAD STATED SOVIETS ATTACHED SOME IMPORTANCE TO NATO-WARSAW NON-AGGRESSION PACT, NOT FOR SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS, WHICH HE AGREED WOULD NOT BE GREAT, BUT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT. IN SPITE OF DOBRYNIN'S DESIRE FOR SOME AGREEMENT WITH WEST, HE

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-3- SECTO 13, MAY 23, 1 PM FROM OTTAWA

WEST, HE HAD NOT FOLLOWED UP ON BERLIN, AND DID NOT SEEM TO BE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED WITH THAT SUBJECT IN LAST CONVERSATION. HE HAD URGED GENUINE RECIPROCITY RE BERLIN AND EMPHASIZED THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT EROSION OF WESTERN POSITION THERE. ALTHOUGH DOBRYNIN HAD SHOWN NO URGENCY RE BERLIN, SITUATION COULD BECOME CRITICAL AT ANY MOMENT.

RE CUBA, SECRETARY SAID THAT THIS WAS STILL DANGEROUS SITUATION. US HAD SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY COMMITMENTS IN ISLAND, SUCH AS AIR SURVEILLANCE, WHICH COULD LEAD TO INCIDENTS, PREVENTION OF ENCROACHMENT AND ARMS SHIPMENTS ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA, AND NEED TO ENSURE THAT SOVIET TROOPS DO NOT FIRE ON CUBANS AS IN HUNGARIAN UPRISING. WE WISH TO MAKE SURE THAT ISOLATION OF CUBA CONTINUES, AND THERE ARE SOME FAINT INDICATIONS THAT DETERIORATION OF SITUATION IN CUBA IS OF CONCERN TO CASTRO AND SOVIETS. COMMUNIST EXPENSES THERE ARE MOUNTING, AND IT MAY BE THAT CUBA WILL SEEK SOME FORM OF RECONCILIATION. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD BE MORE LIKELY IF COMMUNISTS BROUGHT TO REALIZATION THAT PRESENT COURSE CANNOT SUCCEED, AND ALLIES SHOULD DO WHAT THEY CAN ON SUCH LINES AS WITHHOLDING SHIPPING.

SECRETARY MENTIONED MODEST IMPROVEMENT IN VIETNAM. THERE WAS ENCOURAGING INCREASE IN COOPERATION OF VILLAGERS AND GREATER IMPETUS TO STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM. NOT CLEAR WHETHER OTHER SIDE WILL INCREASE ITS EFFORT, OR WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO CONTINUE PRESENT MEASURES INDEFINITELY.

IN CONCLUSION, SECRETARY STATED NATO MUST WATCH MOSCOW CAREFULLY IN NEXT WEEKS AND MONTHS. KHRUSHCHEV MAY NOT BE IN PERSONAL DIFFICULTY, BUT SOVIETS HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS, MAINLY CHINA, AND IF THEY DECIDE TO CONCEDE MORE FREEDOM OF ACTION TO CHINESE, THERE WILL BE SOMBER PERIOD AHEAD. CAUTION REQUIRED RE VIEW [illegible] A DEVELOPMENT ON SOME POINT. WE MUST WATCH FOR GENUINE TURNING POINT FOR SOVIETS, I.E., CRISIS WE HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR, WHEN SOVIETS WILL REALIZE THAT WORLD REVOLUTION IS NOT GOING RIGHT AND THEY MUST DECIDE ON ACCELERATED OR MODIFIED COURSE

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MODIFIED COURSE OF ACTION. WE MAY REACH AGREEMENT WITH THEM WHERE THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR VITAL INTERESTS, BUT WE NEED MORE INFORMATION AND INTEND CONSULT FURTHER IN NATO.

BALANCE OF SESSION REPORTED IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

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Control: 19383
Rec'd: MAY 24, 1963
3:31 A.M.

FROM: OTTAWA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 14, MAY 24, 2 A.M. (SECTION 1 OF 11)

PRIORITY

POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS

FOLLOWING SECRETARY'S STATEMENT (SECTO 13) ERKIN (TURKEY), NOTED POST-CUBA CALM HAS CONTINUED FEATURE EAST-WEST RELATIONS, BUT DID NOT THINK THIS NECESSARILY FAVORABLE, SINCE CALM CONCEALED GREAT GULF BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND NONE OF GREAT OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS HAD BEEN SETTLED. CURTAIN HAS FALLEN ONLY ON FIRST ACT. SOVIET TROOPS STILL IN CUBA, AND CASTRO REGIME CANNOT BE IGNORED OR UNDERESTIMATED. THERE IS SELF-IMPOSED POLITICAL DEAFNESS ON SOVIET SIDE, AND THEY DO NOT SEEM READY FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIETS EVIDENTLY ENGAGED IN SERIOUS RE-APPRAISAL OF POLICY, WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN (1) EARNEST NEGOTIATIONS WITH WEST; (2) CONTINUATION OF PRESENT SITUATION; OR (3) RETURN TO WORST PERIOD OF COLD WAR; (1) SEEMS UNLIKELY COURSE FOR KHRUSHCHEV, SINCE IT WOULD PROVOKE MORE CRITICISM AND ATTACK FROM CHINESE. IF HE FELT HE HAD TO SEEK MODUS VIVENDI WITH CHINA, THEN THERE WOULD BE RETURN TO COLD WAR, BUT MOST LIKELY EVENTUALITY IS MIXTURE OF (2) AND (3). DETENTE MEANS NOTHING TO SOVIETS, EXCEPT IMPRESSION THEY WISH TO CONVEY WHILE AT SAME TIME EXERTING PRESSURE ON SOFT POINTS. SOUTHEAST ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST SEEM TO BE CURRENT SOFT TARGETS FOR SOVIETS.

ERKIN THEN REVIEWED SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST. POINTED OUT NEW REGIMES IN IRAQ AND SYRIA CONSTITUTE AT LEAST TEMPORARY SETBACK FOR COMMUNISTS. INTERESTING DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN ASCENT TO POWER OF BAATH PARTY WHICH NOW HAS OPPORTUNITY TO PUT ITS IDEAS INTO EFFECT. PROJECTED ARAB FEDERATION WILL HAVE DIFFICULTIES

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-2- SECTO 14, MAY 24, 2 A.M. (SECTION 1 OF 11) FROM OTTAWA

DIFFICULTIES WITH NASSER WISHING TIGHTER UNION THAN IRAQ AND SYRIA DESIRE. JORDAN FACING GREAT DIFFICULTIES AND MUST RECEIVE WESTERN ASSISTANCE, SINCE INTEGRITY AND EXISTENCE OF JORDAN VITAL FOR PEACE IN AREA. ALSO NECESSARY TO SUPPORT LEBANON. RE ISRAEL, THERE HAVE BEEN NO IMPROVEMENTS IN RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES AND USSR, AND SOME MEASURES MUST BE DEVISED TO SHOW THAT ANY VIOLENT DESIGNS WOULD BE DETERRED. IN IRAN IT IS IMPORTANT FOR WEST TO HELP CARRY OUT REFORMS APPROVED IN RECENT REFERENDUM. AFGHANISTAN HAS NEED OF CLOSER ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH WEST, AN ITS DISPUTE OVER TRANSIT ROADS WITH PAKISTAN COULD OPEN WAY TO SOVIET PENETRATION; RECENT REPLACEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER MAY BE SIGNIFICANT MOVE TOWARD MORE LIBERAL REGIME. IN PAKISTAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH INDIA OVER KASHMIR HAVE COME TO STANDSTILL AND PROSPECT FOR SETTLEMENT IS GLOOMY; PAKISTANI STATESMEN FEEL WEST HAS NOT GIVEN THEM SUFFICIENT SUPPORT. IN CONCLUSION, ERKIN SAID SOVIETS HAD NOT CHANGED THEIR COURSE, BUT ARE INCREASING THEIR ARSENAL AND CONTINUOUSLY APPRAISING NATO ALLIANCE. WE MUST NEVER LET THEM MAKE A MIS-CALCULATION OR MISUNDERSTAND OUR DETERMINATION AND STRENGTH.

LORD HOME (UK) STATED HOPE FOR SETTLEMENT IN LAOS HAD BEEN BASED ON NEUTRALIST PARTY, BUT THIS HAD NOT MATERIALIZED, AND THERE WAS DANGER THAT CENTER MIGHT BE ELIMINATED, RESULTING IN DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNISTS AND PARTITION OF COUNTRY. RIGHT AND LEFT MIGHT THEN BE REINFORCED FROM OUTSIDE, WHICH WOULD MEAN RESUMPTION OF WAR. SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO ASSIST BUT SEEM UNABLE TO DO SO. WE MUST HOPE FOR BEST, SINCE PARTITION IN LAOS WOULD HAVE SERIOUS EFFECT ON SOUTH VIETNAM.

LORD HOME AGREED WITH ERKIN THAT IN MIDDLE EAST MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WETHER UAR IS HIGHLY CENTRALIZED OR LOOSE-REINED, IF LATTER, ITS NEIGHBORS WILL HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR, BUT IF FORMER, WE MUST ALL WATCH CLOSELY, SINCE NASSER HAS UNDOUBTEDLY EXPANSIONIST IDEAS. ARABS HAVE NEVER BEEN UNITED, AND WE MAY HOPE THAT THEY NEVER WILL BE, AT LEAST TO EXTENT OF ENDANGERING THEIR NEIGHBORS.

/RE USSR

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-3- SECTO 14, MAY 24, 2 A.M. (SECTION 1 OF 11) FROM OTTAWA

RE USSR, LORD HOME POINTED OUT LULL IN SOVIET ACTIVITIES HAS BECOME ALMOST COMPLETE IMMOBILITY. PRIMARY REASON IS THAT CUBAN ADVENTURE DEMONSTRATED TO ALL THAT USSR IS IN WEAK POSITION VIS-A-VIS US. SINCE CUBA DID NOT GIVE SOVIETS SHORT CUT TO INCREASED NUCLEAR POWER, THEY MUST NOW TURN TO LONG HAUL TO REDRESS NUCLEAR IMBALANCE WITH US. THIS RAISES DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF FACING UP TO CLAIMS OF AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY AND BALANCING THEM WITH DEMANDS OF WEAPONRY AND OUTER SPACE PROGRAMS. KHRUSHCHEV MUST BE ANXIOUS ABOUT NEXT STAGE OF TESTING SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS, WHICH INVOLVE ENORMOUS COSTS, AND HE MUST BE WONDERING HOW SOVIETS CAN OVERTAKE US AND OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS.

LORD HOME HAD SOME CONCERN AS TO HOW KHRUSHCHEV COULD CONTEMPLATE DIVISION IN COMMUNIST WORLD. IF HE COULD NOT, THEN HE MUST SEEK TO CLOSE COMMUNIST RANKS, AND THERE WOULD BE SHARP DETERIORATION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. JULY TALKS BETWEEN SOVIETS AND CHINESE MIGHT RESULT IN COMPLETE FAILURE TO AGREE, IN WHICH CASE THERE MIGHT BE DETENTE BETWEEN USSR AND WEST, NOT OUT OF GOOD WILL, BUT OUT OF NECESSITY. TALKS MIGHT END IN RAPPROCHEMENT, IN WHICH CASE WE SHALL HAVE TO LOOK OUT, OR THEY MIGHT SUCCEED IN PAPERING OVER CRACKS. QUESTION ARISES WHETHER WE CAN DO SOMETHING TO BRING ABOUT DETENTE. IT IS NOT MATTER OF KEEPING KHRUSHCHEV IN POWER AS BEST POSSIBLE RUSSIAN, BUT RATHER OF TRYING TO TILT MATTERS TOWARD OUR OBJECTIVES IF WE RECEIVE APPROACH FROM SOVIETS. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE MIGHT BE ATTRACTIVE ASPECTS IN NATO-WARSAW NON-AGGRESSION PACT, PROVIDED RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY COULD BE AVOIDED. THERE ARE ALSO SUCH SUBJECTS AS NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND NON-TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND IF WE RECEIVED SOVIET APPROACH ON ANY OF THESE, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONCLUDE SOME AGREEMENT IN CONTEXT OF GREAT CONTROVERSY RAGING IN COMMUNIST WORLD. SOVIETS ARE SO SUSPICIOUS AND RIGID, AND ANY APPROACH THEY WOULD MAKE WOULD BE SO CLUMSY, THAT WE MIGHT NOT RECOGNIZE IT AS SUCH, AND WE MUST BE ON OUR GUARD THAT THIS NOT HAPPEN.

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Control: 19436
Rec'd: MAY 24, 1963
4:42 A.M.

FROM: OTTAWA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 14, MAY 24, 2 A.M. (SECTION 11 OF 11)

POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS

LORD HOME CONCLUDED WITH REFERENCE TO SPAAK STATEMENT MAY 22 REFLECTING CONCERN FOR MOUNTING NUCLEAR ARMORIES AND ACCELERATION NUCLEAR ARMS RACE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. LORD HOME QUERIED WHETHER WE MIGHT NOT BE UNDERTAKING BACKBREAKING EXPENSE FOR DEFENSE BASED ON STRATEGY OF LAST WAR THAT MIGHT NOT HAVE RELEVANCE TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. WE ARE BUILDING UP LAND AND NAVAL FORCES AND NUCLEAR STRIKE CAPACITY. COST IS OPEN-ENDED AND HAS NOT IMPOSED UNDUE STRAIN AS YET, BUT QUESTION ARISES: WHAT IS IT ALL FOR? IS IT FOR A WAR THAT COULD NOT BE FOUGHT, THAT COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GO BEYOND EARLY TACTICAL EXCHANGES BECAUSE NO ONE WOULD BE LEFT ALIVE? DOES OVER-KILL MAKE SENSE? SHOULD WE NOT TRY TO ESTABLISH MINIMUM DETERRENCE? WE HAVE MADE UP OUR MINDS TO BE POWERFUL, AND WE ARE POWERFUL, WHICH IS OUR PROTECTION, BUT ARE WE OVERDOING IT? THERE IS A TERRIBLE LOGIC TO VICIOUS CIRCLE OF MORE WEAPONS AND MORE TARGETS, AND QUESTION CANNOT BE ANSWERED NOW, BUT WE MUST CONSIDER WHETHER IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO BREAK VICIOUS CIRCLE AND CREATE MINIMUM DETERRENT WITHOUT OVER-KILL. SCHROEDER (FEDREP) SAID ATTEMPT TO ANSWER LORD HOME'S QUESTIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. THEN PROCEEDED TO DISCUSS SITUATION IN USSR. NOTED SOVIET BLOC NO LONGER MONOLITHIC, EXPERIENCING GREAT ECONOMIC AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES, BUT IN SPITE OF SUCH PROBLEMS SOVIETS HAVE NOT NEGLECTED ARMAMENTS AND HAVE INCREASED PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND HEAVY INDUSTRY. SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT SEEMS TO HAVE HAD NO INFLUENCE ON SOVIET POLICY IN EUROPE. LACK OF ACTION ON SOVIET PART IS DUE IN SOME DEGREE TO PREOCCUPATION WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS, BUT ALSO TO US ACTION IN CUBA. KHRUSHCHEV HAS NOT RENOUNCED

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-2- SECTO 14, MAY 24, 2 A.M., FROM OTTAWA (SECTION 11 OF 11)

RENOUNCED ANY OF HIS AIMS OR SHOWN ANY WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE, ALTHOUGH HE MAY NOT HAVE PURSUED HIS AIMS WITH SAME EMPHASIS AS BEFORE. IT IS HARD TO TELL WHETHER THIS IS GOOD FOR NATO, SINCE PAUSE GIVES US TEMPTATION TO GIVE GREATER EMPHASIS TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. GERMAN POLICY TOWARD USSR CONTAINS NO ILLUSIONS. GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE NOT NORMAL, AND THERE IS LITTLE MARGIN TO IMPROVE THEM. HOWEVER, THERE IS NORMAL BUT LIMITED TRADE BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES, AND PRESENT TRADE AGREEMENT WILL BE RENEWED WHEN IT EXPIRES. GERMANS ARE ALSO TRYING TO INCREASE CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS. HAVE HAD SATISFACTORY TALKS WITH POLISH GOVERNMENT AND WILL OPEN TRADE OFFICE IN WARSAW WHICH WILL BE FIRST FEDREP REPRESENTATION IN SATELLITE COUNTRY. READY TO CONDUCT SIMILAR NEGOTIATIONS WITH HUNGARY AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. SOVIET AIMS RE BERLIN AND EAST GERMANY ARE UNCHANGED, AND KHRUSHCHEV STILL HOPES TO OBTAIN RECOGNITION FOR EAST GERMAN REGIME AND TURN BERLIN INTO FREE CITY. ASSISTANCE TO BERLN NEEDED, NOT BECAUSE BERLIN PEOPLE CAN BE INTIMIDATED, BUT BECAUSE PROLONGED ISOLATION CAN HAVE BAD EFFECT ON THEM. IN EAST GERMANY THERE IS CONTINUING AGRICULTURAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS, BUT IN SPITE OF OPPRESSION THERE ARE STILL FEWER COMMUNISTS PROPORTIONATELY THAN IN SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES. RE PROPOSED NATO-WARSAW NON-AGGRESSION PACT, WE MUST BE VERY CAUTIOUS AND NOT ALLOW SOVIETS TO ESCAPE DISARMAMENT MEASURES IN THIS WAY. SEVERAL MONTHS OF PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR HAVE NOT MADE SOVIETS TRUSTWORTHY, AND PRICE OF PEACE REMAINS HIGH.

RUSK

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Control: 19876
Rec'd: MAY 24, 1963
5:39 A.M.

FROM: OTTAWA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 17, MAY 24, 5 P.M. (SECTION 1 OF III)

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 17; INFORMATION PARIS 137

POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS

POUCHED CINCLANT FOR POLAD

PARIS FOR EMBASSY AND USRO

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AFTERNOON SESSION MAY 23 ON "REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION."

THIS MEETING, WHICH CONCLUDED DISCUSSION POLITICAL SUBJECTS, INCLUDED STATEMENTS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF DENMARK, GREECE, CANADA, ITALY, NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, FRANCE, PORTUGAL AND NORWAY.

1. HAEKKERUP (DENMARK) OPENED SESSION BY COMMENTING BRIEFLY ON THREE TOPICS: (A) REVIEWED SOVIET-DANISH RELATIONS, INCLUDING GROMYKO VISIT IN MARCH, SOVIET EFFORTS TO RELAX TENSIONS IN NAME OF COEXISTENCE AND RELATIONSHIP OF NEW SOVIET APPROACH TO POSSIBLE KHRUSHCHEV VISIT TO SWEDEN; (B) DENMARK SUPPORTED CLOSER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND PLEDGED ITS ASSISTANCE AND FELT THAT WEST SHOULD ADJUST ITSELF TO ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHIES IN THESE COUNTRIES IN EXTENDING AID; (C) STALEMATE IN DISARMAMENT TALKS AND ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN WAS DISCOURAGING AND SITUATION MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS SIMILAR TO LATE 1961; SUPPORTED RECENT US-UK APPROACH TO KHRUSHCHEV AND STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF OBTAINING AGREEMENT RE NON-DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

/2. IN LENGTHY

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2. IN LENGTHY STATEMENT, AVEROFF (GREECE) SUPPORTED SECRETARY'S THESIS RE INTERDEPENDENCE OF US AND EUROPE; AGREED THAT POSSIBLE ATTAINMENT BY CHINESE COMMUNISTS OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WAS DANGEROUS PROSPECT BUT ALSO POINTED WITH CONCERN TO POSSIBLE ATTAINMENT OF LIMITED-RANGE ROCKETS BY ISRAEL, EGYPT AND INDIA. AVEROFF OPPOSED NATO-WARSAW PACT NON-AGGRESSION TREATY, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF PROBLEM OF EAST GERMAN RECOGNITION, BUT BECAUSE SIGNING SUCH PACT WOULD CREATE SENSE OF FALSE SECURITY AND THUS SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC OPINION IN THOSE NATO COUNTRIES WHICH WERE EXERTING THEMSELVES TO ACHIEVE MILITARY BUILD-UP.

IN DISCUSSING EASTERN EUROPE, GREEK FONMIN NOTED THERE WAS DEFINITE FERMENT BUT URGED WEST REFRAIN FROM MAKING ANY "BROAD GENERALITIES" RE INTERNAL SITUATION. MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH WOULD BE TO CHOOSE ONE OR TWO COUNTRIES WHICH SHOWED BEST PROSPECT OF MODIFYING POLICIES AND SEEK TO EXERCISE INFLUEENCE OVER THESE COUNTRIES. THANKED STIKKER FOR COMMENTING ON GREEK ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SYG'S ANNUAL POLITICAL APPRAISAL BUT SAID THAT OECD CONSORTIUM ON GREECE HAD OPERATED IN VACUM. FURTHERMORE, MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAD NOT MATERIALIZED TO DEGREE ANTICIPATED AND THEREFORE TASK OF MAINTAINING GREEK DEFENSE EFFORTS AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY WHEN REMEMBERED THAT AVERAGE PER ANNUM INCOME IN GREECE WAS APPROXIMATELY $360. CONCLUDED WITH SUGGESTION SYG AUTHORIZE STUDY OF QUESTION OF GREEK PROBLEM IN ORDER ACHIEVE MORE PRACTICAL SYSTEM TO CARRY OUT INTENT OF DEFENSE RESOLUTION.

3. CANADA'S NEW FONMIN MARTIN STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVED POLITICAL CONSULTATION IN NATO AND SUPPORTED RECOMMENDATION THAT MINISTERS MORE FREQUENTLY ATTEND MEETINGS OF PERMANENT COUNCIL. WHILE DISARMAMENT PROGRESS WAS NOT HOPEFUL, PARTICULAR EFFORT WAS REQUIRED TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON COLLATERAL MEASURES, SUCH AS RISK OF WAR MEASURES AND NUCLEAR TEST BAN. WELCOMED US-UK APPROACH TO MOSCOW RE TEST BAN AND RECALLED THAT WESTERN FOUR AT GENEVA HAD ADHERED TO PRINCIPLES OF UNGA

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IRISH RESOLUTION. TURNING TO OTHER AREAS, MARTIN EXPRESSED HOPE ICC IN LAOS WOULD ACHIEVE GREATER FREEDOM AND NOTED ENCOURAGING INDIAN REASSESSMENT THEIR ROLE ON ICC; IN MIDDLE EAST, PROBLEM WAS TO PREVENT USSR FROM EXPLOITING SITUATION IN IRAQ AND YEMEN AND ELSEWHERE AND TO ENSURE THAT WEST SHOULD NOT BE RESERVED ABOUT ITS SUP ORT FOR ARAB UNITY; BASIC INTEREST OF CANADA IN MIDDLE EAST LAY IN PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES WITHIN UN FRAMEWORK. IN AFRICA, CANADA STUDYING POSSIBILITY OF ASSISTING MODERNIZATION OF CONGOLESE ARMED FORCES -- ALTHOUGH CANADIAN MILITARY COMMITMENTS ALREADY OVER-STRAINED -- AND, IN LATIN AMERICA, CANADA NOW UNDERTAKING REVIEW OF ITS POLICIES BUT SHOULD BE IN POSITION TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE ALONG LINES SUGGESTED BY SECRETARY RUSK.

RUSK

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FROM: OTTAWA

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: SECTO 17, MAY 24, 5 AM (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 17, INFORMATION PARIS 137.

POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS

POUCHED CINCLANT FOR POLAD

PARIS FOR EMBASSY AND USRO

4. MARTINO (ITALY) REFERRED TO GLOBAL CHARACTER OF NATO AND SAID IT WAS NOT ONLY MILITARY ALLIANCE BUT WAS GENERAL POLITICAL SYSTEM. NOTED WITH SATISFACTION SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSAL FOR REVIEW OF FORCES, BUDGETS, AND STRATEGY; SHARED RUSK'S AND HOME'S VIEW ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, SUPPORTED IDEA OF KEEPING LINES OPEN TO MOSCOW, AND OBSERVED THAT EAST-WEST CONFLICT WAS INCREASINGLY ON ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PLANE. MARTINO STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION WHICH HE CONSIDERED ONE OF WEAKEST ASPECTS OF ALLIANCE. HE ENDORSED COMMON EUROPEAN POLICY, DESCRIBING IT AS BASIS OF ITALIAN POLICY. URGED THAT CLOSER STUDY NEEDED OF LONG-TERM POLITICAL PLANS AND COMMITMENTS OF COMMUNISTS AND REFERRED TO FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER SEGNI'S 1961 PROPOSAL THAT WEST SHOULD FORMULATE SIMPLE DECLARATION OF ITS PRINCIPLES AND AIMS.

5. FOR NETHERLANDS LUNS OBSERVED THERE WAS NO MAJOR CHANGE IN WEST'S RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT PRESENT CALM OFFERED OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE COMMON DEFENSE AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL COOPERATION. IN APPARENT REFERENCE TO WEST NEW GUINEA, SAID THAT CERTAIN NATO COUNTRIES SOMETIMES UNDER PRESSURE FROM THEIR ALLIES TO WEAKEN THEIR POSITION IN WORLD AND THUS ANTI-COMMUNIST POSTURE OF ALLIANCE. LUNS STRONGLY SUPPORTED POLITICAL CONSULTATION, STRESSED

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BELIEF NATO COUNCIL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS FOCAL POINT IN ALLIANCE AND ENDORSED ATLANTIC POLICY ADVISORY GROUP AS USEFUL INSTRUMENT TO BRING POTENTIAL PROBLEMS TO ATTENTION OF MINISTERS. [redacted]

LUNS CONCLUDED BY COMMENTING UPON SECRETARY RUSK'S REMARKS RE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AND SAID DUTCH WOULD PLAY FULL PART IN LATIN AMERICA WHERE BETTER COORDINATION AMONG NATO COUNTRIES WAS NEEDED.

6. SPAAK (BELGIUM) STRONGLY ENDORSED SECRETARY'S COMMENTS RE INDIVISIBILITY OF ALLIANCE. NOTED WITH APPROVAL SECRETARY HAD SAID THAT US SUPPORTED INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN US AND EUROPE NOT FOR SENTIMENTAL REASONS BUT BECAUSE OF BASIC US INTERESTS. WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT CONFLICT COULD OCCUR IN EUROPE WHICH WOULD NOT INVOLVE US FROM OUTSET. US WILLINGNESS TO SHARE TO CERTAIN EXTENT NUCLEAR ARMS AND THEIR USE WAS ASSISTING MILITARY INTEGRATION IN NATO. RE EAST-WEST RELATIONS, SPAAK AGREED THEIR WAS IMMOBILITY IN SOVIET POLICY AND CONTRASTED CURRENT SITUATION WITH THAT SEVERAL YEARS AGO WHEN SOVIET POLICY SEEMED DYNAMIC AND WHEN SOVIETS TOOK MANY INITIATIVES. NOW SITUATION HAD CHANGED COMPLETELY AND WEST MUST FIND IMAGINATIVE WAY OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF PRESENT PAUSE IN SOVIET POLICY. WARSAW-NATO NON-AGGRESSION PACT SHOULD NOT BE REJECTED OUT OF HAND AS NAP COULD BE USEFUL COMPLEMENT TO AGREEMENT ON DISARMAMENT OR BERLIN.

7. FOR FRANCE, COUVE DE MURVILLE SAID WISHED LIMIT HIMSELF TO SUBJECT OF NATO AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND COMMUNIST WORLD. REFERRED TO SECRETARY'S REMARKS REGARDING PRINCIPLES AND OBLIGATIONS OF NATO AND NOTED THAT NATO WAS UNDERGOING EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS, AS PART OF WHICH THERE WERE TWO BASIC PROBLEMS -- FIRST, THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM AND, SECOND, EUROPEAN PROBLEM. NUCLEAR PROBLEM REVOLVED AROUND THE QUESTION OF WHO MANUFACTURED NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHO DECIDED UPON THEIR USE,

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-3- SECTO 17, MAY 24, 5 AM (SECTION TWO OF THREE), FROM OTTAWA

AND WHAT TYPE OF HIGH NATO MILITARY STRATEGY SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. OWNERSHIP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONFERRED ENORMOUS RESPONSIBILITY UPON OWNERS AND SOLUTION TO PROBLEM OF RESPONSIBILITY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED CALMLY AND OBJECTIVELY. RE EUROPEAN PROBLEM, COUVE SAID THAT THIS PROBLEM RESULTED FROM GREAT TRANSITION WHICH EUROPE HAD UNDERGONE IN PAST 15 YEARS AS RESULT BOTH OF EUROPEAN RECOVERY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND OF DISAPPEARANCE OF ANTAGONISMS WITHIN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY BETWEEN GERMANS AND FRENCH. IT WAS INACCURATE TO REFER TO EUROPE AS WHOLE RATHER THAN AS GROUP OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. BECAUSE THIS SYSTEM OF INDIVIDUAL STATES PERSISTED, PROBLEM AROSE WHEN ONE TALKED OF EUROPE AS "EQUAL PARTNER" OF US THIS GOAL MIGHT BE HOPED FOR IN FUTURE BUT FACT REMAINED THAT THERE WAS NO COUNTRY CALLED "EUROPE" BUT RATHER COLLECTION OF EUROPEAN STATES. START TOWARD UNITY WAS BEING MADE IN ECONOMIC FIELD BUT LITTLE COHESION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY. THEREFORE, WHEN THINKING ABOUT EUROPE, ONE SHOULD RECOGNIZE REALITY OF FACTUAL SITUATION. PROGRESS TOWARD MORE EQUITABLE SHARING OF DEFENSE BURDEN BETWEEN US AND EUROPE COULD NOT BE ATTAINED UNTIL THERE WAS GREATER PROGRESS IN POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIELDS.

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: SECTO 17, MAY 24, 5 AM (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 17, INFORMATION PARIS 137.

POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS

POUCHED CINCLANT FOR POLAD

PARIS FOR EMBASSY AND USRO

TURNING TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS, COUVE AGREED WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT WAS OCCURRING WITHIN USSR OR DEGREE TO WHICH NATIONALISTIC OR IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS WERE INFLUENCING SOVIET POLICY. CURRENT IMMOBILITY IN SOVIET POLICY RECALLED SITUATION AT TIME OF SUMMIT FAILURE IN MAY, 1960 WHILE CONSTRUCTION OF BERLIN WAS IN AUGUST 1961 MARKED END OF BERLIN CRISIS AS KNOWN SINCE 1958. COUVE SAID TWO TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS COULD BE DRAWN RE SOVIET POLICY; FIRST WEST SHOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD FAST AND BE VIGILANT; SECOND, WEST SHOULD NOT ALLOW ITSELF TO TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH IT THOUGHT COULD INFLUENCE INTERNAL POLICY WITHIN THE USSR OR SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. ANY INTERVENTION IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS MIGHT WELD TOGETHER DISSIDENT ELEMENTS AND ANY EFFORT TO HELP KHRUSHCHEV MIGHT CAUSE REVERSION TO STALINISM. COUVE TOOK NEGATIVE VIEW OF NATO-WARSAW NON-AGGRESSION PACT SAYING WEST SHOULD VIEW SUCH PACT IN TERMS OF BENEFITS TO WESTERN POLICY RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF RESULTS RE SOVIET POLICY; UNABLE SEE WHAT ADVANTAGES NAP WOULD HAVE FOR WEST BECAUSE IF SOVIETS SEEKING TRUE DETENTE, THIS WOULD BE EXPRESSED THROUGH OTHER MEANS, SUCH AS IN DISARMAMENT FIELD.

8. NOGUEIRA OF PORTUGAL RESTRICTED REMARKS TO LATIN

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AMERICA AND AFRICA. BRAZILIAN PICTURE WAS CRITICAL AND SITUATION IN CUBA WAS AS SERIOUS AS BEFORE MISSILES REMOVED. NOTING GREAT SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL VIA CUBA, EXPLAINED THAT PRESENT CUBAN REPRESENTATIVE IN LISBON ACTING MORE LIKE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE THAN CUBAN. SAID PORTUGAL AND SPAIN FULLY PREPARED TO PLAY THEIR PART TO KEEP LATIN AMERICA SAFE FOR FREE WORLD. RE AFRICA, SITUATION IN PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES HAD IMPROVED, PARTICULARLY IN PORTION ANGOLA WHERE TERRORISTS ACTIVE IN 1961, BUT TERRORISTS STILL RECEIVING SUPPORT THROUGH CONGO AND OTHER SOURCES. DESPITE AFRO-ASIAN STATEMENTS IN UN AND ELSEWHERE, PORTUGAL WAS IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH CERTAIN AFRICAN COUNTRIES, NOTABLY NYASALAND AND MADAGASCAR AND HOPED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CONGO.

9. IN SHORT CONCLUDING SPEECH, NORWEGIAN DEFENSE MINISTER HARLEM ENDORSED HOME'S PROPOSAL THAT QUESTION OF IMPLICATIONS OF SIZE OF WESTERN ARMAMENT BUILD UP SHOULD BE EXAMINED, NOT ONLY IN DISARMAMENT CONTEXT BUT IN NATO PERMANENT BODIES; SUPPORTED EFFORTS OF US AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO ACHIEVE EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL. ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH PRIME MINISTER PEARSON'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT NATO SHOULD CONSIDER ITSELF AS ENGAGED IN BROAD RANGE OF ACTIVITIES NOT ONLY IN DEFENSE FIELD BUT ALSO INCLUDING DISARMAMENT, UN RELATIONSHIPS, AND ASSISTANCE TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

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(43)

FROM: OTTAWA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 18, MAY 24, NOON

POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS

FINAL SESSION MINISTERIAL MEETING HELD MORNING MAY 24 AND CONFINED TO RELATIVELY BRIEF SUMMING UP BY SECGEN AND ADOPTION FINAL COMMUNIQUE (TRANSMITTED SEPARATE TELEGRAM) WITHOUT DISCUSSION.

STIKKER EXPRESSED VIEW MEETING HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN DEVELOPING PARTNERSHIP IN POLITICAL AND DEFENSE FIELDS AND MINISTERIAL MEETING WAS INDISPENSABLE BASIS FOR CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS AMONG PERMREPS. EXPRESSED HOPE MINISTERS WOULD VISIT AND TAKE PART IN PARIS DISCUSSIONS FREQUENTLY. SUMMARIZED COUNCIL DISCUSSION UNDER FOUR GENERAL HEADINGS:

FIRST, WITH RESPECT TO STATE OF ALLIANCE HE NOTED THAT WHILE PROBLEMS EXISTED THERE WERE NO RPT NO CRISES. IN MENTIONING PROBLEM POLITICAL CONSULTATION HE DIGRESSED TO BRING UP QUESTION SITUATION ROOM AT NATO HEADQUARTERS AND ASKED MINISTERS TO INSTRUCT REPRESENTATIVES ON BUDGET COMMITTEE NOT RPT NOT TO QUESTION PRINCIPLES WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED BY COUNCIL AND NOT RPT NOT TO HOLD UP MODEST FUNDS INVOLVED TO IMPLEMENT THEIR DECISIONS, AS HAD HAPPENED YESTERDAY.

WITH RESPECT TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS HE NOTED THAT THERE WAS A "PAUSE" IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. SOVIETS WERE DRAGGING FEET IN ALL AREAS AND APPEARED TO BE UNDERTAKING GENERAL REAPPRAISAL WHICH MAY RESULT IN RE-EMERGENCE OF HARD SOVIET LINE FOR WHICH NATO MUST BE PREPARED. SITUATION ALSO PRESENTED OPPORTUNITIES IF NATO "PLAYED ITS CARDS RIGHT." RECALLED RUSK REPORT RE INDICATION SOVIET DESIRE REACH AGREEMENT RE NATO-WARSAW NON-AGGRESSION PACT. THIS MUST BE CLOSELY STUDIED SINCE

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MANY LEGAL AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED. HE RECALLED GREEK SUGGESTION RE EXTENSION TRADE RELATIONS WITH ONE OR TWO SATELLITES AND CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT DOOR NOT RPT NOT BE CLOSED ON YUGOSLAVIA.

WITH RESPECT TO OTHER SENSITIVE AREAS HE RECAPITULATED DISCUSSION IN COUNCIL ON BERLIN, CUBA, SOUTHEAST ASIA, MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA. AS FINAL POINT HE DREW ATTENTION TO HOME REMARKS MAY 23 RE PROBLEMS OF "OVERKILL" AND MINIMUM DETERRENCE. HOME REMARKS SHOULD SERVE AS BACKGROUND FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF STRATEGY AND IN NATO DISCUSSIONS ON DISARMAMENT.

SECGEN THEN TURNED TO THIRD ITEM ("ANY OTHER BUSINESS"). NO MINISTERS REQUESTED FLOOR.

AS FINAL ITEM BUSINESS HE READ COMMUNIQUE PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH. STIKKER NOTED THAT THIS WAS FIRST TIME THAT NO MINISTER HAD COMMENTS TO MAKE ON DRAFT PRESENTED BY DRAFTING COMMITTEE.

SCP-3.

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Rusk P. Es, LOT 72D12

NATO 175/1

(44)

MONDAY
May 27, 1963
11:56 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR BUNDY

B said McNamara called before Sec got back last weekend and said he thought there was enough puzzlement in his mind from reactions of Def Mins so he thought we should look hard at signs and portents of MLF as Sec talked about it with the Pres. Thought it better for Sec, McN and B and maybe Ball to sit down as the Indians on both sides have taken sides. Get it so Pres can look at it pretty soon. Sec will have a letter to PM by the end of the p.m. which will help meet what they put forward as their concern. Puzzlement is in Rome. Sec thinks we should take a look at it but does not think their comments should be considered the views of the govts. B said that was Ball's view. Sec thinks this should be a warning and we should look at it. Should wait for letter to PM and have it in front of the Pres and meet with him tomorrow late a.m. B said they could also do the test ban one at the same time. Sec thought Nitze should be there too. B will check the Pres' calendar.

pdb

Mtg set for 11:30 5/28.

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MLF

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May 27, 1963

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: S/P - W. W. Rostow

SUBJECT: MLF.

I should like to say a word about the decision we face on the letter to Macmillan in particular and the MLF in general.

As on most great occasions, this one is surrounded by confusion, doubt, and uncertainty. But I am convinced that history will measure this Administration substantially by whether, in these familiar circumstances, we go forward, procrastinate, or go back on the MLF.

So far as the British are concerned, there is no political or military future for them in the national nuclear capability; and the most thoughtful men in both parties know in their hearts that the multilateral solution is the correct one. Both we and the British paid an extremely high price at Nassau for failing then to bite the bullet; neither we nor they can afford the price of procrastination or drawing back at this crucial stage.

I have little doubt that if we go forward firmly the British will come with us. If they do not, their disarray and loss of direction is even greater than I believe it to be; but we cannot build our policy on such transient bankruptcy in London.

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So far as the Continent is concerned, this is, quite simply, a test of whether the U.S. is still a leader that knows its own mind. The German political process has made a correct commitment, not without doubts and uncertainties; but the decision was made. If we go forward, the matter will be essentially settled in Italy; and a new situation will be created in France.

So far as the French are concerned, it is my conclusion from weekend talks that the Gaullists will know, if we go forward, that their hop-head dream is over. That dream has been spelled out to us over the weekend in great candor. It is to build around the force de frappe a political union on the Continent which Paris can dominate. The Gaullists are counting on: our doubts and uncertainties, as reflected in our current dialogue with London; on heightening European anxieties about Germans coming closer to strategic nuclear weapons; and on every other technical or political doubt they can muster.

If we do draw back, they have a chance to try for continental hegemony. It is my own conviction that such an effort would fail. What would happen, if we do draw back, would be a dangerous fragmentation of the Continent, based on differing mixtures of nationalism and neutralism in the various individual countries of Europe.

What is at stake is not de Gaulle against Kennedy: it is the continued unity of the Alliance under U.S. leadership; because the French do not have the strength or capacity to lead the Germans and Europe.

I believe, therefore, that we owe it to allies who are, in fact, as much dependent upon us for political as for military leadership at this stage in history -- including the French people -- that we go firmly forward.

WWRostow:rln

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Control 10332
Rec'd DECEMBER 15, 1963
7:43 AM

FROM: PARIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION: SECSTATE SECTO 5

DATE: DECEMBER 15, NOON

FOLLOWING BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON AND SUBJECT TO REVISION. NOT FOR FOREIGN DISSEMINATION.

SECRETARY'S INTERVIEW WITH SECGEN STIKKER, DECEMBER 14.

1. DISCUSSION ON NATO STRATEGY.

SECRETARY SAID WE REGARDED DIFFERENCES OVER NATO STRATEGY AS LARGELY THEORETICAL AND WOULD REACT ACCORDINGLY IF FRENCH TRIED TO PROVOKE CONTROVERSY. HE NOTED FOLLOWING POINTS: (1) FRENCH STRATEGIC DOCTRINE DOES NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION BERLIN PROBLEM; FRENCH SAY IT IS THEORETICAL BUT NEVERTHELESS IT EXISTS. (2) EUROPEANS APPROACH SUBJECT ON ASSUMPTION THERE WILL BE NO WAR IF NUCLEAR DETERRENT IS STRONG; WE REALISTIC ENOUGH TO THINK THERE MAY BE WAR. (3) PRESENT NATO FORCE GOALS WERE DEVISED ON COMMONLY AGREED BASIS OF A STRATEGIC DOCTRINE CALLING FOR EARLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; ANY REALISTIC REFINEMENT TODAY WOULD CALL FOR STRONGER RATHER THAN WEAKER CONVENTIONAL FORCES. (4) US HAS NEVER STATED THERE MUST BE A MILITARY PAUSE; WE RECOGNIZE LENGTH OF PAUSE, IF ANY, WILL BE VERY SHORT AND WILL DEPEND UPON KHRUSHCHEV SO THAT WE ARE ALWAYS PREPARED TO MAKE QUICK NUCLEAR RESPONSE. (5) FINALLY WE SIMPLY DO NOT BELIEVE CHIEFS OF GOVTS WILL IN FACT CARRY OUT A STRATEGY WHICH SUBJECTS THEIR COUNTRIES TO IMMEDIATE RISKS OF INCINERATION.

STIKKER AGREED WE NEED A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION OF DISPUTE WITH FRENCH OVER STRATEGY IN NAC AND THOUGHT HE SAW AN OPENING FOR THIS IN REMARKS MADE BY AILLERET IN MC/CS MEETING YESTERDAY. IF A STRATEGIC DEBATE WERE STARTED IN MINISTERIAL MEETING, HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD TRY TO TONE IT DOWN. DEBATE MIGHT BE USEFUL

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IN NAC AFTER JANUARY 22, WHEN DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCES WERE PAST. US SHOULD NOT ASSUME THERE WOULD NECESSARILY BE 13 TO 1 UNANIMITY AGAINST FRENCH ON SUBJECT. SECRETARY THOUGHT SOME EUROPEANS MIGHT USE SUPPORT FOR FRENCH AS PRETEXT FOR CUTTING DOWN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. SOME EUROPEANS SEEMED TO ASSUME CONVENTIONAL FORCES NOT IMPORTANT EXCEPT FOR THOSE OF US.

STIKKER THREW OUT IDEA, FOR PRIVATE CONSIDERATION ONLY, THAT IF US WOULD WITHDRAW ONE DIVISION AND GIVE EQUIPMENT TO EUROPEAN STATES, EUROPEANS MIGHT AGREE TO INCREASE NUMBER OF THEIR DIVISIONS SO THAT TOTAL MIGHT GO FROM 23 TO 26-1/2. SECRETARY DOUBTED THIS AND NOTED THAT DESPITE EISENHOWER'S RECENT SUGGESTION, US WAS UNDER NO PRESSURE TO BRING ITS TROOPS HOME.

2. EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

STIKKER ASKED SECRETARY WHETHER HE AGREED WITH BUTLER APPROACH TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS. SECRETARY REPLIED THAT UNLESS ALLIES WERE UNIFIED, NO PROGRESS WITH SOVIETS WAS POSSIBLE. BECAUSE OF UK DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION, BUTLER MIGHT BE MORE ANXIOUS TO MOVE FORWARD EAST WEST AGREEMENT THAN TRAFFIC WOULD BEAR. SECRETARY NOTED EAST-WEST SITUATION NOT AS BAD AS IT WOULD SEEM IN ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT; FOR EXAMPLE, ON NON-DISSEMINATION, FOUR NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD NOT IN FACT DISSEMINATE NUCLEARS; WITHOUT ANY AGREEMENT, DEFENSE BUDGETS MIGHT BE STABILIZED OR DROP OFF SLIGHTLY. STIKKER EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN RE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON EUROPEAN MILITARY EFFORT OF US DEFENSE BUDGET CUT. SECRETARY NOTED ANY US CUT WOULD BE VERY SMALL IN PROPORTION TO $50 BILLION TOTAL AND WOULD NOT AFFECT COMBAT CAPABILITY.

3. AID FOR GREECE AND TURKEY.

STIKKER INFORMED SECRETARY VENIZELOS WOULD PRESS FOR GREATER NATO CONTRIBUTIONS FOR GREEK DEFENSE, [redacted] AS FOR TURKS, STIKKER UNDERSTOOD THEY WOULD SIMPLY ASK FOR A STUDY OF THEIR DEFENSE PROBLEM.

-3- SECTO 5, DECEMBER 15, NOON; FROM PARIS

4. PROCEDURES AT OPENING SESSION.

ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR STIKKER TO MAKE BRIEF OPENING REMARKS DECEMBER 16 INCLUDING TRIBUTE TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY. SECRETARY THEN SPEAKS BRIEFLY AS HONORARY PRESIDENT, READING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGE. SECRETARY WILL LEAVE MEETING FOR NOON APPOINTMENT WITH DE GAULLE AND WILL MAKE HIS STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AT AFTERNOON SESSION.

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FROM: PARIS
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

POLTO 864, DECEMBER 17, 12 NOON

PRIORITY

(SECTION 1 OF 2)

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT POLTO 864 INFO DOWN POLTO 113 LONDON POLTO 141 OTTAWA POLTO 28 OTHER NATO CAPITS USUN

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM USDEL

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, FIRST SESSION, DECEMBER 16 AM

SUMMARY:

AFTER INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY SECGEN STIKKER, SECRETARY ADDRESSED COUNCIL AS HONORARY COUNCIL PRESIDENT, READING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON (TEXT OF SECRETARY'S STATEMENT RELEASED TO PRESS). UK, FRG AND CANADIAN FONMINS THEN SPOKE, PRESENTING EXPECTED VIEWS ON PROSPECTS FOR EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS. ALL SPEAKERS PAID TRIBUTE TO LATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND STRESSED NEED FOR CONTINUED ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND STRENGTH.

DETAILS;

UK: BUTLER ENDED COMMENTS ON VALUE OF ALLIANCE WITH REMARK THAT ISOLATION CANNOT BE A POLICY TODAY; PURSUIT OF POWER IN ISOLATION IS AN ILLUSION. TURNING TO INTERNATIONAL SCENE HE DECLARED SOVIETS ARE NOW EMBARKED ON POLICY BASED ON DETENTE. SIGNATURE OF TEST BAN TREATY AND KHRUSHCHEV DECEMBER 13 SPEECH ON MILITARY BUDGET SHOWS SOVIETS' DESIRE TO LIGHTEN BURDEN OF CONTINUING ARMS RACE. NO SIGN DISPUTE WITH CHINESE COMMUNISTS WILL LEAD SOVIETS TO PUT SELVES IN HANDS OF WEST, BUT SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION WILL AFFECT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD BLOC AND UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, WE CANNOT EXPECT ANY EASEMENT IN PEACEFUL COMPETITION BETWEEN SOVIETS AND WEST IN UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD.

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BUTLER EMPHASIZED DESIRABILITY OF CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH SOVIETS, TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISCALCULATION, BUT SAID AGREEMENTS MUST NOT UPSET THE MILITARY BALANCE TO WEST'S DISADVANTAGE AND MUST NOT IMPAIR ALLIANCE COHESION OR POSITION IN WEST BERLIN AND GERMANY. THOUGHT MOST FRUITFUL SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION MIGHT BE OBSERVATION POSTS, BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT LINKS WITH OTHER MEASURES PROPOSED BY SOVIETS RE OP'S RPT OP'S OR NON-DISSEMINATION AGREEMENT.

TURNING TO MILITARY STATUS OF ALLIANCE, BUTLER URGED MINISTERS TO AGREE ON FORCE LEVELS WITHOUT ENGAGING IN STERILE THEORETICAL DISPUTES ON STRATEGY. THEN PLEADED FOR OUTWARD-LOOKING ALLIANCE, INTERESTED IN EAST-WEST CONTEST IN UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD WHERE NATO COULD BE OUTFLANKED. SAID MALAYSIA PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED WAY IN WHICH DISTANT EVENTS CAN INVOLVE ALLIES; URGED ARMS SHIPMENTS TO INDONESIA BE HALTED.

CONCLUDING, BUTLER REITERATED NEED FOR ALLIANCE STRENGTH COMBINED WITH POLITICAL SUPPLENESS. SUGGESTED MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE CONTAIN PLEDGE NATO HAS NO INTENTION TO USE FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES.

FEDREP: SCHROEDER MAINTAINED CHANGES IN SOVIET BLOC HAD AFFECTED COMMUNIST METHODS BUT NOT OBJECTIVES. USSR MORE DANGEROUS TO WEST THAN CHINA; IT WAS KHRUSHCHEV WHO BROUGHT WORLD TO BRINK OVER CUBA: FEDREP WILL SUPPORT PROPER EFFORTS TO RELAX TENSIONS, BUT SEES NO EVIDENCE SOVIETS YET INCLINED TO NEGOTIATE ON PROBLEMS OF CENTRAL RATHER THAN PERIPHERAL IMPORTANCE. AUTOBAHN INCIDENTS SHOWED SOVIETS STILL TESTING WESTERN RESOLUTION AND UNITY.

AS TO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, SCHROEDER SAID: (1) NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE MEANINGFUL UNLESS PROBLEMS SUCH AS ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN SETTLED FIRST; (2) NON-DISSEMINATION AGREEMENT MEANINGFUL ONLY IF IT INCLUDED CHICOMS AND IF IT WERE NOT OBSTACLE TO CREATION OF MLF WHICH IS MEANS OF BRINGING ABOUT NECESSARY NUCLEAR INTEGRATION OF ALLIANCE; (3) GROUND CONTROL POSTS MUST BE SET UP IN DEPTH AND IN WAY NOT DISADVANTAGEOUS TO WEST, BEARING IN MIND PROBLEM OF STATUS OF SOVIET ZONE AS EVIDENCED IN CONNECTION WITH TEST BAN AGREEMENT.

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POLTO 864, DECEMBER 17 NOON SECTION 2 OF 2

PRIORITY

ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT POLTO 864; INFORMATION BONN POLTO 113 LONDON POLTO 141, OTTAWA POLTO 28, OTHER NATO CAPITOLS UNNUMBERED.

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FROM USDEL

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, FIRST SESSION, DECEMBER 16 AM

SCHROEDER DESCRIBED FEDREP EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND EXPRESSED HOPE SUCH ACTIVITIES COULD EXTEND FROM COMMERCIAL TO CULTURAL FIELD. IF EE GOVERNMENTS WERE COOPERATIVE, INCREASED TRADE COULD LESSEN ONE-SIDED EE DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET UNION. BERLIN MUST BE INCLUDED IN TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH BLOC. THERE SHOULD BE LIMITED TRADE EXPANSION WITH USSR, BUT TO EXTEND LONG-TERM CREDIT WOULD BE A GIFT TO KHRUSHCHEV DAMAGING WESTERN INTERESTS. EXTENDED CREDIT TERMS SHOULD BE WITHHELD AS A TRUMP AGAINST DAY WHEN SOVIETS WILLING TO MAKE REAL POLITICAL CONCESSIONS.

SCHROEDER CONCLUDED WITH DISCUSSION BERLIN AND GERMAN SITUATIONS. SAID FEDREP DOING ALL POSSIBLE TO ASSIST WEST BERLIN ON CHRISTMAS PASSES, BUT WOULD REFUSE BLACKMAIL. POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL LINKS BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND FEDREP MUST NOT BE IMPAIRED. RELAXATION OF GENERAL TENSIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO GRANT SELF-DETERMINATION TO GERMAN PEOPLE. SCHROEDER URGED VILIGANCE TO PREVENT GDR FROM OBTAINING IMPROVED STATUS, ESPECIALLY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

CANADA: MARTIN ANALYZED CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN TERMS SOMEWHAT SIMILAR BUTLERS. SAID THAT THOUGH HOPES FOR FURTHER EAST-WEST AGREEMENTS AFTER TEST BAN HAD SO FAR BEEN DISAPPOINTING IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE TO REDUCE RISK OF WAR. PRAISED SPAAK VISIT TO POLAND, AND SAID ISOLATION OF COMMUNIST CHINA NOT HELPFUL TO WESTERN INTERESTS.

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-2- POLTO 864, DECEMBER 17, NOON (SECTION 2 OF 2), FROM: PARIS

DISCUSSING AREAS WHERE FURTHER PROGRESS POSSIBLE, MARTIN STRESSED ENDC GENEVA ABILITY TO WORK OUT SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT MEASURES. FIRST AMONG THESE WAS SYSTEM OF GROUND OBSERVATION POSTS WHICH COULD BE VALUABLE SAFEGUARD FOR PEACE ELIMINATING THREAT OF SURPRISE ATTACK BY MASSIVE SOVIET LAND FORCES. WEST MUST NOT CONCLUDE BAD BARGAIN IMPAIRING ITS SECURITY: IT MUST NOT ENHANCE STATURE OF GDR, LEAD TO RAPACKI PLAN, WEAKEN WEST BY THIN-OUT OF ARMS OR INCREASE SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSION. NAC AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD CONTINUE STUDIES THIS PROBLEM. URGED IMPROVED CONTACTS BETWEEN ENDC AND NATO.

MARTIN CONTINUED WEST MUST CONTINUE EVINCE WILLINGNESS CONCLUDE NON-DISSEMINATION AGREEMENT ALONG LINES 16TH UNGA IRISH RESOLUTION. HAILED 18TH UNGA ACTION ON DENUCLEARIZED ZONES, APPROVING FLEXIBLE APPROACH. PROPOSED GENEVA CONFERENCE MEET AT REGULAR INTERVALS FOR REGULAR PERIODS, PREPARED TO EXPLOIT ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER AGREEMENT. SAW LITTLE HOPE FOR NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT: SUBSTANCE OF PROPOSED SOVIET DECLARATION ON BERLIN WAS UNSATISFACTORY, AND GROMYKO IN UNGA HAD HARDLY REFERRED TO NON-AGGRESSION. BUT WEST HAD NOTHING TO GAIN BY DROPPING MATTER.

MARTIN URGED CONTINUED EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COMMERCIAL, CONSULAR AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH SOVIET BLOC AND RESTORE SOME OF TRADITIONAL EASTERN EUROPEAN LINKS WITH WEST. NOTED CANADA WOULD CONTINUE TO OBSERVE 5-YEAR CREDIT LIMIT AND URGED TRADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH BLOC BE KEPT UNDER REVIEW IN NATO.

ON LAOS, MARTIN SAID CANADA WOULD PERSIST IN TRYING TO IMPROVE OBSERVATION BY INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. ON VIETNAM, HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ON POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING VIETCONG COOPERATION IN NEUTRALIST SOLUTION. ON YEMEN, THOUGHT THERE WAS LITTLE POINT IN EXTENDING UNYOM BEYOND JANUARY 1964, BUT POLITICAL ACTION MIGHT HELP OBTAIN DISENGAGEMENT. ON CUBA, SAW NO REASON TO BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BUT SAID CANADA WOULD CONTINUE TO BAN EXPORT OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC MATERIALS AND GOODS OF US ORIGIN, AND WOULD ALSO CONTINUE PRESENT RESTRICITIVE AIR TRANSIT POLICY.

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FROM: PARIS
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

POLTO CIRCULAR 49, DECEMBER 17, 9 A.M. (SECTION 1 OF 4 SECTIONS)

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PART ONE OF TWO PARTS

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING SECOND SESSION DECEMBER 16 P. M.

SUMMARY

NATO'S REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION CONTINUED WITH STATEMENTS FROM FONMINS REPRESENTING TEN NATO COUNTRIES: TURKEY, UNITED STATES, ITALY, GREECE, ICELAND, NETHERLANDS, DENMARK, FRANCE, BELGIUM, NORWAY.

ALL SPEAKERS EXCEPT FRENCH FONMIN COUVE DE MURVILLE AGREED SIGNIFICANT CHANGES HAD TAKEN PLACE IN COMMUNIST WORLD AND THAT NATO, WHILE MAINTAINING MILITARY STRENGTH OF ALLIANCE, SHOULD EXPLORE AVENUES FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS ON OUTSTANDING EAST-WEST ISSUES. COUVE TOOK TRADITIONAL HARD LINE, ASSERTING THAT SOVIET REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE ON GERMANY AND BERLIN WAS EVIDENCE MOSCOW'S POSITION UNCHANGED ON VITAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS. COUVE'S ASSESSMENT SHARPLY CHALLENGED BY SPAAK, WHO URGED HIGH DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY IN ALLIANCE'S REVIEW OF EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES AND DEPLORED NATO'S RECENT TENDENCY TO SWEEP CONTENTIOUS ISSUES UNDER RUG. LUXEMBOURG (SCHAUS) DECLINED TO SPEAK; PORTUGAL (NOGUEIRA) WILL SPEAK DECEMBER 17.
END SUMMARY

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-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 49, DECEMBER 17, 9 AM, FROM PARIS
(SECTION 1 OF 4)

TURKEY (ERKIN) OPENED AFTERNOON SESSION WITH LENGTHY STATEMENT WHICH INCLUDED SUMMARY RECENT EAST-WEST DEVELOPMENTS, TURKISH-BULGARIAN RELATIONS, EAST-WEST TRADE. ALSO MADE COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY STATUS REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING ALL COUNTRIES FROM UAR TO AFGHANISTAN. MOST SIGNIFICANT FROM NATO VIEWPOINT WERE HIS COMMENTS THAT (A) BECAUSE OF BULGARIAN SUPPRESSION OF TURKISH MINORITIES, BULGARIA DOES NOT DESERVE SPECIAL TREATMENT BY ALLIANCE AND (B) NATO COUNTRIES SHOULD AVOID ANY INCREASED TRADE WITH SOVIET BLOC WHICH MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT CERTAIN ALLIES, SUCH AS TURKEY.

UNITED STATES (SECRETARY RUSK) SPEAKING FROM NOTES, EXPRESSED US APPRECIATION FOR STATEMENTS ABOUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY. SAID ON BASIS AVAILABLE EVIDENCE, ASSASSINATION WAS COMMITTED BY INDIVIDUAL ACTING IN HIS OWN CAPACITY AND NOT IN CONJUCTION WITH ANY GROUP OR FOREIGN POWER. SPEAKING ON PERSONAL BASIS, SECRETARY SAID PRESIDENT JOHNSON WOULD PLAY MAJOR ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BOTH BECAUSE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY CHIEF OF STATE TO NEGLECT FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND BECAUSE PRESIDENT JOHNSON THROUGH BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE WAS WELL EQUIPPED TO DEVOTE FULLEST PERSONAL ATTENTION TO FOREIGN PROBLEMS.

SECRETARY THEN REVIEWED SITUATION WITHIN ALLIANCE NOTING THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NUMBER OF DIFFERENCES, IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE WAS TO MOBILIZE WESTERN LEADERSHIP AND TO GIVE GREATER SENSE OF UNITY IN 1964 THEN MIGHT HAVE BEEN PRESENT DURING 1963. ANALYZED DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN COMMUNIST WORLD, ASSESSED SINO-SOVIET SPLIT AND INTERNAL SITUATION WITHIN USSR, INCLUDING AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES. OBSERVED THAT NUMBER OF CHANGES WERE ALSO TAKING PLACE WITHIN SMALLER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, AND SUGGESTED NATO COUNTRIES MIGHT UNDERTAKE STUDY ASCERTAIN WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN EASTERN EUROPE. REVIEWED RECENT AGREEMENTS WITH USSR INCLUDING "HOT LINE", TEST BAN TREATY AND UN DECLARATION AGAINST ORBITING OF WEAPONS IN SPACE BUT EMPHASIZED THESE AGREEMENTS DID NOT ADD UP TO DETENTE. DANGEROUS QUESTIONS OF BERLIN AND GERMANY, LAOS AND VIETNAM, AND CUBA STILL REMAINED. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD EXPLORE POSSIBLE METHODS OF ACHIEVING DETENTE BUT SHOULD AVOID ILLUSION OR NAIVETE.

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-3- POLTO CIRCULAR 49, DECEMBER 17, 9 AM, FROM PARIS
(SECTION 1 OF 4)

COMMENTING ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS, SECRETARY SAID HE SAW NO PROSPECT FOR NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT AT THIS TIME ALTHOUGH NAP MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN CONTEXT OF SETTLEMENT WHICH GENUINELY IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ALSO SAW LITTLE MERIT IN SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR SEPARATE SOVIET NAP-TYPE DECLARATION ON BERLIN, WHICH WAS TOO VAGUE AND DID NOT IMPROVE DE FACTO SITUATION. SIMILARLY, LITTLE PROGRESS SEEMED LIKELY ON OBSERVATION POSTS WHICH SOVIETS CONTINUED TO LINK WITH TROOP THIN-OUT AND DENUCLEARIZATION OF GERMANY. SECRETARY ALSO DESCRIBED POSSIBLE SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO NON-DISSEMINATION PROPOSAL IN ADDITION TO THOSE OBJECTIONS DETECTED AT MLF.

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FROM: PARIS
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POLTO CIRCULAR 647, DECEMBER 17, 9 A.M. (SECTION 2 OF 4 SECTIONS)

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

SECRETARY REAFFIRMED US VIEWS RE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND RE BERLIN AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBED PROSPECTS FOR GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS AND FOR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS, INCLUDING SALE OF WHEAT. RE CREDITS SAID US BELIEVED CREDITS SHOULD NOT BECOME AID AND THUS RELIEVE SOVIETS FROM EXISTING ECONOMIC STRINGENCIES. CONCLUDED BY COMMENTING ON SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND CUBA. REMINDED NATO ALLIES THEY SHOULD VIEW CUBAN PROBLEM AS THEIR OWN PROBLEM AND CONSIDER EXERTING ADDITIONAL PRESSURES ON CUBA (FULL TEXT SECRETARY'S STATEMENT WILL BE POUCHED ALL NATO POSTS).

ITALY (SARAGAT) REAFFIRMED NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND POLICIES LEADING TO INCREASING POLITICAL UNITY IN EUROPE. CHANGES HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE WITHIN NATO, PARTICULARLY RELATING TO CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THEREFORE POSSIBLE CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION OF ALLIANCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED; HOWEVER, DID NOT OFFER SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS. SARAGAT ALSO SUPPORTED FUTURE EXPLORATIONS WITH SOVIETS SO LONG AS BASIC WESTERN INTERESTS PROTECTED; ATTRIBUTED SOFTER SOVIET LINE TOWARD WEST AS REFLECTING MOSCOW'S NEED TO PRESENT ITSELF IN BETTER LIGHT IN UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES; AND SUPPORTED CLOSER CONSULTATION IN NATO AS WELL AS ATTEMPT TO CONCERT POLICIES TOWARD USSR. FOR THIS PURPOSE SUGGESTED FOUR MINISTERIAL MEETINGS ANNUALLY. SARAGAT SAID MULTILATERAL FORCE (MLF) WAS

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DESIGNED TO INCREASE POLITICAL AND MILITARY COHESION IN ALLIANCE; EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP IN TERMS SPELLED OUT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY, AND CONCLUDED BY STRESSING IMPORTANCE PAINTING BETTER PICTURE OF NATO IN NON-NATO COUNTRIES.

GREECE (VENIZELOS) DEALT PRIMARILY WITH LOCAL TOPICS, PARTICULARLY GREEK GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN RE DEFENSE OF GREEK-BULGARIAN FRONTIER AND GREECE'S WEAK ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. SAID BULGARIA ARMY HAD RECENTLY BEEN CONVERTED INTO AN OFFENSIVE ARMY AND CONSEQUENTLY IMPORTANT TO OVERCOME GREEK ARMY DEFICIENCIES. NOTING THREAT TO SOUTHERN FRONTIER, VENIZELOS SAID GREECE WAS APPREHENSIVE BECAUSE RECENT NATO DISCUSSIONS ON STRATEGY EMPHASIZED MORE FLEXIBLE STRATEGIC CONCEPT WHICH INVOLVED GREATER RISK FOR GREECE. SAID EARLIER NATO STUDY HAD INDICATED GREEKS NEEDED ADDITIONAL $50 MILLION PER YEAR TO MEET DEFENSE NEEDS, AND EMPHASIZED IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO CLOSE GAP ON URGENT BASIS. ERKIN (TURKEY) INTERVENED TO ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH VENIZELOS' REMARKS, NOTING THAT GREECE'S PROBLEMS WERE TURKEY'S PROBLEMS AS WELL. SYG STIKKER SAID MINISTERS WOULD RETURN TO SPECIAL GREEK-TURKISH PROBLEMS AT LATER SESSION.

GP-4.

CFN MLF 350 SYG GP-4

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NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING SECOND SESSION DECEMBER 16 P.M.

PART TWO OF TWO

ICELAND (GUDMUNDSSON) AFFIRMED NEW CABINET IN ICELAND WOULD CONTINUE ICELAND'S POLICY TOWARD NATO AND THAT ICELAND STILL WELCOMED DEFENSE FORCES UNDER TERMS OF US-ICELANDIC AGREEMENT. OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT PRO-COMMUNIST AND OPPOSITION ELEMENTS HAD STEPPED UP PROPAGANDA AGAINST DEFENSE FORCES SINCE SIGNING OF LIMITED TEST BAN AGREEMENT AND THAT SOVIETS HAD INCREASED PRESSURES FOR LANDING RIGHTS. SUGGESTED NATO SHOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITHIN ALLIANCE.

NETHERLANDS (LUNS) STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF NATO IN PROVIDING CONTINUED SECURITY PROTECTION FOR WEST, EXPLAINING THAT PRESENT THAW IN COLD WAR COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO NATO'S SUCCESS. NATO STRENGTH SHOULD BE MAINTAINED WHILE STUDYING METHODS OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST WORLD. INITIATION OF SUCH STUDIES DID NOT MEAN THAT NATO WOULD NECESSARILY NEGOTIATE, BUT WOULD MEAN ALLIANCE WOULD BE PREPARED IF OPPORTUNITY AROSE. CITED NATO STUDY OF OBSERVATION POSTS AS EXAMPLE SUCH ADVANCE PLANNING. SAID LEADERS OF SMALL NATO COUNTRIES COULD MAKE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION BY THEIR CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD SUCH CONTACTS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN CONTEXT OVER-ALL NATO POLICY.

LUNS ALSO SUPPORTED INCREASED POLITICAL CONSULTATION AND WORK OF ATLANTIC POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP (APAG). RE CREDITS, NETHERLANDS FAVORED ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS MIGHT BE MADE TO BERNE CONVENTION WITH ADVANCE CONSULTATION BUT AGREED WITH RUSK THAT CREDITS SHOULD NOT BECOME AID. REAFFIRMED DUTCH SUPPORT OF ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WARNING IT SHOULD NOT BECOME "INWARD-LOOKING CONCERT."

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Correction issued: 12/18/63 1 p.m.

EUR -2- POLTO CIRCULAR 49, DECEMBER 17, 9 A.M. (SECTION 3 OF 4 SECTIONS). FROM: PARIS. CORRECTED PAGE 2.

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STYLE MEETING OF WEU AND SAID SAME SPIRIT MADE DUTCH GOVERNMENT DECIDE TO PARTICIPATE IN MLF STUDY WITHOUT COMMITMENT. DENMARK (HAEKKERUP), AFTER AGREEING WITH NEED TO CONTINUE SEEK DETENTE, GAVE FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS RE HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW: (A) SOVIET LEADERS HAD NOT CHANGED THEIR BASIC POLICIES; (B) KHRUSHCHEV SEEMED IN COMPLETE CONTROL AND WEST SHOULD NOT BASE POLICY ON ASSUMPTION KHRUSHCHEV WAS ON WAY OUT; (C) USSR FACED UNDOUBTED ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES BUT WEST WOULD BE NAIVE TO THINK THAT IT COULD SUCCESSFULLY HAMPER SOVIET UNION'S BASIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; (D) WHEN KHRUSHCHEV SUGGESTED HAEKKERUP TAKE DENMARK OUT OF NATO, HE DID SO IN ROUTINE FASHION; (E) ALTHOUGH HE URGED DENMARK ACCEPT KEKKONEN'S NON-NUCLEAR ZONE PLAN, KHRUSHCHEV SEEMED SATISFIED WITH HAEKKERUP'S REAFFIRMATION OF SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES' DETERMINATION NOT TO ACCEPT NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEIR SOIL.

FRANCE (COUVE DE MURVILLE) SAID HE WISHED LIMIT HIMSELF TO REFLECTIONS RE EAST-WEST SITUATION WHERE SEVERAL CHANGES WERE APPARENT. FIRST, EARLIER CONFLICT BETWEEN LEADERS OF TWO BLOCS HAD GIVEN WAY TO EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST ELEMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN COMMUNIST WORLD. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE AND INDICATION MORE LIBERAL TRENDS IN EASTERN EUROPE, MANIFESTED BY RECENT TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH FEDERAL REPUBLIC. SECOND, CHANGES OCCURING IN USSR ITSELF WHERE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS PARTICULARLY ACUTE. THESE INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN USSR ITSELF DID NOT CHANGE BALANCE OF FORCES OR BASIC SOVIET POLICY BUT DID CREATE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DIFFICULTIES.

DESPITE CHANGES OF THIS NATURE, COUVE CONTINUED, PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE WITH USSR DEPENDED SOLELY ON USSR ITSELF. KHRUSHCHEV WAS SOLIDLY ESTABLISHED, USSR WAS POWERFUL COUNTRY AND IT THEREFORE WAS NAIVE TO THINK WEST COULD EFFECTIVELY INFLUENCE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS WITHIN USSR TO TAKE ECONOMIC ACTION WHICH MIGHT SIGNIFICANTLY HURT REGIME. IF USSR STOPPED ITS THREATS TO BERLIN ACCESS AND CEASED ITS PROPAGANDA RE NUCLEAR ATTACK, IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT ITS BASIC ATTITUDE HAD CHANGED. BUT THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED. ESSENTIAL PROBLEM WAS GERMANY AND BERLIN. LATIN AMERICA, VIETNAM, LAOS, INDONESIA, WERE NOT VITAL BUT GERMANY WAS VITAL. IT WAS STILL APPARENT THAT GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY WAS CONSOLIDATION OF STATUS QUO IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY AND CREATION OF THIRD GERMAN STATE IN BERLIN, WHICH WOULD BECOME NEUTRAL.

FINLETTER

CORRECTION PASSED WHITE HOUSE 12/18/63, 10 a.m.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O DECEMBER 17 - 6:35 A.M.
PASSED TO THE WHITE HOUSE DECEMBER 17 - 6:34 A.M.

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-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 49, DECEMBER 17, 9 A.M. (SECTION 3 OF 4 SECTIONS). FROM: PARIS.

STYLE"MEETING OF WEU AND SAID SAME SPIRIT MADE DUTCH GOVERNMENT DECIDE TO PARTICIPATE IN MLF STUDY WITHOUT COMMITMENT. DENMARK (HAEKKERUP), AFTER AGREEING WITH NEED TO CONTINUE SEEK

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FINLETTER

* AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O DECEMBER 17 - 6:35 A.M.
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CONTROL: 11367
REC'D: DECEMBER 17, 1963, 5:16 A.M.

FROM: PARIS
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

POLTO CIRCULAR 49, DECEMBER 17, 9 A.M. (SECTION 4 OF 4 SECTIONS)

IMMEDIATE

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FROM USDEL

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING SECOND SESSION DECEMBER 16 P.M.

PART TWO OF TWO

COUVE RECALLED THAT SINCE JULY TALKS HAD TAKEN PLACE WITH SOVIETS ON NUMBER OF TOPICS -- NON-AGRESSION PACT, OBSERVATION POSTS, AND NON-DISSEMINATION. BUT EACH PROPOSAL WENT BACK TO GERMAN PROBLEM. THROUGH NAP SOVIETS SOUGHT RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY, THROUGH OBSERVATION POSTS THEY SOUGHT DEMILITARIZATION OF GERMANY, AND THROUGH NON-DISSEMINATION PROPOSAL THEY SOUGHT METHOD OF STOPPING MLF. TALKS MIGHT CONTINUE BUT BASIC SITUATION WOULD PROBABLY REMAIN UNCHANGED FOR YEARS AS LONG AS GERMANY PROBLEM UNRESOLVED.

BELGIUM (SPAAK) SHARPLY QUESTIONED COUVE'S NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT AND RECALLED THAT AT OTTAWA MEETING IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT AGGRESSIVE POLICIES OF USSR HAD DECREASED. SINCE OTTAWA, "MOSCOW TREATY" HAD BEEN SIGNED AND GENUINE SOVIET GRIEF OVER DEATH OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS EVIDENCE OF CHANGE OF ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PEOPLE. REFERRING TO HIS SUMMER TRIP TO MOSCOW AND RECENT TRIP TO POLAND, SPAAK CONCURRED IN WORLD AS UNCHANGEABLE MONOLITH. PEOPLE AND IDEAS CHANGED AND WAS APPARENT RUSSIANS DO NOT WANT WAR.

SPAAK SAID THAT, CONTRARY TO COUVE'S VIEWS, WEST MUST EXPLORE SITUATION AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY DIFFICULTY IN USSR TO PLAY WEST'S TRUMP CARDS. CASE IN POINT WAS WHEAT DEALS. SPAAK ASSERTED NATO ALLIANCE SEEMED TO BE GRIPPED BY DEADLOCK, BUT IT SHOULD NOT LET OPPORTUNITIES SLIP BY. AT OTTAWA, IT WAS

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2- POLTO Circular 49, December 17, 9 a.m. (SECTION 4 OF 4 SECTIONS), from Paris

AGREED TO UNDERTAKE IMPORTANT ASSESSMENT OF NATO'S STRATEGY, FORCES AND BUDGETS BUT THIS PROJECT HAD RUN INTO ALMOST INSUPERABLY OBSTACLE. HOWEVER, INSTEAD OF ASKING MINISTERS TO RESOLVE PROBLEM IT WAS BEING REFERRED BACK TO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO OBVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN OVERCOMING IMPASSE. WITH REGARD TO OBSERVATION POSTS, SPAAK SAID NATO DOCUMENTS ON OPS WERE DISAPPOINTING AND URGED THAT, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GERMANY, SINCERE EFFORTS BE MADE TO STUDY OBSERVATION POSTS BECAUSE OPS MIGHT BECOME SYMBOLIC STEP TOWARD PEACE. SIMILARLY, NATO SHOULD UNDERTAKE THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF NAP WHICH, WHILE UNACCEPTABLE AS ISOLATED MEASURE, MIGHT BE CAPSTONE TO OTHER AGREEMENTS. SPAAK ENDED BY OBSERVING THAT NATO MEMBERS FOND OF SAYING THAT NATO WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT AND UNITED. IN FACT, NATO WAS NOT UNITED.

NORWAY (LANGE) ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH BUTLER'S EARLIER REMARKS AND AGREED COMMUNIST WORLD NO LONGER MONOLITH: COMMUNIST WORLD IN FLUX AND EXPLORATION DESIRABLE. WHILE AGREEING WITH COUVE NO ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT TO GERMANY AND BERLIN IN PROSPECT, ALSO AGREED WITH SPAAK RE IMPORTANCE SEEKING AT LEAST PARTIAL SETTLEMENT TO MINOR PROBLEMS AND THUS CREATING CONDITIONS FOR SETTLEMENT LARGER ISSUES. EVEN IF OBSERVATION POSTS OF LIMITED MILITARY VALUE, THEY WOULD SIGNIFY SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF SYSTEM OF MUTUAL CONTROL, SOVIET PREVIOUS OPPOSITION TO WHICH HAD THWARTED ALL EFFORTS ACHIEVE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT ON OTHER MEASURES. CONCLUDING, LANGE ENDORSED EARLIER RECOMMENDATIONS THAT NATO COMMUNIQUE REAFFIRM DEFENSIVE CHARACTER OF NATO AND THAT GREATER EFFORT BE MADE TO EXPLAIN NATO TO UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES.

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FINLETTER

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 6:04 a.m., December 17.

Passed White House 6:27 a.m., December 17.

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PARIS (POLTO) DIAC-50 12-17-63

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Control Rec'd 12127 December 17, 1963 9:47 p.m.

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FROM: Paris

ACTION: Secstate POLTO Circular 50 Priority

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DATE: December 17, 11 p.m. (SECTION I OF III).

NATO Ministerial Meeting, Third Session, December 17 a.m.

Summary.

In discussion military questions Ministers heard major statements by Secretary McNamara. After correcting erroneous press interpretation his November 18 speech that NATO and Soviet nonnuclear forces equal, McNamara supported statement chairman Military Committee that deficiencies exist in NATO forces and asseted they would be overcome. McNamara called for cooperative efforts to define issues more sharply, develop alternatives, choose best course, and carry it out. In short statement Secretary Rusk endorsed MLF talks, expressed sympathy for Greece and Turkish needs, and urged other members assist them. Ministers adopted Greek resolution calling on DPC to study military and economic problems of south eastern region and to report to NAC if possible before next Ministerial Meeting. Council also adopted draft resolution on defense (CM) 63 (95 Revised) and noted other documents concerned with 1963 AR. Chairman of standing group presented intelligence estimate of increased Soviet threat. Chairman of Military Committee reported NATO military posture still inadequate. Statements also made by UK, Germany, Norway, Canada, Turkey.

Details.

Intelligence appreciations:

[redacted]

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Military Committee appreciation:

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In considering 1963 IR documents listed as agenda Item II (3) Subparagraphs (A) through (E) and (4), Stikker asked if there were comments. Erkin made statement on behalf himself and Defense Minister stressing urgent necessity for Alliance to assist Turkey in addition to contemplated U.S. aid. Urged NAC take up problem.

Secretary Rusk saw no basis for satisfaction on basis estimates and results 1963 IR. Strongly endorsed MLF as way for others participate in nuclear deterrent without increasing national nuclear deterrents. Europe could participate increasingly as political unity increased. Supported NAC attention to Greek and Turk problems. Urged increased efforts by others at January 16 meeting Turkish Consortium since U.S. funds will decrease. Stressed need for assistance in 1964.

Secretary McNamara then gave major U.S. military statement along lines his November 18 New York speech and supplying details. McNamara reaffirmed U.S. commitment to principles of Alliance and defense member nations. Covered (A) Soviet /strength, (B)

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-3- POLTO Circular 50, December 17, 11 p.m. (SECTION I OF III). from: Paris.

strength, (B) U.S. programs related to NATO, (C) adequacy of forces, (D) BOP. In conclusion McNamara stated "For a military posture which is sound, one which does meet our needs in the face of Soviet strength, is within our reach. Our problem is not total resources, or even perhaps the share of resources devoted to defense, but the proper use of these resources, and I have every hope that in the months ahead we will be able to work cooperatively in defining the issues more sharply, developing the alternatives, choosing our best course of action, and carrying it out."

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December 17, 1963
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FROM: Paris

ACTION: Secstate POLTO Circular 50 Priority

DATE: December 17, 11 p.m. (SECTION II OF III)

NATO Ministerial Meeting Third Session December 17 a.m.

Noted estimates Soviet strength varied -- accepted SGN's general estimate or IRBM/MRBMs. On ground forces, SGN's estimate at upper range US figures. McNamara detailed growing US strategic nuclear capability and second strike capacity. Reiterated US expenses associated with strategic sector would decline over next several years. Savings would be transferred to other forces designed operate overseas in support of allies. Administrative reforms would result in annual savings several billion. Expected US defense budget would decline slightly as percentage GNP though US percentage would remain far above NATO average. Reviewed progress in increasing combat-ready divisions, army reorganization, air lift capability and tactical air squadrons.

McNamara stressed total US offensive capabilities would be available in case major aggression against NATO territory.

[redacted]

Re BOP, McNamara stated US would not let basic commitments and policies be dictated by BOP. However, called for a cooperative approach in assuring that each member nation carries its fair share of defense costs and pointed out relationship of such action to meeting our BOP problem and in reassuring Congress and the American public on this point. Reiterated assurances US would keep combat divisions in Europe as long as needed.

Thorneycroft expressed

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-2- POLTO Circular 50 December 17, 11 p.m. (SECTION II OF III) from Paris

Thorneycroft expressed appreciation for McNamara's analysis of comparative East-West strengths, citing the need to understand the threat and the importance of rejecting the wilder interpretation of New York speech that conventional forces should be built up to point where conventional attack would be fought to end with conventional forces. Also commented that McNamara's remarks again rejected any thought of a reduction of US military strength and a withdrawal from Europe. With respect to strategic nuclear forces, Thorneycroft agreed that Alliance must accept the view that any Soviet surprise attack would still leave enough Alliance forces to annihilate the Soviet bloc. Concerning tactical nuclear weapons, he noted the massive and growing strength of the Alliance and that further increase would result in diminishing military returns. [redacted]

Agreed that full and frank analysis was needed. However, dangerous to rely on nuclear weapons alone and UK spent 90 percent of defense budget on conventional forces. Stated UK unable increase percentage GNP devoted to defense. In conclusion, praised Heusinger's contribution. Thorneycroft did not mention MLF.

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CORRECTION ISSUED
12/18/63 5 p.m. MRJ

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11:07 p.m.

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ACTION: Secstate POLTO Circular 50 Priority

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DATE: December 17, 11 p.m. (SECTION III OF III)

NATO Ministerial Meeting Third Session December 17 a.m.

Von Hassel welcomed President Johnson's reaffirmation US divisions would remain in Europe as long as needed and statement nothing had happened to indicate they not required. Defense free world indivisible and must be strong ties between Europe and America. Germany would do what it could to bear fair share of burden and would look for ways assist southern flank countries. Supported MFP exercise and MLF.

Harlem (Norway) announced five year defense plan adopted by Parliament. Welcomed creation of NATO mobile land forces.

When considering defense resolution C-M (63) 95 revised, Turkish permanent representative read declaration from Turkish Defense Minister warning that unless Turkey received increased external aid GOT would have to reconsider contribution to NATO (resolution adopted and Turkish statement noted).

Report MC5/18 on military activities of NATO adopted.

Stikker commented on C-M (63)123, his report on NATO defense policy. After describing status DPC and DPWG activities, SYG reported MC could not agree on MC100/1. Since policy implications transcended military considerations, NAC would seize itself of problem and be confident could find way progress.

Canadian Foreign Minister Martin read statement on behalf Defense Minister who temporarily absent. Canada undertaking two-stage review of defense policy. Stressed future plans would be determined in

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ACTION: Secstate POLTO Circular 50 Priority

DATE: December 17, 11 p.m. (SECTION III OF III)

NATO Ministerial Meeting Third Session December 17 a.m.

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-2- POLTO Circular 50, December 17, 11 p.m. (SECTION III OF III) from Paris

determined in consultation with allies and NMAs. Canada would correct imbalance where too much spent on operating all new equipment costs. Some adjustments necessary in Canadian Air Forces assigned SACEUR and naval forces assigned SACLANT and would inform Council when discussions with commanders completed. Canada supported NVP exercise.

Council then adopted Greek draft resolution calling on DPC to study military and economic problems of south eastern region. Turkey supported resolution and asked for report prior to spring ministerial meeting. Stikker, supported by Rusk, promised report as soon as possible but said deadline was indication only.

In summing up, Stikker supported McNamara's call for defining issues more sharply, developing alternatives, choosing best course, and carrying it out. He begged ministers to give permanent representatives broad and flexible instruction. He joined Thorneycroft in paying tribute to Hausinger.

Secretary led ovation to Hausinger.

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FINLETTER

MC

(Ø) Omission. Correction to follow.

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Rec'd December 17, 1963
11:16 p.m.

FROM Paris

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ACTION Secstate POLTO Circular 51

DATE: December 17, midnight

FROM USDEL

NATO ministerial meeting fourth session December 17 3:30 p.m.

Afternoon session began with consideration defense aid to Greece for 1964. Greek Minister Mavros described Greek defense problem in terms of competing demands on Greek resources for unusually heavy defense burden caused by geographical position and for social and educational reforms to combat internal Communism. Greece wished again to increase budgetary allotment for defense, but convinced it would be impossible to meet defense requirements without external aid. FEDREP, UK, France, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, and US supported Greek requirement for external aid. Council approved draft decision inviting governments planning to aid Greece in 1964 to coordinate their efforts through Secretary General.

NATO 3 FR(RA)

Next item, cooperation in research, development and production, was introduced by Stikker with brief summary of progress achieved this year. Stikker noted progress not as satisfactory as in previous years and urged increased efforts to bring about better results. Belgium stated cooperation this field step in right direction for NATO. Council noted report without further comment.

In introducing civil emergency planning item, Secretary General referred to Oslo ministers meeting May 1961 which had provided impetus for much of subsequent civil emergency planning. Effective activity this field only way to provide forward momentum for this essential complement to military planning. Council noted copies

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noted concise report on CEP yearly review.

Meeting then reverted to review of international situation. Since Portugal today indicated intention not to speak, Secretary General gave summary of review this item. SYG said reflection and consolidation characterized meeting. In addition, meeting provided for important exchange of views. Divergencies on analysis of East-West situation and on future course of alliance emerged toward end of first day. However, Stikker found no wide gap in approach member governments. Some emphasized advantages of seeking peripheral agreements while others underlined risks in making such agreements. No one, however, opposed continuing contacts in Geneva or individually with Soviets. Ideas cannot be advanced without contacts with other side, and consultation will provide members opportunity to study reports of those making contacts with Soviets.

Stikker noted particularly question of observation posts and asked help of ministers in providing additional technical advice for committee of political advisers through additional civilian and military experts from capitals. Secretary General then noted Secretary Rusk's suggestion that detailed information be exchanged on developments in Eastern Europe and on way in which bilateral East-West relations might be improved. SYG briefly mentioned: Greek proposal to hold Council meeting at heads of government level; Italian proposal for three ministerial meetings per year; Icelandic plea for increased economic cooperation within NATO; Turkish proposal for further study of relations to be developed with Iraq and Syria; and US request that NATO consider what members might do regarding Cuban situation. SYG concluded summary by stating central theme of all discussions was continued need for unity, solidarity and strength which was always achieved in times of tension but more difficult in times of relative calm.

Foreign Minister Luns formally invited Council to The Hague for spring meeting,

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-3- POLTO Circular 51, December 17, midnight, from Paris

spring meeting, May 12, 13, 14. Council agreed.

Council adopted final communique (see separate telegram).

Stikker closed meeting and final session with expression of gratitude for message from President Johnson.

GP-3.

FINLETTER

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EUR-2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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CA-6354 — COPY 1 OF SERIES A

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(51)

FROM : Department of State

DATE: Dec 20 9 11 PM '63

SUBJECT : Secretaries Rusk's and McNamara's Remarks at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 17, under Agenda Item II, "Military Questions"

REF :

Attached for the information of addressees are remarks by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara on the military situation, delivered at the NAC Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 17. Secretary Rusk's statement on the international political situation has been pouched under cover of a separate airgram.

RUSK

Attachments: As stated.

Mail to Buck Dep Washington 8/31/65 — ok

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FORM 4-63 DS-323

Drafted by: EUR:RPM:TDunstan:gmf 12/20/63

Clearances: RPM - Mr. Van Hollen; DOD/ISA - Col. Forsyth(subs); S/S-S-Mr. Moose (subs)

Contents and Classification Approved by: EUR/RPM - David E. Fortier

NATO 182/1

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NATO 182/2

TOP SECRET

Attachment A
(Secret when separated from Airgram)

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY RUSK ON MILITARY QUESTIONS
DECEMBER 17, 1963

(NOTE: Reproduced from uncleared NATO verbatim record C-VR(63)75)

Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief indeed before yielding my time to my colleague, Secretary McNamara. We have read your own report and listened with the greatest interest to the report of Admiral Duquet and General Beusinger. It is quite clear that we have no basis for full satisfaction in the present defense posture of NATO and its readiness and there is much unfinished business to be done, and we hope that we can all do our part to get to it.

The Secretary General has noted the exploratory talks now in progress with regard to multilateral seaborne nuclear force. We believe that such a force would have substantial political and military utility. We have conceived that this multilateral force is a genuine manifestation of partnership. One which gives each member country the opportunity to participate operationally and responsibly in the fundamental nuclear deterrent. It seems to us that this MLF is the best instrumentality thus far devised which can attain this purpose without the spread of national nuclear forces and it will provide a framework within which Europe's role and responsibility in the nuclear field can progressively increase as Europe itself moves toward greater unity. So we do hope that the conversations and studies now underway in Paris and Washington will help to solve the complex problems which are involved in creating this force so that this promising venture can go forward. We are prepared on our side to do everything we can to move it forward and we hope that others will find themselves in a position to do the same.

Just a word, Mr. Chairman, about the suggestions made by our colleagues from Greece and Turkey. We do believe that the Alliance as a whole must give serious attention to the defenses of the so-called Southern Flank of the South-Eastern region. Our commitments in NATO are throughout the NATO area and therefore the defenses of the Southern Flank are the responsibility for all of us in NATO and we welcome the request made that the Permanent Council study these matters with high urgency because assistance to the Southern Flank will be required.

May I mention, in this connection also, the meeting of the Consortium for Turkey on 16th and 17th January, the Consortium of the OECD. The United States has, in the past, traditionally and in the interests of the Alliance, provided the major share of aid to Turkey. Increasing worldwide demands on limited aid funds are not going to make it possible for us to continue so high a proportion. We were severely set back just yesterday when our House of Representatives appropriated only 2.8 billion out of a request of 4.5 billion made by President Kennedy for Foreign Aid. We think that with the assistance of the Senate we may be able to raise

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that figure somewhat, but we are under pressures. So we will urge our colleagues, who are in a position to do so, to give serious attention to this special need on the Southern Flank. I know that Turkey faces a very serious economic problem, particularly in 1964, and project loans for the future are very hopeful and important, but we need to concentrate a good deal on the special problems arising in this next calendar year. So, with these very brief remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would turn the role for the United States over to my colleague, Mr. McNamara.

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TOP SECRET Attachment B

REMARKS BY SECRETARY McNAMARA, DECEMBER 17, 1963

The new President of the United States has unambiguously reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to the principles of the North Atlantic Alliance and the defense of its member nations. No change of Presidents could weaken that commitment, for it is a direct response to two hard facts that confront any man who looks at the world from the White House. First, the security of the United States depends upon the security of all the nations of the North Atlantic Alliance. Second, against the whole range of threats that may be posed by the Soviet Bloc neither the United States nor any other nation or regional group in the Alliance can provide adequately for that security in isolation.

2. The basic principle of the Alliance - that each nation regards an attack upon any member as an attack upon itself - rests on firmer foundations than sentiment or altruism. Because any development in the world that endangers one member of NATO raises risks for all, it is obvious that the co-ordinated use of our joint resources offers greater security to each of us than we could achieve separately.

3. Much has changed in the last decade, in the nature of the threat and in the resources available to meet it. Of course, there is no simple, ideal formula for the security of the Alliance. But we do know that an adequate posture and strategy must be fashioned from the resources of the whole Alliance. A strategy tailored to the limited resources of any one country - even if that country were the United States - could not reflect the advantages to each of us of the existence of the Alliance.

4. But if we are to exploit those advantages in our decision-making and our programs, we must have the fullest exchange of information on the military resources of our opponents and our own national programs and strengths.

5. To this end, I shall bring up to date my earlier reports on the progress of the United States programs which support the Alliance, and make some comments on the adequacy of the Alliance posture in the light of Soviet capabilities.

I. Soviet Strength

6. Regarding Soviet and satellite strength, you have just heard the Standing Group intelligence appreciation given by Admiral Dougnet.

7. Our estimate of the Soviet ICBMs and IRBM/MRBMs that have become operational as of this month shows figures somewhat higher than those you have heard, but the difference is not significant for this discussion.

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8. On the side of ground forces, recent United States studies, based on the fullest evidence that we have, reveal a range of uncertainty concerning the number of Soviet divisions that are manned at combat strength, and the total number of divisions of all strengths; the figures we have just heard are at the upper end of this range of uncertainty. The most important point on this issue is that, as I pointed out in a speech in New York last month, intelligence estimates of Soviet ready strength such as the Standing Group estimates you have just heard are themselves considerably different from the picture that still lives in the public mind, which retains the old figure of 175 divisions and which does not distinguish between cadre or low-strength and full-strength divisions or take into account the large differences in size between Soviet and NATO divisions. Somewhat to my amazement, I found that some of our friends in the press who had regularly questioned the value of improving NATO's non-nuclear capabilities, on the grounds that we were hopelessaly inferior in the non-nuclear areas, now suddenly announced that such improvements were unnecessary because we were already equal to the Communists. I can assure you that this is not the conclusion we draw - the deficiencies of NATO forces are deficiencies which can be overcome.

9. Let me turn now to the United States programs.

II. United States Programs Related to NATO

10. Assuming abomb load of three bombs per bomber, the number of warheads in the American stretegic nuclear alert forces - those forces which we can launch within the warning time of a surprise attach - today totals about 2,400. Current programs as shown in the table below call for a force of approximately 2,800 alert warheads by 1966, of which more than 1,500 will be carried by intercontinental ballistic missiles. Some details of our program are shown in the table below.

STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES
As of June 30 of each year

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Bombers						
B-52	555	615	630	630	630	630
B-47	900	810	585	450	225	-
B-58	40	80	80	80	80	80
TOTAL	1495	1505	1295	1160	935	710
Air Launched Missiles						
Bound Dog	216	460	580	580	551	522
						ICBM

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STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES (continued)
As of June 30 of each year

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
ICBM						
Atlas	28	57	126	126	99	99
Titan		21	68	108	108	108
Minuteman			150	600	800	950
Polaris	80	96	144	288	464	560
TOTAL	108	174	488	1122	1471	1717
Alert Force						
Warheads	1050	1500	2200	2700	2750	2800

11. In the past 24 months, the number of nuclear warheads in the alert force has been increased by more than 100 %.

12. More importantly, whereas virtually all of our strategic retaliatory power in 1961 was concentrated on fixed, soft bases, today it is largely dispersed, protected against nuclear attack or hidden in mobile Polaris submarines. In the 1961-67 period, the number of bases at which our strategic force will be located will increase by ten times, and a very high proportion of them will be protected against nuclear attack - quite apart from the large, untargetable, Polaris force.

13. Our tactical nuclear systems are also being strengthened and modernized. New tactical bombs for aircraft delivery are now on hand in large numbers, replacing older types. LACROSSE and the 280 mm. projectiles are on their way out. The Sergeant missiles have come into operation in Europe; and the United States alone will have approximately 200 on the continent next year. Deployment of the longer range Pershing is scheduled to begin next March.. This missile is greatly superior in mobility, accuracy, speed of response and range of action to the Redstone missile system which it replaces. Its range, for example, is great enough for it to reach 90% of the targets now assigned to alert tactical strike aircraft. Among the smaller weapons, the number of demolition munition warheads has gone up nine-fold in the last year, and 155 mm. Howitzer nuclear projectiles will be introduced into the forces during 1964.

14. The number of tactical nuclear weapons on this side of the Atlantic has increased by almost 60% since early 1961.

15. United States ground forces have also been greatly strengthened. In the last 24 months, we have expanded the number of our combat-ready Army divisions

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by 45%. Eight ready Army divisions are in strategic reserve in the United States as compared to only three in 1961. In addition, two combat-ready Marine divisions are in reserve in the United States. The Army has completed about 80% of the reorganization of its divisions along lines offering improved flexibility. Modernization of equipment is being carried out at an accelerated rate. We have also prepositioned two division sets of equipment in Europe, especially earmarked for two of our ten strategic reserve divisions. This arrangement permits the divisions to move to Europe in a matter of hours and link up with their equipment.

16. The ability of move reinforcing units quickly is especially pertinent to the contingencies most likely to arise in Europe or elsewhere. In situations of heightened tension, where we are apt to have some usable warning, rapid movement of forces not only strengthens our defense but it also signals our seriousness of purpose.

17. For such reasons, we have programmed a 400% increase in available airlift by 1968, as compared with 1961. A major portion of this increased capability is already available. By 1968, this will make it possible, for example, to airlift within 30 days several divisions and move over 1000 tactical aircraft. This improved capability would, of course, also apply to other parts of the world. The recent Operation Big Lift was the first of a series of large-scale, world-wide exercises designed to test our ability to move large forces over long distances.

18. Our land based tactical air mobility is also improving rapidly. Ten years ago it would have taken two full weeks to island-hop a force of 400 tactical fighters to Europe. Today, this deployment time has been cut to 48 hours.

19. In addition, the number of tactical air squadrons has increased by one-third since 1961. Even more important are improvements in the range and payload of the aircraft and in the ordnance they carry. As to load carrying, there will be a doubling of the payload capacity of our tactical forces during the 1960's. Improvements in non-nuclear ordnance are increasing our ability to destroy targets on each mission by a factor of 4 to 40 times, depending on the target. A recent study showed that we could expect to destroy a bridge with 5% of the sorties required with the older ordnance. In short, we are in the midst of a very great improvement in our tactical air capabilities.

20. With regard to the naval forces we have a superiority in numbers of combat ships except submarines. Improvement in these naval forces has enabled us to have the capability for controlling the surface sea lines of communications. We plan to continue our vital anti-submarine warfare efforts to meet the growing Soviet submarine threat.

III. The

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III. The Adequacy of These Forces

21. What can be said about the adequacy of these forces? Let me begin at the high end of the range of conflict. Even the most optimistic Soviet planners would have to accept as a certainty that the most effective surprise attack they could launch would still leave us with the capability to inflict over 100 million fatalities and destroy over 50% of the industry of the Soviet Union. In short, we could destroy the attacker's society. Therefore, deterrence of deliberate all-out nuclear attack seems as well assured as it can be. But because general nuclear war remains a possibility, because of miscalculation or irrational decision, it is also desirable for our forces to be in a position, to the extent practical, to reduce damage to the Alliance. Hence, it is equally pertinent that the relative numbers and survivability of U.S. strategic forces would permit us to assign weapons against all the urgent Soviet military targets - including those forces threatening Western Europe - that are subject to attack. Our force has been chosen to meet these two criteria, in the light of the size and deployment of Soviet forces.

22. However, a significant number of the Soviet delivery vehicles are submarine launched or land-mobile. For practical purposes, these weapons cannot be located and attacked. They cannot be offset by increasing the number of NATO delivery vehicles. The damage which the Soviets could inflict upon the Alliance, no matter what we do to limit it, therefore remains extremely high. Under the most favorable circumstances, this capability must be measured in tens of millions of fatalities in the U.S. and somewhat more in Western Europe.

23. Thus, measured against the Soviet strategic force as it is evolving, our very large investments have brought us to the point where further increases in strategic force size, above those now programmed for the future, must encounter rapidly diminishing returns. On the other hand, important opportunities for improving our forces continue to exist in other areas than numbers of delivery vehicles. We are continuing a major effort to improve the ranges, accuracies, command and control arrangements, and penetration capabilities of our strategic delivery vehicles.

24. One of the consequences of this situation is that the expenses associated with the strategic sector of the United States defense budget will probably decline for the next several years. Parenthetically, I should add that these savings are being transferred to pay for other forces designed to support our Allies in Western Europe and other overseas theaters.

25. We are achieving important savings from the reforms in the organization, management and procurement policies in the last three years - savings of several billion dollars per year. As a consequence, as we have pointed out in speeches

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this fall, the over-all United States defense budget will probably decline slightly in terms of percentage of GNP, though the percentage will remain far above the NATO average.

26. The prospect of quantitative adequacy in our strategic forces does not mean, however, that the over-all mix of Alliance forces for these missions could not be changed. If the members of the Alliance should wish, we are prepared to join other interested Allies in substituting sea-based medium-range missiles for some of the longer range systems now included in our program. In that event, we believe that this force now under discussion by representatives of several members of the Alliance.

27. This issue of the relative proportion of medium and long-range strategic vehicles is essentially independent of the over-all force size or war outcome questions. I do not believe that the character of any conflict in which NATO's strategic forces were involved would be affected by the location of some fraction of those forces. I wish to be quite clear on this point. No conflict in which, for example, Soviet medium-range missiles were appropriate targets could be confined to the continent of Europe. Our total offensive capabilities, wherever based, would be avilable for use in such a conflict. This would be true for any major aggression - in any part of the NATO area, whether in the center or on the flanks, whether nuclear weapons were used by the enemy or not - in accordance with the Athens guidelines. Thus, the adequacy of strategic forces, on which I have commented, is of primary relevance to the adequacy of NATO posture for meeting all of this upper range of challenges.

28. There is another range of conflict which the Military Committee identified as more likely in a report on "The Long Term Threat Assessment" noted by this body a year ago. Limited aggressions, the Military Committee stated, would probably be designed for the quick achievement of limited objectives, to be followed by a prompt call for negotiations to exploit a fait accompli and avoid Western reaction. Although such adventures would be more likely outside the NATO area, they are also possible, and would be even more critical against NATO countries with common boundaries with the bloc. Berlin, and the northern and southern flanks of NATO, are particularly exposed. The report concluded that unless NATO is manifestly ready to make a quick and flexible response, a Soviet move of this type might well prove the most likely military danger.

29. The Alliance now possesses, in addition to its strategic nuclear power, non-nuclear and tactical nuclear capabilities that are relevant to such challenges. But are they adequate? In some ways this question is even harder to answer than questions concerning the upper limites of violence; certainly it has been less investigated.

30. The United States is continuing a very large tactical nuclear weapons development and production programs. We believe that this capability is important to have for insurance purposes. Nevertheless, there are major uncertainties about the effects of such operations upon enemy capabilities and responses and upon the tempo and control of subsequent developments. From

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what we know of Soviet doctrine and weapons, it is not clear that they could or would respond with yields and ranges which would permit us to avoid a rapid escalation. In a nuclear conflict, it is difficult to predict how one's opponents will perceive or act on their available choices. These uncertainties and the likelihood of escalation in a two-sided nuclear engagement cast doubt on the extent to which tactical nuclear weapons can substitute for other types of forces or, by themselves, solve NATO's military problems - we believe they must be thought of as complements to rather than substitutes for conventional weapons. In any event, substantial conventional forces would be required even in a tactical nuclear engagement.

31. Positive answers to the uncertainties associated with tactical nuclear war do not now exist and may never be available. To be sure, these same uncertainties about escalation and the risks of widespread devastation may help to deter a potential aggressor as he confronts our capabilities, our readiness and our will to use these tactical weapons. But to count too heavily that an enemy will calculate and act conservatively in the fact of these uncertainties is scarcely prudent on our own part. To deny ourselves a range of options is likely, in fact, to encourage gamblers among our opponents. We must then consider the adequacy of alternative responses to the more limited challenges.

32. Considerations of overall manpower strength alone might lead to over-optimistic answers on the current ability to defend against lesser threats without NATO use of nuclear weapons. Here again, there are uncertainties, although they are more of a sort that our concerted effort can reduce. We are used to measuring our non-nuclear capabilities only against the more massive and unlikely tests they might fact, for which they are clearly inadequate. But we have tended to neglect the critical examination of inadequacies and remedies for the more likely contingencies.

33. A reasonable criterion would be the ability in cases of limited aggression, for example in connection with Berlin, to confront the Soviets with the frustration of their objectives, unless they choose to escalate to a nuclear exchange or to levels that might make nuclear war highly probable. Is the effectiveness of our posture in this light commensurate with the size of our forces and the heavy expenditures we are all making on them?

34. I do not believe that adequate facts and frank analyses on these matters are yet available. It should be one of our major purposes to explore these issues. I suspect strongly that such a study will not point toward relaxation of effort when we consider what has already been invested, what is now being spent, and the better balance and readiness that further efforts could achieve.

35. The standards of manning and readiness which the United States maintains for its own divisions and combat support in Europe, and our programs to enlarge, modernize, and improve our own capabilities to reinforce Europe, all show the importance we attach to meeting the lower levels of challenge as well as the upper. However, the United States Congress and American public opinion

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will become increasingly restless about a situation in which the United States maintains qualitative standards - manning levels, stocks and force readiness - generally higher than those of our Allies. It is most important that we adopt a common standard in fact, as well as in principle

IV. The Balance of Payments Situation

36. I must turn now to a problem that continues to be of concern to the United States Government: our unfavorable balance of international payments. The average annual deficit during the period calendar year 1958-60 was $3.7 billion. In 1961 and 1962, the deficit in each year was reduced to about $2.3 billion, primarily through pre-payment of governmental debts and other transactions which have involved co-operation by a number of members of NATO. The deficit for the first nine months of 1963, counting all receipts from these special co-operative measures, remained approximately at this level.

37. The gross foreign exchange cost of our military operations abroad amounts to about $2.7 billion a year, of which about $1.7 billion is in NATO Europe. The budgetary cost of maintaining these forces is, of course, many times greater. Since the main region of the world in balance of payments surplus with is is also the region where we have our largest military deployments abroad, I feel it appropriate to bring these facts to your attention.

38. In order to reduce the impact of defense spending on the balance of payments, we have embarked on a program both to reduce our military expenditures overseas and to increase receipts. During this period, fiscal year 1961-1963, our defense expenditures abroad were held relatively constant despite the increase due to the Berlin crisis and higher price and wage levels overseas. We have already brought the over-all net adverse balance attributable to United States defense activities abroad down by aout $1 billion between 1961 and 1963, primarily because receipts from sales of military equipment, supplies and services approximately quadrupled.

39. While all NATO countries to some extent are purchasing equipment from the United States, the agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, which provides for an offset of our defense outlays in Germany, has been particularly helpful. Italy is also making substantial efforts to offset our defense expenditures in that country, and this we appreciate.

40. President Kennedy, in his message to the United States Congress on balance of payments last July, announced a series of actions designed to reduce the overall deficit. One of the actions was a projected reduction in the annual rate of Department of Defense expenditures abroad by $300 million below the calendar year 1963 level, by measures to be put into effect before the end of calendar year 1964.

41. The actions being carried out will include extending programs already under way; for example, increasing procurement of goods and services in the United States, eliminating or deferring construction on projects overseas not

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operationally essential, and close scrutiny of ways and means to cut down overseas expenditures on the Military Assistance Program. In addition, certain actions that we have been able to take because of our growing capabilities or simply because they increase efficiency, have resulted in a further reduction in our expenditure abroad. For example, the growing number of strategic missiles is making possible and desirable the replacement of B-47 medium bombers. It has already led to a plan for the consolidation of the B-47 bomber force in the United Kingdom, which will result in the release of two facilities and a reduction of approximately 2500 men stationed there. A reorganization of our line of communications in Europe, in keeping with our efforts to improve logistics management worldwide, will free approximately 5400 United States Army troops from their duties; it will also enable us to use much more economical routes of supply for the peacetime support of United States forces while retaining an effective line for wartime use. The home basing in the United States of two squadrons of C-130's will permit a more effective use of our airlift capability during peacetime without a significant reduction in the availability of these aircraft to SACEUR in time of need. Through such actions, we will be able to lower expenditures abroad without hurting our combat effectiveness and without hardship to our individual servicemen.

42. I do want to emphasize that, in carrying out this program, the United States will not let its basic commitments and policies be dictated by balance of payments considerations. This would be unwise and unnecessary. We do expect, however, to take advantage of the opportunities which modern technology offers to increase the operational efficiency of our forces, which may also help to reduce overseas expenditures. I can assure you that President Kennedy's affirmation that the United States will keep its divisions in Europe as long as they are needed still stands. However, you will appreciate, I am sure, how important it is for me to be able to put to Congress and the American people that our Allies are co-operating with us in meeting the payments problem and that they are carrying their fair share of the load - in short, that the Alliance is really working as a successful mutual endeavor.

V. Conclusion

43. In summary, notwithstanding the current deficiencies, NATO has made progress in recent years in providing military resources towards meeting its primary objective - providing for the security of its members. Our disagreements cannot obscure that fact; nor, I trust, will they obstruct future progress. For a military posture which is sound, one which meets our needs in the face of Soviet strength, is within our reach. Our problem is not total resources, or even perhaps the share of resources devoted to defense, but the proper use of these resources I have every hope that in the months ahead we will be able to work co-operatively in defining the issues more sharply, developing the alternatives, choosing our best course of action, and carrying it out.

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FROM: Department of State

DATE: Dec 20 8 26 PM '63

SUBJECT: Secretary Rusk's Remarks to NATO Ministerial Meeting and Final Communique

REF:

Attached for the information of addressees is the text of Secretary Rusk's remarks at the NAC Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 16, under Agenda Item I, "Review of the International Situation", also attached are the Secretary's introductory remarks as President of the North Atlantic Council for 1964, and a message to the Council from President Johnson, which the Secretary read. In addition, a text of the final communique is enclosed.

Remarks by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara on the military situation are being circulated in a separate airgram under Top Secret cover.

Four summary reports of the morning and afternoon sessions/the two day meeting (December 16-17) have been sent by USRO/Paris to all NATO capitals. References are as follow: POLTO 864 to Department; POLTO Circulars 49, 50, and 51.

RUSK

Attachments: As stated.

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Drafted by: EUR:RPM:TGustafson:gmf:bje 12/20/63

Cleared and Classification Approved by: EUR/RPM - David H. Popper

Clearances: EUR/RPM - Mr. Van Hollen S/S -S Mr. Moose

NATO 163/1

NATO 163/2

Attachment A
(Unclassified when separated from Airgram)

SECRETARY RUSK'S OPENING REMARKS AS PRESIDENT OF THE NATO COUNCIL
(Including President Johnson's Message) December 16, 1963

Thank you Mr. Secretary-General. It is a high personal privilege for me to be President of the NATO Council for the coming year -- thanks to the inexorable flow of the alphabet. My first duty -- and it is a pleasant one indeed -- is to welcome certain colleagues who are with us for the first time as ministers at a NATO meeting: Messrs Venizelos, Papanicolopoulos and Mavros of Greece; Messrs Saragat and Colombo of Italy; Messrs de Jong and Witteveen of the Netherlands; and Mr. Butler of the United Kingdom. We wish our new colleagues every success in their new tasks and we look forward to the benefit we shall derive from their counsel at this table.

I come from a people who have passed through a period of national tragedy and personal grief. We feel diminished by the loss of so much gallantry, so much vision, so much energy, so much dedication, so much common sense. But we have been sustained by the knowledge that your governments and peoples have shared our loss. It is for me merely to say how much all of us in the United States have appreciated your presence and comfort in this period.

Those who have known President Kennedy personally will understand why we have now turned our eyes toward the future and are taking up our appointed tasks in the always unfinished business of peace and freedom. President Johnson has assumed the Presidency with a sure and steady hand, and the nation has given him its full support. His theme of continuity in policy rests upon a solid base of deep personal conviction, given shape and form by extraordinary personal experience and exercise of responsibility in both domestic and foreign affairs. Perhpas you would let me remind you of a few sentences from his opening address to Congress:

> "This nation will keep its commitments from South Viet-Nam to West Berlin. We will be unceasing in the search for peace; resourceful in our pursuit of areas of agreement even with those with whom we differ; and generous and loyal to those who join with us in common cause.
>
> "In this age when there can be no losers in peace and no victors in war -- we must recognize the obligation to match national strength with national restraint -- we must be prepared at one and the same time for both the confrontation of power and the limitation of power -- we must be ready to defend the national interest and to negotiate the common interest. This is the path that we shall continue to pursue. Those who test our courage will find it strong and those who seek our friendship will find it honorable."

/President

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(When separated from Airgram)

Attachment A
Page 2

President Johnson has been close to NATO from its very birth, has been a pillar of its bipartisan support, and has visited most of the NATO countries. Some of you will recall his visit to SHAPE in April, 1961 and his speech on that occasion. He has asked me to extend to you his personal greetings with the following message:

President Johnson's Message

"Less than a month after John Fitzgerald Kennedy took office, he sent to the North Atlantic Council a message which pledged his continuing support for the purposes and programs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"He fulfilled this pledge in the three years of gallant service which he gave us. That fulfillment is a lasting memorial to the stature of theman we mourn today.

"We can best honor him by continuing our pursuit of the goal of Atlantic partnership -- by seeking an ever-closer collaboration between a united Europe and the United States in dealing with all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.

"It is evidence of my country's continuing dedication to these purposes that I, too, upon taking office, now send a pledge of America's steadfast resolve to the North Atlantic Council.

"For that dedication and this resolve do not belong to one man, or one party, or one administration. They are shared by the vast majority of my countrymen; they have been held by each of the American administrations since World War II.

"And this constancy, in turn, reflects not merely the community of ideals and culture which binds us to Europe. It reflects also my country's awareness that its security can be assured, its interests and values can be furthered, only by a close partnership with Europe in common tasks.

"First among these tasks is that of creating a balanced NATO defense posture, including powerful nuclear and non-nuclear forces, which will deter aggression and enable NATO to deal with any aggression with the force appropriate to the threat. To NATO's continuing fulfillment of this task, I pledge my country's will and resources. We will keep in Europe the equivalent of six American divisions that are now deployed there, so long as they are needed; and under present circumstances there is no doubt that they will continue to be needed. I am confident that our allies will also make their full contribution to this NATO defense, so that the burdens and responsibilities of partnership may be equitably shared.

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"Military strength - both nuclear and non-nuclear is useful only as it serves political ends. Our task is to ensure that NATO remains an effective means for concerting these ends, as well as for building that strength. My country will join its allies in using NATO fully for this purpose.

"In these fields - as well as in monetary affairs, in aid to the developing areas, and in trade - we must each assume responsibilities commensurate with our resources. That is what partnership in a vigorous Atlantic Community means and requires. To this end, we welcome the emergence of a Europe growing in unity and strength. For we know that only uniting Europe can be a strong Europe will be an effective partner.

"NATO is the enduring instrument for joining such a Europe and the United States in common programs to meet uncommon military and political needs. On its success hinges, in large measure, the success of both European and American efforts to build the Atlantic partnership and the larger community of free nations which that partnership serves. That is why, I, like three Presidents before me, rededicate my country to its continuing support and hold high hopes for its continuing success."

****

And now, Mr. Secretary-General, it is a pleasure to turn the gavel over to you in order that our business may proceed under your experienced hand. But let me close these remarks with a word of appreciation from the Ministers for the splendid assistance which we have had from you and your colleagues in the NATO Headquarters in preparations for our discussions. I know that we shall have a good meeting.

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Secretary Rusk's Remarks
under Agenda Item I, "Review of
the International Situation" - December 16
(NOTE: Reproduced from uncleared verbatim record (C-VR(63)74)

Mr. Chairman, I shall try not to detain you unduly but to make my remarks almost in the form of an outline and let you fill in the gaps. I do wish to express appreciation for the things which have been said here today about President Kennedy, and I will not comment further upon that except in two brief respects.

The Assassination

Considerable curiosity has understandably been expressed about the background and the motivation of the assassin. You can imagine we have made the most detailed and meticulous investigation of that problem and the fullest evidence will be surveyed and perhaps augmented by further investigation by a commission under the Chairmanship of the Chief Justice. But I would like to say to my colleagues here in NATO, that on the basis of all of the evidence which is available to us today and after the fullest possible investigation, we are persuaded that he was acting on his own and not in connection with any group or any foreign power. I say that because obviously if we had evidence that he were working for a foreign power, this would raise the gravest issues for us and for everyone else, but on the basis of what we have been able to discover, we are convinced that this was an irresponsible and unstable individual, who was not acting in concert.

Continued Presidential Attention to Foreign Policy

Now if I might make an intimate remark, despite the size of the group here today, I would like to make a brief remark about President Johnson, because some of his background may not be fully known to all of you here. It has been suggested that President Johnson might be a President who concentrates more on domestic affairs and will be rather indifferent to foreign policy. This is not and cannot be the case. In the first place, domestic affairs can no longer be separated from foreign policy

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affairs but it is quite clear that no Chief of Government in NATO, certainly not a Chief of Government of the United States, can be negligent of foreign policy. President Kennedy once remarked that domestic matters may determine success or failure in an election, but that foreign policy matters might determine whether we destroy the Northern hemisphere.

President Johnson has had a long number of years of direct and official responsibility in foreign policy matters. For six years as Majority Leader under the Eisenhower Administration, he had to work intimately on the vast legislative programme which was necessary for our foreign policy, and as Vice-President he met with us regularly in the White House four or five times a week, to consider important foreign policy questions. So he will give our foreign relations his fullest personal attention and will do so against a considerable personal and responsible background in those questions. I hope you will forgive me for that personal remark, but I just wanted to have a chance to say that much.

State of the Alliance

We are in a period when we have left impressions - we, in the Alliance - have left impressions before our public, before the world, that we are in somewhat disarray - that there are differences of view within the Alliance and the Atlantic Community which somehow affect our unity and cause all of us concern. Now it is true that there are questions in front of us for which there is not yet a final answer. For example, it is not clear whether or how or when Western Europe will move toward additional, political arrangements. Here in NATO, there are discussions of strategy and force goals which may reflect differences among us but may, depending upon further examination, prove to be more theoretical than real. We have, coming up next year, negotiations on trade which will be highly complex and difficult, perhaps prolonged, and it may be that those negotiations will be surrounded at times by tension and disagreement.

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If I could express one regret it would be that, during this calendar year 1963, at a time when the Communist world is obviously faced with far-reaching problems of its own, for it is distraught and divided and weakened by problems within itself, that we in the West have not found it possible to move on strongly with a mounting sense of unified effort in order to create a contrast between the free world and the Communist world which could have been formidable indeed. We in the United States will be looking at our own attitudes and our own position as we enter the New Year to see whether there is anything which we can do or whether there are things which we have been doing we should not do, which have to do with this total perspective and responsibility of NATO and the free world. We have no doubt that whatever differences have been expressed have nothing to do with Western solidarity with regard to any external threat against us, as had been demonstrated at such moments as the missile crisis in Cuba or the most recent stoppages on the autobahn to Berlin.

We are linked in common interests in the vast regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. We all know who our enemies are, we know who it is who is trying to destroy freedom, we know that those enemies have not abondoned their task, we know that our responsibilities have never been greater in this regard, we know that there is world leadership of the entire non-Communist World waiting for those around this table if we would pick up those responsibilities and move confidently and strongly and with sacrificial effort to assume that leadership and so I hope that, in 1964, we can recover some of the - not the unity, there is a great deal of unity already - but the sense of unity and recover some of the èlan, which the free world needs in the highly dangerous tasks which still lie in front of us.

Moscow-Peiping Dialogue

But today I should like to spend my few moments in commenting on what may well be the overriding question in front of us. And that is, what is happening in the Communist world? What does this mean to us and to our relations with

/Communist

Communist world? I shall not attempt to speak completely formally as a government on this matter, but to expose to you what might be called some personal observations, as a partial contribution to the discussion which ought to proceed in the North Atlantic Council so that we can come, if possible, to considered consensus about these possibly historic questions, because I do believe that we are at the front edge of very important events in the world scene. I think it is too soon yet to know in which directions those changes will go, but the situation is in flux, things are not going to remain what they were, there is movement and, therefore, both danger and opportunity.

For example, what does the Moscow-Peiping discourse really mean? How deep does this division go? We are inclined to think it goes very deep indeed but we must start with the recognition that the leaders of these two great Communist giants can reconcile their differences. Being the kinds of system they are, they can reconcile their differences if it becomes vital for them to do so if they approach the brink of a complete break and the consequences of a complete break. With that reservation, it seems to us that this breach is fundamental and far-reaching, embracing ideology, state relations, border conflicts, economic interests, a struggle for influence in other parts of the world and what appears to be a deep personal enmity of the top leaders of the present two systems.

What is our own interest in this dialogue between Moscow and Peiping? I should think we have an initial interest in their not getting together again and co-operating. I cannot imagine that they can reconcile their present differences, except on a basis which would be bad news for the free world - a massive monolith, committed to an active and more progressive policy than we have seen in recent months, presenting us with a massive confrontation in the different parts of the world. So I think that we have an interest in their staying separate. And I would also suppose that, in the ideological quarrel between militancy and peaceful coexistence, that it would be in our interests that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence prevail.

Now that does not mean that what Moscow calls peaceful coexistence is satisfactory to us. Mr. Schroder has just pointed out that, after all, it was the Soviet Union that had brought us nearest war in these past two years,

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in Berlin and in Cuba. But, nevertheless, there is some reason to believe that Moscow at least understands what thermonuclear war would do to the Soviet Union. There may be somewhat more sobriety there than in China. It may well be that the attitudes of Moscow's Eastern European allies have created a certain inertia within the Warsaw Pact. There are evidences that the Soviet public wants and expects both peace and more consumer goods and that the leadership feels compelled to make certain commitments to those two demands of the Soviet people and it is just possible that there is, with the development of education and technology and science and management, a middle-aged slackening of revolutionary ardour within the Soviet union. But, in any event, I would suppose that we ought not to allow Peiping to reap rewards from militancy, nor to give Communists anywhere, who are viewing this debate between the two Communist capitals, reason to suppose that militancy will pay dividends.

We are concerned, for example, that Peiping still insists upon the surrender of Formosa as the sine qua non of any improvement whatever in relations with the United States, that Peiping attacked India and remains in position to attack again, although we do not expect that attack in the immediate future. We are concerned that Peiping has not given its support to the Geneva accords on Laos. We have reason to think that it is Peiping that is helping to stimulate Mr. Sukarno. through the PKI, to take a hostile attitude towards Malaysia. We know that Peiping is conspiring in Latin America, sometimes in association with Castro, and we know that Peiping is taking a new look at Africa. So I think we should be much concerned about the militancy of Peiping.

At the same time, it seems to me that we should not allow Moscow to think that we are disinterested in a realistic approach and I emphasise realistic approach to peaceful coexistence. That does not mean that we concede any of our vital interests to the Soviet Union, but I suppose it means, among other things, that we do not make concessions to Peiping in order to put the Soviet Union at a disadvantage, because the Soviet Union can play that game far more effectively than can we.

/Soviet

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Soviet Economic Problems

There are some important trends within the Soviet Union to be considered. We were, frankly, surprised by the extent and the depth of their present economic problems. It seems to us to be significant that, out of an estimated reserve of some 2 1/2 billions, perhaps, of gold and foreign exchange, they have come forward this year with a billion of that for the purchase of foodstuffs.

Our first impression, and I believe that it was the first impression of our friends in Canada, was that that effort this year was probably a one-time matter, a one-shot problem. But more recent information and analysis suggests that the Soviets will not recover this position in just one or two years. It will take them some time to bring their agricultural prodution back to their genuine consumer needs. Also, that the rate of industrial growth has slowed down sharply. Our estimates are that the rate of growth of GNP has dropped to about 2.2% in 1962 and 1963, and that means not only an agricultural drop off, but an industrial drop off. So unquestionably, the Soviet Union is facing difficult problems in allocating resources and whether this will affect the security interests of the West it is too early to say. I think we can be confident that security requirements will still get the highest priority and that would particularly be true in the missile field and in the sophisticated armaments of modern war.

Soviet Defense Budget

Mr. Khrushchev commented, during the nuclear test ban signing in Moscow, in a passing comment, that he rather expected Soviet defence budgets to level-off or drop somewhat next year; and I notice that he has now made a public speech in which he has indicated that. We don't know what that means but it will be of some interest to see whether it does have any significant result in their military establishment. But it at least indicates some concern about available resources. It may indicate some Soviet interest in disarmament, if appropriate measures can be devised.

/Trends

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Trends in Eastern Europe

We have also been interested, Mr. Chairman, in the trends in the smaller Warsaw Pact countries, the Eastern European countries. It seems to me that there would be considerable advantage if we in NATO could compare notes, in a rather detailed way, about what is happening in those countries, because what is happening appears to be taking place at small points in a variety of ways in the improvement of their bilateral relations with the West, rather than by any dramatic development.

It might well be that each of us should keep you and your staff informed as to how these are developing in particular countries, so that the rest of us can have ready points of reference to ascertain what the total attitude of a particular country might be, because we are not at all sure that we should be too concerned about freezing the status quo. It may well be that the status quo is in motion insofar as these countries are concerned. It is clear that they have felt, for a long time, a real nostalgia for the restoration of their historical ties with you people at the main centres of Western civilization in Western Europe and that they are moving in a variety of ways to register that nostalgia as well as to register more practical interest.

Mr. Khrushchev said to a visitor that these Eastern European countries are like children who have grown too big to spank. To the extent that this becomes true, it is an important matter of interest to us in the West. We were interested that, last week, Rumania voted in the United Nations against the rest of the Soviet Bloc on the question of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, despite the fullest consultation among the Communist countries, including Rumania. So we would be glad to find a way to compare views with our colleagues about what is going on in detail in these Eastern European countries. Perhaps we could do that through NATO, for it is just possible that threads are being tied around the freedom of action of the Soviet giant even if by these Lilliputians.

East-West Relations

Now, on the broader questions of relations between the Soviet Union and the West, I think we should note that

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the agreements which have been reached are still somewhat few and limited except in the, shall I say, trade field. We did establish the hot line. It has not yet been used, fortunately. Mr. Gromyko did express to me some concern about a message they received over the hot line, not long ago, which said "the quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog" and it took some time to explain to him it was a sentence often used for mechanical testing because it contains every letter of the English alphabet, but they were puzzled about who the quick brown fox was supposed to be, and who the lazy dog. We did get the three enviornments test ban. That is a much more substantial agreement but still limited in scope. It represented no break-through on inspection, though we have been glad to see that it has now been signed by 107 nations. It was possible to join in a United Nations declaration against the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction and another declaration on broad principles of law for outer space. But these and trade relations do not add up to a détente. We have been trying to emphasise that to our people and to our Congress in order that the situation will not be over-estimated. The Soviets have not abandoned the world revolution, nor has Peiping. The dangerous questions still remain, Berlin in Germany, Laos, Vietnam, Cuba and new dangers can arise with unpredictable rapidity. There seems to be little possibility of progress towards control of armaments, in a broad and significant way, without effective inspection and verification. But, nevertheless, there is a moment when we can look further for the possibilities of a détente, avoiding illusion and naivete and trying equally not to be blind to real possibilities. So we feel we should proceed with and intensify our consultation in NATO to consider what these possible next steps might be.

Non-Aggression Pact

A non-aggression pact does not appear to be particularly promising at this point because it should be connected with some serious improvement on a problem of substantial interest and danger. I am glad that the Soviets raised no question of form because I think we would have great difficulty in persuading our Senate to adopt a treaty

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of non-aggression which preceded the settlement of the problems which might prompt aggression. A bare declaration standing alone could lead to a sense of false security, without either reducing the danger of war, or reducing our defence needs. President Kennedy had said that it must be connected, as a minimum, with reliable guarantees with respect to Berlin, or an improvement in the Berlin situation. We would not oppose a non-aggression pact in the context of political improvement in East-West relations, but we do think that it ought to be associated with such improvement and not be used to stand simply as an empty expression.

The declaration on Berlin which Mr. Gromyko has suggested, the text of which has been circulated in the Permanent Council, seems to us to be too vague, that it does not improve the de facto situation and could be used by the Soviets to inhibit Allied rights. We ought to continue our consideration of that matter because it is just possible that a time would come when this idea of a non-aggression pact would be worth consideration in connection with other matters.

I will not say anything at the moment about observation posts - I think that has been covered here. We would be willing, as far as we are concerned, to look at it carefully if it were disentangled from the idea of a nuclear-free zone or the unacceptable thinning-out of troops in Germany.

Non-Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons

I should like, however, to comment a bit on the non-dissemination idea. You know the Soviets are resisting such an agreement because of the multilateral force. Now, I think we might be quite clear about the nature of the Soviet opposition to the multilateral force. If their objection is that it involves dissemination of weapons to national military establishments, then their opposition is temporary because, when they know what they do not now know, that is what these arrangements actually are to be, it will be clear that that kind of dissemination is not involved, but they may have other reasons for opposing a multilateral force and are using the non-dissemination agreement as maximum leverage, quite apart from the issue of dissemination. For example, if they see in this force what we see

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in it, namely a stronger unity within the participating members of the Alliance, they might object to that. If they see in it an enhanced participation, in nuclear councils, of the Federal Republic of Germany, they may object to that. It may be that they object to the participation of the resources of various members of the Alliance in a nuclear arms race which they expect to continue. It may be that the multilateral force raises for them some difficult questions within their own Alliance. But in any event, we do not believe that the idea of the multilateral force can be abandoned merely to accommodate the Soviet Union on the issue of non-dissemination.

Far beyond, that, as far as the United States is concerned, our interest in the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is largely China. We see no prospect that China will sign such an arrangement. Therefore, we are not optimistic about an early formal agreement. I say early formal agreement, because I do believe that, underneath this discussion lies an approximate coincidence of policy, because I do not believe that, in Moscow or in Paris or in London or in Washington, any government, now possessing nuclear weapons, intends to distribute these nuclear weapons to others. So that the coincidence of policy may be as important as the absence of an agreement.

Berlin Settlement and German Reunification

Now, on Berlin and Germany, we feel that we should continue to reiterate our convictions that a free and unified Germany is important to the achievement of a stable peace in Europe. We support the efforts of the Federal Republic to improve conditions which arise from the division of Germany. We should like to see success in the efforts made to overcome some of the harsh consequences of the war, such as the travel of West Berliners to East Berlin. We frankly do not know why the Soviets detained certain convoys in October and November, but we do think the unified Allied response was an important element in their rapid cessation. We must remain prepared for difficulties of that type.

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We see little immediate prospect for early progress on a Berlin settlement, because the Soviets continue to insist that the Allied position in West Berlin either be eliminated or drastically diluted. Nevertheless, it is a point on which occasional contact with the Soviet Union may be of some importance.

Disarmament

On disarmament, we are reviewing our own situation in preparation for the resumption of the conference in late January in Geneva and if we develop any possible additional ideas there, we shall bring them to the attention of the North Atlantic Council. But we are inclined to think that progress is to be made on separate and rather limited steps, which themselves might develop a measure of confidence, but that a comprehensive agreement, far reaching agreement, is not likely to be achieved in the near future. Nor do we see any prospect of a comprehensive test ban agreement for the elimination of underground testing as well as atmospheric testing.

It is possible that the Soviets might respond at one point. We proposed, as the Permanent Representatives will recall, that we and the Soviet Union join in the mutual destruction of certain medium bombers, the B 47s and the Badgers. These were coming out of inventory. We thought we could destroy them at a rate somewhat faster than they would leave inventory. Although obsolescent in the East/West sophisticated confrontation, they are nevertheless a highly sophisticated weapon to be turning up in various parts of the world - say in Indonesia, or Egypt, or Iraq or wherever it might be - so we thought that it might be a good idea to get rid of these weapons, rather than have other arms races move to new levels of sophistication. The Soviets turned that down, but they did ask whether that was the only kind of weapon which could be subjected to that treatment, or whether this was a sample of an idea. Well, I told Mr. Gromyko that this was the only sample we had thought of and that if they had any ideas they could mention them. They have not come back on that, but he did not seem to be completely disinterested in that problem.

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CM-0356, Pg. 12.

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East-West Trade

It seems, therefore, to us that, on these multilateral matters: disarmament, non-dissemination of weapons, non-aggression pact, a lot more time and practice will be required to discover whether some further agreement might be possible. Meanwhile, we have attempted to explore the bilateral side a bit. We are negotiating a consular convention, which would be helpful in the protection of citizens. We may next Spring undertake a civil air arrangement for the exchange of one or two flights a week between New York and Moscow. We have been keeping the North Atlantic Council informed about that. We have opened up our wheat market for Soviet purchase if they wish to do so under the terms which it is possible for us to offer. Thus, although they have not been able to work out agreements with our grain dealers, we frankly don't know whether those discussions will come to a successful conclusion.

We are inclined to see some advantages to increased Soviet-Western trade in non-strategic goods and we shall be reviewing our own practice there, and we may find ourselves adopting some of the more open attitude of the rest of NATO on that praticular subject. But we have considerable reservations about the terms of credit which might be offered to the Soviet Union. We think some of their stringencies are moderating influences on their policy and we believe that credit should not, by imperceptible stages, become aid and relieve them of their stringencies at a time when they might be trying to serve several appetites at once. But that is a matter which can be discussed further.

Viet-Nam and Cambodia

I have already talked longer than I expected to, but let me make a brief comment on Viet Nam. We cannot report favourable progress during this present month in that situation. During the changeover in government in Saigon, the Viet Cong greatly increased its activity, apparently trying to take advantage of the situation of confusion that had developed. There has been some turning downward

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of that level of activity. Nevertheless the problem remains serious and the new government has not fully taken control of the situation to get on with the job. Secretary McNamara will be going from this meeting through Saigon on the way home in order to give us the fullest possible report, but we are concerned.

You know that we have just recently been thrown out of Cambodia - physically. Therefore, whatever Western interests are in Cambodia, someone else must do something about it. I hope that someone can contribute a psychiatrist to that situation.

Cuba

I might just make a final comment on Cuba. What has been happening in Cuba is a concern to all of us in the Western hemisphere and can, at moments of critical danger, be of concern to the members of NATO as well. There has been a movement out of Soviet forces in recent months. We believe that Soviet units have withdrawn. We don't want to get into the numbers game again, or the television, but there are a few thousand - five to seven thousand perhaps - military personnel remaining, apparently chiefly technical personnel with respect to the SAM sites and for training Cuban armed elements. However, there seems to be no real change in the Soviet commitment to Cuba and there has been an evident increase in Cuban subversive efforts in the Western Hemisphere. A three-ton cache of arms was recently found in Venezuela, clearly and demonstrably traced to Cuba, and the hemispheric countries will be meeting to consider additional measures which might be taken to reduce that kind of penetration and aggression within the hemisphere. Castro's control apparently remains effective; there seem to be some points of disagreement between him and the Soviet Union but these have not had great significance, thus far, in weakening the assistance which the Soviet Union has been giving to Castro.

But we in the Western Hemisphere must take with the greatest seriousness any effort by Cuba to interfere in the affairs of the other countries of that hemisphere.

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And so I would suppose that the Cuban problem becomes more rather than less serious in the next thirty to sixty days ahead of us. We would hope very much that our colleagues in NATO would look upon the Cuban problem as partly their own problem, and to consider whether there is anything which they can do to increase the pressures on that situation and make it quite clear to Castro that this course upon which he has embarked can have no possible future.

Mr. Chairman, I will conclude just with a thought that, although we have serious problems ahead of us, I am glad that we have our problems rather than those of Mr. Khrushchev, for although we have had some differences among us on one or another point, there has been some formidable increase in the strength and the prosperity of the NATO community and that we should look ahead with confidence but with realisation that there is much unfinished business and that we need to repair a few leaks in our roof as we get ready for next year. Thank you, Sir.

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JAN 18 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. A. J. GOODPASTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Papers for President Eisenhower's Meeting with President-Elect Kennedy

In response to your request, I enclose briefing items on the following subjects for the President's January 19 meeting with the President-elect. They have been approved by the Secretary.

Laos

The Congo and the African Situation

Cuba, the Dominican Republic and the Caribbean

Algeria and US Problems with France

Berlin

Nuclear Test Talks and Disarmament

/S/ Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Director
Executive Secretariat

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JAN 18 1961
A true copy of signed original

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BERLIN

Continuing Soviet objectives appear to be separation of Berlin from West Germany, establishment of the so-called "free city", incorporation of Berlin into East Germany, consolidation of the East German and Eastern European regimes, and extension from this base of Soviet control throughout Germany.

Since November 1958, the Soviets have threatened to conclude a "separate peace treaty" with East Germany, designed to give it full control over access to Berlin. More recently, the USSR and East Germany have adopted a more subtle erosion of the Western position. The separate treaty has been subordinated to claims that East Germany is already fully sovereign, except for certain temporary obligations of the USSR relating to Allied garrisons in Berlin. It is very difficult to demonstrate that the real issue in each minor incident is the survival of free Berlin. Recent vigorous German-US-UK-French countermeasures, directed mainly against East German trade with West Germany and other NATO countries, seem to have halted this erosion for the time being. The Soviets may soon shift the emphasis again, however, possibly pressing for a summit conference to discuss proposals looking toward the "free city".

No acceptable and negotiable formula has yet been devised to solve the Berlin problem separately from a solution for Germany as a whole. The West has repeatedly been blocked by Soviet insistence upon gains at the expense of vital Western interests. A complicating factor has been the need for US-UK-French-West German agreement. The principal Western tactic has been to gain time and demonstrate determination to protect West Berlin, while seeking a basis for solution. The problem is increasingly one of convincing the USSR that the Western Powers have the will and the means to maintain their position. Khrushchev has asserted disbelief on this score. Many Western European leaders consider it out of the question to respond to Soviet encroachments with nuclear weapons. Compelling legal arguments support the Western position, and the Soviets appear aware that overt aggression could jeopardize their broader "coexistence" objectives as well as possibly involve a risk of WAR.

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54

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE COUNSELOR
WASHINGTON

(318)

~~EUR~~ ~~REU~~ ~~S/S~~ ~~ACTION~~

February 27, 1961

~~G/PM~~ ~~INFO~~ RM/R IC

material forwarded S/P 3/2/61 for transmission to White House

TO: EUR - Mr. Foy D. Kohler

FROM: S/P - George C. McGhee

762.00/2-2761

Mr. Bundy has confirmed assignment to the Department, on an urgent basis, of a report for the President on the problem of Berlin. The description of the problem given in his memorandum is as follows:

> "The Political and Military Aspects of the Berlin Crisis.
>
> "A Position on Germany for Possible Four Power Negotiations - What alternative approaches to the Berlin and German problems should be explored? Would it be desirable to shift the emphasis from Berlin to German unification? Is there any basis upon which the U. S. could accept a confederal approach to unification? Is a deal on a Berlin corridor versus acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line possible and in our interest?"

I assume you will, as soon as possible, prepare a report along these lines but embodying such other elements of the problem as you consider appropriate for submission to the President.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

762.00/3-861

Memorandum of Conversation (55)

DATE: March 8, 1961

SUBJECT: Meeting of Four Power Working Group on Germany including Berlin

PARTICIPANTS:

United States	Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Foy D. Kohler (Chairman)	Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe
Mr. Richard Davis	Mr. Swidbert Schnippenkoetter
Mr. Martin Hillenbrand	Mr. Horst Blomeyer-Bartenstein
Mr. William O. Anderson	
Mr. Frank Cash	United Kingdom
Mr. Arthur Day	
Mr. Charles Johnson	Lord Hood
Mr. Nicholas Veliotes	Mr. John Thomson
Mr. Richard Kearney	
Mr. Robert Fritts	France
	Ambassador Herve Alphand
	Mr. Jean-Claude Winckler

March 21, 1961

762.00/3-861

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30-31

(31)

Khrushchev Memorandum on Germany and Berlin to Chancellor Adenauer

Opening the meeting, Mr. Kohler mentioned that the report on dealing with a "separate peace treaty" had been sent to the President and the Secretary for their approval. He also stated that he felt the Four Power Working Group should continue meeting from time to time so as to keep abreast of the current Soviet policy as it becomes more clear. He then explained that the meeting had been called at the request of the Germans to discuss the Soviet memorandum of February 17, 1961, on Germany and Berlin, which Premier Khrushchev had addressed to Chancellor Adenauer. Mr. Kohler observed that our initial reaction was that the memorandum restated the standard Soviet positions. He did, however, feel that the memorandum was interesting as it gave implications of a "deal on the side" with the FRG and should thus be considered as a basic document in connection with any policy on Germany and Berlin to be put forth by the Soviet Union. He added that the subsequent treatment of the memorandum by the Soviets indicate[d] that it

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that it may be the start of the '61 campaign to get negotiations on Berlin and Germany under way.

At Mr. Kohler's request, Ambassador Grewe gave a full and complete analysis of the Soviet memorandum. He regarded the memorandum as containing no basic change in substance with regard to Soviet aims of making Berlin a "Free City", of fixing the existing situation with regard to boundaries and the "social accomplishments" of the "GDR", of reiterating that there would be no binding connection between a peace treaty and the establishment of an All-German Government, of their threat to eventually conclude a separate peace treaty with the "GDR", and of the non-participation of the FRG in the negotiation of any interim agreement. The only substantive innovation was the linking of any interim solution with the ultimate goal of a peace treaty and this represented a certain hardening of the Soviet position. In addition the statement by the Soviets that the FRG could possibly influence events on Berlin by participating in bilateral discussions with the Soviets was a new task.

Commenting on the style and tone of the memorandum, the Ambassador noted that its phrasing was mild and non-polemic in contrast to the Jan. 28, 1960 letter to the Chancellor, and that it could not be regarded as an ultimatum since in stressing the urgency of finding a solution it fixed no time limit. He felt that the tone of restraint fitted in with the current policy of reasonableness being shown by the Soviets in their dealings with the United States.

He felt the purposes of the memorandum were several. It was obviously an attempt to continue the policy of trying to split the Allies over the problem of Germany and Berlin by making an attractive offer of bilateral negotiations with the FRG. It would also provide the Soviets with a useful alibi for internal propaganda on the German question since the offer of bilateral negotiations would certainly not be accepted. The memorandum also served to contract the area for future agenda by disassociating the relationship of disarmament from the problem of Germany. The memorandum should also be regarded as serving notice that the attitude of the Soviets toward Germany and Berlin had not changed but that they still considered the question to be urgent and unsettled. The Ambassador noted that an improved translation of paragraph 7 on page 6 would replace the word "appropriate" with "corresponding" and thus give a truer indication of the relationship to the "GDR" of the proposed bilateral negotiations with the FRG.

In response to a question by Mr. Kohler, Ambassador Grewe commented that the memorandum had no particular application to the forthcoming German electoral campaign as the views of the main political parties on these problems were so similar.

All participants agreed that the German presentation was an able and precise analysis of the Soviet memorandum. Lord Hood, in recalling the FRG-USSR trade agreement, commented further that the memorandum replayed the previous theme of the FRG looking out after its own interests. He also felt that the memorandum, while containing nothing new, was an attempt to influence public opinion in Germany and that this was in line with a Pravda article of today which noted the

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need to impress public as well as governmental opinion.

Lord Hood thought he noted a contradiction in the Soviet memorandum between the sense of urgency expressed by the Soviets over the problem of Germany and Berlin and their supposed patience and willingness to discuss interim arrangements.

In response to a query from Ambassador Alphand as to what the FRG thought to do with the memorandum, Ambassador Grewe replied that he had no instructions. He thought that they would reply to the cover letter on repatriation, but he had no indication as to whether or not a reply to the memorandum would be made. In any event, there was patently no special urgency since the German letter to which this was a reply had been sent in October 1960. He emphasized that no reply would be sent without consultation. Ambassador Alphand then stated that neither was he in a position to give advice today.

Lord Hood then raised the question as to whether this memorandum might be a request for counter-proposals on a draft German peace treaty. It seemed that the Soviets might be trying to make a distinction between negotiation on a "draft" for a peace treaty as compared to negotiating on an actual treaty. He thought this might be relevant with regard to the term "corresponding" applying to the negotiations which the Soviets had held with the "GDR".

Ambassador Grewe replied that any such counter-proposals would be quite restricted to the area for [redacted]. Any such negotiations would thus not really mean very much. At this point Mr. Kohler referred to the statement of von Brentano who had categorically stated during his Washington visit that the FRG had no intention of conducting direct negotiations. Ambassador Grewe said that although he had no specific instructions on this point, he was certain he could reaffirm this.

In response to Lord Hood's query, Ambassador Grewe noted that a copy of the memorandum had been transmitted to NATO and it would be up to NATO to decide what to do with it. Replying further to Mr. Kohler's question, the Ambassador said that they would not "press" for presentation by the German representative to NAC of an analysis similar to the one that the Ambassador had made here. He felt such a "big discussion" would only lead to problems.

With respect to the timing of any possible reply, Ambassador Grewe stated he would be particularly interested in the views of the United States as this was the first real item on Germany to occur since the new Administration had taken office.

Mr. Kohler reviewed again the instructions on Germany to Ambassador Thompson and suggested that any reply should be delayed until we know what Khrushchev might say to Ambassador Thompson on the subject. Considering that the transmittal of this memorandum is the first step of a Soviet tactic, and the publication of it the second, it might well be that the Khrushchev-Thompson meeting would be the third piece and perhaps make a clear picture.

Mr. Kohler then

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Mr. Kohler then summarized the results of the meeting which he felt to be the following:

1. Full approval of the analysis presented by the German Ambassador;

2. An agreement to receive the views of their respective governments on any possible reply while basing the final decision upon the Khrushchev-Thompson conversation.

Mr. Kohler added that the United States would use this opportunity to make a full report to the President and the Secretary on the Berlin and German situations as this memorandum was, in reality, addressed to all the occupying Powers. All the participants agreed to Mr. Kohler's summation.

US Statements on Berlin

Before the meeting adjourned, Ambassador Grewe mentioned that several news commentators in Berlin were speculating on the recent emphasis by the United States of "maintaining the freedom of the people of Berlin" rather than emphasizing the status and rights of the occupying Powers. He felt that we had probably decided on this emphasis due to its psychological effect upon the people of Berlin. In view of the current speculation he thought it might be useful for the United States to reaffirm publicly in some manner our belief in the rights and status of the Western Powers in Berlin. He thought that the Brandt visit might perhaps give us such an opportunity. Mr. Kohler replied that there was no attempt to soft-peddle the rights line but that such a statement as the Ambassador suggested might well be made.

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7:05 P.M.

FROM: BONN

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1414, MARCH 8, 11 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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FROM HARRIMAN

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EYES ONLY PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

WHILE IN BONN I HAD TWO LONG TALKS AS WELL AS LUNCHEON WITH ADENAUER, TOTALLY OVER FIVE HOURS. WE COVERED THE WATERFRONT OF SUBJECTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

THE CHANCELLOR SEEMED TO BE ENJOYING HIMSELF. HE IS LOOKING FORWARD KEENLY TO THE TALKS WITH YOU. I DESCRIBED THE NEW VIGOR AND ATMOSPHERE OF VITALITY IN WASHINGTON AND EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO OBTAIN FROM HIM THE SUBJECTS UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND WHICH HE MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS WITH YOU AND TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS ON POLICIES OF NEW ADMINISTRATION AS FAR AS I UNDERSTOOD THEM. HE IMMEDIATELY REFERRED TO NEED TO STRENGTHEN NATO BOTH IN MORALE AND IN PHYSICAL CAPABILITIES. HE REFERRED TO DULLES' LACK OF INTEREST IN NATO. HE EXPRESSED HIS HIGH REGARD FOR DULLES AND THAT HE HAD FELT CLOSE TO HIM BUT THAT HE COULD NOT CONVINCE HIM OF THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO. DULLES HAD FELT THAT NATO WAS TOO LARGE TO MAINTAIN SECRECY. NOW US SHOULD, ADENAUER URGED, EXERT LEADERSHIP AND THEN THE OTHER MEMBERS WOULD FOLLOW OUR LEADERSHIP. NATO'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED BUT THE ORGANIZATION SHOULD ALSO BE USED AS A MEDIUM TO DISCUSS AND CONCERT POLITICAL POLICIES IN THE COLD WAR. HE AGREED THAT THE OECD WAS THE INSTITUTION THROUGH WHICH WE SHOULD COOPERATE FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC POLICIES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

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I ASSURED HIM OF YOUR INTEREST IN AND CONCERN FOR NATO AND EXPLAINED THE REVIEW OF NATO YOU HAD SET UP TO ESTABLISH FUTURE POLICIES OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION. THE FACT THAT YOU HAD SELECTED ACHESON, WHOSE FAITH IN NATO WAS WELL-KNOWN, TO HEAD THIS REVIEW INDICATED YOUR APROACH. HE EXPRESSED THE STRONG HOPE THAT THE HERTER-NORSTAD PROPOSAL FOR NATO NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WOULD BE ENDORSED AS HE CONSIDERED THE BASIC CONCEPT ESSENTIAL. HE HOPED THAT THEREBY DE GAULLE COULD BE INDUCED TO ABANDON FRANCE'S INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER. HE AGREED WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT DE GAULLE WOULD NEVER AGREE UNLESS BRITISH REDUCED THEIR POSITION TO SUBSTANTIAL EQUALITY TO THAT OF FRANCE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY RESIST BUT PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UK MIGHT WELL WELCOME SUCH A MOVE.

ADENAUER SHOWED CONCERN OVER THE COLD ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TOWARDS NATO. HE SAID THAT AT A MEETING IN PARIS IN 1959 DEBRE, COUVE, AND JOXE HAD EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT IN TIME NATO WOULD "WITHER AWAY". DEBRE HAD CONTENDED THAT THE US WOULD WITHDRAW FROM EUROPE AND THIS NECESSITATED A POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE FROM THE US BY EUROPEAN NATIONS. AT THAT TIME WHEN HE QUESTIONED DE GAULLE THE LATTER HAD STATED THAT THE US MUST BE KEPT IN EUROPE. THE NEXT YEAR, 1960, HOWEVER, DE GAULLE APPEARED TO BE CLOSER TO DEBRE'S VIEW.

STRESSING AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO AND THE NECESSITY OF ITS HAVING NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, HE SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER DOUBTED US INTENTIONS TO SUPPORT ITS COMMITMENT TO EUROPE NOT BECAUSE OF A MORAL COMMITMENT BUT BECAUSE US UNDERSTOOD THAT DEFENSE OF EUROPE WAS THE DEFENSE OF THE US". HE SAID THAT SOME PEOPLE IN EUROPE HAD HAD CONFIDENCE IN THE US WHEN EISENHOWER WAS PRESIDENT BECAUSE OF HIS KNOWN INTEREST IN EUROPE WHEREAS DURING THE ELECTION THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT A NEW PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE EQUALLY INTERESTED. HE SAID HE HIMSELF HAD NOT SHARED THAT CONCERN REPEATING THE REASON GIVEN ABOVE.

IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION HE ADDED THAT HE WAS NOT WORRIED BY THE PRESS REPORTS ABOUT A NEW POLICY OF SUBSTITUTING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS FOR NUCLEAR BUT REPEATED AGAIN THE NEED FOR US

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-3- 1414, MARCH 8, 11 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM BONN

LEADERSHIP IN NATO. HE APPEARED REASSURED WHEN I UNDERLINED THE STRONG STATEMENTS YOU HAD MADE REGARDING BERLIN. HE COMMENTED THAT MACMILLAN SEEMED NOW CONVINCED OF NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING A FIRM STAND ON BERLIN. THIS OPINION MACMILLAN HAD EXPRESSED WHEN ADENAUER HAD TALKED TO HIM IN LONDON LAST DECEMBER. HE ADMITTED THAT HE BELIEVED PRES EISENHOWER HAD GIVEN KHRUSHCHEV THE IMPRESSION AT CAMP DAVID THAT HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO COMPROMISE. HE HOPED NOW KHRUSHCHEV WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT ALL FOUR WESTERN LEADERS ARE UNITED ON REFUSING TO BE PUSHED OUT OF BERLIN.

TURNING TO KHRUSHCHEV AND SOVIET INTENTIONS, HE STATED THAT HE BELIEVED KHRUSHCHEV WAS MORE AFRAID OF RED CHINA OVER THE LONG RUN THAN OF THE US. HE EXPLAINED THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD ASKED HIM IN 1955 FOR SUPPORT AGAINST RED CHINA. (AT LUNCH WHEN HE COULD NOT BE OVERHEARD HE ADDED THAT HE HAD REFUSED KRUSHCHEV'S REQUEST FOR ANY SUCH UNDERSTANDING AS KHRUSHCHEV HAD INCLUDED THE US AS A COMMON ENEMY.)

ADENAUER CONTINUED THAT KHRUSHCHEV DID NOT RPT NOT WANT WAR AND SINCE KHRUSHCHEV HAD REDUCED ROLE OF SOVIET SECRET POLICE HE HAD NOW TO CONTROL THE COUNTRY THROUGH CONTROL OF THE PARTY AND THAT THE PARTY WAS INFLUENCED BY PUBLIC OPINION. HE BELIEVES THAT INTERNAL PRESSURES WITHIN THE SOV UNION WILL OPPOSE A POLICY OF SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE WEST. I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT RPT NOT AS OPTIMISTIC IN THE NEAR FUTURE ALTHOUGH IF SOVIET ADVANCES WERE CHECKED AND ROLLED BACK WE MIGHT IN TIME EXPECT NEW LEADERS TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN RUSSIAN DEVELOPMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF RUSSIAN PEOPLE THAN IN EXTERNAL AGGRESSION THAT TODAY I FEARED THERE WERE PRESSURES FROM PEIPING AND FROM WITHIN THE KREMLIN WHICH WOULD COMPEL KHRUSHCHEV TO BE MORE AGGRESSIVE THAN HE OTHERWISE MIGHT BE. WE BOTH AGREED THAT KHRUSHCHEV WOULD PLAY A DANGEROUS POLICY OF BRINKSMANSHIP.

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PRIORITY

FROM HARRIMAN

EYES ONLY PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

ADENAUER CONTINUED THAT HE BELIEVED CONTROLLED ARMS LIMITATION WAS THE BEST AREA FOR NEGOTIATION WITH SOVS TODAY. HE IS REASSURED OF YOUR INTENTIONS IN THIS FIELD BY YOUR SELECTION OF MCCLOY. HE FEELS THAT IF WE CAN MAKE SOME PROGRESS IN THIS AREA, TENSION MAY BE SOMEWHAT RELAXED AND DISCUSSION OF OTHER SUBJECTS SUCH AS BEGUN MIGHT BE MORE USEFUL. ADENAUER BROUGHT UP SOV MEMORANDUM ON BERLIN SAYING "TONE SOFT BUT CONTENTS HARD." HE HOPES THAT WE WILL POSTPONE BERLIN AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. I EXPLAINED IN GENERAL TERMS YOUR INSTRUCTION TO THOMPSON MENTIONING THAT YOU MIGHT BE READY FOR DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS IN EARLY SUMMER. I ADDED THAT YOU OF COURSE WOULD DISCUSS ANY PROGRAM YOU HAD IN MIND FULLY WITH HIM AND OUR OTHER PRINCIPLE ALLIES BEFORE ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOV UNION. ADENAUER FULLY APPROVED YOUR POLICY OF "QUIET DIPLOMACY" AND APPEARED OPEN TO ANY SUGGESTIONS ON "QUIET" RATHER THAN PUBLIC TALKS WITH KHRUSHCHEV ON DISARMAMENT AND ANY SUBJECTS IN SO FAR AS THEY MIGHT BE PRODUCTIVE.

WE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS OF THE "DEVELOPING AREAS" AT LENGTH. HE AGREES THAT THIS IS THE AREA IN WHICH KHRUSHCHEV EXPECTS TO MAKE HIS NEXT ADVANCES AND IS THE PRESENT BATTLEFIELD OF THE COLD WAR. HE ASSURED ME REPEATEDLY THAT WE COULD COUNT ON THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC CONTINUING CONTRIBUTION TO AID FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THAT THEY WOULD CONTRIBUTE THEIR FULL SHARE OF GRANTS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND SOFT AND HARD LOANS. HE MAINTAINED HE WAS NOT IN POSITION TO GIVE FUTURE

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FIGURES UNTIL AFTER ELECTION. ALSO HE UNDERLINED THE NEED TO CONCERT OUR PROGRAMS WITH OTHER INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INCLUDING JAPAN THROUGH DAG AND LATER THROUGH OECD. I DISPELLED A REPORT HALLSTEIN HAD GIVEN HIM THAT WE WERE GOING TO PROPOSE DIVIDING THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES INTO SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY ALTHOUGH FRANCE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE INTERESTED PRIMARILY IN HER FORMER COLONIES. THIS SEEMED TO RELIEVE HIM BUT HE REPEATED THE NECESSITY OF CONCERTING PROGRAMS TO AVOID OVERLAP AND TO ASSURE THAT NO IMPORTANT AREAS WERE OVERLOOKED.

HE FULLY AGREED THAT DULLES HAD RELIED TOO MUCH ON MILITARY ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE AND FAR EAST AND OUR AID HAD GONE LARGELY TO THE "CRISIS" COUNTRIES. HE FEELS WE SHOULD SUPPORT OUR FRIENDS AND HELP THEM ACHIEVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GAINS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN PARTICULARLY WITH ADVERSE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN, ALSO IN GREECE AND TURKEY. PAKISTAN, HE CONSIDERS, SHOULD BE HELPED TO EXPAND INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT, ENCOURAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT OF WESTERN INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES. HE IS INTERESTED IN AFRICA AND AGREED THAT THE AFRICANS WERE NO LONGER AFRAID OF GERMANY AS SHE HAD NO COLONIES. HE REPEATED A REMARK MACMILLAN HAD MADE TO HIM TO THE EFFECT THAT HE WAS LUCKY IN TWO WAYS: GERMANY HAD NO COLONIES AND WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE UN. I MENTIONED THE NECESSITY OF OUR SUPPORTING THE UN IN THE CONGO, THAT WE EXPECTED IT TO SUCCEED BUT IT WAS AT BEST A LONG OPERATION. HOWEVER, YOU HAD MADE IT PLAIN THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD THE SOVS BE PERMITTED TO TAKE OVER CONTROL. HE AGREED, COMMENTING "IF THAT HAPPENS, EUROPE IS LOST."

WE DISCUSSED CASTRO AND THE INFLUENCE OF HIS MOVEMENT AMONG THE EXPLOITED PEOPLE OF LATIN AMERICA. HE INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ENCOURAGE GERMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND TRADE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE POINTED OUT THAT GERMANY COULD NO LONGER CONSIDER FOREIGN INVESTMENT ALONE FOR PROFIT BUT FOR THE NEEDS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. ALSO ASSISTANCE WAS NOT CHARITY BUT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WORLDWIDE POLITICAL STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM.

HE SHOWED LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THE UN SAYING "WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN WITH SO MANY NEW MEMBERS EACH WITH ONE VOTE?" HE KNOWS, OF COURSE,

OF COURSE, OF DE GAULLE'S LACK OF INTEREST IN UN. I ASSURED HIM OF OUR CONTINUING DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT UN AND THAT THE SMALLER NATIONS WERE APPRECIATING MORE AND MORE THAT THEIR FUTURE SECURITY WAS PROTECTED LARGELY BY UN; THAT IF WE TOOK AN INTELLIGENT INTEREST IN THEM AND THEIR PROBLEMS WE WOULD FIND A MAJORITY VOTING SENSIBLY.

I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE DIFFICULTIES AND DIFFERENCES OF POLICY BETWEEN NATO MEMBERS MENTIONING PORTUGAL'S OVERSEAS TERRITORIES AS AN EXAMPLE.

IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION REGARDING HIS RECENT TALK WITH DE GAULLE HE SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD HAD DIFFERENCES WITH HIM BEFORE, THIS LATEST TALK HAD BEEN "VERY REASSURING". DE GAULLE HAD NEVER MENTIONED HIS IDEA OF A TRIPARTITE DIRECTORATE IN NATO TO HIM BUT, IF HE HAD, HE WOULD HAVE HAD TO "REJECT IT IN THE STRONGEST TERMS".

EARLIER IN THE TALK WHEN I HAD BROUGHT UP THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS QUESTION, ADENAUER SAID THAT SEC ANDERSON HAD NEVER RAISED QUESTION OF AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES; INSTEAD THE DISCUSSION HAD CENTERED ON GERMAN PAYMENT OF US MILITARY EXPENSES IN GERMANY WHICH HE COULD NOT AGREE TO AND REMAIN IN OFFICE. HE ASSURED ME HE INTENDED TO BEAR HIS FULL SHARE OF AID AND NATO BURDENS AND WAS FULLY APPRECIATIVE OF THE HELP US HAD BEEN IN GERMAN RECONSTRUCTION. IN CLOSING HE EXPRESSED HIS SINCERE DESIRE TO ESTABLISH CLOSE RELATIONS WITH YOU AND THIS HE HOPED WOULD BE ACHIEVED IN HIS IMPENDING VISIT TO WASHINGON.

DOWLING

MB

FOR GER: Willy Brandt all
(Mailing Office and Officer)

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Approved in S
3/29/61

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

XR 762.00

Memorandum of Conversation

57

321

DATE: March 14, 1961

SUBJECT: Berlin and Related Problems

PARTICIPANTS: The Governing Mayor of Berlin, Mr. Willy Brandt
Mr. Egon Bahr, Press Chief of the West Berlin Senat
Mr. Franz Krapf, Minister, German Embassy
Mr. Hans Arnold, First Secretary, German Embassy

APR 5 · 1

The Secretary
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, EUR
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER

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762.0221/3-1461

After an initial exchange of amenities, Governing Mayor Brandt said that he had not come to the United States to be convinced of American firmness on Berlin. This he knew. Although some doubts about American policy had been expressed earlier this year in the West German Press, particularly after the President's State of the Union Speech had omitted reference to Berlin, these doubts were not shared by the West Berliners. Mayor Brandt noted that he had already discussed the meaning of Khrushchev's February 17 memorandum with Mr. Kohler. One could not be sure what the Soviet time-table envisaged. He had the impression that the Soviets would not precipitate a Berlin crisis during the German electoral campaign. On the other hand, Khrushchev might have to have something to tell his Party Congress in October on the subject. Mr. Kohler commented that he was glad to hear earlier from Mayor Brandt that the SPD had made contingency plans in the event that the Soviets heated up the Berlin question during the electoral campaign. Mayor Brandt said that, under such circumstances, he would obviously have to leave the campaign and return to Berlin.

The Secretary observed that, in the broadest sense, West Berlin might be considered a provocation to the other side. Were there any details in this connection, however, which might be considered unnecessarily provocative? Did any aspect of Western activity in Berlin cause the Mayor concern? After reflecting a moment, Mayor Brandt replied that perhaps the West should stop using refugee statistics as part of its propaganda. This was rubbing salt in the wounds.

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in the wounds. It might also be, the Mayor continued, that some intelligence agencies believe they can work more in the open under the special conditions prevailing in Berlin than would be the case elsewhere, for example, in the processing of refugees at the Marienfelde refugee camp. There was obviously a legitimate information-gathering function to be carried out with respect to refugees, and he understood that something had already been done in removing some of the more obvious aspects. However, he wished to point out that, if certain practices were changed, the East would always find new things to complain about. The basic fact was that the existence of the free city of West Berlin was what they did not like. From a different point of view, however, West Berlin was perhaps a necessary safety valve for East Germany, enabling reduction of internal tensions within the GDR to more tolerable levels.

In response to the Secretary's query, Mayor Brandt said there had been no change in the relationships between the West Berliners and the population of East Germany. He referred to the daily flow of the so-called "Grensgaenger". The new project of Interior Minister Schroeder to establish more effective police controls at the boundaries between the Federal Republic and the GDR would obviously result in less movement from East to West. However, the SPD was opposed to this legislation and there was also strong opposition within the CDU. It, therefore, had no chance of passage in the Bundestag. Such a law would really be a sign of weakness on the part of the Federal Republic.

After a discussion of the SPD's European policy (covered in a separate memorandum of conversation), Mayor Brandt noted that one difference between his party and the CDU was that many supporters of the latter were mainly interested in protecting the West against influences from the East, whereas the SPD was more confident of Western strength and of Western capacities in the ideological field.

The Secretary asked whether, in Mayor Brandt's opinion, if the situation in Laos were to develop so that the Soviets increased their pressure, would this be likely to lead to more pressure in Berlin also? Mayor Brandt said it was difficult to say. The Secretary noted that we have had no particular impression as to what the Soviets intend to do about Berlin. Perhaps Khrushchev might try to compensate elsewhere, as in Laos, for his lack of success in the Berlin situation. Mr. Kohler observed that perhaps another possibility was that, if the Soviets started losing in Laos, then they would compensate by shifting the pressure to Berlin.

In response to the Secretary's question, Mayor Brandt said there was no Red Chinese community in West Berlin. Some Red Chinese may come over occasionally but there were no official contacts with the West Berlin Government. The Soviets were probably not interested in furthering this. It was known that the Red Chinese did have good contacts with certain elements of the SED leadership. A year or so ago Ulbricht had tried to play this record more.

In response to a further query by the Secretary, Mayor Brandt said that very few

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very few young West Berliners were going East to study. Perhaps some ten to twelve per year went to the Soviet Union on an exchange arrangement. He would certainly not object if more went to the Soviet Union under such an arrangement.

Mayor Brandt stated that relations between the West Berlin population and U.S. troops were excellent. The blockade had put both the Occupying Forces and the Berliners into one boat and had developed a spirit of friendship which remained to the present day. There were isolated difficulties, of course, but these were not serious.

The Secretary noted that Mayor Brandt had discussed with the President the de facto position of West Berlin if the Soviets concluded a peace treaty with East Germany. Mayor Brandt said that, personally speaking, what he had in mind was something which he would have been inclined to do for some time in reacting to the Soviet threat to sign an independent peace treaty. He would simply say to the Soviets: "Please do it. We cannot accept the legality of your action but at the same time we cannot stop you from making arrangements within your own area of control. What we cannot accept is any attempt unilaterally to abrogate our rights". He thought, the Mayor continued, that if the West took this position strongly enough and made it clear to the Soviets how much United States prestige was involved in our position in Berlin, they might be willing to make such a peace treaty but exclude Berlin access from the control of the East German regime. Another possibility was that the East Germans would make a statement guaranteeing non-interference with respect to the access routes of the Western garrisons in Berlin.

The Secretary asked whether Mayor Brandt saw any prospects for the extension of informal de facto contacts between the East and West Germans. The latter observed that there had been some improvements in traffic recently between Berlin and the West. He had reason to believe that the East Germans would fulfill the agreement of late December which led to the restoration of the Intersonal Trade Agreement by the Federal Republic, but he did not think this would lead to much improvement in other areas of technical or practical cooperation. One possibility which he had considered was that the Four Powers might meet to discuss the question and say that in 1949 they had agreed that the Four should consult together in Berlin to try to improve conditions of access to Berlin. If, under such cover, experts from both the Federal Republic and East Germany could come together, it might be useful and would not raise the question of recognition. Such a Four Power decision might be the basis for bringing experts together in fields other than trade or traffic. The Secretary commented that by spinning spider webs across from West to East it might be possible to create a rope. Mayor Brandt said that some contacts, of course, exist at the present time. He referred to a recent issue of Neues Deutschland which, for the first time in many years, mentioned the 1949 Agreement as something giving the West rights which the threatened German action in denouncing the IZT would terminate.

The Secretary

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The Secretary said that a problem was that since we could live with the status quo in Berlin, we always seemed to be on the defensive. Were there any initiatives which the West should consider? Mayor Brandt said he would favor a more positive posture towards the East in many fields, but he was inclined to believe that it was better not to take the initiative in raising the Berlin question. As Lord Home had recently put it: "We have no Berlin problem. If the Soviets do, they should tell us". Obviously the West had to make preparations before the Soviets again raised the question. The West should not only react but have counter-demands to make. More could be said about conditions in East Berlin, stressing that this legally is a Four Power area with respect to which the Soviets are not carrying out their obligations. This emphasis on East Berlin is our strongest point in discussions with certain non-committed countries, Mayor Brandt observed. It has more appeal to them than arguments about Western occupation rights.

The Secretary asked whether Mayor Brandt thought the new American Administration need say any more on Berlin at this point. He noted that we had deliberately held back so as not to precipitate discussion of the subject with the Soviets. Mayor Brandt said he and the Berliners were fully aware of the situation and did not require assuring. As he had previously noted, certain West German newspapers had tried to draw conclusions from the fact that Berlin was not mentioned in the State of the Union speech, but this had not been the case in Berlin. He was glad to have Berlin left out of the current problems being discussed. He noted that, shortly after the Democratic Administration had taken over, Ambassador Dowling in a personal conversation had assured him that the new Administration would be at least as firm as the old on this subject. He had been satisfied with the Secretary's statements during his press conference last Thursday. The Secretary commented that the questioning had gotten a little involved. The use of the word "forever" was somewhat silly and misleading, but then correspondents jumped to the other extreme and asked that if you don't mean "forever", do you mean "tomorrow"? The conversation concluded with the Secretary's noting that he had studied in Berlin in 1934 at the Hochschule fuer Politik, and with Mayor Brandt's extending an invitation to the Secretary to visit Berlin the next time he was in Europe.

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Downgraded to Category "A"
September 21, 1960
By Warren L. Henriksen

Downgraded To: SECRET C[illegible]
EO 11652: XGDS (C) 2 6 c
Authorized By: H. L. Brewster
August 4, 1975 April 3, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Berlin

I have started on the problem which the President posed for me, and will report further after my return from Europe about May first. In the meantime, it is essential to establish premises upon which analysis can rest. Those stated below are for study, which has already been requested, in my absence in the Departments of State and Defense.

Tentative Premises for Analysis

1. There is no "solution" for the Berlin problem short of the unification of Germany. All courses of action are dangerous and unpromising. Inaction is even worse. We are faced with a "Hobson's choice." If a crisis is provoked a bold and dangerous course may be the safest.

2. No agreement with the Soviet Union on Berlin is possible which will not weaken the Western position and open the way to early Western elimination from Berlin--except, of course, a wholly unlikely USSR decision to drop the whole issue. A temporary agreement, such as was discussed at Geneva in 1959, by its very time limit would call our basic position in Berlin into question, and merely postpone the crisis to be met under more disadvantageous circumstances. Nor is it probable that the crisis would be long deferred by any concession in the all-German field which we could realistically offer.

3. It seems more likely than not that the USSR will move toward a crisis on Berlin this year.

4. Decisions and preparations to meet this crisis should be made at the earliest possible date.

5. Berlin

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5. Berlin is of great importance. It is more than probable, and approaches certitude, that if the United States accepted a Communist take-over of Berlin—under whatever face-saving and delaying device—the power status in Europe would be starkly revealed and Germany, and probably France, Italy and Benelux, would make the indicated adjustments. The United Kingdom would hope that something would turn up. It wouldn't.

6. If USSR is not to dominate Europe, and, by doing so, dominate Asia and Africa also, a willingness to fight for Berlin is essential. Economic and political pressures will not be effective; they would degrade the credibility of the United States commitment to NATO. War would threatening to initiate general nuclear war be a solution. The threat would not carry conviction; it would invite a preemptive strike; and it would alienate allies and neutrals alike. The fight for Berlin must begin, at any rate, as a local conflict. The problem is how and where will it end. This uncertainty must be accepted.

7. The issue over which the fight is made should be chosen early and carefully. The issue should not be the substitution of East German for Russian personnel, or the stamping, form or style of papers. It should be persistent physical interference with military or civilian traffic to and from Berlin, whether by East Germans or Soviets. Opinion at home and abroad should be fully and carefully informed as to why such interference would constitute aggression. We should not be under any illusion, however, that the neutrals will accept our view. Our interests and theirs are not the same; they will want peace at any price. The United Nations is thus unlikely to be of any more help in a future Berlin crisis than it was in 1948; a problem may arise in keeping it from being a hindrance.

8. We do not have the capability, against determined USSR resistance, to open a ground corridor to Berlin or to maintain an airlift.

a. The former is demonstrable by a comparison of available ground forces.

b. The latter view rests, not on the outcome of an air fight over the corridor, but on the vulnerability of an airlift to

ground-to-air

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ground-to-air missiles. If extensive bombing of these ground missile batteries were begun and replied to, the result might be not to make the airlift possible, but to broaden and escalate the warfare.

The issue, therefore, is not our capability to reopen ground or air access to Berlin; it is a test of will. In the face of a determined attempt to reopen access will the USSR make determined resistance? If so, how determined? And how vigorously and long would the USSR resist the efforts of others to stop the fighting once fighting was again a basis, a basis wholly in accord with United States interests?

9. The United States will have the gravest difficulty, as it has had in the past, in getting its allies, including the Germans, to agree in advance to a fight for Berlin. Nevertheless, the United States should proceed with its preparations. These preparations will be apparent to the USSR and will contribute to the deterrent. But they should be consistently played down, e.g., covered as plans for maneuvers. Unless these steps are handled most discreetly, and full consultation on the objective continuously conducted, our allies might become frightened and tempted to make concessions on Berlin, without our agreement, which might amount to its surrender.

10. The United States Government should have ready plans, which should be allowed to become known, for a large increase in the United States military budget, which would be undertaken as soon as the USSR begins an increase of tensions on Berlin. Such an increase would, in fact, become necessary if the attempt to seal off Berlin should be made. It would also confront the USSR with unpleasant problems of the allocation of resources. The prospect of such an increase would thus add to the deterrent.

11. While the United States should make plain by its preparations that it did not intend to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, it should make no such declaration and should constantly indicate its concern at the possibility that events themselves might take command of the situation. The degree to which SAC alert should be increased as the crisis develops is obviously a matter of the greatest importance and utmost sensitivity. It should not be at a lesser rate or to a lesser extent than in prior crises, in order to maintain the credibility of United States determination. It

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should not be enough greater to drive the USSR to a desperate preemptive strike.

12. The United States should review possibilities of causing disaffection and sabotage in the Eastern European satellites in the event the United States took vigorous action.

13. The United States should review the possibilities of harassing the USSR elsewhere—e.g., closing the Black Sea, or the Baltic in whole or part to USSR traffic.

Questions To Be Resolved

1. Along What Lines Can We Most Hopefully Seek Allied Agreement On the Issues Over Which We Would Fight Rather Than? The principles are stated in Paragraph 7 above. The methods of making these principles clear require study by the State Department.

2. What Should Be the Immediate and Precise Purposes of a Fight Over Berlin? If the premises stated above are correct—i.e., that neither ground nor air access to Berlin can be maintained against determined Soviet opposition—what is the purpose of the proposed fight?

a. The first purpose is to face the USSR with the hard decision whether to incur what risks there are in a determined opposition; and, if the opposition is not made, to reopen access. To accomplish this result the United States effort must be a determined one.

b. A second purpose, if the Russians do make a determined fight, is to convince them that to prevent the loss of Berlin is more important to the United States than gaining it by force is to the USSR; and that the United States is prepared to run greater risks to achieve its purpose than the Soviets should be to attain theirs. If time is on their side, as they say, why risk everything by being in a hurry? A sustained fight would involve grave risks of escalation, a drain on economic development and on "peaceful coexistence", and chances of trouble in the satellites.

c. A third purpose is to rally our European allies to a unified and determined rearmament program. Since Berlin cannot be held

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be held against determined Soviet use of military power short of nuclear war, it is important—if the decision is against nuclear war—to be able to mitigate a defeat over Berlin. To have put up a really determined fight might permit the United States to turn, in part, a liability into an asset, by rallying the alliance into greater unity and military power. This was done after the Czechoslovakian coup and the Korean attack. The consequences to the USSR might be serious enough to produce something much better than the unresisted yielding of Berlin. (It should be emphasized that this memorandum does not advise for or against eventual use of nuclear weapons in defense of Berlin, or suggest to what extent the choice will remain ours to make freely. At a later stage in this study, views may be possible on this point.)

d. There is a fourth and more speculative purpose. Might a grave conflict in the heart of Europe lead to widening the frame of diplomatic negotiation, to include steps toward a German settlement and arms control which now seem infeasible?

3. Should the Test of Will Take Place on the Ground or in the Air or Both? These alternatives need more careful study than they seem to have received.

a. Doubts about an air operation arise from lack of any clear idea of what it seeks to or, if successful, will achieve. It cannot achieve an airlift against determined resistance. If the USSR decides not to oppose determinedly it achieves only an airlift, which, except for garrison supply, may be of ephemeral use. Nor is it clear how a continued air fight over the corridors would create a severe test of Soviet will, unless the United States were willing to expand the area of combat by ground bombing. This memorandum does not purport to judge the issue; merely to sound a note of inquiry, as a basis for further study. If it should turn out to be the proper choice, preparations should be instituted promptly.

b. A ground operation presents advantages and opportunities. It also presents grave dangers of escalation and of the Western force being destroyed or cut off—especially if and when the Elbe has been crossed. If undertaken it should be by a considerable force. A battalion is too small. It can be stopped, defeated

or captured

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or captured without disclosing any of the intentions or achieving any of the results desired. Its only merit seems to be in the fact that this is as far as the British have been willing to plan. This is not an adequate justification. An armored division, with another division in reserve, is a wholly different matter. This is a formidable force. It raises the most difficult questions for the other side. It cannot be stopped without military action. It can take care of itself against East German or token Soviet opposition. It can raise the issue of determined Russian resistance without the certainty of disaster, if it occurs. If it succeeds, a real accomplishment will have been registered. It should begin its operation without tactical nuclear weapons, and without any great air assistance until the latter may be needed.

The preparations for a ground operation would be lengthy, discernible and ominous. They would require the movement of troops on the front, and perhaps additions to them by calling up European reserves to take the place of divisions to be used and perhaps by the movement of a STRAC division to Europe and the federalizing of one or more National Guard Divisions. This would not be without effect.

Both air and land operations are in urgent need of more professional study, which I shall ask to have undertaken.

Dean Acheson

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LT COLONEL S. DAVIDSON, EXEC.

APR 3 1961 323

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Berlin Briefing of Mr. Dean Acheson (U)

1. (TS) At his request, Mr. Dean Acheson was informally briefed on 31 March 1961 by Lt Cols D. C. Armstrong and J. A. Rogers concerning technical military aspects of a possible Berlin operation. Mr. Acheson had expressed interest in the military possibilities of using a non-nuclear ground force of one or more divisions to restore ground access when forcibly blocked. It is understood that this interest is associated not with his examination of NATO's situation but rather with a special project to advise the Administration on the Berlin problem specifically. Also present were Mr. Henry Owen, now assisting Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Martin Hillenbrand, OIC of the German desk in State Department. The expected representation from ASD(ISA) was not on hand.

2. (TS) Mr. Acheson opened the discussion by stating that although to him some non-nuclear military operation like a division advance down the autobahn seemed needed, whenever he mentioned it people always told him it could not be done. Lt Col Armstrong then stated that, leaving aside the questions of political feasibility and desirability, it was certainly a feasible military operation. After appropriate warnings about limited applicability, uncertainty, and the lack of any official status, he gave the participants copies of a paper "Some Technical Observations about Military Aspects of Restoring Ground Access to Berlin," around which discussion thereafter focused.

3. (TS) Instead of an expected 45 minutes, the meeting lasted an hour and a half. Mr. Acheson was keenly interested, showed thorough acquaintance with the content of the military problem, agreed the paper offered no panacea, and appeared to conclude that the possibilities definitely required full examination and appropriate official judgment. Although many of his questions were about political aspects, a sustained effort to confine military opinions to military matters was made. Thus, when he asked whether the military preparations should be deliberately conspicuous or not, the response was that the choice was political--that militarily it was possible, if desired, to conceal some preparations but not injurious to display them. It was noted that quiet but obvious preparations would go far toward proving Allied determination.

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4. (TS) Among the matters explored by Mr. Acheson's questions were:

a. West German military relationship. Did Berlin contingency plans provide for use of German divisions? Should they? How good are the German troops? (No. Political questions; no military reason why not. Quite good, though not yet at their peak.)

b. Relationship of Berlin garrison. Had they any role in the operation described in the paper? (No change from their important mission of occupying and maintaining order.)

c. Increased nuclear readiness. Should any nuclear preparations be made concurrently? (None beyond SAC's usual increased readiness in response to frequent international tensions.)

d. "Air battle" as an alternative. What about the idea of using our air strength to destroy Russia so that an airlift could be run to and from Berlin? (What objective is attainable? An air transport operation to Berlin is virtually impossible in the face of anti-aircraft gunfire, let alone missiles, and air action could not prevent anti-aircraft missiles from being used.) Mr. Acheson seemed convinced that weapons like Red-Eye, which he cited, made this alternative unpromising. He injected an anecdote about Air Force assurances given him and President Truman in June 1950 that air power alone could stop the North Korean attack.

e. Soviet invasion of West Germany. Couldn't the Elbe reply to our autobahn operation by attacking part way into West Germany? (Surely, but would they? The NATO guarantee of territorial homelands would then operate. No part of the Land Court front would be left uncovered by troop shifts to execute the Berlin operation. Ideally, troops should come from national reserves in the US, UK, and France to replace in Land Court sectors those drawn up to the Helmstedt vicinity; otherwise, neighboring units would extend to cover.)

5. (TS) A number of Mr. Acheson's questions and observations about the specific operation under discussion dealt with the possible damage the Soviets could inflict and the domestic political effects resulting. Evidently he was seeking to locate a worst-possible-if-nonnuclear outcome to go with the obvious worst-possible-if-nuclear and the best-possible benchmarks. The military significance of the Elbe bridge was examined in relation to a Soviet attempt to cut off and swallow up a force. The variable density of the column in depth was explained, and the certainty that substantial forces would be dropped off astride the bridge. Here, among other instances, was emphasized the

vast difference between a battalion operation and one involving a division or more. It was recognized, however, that determined, strong Soviet counteraction could destroy the force. Popular reaction in the US was clearly on Mr. Acheson's mind in considering this. The alternative of world-wide reaction in the event of a US failure to use force was also mentioned.

6. (TS) Reactions of other nations were discussed principally by Mr. Acheson and the two State Department officers. Lt Col Rogers emphasized, however, that where the use of a battalion left on us the burden of choice whether to use nuclear weapons, the use of a division or more passed the burden to the Soviet leadership.

7. (TS) In considering disadvantages of the operation, Lt Col Armstrong discussed the "maldeployment for general war" argument and sought to refute it. Mr. Acheson appeared to agree that the added prospect of avoiding general war was the more significant factor.

8. (C) Copies of the paper were left with Mr. Acheson and Mr. Owen. Mr. Hillenbrand asked if he might have a copy to give Mr. Henry Kissinger, who is studying the Berlin problem in the capacity of personal adviser to President Kennedy. With the express understanding that Mr. Hillenbrand would stress the non-official status of the paper, the fact that it has not been submitted for Army or DOD approval, the request was granted.

9. (U) To be regraded when JS-5 2101/413/4 is regraded.

DeWITT C. ARMSTRONG, III
Lt Colonel, GS
IPPD

[redacted]
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Approved in U
4/19/61

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

(60)

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DATE: April 4, 1961

SUBJECT: Berlin

Downgraded To [redacted] CONFIDENTIAL
EO 11652: XGDS 0 2 0 4
Authorized By: H. D. Crocker
August 4, 1975 Only

PARTICIPANTS:

US
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
John M. Steeves, Acting Assistant Secretary, FE
William C. Burdett, Director, BNA
James W. Swihart, Officer in Charge UK and Ireland Affairs

[redacted]

UK
Lord Home, Foreign Secretary
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office
Lord Hood, Minister
The Hon. Peter Ramsbotham, Head, Planning and Coordination Section, Foreign Office
[redacted]
C. D. Wiggin, First Secretary, British Embassy
A. C. I. Samuel, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

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Lord Home opened the discussion by noting we were agreed that the present position on Berlin was the best we could hope for. However, Khrushchev was bound to make a move before the German elections. If he was clever, he might make a treaty with the GDR. If the GDR were clever it might leave the situation just as it is for a year or more before beginning to tighten the squeeze on Berlin. This tactic would leave us in a most difficult position. Public opinion would be lulled and it would be hard to mobilize public support once the squeeze started. We should look at the kind of solution which might be worked out if this problem arose, but should not talk to anyone else before our minds are clear. Gromyko has said that the occupation status must end. This is the principal point he has made publicly. Would we be in a weaker position if our rights in Berlin were put on a treaty basis? The right of conquest argument is growing somewhat thin. We might then set the East Germans and the West Germans to working out their own treaty while we held fast on Berlin. We could keep the frontier card up our sleeve. The Secretary asked who would sign the treaty. Lord Home replied the treaty would be between the Four Powers. The idea would be to get Khrushchev off the occupation status hook. He might not wish to hand over control to the East Germans.

The Secretary inquired why would Khrushchev be interested? Lord Home answered so as not to hand over to the East Germans. If he did so the issue of peace

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of peace or war would be in the hands of the East Germans. Mr. Kohler commented that Khrushchev was not afraid of the East Germans. The regime was his creature. Furthermore, Russian troops were present. Sir Frederick asked whether Khrushchev would be willing to sign a treaty leaving the allied troops in Germany for ten years. Mr. Kohler remarked that he wishes the troops out.

Lord Home described his suggestion as an alternative to fighting. A solution must be found unless/were prepared to fight and to have a nuclear war. It would be very difficult to act if nothing happened on the ground. The Secretary said that if a treaty were signed by the Soviets with the East Germans we would just not recognize it. If nothing happened on the ground there would be no danger. Mr. Ramsbotham pointed out that the East Germans would take over the control posts.

The Secretary observed that as a private citizen he had not quite seen the argument that a treaty between the Soviets and the GDR would be so dangerous.

Lord Home expressed the belief that the right of our troops in Berlin rests on an agreement with the Russians. Mr. Kohler corrected him to say that it rested on the right of conquest. The Secretary said that he would be inclined not to stress the right of conquest. We might simply say that the three great powers were going to stay in Berlin until the German question was solved and were not going to be pushed out. This would avoid an argument on technicalities.

Mr. Ramsbotham said that the East Germans, if a treaty were signed, would begin to exercise their rights. Mr. Kohler pointed out that we have envisaged this and decided just what we would do. Lord Home asked what would happen if the East Germans made no difficulties. Mr. Kohler replied that we would then keep on going just as we do now. Lord Home described the East Germans as a different set of people not nearly as responsible as the Russians. The Secretary inquired whether the UK had heard from the Russians what they proposed to say in a treaty with the East Germans regarding our rights. Sir Frederick replied that our rights would terminate and access to Berlin would be at the sufferance of the East Germans. Lord Home inquired about the legal position noting the Russians say such a treaty would bring our rights to an end. Mr. Kohler answered that the lawyers were perfectly satisfied that we were on solid legal grounds. The Secretary doubted that there would be much pressure from the UK to abandon Berlin.

Lord Home reiterated that it would be safer to deal with the Russians. Sir Frederick inquired whether the Russians would be prepared to sign a treaty on Berlin without bringing in the GDR. The Secretary said that they might agree to bring in the GDR after ten years. Mr. Kohler commented that this was the joker introduced at the Geneva Conference. The Russians maintained that at the end of an agreed period a Free City should be established.

Lord Home again remarked that it would be very difficult if a treaty was

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signed and nothing happened. There was the question of public opinion. Mr. Kohler said that in the end the only issue which we would fight on would be interference with our right of access. All of the contingency planning is based on making the right of access the issue. The Secretary said he assumed that this meant access to support the city of Berlin and not just our own forces. Mr. Kohler replied affirmatively. He described the situation last fall when we had used restriction of travel documents and trade pressures by West Germany in response to East German restrictions. We had discovered that these weapons were surprisingly strong.

Lord Home observed that if we let the Russians out and deal with the East Germans over a period of years we will move deeper and deeper towards recognition of East Germany. Mr. Kohler said we would not deal with East Germany.

The Secretary thought that a build up by West Germany of relations with East Germany might be all to the good. The Under Secretary commented it was a mistake to think that the East Germans would dominate Germany. Lord Home said that if the Russians were out of the picture we might be worse off.

The Secretary said that he would need a good deal more briefing before he could give a flat answer to that proposition. He supposed there was not too much distinction to be drawn between the Russians and East Germans. If the latter started to deport themselves somewhat more gayly it would be with Russian inspiration.

Ambassador Bruce pointed out that the Soviet presence provides a control over the East German apparatus. The weakness of the Western position arises not from interference with our military forces but from East German control over civilians. It was a fallacy to believe that West German-East German exchanges would bring about a consolidation of the East German position. Impediments to trade came from the East Germans. The East Germans were being "corrupted" by the West Germans. The West Germans unfortunately were unimaginative in doing something constructive. They could not be expected to be imaginative as long as they abrogated their own responsibilities and pinned them on the West. Signature of a treaty would be extraordinarily difficult. It would result in a convulsion in West German politics particularly during the election campaign. If we were to abandon our insistence on the right of conquest and sign a treaty it would be much easier for one party to repudiate the treaty. Lord Home said he was sure nothing should be done before the elections.

The Under Secretary inquired what the probable reaction would be if the Russians pushed the East Germans and we were to turn some of our powers over to the West Germans.
Mr. Kohler commented this was the thing the West Germans were most afraid of, that is, any easing off of Western responsibility. The Germans would be scared we were pulling out. The presence of allied forces in Berlin is an essential guarantee of our continued interest. During the last six months the West Germans have come to realize that they must play a larger role.

We

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We have brought them into the contingency planning.

The Secretary said that as he understood the matter tripartite planning did not envisage that a Soviet-East German treaty would start action. We would keep our eyes on what actually happened on the ground. Mr. Kohler pointed out that we have a contingency plan covering what to do if a treaty is signed. This plan calls mainly for diplomatic action and certain preparations.

Lord Home thought the situation was not so simple. Almost immediately after a treaty was signed we would be in the position of dealing more and more with the East Germans. The West Germans would be even further in such a position. Sir Frederick stated that one objective of the Russians, of course, was to obtain recognition of the East German regime. The Secretary asked whether the Russians were content to see an increase in East German-West German contacts. Mr. Kohler observed that the Russians keep a terrific control over any contacts except for the one loophole of Berlin.

Lord Home again said he was certain nothing should be done before the German elections. He was not at all sure that it was in our interest to have the Russians out of the German situation or that it was in the Russian interest. The East Germans could spark a war. The Russians would want to retain control. He did not wish to wash out entirely the idea of changing over to a treaty status.

The Secretary said he had been out of the picture for some time and would need further briefing. He would have thought that there were opportunities in de facto dealings with the East German regime. He was not convinced that the East Germans would be more dangerous than the Russians.

Sir Frederick suggested that the working group in Washington have a look at the various priorities in the contingency planning. The UK had heard that SACEUR thought that certain military measures might be taken almost automatically. Mr. Kohler said that the group had tried to assign priorities. An exercise was now in progress about priorities in the non-military series. The way the situation actually developed would largely determine the order of priority. Sir Frederick said the UK feared the military might think that a whole series of measures should start almost automatically. Mr. Kohler said that he readily agreed that the problem should be examined in the working group. He referred to a practical matter which had come up. The working group had discovered that some countries did not have the legislative basis for taking certain economic measures. All the governments should equip themselves to do so. He said we are equipped to do so but he understood the UK was not. Sir Frederick said this matter was being looked into.

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April 4, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

1. Here's a first-rate interim memorandum on Berlin from Dean Acheson. It sharpens the issues and offers a base from which you may wish to make one or two comments to Macmillan.

2. Acheson argues: Berlin is of first importance; a crisis is likely this year; we have no good answer to Soviet pressure upon the routes of communication; the resolution of our allies is uncertain, and the attitude of neutrals is likely to be unhelpful.

3. His major conclusion is that we must be ready to use force in substantial amounts. He leaves open the question of a possible recourse to nuclear weapons, although my impression is that he would currently counsel against it.

4. Acheson urges study of the following possible courses of action, all of which I think he is likely to support as his work goes on:

a. Prepare one or two divisions for a major ground action with conventional weapons to keep the lines open.

b. Be ready to define the grounds of such a fight clearly, and ahead of time, in terms not of formal changes in management, but rather of real physical interference with our right of access to Berlin by Soviets or their tools.

c. Leave the possibility of nuclear escalation in the air, without saying anything about it.

d. Consider promptly ways and means of communicating our view of this matter and our resolution to all concerned.

5. With respect to Macmillan's visit: It seems to me that there is every reason to press strongly upon the British our determination to stand firm here. Attempts to negotiate this problem out of existence have failed in the past, and there is none which gives promise of success now. We should of course be willing to look at any new schemes

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they may dream up, but in return we should press very hard for British firmness at the moment of truth, and in particular we should strenuously oppose the middle man's posture which Macmillan in particular has tried to take up in the past. Berlin is no place for compromise and our general friendliness and eagerness for improvement on many other points really requires strength here in order to be rightly understood.

McG. B.

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AMB:SBB:PSCASH,R:cmw SECRET

(62) 6-12 Stp Memco

Approved in S
4/25/61
Approved in U and B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

(326)

DATE: April 12, 1961

SUBJECT: Meeting between the Secretary and the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister at the Department 4:00 p. m. - 5:30 p. m. April 13, 1961 — BERLIN

PARTICIPANTS:

United States	German Delegation	German Embassy
The Secretary	The Chancellor	Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Bundy	Dr. Von Brentano	Mr. Krapf
Mr. Ball	Mr. Von Eckardt	Mr. Schnippenkoetter
Mr. McCloy	Dr. Carstens	Mr. Steupling
Mr. Harriman	Dr. Von Herwarth	
Mr. Kohler	Dr. Herbert	
Mr. Bowling	Mr. Barth	
Mr. McGhee	Mr. Limburg	
Mr. Kohler	Mr. Von Hase	
Mr. Kitze	Dr. Osterheld	
Mr. Hillenbrand	Mr. Sahle	
[redacted]	[redacted]	
Mr. Freeman	Mr. Reichenmayer	
Mr. Cash	Mr. Balken	
Mrs. Lejins	Mr. Huber	

Copies To: (See page 4)

In introducing the subject of Berlin, the Secretary said that the new Administration had not said a great deal publicly concerning Berlin not because of lack of interest, but because it was felt that as long as the Soviets were leaving this issue relatively quiet we should not stir it up by throwing out a challenge. It would have been noted, he continued, that during the first period of the new Government there had been an absence of strong language in public exchanges. This was part of an attempt to restore the channels of communication between the United States and USSR. This did not mean that any problems had been solved, or that we were under any illusions that they had been. The Soviets would raise the issue of Berlin at some point, and we would like to have the Chancellor's opinion in this regard. Without equivocation this new Administration—as did its predecessors—took its obligations concerning Berlin very seriously and expected to meet any test with great firmness and clarity.

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The Chancellor began by saying that there was, as everyone knew, a par congress in the Soviet Union in October. He did not know, he continued, whether it would be good for Mr. Khrushchev to be having open difficulties with the Western Governments at that time. He did not believe that Khrushc would want a crisis in September or October. In Geneva, the Soviets are trying to determine the position of the new Administration. He did not thi they would allow a new Berlin crisis to disturb those talks. The end of t might see some developments in the Geneva talks. This would leave the peri from May until September, and we must expect some trouble then. This was certain, but it might happen.

Everyone must understand, the Chancellor added, that the new Administ tion would try to talk with the Soviets. The way it had handled Berlin ha been quite correct, and he fully understood. The new Administration had spoken very clearly on Berlin.

The Chancellor said that two questions arose. Were the stocks in Ber sufficient for an emergency? Were the three Western Powers prepared to tal action so that the Russians would realize that they must not go too far?

The Secretary said that with regard to the Geneva talks he did not th the United States was so sure that the Soviets attached too much importanc to them as a test of Soviet-United States relations. Laos was, however, a real testing point. In our discussions with the Soviets, we had said litt on Berlin, but we had been quite specific on Laos. We had told the Soviet that we could not accept a Soviet-dominated Laos, but we did not yet know whether a neutral Laos could be negotiated. Mr. Khrushchev had said he was an "Austrian" Laos, and with this the United States would be content. Now the question was whether or not we and the Soviets meant the same thing in this regard. He said his question was whether serious trouble over Laos w increase or decrease the danger for Berlin.

At this point Mr. McCloy, who was asked to comment by the Secretary, sa that he agreed that the discussions in Geneva were not comparable with those concerning Laos. He said he did not think the Soviet Union was so anxious for a test ban agreement that it would hold off a crisis in Berlin. He thou they might stall in Geneva in order to transfer those talks into general dis armament discussions. He did not believe that the Soviets would hold back Berlin because of what was going on in Geneva. On the other hand, he said it might be significant that in every conversation he had had with the Rus concerning the Geneva talks, they had brought up Berlin and had given him certain sense of immediacy. The Soviets had taken the position that they to have three-party inspection control with each having a veto, which, of course, was the very negation of inspection. They had tied this position with their position at the United Nations, and this would make it difficul for them to change it. If they held to this position, we might have to br off the Geneva talks, and in the resulting serious situation the Soviets w counter in Berlin. He thought they would continue to stall in Geneva in o

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to get into general disarmament talks while keeping the present test moratorium in effect. This might prove to be intolerable for the United States. Therefore, the May-September period might indeed be a critical time.

The Secretary said that when Prime Minister Macmillan was in Washington the United States had discussed Berlin with him. An agreement had been reached that tripartite and quadripartite contingency plans should be reviewed and renewed so that improvisation would not be necessary.

The Chancellor said he believed that the problem was that no one could say with any degree of certainty what the Soviets would do in May, June, and July. He agreed that we must be prepared for anything. He said that the United States had stated quite firmly that it was ready to act, and that Mr. Macmillan had made a similar statement if somewhat less firm. He said he did not know whether the French had made such a statement. He believed that this was most important.

The Foreign Minister said that it was quite clear that the Soviets would not attack directly. He said we must expect the conclusion of the "separate peace treaty" with a simultaneous denial by the Soviets of any responsibility for access to Berlin. They would point out that any difficulties that arose subsequently in this area would have to be worked out with the so-called "GDR." They would then undoubtedly instruct the "GDR" to behave and make pressure step-by-step. At first they would probably interfere only with German civilian access rather than Allied access, and this would be difficult to deal with. The question was then do we react? This must be considered, as well as how we should react, and the Federal Government would like to be in on the discussions in order to have an opportunity to express its opinion. The Three Powers had certain specific responsibilities concerning Berlin, and their contingency planning was, therefore, logical. However, the Federal Government was at least as much concerned as were the Three Powers. Certain reservations had been raised in the past--not by the United States but by others--concerning the Federal Government's participation in Berlin contingency planning. This did not do justice to our relations.

The Secretary said he fully concurred, and that although the Three Powers had primary responsibility, reaction must be at least quadripartite or even broader. Contingency planning, he continued, must be strengthened and dealt with as more than merely a planning exercise. It must be more carefully considered at higher levels of government. The most difficult situation to deal with would be that of the "separate peace treaty" without immediate interference with access. As the Germans knew, there was now before the four Governments a request on certain measures to be taken to deal with this situation.

The Secretary then asked what points the Germans wish to take up in the meeting the following day.

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The Chancellor said that the problems of development assistance and Berlin were very important, and having discussed them, the meeting had achieved much. He would like to develop further at subsequent meetings the question of the reorganization of NATO and make some additional points concerning Berlin.

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(63) NSF 3

TOP SECRET

April 17, 1961

(327)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Berlin

Reference: Memorandum from Mr. Acheson for the President; subject, "Berlin", dated 3 April 1961

It is requested that the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs undertake the following studies for the President - for completion by May 5, if possible:

1. A study to determine the likely military course and effects of a use of substantial non-nuclear ground force (e.g., 1 - 2 divisions) to try to reopen ground access to Berlin in the face of determined local Soviet opposition. The study should include an examination of the various questions regarding this course of action raised in referenced memorandum. It should also include an examination of the timing and nature of the steps that would have to be undertaken in preparation for this course of action.

2. A study to determine the likely military course and effects of a substantial non-nuclear effort to reopen and maintain air access to Berlin. This study should examine the various questions regarding this course of action raised in referenced memorandum, including the ability of air access, if it could be maintained, to meet the needs of (i) the Western garrison, and (ii) the civil population. It should also consider needed preparatory steps.

3. A study to determine military actions, e.g., naval blockade and air harassment, which might be undertaken in areas other than Central Europe to apply pressure on the Soviets for reopening of access to Berlin. A pattern of implementation should be presented which would, by its increasing severity, clearly portray U.S. will and determination to reopen access and to accept the risks necessary thereto.

Knowledge of these studies would be limited to persons who need to know, and it should be made clear to these persons that the studies are hypothetical and have no special significance other than being part of the Executive Branch's continuing re-examination of Berlin contingency planning.

McGeorge Bundy

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FROM: OSLO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 13, MAY 8, 1 PM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAY 8 PM 3 02
OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS MESSAGE CENTER

762.00/5-861

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 13; REPEATED INFORMATION BONN 15, BERLIN 2, MOSCOW 1, LONDON 305, PARIS 68.

FOLLOWING SUMMARIZED FROM UNCLEARED MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:

AFTER CONCLUDING DISCUSSION OF LAOS AND BRIEFLY TOUCHING ON ANGOLA AT TRIPARTITE MEETING LAST NIGHT, FRENCH, US AND UK FOREIGN MINISTERS LENT OVER GROUND ANTICIPATED DISCUSSION OF BERLIN WITH VON BRENTANO AT QUADRIPARTITE MEETING TONIGHT. AGREED THREE APPROPRIATE TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION WERE, AS SUGGESTED BY GERMANS:

A. TIMING OF GERMAN REPLY TO SOVIET MEMORANDUM OF FEBRUARY 17.

B. SHOULD WESTERN POWERS TAKE INITIATIVE RE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON BERLIN AND GERMANY?

C. SHOULD WESTERN POWERS TAKE OCCASION TO TRY TO CORRECT KHRUSHCHEV APPARENT MISAPPREHENSIONS RE WESTERN FIRMNESS ON BERLIN?

ON TIMING GERMAN REPLY THERE WAS AGREEMENT NO NEED FOR HASTE AND SECRETARY'S SUGGESTION ACCEPTED THAT MIGHT WAIT UNTIL AFTER PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO DE GAULLE.

THERE WAS ALSO AGREEMENT THAT WESTERN INITIATIVE TO LAUNCH NEGOTIATIONS AT PRESENT TIME ON GERMANY AND BERLIN NOT DESIRABLE. NO ENTHUSIASM SHOWN IN RESPONSE COUVE'S QUERY AS TO WHETHER THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE ON GROMYKO'S PRESENCE AT GENEVA FOR LAOS CONFERENCE TO RAISE BERLIN QUESTION.

ENSUING DISCUSSION DEVOTED MAINLY TO SPECULATION AS TO SOVIET

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INTENTIONS RE PEACE TREATY AND BERLIN. COUVE SEEMED FAIRLY DOGMATIC IN PREDICTING THAT AT SOME POINT, PROBABLY AFTER GERMAN ELECTIONS, SOVIETS WOULD PROPOSE CONFERENCE TO SIGN PEACE TREATY WITH BOTH GERMANIES EXPECTING WEST TO REFUSE ATTENDANCE. THEREAFTER KHRUSHCHEV WOULD CALL CONFERENCE AND PROCEED SIGN TREATY WITH GDR. TURN-OVER OF SOVIET RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ACCESS TO GDR WOULD THEREAFTER FOLLOW. HE STRESSED COMPLETE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH SOVIETS APPROACHED BERLIN QUESTION AS OF VITAL INTEREST TO THEM AS CONTRASTED SUCH ESSENTIALLY PERIPHERAL ISSUES AS LAOS, CONGO, CUBA. LORD HOME ALLOWED FOR GREATER POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATION SO THAT FOUR-POWER NEGOTIATIONS ON BERLIN WOULD TAKE PLACE. DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE WESTERN COUNTERPROPOSAL TO SOVIET FREE CITY CONCEPT WAS INCONCLUSIVE THOUGH CONSENSUS SEEMED TO FAVOR AT LEAST STARTING WITH SOME SORT OF ALL-BERLIN PROPOSAL. SECRETARY MADE POINT THAT WEST SHOULD NOT RESPOND SIMPLY BY MAKING CONCESSIONS TO SOVIETS BUT BY MAKING DEMANDS OF ITS OWN.

FULL MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BEING POUCHED TO ADDRESSEE POSTS.

RUSK

BP

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STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE | TYPE MSG (Check): X | DA | Berlin Contingency

66

JCS

TO: USCINCEUR

SECRET JCS 2396303 From JCS, Director, Joint Staff sends.

1. A recent study indicated that an allied or US attempt to reopen access to Berlin with only a one or two division force could be stopped by East German forces alone.

2. SECDEF feels that a great power such as US should [redacted] not select a course of action which could lead to defeat by a Soviet puppet regime, even though main purpose of this conventional military operation is political and an extension of test of will between USSR and US. SECDEF states he considers it mandatory that, in any operation larger than a probe, we have force level required to defeat any solely satellite force, without employing our nuclear response.

3. Copy of memo enlarging on above being delivered

REGULAR JCS DISTRIBUTION

Cleared by: G. O. O'CONNOR Colonel, USA Executive, J-5

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified; DOD Directive 5200.10

DATE 20 TIME 1100

DATE May 1961

W.B. Wideman, Capt, USN

54199

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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Earle G. Wheeler

7

Earle G. Wheeler
Lt. General, USA
Director

JCS 2396303 (May 61) PAGE NR 1

DD FORM 35-4

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NLK, 95-1, 81

by hand for discussion with JCS while in Paris for CHARTER 61.

4. Request forward ASAP to Joint Staff your estimate of what forces (in Europe) would be required in order to restore ground access to Berlin against purely GDR operation, however determined. It is further requested your estimate include sufficient details of concept of operations, including operational area that will be involved, as will permit evaluation of force estimates

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331 10,358

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

White House approved 7/3/61

Memorandum of Conversation

762.0221/6-1261

DATE: June 12, 1961

SUBJECT: - Vienna Talks - Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: The President
His Excellency Amintore Fanfani, Prime Minister of Italy
Neil A. Seidenman, Interpreter

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JUL 5 1961

The President opened the discussion by referring to his talks with Khrushchev in Vienna. He said the Soviets had submitted an aide-memoire outlining their view on the need for a German peace treaty and the establishment of West Berlin as a free city. The U.S. position, the President said, was that the West should wait for German unification before attempting to reach a settlement of the Berlin problem. This was the firm position of the German Federal Republic as well. There were some people who even though they might agree with the U.S. on this point were prone to say that German unification was not a healthy issue to stand on, and that it was an unrealistic Western goal since the Russians held the best cards; nevertheless, the President said, the U.S. thought that the issue could not be separated from the Berlin problem.

In the meantime, we were in Berlin by right and because the people of West Berlin accepted us and not by sufferance of the Soviet Union. While the Russians could go ahead and sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, they still could not deny our occupation rights. Any interference with these rights would be considered as a belligerent action, and we would make the necessary preparations to make clear to the Russians that we were ready to maintain our position by every means at our disposal. Any decision to help West Berlin in the event this should become necessary because of Soviet action would be formulated after due consideration was given to every factor, including the forthcoming general elections in West Germany.

At this point, the President asked Prime Minister Fanfani whether he (Fanfani) did not think that this position was the correct one at the present time. The Prime Minister

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Prime Minister agreed that Soviet conditions for a German peace treaty were not acceptable since the Russians would be the only ones who would stand to gain in West Berlin and West Germany as well. Fanfani warned that Khrushchev would make an all-out effort to organize mass public opinion in his favor by exploiting the theme that the Western Powers were ready to go to war for the sake of an insignificant legal formality. The West, said Fanfani, could not allow Khrushchev to succeed in this propaganda campaign, and we should take the initiative in formulating counter-proposals which could be accepted by public opinion. In this connection, Fanfani suggested that to avoid the risk of leaks to the press, the four powers most directly concerned with the Berlin problem (the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and France) should deliberate Western plans in strict secrecy.

The President conceded that Khrushchev's arguments for the solution of the overall German problem and the desirability of signing a treaty to end the division of Germany might very well curry favor with many people. The prospect of Berlin as a free city, with free access to it under UN jurisdiction, might have a great deal of appeal to the unsophisticated. We had to find a way, however, to dispel this notion by stressing the legality of our position. People had to realize that the Khrushchev goal was not to end the abnormal situation of a divided Germany but to advance the Soviet cause. The President agreed that the U.S. reply to the Soviet aide-memoire should reflect a realistic approach to the problem, but emphasized the point that it should leave no doubt as to our intention to preserve the freedom of West Berlin.

Fanfani remarked that on the basis of experience, there was no doubt as to the sincerity of the actions of the Western Powers, yet public opinion always seemed to favor the Soviet position. It was a great tragedy, he said, that a dictator like Khrushchev should have such great appeal among the masses while the Western Powers were able to influence only the leaders of the people. The German problem, added Fanfani, was of such magnitude that it would have to be studied from a military as well as public relations point of view, if the free world was to be prepared for its own defense.

The President asked Fanfani to what extent Italian public opinion was determined to preserve the freedom of West Berlin. The Prime Minister replied that he could not think of anyone who would favor the Soviets advancing one inch beyond the present lines. One reason, said Fanfani, why the Italians were so intransigent about the Alto Adige controversy with Austria was that Austrian demands for the autonomy of Bolzano implied the neutralization of territory which was part of the NATO defense strategy.

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NLK, NSF, N9F89 Guad Docs 6/12/41

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332

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning

1. It is requested that the studies described in the attached memorandum be undertaken for Mr. Acheson, in connection with the work relating to Berlin which he is undertaking for the President.

2. It would be appreciated if these studies could be completed by June 26.

3. These questions do not reflect any policy decisions, but are posed to create an analytical framework which would be helpful in review of the Berlin problem.

McGeorge Bundy

Attachment:

Memorandum

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I. Assumptions. For purposes of this study, it should be assumed:

1. That it is the Soviet intention to face the Allies with a crisis over Berlin in 1961 or early 1962. (By a crisis is meant such limitations imposed on either military or civilian access to Berlin as to be unacceptable -- thus producing, by allied refusal to accept these limitations, a blockade.)

2. That it is the U.S. intention to deter the USSR from applying such limitations, or from maintaining these limitations if they are applied, and the U.S. will run whatever risks are necessary in order to do so, including the risk of nuclear war.

3. That, if the Soviets were wholly convinced of the U.S. intention to follow this course, they would be deterred from imposing such limitations, or from maintaining such limitations if they had been imposed.

4. That it is the U.S. intention, if there is continued Communist obstruction of access, to prepare for - and then to use - more substantial non-nuclear force than is contemplated under present contingency planning, before proceeding with general nuclear war. The purpose of this more prolonged and substantial use of non-nuclear force would be (i) to give the nuclear deterrent more time to operate as a deterrent, and (ii) to make that deterrent more credible, by creating an ascending scale of non-nuclear violence involving a large risk of escalation into general war.

II. The Questions. Military views are requested on the following questions:

1. What preparations of mounting seriousness could the U.S. take - in the US, in Europe, and worldwide -- to provide a basis for the threat and use of (i) non-nuclear force, in successive stages, as outlined in para 2, below; (ii) general nuclear war. The purpose of

these

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these preparatory steps would be twofold, and their timing would be geared to that purpose.

(a) to influence Soviet decisions before they are taken this summer or fall;

(b) to create no later than October 1961 the best capability for prosecuting the course of action indicated in para 2, if it should become necessary, and for facing up to the risk of general nuclear war which it involves. (Inherent in these questions is the possibility that the use of any substantial force might lead to an escalation of violence and by self-generated momentum carry the combatants onward to general war.)

2. What type and amount of offensive non-nuclear force would have to be applied in Europe, if the preparations indicated in para 1 failed to have the desired deterrent effect, in order to:

(a) restore access if the Soviets opposed it with GDR forces alone;

(b) permit progressive application of non-nuclear force, as successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance were encountered;

(c) allow the Communists time and opportunity to restore access, by avoiding destruction of the force without use of U.S. nuclear weapons for a period of (i) 5, (ii) 15 days, during which negotiations could be undertaken looking to restoration of access.

Insofar as feasible, a military judgment is requested as to the possible sequence of US action and Soviet reactions, assuming a decision to carry out these measures. This sequence should begin with that decision and should extend to the point at which a decision concerning general nuclear war would need to be made.

3.

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3. A military judgment is requested of the adequacy of our capability to prosecute by 31 October 1961 the course of action described in Question #2, assuming the preparations referred to in Question #1 have been made. If that October 31 capability is judged inadequate for effective execution, how long would it take to create the required capability?

4. These questions should be answered on two alternative assumptions:

(a) Full allied cooperation, including West German participation.

(b) Unilateral US action.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

JUN 13 1961

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(333)

S/S - Mr. Battle -

June 13, 1961

RS/R FILES

MS City file

MEMORANDUM FOR C - Mr. Johnson Attention ----------
Keep this study together

On all sides I hear nothing but plans underway concerning the Berlin contingency. I am not sure whether anyone knows what anyone else is about and wonder if you would like to have a look at this problem and coordinate various activities underway with regard to it.

Among others operating in the field, the White House has initiated some work on this subject and Mr. Bundy has been talking with Ambassador Gruwe, apparently concerning this problem.

762.00 / 6-1361

L. D. Battle

Like -

Matter was formally discussed by U.N.S with Foy. Alex and he wants EUR to keep responsibility. Alex mentioned at Bundy lunch today and at this afternoon's NSC. Bill thinks it was agreed and agreed EUR in charge. Incoming paid material desired by Mr. Acheson would be ready by the 26th. McNamara reported on military supply situation. At the present everyone from the President down knows EUR has the responsibility. (Alex is ready to help if and as necessary.)

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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762.00/6-1461

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 14, 1961

SUBJECT: Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Dirk Stikker, Secretary-General, NATO
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Dean Acheson
Mr. A. Saint-Sleux, NATO International Staff
Ambassador Thomas K. Finletter
Mr. George C. McGhee, Counselor & Chairman of Policy Planning
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Mr. Russell Fessenden, Director RA
Mr. Robert N. Magill, Deputy Director RA

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JUL 5 1961

762.00/6-1461

The Secretary said we hoped in a few days to have ready our draft reply to the Soviet aide memoire on Berlin for consideration by the other NATO Governments. We were not yet prepared to discuss our response in any detail but hoped to be able to do so with Mr. Stikker before he left Washington. Mr. Stikker noted that he would be visiting Bonn on June 25 and said he would find it useful to have an indication of Washington views beforehand. He would have a private talk with the Chancellor and expected, on the basis of their close personal acquaintance, to sound out his basic position on Berlin.

The Secretary asked what impressions Mr. Stikker had regarding the views of other NATO Governments on Berlin in light of the Soviet aide memoire. Mr. Stikker said he thought Soviet intentions were regarded as more serious than previously. Khrushchev was becoming more and more personally involved and putting his prestige on the line. He doubted that Khrushchev's position was all bluff. He also had doubts regarding the firmness of all NATO Governments on Berlin, and was uncertain even as to how far Adenauer would be willing to go in defending the Western position in Berlin. Adenauer in recent conversations with Stikker had been somewhat less than forthright on this question and his close advisers think he might make concessions at the last moment. They feel that his chief objective is German adherence to NATO and the unity of NATO rather than Berlin. Mr. Stikker said most NATO Governments do not want to go to war over the matter of a stamp and the question was at what point they would be prepared to use force. He felt personally that NATO must be willing to act and must prepare for action. This had been his objective in calling for a report on

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report on contingency planning for the NATO Council. He said that if we were not prepared for action, then we would lose Berlin. The issue of Berlin was the real test for NATO.

In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Stikker said he had had no indication of counter-proposals on Berlin that other governments might have in mind. The Secretary said in confidence that we too had some indications during Adenauer's visit here that he was not quite clear in his position on Berlin. It was important for us to obtain clarification of the Chancellor's views. He said the Germans are supposed to give us a memorandum on their position. Mr. Stikker asked if the Germans were unwilling to go to war in defense of Berlin. The Secretary observed that he was not completely sure what any NATO Government's position was in the last analysis of this key question.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

9676

June 19, 1961

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6/27/61

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: Ambassador L. E. Thompson

SUBJECT: The Berlin Question

762.00/6-1961

ANALYSIS

It is not entirely clear what weight Khrushchev gives to the various factors involved in the Berlin and German question. The following would appear, however, to be his principal objectives:

1. To stabilize the regime in East Germany and prepare the way for the eventual recognition of the East German regime;

2. To legalize the eastern frontiers of Germany;

3. To neutralize Berlin as a first step and prepare for its eventual take-over by the GDR;

4. To weaken if not break up the NATO alliance; and

5. To discredit the United States or at least seriously damage our prestige.

I do not think this latter point is his principal objective since his Free City proposal was in fact designed to accomplish his objectives while saving face for us. I believe that Khrushchev was surprised and disappointed at our reaction to his proposal.

I do not believe that Khrushchev is bluffing and believe that he will at least go through with his separate peace treaty. He has left himself an out by making it possible for the East Germans not to interfere seriously with our rights of access,

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but even in these circumstances the conclusion of a separate peace treaty would have disadvantages for both the West Germans and the Western allies. The very most we could hope for would leave us in a worse position than we are now and would increase to a considerable degree the de facto recognition of the GDR. It is therefore to our advantage to prevent if possible the conclusion of a separate peace treaty.

I suggest that our policy for dealing with this problem should be one which 1) appears reasonable to public opinion in the United States as well as the rest of the world; 2) maintains the unity of our alliance; 3) would avoid so far as possible any miscalculation on the part of the Soviets. Public opinion is important to the Soviets and they will be far more dangerous if their position has wide public support. I believe it is of the highest importance that we have the support of our allies, especially the British, during the early phases of the problem. The greatest danger of miscalculation on the part of the Soviets comes from their imperfect understanding of the way democracies work. Khrushchev can maintain absolute control over his policy and does not appreciate the role which public opinion plays in a democracy.

It appears to me that the problem divides itself into four periods of time:

1. From now until the German elections;

2. From the German election until the convocation by the Soviets of a Peace Conference;

3. The period between the conclusion of a treaty and its entry into effect; and

4. The implementation of a separate peace treaty.

I consider it highly important that we attempt to reach decisions now on our policy during all phases of this problem, as otherwise we are in danger of drifting and losing opportunities by default. For example, it is extremely difficult to draft a reply to the Soviet Aide Memoire until we have actually determined what our final policy will be in a show-down on the Berlin problem.

PERIOD FROM NOW UNTIL THE GERMAN ELECTIONS

For many reasons, I believe we should have an alternative to put forward to the Soviet Free City proposal at an appropriate time.

It is

It is clearly impossible, however, to do this until after the German elections, as Adenauer will most certainly not support any alternative proposal until the elections are over. I suggest that during this period we should take actions which will convince the Soviets of our seriousness but will not unduly alarm public opinion or our allies. The following actions might be considered in this connection:

1. I suggest we should immediately approach the West Germans and our allies with a proposal to hold a referendum in West Berlin on the question as to whether they prefer the Soviet Free City proposal or the maintenance of the present situation pending the reunification of Germany. This should be held under international supervision if feasible but as a minimum observers should be invited from all countries. Such a referendum would go far to discredit the Free City proposal and make it difficult for the Soviets to impose it upon an unwilling population.

2. Since the Soviets presented us at Vienna with proposals on both the Berlin problem and that of atomic testing, the early resumption of testing might help convince them that we are serious in our attitude on the Berlin problem.

3. We should make strenuous efforts to reach agreement with the British on our policy during this and the subsequent period at least. In order to achieve this it might be advisable to abandon attempts to commit the British now to a definite action when the show-down comes.

4. We should make military preparations of a nature which would not become known to the general public but which would be picked up by Soviet Intelligence.

5. We should consider again extending an invitation to Marshal Yershinin to return the Twining visit. This would enable us to impress the Soviet military both with our strength and our determination. If this were done I believe we should show the Soviet delegation the maximum possible consistent with our security interests.

PERIOD FROM GERMAN ELECTIONS TO SOVIET CONVOCATION OF PEACE CONFERENCE

1. During this period it is highly probable that the Soviets will attempt bilateral negotiations with the West Germans. We should decide now whether this is desirable and if so what advice we should give the West Germans regarding such negotiations. In

my

my view, we should not attempt to prevent such negotiations if the Germans desire them but should not encourage them, mainly for the reason that the Germans are unlikely to be willing to make a concession on the frontier problem, which the Western allies could easily do if necessary to resolve the problem.

2. We should prepare now and have ready to put forward promptly after the German elections an alternative to the Soviet Free City proposal and to their plan for a separate treaty. We should if possible put the Soviets in a position of saying "no" to a proposal which would avoid the danger of war over the Berlin question instead of being in that position ourselves, as is the case today. I do not feel competent to suggest what this alternative could be, but believe the following proposals might be considered:

a) An all-Berlin solution. I do not myself favor this as I believe it would have most of the disadvantages of the Free City proposal. The Soviets would consider that any proposal involving all of Berlin would mean a major concession on their part for which they would want concessions, and their terms would be more onerous than if a solution involved only West Berlin. Nevertheless, we might put forward such a solution with a view to the Soviets turning it down. If we do, I suggest that it would be essential to have some kind of negative veto as we had in Vienna; that is, all four Powers would have to agree in order to interfere with any actions taken by the Berlin Senate. The Soviets would never accept an all-Berlin solution unless they were able to control the refugee flow.

b) I believe we could put forward a modification of our Geneva peace package proposal, which would appear reasonable to public opinion and which would in fact have considerable appeal to the Soviets. This would consist of setting up an all-German Commission, providing a series of steps leading up to a referendum in both parts of Germany at the end of a 7-year period, unilateral declaration by the British, the French and ourselves that at an eventual peace conference we would not support any change in the present frontiers, and possibly a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement, and the interim solution for the Berlin problem be put forward at Geneva.

c) We might agree not to oppose a separate peace treaty provided it contained a protocol making provision for an interim Berlin solution. This could be coupled with the other proposals contained in point b) above.

There

There are various ways in which such proposals might be put forward. One would be by a Note or public declaration by the Western Powers; another would be the calling of a high-level conference, and a third would be by our acceptance of a Soviet invitation to a peace conference.

PERIOD BETWEEN CONCLUSION BY THE SOVIETS OF SEPARATE TREATY AND ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE

If matters go this far, I suggest we should go all out in military preparations in an effort to convince the Soviets that we mean business, but we should do so in such a way as to not cut off the Soviet escape route, namely, the failure of the East Germans actually to interfere with our access in a manner unacceptable to us. This period might be short and the moves we make should be worked out well in advance.

PERIOD AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF SEPARATE TREATY

This is of course the most difficult decision of all. In view of both the French and British attitudes I would favor, in order to get their support, that we begin with an air-lift, which means that the Soviets and East Germans would either have to allow it to operate or take the first belligerent move. At the same time, our troops would be disposed in battle formation and if the East Germans were blocking our land access we should notify them that after a given period of time we would use whatever force was necessary to reopen it. If no solution is reached at this point we should then proceed with military action, including the use of tactical atomic weapons. Before this happens other elements in the contingency plans could be brought into operation, but these should be carefully considered in order that the Soviets not be led to believe that economic and political sanctions is as far as we intend to go.

cc - Mr. Acheson
- Mr. Kohler
- Mr. Bohlen
- Mr. McGhee

EUR:LEThompson:lh

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
June 22, 1961
CONFIDENTIAL

S/S - Mr. Brubeck

Berlin Contingency Planning

The following resulted from a conversation yesterday with GER - Mr. Hillenbrand:

1. Acheson Report - The Acheson report will probably be presented to the President in three weeks. Although Mr. Acheson has set for himself a June 26 deadline, Henry Owen does not think he can possibly produce in less than 20 days. It is expected that the report will be made available to the Secretary at the same time it goes to the President. The Department's role in the Acheson report has so far been confined to drafting two sections dealing with "face-saving" situations - both ours and the Soviets. In addition to drafting the sections, however, Hillenbrand has had a number of conversations with Mr. Acheson.

2. White House Adviser Mr. Bundy told Mr. Hillenbrand and Mr. Kohler that he was the President's principal adviser on Berlin. Mr. Bundy also informed us that he wishes to attend all future inter-Departmental working group meetings on BERCON. (FYI Mr. Kissinger attended the meeting last Friday when Acheson spoke). Can we assume that all inquiries from the White House concerning Berlin should be cleared through Mr. Bundy?

3. Post Vienna Background Reports - GER is preparing a series of Post-Vienna background reports on Berlin. These reports will be prepared on mats and S/S will be requested to reproduce and distribute them. Our distribution list will include the White House. In this manner, we would hope to keep the various interested parties informed and to eliminate emergency requests on GER for material which apparently is taking too much time and depleting GER's files. In addition to our regular Berlin Contingency Planning books, we will maintain current books on these background papers.

S/S - Mr. Brubeck.

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4. [redacted] Timetable - As I understand the status of Berlin Contingency Planning, it is likely that the following steps will have to be completed prior to our kicking-off a campaign as contemplated by Mr. Acheson. It should be mentioned that if these steps are necessary, it would be impossible to initiate the implementation of any US planning for at least a couple of months:

a) the Acheson report will be completed and presented to the President and to Secretaries Rusk and MacNamara;
b) the Departments of State and Defense will consider the report;

c) Inter-Agency discussions to arrive at agreed positions, if possible;

d) consultations with the UK, France and possibly the Germans;

e) possible consultation in NATO.

Nicholas A. Veliotes

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Presidential Correspondence
Lot 66D204

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

June 25, 1961.

Dear Mr. Secretary

In the absence of the Ambassador, I have been asked to pass to you the enclosed message from the Foreign Secretary on Berlin.

Yours sincerely,

(Hood)

The Honorable Dean Rusk,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

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TEXT OF MESSAGE

June 25, 1961.

I have thought over our discussion in Washington about Berlin and the subsequent talks between officials and would like to send you the views which I have formed up to the present.

First, as regards replying to Khrushchev's Aide Memoire, I agree that we ought to do this fairly soon if only because the Germans want to send their reply to the earlier Note addressed to them in the near future and the two ought to be closely co-ordinated. But I do not feel there is any very great urgency and I think we could be satisfied if we were able to reach NATO agreement on the text within two or three weeks. The great thing is to get the contents right and on this I would like to put to you the following considerations.

I sympathise with your general idea of getting the Berlin question before the United Nations on our terms. It is likely to be brought there in any case if a crisis comes and the circumstances might then be unfavourable to us. I also see the merits of the proposal to ask that

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the question of law be put before the International Court and then, if the Russians refuse to let it go there, to press in the Security Council and the Assembly for an advisory opinion to be sought. This would give us a series of opportunities to indict the Russians for disturbing the peace etc. What we need to consider very carefully is the timing of any such move. It seems to me that if this idea is launched in your reply to the Aide Memoire, that is to say within the next two or three weeks, it might fall very flat with world opinion and the follow-up action in the Security Council and the Assembly (after the Russians had rejected the proposal) might prove difficult to mount with good hope of support. I am afraid people would think that we were concentrating too much on the legal aspects of our case and that we might not get majority support. There is also the point that the question of law on which we would be seeking an opinion would be a hypothetical one relating to an action which the Russians would not yet have taken, namely the signature of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. The Russians might get a good deal of sympathy in brushing it aside. The result might be that the initiative would pass to the uncommitted countries who would be likely to propose some harmful compromise. 1139

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On the other hand I think the proposal might have very great value at a later stage, particularly if it formed part of a more positive comprehensive Western move, involving proposals for the whole city of Berlin, on the lines we discussed in Washington. It is difficult to see now how we might want to play the hand, but I can imagine that some time between September 17, that is after the polling day in the German elections, and the beginning of October, we might want to bring the United Nations in. We should by that time have had more time to study the pros and cons of having recourse to the International Court of Justice and we might be able to make a double impact on the United Nations by calling in the International Court of Justice as part of a Western initiative while the Assembly was in session. I would hope that we should also have been able to work out exactly what our position would be in the likely event of the United Nations calling for renewed negotiations between the parties, or in case by that time we thought it was tactically advantageous to propose negotiations ourselves. But in short, my view is that the reference to the Internationa Court is a card which we should hold up our sleeve for the

/ time being

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time being in order to make the best tactical use of it at a later stage.

I think this would be the best timing but let me know what you think of it. Without the International Court of Justice idea the draft reply would be primarily a holding operation designed to set out our present basic position and to refute the Soviet thesis, but without making any substantive proposals. I do not see any harm in this. Our main purpose, until we are really agreed upon general policy, should be simply to keep Khrushchev in play, possibly asking some awkward questions about self-determination and some inconsistencies in the Soviet Note.

I will send you my thoughts on other aspects of the Berlin problem in a day or two.

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June 26, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WWR

Essentially, Khrushchev's strategy comes to this: he exerts pressure at some point on our side of the line; by such pressure he creates a situation in which we can only reply at the risk of starting a nuclear war or escalating in that direction; faced with this prospect, we look for compromise; he backs down a little; and a compromise is struck which, on balance, moves his line forward, and shifts us back.

This is what we face in Laos where the Communists moved out successfully from beyond their two provinces granted in 1954; it is the essential point of the exercise on Berlin, from Khrushchev's perspective; and before very long we shall be offered a 'compromise' on Viet-Nam in which a relaxation of guerrilla warfare will be offered for for Viet-Nam's 'neutrality.'

It was to meet this kind of nibbling operation, in a thermonuclear age, that many men came to advocate, in the past ten years, a build-up of conventional forces. The rationale was to provide the U.S. with some useable means of force to substitute for the choice between surrender and nuclear war.

As we learn more about this business from day to day, I submit that a conventional force build-up is not sufficient to cope with Khrushchev's tactic. If we are to maintain the status quo in the face of this tactic, we must find ways of putting pressure on Khrushchev's side of the line (with conventional forces or by other means) which will offset the pressures on our side of the line. If he thinks we can do this, he may leave the status quo alone. If he tests us, such counter-pressure may permit a negotiation which protects the status quo, rather than shifts it against us. Put another way, we must make Mr. Khrushchev share the burden of making sacrifices to avoid nuclear war. This means we must be prepared to increase the risk of war on his side of the line as well as facing it on ours.

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PAPERS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
NATIONAL SECURITY FILES
COUNTRIES - LAOS: GENERAL

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Concretely, in the case of Berlin, this means, in my view: (a) We must begin now to present Khrushchev with the risk that if he heightens the Berlin crisis, we and the West Germans may take action which will cause East Germany to come unstuck; (b) it may mean that the purpose of a divisional probe should be not merely to go some distance down the autobahn, but to take and to hold a piece of territory in East Germany that Khrushchev may not wish to lose (for example, Magdeburg); and (c) it raises the question of whether we may not wish to place some tactical nuclear weapons in Berlin at an appropriate tense moment.

If Mr. Khrushchev believed we could and would do these things, his appetite for a Berlin crisis might well be reduced.

With respect to the crisis in Southeast Asia, this view of the matter would imply that we may not wish to protect South Viet-Nam merely by accepting an expanded guerrilla war south of the 17th parallel. We may wish to put Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, and the World Community on notice that an expansion of the attack on Diem may lead to direct retaliation in Vietminh territory. This would require using the Geneva Conference on Laos, the UN, or both, to present and to dramatize Vietminh aggression against Viet-Nam, and to present the case for moving against the source of the aggression.

Whether these concrete suggestions are sound or not, I am confident that we would be gravely mistaken to accept in each case Mr. Khrushchev's terms of reference for each crisis: they are designed to place us at maximum disadvantage; and they succeed in doing so.

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PAPERS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Refer to I-18702/61
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

26 June 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning

In the interests of speed, the studies made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to your memorandum of 12 June are herewith forwarded directly without Defense Department comment.

The Secretary of Defense looks forward to an early opportunity to discuss these subjects with you, with Mr. Dean Acheson, and with the Secretary of State.

Paul H. Nitze

CC:
The Secretary of State

2 Enclosures
JCSM-430-61
JCSM-431-61

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RECEIVED
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Washington 25, D. C.

1961 JUN 26 11 19

JCSM-431-61
26 June 1961

OFF SECY OF DEFENSE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

1. Reference is made to memorandum[a] from the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the Secretary of Defense, dated 13 June 1961, subject as above, in which he requested answers to questions posed by Mr. Acheson in his continuing review of the Berlin problem.

2. The three studies[b] were prepared on a priority basis. They are responsive to Mr. Acheson's questions on the above request which states, in part: "These questions do not reflect any policy decisions, but are posed to create an analytical framework which would be helpful in review of the Berlin problem." Consideration was given to the views developed jointly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Mr. Dean Acheson and General Norstad during the discussions held on 14 June 1961.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the immediate concern is to influence Soviet decisions on Berlin before they are taken this summer or fall. United States preparations for a Berlin crisis - in the US, in Europe, and world-wide - should be taken in both nuclear and nonnuclear military areas concurrently. In this connection the requirement for modernizing, strengthening, and improving the US and Allied military posture world-wide has been recognized; however, the basic consideration remains the need for re-establishing the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Our Allies must have confidence and the USSR

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must be made to believe that the United States has the will and determination to use nuclear weapons in the defense of NATO, Berlin or the US position world-wide, as necessary, rather than submit to Soviet abrogation of US and Allied rights or position. Berlin is the immediate concern, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the questions posed by Mr. Dean Acheson are contained herein.

4. The conclusions to the three appended studies, which are based on the assumption that nuclear weapons will not be employed by either side, are summarized as follows:

a. Military Measures World-Wide

(1) The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war.

(2) The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). United States action alone is feasible only to the extent that the Allies will permit the use of their national territories and that the action contemplated does not involve the sovereignty of an Ally. The measures are designed to be a clear demonstration of US determination and leadership which could be expected not only to influence the Soviet decision making process, but also to

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restore the confidence of our Allies in the United States and to obtain their full cooperation and support.

(3) Although a measure of Allied agreement could probably be obtained for the early execution of some of the measures envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A (e.g., increase state of readiness of US forces world-wide, but particularly in Europe), it is doubtful that US Allies, in the absence of a clear-cut Soviet-inspired Berlin incident, would agree to a rapid and systematic build-up for limited nonnuclear war in Central Europe together with the risk of general war.

(4) The execution of the measures envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect on the Soviets. There is a possibility, however, that the Soviets might react by taking military counteractions to pre-empt US and/or Allied efforts to protect West Berlin. For this reason, the United States must be prepared for general war.

b. Types and Amount of Offensive Nonnuclear Force for Certain Contingencies

(1) When opposed by GDR forces alone. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view that the hypothesis of opposition from GDR forces alone is invalid, and that there is no substantive difference between GDR and Soviet military forces. However, using present active GDR forces as a unit of measurement (6 divisions and about 225 tactical aircraft), it is considered that a balanced force of seven divisions supported by four tactical air wings could reopen access to Berlin. This size force is based on the assumption that political limitations

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restrict military operations to the axis of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and the air forces to defensive operations only.

(2) When opposed by readily available USSR and GDR forces in the area of East Germany only. Under such a situation, the hostilities could not be limited to the Helmstedt-Berlin corridor alone. Operations would have to be conducted to meet and defeat Soviet and GDR forces throughout East Germany with the objective of establishing a defense line on the Oder-Neisse River line. Forces on the order of 50 allied divisions and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be required to achieve this objective.

(3) To allow the Communists time and opportunity to change their decision to block access. If the action begins with Allied forces opposed by GDR forces only, a balanced seven divisional force with adequate air support would provide, during the first five days, time and opportunity for the Communists to change their decision to block access. In the event that the Soviets entered the operation at any time, the situation described in paragraph 4b(2) would pertain. The Allied force of seven divisions already committed to the operation could avoid destruction.

c. Adequacy of Capabilities.

(1) After a mobilization period of four months, the United States or the US and its European Allies, has

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the capability of deploying sufficient ground and air forces to Europe to restore access to Berlin if opposed only by GDR. This same size force could avoid destruction for a period of five days or 15 days if opposed by GDR and Russian forces.

(2) Due to the inability to determine the quality of European Allied forces and due to the inability to predict with confidence that all European Allies and the United States will commence full mobilization four months prior to an anticipated incident in Berlin, it is considered that there would not be sufficient forces in Europe by 31 October 1961 to restore access to Berlin against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.

(3) Because of the need for air bases, staging areas and assembly areas, it is impractical for the United States to consider unilateral action in the Berlin area. As a minimum, full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is required, and to a lesser degree that of France and Great Britain. In addition, the United States cannot put sufficient forces in Europe in a four-month period to restore access against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.

(4) Considering the reinforcement rate of both sides and the need for industrial mobilization in order that the United States can support its Allies as well as its own forces, it would not be feasible for European Allies or the United States to engage in nonnuclear war for any extended period with the Soviet Bloc forces which could be brought into the area by 31 October 1961. In some cases, mobilization of the Allied countries requires 15

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months and only after full mobilization of Allies and the United States is attained (one year plus) do the Allied forces appear to exist in comparable numbers with Soviet forces.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the desirability of providing viable alternatives to general war in the event the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A fail to deter the Soviets from denying Allied access to Berlin and limited ground force action is unsuccessful. In this connection, consideration must be given to other measures that will forcibly demonstrate on a rising scale US determination to achieve its objective of restoring access to Berlin. Possible measures could include consideration of actions such as the use of nuclear weapons on purely military targets in a manner which will forcibly drive home to the Soviets the seriousness with which the United States views the situation.

6. It is recommended that you note the enclosed studies and forward them to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as requested by him, for use by Mr. Acheson in his continuing review of the Berlin problem.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

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TOP SECRET

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Assistant Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

(76)

June 27, 1961

(340)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Ambassador Grewe came in to have a long "private" talk with me about Berlin and related questions, which lasted for approximately an hour. He first presented to me a letter to the Secretary from Foreign Minister von Brentano reaffirming the German appeal for full membership in the ambassadorial Steering Committee and closer association in general with contingency planning. I reiterated our sympathetic views toward this and mentioned that we had discussed it again with the British and French during the visit of Shuckburgh and Laloy of their respective Foreign Offices.

762.00/6-27 61

Ambassador Grewe informed me that the specific point I had raised in his talk with the Secretary on the occasion of the presentation of the German paper on German policy and commitments with respect to Berlin -- namely whether it was implicit that the Germans were prepared to engage in advance readiness measures of a military nature -- had been put up to Bonn for confirmation of the Ambassador's own assurance that the answer was affirmative.

With respect to the nature of contingency planning and counter operations, the Ambassador put forward the thesis that it was important that these be carefully designed to make the retaliation correspond as symmetrically as possible to each Soviet move. In this connection he saw four particular fields of activity:

(1) Eastern Europe. He felt that such measures as breaking of diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe would be appropriate response to the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the GDR. I suggested that this might be counter productive as it would run counter to another theme which was that we wanted to persuade Khrushchev that the satellites were not reliable.

(2) German armament. He felt that we should not give too much in the way of assurances here but hold these assurances as now incorporated in the American draft reply until a later stage. I argued

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I argued that this was a major Soviet ploy and that I felt that it should be hit head on at this point even though I agreed with him that the assurances should not be given directly by the FRG to Moscow.

(3) Economic. He felt that it was essential that we move forward in this field getting the full cooperation of NATO so that there would not be seepage. He recognized that Allied unity in this field was difficult to achieve.

(4) Legal and moral measures.

FDK

Foy D. Kohler

cc - The Secretary
S/S (2)
GER (2)
EUR (2)
S/O
SOV
RA

EUR:FDKohler:mt

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN

E. Mautner, S/O
(Drafting Office and Officer)

(33)

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 762.00/7-361

IR 762 0221 10506

Memorandum of Conversation

77

DATE: July 3, 1961

SUBJECT: Meeting of Four Power Working Group on Germany including Berlin, June 30, 1961

PARTICIPANTS:

United States
Mr. Kohler, EUR/CHR.
Mr. Nitze, Asst. Sec. Def.
Mr. Achilles, S/O
Mr. Davis, EUR
Mr. Vigderman, GER
Mr. Cash, GER
Mr. Chayes, L
Mr. Kearney, L
Mr. Mautner, S/O
Mr. Anderson, SOV

French Embassy
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. Winckler
Mr. Legrain

German Embassy
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Krapf
Mr. Blomeyer

British Embassy
Lord Hood
Mr. Thomson

29

Mr. Kohler regretted that the production of identical notes at this stage seemed too much of an undertaking. The only solution now open would be an American aide-memoire which included the "operating" language of the French draft and noted British and French close association with the thoughts expressed.

M. Alphand agreed that this was the most practical way and Lord Hood regretfully accepted this view stating that London would have preferred identical notes. He thought the US reply should be sent first followed at a short interval by the British and French replies to the Soviet oral representations. Double publicity mileage could thus be obtained. The US strongly endorsed this view. M. Alphand said he would propose this to Paris. He would further suggest to Paris to add to the French note, which was generally held in a more popular and shorter form of less legalistic language, some of the points made in the US draft:

1. Self-determination
2. Consideration for the wishes of the Berlin population.

(This point would have to be phrased carefully, as the German Ambassador had stated, since our principal argument in the note should be the maintenance of Allied rights, Mr. Alphand added.)

3. The legal consequences of the Soviet unilateral action.
4. A vague and carefully worded reference to the threat to the peace.

Mr. Kohler remarked that self-determination obviously was most important; the legal argument was considered by the US to be fundamental. There was really missing only one point of importance in the French reply. This was the citation of Ulbricht's threats showing what Khrushchev's "Free City" really meant.

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Mr. Grewe said the German Delegation would appreciate being associated with the remark of consultation among the Allies expressed in the American draft, an obligation to "consult" having been undertaken in the Bonn Convention of 1955.

Mr. Kohler thought that the American draft based itself primarily on the legal rights of the three Allied Powers. After a few attempts to incorporate an appropriate phrase in the draft, it was decided to have it later worked into the text.

M. Alphand asked that the French language concerning minor incidents be incorporated into the American reply at some point, to which Mr. Kohler agreed.

Some minor changes were then suggested.

The meeting then set up a tentative timetable. It was thought realistic to have the German reply to the memorandum to Chancellor Adenauer of February 17, 1961, circulated in NATO beginning next week and sent to Moscow July 6. The American reply would follow after NATO circulation, for presentation in Moscow on July 10 with the British and French replies to be presented July 12.

Another meeting of the Four Power Working Group was called for Monday, July 3, at 10:00 a.m.

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AmEmbassy, Moscow - 23
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Space 27-29

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[redacted]

July 6, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Berlin Planning Organization

The Secretary of State, General Taylor, and I have discussed together a plan for Berlin operations which seems to all of us to make sense and which we think would be strengthened by your approval and perhaps by public announcement if you see fit.

Fundamental working group on Berlin would be an interdepartmental coordinating committee under the full-time direction of Foy Kohler. This committee will have sub-committees formed for specific assignments as they come from higher authority or as they are generated by Mr. Kohler and his immediate associates in the major participating departments. During Mr. Kohler's service on this committee, the other work of the European bureau will be handled by his deputy, William Tyler. It is our recommendation that the Defense Department also assign a full-time officer to this committee, and that other departments make appropriate personnel available as needed.

Mr. Kohler's committee will be responsible to a steering group chaired by the Secretary of State. Other members of this group will be the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, CIA, the Director, USIA, General Taylor and myself. The steering group will be responsible for insuring full departmental support and policy coordination, under your final direction.

Appropriate records will be maintained by both the working committee and the steering group, and Mr. Kohler's office, in particular, will be a center of information, coordination, and follow-up on decided courses of action. Full reports will be available to General Taylor and to me, and a senior member of the NSC staff will be assigned to work with Mr. Kohler's group, probably full-time.

This brings me to my last request, which I regret to say does violence to an earlier understanding between George McGhee and myself. I believe that by his experience in the last six months and by his basic qualifications Mr. Henry Owen is uniquely fitted to serve as the White House staff officer in this case, and I am sure that his service in this capacity far outweighs anything which he could accomplish in an equivalent time on the planning staff. If, however, he is to come with us during the next

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Executive Order 11652

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RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

six months, Mr. McGhee cannot be expected to hold open the high position he has offered to Owen, and accordingly Owen should burn his bridges at the State Department and join us for good. Owen himself has made no move whatever in this direction, but I see no other good solution to a central problem of our own service to you.

General Taylor and I have recommended to the Secretary of State a somewhat parallel organization for Southeast Asia, but he is not yet ready to join in a recommendation on this point, and accordingly this matter is delayed for a couple of days. This raises the question whether we should make the Berlin organization known at once, at least within the government, or whether we should hold it up until we have a decision about Southeast Asia. My inclination is somewhat in favor of going ahead on Berlin, but I think General Taylor inclines the other way, because in his view these two crisis areas deserve to be kept in mind at once.

McG. B.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

(79) SECRET (343)

July 7, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: The Under Secretary

SUBJECT: Berlin

Reclassified as Category "A" September 30, 1988 By Warren L. Henderson

As I told you at lunch on Thursday, I am concerned by the general trend of our thinking in regard to Berlin. Here are some brief thoughts which I hope may be discussed before final decisions are reached.

As I see it, our objectives should be:

1. To maintain West Berlin in freedom.

2. To do so without war, if possible.

3. To promote whatever possibilities may exist for a much broader settlement.

So far our discussions have largely focussed on the particular set of proposals of Dean Acheson's NSC paper. This paper has two major premises:

1. The basic Soviet objective is to gain a major world-wide victory by forcing the United States to a humiliating back-down on one of its most important commitments.

2. The only way to win the "contest of wills" is to convince Khrushchev that the United States will initiate nuclear war rather than accept this humiliation.

To meet

SECRET

U. C. Bowles

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FNB
To Bundy
Memo 7/7

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To meet this challenge a series of measures of readiness and gradually intensifying military engagement have been proposed. These are primarily designed to make our nuclear threat more credible to the U.S.S.R.

Perhaps equally, they are intended to insure that the American people and its leaders will become psychologically and materially committed to go to nuclear war if our "will" does not prevail.

Negotiation appears to be rejected, except for propaganda purposes, until Khrushchev has himself backed down. Negotiations are then seen in large measure as a face saving device.

In my judgment this proposed course of action is unsound in both premises and conclusions.

First, it would increasingly divest our government of control over the course of action. At each step is taken, failure to take the next would become in itself a retreat, a defeat in the contest of wills.

Thus in the end we will have deprived ourselves of control even of the final decision to initiate general nuclear war.

According to this argument we can appear determined only if we are determined. It suggests, however, that we should rely for this determination, not on the will and leadership of the President, but rather we should seek to create it by withdrawing or limiting the President's freedom of action.

Second, the policy is an all-or-nothing policy. It aims at total victory -- a public back-down by Khrushchev under the threat of force. The only

possible

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possible favorable outcome envisaged is humiliation and defeat of the U.S.S.R. It is, in effect, an unconditional surrender policy, with all the difficulties that this implies.

On the other hand, if the policy fails and the Soviet Union is not deterred, the loss in terms of United States objectives would be maximized: either way we are in a general nuclear war. If, as must remain possible, we shrink in the end from the holocaust, we do so under the very circumstances of national humiliation and shattering defeat which the proposal sets out to avoid.

Third, the proposal appears largely devoid of political objectives. It does not say what it is we are going to war to defend. It does not say with precision what the event is that will trigger off the military engagement. It does not suggest what we say to the world -- allies, neutrals, USSR -- between now and then. It does not say what we should want if we win the "contest of wills".

I believe that this lack of political content is self-defeating. The credibility of any threat of general war depends not only upon military readiness but to some extent on the existence of political objectives for which it is believable that force of this magnitude will be employed.

No one can predict the course of events in regard to Berlin. To achieve the basic objectives stated above will require a careful mix of diplomacy and military demonstrations continuously subject step by step to national control in the light of the developing situation.

An alternative

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An alternative course would be to begin negotiations at an early stage. There are many reasons to do so: (1) it may be possible even now to arrive at a substantive settlement; (2) negotiations would stretch the "crisis" over time, during which important changes in the setting might take place; and (3) we can demonstrate Khrushchev's real intentions only by a responsible effort to negotiate.

The following is a sketch of the course of action implied by a decision for early negotiations.

II

Military. Certain low key preparations should begin relatively soon to demonstrate to our adversary our determination to fight if we are pressed beyond a certain point.

But every measure of overt military preparation, however, contributes to the credibility of the threat. Moreover, particular military measures may have other consequences: for instance, they may stimulate a sharper reaction by our posture before the world as a whole; finally, they may permanently de-stabilize the military environment.

Without addressing myself to particular military measures, I would suggest the following criteria:

1. The measures adopted should substantially improve U.S. readiness to fight a large-scale but controlled conventional war. This implies that the decision to advance to a nuclear level will only be made upon independent consideration of the situation after any conventional engagement begins.

2. They

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2. They should be as unostentatious and unbelligerent as possible. The emphasis should be on actual readiness rather than publicity about it.

3. They should not seriously de-stabilize the long-term military environment.

Negotiations. We should now begin to develop a political stance which will, at the same time, enhance the credibility of our military threat and win support for us among allies and neutrals.

It is probably, though not necessarily, wise to avoid specific proposals in the months before the German elections. But we should at least shift the emphasis of discussion from "legal rights" to the more fundamental purposes for which we are engaged. These should include not only the self-determined freedom of West Berlin, but beyond that the vision of a free and peaceful Europe, of which West Berlin itself may be made a symbol.

It may be desirable to make some private approaches to Khrushchev before the end of the summer indicating a willingness to negotiate, not only on Berlin but on all outstanding differences. But for present purposes we may limit consideration to the timing and framework of public negotiations.

As to timing, it is generally argued that no negotiations should be begun before the German elections and the Communist Party Conference have taken place early in the Fall. Although these assumptions, especially the latter, should be carefully re-examined, they may be accepted for present purposes.

An outside limit is set by Khrushchev's announced

intention

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intention to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany by the year's end. One of the objectives of negotiation should be to prevent this from happening. Therefore we should probably arrive at the conference table sometime in November or early December.

There are four possible frameworks of negotiation: Berlin itself, all-German, all-European, or global.

The Berlin framework is obviously too narrow. It invites trading concessions on the city itself. By the same token, an all-European or global settlement would appear, at this juncture, impossibly Utopian.

This suggests we should begin negotiations in the setting of an all-German settlement.

Such a setting will be available to us when the Soviets call their peace conference. It may well be that we would gain significant psychological advantage by simply appearing and tabling a draft treaty. If it were thought that our own initiative were preferable, we ourselves could summon a peace conference.

I suggest that we should now begin to prepare a draft treaty which is reasonable, non-punitive, and centered on self-determination for Germany. It should confirm existing external boundaries and should permit the resulting Germany a free choice in military and foreign policy. It should prescribe a procedure culminating in free elections for an all-German government. It should look to admission of such a Germany to the United Nations.

This draft

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This draft treaty together with the Russian draft, would form the opening basis of negotiations. As the negotiations progress, we might recede from the notion of a unified Germany (which, as a practical matter, would almost certainly mean the break-up of the Common Market and NATO).

It is likely that these negotiations will take time. It is less likely that they will produce a final settlement for Germany.

The very continuation of the conference, however, will inhibit the Russians from signing a separate peace treaty. It will tend to prevent US action which might get out of hand. Rational, non-provocative military preparations could go forward during the conference.

How the conference would end is problematical. It might simply dissolve as did the earlier Berlin conferences, without either settling the issue or having the Soviets make drastic changes in the status quo. In certain circumstances, perhaps induced by the intensity of the crisis itself, it might be possible to proceed to the broader content of an all-European settlement.

Here important possibilities for arms reduction might open up, for instance, with inspection over a wide area including Western Russia and Western Europe (DeGaulle and Adenauer commented favorably on this possibility three years ago.) Again, the peace conference might provide the occasion to negotiate some sort of acceptable interim settlement for Berlin. Finally, it remains possible that the Russians will withdraw and sign a separate treaty with East Germany.

If this

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If this were followed by forceable interference with access to Berlin, we would have to make a military response. But at least we would do so as the last resort, not the first.

III

The foregoing is, of course, only a skeleton. I believe it should be worked up into a fully developed study.

Whatever is the wiser course, such a study, in confrontation with Dean Acheson's proposal would focus the major policy issues for decision by the President.

There is still time in which to think. It is important that we use it to decide upon our course for Berlin after systematic and reasoned deliberation.

U:CBowles:jc

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TOP SECRET

National Defense University

NDU 34 Berlin File / Legere

(80)

(344)

10 July 1961

General Taylor -

Henry Kissinger has sent this over for your information. He will be in the Building on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday if you want to talk to him about it. Note Paragraph 5.

Meanwhile, you may or may not work this in somehow when you see Gen. Lemnitzer tomorrow.

LEGERE

There was no "final" version of this paper, I am told. It went forward to Mr. Bundy "as is".

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SPEC - TS - Oct. 90

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(2)

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

TOP SECRET

DRAFT
Hallsinger:mm
7/7/61

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: General War Aspect of Berlin Contingency Planning

1. One of the key features of the Berlin contingency planning is the risk and the threat of general nuclear war. The Acheson report correctly points out that the President must make an early decision about his willingness to risk nuclear war over Berlin. All military plans contain the phrase that we must bring home to the Communists the "unmistakable risk of general war". None of our plans with respect to ground access - even Mr. Acheson's proposal - make sense unless we are prepared to face the risks of nuclear war.

2. This is good so far as it goes. I believe however that the President should not be asked to make a decision about going to nuclear war in the abstract. It seems to me that before he makes the decision he has to know what is meant by nuclear war. It would therefore seem to me essential that the nature of our nuclear options be defined now.

3. This seems to me essential not only to aid the President in making a decision but also if civilian control is to have any meaning particularly with relation to the actual conduct of operations. As things stand now, I fear that the military will try to force the President's hand during a crisis - particularly if ground fighting should take place - by claiming that they can no longer guarantee the security of their forces.

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There should be agreement now about the measures they will be able to carry out.

4. As an initial step the Defense Department might be asked to prepare recommendations about graduated nuclear actions both in Europe and against the Soviet bloc. These should contain the pros and cons of the various courses of action. The Defense Department should be asked to submit a plan for graduated nuclear response even if the Joint Chiefs do not consider it the optimum strategy.

5. Once the President has made a decision I would recommend that General Taylor's office monitor its execution.

6. I have discussed the problem with both Carl Kaysen and Henry Rowen, who concur. Henry Rowen would be happy to draft instructions for the President's signature if you agree.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc - Mr. Kaysen
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Owen

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No. 1 of 5 copies, Series A

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FILE

345

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PARIS
July 10, 1961

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL
SECRET

Dear Chet:

Thank you for your letter of 23 June. In it, as you may recall, you asked for any ideas I may have on the Berlin situation or the German situation in general.

Today's press contains some pro and con arguments about Willie Brandt's idea for a general peace conference and Adenauer's criticism of it. I was particularly interested in this development of the idea. About a week or so ago it had come to me in the form of a letter from Klaus Mehnert. I attach the letter herewith. Mehnert is well-known to Chip Bohlen. Although he is a writer and newscaster he is one of the best-informed people in Europe on Soviet affairs. Aside from a personal friendship of some ten years standing we are both members of the American Council for Germany.

All of us here, and I speak for the French as well as the Americans in the Embassy, are following the developments in the Berlin situation with considerable concern. Khrushchev's announcement on his cessation of the cutback in the Russian military forces and his very impressive air show yesterday appear to be most significant. Despite all of the sounds emanating from the Kremlin I still feel that ultimately it will be a salami-slicing situation with which we will have to deal. The present build-up on Khrushchev's part will place him in a position to assume the role of a very good fellow when, after the signing of the treaty with East Germany this Fall, he then assures us that our access to Berlin will be not interfered with, and that he has only the most peaceful of intentions. The

The Honorable
Chester Bowles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

5

James M. Gavin

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The real trouble will come later and I was particularly pleased to read the President's comment about the need for patience and understanding over a long period of time on the part of the American public. I am convinced that rather than war this Fall we will have to deal with problems that will become increasingly irritating, starting some time next year. Nevertheless, I have believed for some time, and I so wrote in 1958, that Khrushchev's chances will be maximized in about another year or so. After that, when the fruits of the late measures taken by the last Administration and Mr. Kennedy's present endeavors begin to bear fruit, Khrushchev's prospects will begin to diminish.

So, in conclusion, it seems to me that there is a real threat of war in immediate prospect but I believe that Khrushchev is too clever to force a war this year. Instead he will undertake a series of increasingly annoying measures, none of which in themselves will appear to be worth a war, next year with the intent of achieving a de facto triumph over us within the next two to three years. I think that finally, he will go to war to accomplish his ends, if his irritants short of war fail to accomplish their purpose. Unfortunately, from a technical point of view his air show was tremendously impressive. He has not slowed down his research and development program in new hardware, and the amount that he must be spending on new armament, by our standards, should be pretty staggering.

From this end it appears that the measures now being taken by the United States, so far, are adequate. There is one aspect of this, however, that it seems to me we should really do something about. It is the problem of Spain. There is no denying the fact that the Pyrenees and Spain are there and that NATO needs that land depth. I realize also that there is an aversion on the part of some nations to accepting Spain in NATO. However, the threat made us be realistic in admitting Germany and now, it seems to me, we should take measures leading to the admission of Spain into NATO. If Mr. Khrushchev continues his bellicose announcements this should give us the very opportunity that we need. With the danger increasing hourly it is past time that we recognize the necessity for integrating our military endeavors in Europe with the potentialities in Spain. I am not sure of the value of the Spanish military forces, and I would not consider them to be very high, but the land area of Spain will be

of critical

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

of critical importance to us. This may be particularly true if the Soviets succeed in seizing portions of the African land area and thus ultimately place present NATO forces in danger of being outflanked by missile-equipped forces. I mentioned the importance of Spain to General de Gaulle when I talked to him a month or so ago, and characteristically, his answer was positive in tone but lacked specifics. I have been assured, however, that he would look with favor upon any action taken towards Spain's entry into NATO.

I thank you very much for your understanding help with the problem of Cecil Lyon. He is an invaluable asset to me, particularly now with the situation as intense as it is here in France and with my plans to get out and visit the country. I have made a trip to Bordeaux and another to Normandy. Last week I made an overnight trip to Lyon and a one-day trip to Vichy. Mrs. Gavin has accompanied me and they have been most successful. That sort of activity will slow down a bit during the summer but I have plans to do extensive travelling beginning in September. I find it most helpful in acquiring a real understanding of the true situation in this very troubled country.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

James M. Gavin

P.S. My political advisers in the Embassy counsel against any action on Spain at this time. They feel that we have air bases in Spain, etc. and to take steps to get a formal admission of Spain into NATO would be to aggravate our NATO friends at a time when we have problems enough. I would add, however, that I feel that the admission of Spain would be in the best interests of all and if Khrushchev continues his bellicose attitude and his military build-up we should at least take the preliminary steps by discussing the problem with our NATO allies, having in mind the bringing in of Spain at an early date.

Enclosure:

Letter from K. Mehnert.

SECRET

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

KLAUS MEHNERT

STUTTGART-SILLENBUCH June 27, 1961
[illegible]straße 4 857

Ambassador James L. Gavin
2 Avenu d'Iena
P a r i s

Dear Jim,

My friends and I have been discussing the present world situation a good deal, and a thought occurred to us which I wanted to communicate to you. If you think that it is a good idea, you might pass it on to the boss. I am not interested in claiming the authorship; in fact, my "Old Man" might not like this idea at all because at his age one likes to stick to wellknown thoughts. Here it is:

Mr. Kennedy should tell Khruschchev that he intends to call a peace conference for Germany on November 15 to Westberlin, all those nations participating which have fought against Germany during the Second World War (i.e. excluding those which only declared war but did not do anything about it). During the first phase of the peace conference the victors would meet among themselves, with Bonn and Pankow only represented by observers (to spare Adenauer the necessity of sitting next to Ulbricht), in the second phase the victors would discuss the peace terms with those Germans which the peace conference would decide to consider the proper German representatives.

Of course, nothing will come of it, because the victors will not agree on one common policy toward Germany. But if the President calls such a conference, K. can not refuse to come, because he has been demanding a peace conference all along. Once the conference has met, it will be difficult to terminate it (it is difficult nowadays to break up a conference; nobody wants to be responsible for it). Therefore the conference could go on for months or years. At first the foreign ministers would participate, then their deputies and finally their deputies' deputies. The West would be represented by more than twice the number of governments than the East (Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade). The main risk for us: that quarrels might arise among the Western governments; but, on the whole, these agree on the essential points and probably could keep their unity intact. There is no need for me to outline the Western position; it is wellknown as it has shaped up during the last five or six years.

K. will not exactly like the idea but I do not see how he can refuse. If he insists that the Ukraine should be represented - I don't mind. There may be even a possibility

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that he is not all against this suggestion, for one particular reason: Perhaps he has been so very vociferous these last weeks because he wants to go before his Party Congress in October as the strong man who can scare anybody. He has been changing the top party apparatus lately to such an extent that he may not be quite sure who is who in the Congress. Once he has the Congress behind him and the wires firmly in his hand he might be glad to find a plausible excuse to get away from his six months deadline on the Berlin question.

It would be desirable to surprise K for once. The President could discuss this matter directly with Macmillan and de Gaulle, without involving the diplomatic machinery. If they agree, he might ask Adenauer for a day to Washington to sell him the idea. And then send out the invitations.

That's all. If you like it, use it as your own idea.

With sincere friendship and many regards to you and your "girls".

Always yours,

Konni

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July 22, 1961

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FILE

SECRET

Dear Jim:

I greatly appreciated your letter of July 10 with its thoughtful observations on the German situation. I agree that salami-slicing may still represent the major element in Kremlin thinking. This is, of course, the hardest kind of tactic to meet with firmness and consistency as our attention is constantly being diverted from one crisis to another.

Your suggestion regarding Spain deserves the most serious study even though, as you say, the political repercussions are bound to be considerable should we take any steps towards formally admitting Spain to NATO.

I leave Monday on a three week's trip to Africa the Middle East and South Asia which I think will be of great value in bringing our missions a better understanding of the current emphasis in our foreign policy. I wish I could stop over to see you but I shall look forward to talking at length with you when you come to Washington in the fall.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

/S/ Chet

Chester Bowles

The Honorable
James M. Gavin,
American Ambassador,
Paris.

S/S-RO
JUL 24 1961
[illegible] signed original

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SECRET

NLK
NSF Series to N.P.
Week end of July 1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1961

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Views of Lovett and Murphy on the Acheson Report

At your direction, copies of this report were circulated to Mr. Lovett and Mr. Murphy. Mr. Murphy's comments are in the attached letter, and Mr. Lovett has given me an oral account of his reactions.

The Lovett view is as follows:

(1) Love is not an operative emotion among nations. We must act on basis of our interests and our powers. Popularity is no path to success.

(2) We must be prepared to fight a nuclear war for our rights in Berlin. This determination is fundamental.

(3) We need to stop "making a poor mouth" about our position and our future.

Mr. Lovett explicitly refrains from passing judgment on the broader military elements of the Acheson Report, except to say that in his judgment a small-scale probe of one division strength, or less, is nonsensical. He warned me that Bob Murphy would be skeptical of the airlift, and indicated that he himself did not share this skepticism, but he made no specific affirmative comment on this point.

On a separate subject, Mr. Lovett spoke to me with great emphasis on the need for a change in the Department of State, which I have bothered you about before.

McG. B.

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V:CBowles
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Number 1 of ___ copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

762.0221/7-1261
11293

Approved in U
7/17/61

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 12, 1961

SUBJECT: Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: Mikhail A. Menshikov, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Under Secretary Chester Bowles

JUL 20 1961

COPIES TO: S/S - 1, S/P - 2, O - 3, DDR/C - 4, S/B - 5, S/O - 6, EUR - 7, SOV - 8, EE - 9, Amembassy Moscow - 10, Amembassy Bonn - 11, Amembassy Paris - 12, Amembassy London - 13, Paris USRO - 14, US Mission Berlin - 15, White House - Mr. Bundy - 17, Defense - Mr. Nitze

I met with Ambassador Menshikov at the latter's request. He had called the week of June 26th, shortly after his return from Moscow and invited me to luncheon at his home. Having been at his home for two previous occasions, I invited him to my home on July 7th at 1:00.

Although we talked for an hour and a half, I doubt very much was accomplished. On the last two occasions he had been disagreeable and even threatening. This time there was no such display; indeed, he was quite restrained.

Most of his questions seemed to be aimed at our willingness to negotiate, but with the area of negotiation entirely on Berlin. There was no evidence of any desire to broaden the areas of discussion.

I tried repeatedly to pin him down on what action the Soviets might take in regard to Berlin. He stated and restated that they planned to sign a treaty with the East German Government, that they hoped we would join them, but if we were not, they would go ahead.

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Once this was done, he said, all the rights and privileges now held by the Soviets would be held by the East Germans and we would have to deal with them. He added that he was quite sure the East German Government would not be willing to accept the status quo on West Berlin.

On the several occasions when I asked him what he meant by this unwillingness, he responded in various ways. For instance, he said that the East Germans would not interfere in any way with the lives of the people in West Berlin. When I asked him if that meant that the East Germans had no intention of interfering with the flow of traffic or commerce in and out of the city, he switched gears and repeated that the status quo would not be tolerated.

When I asked if they intended to interfere with the supplies for our military contingent, he went through this same circle.

With constant repetition, I think I was able to register the point that we were prepared to take all necessary risks in defense of our present position in Berlin.

I then said that I assumed his government had taken into account the possible military consequences if some miscalculation occurred. I added that if fighting developed, the Chinese would be the only people who would benefit by it; indeed, they would laugh their heads off. I added that even though we were fortunate enough to avoid a military outbreak, the impact of the crisis on the Soviet Union's relations with the United States and other western countries would be disastrous.

I reminded him of the long, slow, tedious process of easing the tensions between our two countries to the point where cultural and educational exchanges have been on a broad scale.

Economic relationships which the Soviets had built up in Europe and elsewhere would also be destroyed.

I wondered if all of this damage could be worth the gamble on which his country was embarking. I added, speaking personally,

that

that I hoped we would go beyond the Berlin issue to open the much broader questions involving USSR-USA relations in the arms race and in various parts of the world where we were in conflict. Although we could not change our position on Berlin as long as Central Europe remained so unsettled, there was much we could accomplish elsewhere with good will on both sides.

To this there was no comment.

... Although the luncheon appeared largely unproductive, I was able again to reaffirm our willingness to take an extremely tough position in regard to our rights in Berlin and to suggest that one possible way out of the dilemma was to broaden the scope of the discussions to cover wide areas where agreement might be reached to our mutual advantage.

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

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(84)

July 12, 1961

Recategorized as Category "A"
September 30, 1968
By Warren A. Henderson

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: USIA Planning and Action on Berlin

Anticipating a new Berlin crisis in the coming months we began in April to prepare for an intensive worldwide information and propaganda campaign seeking to align world public opinion in support of the U.S. position and to generate public pressure in order to influence the Soviet - East German position.

Three phases of activity were agreed on:

1. Beginning immediately, USIA's "fast media" -- Voice of America, press service, newsreels, and television -- were directed to intensify their exploitation of opportunities provided by events, such as statements by the President, Secretary of State and other leading U.S. and Free World spokesmen, useful foreign and domestic editorial comment, and Communist statements or actions exposing their aggressive intent. A Berlin information policy guidance was issued June 16.

2. Simultaneously, preparation was ordered on a priority basis of a list of source materials covering all important aspects of the Berlin situation from its inception to the present. The resulting nine-page document was distributed May 18 to all USIA media. Our media were instructed to produce and have ready by August 21 the following:

(1)

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(2)

A thirty-minute documentary film exposing the weakness of the Russian position and emphasizing Western determination to preserve Berlin's freedom;

A thirty-minute television feature relating Soviet pressure on Berlin with Communist expansionism in Laos, Vietnam, and other critical areas;

A special press packet of fifteen features and by-liners (Chronology of Events, 1945 - 1961, Legal basis of Allied rights in Berlin, Contrast between East and West Berlin, etc.) and selected news photos;

A seven-part radio documentary series including interviews with West Berliners, in both scripts and tapes, a one-hour documentary, and other scripts documenting Western legal and moral rights in the city and the need to resolve the Berlin situation in the context of German reunification through the free vote of the people;

A shelf of some twenty of the best books, U.S. and foreign, on Berlin, with a photo exhibit to be displayed with this collection in USIS libraries around the world.

This complete background "package" of materials is being distributed to USIS posts around the world, with an embargo on the use of any of it until concerted release and placement is telegraphically authorized by the Agency. (The release date will come whenever the critical phase is clearly at hand, tension mounting, and public interest at a height which will ensure maximum audience receptivity of this entire "Berlin package." Hopefully, a major impact will be achieved around the world, setting up constructive responses in the mass communications media -- press and radio particularly -- of other nations.)

3. To build up the momentum thus generated (and the resulting pressure of world public opinion on the Soviet Union),

all USIA media will, on a day to day basis, document Western solidarity on the defense of West Berlin and the preservation of the rights involved, and the need to do this in the interest of the security of all free peoples.

The highly successful tactic, used before in 1958, of flying leading correspondents of other nations into Berlin for "on the spot" reporting will again be utilized. The Agency cabled USIS-Bonn requesting it to inform the German Federal Republic of our willingness to assist in arranging the visits of large numbers of correspondents. The Post and the Embassy on June 26 replied jointly by cable that this offer had been welcomed by the GFR, that the latter plans major attention to this project, and meanwhile is already distributing effective pamphlets and books via its missions in other countries. The GFR offered to keep in touch with us on planning.

We have also taken similar steps with the British and are prepared to do the same with the French when a basic policy decision is reached.

Edward R. Murrow
Director

National Defense University

(34)

(85)

12 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Through: The Secretary of Defense

Subject: Berlin Airlift

The President has asked me to request you and General LeMay to furnish a run-down on our capabilities for an airlift and what we should do in building up our air strength during the next three or four months in order to protect the airlift.

It would be appreciated if the requested information could reach me by July 17.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

86

Memorandum From Robert Johnson to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)

Washington, July 12, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.

Done by OWEN for BUNDY (351)

1(a) below is practically same as my "talking paper."

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July 12, 1961

(87)

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Briefing for Thursday NSC Meeting

The paper to be discussed at this meeting is attached. The President may wish to lead the discussion through the ten point memorandum on 'Imminent Decisions' at the start of the paper. An item-by-item commentary on this memorandum follows. The items which will call for particular emphasis or decision at the NSC meeting are marked by an asterisk: (1, 2, 5, 9,

(9). Military Preparations. The DOD Annex to the paper outlines a program of early large-scale preparations so as to be able to resort to a substantial use of ground force as soon as our access to Berlin is blocked.

The arguments pro and con this course are summarized in paragraph 1 of the paper on 'Imminent Decisions'. There is one additional consideration, which is not mentioned there: The undesirability of having large numbers of reservists and National Guardsmen standing around the Federal Service, waiting for blocking of our access -- which the East Germans might well postpone for a considerable period after signing of a peace treaty.

As a basis for his decision about military preparations the President might wish to have the Defense and State Departments prepare and study the effects of an alternative and more modest package, which he could compare with the proposals in this paper, and which would have two main components:

"Talking Paper" point

(a) Measures which would need to be taken now by the U.S. and its allies to enable them to use substantial ground force four months after Communist blocking of our access. (Berlin could live off of the stockpile and an airlift for at least four months after access was blocked.) These would be mostly undramatic long lead-time measures, and would probably not involve the proclamation of a national emergency.

Possible "talking paper" point (as revised in last sentence) if "talking paper"

(b) Measures to hasten fulfillment of existing NATO programs for strengthening forces on the Central Front, with primary emphasis on measures that would take effect within at least the next year to eighteen months. These NATO measures would be helpful in dealing with a Berlin crisis, which may be a long-drawn out off-again-on-again affair; they would be valuable in their own right; and they could be presented as a response to the overall world situation, rather than as a 'crash' program for Berlin.

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Bill

On the basis of DOD and State's preparation and evaluation of this alternative package, the President could reach a decision about (i) the general level and timing of military preparations; (ii) what additional funds, if any, to request for the DOD budget before it has been acted on by the Senate Defense Appropriations Committee.

The President may also wish at the NSC meeting to emphasize the need for military preparations which would enable the US to exert continuing and flexible control over nuclear weapons during a Berlin crisis:

"Command's duty"

First, steps to strengthen US physical custody of nuclear warheads in Europe and SACEUR command and communication facilities, so as to ensure that nuclear weapons would only be used with proper authority -- even during the confusion and violence which would be attendant on substantial fighting in Central Europe.

Royer's point

Second, steps to prepare war plans which would permit the disciplining application of strategic forces against the USSR. It is not believed that such plans now exist.

c2. Permanent Increase in DOD Budget. It would be useful to convince the Soviets that a Berlin crisis would lead to a permanent increase in the DOD budget, such as followed the Korean war.

Planning for such a long-term increase would not be primarily designed to affect our capability for early fighting over Berlin, but rather to deter the Soviets, who will not relish the prospect of a lasting quantum jump in U.S. defense spending. The ostensible purpose of such planning would be to prepare for a long period of stepped-up worldwide Bloc pressures, which any violent Soviet action against Berlin would presumably portend.

No opposition to this course of action has surfaced during interagency discussions. It tends, however, to become confused with -- and submerged by -- proposals for early large-scale military preparations designed to enhance our capability for fighting over Berlin.

The Secretary of Defense is studying the possibility of a lasting post-Berlin increase in the DOD budget. The President may wish to ask how this planning is coming, and to ask for State and DOD views as to how it might be brought to the Soviets' attention.

2. Covert Actions. The recommendation in this paper that planning for such actions be approved, subject to the Secretary of State's decisions about scale and timing, seems sound.

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4. Defense Mobilization and Civil Defense. The OCDM submission is not an adequate basis for Presidential decisions. It will need to be remanded to the DOD for further review.

5. Economic Counter-Measures. State believes that no new decisions are required. Treasury seems to feel that the State paper is not sufficiently vigorous. The President may wish at the NSC meeting to ask Treasury for its views, so that this disagreement can be surfaced.

6. U.S. Economic Dislocations. Decisions on this subject will need to be postponed until other Presidential decisions about military preparations.

7. Public Information. While the paper is correct in saying that the only decision needed is about an early Presidential speech, Presidential encouragement would probably be helpful in getting State and USIA to proceed urgently with the large scale information program projected in this report.

8. Negotiations. While no early decision is needed, the Secretary of State expects to present some of his preliminary views on this question.

9. Western Attitude Toward East German Personnel Along the Access Routes. The staff work is finished and no early decision is required. The President may wish to ask the Secretary of State to present the arguments pro and con our accepting East German "paper stamping", which is what is basically at stake.

10. Other Issues.

(a) UN. The President may wish to direct State to proceed urgently with studies of the timing and manner of possible UN involvement.

(b) Congressional Consultation. No planning for Berlin consultation with the Congress now seems underway in the Departments concerned. It might be helpful if the President made clear that primary responsibility for such planning lies with the Secretary of State, who can be expected to take the lead and to recommend any action by the President or Cabinet officers which he believes desirable.

11. Constructive Action. This completes the commentary on the NSC paper. That paper does not deal with the possibility of exploiting a Berlin crisis to advance our constructive purposes (as the 1947 crisis led to the

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Marshall Plan and as the Korean war was used to revitalize NATO). The President may wish to ask the Secretary of State to organize a special study of how:

(a) The felt need for greater interdependence which is likely to be triggered by a Berlin crisis might be used to register advances toward greater Atlantic cohesion -- in the political, economic, and military fields -- which would not otherwise seem feasible.

(b) The greater awareness of the dangers of the existing situation which is likely to be one result of a Berlin crisis could be exploited, in its aftermath, to try to achieve political and disarmament agreements which our allies and the USSR would not otherwise find acceptable.

It would be useful if we could come out of a Berlin crisis with something more than a defensive win to show for the tremendous effort which we will have devoted to this subject.

12. SNIE. A Special Intelligence Estimate has been prepared in anticipation of this meeting. The final pages (18-25) on probable Soviet actions are particularly worth reading. (We have set of you want to look at over)

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NSC... Berlin Crisis

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13 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: NSC Meeting of July 13 on Berlin.

1. The NSC Meeting on this date lasted from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., after which the Steering Group met in the President's office. The outcome of these two meetings was the directive, attached herewith, for further departmental planning. The issues remaining to be decided are:

a. When and how to declare a National Emergency.

b. When and how to ask Congress for new funds. Shall it be for 1.5 billion initially and later to raise the request to 4.3 billion?

c. When to call up reservists.

d. How to inform our Allies.

e. When to talk to our Ambassadors and Congressional leaders. What to tell them.

f. How to ease the impact on domestic programs, in particular, how to avoid a reduction of funds for Foreign Aid if a large Defense increase is requested.

2. The attitudes shown by the principal participants was as follows:

a. Rusk wishes to withhold a position until the meeting next Wednesday, July 19. He recognizes that there is a strong group in State opposed to a significant military build-up at this time.

b. The Vice President favors the Acheson program and Military Choice Number 1. Johnson is convinced that the entire sum of 4.3 billion should be requested at once from Congress, along with a clear explanation of the need for this increase.

c. Secretary McNamara favors the Acheson program, but sees no need for declaration of a National Emergency before September 1st. He will be very cautious in calling up reserve and National Guard divisions. He has no doubt, however, about the need for increasing the combat readiness of STRAF divisions and obtaining additional stand-by sea and air lift.

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Suggested Remarks at close of NSC Meeting 13 July 1961

It is my understanding that the Berlin planning at the working level is being done by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary Kohler. This group is responsible to a steering group, chaired by the Secretary of State, which is responsible for ensuring full departmental support and policy coordination under the final direction of the President. The Berlin paper which we are considering today is evidence of the effectiveness of the Coordinating Group in producing a very comprehensive document in a short period of time.

It seems to me that the next step is to return this paper to the Coordinating Group for further refinement and development. This work would include a systematic analysis of the political and military implications of the various alternatives, as recommended on page 2 of the "Imminent Decisions" cover sheet of this Berlin study.

I would also like to see the integrated timetable developed further to provide the framework for planning and subsequent implementation. All the specific measures recommended for consideration in the table should include a date by which a decision must be taken. Thus, the tabulation would remind us of the need for timely study of these measures in advance of the required date for decision. I consider it a primary duty of Mr. Kohler and his associates to bring such matters to my attention or to that of the responsible department head in time for us to take appropriate action.

Now I should like to raise a number of points and questions which have arisen in my mind from the consideration of this Berlin document. I should like them to be referred to the Coordinating Group for the preparation of answers.

1. Why is it recommended to postpone consideration of negotiation alternatives? I would think it desirable for us to think through these alternatives now, even though a final decision is withheld.

2. I note the indication of a need for decision on checkpoint procedures. I should like to have a rundown setting forth the pros and cons for the course of action recommended.

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3. I note on page 10 of "Military Preparation" that our military forces can create a capability for large-scale non-nuclear ground action within four months after mobilization is ordered. What is meant by large-scale non-nuclear ground action? Is it the use of the six division force? If so, what NATO forces are assumed to be involved?

4. I would like to have a clear picture of the logistical capability of US and of NATO forces for sustained ground combat in Europe. I understand that a shortage of conventional ammunition may limit the scope of such action.

5. I am impressed with the need for a tight coordination of propaganda action in support of our Berlin program. How is it planned to hold together our resources in the covert and overt propaganda fields?

6. I would also like to get a feel of the various steps of escalation toward general war which might have to be considered if we embark on this course of action.

7. This program has to me the ring of unilateral action. I would like to know how and when we expect to bring in our Allies.

I would like the Kohler Committee to submit by July 20 the new requirements growing out of this meeting.

Taylor

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National Defense University

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1961

354

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO: The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, United States Information Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Maxwell D. Taylor

The President intends to adjourn the meeting of the National Security Council after general discussion of the papers which have been presented, and then to hold a smaller session in his own office. He asks that you attend this smaller session, at which he plans to hold a discussion of the problem of choice which is outlined in the attached memorandum.

McGeorge Bundy

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY ATTACHMENT

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

FND to Kent 7/13 NSC record

SECRET - TS - 088-90

B-112

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

Military Choices in Berlin Planning

There are four broad choices available:

1. Proceed at once with all possible speed with a substantial reinforcement of U. S. ground, air and naval forces. This course would require a prompt declaration of a national emergency and an immediate request for legislation giving stand-by controls over the economy.

2. Proceed at once with all measures not requiring declaration of a national emergency; in effect, this means everything but the call-up of units and specialists from the National Guard and Reserves. At a later date, related to the development of the crisis, declare a national emergency, with the understanding that there will be a delay of up to four months in the combat availability of units called to active service after the declaration of emergency. This course would also require stand-by controls, but the time of this need is not clear.

3. Proceed at once with a declaration of national emergency and with all preparations except a large-scale call-up of Reserves or Guard units. In this course the declaration would be put in as low a key as possible, and described as a means of freeing the President's hands for later action in an emergency. In this course, stand-by controls might be requested in the same tone of voice.

All three of these courses imply a prompt request for a substantial add-on to the military budget for FY '62. The firm recommendation of the Department of Defense is for an additional 5 billion dollars, with the understanding that about 1 billion 5 would definitely be spent on hard items, and the rest mainly on troops, only if the crisis required it.

4. Avoid any significant military build-up at this time, on the ground that the crisis is one of political unity and firmness of will, and on the further ground that substantial military preparations at this stage would divide the alliance, stiffen the Russians, frighten our own people, and operate against an effective stand in Berlin under the fundamental shield of the nuclear deterrent.

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

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"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON

July 17, 1961

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
U. Alexis Johnson,
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Department of State.

FROM: Henry H. Fowler

SUBJECT: Treasury Comments on National Security Action Memorandum No. 59 - Economic Sanctions.

Pursuant to our telephone conversation, there are attached a Treasury Draft responsive to paragraph 2(a) of National Security Action Memorandum No. 59, regarding sanctions we will ask our allies to apply if access is blocked, and tactics we will use in seeking allied agreement. We have not seen the papers requested in paragraph 2(b) having to do with allied reactions and compensatory measures, but understand we will have an opportunity to comment on these papers prior to the Interagency Coordinating Group meeting tomorrow.

Attachment:

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"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

TREASURY DRAFT RESPONSIVE TO PARAGRAPH 2(a) OF NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM #59

In accordance with the directive in National Security Action Memorandum #59, July 14, 1961, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, reports on the economic sanctions the U. S. should ask its allies to be ready to apply if access is blocked, tactics that we will now use in seeking Allied agreement to these preparations, the likely Allied reactions to various U. S. approaches, the compensatory measures that we should be prepared to adopt in order to secure Allied agreement.

Submitted in conjunction is an estimate by the Director of CIA of the likely effect of such sanctions from both an economic and strategic standpoint and their probable impact on Soviet intentions.

I. Economic Sanctions the U. S. Should Ask Its Allies to be Ready to Apply If Access to Berlin is Blocked.

(1) It is recommended that, as an integral part of the U. S. - Berlin proposals to our Allies along with the various elements of the political and military program, the President or the Secretary of State should seek agreement at the highest level of government, at the earliest possible date, from the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany, and thereafter the entire NATO group, to a severance of economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc should military and/or civilian access, air or ground, to Berlin be blocked or the subject of substantial interference.

(2) This agreement should be formalized in a memorandum of understanding on a quadripartite basis initially, and subsequently on a NATO basis in order to provide a firm basis for necessary preparations or utilization for deterrent value. It should provide for (a) concerted action by the NATO countries in event of blockage of access to put the embargo into effect and minimize any resulting hardship to participants, (b) the undertaking of legal and administrative measures by each country to facilitate the carrying out of its part of the embargo shortly after the reaching of the agreement, and (c) the establishment within NATO of a group of senior representatives of each participating country to exchange information and reports between the governments on progress in preparations and carry forward further detailed negotiations that may prove desirable and necessary, including negotiation with other friendly powers to extend the coverage of the embargo to the maximum.

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(3) The economic embargo to be proposed in event of blockage of access would be total. It would include among other things:

(a) The prohibition of the use of all financial facilities of the NATO countries to carry on current transactions with the USSR, East Germany, the other Sino-Soviet Bloc members and their Nationals.

(b) The expulsion of all Sino-Soviet Bloc technical experts and foreign trade officials without diplomatic immunity from the NATO countries.

(c) The freezing of all assets of the members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc under jurisdiction of the NATO powers.

(d) Termination of trade agreements involving Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.

(e) The denials of all exports to Sino-Soviet countries.

(f) The stoppage of all imports from Sino-Soviet countries to NATO countries.

(g) The closure of NATO ports to Sino-Soviet shipping and planes and Bloc chartership.

(h) The prohibition of calling at Sino-Soviet Bloc ports of vessels and planes of the NATO countries.

II. Proposed Tactics in Seeking NATO Agreement

(4) As noted above, it is recommended that negotiations be undertaken promptly to secure the earliest possible agreement at the highest governmental level with the NATO countries for a severance of economic relationships should access to Berlin be blocked. The technical discussions at a lower level will not provide the solid base for concrete and meaningful administrative and legal preparations which must be put under way and expedited if adequate arrangements are to be made in timely fashion. The

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mere development and refining of a checklist of economic countermeasures through technical discussions at the tripartite level will have limited usefulness from here on unless there is firm high level agreement that the NATO countries are prepared to invoke total economic embargo in event our access to Berlin is blocked or the subject of substantial interference.

(5) If our allies will not agree to this economic countermeasure in this contingency, a realistic U. S. policy should concentrate on purely political or military alternatives.

(6) Therefore, the proposal should be urged in the strongest terms. Unless the U. S. has full cooperation of our major Allies on a countermeasure that amounts to full embargo, the application of lesser economic sanctions on a selective basis with limited participation will be counterproductive, revealing a lack of unity and determination. Furthermore, any resort to mild economic countermeasures as a response to the blockage of rights to Berlin would be interpreted as weakness, a moral protest, and a long step toward negotiated appeasement.

(7) This tactical position will not preclude agreement to employ a lesser complex of economic sanctions as a preliminary measure prior to any block of access to Berlin. However, we should seek agreement in the full embargo measure in event of blockage access before discussion of the lesser complex of measures that might be undertaken prior to blockage.

(8) It is also recommended that this agreement on the application of an economic embargo in event of blockage of access to Berlin should be sought at the highest governmental level concurrently with the presentation of the U. S. position on political and military measures. This approach is preferred to any separate presentation in order to underscore and emphasize the importance the U. S. attaches to agreement on strong economic countermeasures and the undertaking of concerted preparations necessary to their execution. To discuss political and military measures at the highest governmental level, leaving the economic countermeasures for technical discussion separate and apart, would be to consign the economic countermeasures to secondary and unimportant position of priority in U. S. plans.

III. The Likely Allied Reactions
(To be supplied by State)

IV. The Compensatory Measures the U. S. Should be Prepared to Adopt in Order to Secure Allied Agreement.
(To be subject of a State draft for later discussion.)

July 17, 1961

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"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

University [redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

JUL 17 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT

Through: The Secretary of Defense

Subject: Berlin Airlift (U)

Enclosure 1 contains the information you requested for the President on our capabilities for a Berlin airlift and what we should do to build up our air strength during the next three or four months to protect an airlift operation.

Because of the complexity of the subject, General LeMay and I planned to present you with a briefing which would provide the answers to your request and then discuss with you any further questions you might have. The enclosure contains the proposed briefing. Basically it consists of an operational plan for a Berlin airlift. This approach was taken to focus on the objectives of a renewed airlift, the proposed concept of operations, and the tasks that must be performed to implement the plan. Following the explanation of the plan, the decisions that must be made and actions that must be taken to provide the capabilities to implement the plan on 1 January 1962 are briefly discussed.

General LeMay and I urge that you hear the briefing so that we may discuss the enclosed matter with you further.

Eugene M. Zuckert

1 Encl
Briefing on Berlin
Airlift Plan

DS 61-6380-B1

Classification may be downgraded to SECRET upon removal of inclosures.

[redacted]

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR. 5200.10

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

CONFIDENTIAL

July 18, 1961

Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador M. A. Menshikov, USSR,
Monday, July 17, 1961

The conversation began with Ambassador Menshikov asking me about how the White House staff was organized. At about the third sentence I mentioned Berlin. For the next two hours this was the sole subject of conversation, with one exception noted below.

I stated that the crux of the issue, from the American side, was Mr. Khrushchev's statement that, by unilateral action, the East German Republic might undertake to extinguish Western rights of access to Berlin which derived from the Second World War. I then invited his own view of the German problem.

What followed was a lengthy exposition of the familiar Soviet view marked, however, by very strong emphasis on: (a) the Soviet belief that the signing of a peace treaty would damp down West German "military aggressiveness" and (b) the Soviet desire to enter into negotiations with the U.S. and others on a German settlement as a whole -- not on Berlin alone, but Germany. He ended by asking at some length why we objected to dealing with an East German government, which we evidently disliked greatly, when we were prepared to deal with a great many governments which we equally disliked.

I emphasized we did not merely dislike the East German government but that the method of its selection was in violation of wartime and postwar agreements. The Soviet government should not assume that because we had not gone to war over the issue of elections in East Europe that the American commitment in this matter was superficial.

He said this was an irrational view; to which I replied that it was necessary for each country to take into account in its calculations feelings that were strong on the other side even though they might be regarded as irrational. The feeling about East German elections was particularly strong in the generation which had fought the Second World War. The Soviet Union had suffered greater war losses than the U.S., but the Americans lost were just as dead as the Russians.

I went on to state that we did not fully share Soviet anxiety about West German aggressiveness. Nevertheless, in view of Soviet wartime losses, we were prepared to understand the strength of their feelings. But I pointed out that the method they were using to raise the German issue was bound to strengthen, rather than weaken, West German aggressiveness.

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He then stated that the Soviet Union was sure that the West Germans would acquire nuclear weapons and were anxious to prevent this development. I stated that we also were anxious to prevent this outcome; and that the President had accepted continued tension with De Gaulle to help forestall this result; but that the best way to do this was to have completed a test ban negotiation along the lines I had discussed in Moscow last December with Kuznetsov. He then said that Hammarskjold had taught them a lesson about neutrals; and they were unprepared to have a test ban agreement unless it included the Troika provision. I said the Congo position taken by the UN was not a matter of Hammarskjold's manipulation, but of the attachment of the majority to the UN as an institution. I cited Indian troop movements to the Congo. He said the Indians were now sorry they did it.

He then stated flatly that the signing of a treaty with East Germany would take place in the second half of November; and that invitations would be issued for the conference some time before.

He asked me if the U.S. would come to this conference. The first time round I evaded a direct response; the second round he stated that, from what he could gather in Washington, the U.S. would not attend such a conference. I did not deny this.

He then said that while he now regarded war as a possibility for the first time he did not regard war as inevitable; but that time was running out. He said he hoped there would be serious negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR before war became inevitable.

He then gave me a version of the schedule: everyone would be invited to the peace conference; if we did not engage in negotiations looking towards a treaty with two Germanys, the peace treaty with the GDR would be signed; the East Germans would not block Western access to Berlin and would be prepared to grant access to Berlin if certain "offensive" activities in West Berlin would be stopped. He implied that full recognition of the GDR would not be required for this exercise but that arrangements with the East Germans would be necessary on a basis other than Western rights of conquest. He asked: Why do you wish to be in Berlin as conquerors?

Towards the end of the conversation he came back again to the question: When you deal with so many governments which you dislike, why will you not deal with the East Germans? I again pointed out that we regarded our position in Berlin as a matter of trusteeship for all of Germany; and that the question was not whether or not we dislike the East Germans but whether we would accept the definitive abrogation of agreements about the

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selection of a German government which had arisen from fighting the Second World War. I urged him to believe that American feelings on this matter were quite as deep as Soviet feelings about the development of military power in West Germany.

At no point did he say that he did not believe Americans would fight in this matter; he did say that he thought it was irrational for Americans to fight on this issue. He stated, however, that he thought that, if the crisis intensified, the West Germans would leave West Germany as fast as the East Germans were leaving East Germany, and that we should not count on the French.

This part of the conversation closed when I stated that it was easy to underestimate how citizens in a democracy would behave in a crisis. I had been a student in Britain in 1936-38. Hitler and many others believed they were incapable of summoning the unity and will to fight a war. The British entered a war, under most unpromising circumstances, and stayed with it for six years. The ultimate unity and will of the West could now be similarly underestimated.

To this he replied that now there were nuclear weapons; and to this I agreed but pointed out that, backed against the wall, men generally behaved bravely, even if irrationally, and that in the end men often took the view that they could only die once.

We both agreed that it would be wiser if the matter could be settled to mutual satisfaction before it came to the point of this test.

He then referred briefly to Laos, saying that American policy in the past had been unwise not to accept Souvanna; but that he understood the policy of the present Administration had changed. I agreed that we now were concerned to establish a neutral and independent Laos; but pointed out that Viet-Nam was a different matter since the aggression there had been mounted from Hanoi as a matter of enunciated policy by the Vietminh government. He said that in these areas people turn to guerrilla warfare when they cannot express themselves by any other means. I said that in our understanding, the war in Viet-Nam -- which we took very seriously -- was not a matter of frustrated democratic politics but a matter of enunciated policy, training, supply, and guidance from Hanoi. I asked him if he had read my speech delivered at Fort Bragg. The Chargé d'Affaires said that they had a summary; but at Menshikov's request I promised to send the full text to the Carlyle Hotel in New York, where he will spend two days before departing for the Soviet Union on vacation.

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On reflection these points stand out.

1. Whenever I raised the issue of Western access to Berlin as the crucial element in the Vienna talks, he said there was a "misunderstanding." The Soviet Union was not trying to block access to Berlin, nor the GDR. What he was evidently trying to project at this stage was that from the Soviet side, the crucial aspect was some degree of increased recognition of the GDR. He gave the impression that something a good deal short of full recognition might be acceptable. He referred several times to the dealings between East and West Germans.

2. This was the first occasion I had heard the Soviet peace conference dated in the last two weeks of November. This he said was "absolutely firm and predictable."

3. At no point did he assert that we would not fight over access; nor did he threaten the U.S.

4. The general tone was, after his own curious fashion, conciliatory -- which may well relate to his knowledge that this is our week of crucial decision on Berlin.

W. W. Rostow

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION BY

NLK, 82F
Germany

94

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 17, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

The decision on Berlin

I. One alternative recommends that you, in the near future inter alia

-- declare a national emergency
-- call up the reserves and the national guard
-- extend terms of service of those on active duty
-- return dependents from Europe
-- request an additional $4.3 billion for defense, for a total deficit of from $8 to $10 billion
-- postpone any discussion of negotiations or constructive proposals.

Such a course of action, in my opinion, would

-- endanger our foreign aid, education, space and other appropriations, while creating a deficit spending issue for 1964 when the cause of the deficit may have been forgotten
-- leave the propaganda and diplomatic initiative to Khrushchev, enabling him to choose and monopolize the forum and topic for discussions and cause the United States to be disadvantageously forced into negotiations by our Allies, neutral opinion or the U.N. instead of at our own initiative
-- engage Khrushchev's prestige to a point where he felt he could not back down from a showdown, and provoke further or faster action on his part in stepping up the arms race or signing a treaty with East Germany
-- arouse those at home and abroad who are fearful of "rash" and "trigger happy" actions by the United States, with possibly so much divisiveness that Khrushchev could be encouraged.

It would also run counter to the following recommendations, which I believe are among the best you have received:

Acheson: "We should try to avoid actions which are not needed for sound military purposes and which would be considered provocative ... The more drastic of our preparations will be more impressive to Moscow, and perhaps, have a less disturbing effect on our allies, if taken later on as the crisis deepens, when they will be more suited to the immediacy of the threat."

National Intelligence Estimate: "... military preparatory measures undertaken with fanfare at an early stage of the developing crisis over Berlin would have the effect of making the Soviet negotiating position more rigid ... At the least, they would feel compelled to respond with a strong public posture and military measures of their own to prove that they could not be intimidated."

Tripartite Contingency Plan: "...quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence."

Kissinger: "... firmness should be related to the substance of our negotiating position ... not proved by seeming to shy away from a diplomatic confrontation."

Bohlen: "... The actual value of the increased military force (6-7 divisions instead of 2) would seem to be a secondary point. Therefore, there would not seem to be any great urgency as to timing beyond measures which could be taken now without formal Congressional action or Presidential Proclamation."

McNamara in May, 1961: "It is my belief that the overall force strength (of U.S. Armed Forces) is appropriate at this time and should not be significantly expanded ... certain additional actions can be financed within the limits of the budget previously recommended."

1- 12[illegible]

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II. The other course would be articulated by an early Presidential TV address which would

-- explain the nature of the Berlin issue, our rights, obligations and objectives from which we will not back down an inch

-- emphasize the nature of the crisis as one requiring endurance rather than emergency actions, and confidence in leadership rather than detailed disclosure of plans

-- express confidence in the military readiness moves previously undertaken (not in response to Khrushchev's note) including our capacity to order an air alert at any time, improvements in our ground alert, the ability of our Polaris now on station, the increased readiness of our reserves and the addition of a new Marine Division

-- make clear that we will take whatever other military measures are necessary to insure our ability, in a Berlin showdown, to make clear our intent to defend Berlin at all costs, and to give the Russians an opportunity to negotiate before the nuclear stage is reached

-- urge increased attention to Civil Defense

-- announce plans for allied machinery on economic sanctions

-- announce plans for strengthening the readiness of West Berlin, its stockpiles and airlift preparations, etc.

-- describe the concept of "contingency plans" and allied efforts to improve them

-- call for Congressional Resolution underlining our commitments to aid and protect the people of Berlin and their right of self-determination.

-- make whatever constructive proposals we are ready to initiate now.

III. Before you can choose and execute either alternative, you must make certain that (despite the abundance of memos) the following questions have been answered:

1. Is a declaration of national emergency necessary now?
   -- Obtain an opinion from the Attorney General as to what powers may be exercised under the present "Korean emergency".

2. Is a call-up of reserves and national guard necessary now?
   -- Obtain a report from Defense as to precisely what conventional forces would be used in Berlin if our access were blocked; what allied forces would be available in that area in late 1961; and how the remainder could be available [illegible] increased draft calls and recruiting, reassignments to combat duty, and otherwide.

3. Is a $4 to 5 billion additional Defense request necessary now?
   -- Obtain a report from Defense as to how the answer to (2) could be initiated now with an additional $1.5 additional or less, through reprograming and borrowing and the opportunity to get a supplemental in January if the situation has worsened.
   -- Obtain a report from Budget as to how much [illegible] of the $4.2 billion request [illegible] essential now for Berlin

4. Is a wholly negative diplomatic posture necessary now?
   -- Obtain a report from USIA on what and whether positive moves could help win world opinion to the support of our position in Berlin
   -- Obtain a report from State evaluating (on their merits, as well as on the basis of DeGaulle's, Adenauer's, or Khrushchev's likely reaction) all constructive proposals which might now or later be included as a part of our position, including: a new version of the Western peace plan, our initiating a German peace conference, the role of the UN, the use of the World Court, a Western Summit, a plebiscite in Western or all of Berlin or Germany, Thompson's suggestion for stretching out the period of achieving an all-German constitution, solution "C" and Acheson's additons, and all - Berlin Free City, comprehensive schemes for European security, a nuclear free zone, use of the forthcoming conference of neutrals, exploratory private talks with the USSR, and alternatives to our position on reunification and the recognition of East Germany.

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-- Obtain from State a report on other counter-offensive features in a diplomatic-propaganda program that would make it hard for Khrushchev to sign a treaty this [redacted], including complaints of Russian violation of previous agreements regarding Berlin and East Germany.

Theodore C. Sorensen

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Lot 72 D192

(95)

(359)

THURSDAY
July 20, 1961
12:00 noon

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR SORENSEN

The Sec said he would mention 8 items as an interim report.

1. Start with the theme of desire for world of peace.

2. Underlying causes of tension - making reference to those who act like outlaws and refuse to accept deeds of our community.

3. With this sort of a situation - give our desire for peace and threats to peace we combine readiness to search for peace and also protect our vital interests.

4. A brief recapitulation of military position since World War II pointing out if we had rearmed since 1946 it was because this course has been imposed upon us.

5. A need for further strengthening military and civil defense - put in his proposals.

6. Every citizen wants a share - taxes etc.

7. We cannot let Mr. K divert us from our great constructive tasks at home and abroad. If he threatens us we must not quit doing everything we need to do. We can afford what has to be done but not the other.

8. The Sec will try to draft this himself if S likes the idea - an invitation to K to join the rest of the world and take his part in writing chapters of history which men will regard with gratitude and not the other kind. [redacted]

The Sec said this is rough but he will be working at it some more and maybe come up with a different list but he thinks these are the key points we should touch.

S asked if we should touch on some of the other items - should we mention we are going to explore the possibility of economic sanctions - the Sec said not on Tuesday. We don't want to get into details of how we are going to handle Berlin. S said the Pres has a wholly different kind of speech in mind. Stress the point our only

This is speech b/g for.

(2)

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concern is not Berlin but at this time we have to say in some detail to the American people what the shouting is about with respect to Berlin - background in history, geography, law, etc. The Sec said if he has in mind that we come out with answers it raises great problems for our consultations with our allies. S is sure it does that and that was why he was concerned about the timing of it. That is what he asked if we have to clear it. The Sec said no if we don't say what needs to be cleared. The Sec said we could try to do a good deal of that in what he called S. S will convey that to the Pres and may have to come back. S took for granted the Sec's checklist. His had question marks. The Sec said he only has 25 minutes. S mentioned self-determination, plebecite of West Berlin, ways of settling legal problems - we can work these in. The Sec asked if S had specific points with question marks. S said what he had was should we mention the FM mtg in August, should we mention there are contingency plans and what they mean and we intend to improve them. S thinks we should mention strengthening the readiness of West Berlin, etc. The Sec said if you mention stock piles and economic sanctions this will lead K to think this is the end of the trail. S said not if you also mention what we are doing militarily. The Sec is not sure it is right - we have to be careful on timing of the surfacing of some of these things. The Sec will think about it. S thinks the Pres regards this as a speech in which he explains to the American people this is our answer. That is why he has positive proposals. The Sec said this is not the way you make proposals on Berlin. We could give the ballgame away to K and hurt allied unity. S agreed but posture goes beyond a speech. The Sec said there is much to be used from the statement and the aide-memoire. S agreed and said he thinks that might be the starting point. He suggested the Sec think over what he mentioned - best thing may be to get an actual draft and see what it looks like.

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NLK, PUF Germany

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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July 20, 1961

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: W. W. R.

SUBJECT: The Attorney General asked me yesterday to consider our Berlin problem as if it were a political campaign and to help find a theme which would unify the Free World's response to it.

Considerations.

1. The theme should have these characteristics:

a. It should draw attention away from the Berlin problem, in the narrow sense, and root our policy in wider considerations.

b. It should unify the Free World to the maximum possible.

c. It should not be inconsistent with negotiations about Berlin and Germany.

d. It should provide the foundation for continued emphasis on such constructive Free World enterprises as foreign aid.

e. It should provide Western European politicians with a concept which would counter the latent anti-German feeling there; and, if possible, put them in the position of risking wider losses if they do not respond effectively to the American initiative.

A Theme.

2. The suggested theme is this: What we now face is not a Berlin crisis. What we face is a test of the unity, the will, and the creativity of the North Atlantic Community.

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Three Challenges: An Elaboration of the Theme.

3. The theme might be developed as follows. Mr. Khrushchev has questioned the unified will and the ability of the North Atlantic Community to maintain its commitment to the freedom of the people of West Berlin. We must answer this question by meeting three challenges. The first challenge is military. We must put our military house in order. We do not seek war, but we must be prepared to meet force with force at any level of force which might be applied to obstruct access to West Berlin. This requires not merely that we develop a significant increase in NATO's military strength, but that, together, we make the economic arrangements required to underpin our military forces. Together we must find the ways to share the burdens of the enterprise in equity. Together we must find, as a community, the foreign exchange which will be required for each to do his part.

The second challenge is diplomatic. Mr. Khrushchev has done more than challenge our unity and our will. He has challenged us to negotiate. As I said on January 20, we shall never negotiate from fear; and we shall never fear to negotiate. A part of the challenge to the North Atlantic Community is to create and to present at the proper time and in the proper forum our own ideas as to how the difficult and dangerous problem of Germany might be moved towards a settlement which would respect the fundamental principle of self-determination and respect the legitimate security interests of all nations and peoples.

The third challenge to the North Atlantic Community is that we go about the business of arming and parlaying while not losing perspective on our total responsibility to the world community. If the note Mr. Khrushchev handed me in Geneva on June 5 should lead to our forgetting that there is danger in Southeast Asia and in other parts of the world; if the delivery of that note should, above all, make us fail to follow through on the great creative task of providing adequate resources from the rich nations of the North to the aspiring and developing nations of the southern half of the world, that diversion of our attention from our common responsibilities would constitute an enormous Soviet success.

The third test of the North Atlantic Community is, then, that this rich, comfortable group of nations, which has enjoyed in the last decade a success which no one predicted in the difficult postwar years, find the poise and the resources to maintain its responsibilities to the security and the development of the whole world community while dealing with the particular challenge in central Europe which now immediately confronts us.

[redacted]

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If the North Atlantic Community meets these three challenges together, I am hopeful of the result.

I am confident that the people of West Berlin will emerge from this crisis with faith in their future freedom undiminished.

I am confident that the military, political, and economic institutions of the North Atlantic Community will be strengthened by this test of their viability.

I am confident that there will emerge an understanding that, in a world where nuclear weapons are possessed on both sides, there is an equal determination to face down unilateral threats -- whatever the cost may be.

I am hopeful, even, that we may be able to make some progress over the coming year towards a solution to the German problem as a whole.

But none of these good results will emerge if we fail to act together: in resolution, unity, and poise. The North Atlantic Community was built in response to a series of challenges. The economic weakness of postwar Europe; Stalin's thrust against Berlin and against South Korea; Stalin's consolidation of the satellite empire in Eastern Europe.

Now, a decade later, this community faces the triple challenge I have outlined.

The United States is prepared to play its full part; and I am confident that this community of nations -- the heartland of human freedom -- is ready to move forward together.

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NLK, NSF81

July 20, 1961

McGB

Nuclear Weapons and Berlin

As I read the press, I become increasingly concerned lest too exclusive an emphasis on "conventional" build-up may tend to erode the credibility of our posture on Berlin. Despite the obvious good sense of the Acheson doctrine that in a nuclear stalemate we cannot respond initially with massive retaliation, to convey too strong a public impression that we will only react conventionally before we have really acquired a capability to do so will not carry much conviction in Moscow. Indeed it may have the opposite result.

I fully agree that our actual Berlin responses should be conventional. What I query is whether in our statements and actions leading up to this point we should over-stress this fact. Largely because of his substantial conventional superiority, Khrushchev will not be very impressed by modest increases in our non-nuclear strength. His contemptuous remarks to the British Ambassador about one French division coming back from Algeria, and his boast that he could mobilize 300, probably reflect his real feelings.

What we hope will scare him, of course, is fear that if a major fracas erupts in Germany, he will be started down a slippery slope which might lead to nuclear war. But conventional preparations, without keeping the nuclear threat alive in the background, may actually confirm to Khrushchev that we dare not use the very weapons which would scare him most. He may well interpret our remarks and preparations as meaning that we are in fact afraid to use nuclears in the clutch.

Premature emphasis on conventional to the exclusion of nuclear forces may also weaken our credibility to our allies. We have been telling them for years that our NATO nuclear capability was the great equaliser, and our success in selling this doctrine is amply evident in their less than enthusiastic responses to the Acheson doctrine. If we make it too patently apparent that our responses will be only conventional, we may fail to convince our allies that we will go to the wall if necessary over Berlin. As you know, they already fear that our

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new non-nuclear emphasis means we are no longer willing to use our nuclear "sword".

What can we do about this? Go...the civil defense prog. etc.

Low Key Reminders of Our Nuclear Strength. Let me record again my conviction that our present tactical nuclear stockpiles in Europe (particularly in shorter range weapons) are substantially in excess of those of the Soviets. Khrushchev may say he doesn't think much of tactical weapons, but this is largely because he doesn't have too many yet. Soviet stockpiles are not yet sufficient to permit a major tactical weapons build-up on top of equipping their strategic forces (which naturally had first priority). Hence Khrushchev is probably still frightened of tactical nuclear war, despite his claims that any nuclear war would quickly become all-out (a smart thing for him to say during a period of his tactical inferiority). He is no more anxious than we to see a tactical nuclear war escalate into Armageddon.

Ergo, in demonstrating our determination in the test of wills over Berlin, we should not talk exclusively of conventional build-ups, even though conventional responses are all we actually contemplate. Mr. Gilpatric at his press conference seemed rather feeble on this score. Low key reminders of our current strategic nuclear superiority, and above all of our great tactical superiority, would dilute the non-nuclear focus, worry Khrushchev, and reassure our allies. Indeed, we might even deploy a few more nucs to Europe just to give balance to our public stance.

Threatening to Give Nucs to Bonn. These are dangerous days, and if we accept Mr. Acheson's precept that the stakes are absolutely crucial, can we shy away even from contingency plans for rattling nucs? On this score, Khrushchev might turn green if we threatened to give nuclear weapons to the Germans. I'd be no happier about this than anyone else. But at a late stage in a Berlin crisis, why not tell Khrushchev discreetly that if faced with such a crucial threat to our whole position in Western Europe we would feel compelled to provide our allies with whatever means were necessary to defend their vital interests?

Resumption of Nuclear Testing. Another way of reminding Khrushchev of the nuclear threat lurking in the background would be the resumption, at some stage in the crisis, of US nuclear tests. It is a fair bet that

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Khrushchev hopes he's put us in a box where we are unwilling to incur the onus of abrogating even an unpoliced moratorium. For us to test, and to incur this onus, would further validate our determination to go to war if necessary. It would also refocus attention on the nuclear stakes involved. Such a step would add to an already tense situation, but at least it would not be open to miscalculation.

Nuclear Demonstrations. If worst comes to worst, and we find ourselves at the brink on Berlin, certain high-risk options which now seem almost incredible might begin to look worthwhile. Let's say we are already in a substantial conventional fracas on the approaches to Berlin. At the eleventh hour we face defeat, negotiated compromise, or general war. But there is a further alternative which might be sandwiched into an ascending level of violence. I would call this a "controlled nuclear demonstration" of a very limited sort.

If things got to the point where the Soviets were licking us on the ground in Germany, they clearly would be gambling that we would not actually use nuclear weapons. The problem at this point would be to convince them, but by means short of all-out or even tactical nuclear war. This might involve the highly selective use of nuclear weapons as a demonstration of will.

[redacted]

I'm under no illusion as to the critical risks involved. Their escalation potential is great. They might petrify some allies. And two can play at this game. But remember that these steps would take place only when we were at the very brink of all-out war. They are suggested as last ditch alternatives which postpone an all-out response in the hope that they would forestall the necessity for it.

True, they might provoke a Soviet first strike but we are already in so tense a situation that the risk of preemption has become almost

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a constant; in any case we would be at full readiness. If firing a few nuclear weapons seems horrendous to contemplate, it seems less so to me than firing thousands. Hence, I urge some contingency planning to see what we might drum up.

Best.

cc: HO

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NLK,NSF81

(362)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

21 July 1961

(98)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Berlin Airlift.

You recently asked about our supplies in Berlin and our capabilities for an airlift, including any recommended action to build up our air strength during the next few months in order to protect the airlift.

In general, the stockpile of supplies in Berlin seems adequate to take care of the population during any presently foreseeable crisis. For example, even without an airlift, current stocks of solid fuel would last one year; of food, six months; and of medical supplies, four months. Thus, any massive effort to increase stocks does not appear necessary. It would, besides, create real problems of storage and rotation, and might not in any event be wise since it could be interpreted as accepting the likelihood of a new blockade.

Two areas which probably should be improved are medical supplies, which, it seems to me, should be raised to six months in view of their importance if an airlift failed, and liquid fuels (largely for transport), which now stand at less than a two months' level of normal, unrationed consumption and which should probably be raised somewhat if this can be accomplished without major new construction that would create alarm.

Any airlift would, of course, supplement the stockpile. Four squadrons of transports already in Europe could begin operating immediately and, built up by augmentation from the U.S. and from our Allies, would reach 2000 tons per day after one month, and the target figure of 4000 tons per day after three months. Meanwhile, the stockpile would be decreasing in certain categories, but the airlift would be flying in cargo, such as fresh meat and vegetables, mail, and light industrial raw materials, as well as flying out finished light industrial products. On balance, the economic experts estimate that under these conditions Berlin would suffer no acute economic crisis for eight months; this "crisis" connotes widespread economic dislocation, but no problems of individual subsistence even then.

TOP SECRET

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The target figure of 4000 tons per day assumes no Soviet harassment, for example by jamming of electronic landing aids. If they did jam these aids, and thus restrict the airlift to visual flight conditions, the daily tonnage on fair days would have to rise to 6000 in order to maintain the 4000 average, and this could be done.

Secretary Zuckert and General LeMay say that if ten million dollars are committed now, they can by December 1st install in Berlin and for use in the corridors a "package" of the very latest navigational and landing aids, although some of this equipment is presently earmarked for the continental air defense command. They also indicate that appropriate deployment of protective fighter aircraft to Europe need not be accomplished until about one month prior to the anticipated beginning of an air lift.

In summary:

a. The stockpile of medical supplies in Berlin should be raised to a six-months' level as soon as possible, and the stockpile of liquid fuels should be raised somewhat if this can be accomplished without major fanfare.

b. Our airlift capabilities are in good shape: adequate and ready for quick reaction, which has been extensively planned. Ten million dollars might buy some valuable insurance in the form of improved electronic landing aids, but before giving you a final comment on this point and on other means to protect the airlift I should like to speak further with Secretary Zuckert and General LeMay whom I will see next Tuesday.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

cc: Secretary Zuckert
General LeMay



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July 22, 1961

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM ON MEASURES FOR
DEALING WITH THE BERLIN SITUATION

1. The United States Government has given urgent and intensive consideration to the manner in which the Soviet threat to the Western position in Berlin should be met. In this process, searching analysis has been undertaken of Soviet objectives and tactics, and of the resources, and the alternative means of employing them, available to the Western Alliance for dealing with the situation they present. The United States has now reached certain conclusions as to the courses of action which it believes should be followed. This memorandum is intended to describe briefly these conclusions and in so doing to serve as a basis for initial consultations among the four Western Powers on the subject.

2. The Soviet threat to the Western position in Berlin has existed in the same general form since 1958. The United States believes, however, that the West must assume for purposes of arriving at its own policy that the USSR is in earnest in its stated intention to sign a separate peace treaty this year with East Germany which will, in the Soviet view, bring to an end Allied rights in Berlin.

3. The United States believes that in addition to the objectives in Central Europe which have led the USSR to pursue this course of action, a key factor in Soviet policy formulation is the belief that, in the end, the West will not fight to defend its position in Berlin,

4. In the view of the United States, therefore, Western policy should consist of two principal elements: 1) a clear demonstration of Western determination to defend the Allied position in Berlin, at the risk of war if necessary; and 2) an active diplomatic program, including negotiations with the Soviet Union, designed to provide the Soviet leadership an alternative course of action which does not endanger vital Western interests in Berlin.

5. With respect to the first element, which might be characterized as the establishment of a more effective deterrent and capability for military action, the United States proposes to begin immediately a series of measures to increase its armed strength. These steps will be taken with due regard to the dangers of a spreading arms race. We continue to stand ready to negotiate on the reduction and control of armaments. However, at this time, the greatest danger to peace is the failure to take the measures outlined in this memorandum.

6. The United States, for these reasons, proposes to take as its first steps measures which will initiate a long-run build-up of military

strength and

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RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

strength and which will not be of such a dramatic and emergency nature as to exacerbate the crisis. It intends, more specifically, to undertake:

a. A request to the Congress, to be made on Wednesday, July 26, for a supplementary defense budget of three and two tenths billion dollars to add to the approximately three billion dollar supplementary request already made. This would provide the United States with progressively stronger forces in the months ahead, giving it a capability of moving an additional six divisions to Europe at the end of the year or at any time thereafter if our allied decision is that the situation warrants this. The United States would also have available supplementary units of tactical and transport aircraft and increased naval strength especially in the field of anti-submarine warfare. Further, the United States is acting to increase immediately by fifty per cent the number of its bomber aircraft on ground alert status. Attached to this memorandum is a paper setting forth this program in more detail, together with our thoughts on NATO-wide measures in this field.

b. Substantial measures in the field of civil defense (shelter construction, recruitment and training of personnel, etc.).

7. In addition, the United States believes that the following precautionary and planning efforts should be undertaken within the next few weeks:

a. Strengthen the position of West Berlin to sustain an interruption of access by reviewing and improving airlift procedures and the stockpile as necessary;

b. Review our Berlin contingency planning in the light of the present situation;

c. Complete Allied plans for use of a wide range of non-military countermeasures, including economic sanctions, upon interruption of access to Berlin or earlier as a warning and deterrent. A paper on the subject of economic sanctions is attached.

8. It will be of great importance to obtain the maximum support of world public opinion for the Western position and policies. The United States has begun, therefore, and proposes to expand in cooperation with its Allies, an active public information program on a world-wide scale to this end. A preliminary quadripartite paper based on propaganda themes suggested by the British Government has already been agreed, and the attached paper is intended as a further step in the development of such a program.

9. The United

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9. The United States regards it as of the utmost importance that the response to the Soviet threat be a joint undertaking on the part of the NATO Alliance. The unity of the West in the face of Soviet aggrandizement in Central Europe will in and of itself be a most powerful factor in deterring the USSR from its present course of action. The United States hopes, therefore, that in all aspects of this endeavor it will be joined by its Allies. In the military field particularly the United States believes that all NATO members should make an effort comparable to that which it is making. The United States realizes that cost and sacrifice will be involved, but believes that the Alliance must act vigorously to meet the present challenge. A clear willingness to bear increased burdens on the part of all our countries will be essential to convey to the Kremlin the needed impression of allied determination. We are prepared to join our allies urgently in working out a joint military program to this end. A joint endeavor of this nature will require the closest consultation at every step of the way, and suggestions will be made later in this memorandum for pursuing the initial stages of this consultation.

10. With respect to the second element of Western policy, an active diplomatic program, the United States foresees several possible courses of action. They shall be the subject of further intensive discussion among us, but it might be well at this stage to indicate in general terms what the United States may wish to propose in more detail later:

a. It might be well at an early date for us to have informal and quiet talks with the Soviet leadership, for example through our Ambassadors in Moscow, to probe the Soviet position, to warn of possible consequences of that position in terms of Allied military build-up, and to take advantage of any opportunities which might appear to move towards subsequent understanding on an arrangement which might be acceptable.

b. Thereafter we might wish to explore opportunities for Western political initiatives at an appropriate time. The timing of such initiatives would depend on a number of factors, among them the likelihood at any particular time that the Soviet leadership may have been sufficiently impressed by the Western deterrent efforts to be willing to settle for solutions acceptable to us.

11. The United States suggests that consultation begin at once, commencing with the Ambassadorial Steering Group. This Group would presumably wish to consider directives to guide the activity of Allied working groups in Washington on general aspects of the question, non-military countermeasures and psychological and propaganda problems; the quadripartite group on economic countermeasures; and the Live Oak group.

12. Following

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12. Following the initial consultations of the Steering Group, the United States proposes consultations at a senior official level to take place in Paris for a week beginning July 28. This session would have the purpose of surveying and coordinating so far as possible the entire range of military, political, economic and psychological measures.

13. There would then follow meetings of the Western Foreign Ministers in Paris to review the state of preparations, settle outstanding problems and issue directives for further work.

14. After the Foreign Ministers meeting, it is proposed that one or all of the Foreign Ministers make an interim report to NATO and seek other member countries' views on the state of preparations.

15. If necessary, the senior level group could presumably remain for a few days in Paris to carry out the instructions of the Foreign Ministers.

Attachments:

1. The Military Program.
2. The Use of Economic Countermeasures in the Berlin Crisis.
3. Information Program in Support of Berlin Policy.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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July 21, 1961

OFF SECY OF DEFENSE

Dear Bob:

An urgent question requiring resolution is the relationship of our Berlin program to NATO discussions of longer-range strategy and defense planning. As you know, in our Berlin program we will shortly be asking our NATO allies to take a number of urgent actions designed to strengthen their forces in the Central European front. These actions should receive the highest priority attention. Our efforts, both bilaterally and in the NATO Council, should be concentrated on seeking to persuade our allies to make the necessary increases, and thus to match the major increases which we will be ready to make in our own forces.

The NATO strategy exercise is different in that it involves longer-term planning, including setting of force goals for 1966. As Ambassador Finletter has pointed out, it is important for the U.S. Government to work out carefully its own position on the specifics of what these longer-term goals should be before they are intensively discussed in NATO. It will therefore be advantageous to us to buy some time before proceeding further with these discussions of long-term goals in NATO.

I suggest that the U.S. propose that, for the present, we concentrate our efforts in NATO entirely on the additional military measures we expect of our allies as part of the Berlin program. While by no means abandoning the longer-range NATO strategy exercise now in progress, we would not push ahead on this front in NATO at the present time. This approach has the great advantage of helping us to meet most of the objectives of the NATO exercise, using the urgent Berlin situation as a powerful stimulus, and without getting bogged down in the conceptual and semantic controversies which discussions of long-term strategy have generated. This approach would, in all likelihood, be highly acceptable to our allies.

The fact

The Honorable
Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense.

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The fact is that the measures we are proposing on the military side of the Berlin program are entirely in line with the longer-term policies we are seeking out in the NATO strategy exercise and would go very far to ensure their fulfillment. This applies to the increases in ground force commitments of countries with forces deployed in Central Europe. It applies also to the recommendations for raising the training and equipment levels in active units, for improving the combat readiness of forces, for increasing length of service to 18 months and retaining specialists in service, and for improving the logistic support for non-nuclear action.

Thus, by shifting the emphasis to the military measures in the Berlin program, we could go a long way toward attaining the same objectives we are seeking in the long-term NATO strategy operation, and gain time for further spelling out of specific force goals relating to this operation within the U.S. Government.

This does not mean that the Council should let the NATO strategy exercise go completely. It will be essential to move forward eventually with Council discussion of this program as part of the long-term advance military planning which NATO necessarily must do, irrespective of whether or not we have a Berlin crisis. But the discussion could go forward at a slower pace -- with discussion of our immediate proposals for force improvement receiving first priority. This would probably mean that the target date for NATO agreement on 1966 force goals would need to be deferred.

If you agree with this general approach, I will prepare a directive to Ambassador Finletter in this sense and you might also find it useful to discuss the approach with General Norstad in your forthcoming visit to Paris. I believe that this approach would be consistent with the general tenor of the President's remarks to Mr. Stikker during the latter's recent visit to Washington, at the meeting which representatives of both our Departments attended.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

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NLK for Germany

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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July 22, 1961

365

101

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: W. W. R.

SUBJECT: A High Noon Stance on Berlin.

We have now begun moving down the track of consulation with allies on Berlin. It is often said that we must put to them our own strong positions; if these are accepted -- well and good; if not, we may have to adjust our positions backward.

There is, evidently, a sense in which this is true. On the one hand, the unity of the allies is a factor on which Moscow has its attention carefully focussed. They will take any sign of disunity and disarray as a cause for pressing their position with increased confidence. On the other hand, we cannot move forward to a tough position -- if that should be required -- unless the German government and the French government -- at least -- stay with us. On both counts, allied unity matters: the maximum degree of allied unity is desirable; a minimum degree is essential.

But it may be useful -- at an early and relatively quiet stage of the enterprise -- to accept the possibility that -- if the crisis is not aborted -- we may have to stand strong -- relatively isolated -- as the crisis comes to a head. I would not expect our allies to order our bombers off their bases. But I would be prepared for overt disagreement within European countries on a tough policy: strikes; marches; protests; etc. And I would be prepared to have the allied governments exploring more passionately than ourselves a formula for settlement.

But we should not let their stance necessarily determine our own; nor should we regard such difference in behavior as surprising or a sign of incurable weakness; nor should we automatically dilute our position backward to theirs.

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There are two reasons why -- in degree -- we should prepare ourselves for what you might call a High Noon stance. (You recall Gary Cooper dealt with the bandits alone.)

First, it is on the United States -- its will and its power -- that the Russians will ultimately focus. We may have to pay something in the end for a degree of wilting on the part of our allies. But the final formula will be heavily determined by what we will take or not take. Although allied unity and American toughness will have to be carefully weighed, at each stage, the question of unity should not be automatically overriding. In short, to achieve the best possible net bargaining position for the West may require that we permit some opening between ourselves and our allies.

Second, we must remember that the position of our allies differs from ours in some important respects. We have the finger on the atomic trigger -- not they. It is one matter to face the possibility of atomic war, if your political leaders have their finger on the trigger: it is a quite different matter if someone else's leaders are in that position. Further, it may be that each nation has just so much stomach in it for facing war. The capacity of the Europeans for this kind of thing is -- and should be -- somewhat lower than ours, given the history of the last half century.

I may be quite wrong. It may be that the importance of Atlantic unity and the inescapable moral commitment to the West Berliners will see us all together, right down to the final test. (And, of course, the crisis may abort at a relatively early stage.) But I do believe we must be prepared in our minds for the possibility of a relatively lonely stage; and we should accept it without throwing our sheriff's badge in the dust when the crisis subsides.

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 87, JULY 24, 6 PM

ACTION BONN 73, DEPARTMENT 87, INFORMATION LONDON 44, PARIS 45, MOSCOW 42.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL AND FINN.

RE DEPTEL 172 BONN, 68 BERLIN.

DEPT'S ANALYSIS EAST GERMAN UNREST AND DILEMMA FACING SOVS AND US IS SIMILAR TO OURS. CERTAINLY IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO FOMENT FURTHER DETERIORATION CONDITIONS THERE AS LONG AS NO ANSWER CAN BE GIVEN TO AMB. DOWLING'S QUESTION AS TO WHAT WE WOULD DO IF EAST GERMANS ROSE IN REVOLT.

WITH REFERENCE TO OBSERVATION THAT SOVS FOR MOMENT SEEM TO BE TOLERATING LOSS OF REFUGEES WHILE PRESSING TOWARD DECISION ON BERLIN, I THINK THIS RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE EXAMINED VERY CLOSELY. PROSPECT OF INTOLERABLE LOSS OF REFUGEES AND/OR FEARS OF INCIPIENT REVOLT MIGHT WELL LEAD KHRUSHCHEV TO CEASE PRESSING TOWARD BERLIN DECISION. IF HE COMES TO REALIZE EXTENT TO WHICH THREAT OF SEPARATE GDR PEACE TREATY WITH ATTENDANT CLOSING OF ESCAPE ROUTE IS MAJOR CAUSE OF EXODUS AND UNREST, WITH ECONOMIC CAUSES SECONDARY, HE WOULD IN OUR OPINION BE MORE LIKELY TO HOLD BACK RATHER THAN TO PRECIPITATE SHOWDOWN. KHRUSHCHEV WOULD ALSO HAVE TO WEIGH WHAT REACTION EAST GERMAN POPULATION WOULD BE IF SUCH TREATY BECAME REALITY,-NOT MERE THREAT. IN SHORT IT IS POSSIBLE WE MAY HAVE HERE ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT DETERRENTS TO SOV ACTION ON BERLIN, IN WHICH CASE SITUATION PERHAPS CALLS FOR SOMETHING MORE THAN "OUR HELPING ADVERTISE FACTS TO WORLD."

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BETWEEN EXTREMES OF AIDING AND ABETTING UNREST IN EAST GERMANY AND OF ADVERTISING FACTS TO WORLD THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF TAKING CERTAIN QUIET BUT EFFECTIVE STEPS TO EXPLOIT EXISTING CONDITIONS IN THE ZONE WITH OBJECT OF INTENSIFYING DOUBTS AND FEARS OF SOV LEADERS. THIS OF COURSE OPENS UP WIDE FIELD OF IMAGINATIVE, SUBTLE, OVERT, COVERT POSSIBILITIES. FOR EXAMPLE CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO USING DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN INFORMAL WAY TO POINT OUT DIRECTLY, OR THROUGH THIRD PARTIES, TO SOV OFFICIALS THAT US IS MORE AND MORE CONCERNED LEST SOV/GDR PEACE TREATY SPARK REVOLT OF EAST GERMANS WHICH COULD BE DANGEROUS TO WORLD PEACE. MIGHT EVEN GO SO FAR AS TO DROP HINT THAT IN THAT EVENT NO ASSURANCE US FORCES THIS TIME COULD AFFORD TO REMAIN ON SIDELINES. MIGHT MENTION SOMETHING BRANDT TOLD COMMANDANTS JULY 21: THAT IT WAS BY NO MEANS IMPOSSIBLE FOUR MILLION EAST GERMANS MIGHT FLEE TO WEST BEFORE END OF YEAR IF THEY BELIEVED SEPARATE GDR PEACE TREATY WAS IMMINENT. WHAT HAPPENS AFTERWARDS TO POPULATION WHICH NO LONGER HAS EASY ESCAPE ROUTE THROUGH WEST BERLIN IS UNPREDICTABLE BUT WHOLE THING IS DANGEROUS TINDERBOX CAUSED SOLELY BY SOV INSISTENCE ON UNILATERAL SOLUTION.

IN THIS CONNECTION CONSIDERATION MIGHT ALSO BE GIVEN TO REMINDING SOVS THROUGH INFORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS OF OUR RESTRAINT WITH RESPECT TO THE REFUGEES; FACT THAT NEITHER WEST GERMANS NOR ALLIES HAVE EVER URGED EAST GERMANS TO FLEE TO THE WEST; ON CONTRARY POLICY HAS BEEN ONE OF DISCOURAGEMENT, AND EVEN AT PRESENT TIME POLICY IS TO REFRAIN FROM ANYTHING THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS URGING ANYONE TO COME WEST. AT APPROPRIATE TIME MIGHT BE USEFUL DROP HINTS WE COULD EASILY CHANGE THIS POLICY WHICH COULD OVERNIGHT DRASTICALLY WORSEN INTERNAL GDR SITUATION.

POINT COULD ALSO BE MADE THAT UNSATISFACTORY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN EAST ZONE ARE OBVIOUSLY RESULT OF SOVIET POLICIES AND ACTIONS, IN PARTICULAR SOVIET RELIANCE ON INCOMPETENT EAST GERMAN STALINIST-ERA HOLDOVERS AND THAT SOVS SHOULD

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REALIZE IT IS NEITHER IN THEIR INTEREST NOR OURS THAT SITUATION IN EAST GERMANY BE PERMITTED TO DETERIORATE TO POINT OF INTERNAL DISORDERS THAT COULD LEAD TO UPRISING SIMILAR TO 1953 OR TO HUNGARIAN REVOLT OF 1956.

LIGHTNER

MEM

NLK, NSF

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(367)

EXEMPT
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July 25, 1961

Meeting of the Interdepartmental Steering Group, Office of the Secretary of State, Monday, July 24, 1961, 11:00 a.m.

The Secretary of State opened the meeting by describing the Aide Memoire received from the British Government with respect to the balance of payment difficulties of the United Kingdom. Because of these difficulties, the British say they will be required to withdraw some troops from the Continent in the Fiscal Year beginning in April, unless new arrangements can be made for cooperative handling of the foreign exchange problems of NATO defense. Because of the immediate threat to Berlin, there will be no reduction of English forces before April, even in the absence of such arrangements.

Under Secretary Fowler felt it important that the President and other leading Americans be prepared to react by saying that this is not an unnatural position and indeed one to be expected. We might add that the British emphasis -- upon new cooperative methods of procurement, upon joint use of facilities, and upon the need for a common plan -- corresponds closely to our own view of what is needed.

The Secretary of State noted that the new United Kingdom division which is needed under our military proposal can perfectly well be raised and trained in the United Kingdom, from our standpoint.

The Secretary of State indicated his view that the British position derived from studies under Selwyn Lloyd which aimed at the balance of payments problem, and was not developed in response to our proposals for strengthening NATO forces in Europe. Yet it was a fact that they had our proposals before they finally approved and dispatched their Aide Memoire.

Secretary Rusk read Prime Minister Macmillan's letter to the President and noted that his ideas about negotiation gave us no difficulty since, in our own judgment, it also would be important to be in touch with the USSR for serious conversations considerably before a peace treaty became a fact. On Civil Defense, there was uncertainty about the real difference between the British position and our own, and it was agreed that the matter should be reviewed with Yarmolinsky of Defense (later in the day Mr. Yarmolinsky provided very useful information and comment for use in the President's speech).

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The Secretary of State then reported on the situation in Biserte. It could not be worse. Neither side had consulted us. It blew up from Bourguiba's pressure on the French, pressure which had made the French bull-necked. The shooting had started overnight and we were caught in the middle. At present we are getting considerable strains from both parties. The Tunisians wish the United States to return 3100 troops from the Congo to Tunisia. We shall certainly have to return such troops in some numbers, though we have been delaying a flat response. Yet if we had to make a flat 100% choice, we would choose France. Bourguiba, Jr., called this morning to say flatly that the Tunisians would take help wherever they could get it. The French have not consulted us at any point, nor have they made clear their real intentions or purposes. They are not in Biserte by clear treaty right, but rather under an exchange of letters which leaves the international position unclear. We have indicated to the French that we have decided in principle to undertake the plane lift, but the reaction was so cool that it may be necessary to make further representations.

Later in the morning, the matter was discussed with the President, and at his direction the Department of State is undertaking special examination of the possibility of handling the airlift by civilian planes, from both the U. S. and other Western countries, with U. S. financial support arranged through the United Nations. (The President believes that the U. S. must help to get the Tunisian troops back from the Congo, but he would prefer to do it in company with other nations and in civilian aircraft, if possible.)

In response to questions from the Attorney General, Mr. Murrow stated that he was undertaking the coordination of propaganda activities and would prepare a report showing the quantities of information that were being made available on the Berlin matter through various media.

McGeorge Bundy

Copy to:

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
Director of Central Intelligence
Director, USIA
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Taylor
Mr. Sorensen

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S/O: JToppings 8/1/61
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 4 pages
No. 1 of

Memorandum of Conversation

(104)

DATE: July 25, 1961 (365)

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin.

PARTICIPANTS:

White House:	Mr. Owen	USIA:	Mr. Phillips	
Defense:	Mr. Nitze	State:	Mr. Johnson	
	Gen. Gray		Mr. Achilles	
	Col. Armstrong		Mr. Kohler	
	Mr. Rowan		Mr. Hillenbrand	
Treasury:	Mr. Sullivan		Mr. Ausland	
	Mr. Fowler		Mr. Brandin	
			Mr. Cash	Mr. Stern
CIA:	Mr. Amory		Mr. Day	Mr. Topping
	Mr. Karlow		Mr. Chayes	Mr. Mautner
	Mr. Stewart		Mr. Tubby	
	Mr. Eisenstadt		Mr. Vigderman	

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Mr. Kohler said that the meeting was called in anticipation of the Paris meetings of the Working Group and the Foreign Ministers, and to line up the back-stopping operations in Washington. He pointed out that two meetings on the Berlin problem had been held since the ICG had last met -- that of the NSC on July 19 and the meeting with the representatives of the Embassies of Great Britain, France and Germany held by the Secretary on July 21. These would be followed by the President's statement on television and radio that night, which our Ambassadors would promptly deliver to the Government to which they were accredited, and which would be given strong play by USIS.

Mr. Kohler expected to be in Paris from July 28 until about August 12, after the Foreign Ministers Meeting. He hoped it would be possible to push through a series of reviews of the Berlin contingency planning. The French would prepare the formal agenda for the meetings, but he would undertake to have them cover the following points:

1. Political and negotiating steps;
2. Consideration of the military situation, and possible military actions;
3. Non-military counter measures;
4. Reviews of the basic Berlin contingency plan;
5. Consideration

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5. Consideration of a new military paper, involving the Live Oak project; and

6. Reviews of the proposed propaganda campaign.

Mr. Kohler said that the British, French and Germans had been given copies of the "Memorandum on Berlin" dated July 21, and suggested that all members of the ICG read it.

Mr. Kohler pointed out that all of the work the Working Group does in Paris will be on an ad referendum basis, which meant that if papers were to be finalized there would be a considerable volume of telegraphic traffic with the Department. During his absence, he hoped that Mr. Johnson would chair the Group, and that Mr. Davis would cover for EUR. He felt that communications originating from our delegation in Paris would become heavy about Monday, July 31, and that some of the members of the ICG might move into available quarters in S/O, including particularly representatives of the Department of Defense (Col. Moody), the Treasury Department (Mr. Sullivan) and possibly someone from the Department of Commerce, though this latter would have to be investigated further. There should also be representatives of EUR.

The question was raised whether the Government of West Germany would be represented in the Working Group in Paris. Mr. Kohler said that both the United States and Great Britain hoped so, and had so advised the French Government. The Germans would be prepared to attend. However, the final decision and invitation was up to the French. He hoped that this could be resolved favorably during the first working day that the Group met.

General Gray and Mr. Witze explained that General Norstad had recently sent in a request to augment the space assigned to the Live Oaks Staff, so that it could have an operational as well as a planning capability, including both British and French representatives. The JCS had notified him of its approval, and it was understood that the British had probably also approved the proposal. It was agreed that steps would be taken to determine whether the British, and the French, have actualy agreed.

The meeting discussed the possiblity of German inclusion in Live Oak. It was noted that the establishment of a German liaison office had been approved. Mr. Kohler said that the British had approved the proposal in London, and that it would be necessary to check with the French to determine their decision. This led to the question of extent of Live Oak responsibility, that is, whether it extended only to the handling of an initial probe or went beyond that point. Members of the Group were of the opinion that the initial instructions for Live Oak mentioned a probe, and also included general wording about measures to reestre access to Berlin. There was a

problem

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problem arising from the difficulty of determining precisely when the operation changed from Live Oak to NATO responsibility. It was noted that the Germans want to participate in the Live Oak planning. It was agreed that the problem would probably arise in the Working Group next week. Live Oak is a tripartite exercise, with forces from other NATO members not involved in the probe. Under present troop dispositions in Western Germany, no forces other than those of nations involved in Live Oak were stationed in the area from which the probe would be mounted.

The meeting discussed what papers the American delegation should have available in Paris. The British and French would have the existing mutually agreed papers, or ones worked out together with them. We should make sure that when talking with them we are talking about agreed and not about internal United States papers. Mr. Hillenbrand said that the existing papers are covered in the BerCon series. It was agreed that those members of the Group having copies should take them along. They should also bring their copies of the "Memorandum on Berlin", and the paper tabled by the British on the information program, copies of which would be distributed.

Mr. Fowler raised the question of study of the effects of economic counter-measures on our allies. Mr. Kohler was of the opinion that to this date this was an internal American exercise, and will have to be handled in Washington. He added that the question of balance of payments considerations, both military and otherwise, would have to be looked into. Mr. Fowler said that the problem has been discussed periodically during the last several months at the OECD level with our allies, and that, depending on the results of the Paris meeting, it might have to be changed to an ad hoc basis. Consideration would also have to be given to the problems of alternative sources of supply and of panic buying. There was some discussion of the British financial problems, and of their desires in that connection. Mr. Hitze said he understood that they covered two general categories: (1) weapons systems development problems; and (2) what we can get the Germans to do to increase procurement in Britain. Mr. Owen mentioned the British desire for German help in connection with the expenses of the British military in Germany. Mr. Hillenbrand said it would be helpful to get some idea of the total amount the Germans will be expected to pay in connection with military build-up in West Germany. Mr. Hitze suggested agreement on a principle that we will not let financial troubles interfere with political and military action, and will try to avoid letting third parties obtain benefits from resultant movements of international capital.

Mr. Hitze said that a fundamental question was what kind of directive this Group should recommend their Ministers give their military. It was agreed that this was a difficult matter, because of the confused and

overlapping

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overlapping responsibilities and interests of the various tripartite, quadripartite and NATO groupings. General Norstad would be in Control of the Live Oak probe, but at some point this might shift into a NATO operation and the question would then arise as to whom he was responsible. This might be something in the nature of an executive committee of the Heads of State of the member nations of NATO. The Group cannot decide the matter, which is one of high policy, but it was agreed that the matter will come up during the course of the discussions in Paris.

S/S - 2 - 1-2
EUR - 1 - 3
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G - 1 - 6
S/O - 2 - 7-8
L/EUR - 1 - 9
I - 1 - 10
- 2 - 11-12

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

105

31 July 1961

Dear Dean:

I know that you are assembling many thoughts on Berlin negotiations. I attach one approach for what it is worth based on three premises:

a. Our "rights" in Berlin are of no real value in themselves. We would like to get rid of them if an honorable way were found.

b. On the other hand, the safety of West Berlin is vital to us and to fulfill our commitment we should be prepared to risk war.

c. However, our position on Germany and West Berlin should be no tougher than that of the West Germans.

If these premises are correct, why not let the West Germans do our negotiating for us, feeling that we can probably accept any settlement which they will indorse? We would lose nothing if we disposed of our "rights" under conditions where the safety of West Berlin were amply protected.

Max
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

SECRET

(2)

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The U.S. encourages the formation of a Mixed German Committee representing West Germany, West Berlin and East Germany for the purpose of developing proposals for the settlement of the German and the Berlin questions. These representatives are authorized to assume for the purpose of their discussions that the U.S., U.K. and France would undertake to transfer their rights in Berlin to the West German government and that the USSR would do likewise in transferring its Berlin rights to the East German government. Thus, the conferees will have new assets for negotiation and will be unimpeded by agreements arising out of the termination of the war in working out new proposals for Germany and Berlin.

All four powers would reserve the right to give approval to any ultimate arrangement affecting their rights in Germany and in Berlin. While these negotiations were in progress, there would be no change in current Allied rights of access and presence in Berlin.

Enclosure

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NLK, NSF 68 Ger/Berlin Steering Grp

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

106

2 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Today's Meeting with the Berlin Steering Group.

1. In the meeting with the Berlin Steering Group today I would suggest discussion of the following points which, to my knowledge, have not been definitely decided:

a. What should be the planned Allied reaction to an interruption of access to Berlin which affects only Allied traffic and not German civilian traffic? In other words, if the challenge is only to Allied rights and does not endanger the safety and well-being of West Berlin, is there any distinction to be made between this situation and one approximating a 1948-type blockade?

b. Under what conditions will a ground probe be used? Will consideration of an airlift precede or follow the result of a probe?

c. If we are reasonably sure that the East Germans will use force to bar Allied entry into Berlin, should we go at once to a garrison airlift or risk the defeat of a ground probe first?

d. At what point in our reactions would we want West German participation?

2. In partial response to these questions I would be inclined to take the following position:

a. There is a definite difference in the stakes involved between interference only with Allied traffic and a clear threat to West Berlin itself. Since the stakes are much higher in the latter case, so are the risks which we are justified in taking. The safety and freedom of West Berlin are, in my judgment, worth risking a war, whereas quadripartite rights are worth tough negotiating and non-military reprisals -- but short of war.

b. The purpose of a ground probe is to establish that we are not yielding our rights to bluff. I, therefore, feel that we should

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risk having the ground probe repulsed before we go to a garrison airlift. I can see no justification for a civilian airlift until a more serious effort has been made on the ground to get through to Berlin. The garrison airlift would be so insignificant that, as a means for circumventing harassment to Allied traffic, it could be invoked relatively quietly.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

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SECRET (107)

August 4, 1961

371

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Paris's Embtel 531 of July 30, 1961 (copy attached)

I do not think well of the idea put forth by Foy Kohler in a conversation with Carstens that the access problem could be solved by declaring the East Germans Soviet agents and the West Germans Western agents and have them settle all access procedures to Berlin, including military access. My reasons are as follows:

(1) I do not think we should place the Germans into the first line of confrontation over military access procedures. They do not possess appropriate sanctions if negotiations fail, or if they seek to apply pressure it will make a show-down appear as provoked by Germans;

(2) It would greatly weaken, in advance of any negotiation, the legal basis of four-power responsibility;

(3) It would undercut the Federal Republic's views on German unity and on an issue where even Soviet acceptance of the procedural problem will yield only marginal advantages;

(4) It is bad propaganda, whether refused or accepted. If refused, Communists will claim that West Germans have proved that they are not sovereign by acting as our agents. If accepted, we have gone far towards legitimizing the Communist case on Berlin; and

(5) I would hold this view even if we moved in the direction of Karl Kaysen's approach on Germany.

Henry Kissinger

Attachment:
Subject telegram from Paris.

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Berlin (Memos to Pres. file)

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

National Defense University

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 10, 1961

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

General Taylor
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Owen

Re: Berlin Plans

I hope that this afternoon we can have a careful talk on Berlin Political planning, from the point of view of the President's own needs in the next few weeks. I suggest the following order of discussion:

1. In what respects do any of us have major reservations about the argument of the Acheson memorandum? In particular, do any of us believe that the President should examine further

a. a very different opening position: a Peace Conference, a new European Security Plan, a new status of Berlin as an international city; or other?

b. a very different closing position: direct exchange of guarantees with the D. D. R; some form of internationalisation of West Berlin; acceptance -- in word or deed -- of lasting division of Germany; signature of parallel peace treaties; or other?

2. What are the most effective ways of arranging study and argument for President on any such major departures from the Acheson line?

3. Within any agreed U. S. position, what is the proper plan of diplomatic efforts to ensure maximum Western unity. How do we keep in unison with the Germans, particularly, on changes from this preferred position?

4. What other comments or suggestions do any of us wish to put forward for discussion or action?

McGeorge Bundy

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NLK NSF 322 Staff memos McGeorge Bundy SECRET

(109)

August 11, 1961

RECORD OF MEETING

SUBJECT: Berlin

Present: General Taylor, Messrs. Bundy, Rostow, Kissinger and Ormsby-Gore

1. It was agreed that the following possibilities, not discussed in the Acheson report, needed further study:

(a) A new juriedictional status for West Berlin, involving guarantees by the Four Powers and perhaps by the UN, with the West Berlin Senat selecting UN members from which forces could be stationed in the city. A UN presence of some kind might be added on. Some international control of the access routes might be sought as an opening position. West Berlin would be free to develop economic and social ties with any nation but not to become a political part of West Germany.

(b) Parallel peace treaties with West and East Germany, to be signed by the Western powers and the Communist powers, respectively. These peace treaties would have identical clauses regarding Berlin, the process by which unification was to be sought, and European security arrangements. We might search for alternative label to peace treaty; or we might appropriate the term for our own purposes.

(c) A Western willingness to discuss the modalities of access on a technical level with the East Germans, after East German recognition of the Western right of access.

(d) Opening Western positions which would come as something of a shock to the Soviets and might help to persuade them that crisis-mongering can be counter-productive. Two examples were cited: A Western intention to sign a peace treaty with West Germany, as the heir to the Third Reich, which would legally extend the Federal Republic's writ throughout Germany; a Western proposal for immediate self-determination in East Germany, even before political ties had been formed between East and West Germany which involved more than a loose confederal relation.

(e) "Openings to the West" which might create new horizons of Atlantic and European cooperation for the Germans, to compensate for any frustration of their Eastward aspirations which they felt as a result of a Berlin/German settlement.

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Also in Taylor papers Box 38 Gen. Conference Items?

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In studying (a) - (c) above, consideration should be given to the effect on Western security of merely making these proposals, whether or not they were accepted.

2. Other possibilities were discussed and discarded, notably placing Berlin under some form of UN jurisdiction, e.g., making it a "world city" which would bear the same relation to the UN as the District of Columbia bears to the US.

3. It was agreed that changes in the existing Western position, such as those proposed by Mr. Acheson or indicated above, would require a deep-going and candid dialogue with the West German government, designed both to reflect our confidence in its reliability and its attractive power and to lay out the opportunities and prospects confronting that government in broad historical perspective. The success or failure of the enterprise would hinge on the skill and understanding with which this dialogue was mounted. The means of approach to the Chancellor was of critical importance.

4. It was agreed that the machinery for study of most of the possibilities listed under 1 above, existed in the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin and Germany, presided over by the Secretary of State and Foy Kohler at their respective levels.

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August 11, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WWR

You asked me to raise the following question with Chip Bohlen: Would he judge it helpful for Harriman to tell the Russians in Geneva that we would hope for an early settlement of the Laos matter to help clear the way for the Berlin negotiation?

Chip has now returned from Paris and his judgment is the following: He does not believe that such a comment from Harriman is likely to affect the Berlin problem significantly one way or the other. It might lead to expectations in Moscow of an early diplomatic proposal from the West, which, in view of the Paris discussions, may take more time to shape up than we would like.

His conclusion was that it would do no harm to give Harriman a general instruction to make this noise if he felt it was useful and appropriate; but nothing much was likely to come of it.

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Papers of Pres. Kennedy
NSF : Countries
Laos General
8/4/61 - 8/10/61

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

(111) NLK, NSF, Kissinger 378 1

August 11, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Acheson Memorandum

1. I would like to explain what I had in mind when I suggested that more options be placed before the President. I agree that the President cannot possibly be asked to consider the pros and cons of every single negotiating position. He might, however, wish to consider the various over-all options and then choose among them. For example, I would consider the Acheson paper a modified version of the status quo. This is not undesirable, it may indeed be the best solution. It might help the President, however, if the assumptions were made more explicit and if alternative strategies were presented. For example, it is conceivable to analyze the pros and cons of the option represented roughly by the views of Carl Kaysen or Abe Chayes. Similarly, it might be useful to explore the pros and cons of a more offensive approach. Once the President has selected a general course, it should not be too hard to frame proposals consistent with it.

2. One way of arriving at this choice might be to consider explicitly just what we are after in Central Europe. What would we envisage Europe to be like in say 1965 on the assumption of various courses of action?

3. In analyzing the various possibilities, it may be useful to consider the consequences not only of the success of a given course of action but also the impact of <u>making</u> a given proposal, whether or not it is accepted.

4. If the Acheson paper becomes the basic policy, a more detailed study of its various features becomes important. Items which require more careful consideration in addition to those discussed yesterday include:

European security schemes.
The details of the arrangements on Berlin. (Some of the phraseology at the bottom of page 8 referring to discouraging excessive movements of people seems to me dangerous, and some other clauses are vague.)

? Kissinger

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The nature and purpose of the Mixed German Committee. (I am doing a paper on that.)
The nature of the NATO command structure.
The military consequences of a failure of negotiations. (I remain extremely uneasy about that.)

Henry Kissinger

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TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

21

(112)

(376)

DATE: 11 August 1961

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: Berlin

The response to Secretary Rusk's proposals for increased military strength and political unity among NATO allies has been reassuring. There have been, however, apprehensions as to negotiations - more specifically, what is to be negotiated. Speak has been the principal exponent of the establishment of conditions and issues for negotiation. Rusk apparently has counselled flexibility on this point, perhaps because he also is not sure what should be negotiated.

Mr. Rusk has taken surprisingly strong positions in regard to the utilization of military forces. He has probably been motivated by Khrushchev's more recent pronouncements which have rendered negotiable issues somewhat obscure. Further, latitude in use of conventional military forces seems to become progressively limited. In fact if one accepts Khrushchev's threat to subject any Western probe to nuclear attack, the latitude is nonexistent in terms of time and space. The appointment of the very able and ruthless Marshal Koppev to command Russia's 22 division in East Germany is an additional measure designed to impress the West with Soviet capability and possible intentions.

There appears to be occurring, therefore, a change in concept and strategy. The idea of an engagement with conventional forces elicits from State the comment of distrust of a relatively insignificant military probe. This same comment has appeared in the press; it may be coincidental, or it may be the same voice speaking. Defense also tends to rule out the idea of a probe on the basis that the force, regardless of size, could easily be isolated by destroying bridges. The probe would then be immobilized to the embarrassment of the West, or it would have to limp or fight its way out to the delight of the East.

The essential elements of the US position at this point appear to be:

1. Attempt to avoid war and negotiate all issues reasonably negotiable (not defined so far).

2. If war is unavoidable, place the responsibility for starting war on the Communists.

3. Engage East German and Soviet forces with <u>significant</u> allied conventional forces before resorting to nuclear weapons.

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Memos to VP & Burris
Jan 61 - June 62

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Since the idea and possible use of probe action are discounted, the resort to airlift offers certain possibilities, particularly in regard to item 2, above. During an airlift the case of initial communist aggression can more easily be made. Defense is prepared to initiate an airlift even though the conditions will be much more difficult than in 1948.

One of the most significant developments in the Berlin issue is the refugee problem. Its magnitude has compelled the East Germans to initiate controls, but reports reflect communist apprehension as to the effect of severely restrictive measures. The imminence of a crisis, which a peace treaty might precipitate, magnifies the measures which are being imposed. Therefore, there is the possibility that the refugee problem will precipitate an East German uprising before Khrushchev invokes his threats. The US must prepare to exploit such a situation and not to sit idly by as it did in Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956.

The West Berliners, who up until this point have appeared complacent and calm over the brewing storm, have begun to show unrest. They have expressed opposition to any damaging compromises and to the bargaining-away of any Western rights. One source reported that the origin of this feeling was the apparent British readiness to negotiate and make concessions. Finally, on 9 Aug, Willy Brandt reasserted the will of Berlin and called for an all-Berlin plebiscite. Such a call is untimely and surely Brandt realizes it. He simply reflects growing German uneasiness and proclivities.

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Rec'd: AUGUST 13, 1961
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1961 AUG 14 PM 7 26
OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 176, AUGUST 13, 11 AM

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT 176, BONN NIACT 150. INFORMATION PARIS PRIORITY 98, LONDON PRIORITY 92, MOSCOW PRIORITY 89, POLAD USAREUR PRIORITY 87

PASS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL AND FINN

EARLY MORNING AUG 13 EAST GERMAN REGIME INTRODUCED DRASTIC CONTROL MEASURES WHICH HAVE EFFECT OF PREVENTING ENTRY INTO WEST BERLIN OF SOVZONE AND EAST BERLIN RESIDENTS. THREE DECREES WERE ISSUED BY REGIME, ACCOMPANIED BY GDR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS RESOLOUTION BASING DECREES ON DECLARATION WARSAW PACT GOVERNMENTS WHICH REQUESTS THAT GDR TAKE SUCH ACTION. MISSION OBSERVERS ASCERTAINED EARLY MORNING HOURS SUN, AUG 13 THAT CONTROL MEASURES WERE BEING IMPLEMENTED.

EVIDENTLY AS A RESULT OF INCREASED REFUGEE FLOW WITH ATTENDANT ECONOMIC LOSS TO GDR AND PRESTIGE LOSS TO SOCIALIST CAMP, EAST DECIDED AT RECENT MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO PROCEED WITH FAIT ACCOMPLI WHICH WOULD DRASTICALLY DISRUPT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN BERLIN AND ERECT FRONTIER WITH RESPECT ENTRY INTO WEST BERLIN OF SOVZONE AND EAST BERLIN RESIDENTS. IN THIS WAY EAST HAS NOW TAKEN SOME OF THE STEPS WHICH IT HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED WOULD FOLLOW FROM SEPARATE PEACE TREATY WITH GDR.

SUMMARY OF DECREES CONTAINED NEXT FOLLOWING MESSAGE.

ASSUME DEPT HAS RECEIVED BERLIN "CRITIC CHANNEL" MESSAGES SENT EARLY THIS MORNING.

LIGHTNER

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Recategorized as Category "A" September 30, 1966 /s/ Warren A. Henderson

Downgraded To: [redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

EO 11652: XGDS 2 6 4

Authorized By: [illegible]

August 4, 1975

114

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August 14, 1961

Amembassy
Belgrade
Personal and eyes only for the Ambassador

Should you find a convenient and natural occasion for a wholly private and informal talk with your Soviet colleague, you might tell him that you know, from your recent discussions with senior American officials in Washington, that the United States Government is sincerely anxious to find a peaceful solution to the Berlin crisis and realizes that this must be one which takes account of the interests of all the various parties involved. Your Government hopes, you may add, that regular negotiations to this end may be undertaken in the fairly near future. It is possible, however, that preparations for such negotiations might be facilitated if facilities existed for occasional purely informal and exploratory exchanges of views between the two governments on some of the problems involved. You would, you may say, be available for such discussions to him or to anyone else whom the Soviet government might wish to designate for this purpose. You should make it clear that you would not be able, in such discussions, to commit the United States Government or any of its allies or associates in any way, nor would you expect any such commitment on the Soviet side; anything of this sort would have to await regular and formal negotiations. You might add, however, that you are taking this step with the knowledge of your government, and that if such exchanges should take place, you would be in touch with your government and would not be speaking irresponsibly.

(1)

You should stress that the value of such discussions would be dependent on the observation of strictest secrecy; should the Soviet side not agree that the talks should be handled on this principle, then, you may say, it would be better not to pursue them at all.

Rusk

We

no drafting office

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762.00/8-1461

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We feel that you should go no further than this on the first occasion. Should your colleague say that he is already empowered to hear anything you have to say along this line, you should request that he nevertheless first apprise his government of what you have told him, and say that you would prefer to await his government's reaction before getting down to any matters of substance.

Should he inquire whether any of the allies of the United States have knowledge of the suggestion you are making, you may say that they do not, and that while the United States will of course be guided, in its dealings with its allies, by whatever enlightenment as to the Soviet viewpoint it may derive from these informal exchanges, it does not intend that any other government shall be apprised specifically of the fact that such talks are occurring. In particular, it is not intended that the Germans shall have any knowledge of them.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

13021

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 70

August 15, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

In relation to the Berlin situation, I should appreciate a report on how we are progressing in obtaining commitments from our NATO allies to increase their military forces.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Sir:

EUR has already initiated action on this subject.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

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USMISSION BERLIN PRIORITY 128

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Reference Tel Moscow Action 441.

Following based on uncleared memorandum. Further on quadripartite meeting this morning.

Kohler said Foreign Ministers had assigned three priority tasks to quadripartite group: (1) revision and agreement on contingency planning; (2) clarification of relationship between Live Oak operations and NATO, with suitable agreed instructions to General Norstad; and (3) reply to Soviet notes August 7. Added that NATO representatives working on two additional subjects: (1) NATO military build-up; and (2) possible economic countermeasures by NATO members.

Meeting next considered reply to Soviet Notes. Kohler said agreed in Paris should be negotiations with USSR in advance of any unilateral Soviet action to alter status of Berlin, but question of nature and timing any Western initiative left open. He added that Secretary had

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put forward, not as an agreed American position but as a proposal for discussion, a formula for negotiations in our reply to the Soviet Notes, which would call for negotiations and suggest that Foreign Ministers might undertake to reach agreement on location and timing when in New York in September to attend UNGA. Developments of past weekend in Berlin have put us in a position where if we desire we can say in our reply that Soviets have created conditions in Central Europe of unstability and danger, and in effect demand conferences on our terms. USSR would almost certainly reject this proposal, but the initiative would then be in our hands. Ambassador Caccia said that we have two advantages: (1) Khrushchev's actions have created an emergency and we can call him to account; and (2) he has taken an illegal action. Ambassador Grewe reported his Government feels that there might be some advantage to taking an early initiative, and that an offer of negotiations might delay further undesired Soviet actions. Bonn's main concern, however, was question of what we intend to negotiate.

Kohler pointed out that there had been agreement in Paris that basically our negotiating position could not vary much from that of 1959. He felt that the quadripartite group should avoid too much discussion of details. He pointed out that if we move on the heels of the recent actions in Berlin, we would have to call for immediate negotiations, while the concept put forward by the Secretary would propose negotiations at this time, but leave actual negotiations for later agreement. Caccia felt that delay in a proposal for negotiations might lead Khrushchev to feel that he had been successful

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successful with recent actions in Berlin,. and could safely "take another piece of salami". It was noted that an immediate proposal for negotiations on basis developments East Germany and Berlin would expand the agenda of any conference, in useful way. French emphasized that it would have to be done extremely fast. Kohler said that we would try to draft along the lines of both concepts, but hoped that by Friday noon Group could be in possession of views of their Governments on the matter. Delicacy of subject, and need for exceptionally tight security concerning both discussions and decisions, was emphasized.

Group then considered relationship between Live Oak and NATO. Kohler and Hitze pointed out that paper tabled in Paris by American delegation was proposal, not an agreed American position, and now being reworked. It had been agreed that the proposal would be discussed in the various capitals, and Embassies of other nations in Washington strengthened by addition suitable military experts. British had no information concerning strengthening, German experts were already on the scene, and French said they would undertake to have their man arrive coming weekend. The British inquired whether we had General Norstad's views. Hitze recounted conference at which Norstad had felt that instructions could be simpler and shorter than those in the proposed since his standing instructions covered some of the questions raised.

[redacted]

Group agreed a draft should be prepared, and then senior military representatives including General Norstad called to Washington for final discussions and approval. Drafting sub-group was established, under Chairmanship of Hitze.

Kohler

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Kohler understood instructions to quadripartite group were to develop a list of economic countermeasures to be progressively applied. French Foreign Minister had felt that this list should high-light decisions which would have to be taken at various stages. Treasury Undersecretary Fowler will head the drafting sub-group on this subject. British were adequately staffed, the French were not, and the Germans had to look into the matter further. It was agreed group would begin work Monday August 21. Other groups will begin work immediately.

Ambassador Grewe then put forward views of German Government concerning economic responses to Soviet-East German actions affecting access to Berlin. If both civil and military traffic were blocked, there should be an economic embargo on trade with the Soviet Bloc. If only civil traffic were halted, West Germany would stop intersonal trade and would expect its Allies to take parallel action affecting East Germany. If military traffic were stopped, there might possibly be an embargo against the whole Bloc. But intersonal trade would not be interrupted. German Government has some doubts about continuing intersonal trade in such case, and would like to discuss further. Fourth contingency was signature of peace treaty between USSR and GDR without interruption of German... German Government would consider stoppage of intersonal trade, because they feel that signature is of basic importance to them. Stoppage of trade would not restore previous situation, and the Germans wondered if Allies would plan any other action. Kohler said the U.S. would have difficulty in accepting idea of cutting off trade in response to signing of treaty, particularly since

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since it has been agreed that signing of X treaty would not be casus belli, while stoppage of trade would unavoidably lead to actions affecting access to Berlin, which is regarded as casus belli. Ambassador Crowe said that this was not a governmental position, but rather thoughts for discussion, to be considered in context of possible actions to take including those involving Eastern Europe. He agreed to provide copies of a paper on the subject.

The group agreed that information and propaganda activities at this time were of the utmost importance, and should be energetically pursued. Information groups established under Wilson USIA.

Rusk
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PARIS FOR USRO AND STOESSEL

In addition to ideas discussed at Quadripartite Meeting yesterday of strengthening Allied garrisons in Berlin and increasing patrols in East Berlin, suggestion has been made Berliners would be reassured by appropriate deployments of forces in proximity Western Sector borders. Request assessment all three ideas.

Rusk (Col)

RUSK

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JCS to NORSTAD Paris

Berlin - Live Oak 1961 thru 30 Aug (3)

TOP SECRET

(118)

FROM: GENERAL LEMNITZER, WASHINGTON 16 AUGUST 61

TO : GENERAL NORSTAD, PARIS

1. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS THE 3-PHASED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE BERLIN CRISIS, WHICH YOU GAVE HIM ON 24 JULY. ALSO HE IS AWARE OF OUR MEMO TO COMMANDERS DATED 12 APRIL, ENTITLED UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR BERLIN, AND OF THE REVISED INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPANDED LIVE OAK PLANNING WHICH THE AMBASSADORIAL GROUP WILL PREPARE AND ISSUE TO YOU AS A RESULT OF THE PARIS MEETING.

2. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, HE HAS DIRECTED THE JCS TO REQUEST YOU TO COMMENCE MORE DETAILED PLANNING ON A UNILATERAL U.S. BASIS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY. THE PURPOSE IS TO PLAN TO APPLY NON-NUCLEAR MILITARY POWER ON A LARGER SCALE THAN HERETOFORE ENVISAGED IN ORDER TO INDUCE THE COMMUNISTS TO REOPEN ACCESS TO BERLIN. HE DESIRES THAT PLANS BE PREPARED FOR NON-NUCLEAR OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE:

A. GROUND ACTION, SUPPORTED BY AIR, OF A CORPS OR LARGER UNIT;

B. NON-NUCLEAR TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS, AND

C. MARITIME MILITARY OPERATIONS.

3. HE ALSO DESIRES THAT PLANS FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

(2)

TOP SECRET

16 Aug 61

41

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INCLUDE PROVISION FOR:

A. DEMONSTRATIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON A VERY LIMITED SCALE.

B. LIMITED USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS INCLUDING RESPONSE TO A LARGE-SCALE TANK ATTACK, AND

C. LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR.

4. ACCORDINGLY, I AM HAVING DRAFTED A PLANNING DIRECTIVE TO YOU AND OTHER U.S. COMMANDERS WHICH I SHALL SUBMIT TO THE JCS. IT IS MY FEELING THAT THE JCS SHOULD PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE THAN HAS HERETOFORE BEEN ISSUED. YOU WILL BE REQUESTED TO ASSESS THE RISKS INVOLVED IN EACH COURSE OF ACTION TOGETHER WITH THE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT NECESSARY.

5. MEANWHILE, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL VIEWS AS TO THE SPECIFICS THE JCS SHOULD INCLUDE IN THEIR PLANNING GUIDANCE. WHEN YOU HAVE RECEIVED THE JCS DIRECTIVE I WOULD APPRECIATE AN ESTIMATE OF HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE YOU TO DEVELOP THESE PLANS.

SCP 3 [redacted]

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Control: 11795
Rec'd: AUGUST 16, 1961
3:18 PM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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OFFICE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
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119

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 701, AUGUST 16, 4 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 701, INFORMATION PARIS 142, BONN 43, BERLIN 17, MOSCOW 28.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY USRO AND STOESSEL

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 747

IN CONSIDERING WHAT ACTION WE SHOULD TAKE IN PRESENT BERLIN CRISIS, I FEEL WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE AS FUNDAMENTAL POINT THAT WHILE GDR BEHAVIOR IS BRUTAL, INFLAMMATORY, AND IN VIOLATION OF BERLIN AGREEMENTS, IT HAS NOT YET VITALLY AFFECTED WEST'S POSITION IN BERLIN OR SECURITY OF WEST BERLINERS. AS SOME HAVE SUGGESTED, IT MAY BE IN NATURE OF PROBE OF WEST'S WILL AND NERVE, AND IF NOT VIGOROUSLY COUNTERED, COULD LEAD TO FURTHER ENCROACHMENTS. I TEND, HOWEVER, TO SHARE AMBASSADOR DOWLING'S VIEW THAT PRINCIPAL MOTIVE FOR GDR ACTION WAS DESIRE TO STEM REFUGEE FLOW, AND DOUBT IF OTHER MOVES AGAINST ACCESS ARE SCHEDULED FOR EARLY IMPLEMENTATION.

IF THIS ANALYSIS IS CORRECT, I FEEL WE SHOULD RESIST PRESSURES FOR EXTREME COUNTERMEASURES AS DEMONSTRATION OF SYMPATHY FOR PLIGHT OF EAST GERMANS. WE CAN SHOW SYMPATHY IN OTHER WAYS, FOR EXAMPLE, THROUGH VIGOROUS PROTESTS AND FULLEST PROPAGANDA EXPLOITATION OF THE INHUMANITY AND ILLEGALITY OF SOVBLOC ACTIONS.

WHILE WE MUST NOT BY OUR ACTIONS ENCOURAGE SOVIETS TO DOUBT OUR FIRMNESS OF PURPOSE OR GERMANS TO DESPAIR OF IT, WE

762.00/8-1651

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IT, WE CANNOT AFFORD TO EXPEND OUR MEAGER STORE OF COUNTERMEASURES PREMATURELY, NOR SHOULD WE TAKE STEPS WHICH MIGHT BRING ABOUT REPRISALS AGAINST OUR ACCESS OR ENCOURAGE A POPULAR REVOLT -- DEVELOPMENTS WHICH I ASSUME ARE IN OUR INTEREST TO AVOID.

LOOKING AT THE MEASURES MENTIONED IN DEPTEL 747 WITH THIS FRAMEWORK, I FEEL THAT MOST ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO PRESENT SITUATION. THEY ARE EITHER TOO EXTREME (E.G. TRADE EMBARGO), NOT SUFFICIENTLY RELEVANT (E.G. SCRAPPING OF CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND US-SOV AIR AGREEMENT), LIKELY TO EVOKE UNDESIRABLE COUNTER-ACTION (E.G. TTD BAN) OR INCAPABLE OF BEING APPLIED UNIVERSALLY (E.G. LEIPZIG FAIR BOYCOTT, BAN ON WESTERN TRAVEL TO GDR).

A WESTERN INITIATIVE CONFINED TO PROTEST WILL NOT OF COURSE SATISFY THOSE WHO CLAMOR FOR BOLDER ACTION. PROTEST DEVICE IS NOW ADMITTEDLY A SERIOUSLY DEPRECIATED CURRENCY IN CONVINCING PUBLIC AND OTHER SIDE OF SERIOUSNESS OF WESTERN PURPOSE. IF, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD FOCUS SPOTLIGHT ON INHUMANITY OF SOVBLOC ACTION, EFFECT GENERALLY, AND PARTICULARLY ON UNCOMMITTED AREAS, MAY WELL BE CONSIDERABLE. I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA WOULD NOT BE MOVED BY SPECTACLE OF EAST BERLINERS BEING PENNED IN BY RING OF TANKS AND ARMED SENTRIES.

IN SUM I THINK THIS IS THE TIME FOR VIGOROUS WESTERN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY IN ADVANCE OF THE CONVOCATION OF A FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE.

BRUCE

HC/23

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Berlin 226 762.0221/8-1761

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Control: 126
Rec'd: AUGUST 17, 1961 3:16 PM

(120) D (384) RM/R

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 226, AUGUST 17, 6 PM

PRIORITY

762.0221 & 762.5

ACTION DEPARTMENT 226, BONN PRIORITY 199, INFORMATION PARIS PRIORITY 141, LONDON PRIORITY 135, MOSCOW PRIORITY 130, POLAD USAREUR PRIORITY 125.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO AND STOESSEL.

REFERENCE: DEPTEL 127 BERLIN, 360 BONN.

RE STRENGTHENING ALLIED GARRISONS IN BERLIN, REGARD SUCH ACTION AS DESIRABLE FROM STANDPOINT OF POLITICAL EFFECT ON LOCAL POPULATION. SMALL AUGMENTATION OF BERLIN COMMAND FORCES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES HAS BEEN PROPOSED BY BERLIN COMMANDER AND IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION BY CINCUSAREUR. UNDERSTAND MAIN OBSTACLE TO INCREASE HAS BEEN LACK OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN EUCOM. IN THIS CONNECTION IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ACTUAL PHYSICAL INCREASE OF FORCES CANNOT BE EFFECTED QUICKLY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO HAVE ANY DECISION FOR INCREASE ANNOUNCED TO PRESS AS SOON AS MADE IN ORDER HAVE FAVORABLE EFFECT IN WEST BERLIN.

(3)

RE INCREASING PATROLS IN EAST BERLIN SINCE SUNDAY BERLIN COMMAND HAS INCREASED PATROLS TO EXTENT REQUIRED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. NO MILITARY REASON FOR FURTHER INCREASE. HOWEVER, MILITARY HAVE ALSO SINCE SUNDAY BEEN FINDING OUT IN OFFICIAL MILITARY CARS INCREASED NUMBER INFORMAL OBSERVERS IN UNIFORM TO VISIT SECTOR BORDER AND EAST BERLIN. THIS LATTER ACTIVITY HAS BEEN DONE LARGELY FOR POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT AND WE PLAN CONTINUE THIS PROGRAM. WE UNDERSTAND FRENCH DID NOT PATROL IN EAST

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL: H Fuller	DATE OF ACTION: 8/19
CORRECTIONS TO RM/R: Ltr	

F/Wd to Norstad Cable to Limetype 8/18

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EAST BERLIN BEFORE AUG 13; SINCE THEN THEY HAVE BEEN SENDING OUT PATROLS DAILY. BRITISH WE UNDERSTAND HAVE NOT BEEN SENDING OUT PATROLS EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER AUG 13.

RE APPROPRIATE DEPLOYMENT ALLIED FORCES IN VICINITY WESTERN SECTOR BORDERS, WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE MISUNDERSTOOD BY WEST BERLINERS AND EAST PARTICULARLY IF UNDERTAKEN SO LATE IN GAME. BERLIN COMMAND DOES NOT REGARD IT AS DESIRABLE TO PUT OUR LIMITED FORCES INTO A POLITICAL DEPLOYMENT POSTURE. HOWEVER, AUTHORITY BEING REQUESTED OF HIGHER HDQRS TO HOLD NORMAL MONTHLY BERLIN COMMAND ALERT EXERCISE ON SCHEDULE NEXT WEEK WITH DEPLOYMENT OUR FORCES IN US SECTOR; PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENTS TO BE MADE TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE PUBLIC MISUNDERSTANDING IN WEST BERLIN. DEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN DONE BEFORE BUT WAS NOT SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST EXERCISE. WE BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE TO INCLUDE DEPLOYMENT AT THIS TIME IN ORDER BOLSTER WEST BERLINERS MORALE. BRITISH ARE PLANNING ROUTINE ALERT WITHOUT DEPLOYMENT LATTER PART THIS MONTH. WE UNAWARE FRENCH PLANS FOR ALERT. TRIPARTITE ALERT IS QUARTERLY EXERCISE AND NEXT ONE SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER.

WE WELCOME QUADRIPARTITE CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES TO REASSURE WEST BERLINERS THROUGH GREATER PUBLIC DISPLAY OF ALLIED MILITARY PRESENCE AND PREPAREDNESS IN BERLIN. GENERAL WATSON FEELS STRONGLY AND WE AGREE THAT ANY NEW MEASURES TAKEN FOR THIS ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL PURPOSE SHOULD ALSO BE JUSTIFIED ON MILITARY GROUNDS. MUCH CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED TOWARD THIS END BY LIFTING BAN WHICH HAS BEEN IN EFFECT FOR SOME TIME ON LOCAL MILITARY RE PUBLICITY ATTENDANT ON TRAINING AND OTHER MILITARY ACTIVITIES. SUCH BAN APPEARS TO BE OUT OF DATE AS RESULT OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE AUG 13.

I BELIEVE PROGRAM DESIGNED TO INSPIRE LOCAL CONFIDENCE IN ALLIED MILITARY AT THIS TIME CAN BE BENEFICIAL BUT POINT OUT WE SHOULD NOT OVER-ESTIMATE THE POSSIBILITIES THAT SUCH PROGRAM IN ITSELF WILL HAVE GREAT EFFECT ON MORALE OF BERLIN POPULACE. PEOPLE HERE ARE NOT WORRIED ABOUT STEADFASTNESS OF ALLIED MILITARY, AND IN FACT HAVE SHOWN NO SIGNS OF BEING WORRIED ABOUT THEIR OWN PHYSICAL SAFETY.

SEE

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-3- 226, AUGUST 17, 6 PM, FROM: BERLIN

SEE OURTEL 224 DEPT, 197 BONN RE ENTHUSIASTIC RESPONSE TO BRANDT'S MENTION IN SPEECH AT YESTERDAY'S PUBLIC RALLY OF GEN CLARKE'S BERLIN VISIT, IN CONTRAST TO BOO'S FOLLOWING MENTION OF PROTEST NOTES.

LIGHTNER

DMJ/23

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 232, AUGUST 17, 9 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 232, BONN PRIORITY 205; INFORMATION PARIS PRIORITY 145, LONDON PRIORITY 139, MOSCOW PRIORITY 134, POLAD USAREUR PRIORITY 129

PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE.

REFERENCE: BERLIN'S 219 DEPT, 192 BONN.

VOPO EFFORTS CONTROL ENTRY OF ALLIED PERSONNEL INTO EAST BERLIN CITED REFTEL ARE CONTINUING. SEVERAL OF THE MISSION VEHICLES ENTERING AND EXITING EAST BERLIN TODAY WERE STOPPED BY VOPOS WHO DEMANDED THAT OCCUPANTS SHOW ID CARDS. WHEN MISSION PERSONNEL REMINDED VOPOS OF LONG ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES WHEREBY MISSION VEHICLE LICENSE PLATES ARE ACCEPTED AS SUFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION AND THAT AUG 13 DECREE HAD STATED THAT REGULATIONS FOR ALLIED TRAFFIC INTO EAST BERLIN REMAIN UNCHANGED, VOPO NEVERTHELESS INSISTED THAT OCCUPANTS SHOULD SHOW ID CARDS. ONE VOPO STATED HE HAD RECEIVED NEW ORDERS TODAY REQUIRING ALL OCCUPANTS OF NON-MILITARY ALLIED VEHICLES TO SHOW ID CARDS. FRENCH MISSION CARS HAVE EXPERIENCED SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES.

(3)

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ELP/22

8.17.61

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OFF SECY OF DEFENSE

(122) (386)

BERLIN TASK FORCE

Minutes and Assignments of August 17 Meeting.

Mr. Kohler said that the White House has instructed that no further action should be taken on the idea of probes or presentations by the Western Ambassadors in Moscow pending further considerations and instructions.

Mr. Kohler wanted information on what we are doing and what progress has been made on the information requested from DOD in connection with the proposed build-up of forces of our NATO Allies. Information was inconclusive. Mr. Kohler said he hoped that it would be available in time for the 5 p.m. meeting at the White House. He also inquired where we stand on the directive on the Live Oak planning. He suggested that work be pushed forward on a tentative calendar for negotiations.

It was agreed that ISA will prepare a weekly assessment of Soviet developments, with emphasis on the results on the Soviets of our actions in connection with Berlin. This should not be a formal study, but should be suitable for presentation to the Steering Group. Pertinent Sino-Soviet developments should be included.

A reply, to be signed by the President, to the letter from Mayor Brandt was discussed. Mr. Cash and Mr. Day will prepare a draft answer to be available for the 5 p.m. meeting. The problem of Adenauer's feelings over an exchange of letters between the President and Brandt was discussed.

It was agreed that the text of the American note of protest to Moscow will be circulated to all UN members. IO would handle this.

ISA gave a short briefing on background of and developments after the GDR actions in Berlin of August 13.

It was agreed that the Task Force would meet henceforth daily at 10:30 a.m.

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Gen. McGarr 4W

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NLK, NSF 0 -

August 17, 1961

123

Mac - SEE CONSOLIDATED VERSION NLK-76-662

I spoke to Foy about the Brandt letter and he makes these points:

1. Putting West Berlin on a 3-Power basis would undercut part of the basis for our protests about the situation in East Berlin and would also of course make it that much more difficult to call for 4-Power negotiations about the situation in East Berlin. Foy votes against it for these reasons.

2. On the UN, he says that the Secretary's feeling is that the Afro-Asians are so mad at us on account of Bizerte, that we would not do well in any organ on Berlin at the moment. (I'll check further with Harlan Cleveland on this one.)

3. Our answer to Brandt ought to be very much along the lines of Brussels telegram: The only way to get a reversal of recent events is to straighten out the whole situation from which they arise. This means going forward with our military preparations and moving toward parleys on the basis of these preparations. This we propose to do.

4. Foy will try to have a draft reply to the Brandt letter at the close of business today.

HO

n Henry Owen

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Control: 13900
Rec'd: AUGUST 18, 1961
6:08 P

(124)

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 250, AUGUST 18, 9 P M

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1961 AUG 19 AM 7 12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
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FADRC FOI CASE NO. 11004 Withdrawn

ACTION DEPARTMENT 250, BONN PRIORITY 223, INFORMATION PARIS 161, MOSCOW 150, LONDON 157, POLAD USAREUR 42

PARIS, FOR EMB, USRO, STOESEL AND MCGUIRE

SINCE COMMUNISTS HAVE CHOSEN BY DIRECT ACTION TO ALTER RADICALLY SITUATION EAST BERLIN AND DESTROY COMPLETELY RESIDUAL FOUR-POWER STATUS, THERE ARISES A BASIC QUESTION FOR THE WEST WITH RESPECT TO EXTENT TO WHICH WE WISH TO CONTINUE COMPLY WITH FOUR-POWER ARRANGEMENTS, PARTICULARLY INSOFAR AS THEY RESTRAIN US FROM TAKING ACTIONS OTHERWISE DESIRABLE. BERLIN POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE BERLIN PRESS HAVE BEGUN TO WRESTLE WITH THIS MANY-SIDED AND DIFFICULT PROBLEM WHICH AS BRANDT'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT INDICATES WILL BE DOUBTLESS REFERRED BY THEM TO ALLIES.

(2) THERE IS ONE ASPECT WHICH WE RECOMMEND FOR URGENT CONSIDERATION. SED REGIME HAS NOW PHYSICALLY AND COMPLETELY ABSORBED EAST BERLIN INTO GDR. POSSIBILITY OF AN ALL-BERLIN SOLUTION, NEVER GOOD, HAS NOW BEEN COMPLETELY DISSIPATED. SOVS/GDR HAVENSINCE BEGINNING BERLIN CRISIS NOV 1958 MADE CLEAR THAT ONE OF THEIR MAJOR AIMS IS TO CUT TIES BETWEEN FEDREP AND WEST BERLIN. IN OUR OPINION MOST DANGEROUS PROSPECT RE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND ANY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IS RUPTURE OR GRAVE REDUCTION TIES BETWEEN FEDREP AND WEST BERLIN. THESE TIES ARE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE VITAL LIFESTRAM OF WEST BERLIN; IF CUT OR ATROPHIED, WEST BERLIN WILL WITHER

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ON THE VINE, EVENTUALLY BECOMING EASY PREY FOR COMMUNIST TAKEOVER.

THERE IS ONE ACTION WHICH COULD BE TAKEN PRIOR TO ANY NEGOTIATIONS, AN ACTION WHICH WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF ESTABLISHING DEFINITIVELY RELATION BETWEEN FEDREP AND WEST BERLIN. IN MILITARY GOVERNOR'S LETTER OF MAY 12, 1949, THE RESERVATION CONCERNING ARTICLES 23 AND 144(A) OF THE BASIC LAW WAS DESIGNED TO PRESERVE FOUR-POWER OCCUPATION STATUS OF WEST BERLIN. IN VIEW OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY SOVS/GDR ON AUG 13, 1961 WE QUESTION WHETHER THERE IS ANY LONGER REASON FOR WEST TO MAINTAIN THIS PREVIOUS RESERVATION. FORMAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE RESERVATION WOULD PERMIT BERLIN TO OBTAIN STATUS OF A LAND OF THE FEDREP EVEN THOUGH UNDER GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES THIS WOULD APPLY ONLY TO WEST BERLIN. SPECIAL SITUATION WEST BERLIN WITH PRESENCE FORCES ALLIED POWERS COULD BE REFLECTED BY MAKING STATUS AS LAND SUBJECT TO RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY OF THREE OCCUPYING POWERS WHICH WOULD CONTINUE MAINTAIN GARRISONS, HAVE RIGHT VETO APPLICATION FEDERAL LAWS AND COULD REASSUME COMPLETE CONTROL IN EVENT EMERGENCY.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE VARIOUS PROS AND CONS RE SUCH ACTION WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. TIMING IS OF COURSE A FACTOR. WE MIGHT NOT WISH TAKE SUCH ACTION RIGHT AFTER DELIVERY OUR NOTES IN MOSCOW STRESSING 4-POWER AGREEMENTS, BUT IF NOTES NOT PROMPTLY ANSWERED OR AFTER NEGATIVE SOV REPLIES RECEIVED, IT MAY BE PROPITIOUS TIME TAKE ACTION. FINALLY, SUCH INITIATIVE ON WESTERN PART WOULD HAVE PROFOUND REASSURING EFFECT ON WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMAN POPULATION, MORE SIGNIFICANT EVEN THAN MILITARY ACTIONS BEING TAKEN, AND MOREOVER WOULD HELP REDRESS DAMAGE CAUSED BY SOV/GDR ACTIONS AUG 13 TO WESTERN BARGAINING POSITION IN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS.

LIGHTNER

MDG Note: Mr. Freeman (CAR) notified 8:55 pm, advance copy to SO, 8/18/61 CHO-M

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

(389)

(125)

August 18, 1961

! URGENT ATTENTION FIRST THING SATURDAY MORNING !

To: The Secretary

Through: S/S

From: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

Attached are the contingency orders being sent by the Pentagon to the Commander of the Battle Group. After Defense accepted my amendments as shown in pencil, I cleared for the State Department. Secretary McNamara plans to clear with President first thing Saturday morning.

Attachment

762.00/8-1861

FILED

MAY 1 '63

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[redacted]

EUR:FDKohler:mc
7/16/63

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1. The objective of augmenting the Berlin Garrison by one U.S. Army battle group is to provide concrete political and psychological demonstration of U.S. attitude in regard to the Berlin situation, not repeat not to probe Soviet intentions. However, East Germans and/or Soviets might undertake to harass or oppose this movement.

2. Four types of resistance may be encountered: (a) Administrative; (b) Undefended or passive obstacles; (c) Lightly defended obstacles or harassing fire; (d) Superior military forces.

3. Should administrative resistance, such as refusal of personnel at check points to honor properly documented papers be encountered, notice should be given that the column will proceed and, after a reasonable interval given the gate checkers to obtain instructions from higher authority, the column should proceed.

4. In the event undefended or passive obstacles are placed in the way, the obstacles should be removed and the column continue.

5. Lightly defended obstacles or harassing fire: The column should take appropriate defensive action and attempt to proceed.

6. Superior military forces: The column should halt, defend itself as necessary and attempt to remain in place, reporting the situation to higher authority. The column should disengage and withdraw if the commander considers there is danger of him being cut off or losing his forces by military action.

7. The question of alerting NATO forces is left to your judgment. We would prefer that any actions taken be such as to attract minimum publicity. However, to enable you to afford quick assistance in the event the column is attacked by hostile aircraft or is in danger of being overwhelmed by superior ground forces, alert U.S. air elements should be prepared to give air cover and close air support to the withdrawing column, using conventional weapons.

8. If any situation develops not covered by the foregoing instructions the column commander should halt, report and request further instructions.

9. Request the Joint War Room, JCS, be kept informed of progress of column until it closes in Berlin and of any incidents arising.

DEPT. OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE
5200.9
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(126)

(390)

CEB

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

August 18, 1961

file

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Foy D. Kohler

FROM: W. W. Rostow

The Vice President should not merely reassure the West Berliners that we shall protect access.

He must also say this:

This crisis came about because of the extraordinary success of West Germany and West Berlin as compared to East Germany. This is the historical fact on which we must fasten our eyes. This is the historical fact which Khrushchev understands. He is trying to deal with it via barbed wire, troops, and bullying the men and women of East Germany. Khrushchev can not deal with Western strength and Eastern weakness by these means any more than King Canute could stop the rising tide.

This is a time for confidence and faith among the West Berliners, among the West Germans, and throughout the West. Let the Vopos crow. In their hearts they know that history is not on their side.

Now is the time, too, for the Western allies -- all of us -- to come closer together. The commitment of the U.S. to the freedom of West Berlin is absolute.

7624.00/8-1861

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INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State** (391)

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Control: 13894
Rec'd: AUGUST 18, 1961
6:14 PM

(127)

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 907, AUGUST 18, 10 PM

EYES ONLY

Paris 907

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT 907, INFORMATION LONDON NIACT 199.

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LONDON FOR AMBASSADOR

DEPTEL 933; DEPTEL 187 TO LONDON.

(1) FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS JUST BEEN RECEIVED FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM PRESIDENT DE GAULLE:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

"HAVING RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF TODAY, I AM PLEASED TO AGREE TO JOIN WITH YOU AND EVENTUALLY WITH MR. MACMILLAN IN A COMMON DECLARATION ON BERLIN. I SEND YOU HEREWITH THE TEXT THAT I PROPOSE, AND WHICH ASIDE FROM THE ENDING WHICH I THINK IT WELL TO ADD, DIFFERS VERY LITTLE FROM THAT WHICH YOU SENT ME.

"YOU ARE CERTAINLY WELL AWARE THAT THIS OBLIGATION TAKEN BY US IN SUCH A SOLEMN MANNER COULD NOT HENCEFORTH BE CALLED INTO QUESTION.

"IN PARTICULAR, I FIND IT HARD TO SEE WHAT POINT THERE WOULD BE IN UNDERTAKING AT PRESENT A NEGOTIATION WITH MOSCOW ON BERLIN SINCE OUR POSITION IS GOING TO BE SO CATEGORICALLY FIXED AND PUBLICLY STATED.

"AS

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76.2.00 / 8-1861

(2) PP

also in 66D204

"AS YOU KNOW, FRANCE, WHILE NOT OPPOSED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATION, QUITE THE CONTRARY, BELIEVES THAT ONE CANNOT ENGAGE THEREIN USEFULLY UNLESS THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE HAS BEEN PROFOUNDLY CHANGED BEFOREHAND, THAT IS TO SAY, MADE PEACEFUL INSTEAD OF MENACING. I THINK WE MUST SAY THIS.

"CORDIALLY YOURS, CHARLES DE GAULLE"

TRANSLATION OF TEXT FOLLOWS (FRENCH ORIGINAL IN NEXT FOLLOWING TELEGRAM):

QUOTE SUBJECT: PROPOSED TEXT FOR THE THREE POWER STATEMENT.

THE ACTION WHICH THE AUTHORITIES ESTABLISHED IN EAST GERMANY BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAVE UNDERTAKEN, AN ACTION WHICH CONSISTS, IN VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS, IN CLOSING THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN AND IN PREVENTING ITS INHABITANTS FROM ENTERING THE WESTERN SECTOR, HAS DANGEROUSLY INCREASED TENSION WITHIN THE CITY AND HAS PROVOKED ACUTE ANXIETY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO STATE THAT THEIR THREE COUNTRIES ARE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN, JOINTLY AND IN ALL CASES, THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN BERLIN AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THE POPULATION WHICH IS PLACED UNDER THEIR CONTROL.

AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT, THEY RENEW THE OBLIGATION THEY HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO DEFEND THE LIBERTIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF WEST BERLIN AGAINST ANY ATTEMPT BY THE AUTHORITIES WHO HAVE BEEN SET UP IN EAST GERMANY BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, OR ANY ATTEMPT BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ITSELF, TO VIOLATE OR MODIFY THESE LIBERTIES, INCLUDING FREEDOM TO PROCEED TO OR RETURN FROM WEST GERMANY.

WITHOUT IN ANY WAY EXCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT PROBLEMS

CONCERNING

CONCERNING GERMANY, AND BERLIN IN PARTICULAR, MAY ONE DAY BE TAKEN UP IN NEGOTIATIONS, AT SUCH TIME AS THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE AND RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST MAY BE CHARACTERIZED BY A WIDE AND GENUINE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS, THEY CONSIDER THAT INITIATIVES SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAVE JUST BEEN TAKEN IN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN PREVENT ANY ATTEMPT AT SETTLEMENT. END QUOTE.

IT WILL BE NOTED THAT NO REFERENCE IS MADE TO FINAL PARA OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S LETTER REGARDING REINFORCEMENT OF BERLIN GARRISONS.

DE CARBONNEL, SECY GENERAL FONOFF, TELLS ME THAT DECISION HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED ON THIS.

LYON

KEA

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 7:15 PM 8-18-61.

NLK NSF 320 [illegible] 128

SECRET

August 18, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: German Policy

I. General Consideration-The Problem of German Unification

At the center of any position with respect to the Berlin crisis is the attitude to be taken on the question of German unification. It is argued that Germany will remain divided whatever our attitude. Thus realism should impel us to confirm what we are incapable of changing. No other nation besides the United States is said to be interested in German unification. For us to press for German unity will be to undermine Allied cohesion and to drive the East European satellites closer to the USSR. As for the USSR, it is argued that its chief concern in fomenting the Berlin crisis is to obtain U.S. recognition for the status quo in Central Europe. A modus vivendi is possible, so the argument goes, if we accept the division of Germany as final.

These arguments do not do full justice to the complexity of the problem. The issue is not simply whether Germany will remain divided or not. The problem we confront is to demonstrate why and in the name of what it remains divided. At stake is not only the outcome of the immediate crisis but the expectations of the people of Germany. This in turn will affect the future course of the Federal Republic and therewith of the Western Alliance.

The goal of stability in Central Europe is highly desirable. However, in order to attain it, it is important to understand that the dividing line which offers the best prospect for it is the Oder-Neisse, and not the Elbe. In the long-term, reasonable people in the USSR or the satellite orbit should be made to realize that by seeking to prop up the East German regime they are creating the dangers they are trying to avoid. A corollary is that if they do come to this conclusion, they will find us forthcoming and conciliatory with respect to their legitimate security concerns.

The instability of Central Europe is not due to the failure of the U.S. to recognize the East German regime. It is inherent in the situation. The position of East Germany is different from

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that of the rest of the satellite Empire. In Germany a Communist regime has been established in only a portion of the country, a portion that has no historical, ethnic or cultural tradition distinct from Germany as a whole.

Moreover, there exists a free and prosperous West Germany which is the symbol of an alternative -- a condition different from that in any other satellite country. The East German regime will be driven by the logic of its situation to seek to undermine or to demoralize the Federal Republic. By the same token, no West German government can accept as permanent the partition of German territory without undermining its domestic support.

An acceptance by the West of the East German regime is almost certain to force <u>any</u> government of the Federal Republic into some degree of opposition to its allies. All West German political parties, all West German political leaders, have stood on the proposition that they represented the only legitimate government of Germany. To reverse this course would be a deep psychological shock to the whole fabric of West German politics. If the Federal Republic is persuaded that the West <u>prefers</u> the division of Germany for its own ends, it may attempt separate dealings with the East. The argument may gain credence that close ties with the West having failed, Germany must pursue a policy of pressure and nationalistic advantage. The chief thrust of Khrushchev's policy seems to me to make the West share the responsibility for the division of Germany and thus lay the basis for a Rapallo policy.

It is sometimes argued that, whatever its frustrations, the Federal Republic would soon discover that its scope for separate dealings was severely limited. This line of reasoning -- which I question -- overlooks the problem of timing. By the time the Federal Republic would have realized how circumscribed its area of maneuverability really is, Western cohesion would have been wrecked. Retaining Germany as a willing member of the Western Community is important not only for the future of Germany, but it is even more vital for the peace of the world. The Soviet leaders are demanding recognition of their East German satellite

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so insistently because they know very well that acceptance by the West of the status quo is the best means for undermining the status quo. (For the first intimations of shaken German confidence in the U. S. see West German editorials, as reported in Embassy Bonn's telegram 343 of August 16, 1961.)

Soviet and East German declarations leave no doubt that acceptance by the West of the status quo in Central Europe is conceived not as the end but the beginning of a process. They are always presented as a means to undermine the "militarists" and "industrialists" of the Federal Republic, i. e., its pro-Western orientation. To be sure, the USSR almost certainly does not have a detailed master plan to communize all of Germany immediately. It would settle for loosening the Federal Republic's Western ties and to radicalize its public life. It would then have the opportunity to play off Germany against its neighbors. It could appeal to German nationalism with the lure of unification, and to the other European countries through their fear of Germany.

For all these reasons, a wise Western policy will see to it that the Soviet Union is forced to bear the onus for the division of Germany. If the West understands its interests correctly it must stand for the unity of Germany despite the experiences of two world wars and despite the understandable fear of a revival of German truculence. The West may have to acquiesce in the division of Germany but it cannot condone it. The division of Germany is almost certainly unavoidable, but the future cohesion of the North Atlantic Community depends on our ability to demonstrate what makes it so.

Western policy should have four goals:

(1) to demonstrate to world opinion that the Soviet Union rejects even the most reasonable schemes for unification;

(2) to appeal to reasonable people in the Soviet Union and the satellite bloc that there is an alternative route to security than the division of Germany;

(3) to demonstrate to Western Germany that it cannot do better for itself through separate dealings

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with the East than through being a loyal ally of the West; and

(4) This last goal in turn has two prerequisites:

(a) that the Allies seem to take seriously one of West Germany's paramount concerns -- that of unification, and

(b) that they give the Federal Republic an increasing stake in a larger framework than that of Germany, specifically, the Atlantic Community.

The attitude towards Eastern Germany is of importance also in our dealings with the Soviet Bloc. If the USSR can force us to give up the principle of self-determination in an area where our moral and legal position is unassailable, we will have demonstrated that we may accede to any fait accompli. Given the Communist mentality, this is more likely than not to set up a pattern of blackmail in other areas.

A plan for Central Europe should, therefore, have the following features:

(1) It should seek to offer a means towards the unification of Germany on the basis of some scheme of self-determination;

(2) It should seek to take account of legitimate Soviet security concerns. Reasonable men in the Soviet hierarchy should be able to come to the conclusion that their security can be safeguarded without enslaving 17 million people;

(3) It should reassure the East European countries about their present territorial extent. Specifically, Poland and Czechoslovakia should be given to understand that support for the Soviet Berlin policy is not required to safeguard their frontiers; and

(4) If the West settles for the status quo it should make clear that it does so not by preference but because it prefers the status quo to nuclear war.

[redacted]

3.

II. Illustrative Scheme

(NOTE - The proposals that follow obviously require a great deal of detailed study. They are not presented as being fully thought out, but as indicating a direction in which to move. If the President decides on this course of action, the State Department should be able to come up with a great variety of suggested schemes.)

Phase I.

The West accepts the Soviet notion that there should be a Confederation of the two states in Germany. However, the governments of these states would emerge from free elections conducted separately in each state. All parties existing in one part of Germany can operate in the other and the elections would be under international supervision. The steps leading to elections could include a Mixed East-West German Committee to draft an electoral law. If the Committee could not agree, there would be a plebiscite as to the electoral law after three years. Elections for governments in the Federal Republic and the GDR would take place no more than four years after ratification of the agreement. The Confederation would have a common foreign policy, a common Defense Ministry and a common Finance Ministry. Each state would be free to maintain any social structure it chose. There would be free movement as between each of the German states. The East German state would be completely demilitarized -- i.e., no military forces of any kind could be stationed on its territory or recruited among its population. The East German state would fulfill the present economic obligations of the GDR to the Soviet bloc for a period of ten years. Western troops would withdraw the same distance from the Elbe as the width of the GDR. The Rapacki Plan would be instituted. The East German state would reaffirm its previous acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line. Berlin would be the capital of the German Confederation. (The clauses could be phrased so that they apply equally to both sides and do not seem to assume the transformation of the present East German regime. They are stated in the present form only for simplicity.)

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This scheme, if rejected, would demonstrate:

(1) that the Soviets oppose German unity on any terms involving free popular expression, and

(2) that the Soviet opposition to unity is produced not from fear that the Federal Republic would swallow up the GDR but out of fear of Soviet determination to maintain a Communist regime against the will of the people.

At the same time, the scheme would have the following attractive features from the Communist point of view:

(1) There would be a reasonable period of time for a transitional stage;

(2) The economic assurances make possible a gradual adjustment without any basic strain on the economies of Eastern Europe;

(3) The political frontiers in Central Europe would be recognized; and

(4) The military guarantees and leaves no doubt that the Soviet leadership is risking war not for defensive but for aggressive purposes. Indeed, this could be the theme of our propaganda.

The propaganda theme to accompany this proposal could go somewhat as follows:

"The United States has full sympathy for the fears of Germany's victims of World War II. It can even understand the apparent conviction of some countries -- such as the USSR and the East European satellites -- that a divided Germany represents the best guarantee of their safety. However, it is the conviction of the United States that this policy cannot be in the long-run interest of <u>any</u> state. The history of our century demonstrates that the quest for national self-determination, once

thwarted, takes on ever more explosive forms. We advocate self-determination for the German people, because we are profoundly convinced that this is in the long-term interest of all Europe and the world. We have made certain proposals which to us seem to guarantee the right of self-determination. We are ready to examine any Soviet proposals consistent with the basic right of peoples to choose their own fate.

"At the same time, we will do everything in our power to eliminate the charges of aggression in Central Europe. The security features of our plan are designed to achieve this end. We are prepared to consider other proposals. It is the United States' conviction that support for the Soviet policy on Berlin is not required to meet the security concerns of any people, including the Russian people. Indeed, it is a good way to undermine these security concerns."

This theme could be elaborated to develop to a maximum any potential conflict of interests between the USSR and the satellites.

Phase II.

Here we could offer two schemes:

(1) The four powers agree that Germany be unified on the basis of free elections. As a symbol of this commitment, Berlin is established as the capital of Germany. Free elections would be held in all of Berlin no less than two years after the ratification of the agreement. Upon the establishment of a united Berlin, governmental bureaus of both the Federal Republic and the GDR would be removed from it. At this point, also, a Mixed German Committee would be established and charged with preparing an electoral law for all of Germany. If this Mixed Committee cannot agree, a plebiscite would be held in both parts of Germany at the end of five years. Elections on the basis of the new electoral law would be held within two years of

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the plebiscite. The security guarantees would be the same as in the previous scheme. The chief difference between Phase I and Phase II is the intermediate step of a free all-Berlin and the problem of timing. The time-table for unification would be in effect ten years, the East German regime would have given a hostage the fulfillment of its obligations by agreeing to the unification of all of Berlin -- a step which would at the least reduce the Communist incentive to maintain the GDR; and

(2) The main features of Mr. Acheson's Stage I with a commitment to a plebiscite at the end of three years.

Phase III.

A solution for West Berlin incorporating the main features of "Solution C". We might concede here the mode of negotiations with the GDR outlined earlier, provided that we can define the subjects for technical discussion with great precision.

Henry Kissinger

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TOP SECRET NLK NSF 82

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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18 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Further Information on Troop Movement to Berlin.

1. The following information was developed from discussion with General Lemnitzer at 2:30 p.m. today.

a. The battle group selected for movement to Berlin is from Mannheim and belongs to the 8th Infantry Division. It is expected to leave Mannheim early tomorrow morning (about 1:00 a.m. Washington time), reaching bivouac at Helmstedt at the end of the day. The distance from Mannheim to Helmstedt is approximately 200 miles.

b. The battle group will spend the night at Helmstedt, entering the check point the following morning and proceeding up the autobahn to Berlin. It should close in Berlin late Sunday afternoon.

2. Contingency planning for possible incidents is in progress with tentative thinking taking the following form.

a. If entrance to the autobahn at Helmstedt is refused, the convoy will report the fact and await orders.

b. If the movement is blocked by obstacles in the course of the march, the instruction to the troop commander will be to use all available means to remove or overcome the obstacle short of the use of actual weapons.

c. If the column encounters opposing fire, the commander will move forward, returning the fire as necessary, provided there appears to be any chance of pushing through. If the opposing force is clearly so large that the chances of success are not reasonable, the commander will be directed to withdraw, covering himself as best he can with the weapons available.

3. The composition of the column has not yet been determined, but will presumably include infantry in trucks, artillery, and engineers. Because of their slow rate of movement, it is unlikely that tanks will be included.

TOP SECRET

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4. There is no present thought of alerting additional troops for movement to Berlin by air in case the ground movement is interrupted. However, such an airlift could be arranged in a few hours.

5. There are some 600 troops from the Berlin garrison presently training in West Germany. Thus, the movement of U.S. military units at this time of year is quite common along the autobahn.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Lot 66D204

130

EYES ONLY

SECRET

Rec'd from Wood at White House 6:40 pm Aug 18

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August 18, 1961

Original to President

In the absence of the Ambassador,

I enclose a message from the Prime Minister.

(Wood)

The President

of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C.

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EYES ONLY

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in Berlin.

The President of the United States, the President of France and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom feel it necessary in the light of these actions to issue a solemn warning concerning the determination of their countries to maintain their rights, to fulfil their obligations to those under their protection and to preserve the freedom and viability of West Berlin and the right of access to and from the West". Ends.

I hope you will feel this contains the essential points which will help to reassure the West Berliners.

I am sure that, if we do make a declaration, we should let it be known simultaneously that we are ready to begin exploring the modalities of negotiations. Our Ambassador has been instructed to make this point in the Ambassadorial Group meeting which takes place this afternoon.

I have also considered your suggestion for further reinforcements of the garrison in Berlin. As you know, we have already arranged to send in some armoured vehicles. These are on their way by train and their arrival should be a tangible sign to the West Berliners of our continued

[redacted] /concern

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[redacted] for their liberty. We are not inclined at the moment to send a detached battalion from the United Kingdom and if we sent reinforcements to Berlin from Western Germany this would weaken our formations without, I feel, any corresponding military advantage.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

HAROLD MACMILLAN.

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[redacted]

TEXT OF MESSAGE

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter and for the draft of the Declaration which you suggest that President de Gaulle and you and I might make. No doubt you will consider very carefully before you finally decide whether it is likely to be counter-productive. So far, Mr. Khrushchev has put himself very much in the wrong with world opinion and we do not want the blame to be switched from the Russians and East Germans on the ground that we are being entirely negative in our approach to the problem.

If you feel after consideration that there should be a declaration I would be willing to join in one worded as follows. Begins

"The action of the East German authorities and of the Soviet Government in closing off the eastern section of Berlin, and other measures of restraint instituted by them to limit the freedom of movement of the people under their control, have seriously and dangerously increased tension

/ in

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INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

NSF 92 Berlin

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TOP SECRET

Control: 14415
Rec'd: AUGUST 19, 1961
11:14 AM

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FROM: JCS

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: JCS 1185, 191422Z AUGUST

NIACT

ACTION USCINCEUR, INFORMATION CINCUSAREUR, JACE AJCC FT RITCHIE, STATE DEPARTMENT, WHITE HOUSE,

FROM CHAIRMAN.

JCS FOR GENERAL NORSTAD AND GENERAL CLARK SIGNED KEMNITZER

1. THE OBJECTIVE OF AUGMENTING THE BERLIN GARRISON BY ONE US ARMY BATTLE GROUP IS TO PROVIDE CONCRETE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEMONSTRATION OF US ATTITUDE IN REGARD TO THE BERLIN SITUATION, NOT TO PROBE SOVIET INTENTIONS. HOWEVER, WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR REMOTE CONTINGENCY THAT EAST GERMANS AND/OR SOVIETS MIGHT UNDERTAKE TO HARASS OR OPPOSE THIS MOVEMENT.

2. FOUR TYPES OF RESISTANCE COULD BE ENCOUNTERED:
(A) ADMINISTRATIVE; (B) UNDEFENDED OR PASSIVE OBSTACLES;
(C) LIGHTLY DEFENDED OBSTACLES OR HARASSING FIRE;
(D) SUPERIOR MILITARY FORCES.

3. SHOULD ADMINISTRATIVE RESISTANCE, SUCH AS REFUSAL OF PERSONNEL AT CHECK POINTS TO HONOR PROPERLY DOCUMENTED PAPERS BE ENCOUNTERED, NOTICE SHOULD BE GIVEN THAT THE COLUMN WILL PROCEED AND, AFTER A REASONABLE INTERVAL GIVEN THE GATE CHECKERS TO OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY, THE COLUMN SHOULD PROCEED.

4. IN THE EVENT UNDEFENDED OR PASSIVE OBSTACLES ARE

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PLACED IN THE WAY, THE OBSTACLES SHOULD BE REMOVED AND THE COLUMN CONTINUE.

5. LIGHTLY DEFENDED OBSTACLES OR HARASSING FIRE: THE COLUMN SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE ACTION AND ATTEMPT TO PROCEED.

6. SUPERIOR MILITARY FORCES: THE COLUMN SHOULD HALT, DEFEND ITSELF AS NECESSARY AND ATTEMPT TO REMAIN IN PLACE, REPORTING THE SITUATION TO HIGHER AUTHORITY. THE COLUMN SHOULD DISENGAGE AND WITHDRAW IF THE COMMANDER CONSIDERS THERE IS DANGER OF HIS BEING CUT OFF OR LOSING HIS FORCES BY MILITARY ACTION.

7. THE QUESTION OF ALERTING NATO FORCES IS LEFT TO YOUR JUDGMENT. WE WOULD PREFER THAT ANY ACTIONS TAKEN BE SUCH AS TO ATTRACT MINIMUM PUBLICITY. HOWEVER, TO ENABLE YOU TO AFFORD QUICK ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT THE COLUMN IS ATTACKED BY HOSTILE AIRCRAFT OR IS IN DANGER OF BEING OVERWHELMED BY SUPERIOR GROUND FORCES, ALERT US AIR ELEMENTS SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE AIR COVER AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO THE WITHDRAWING COLUMN, USING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

8. IF ANY SITUATION DEVELOPS NOT COVERED BY THE FOREGOING INSTRUCTIONS THE COLUMN COMMANDER SHOULD HALT, REPORT AND REQUEST FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

9. REQUEST THE JOINT WAR ROOM, JCS, BE KEPT INFORMED OF PROGRESS OF COLUMN UNTIL IT CLOSES IN BERLIN AND OF ANY INCIDENTS ARISING. SCP3

RJT

Note: Advance copies EUR, SS, SO, 12:10pm 8/19/CWO-JRL

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SECRET

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

RM/R File

August 21, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY

From: S/B - Charles E. Bohlen

Through: S/S

Subject: Report on Vice President Johnson's German trip.

The immediate effect of the Vice President and General Clay's visit to Germany and West Berlin was excellent. His visit to Bonn and the conversation and luncheon with Chancellor Adenauer were very successful. We arrived at the Köln-Bonn airport on the outskirts of Cologne a little after eleven o'clock on Saturday morning. The Vice President was met by Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Von Brentano and other German officials. On the ride from the airport to Bonn, approximately thirty-five to forty minutes, the turnout of the people was excellent, despite the briefness of the notice which had been carried on the radio that morning in the Bonn area. It was estimated that there were some thirty to forty thousand people along the route and in Bonn itself.

The conversation with the Chancellor, Von Brentano, and other German officials which took place before lunch, proceeded very satisfactorily. The Chancellor was obviously delighted with the Vice President's visit and they discussed the general situation in Berlin. A copy of the memorandum of conversation is enclosed.

After lunch, we returned to the airfield, together with Adenauer. A problem arose during lunch as a result of the Chancellor's desire to go to Berlin. When we heard of this, we spoke to Von Brentano, pointing out that this was an American visit, and that we felt that the participation of the Chancellor would give it a German-American flavor which might cause complications with our allies and, in addition, might afford the Soviets a convenient target. Von Brentano spoke to the Chancellor who recognized the force of these considerations, but suggested that in order to have a West German official present, that Von Brentano should go to Berlin that afternoon to be there in order to

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S/B - C.E. BOHLEN

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welcome the Vice President. Although unspoken, it was obvious that the Chancellor was concerned at the possible electoral effects of leaving Mayor Brandt alone to deal with the Vice President. The issue, according to Ambassador Dowling, is not in any way the winning of the election, but rather whether or not Adenauer succeeds in obtaining an absolute majority in the Bundestag. When we departed, Von Brentano accordingly left and went by his own plane to Berlin somewhat ahead of the party.

Having transshipped to an Air Force constellation, we proceeded to Berlin, arriving approximately 5:00 p. m. The Vice President was met by a guard of honor, Mayor Brandt, and other West Berlin officials, the American Commandant and other U. S. officials. The ride from Templehof to the Potsdames Paltz and the City Hall was, in truth, a triumphant procession. The streets were lined with West Berliners who greeted the Vice President and General Clay with tremendous enthusiasm and every appearance of pleasure and relief. The Germans subsequently estimated the number of people along the route somewhere in the neighborhood of five hundred thousand, with at least two hundred fifty thousand in the Platz before the City Hall, stretching into the side streets.

Mayor Brandt, from the steps of the City Hall, introduced the Vice President, who made his first speech (apart from a brief arrival statement) in Berlin. The text of this speech, you have undoubtedly seen. This was followed by a speech by Brandt, expressing the great pleasure of the people of West Berlin at the Vice President's visit, etc. The reception was outstanding and the Vice President's remarks, although translated paragraph-by-paragraph, were frequently interrupted by extensive applause. Following the playing of the two National Anthems, the party went into the West Berlin Senate, where the "Golden Book" was signed. This was followed by a meeting with the elected representatives of West Berlin at which the Vice President made his second speech. Brandt and Von Brentano also spoke. Since the schedule was already delayed in conversation between Brandt and the Vice President, the delivery of the President's letter was postponed until the next day at ten o'clock. Then we went almost immediately from the session of the representatives to dinner, which was in the City Hall.

The next morning at ten o'clock, Mayor Brandt came to call on the Vice President, who gave him the President's reply to his letter. A memorandum of this conversation is attached herewith.

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It subsequently developed that the Vice Mayor of Berlin, Franz Amrehn, who is CDU, was considerably irritated that he had not been included in this conversation and told Ambassador Dowling that he had heard from Brandt's entourage that this was at the request of the Americans, which point, however, was straightened out since there had been no expression of that nature at all from the American side. This minor incident was further reflection of the influence of the electoral campaign. Following this talk, the Mayor and the Vice President with General Clay and myself and others, took a tour of the city, again with the streets and roads lined with thousands of West Berliners cheering, waving flags and handkerchiefs. We went to the edge of the American sector in order to greet the first echelon of the fifteen hundred reinforcements which by that time had passed through Helmstedt and the Soviet checkpoints, without the slightest incident. This encounter was perhaps one of the most dramatic and moving of the entire Berlin trip. The United States troops appeared to be a very effective combat unit, in good training and in excellent spirits. They, and the Vice President, received a tremendous ovation from the Berlin population.

Following this, the party went to the Army barracks for an all-American lunch at which the Vice President again spoke. His statement on this occasion was also published, since the American correspondents were present.

Following the lunch, he made a short address to the first echelon of the arriving reinforcements at the termination of which the party separated. The Vice President and Ambassador Dowling went down to Marienfeldt, the refugee center, again through crowded streets and enthusiastic welcome, and ended up at the main United States building to greet the following echelons of the reinforcements. In the meantime, General Clay, Mr. Lightner, and I had taken a military car and had driven into the Eastern Sector. We were not stopped once nor asked to show any papers or in any way molested or bothered during this trip. The vehicle was an Army automobile and this appeared to be in itself sufficient to guarantee access and movement about the Sector. The contrast between the Eastern Sector and the Western Sector of Berlin was indescribable. From the enthusiastic and exuberant reception which the thousands of West Berliners had been giving to Vice President Johnson to the semi-deserted, only partially reconstructed military occupied Sector, was as sharp a contrast as could be imagined.

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While we only went through a small part of the Eastern Sector, there was visible at the entrance points and on virtually every corner, squads of East German Armies, Volkspolitzei, and some of the armed militia. We also saw several personnel carriers filled with East German soldiers. At one square, there were some ten or fifteen Soviet T-34 tanks standing on the alert, with engines running, and fully manned. In another, we saw some two hundred East German soldiers lined up, apparently for inspection. While I had not been in the East Sector since 1954, I could see relatively minor changes in construction, with the exception of a number of new apartment houses on Stalinallee. There were extremely few people on the street and no staring or demonstration or incidents in regard to an American Army vehicle.

Following this trip, I went to the City Hall with Ambassador Dowling and Mr. Lightner for a further conference with Mayor Brandt and Vice Mayor Amrehn, which lasted about forty-five minutes. A record of this conversation is attached. Following that, there was a background press conference with the American correspondents at the Ambassador's house. The Vice President and General Clay took Mayor Brandt and Vice Mayor Amrehn out for dinner that evening. We left Berlin at 4:00 a. m., Monday, and were seen off by Mayor Brandt. The Vice President was given a United States guard of honor and the French military band played. (We took off from Tegel airport, in the French Sector.) The British and French Commandants were there to say good-bye to the Vice President.

It is difficult to draw any very specific conclusions from the Vice President's trip. It certainly can be said that the effect on the immediate Berlin morale was extraordinary and excellent. There had not been so great an outburst of popular exuberance, according to the West Berlin officials, on any other occasion that they could recall. Coincidence of the Vice President's visit and the arrival of the reinforcements was particularly useful as it dramatized to the people of Berlin the expression of American determination and will in the Berlin situation. From this point of view, the visit and the effect of the reinforcements can be put down as a complete and unqualified success. What, however, is not so certain is the lasting effects. The attitude of the West Berliners may have been a reflex action from the earlier depth of depression and frustration and anger which the population felt at the East German closing off of the Eastern Sector and therefore may not last as a permanent factor. On the other hand, it may be that the visit and the reinforcements combined together restored the badly shaken morale of the West Berliners. It is too soon to say which of these effects, over any period of time, these events will have.

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The full effect of the sealing-off of the Eastern Sector of Berlin on the West Germans was much more profound and serious than we had estimated here. This reaction seemed to have been combined of the following factors:

1. The fact that the East German regime, generally held in contempt by the West Berliners, should have been permitted to have carried out this action. If the sealing-off had been done by Soviet troops, there would, of course, have been resentment, but it would have been accepted by the West Berliners as an illegal, but nonetheless more tolerable, action undertaken by one of the occupying powers. This aspect of the German reaction is one that we should ponder carefully for its significance for the future.

2. There seemed to be a rather widespread feeling among West Berlin officials, shared, I might add in large measure by our representatives there, that our failure to react immediately and definitely in some manner, generally undefined, in the face of the East German action has increased communist confidence to a point where further piecemeal restrictions and harassments are to be expected. There was a tendency to mix up the fact that the measure was taken because of the refugee flow with some idea that it was part of a calculated series of moves by the communists.

3. These actions brought on, initially, a great questioning of the willingness and determination of the allies to protect West Berlin and allied rights in the future. This factor, I believe, the visit and the reinforcements went far to offset, but we should recognize that the visit itself and the reaffirmation by the Vice President in such circumstances increased, in the popular mind, our commitment to Berlin and may possibly be the subject of some overt interpretation.

In addition to the foregoing considerations, which the action of August thirteenth generated in West Berlin thinking, there is, and this remains a recognition, that August thirteenth represented a definite turning point, not only in the history of Berlin, but also in the history of postwar developments for Germany as a whole. Brandt, as you will see from the attached memorandum, spoke rather soberly and realistically on this point, mentioning the necessity of a reorientation of

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West Berlin to the acceptance of the fact that West Berlin will be an isolated entity completely surrounded by communist power. He also spoke of the effect of August thirteenth upon the German dream of reunification.

In summation, I would say that the visit of the Vice President and General Clay, coupled with the reinforcement of the Berlin garrison, achieved its purpose excellently. The Vice President discharged his task in this matter with the greatest possible competence. His statements stayed carefully within the terms of the President's letter, and his skill in public relations in dealing with crowds was eminently successful. I would say that the question of the long-term effects on Berlin morale depends entirely upon the action which the communists may or may not take within the immediate future. But we should certainly keep very closely in mind the mercurial character of the Berliners who went from the depth of despair immediately after the sealing-off of East Berlin, to the rapture and enthusiasm with which they greeted the Vice President.

In addition to giving recognition to the importance of this factor in our plans for negotiation and the type of rearrangement, if any, against this background, I have only one specific recommendation to make at this time; and that is that we be prepared to react swiftly and decisively and, indeed, to overreact, if necessary, to any clear signs of harassment or any attempts by the communists to erode our rights, and especially in regard to access (which includes the communications between West Berlin and the Federal Republic.) Any hesitancy or delay in our reaction to any such attempts would rapidly cast the morale of the West Berliners back to the depths which it was immediately after August thirteenth and prior to the Vice President's visit.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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August 23, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM No. 77

TO: The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Berlin Crisis - NATO Building and Planning

1. I wonder if we could get a report by the end of August on what military building in conventional forces we are going to get from the NATO countries for the Berlin crisis. If you are not satisfied with it should you go to Europe and meet with the Defense Ministers of the countries involved. Or what other steps would you suggest taking?

2. I think we should have a review of our contingency plan for Berlin and also see whether we have reached any understanding with the governments for the implementation of those plans. We have to assume that some time in the fall there may be a blockade of a formal or informal kind. Have we doubled with the British and the French and the Germans what our responses will be?

3. If the Communists blockade West Berlin and we begin an airlift should we not be reaching some decision as to what other steps we would take against them besides economic. Could we request our Navy to carry out any blockade of the Soviet Union for example in the Khabrov Mediterranean or in the Northern seas.

4. Would you talk to me about these matters at your convenience.

/s/ John F. Kennedy

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Control: 15341
Rec'd: August 21, 1961
4:53 p.m.

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Belgrade 229

12

M
Action
SS
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FROM: Belgrade

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 229, August 21, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

NIACT

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HY WN 2201630Z

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My acquaintance with views of other neutral nations on Khrushchev's pressures and our response is not sufficient to allow me to comment on their reactions as a whole. Following relates only to Yugo; but it should be considered in light of fact that Yugo views on Berlin will no doubt have particular weight among unaligned nations in coming period.

1. It is true that the Yugos are not much impressed with arguments about our rights and obligations in Berlin. They consider that situation has undergone extensive change since 1945 or 1949. Rights of conquest seem to them of dubious relevance in view of length of time that has elapsed since the defeat of Germany, and in view of fact that in so many other respects rights of conquest have now yielded to other arrangements, including West Germany's effective reestablishment as sovereign state, its rearmament, and its admission to NATO. They feel that the Berlin crisis, particularly in view of serious danger of war which affects prospective neutrals as well as belligerents, ought to be viewed as a practical political problem, rather than a legal one, and settled in a manner that gives some recognition to the political interests of both sides.

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TOP SECRET

-2- 229, August 21, 3 p.m. (SECTION 1 OF 2) from Belgrade
CORRECTED PAGE 2

2. I think it exaggerated to say that they expect us to compromise our position even at expense of people of West Berlin. They have noted Khrushchev's many statements and hints that Russia would agree to new statute for Berlin which would guarantee rights of communication and even permit retention of the western garrisons. They do not regard Russian position as equivalent to demand that we leave city and abandon inhabitants to Ulbricht. They would not expect us to buy in toto Soviet proposals as publicly expressed to date; but they find it difficult to understand why we have thus far shown no willingness to test these proposals in actual negotiation and, to this end, to make some of our own.

3. It is quite true that Yugos consider we took upon ourselves heavy responsibility in rearming Western Germany, in bringing it into NATO, and particularly in ignoring Rapacki's various proposals for creation of atom-free zone in Central Europe. Whatever may have been real justification for these measures, they were so inadequately presented and justified to world public opinion that we are now paying price for the deep-seated negative reactions they aroused. For these and other reasons, it does not appear to Yugos that Russians are alone responsible for attempts to alter German status quo. Khrushchev's talk about a peace treaty does carry some plausibility as an effort to compose German situation and to bring some stability into a situation rendered unstable by the seemingly pending pursuit of military rivalry in Central Europe.

4. Tone of Yugo press on Berlin has shown improvement in recent days, from our standpoint; closing of city by Communists has made some impression; and I would think it extreme to say now that Yugos have no understanding or sympathy whatsoever for our position. We have also succeeded, I think, in making them aware of some of the reasons why we cannot move precipitately in meeting Soviet demands at negotiating table. Nevertheless, their attitude will be decisively affected, in my opinion, by

/whether

whether we do or do not show readiness to sit down with Russians at early date and come forward with some sort of counterproposals or ideas of our own designed to advance discussion of this problem to a more fruitful and hopeful stage. Impression created here is that we have rejected every idea or suggestion Khrushchev has put forward about Berlin over recent months but have, as of today, no counterproposals of our own and no disposition to discuss the ones he has made. Geneva proposals of 1959 made little impression at the time and knowledge of them is almost non-existent today. They were too complicated to be vivid and intelligible to mass opinion. The texts of them are not now generally familiar or accessible to outsiders. It has certainly not been made clear, furthermore, to what extent we still consider ourselves bound by them. Finally, to the extent our public position is still understood as primarily a demand for free elections, it carries little persuasiveness to people here. They are skeptical of the sincerity of the implied attachment on our part to the principle of German

/reunification.

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reunification. Beyond that, it is felt here that the demand for self-determination, whatever its moral justification, takes no account of defensive requirements of Soviet military and political position in Eastern Europe and cannot provide a hopeful basis for political, rather than military, solution of Berlin problem.

5. I cannot find that we have been criticized here for the fact of our limited military buildup, as distinct from the publicity given to it. Tito has even said in private conversation that he understood well enough why we wished to take these measures but was unable to understand why we had to talk so much about them. Similarly, I have not found anyone here who thinks that we are militarily weak or lacking in firmness. But I have found people who inquire why a nation so strong should be so timid about going to the negotiating table and taking initiative in an effort to halt the trend toward war. I have found no one, in particular, who feels that our willingness to negotiate about Laos was an expression of weakness. The Laotian question, however, and other situations in Asia and African, are viewed entirely differently from Berlin. If our position in these non-European problems fails to command greater sympathy and confidence, this is for quite other reasons: notably, the feeling that in the past we have opposed neutralism as such, have insisted on treating political situations as military ones, have supported reactionary regimes against popular impulses, have not made an adequate contribution to the liquidation of colonial relationships, and have allowed our approach to Asian problems, in particular, to be rendered sterile by a petulant and emotional approach to the problem of China. The fact that these reproaches are largely unjust does not alter the fact that they have become deeply engrained. I fear they cannot be altered in any short space of time.

KENNAN

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(#) Omission. Correction to follow.

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Control: 15342
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4:53 p.m.

Info

FROM: Belgrade

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 229, August 21, 3 p.m. (SECTION 2 OF 2)

NIACT

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

HY WH 2201630Z

6. Returning to Berlin: as you and the Secretary are aware from our recent discussions in Washington, I fully recognize the great delicacy which, in the light of the sensibilities of our allies and the need for preserving NATO unity, surrounds the preparation and the bringing forward of any negotiating position which would give real promise of a peaceful solution in Berlin and would alter the impression of negativism and helpless drift toward war to which our present stance gives rise. On the other hand, it is clear that if Berlin crisis is ever to be peacefully resolved we shall have to take upon ourselves at a number of points the responsibility for overriding the timidities and inhibitions of our allies and assuming a dimension of leadership and initiative commensurate with our real relative strength within the NATO group. Khrushchev has indeed recently given us some help vis-a-vis neutral opinion by the extremism of his measures in Berlin; but it remains my view that unless we can contrive to give greater evidence of a willingness to draw a clear line between our policy, on the one hand, and the external interests of the Bonn regime on the other, and to make a bold and positive approach to the negotiation of a Berlin settlement, we have little hope of winning the sort of confidence and understanding for our policies we would like to see among the Yugos. As things now stand, I would expect their initiative at the Belgrade conference

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to be confined to an appeal to both parties to make the effort to compose the Berlin problem at the negotiating table. This will of course invite from Khrushchev the response that he has spent two and a half years trying to persuade us to do just that. In present circumstances, I am afraid that this answer on Khrushchev's part, however much it may represent a distortion and over-simplification of the true facts, will not be without its effect.

It is, as you know, my belief that Khrushchev does not want war, that he is acting rather out of weakness than out of strength, but that he needs help to extract himself from this situation without intolerable loss of prestige. The fact that he may not deserve such help, as a matter of moral justice, does not alter the fact that a failure on our part to try to give it may carry us all to disaster. While the Russians are never easy to deal with and would no doubt give many instances of unhelpful behavior at the negotiating table, I nevertheless feel that a possibility for peaceful adjustment of this problem does exist in a deal which would involve Soviet agreement to guarantee and even improve the communications of Berlin with West Germany, to sanction the further stationing of our garrisons there, to permit continued economic and financial ties between Bonn and Berlin, and to accept a long-term arrangement for study of problems of unification, in return for our willingness not to protest the conclusion of a Soviet-GDR peace treaty as such, to negotiate a special protocol to cover the status of Berlin, to give assurances against exploitation of West Berlin for attack on the Ulbricht regime, to accept Oder-Neisse boundary, and to consider a NATO-Warsaw pact security treaty. So far as future status of Berlin is concerned, I feel we could afford to consider either all-Berlin solution, involving departure of GDR Government and maintenance of garrisons by all four powers, or three-sector solution involving western garrisons alone. Naturally, no one can predict success of effort to explore such solutions with Russia; but unless we are willing to make the effort, I am not sure we can say we have done all in our power to avoid war.

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-3- 229, August 21, 3 p.m. (SECTION 2 OF 2) from Belgrade

7. I hope my own position will not be misunderstood. I have always considered Berlin situation susceptible of truly satisfactory solution only in terms of wider solution of German problem generally; and have felt that; for this and other reasons, western powers ought to be willing to offer certain concessions in military field, involving nature and location of forces to be stationed on German soil and nature of Germany's relationship to NATO, in order to achieve withdrawal of Soviet forces, which alone could offer to people of Eastern Germany and Berlin prospect of real freedom and security. Movement along this line is what I personally have always favored and preferred. I understand this approach, however, to have been rejected by western governments; I know that we are now deeply committed to another course; and I am not pressing this view. If I now suggest the sort of concession outlined above, it is only because I feel that if we are to adhere to this position, we must consent to recognize its implications for Berlin and to make the best of what is admittedly a bad situation. To attempt to have one's cake and eat it too - - to continue to develop West Germany, that is, as a heavily armed NATO partner [redacted] and at the same time to try to maintain West Berlin as a symbol of unification and a source of political uncertainty and discomfort for the Ulbricht regime - - is a course which is contradictory in itself, which leaves to our adversaries no peaceful alternative short of the unilateral capitulation of their political and military interests in Central Europe, and which, if undeviatingly and exclusively pursued, is almost certain, in my estimation, to lead directly to war.

KENNAN

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(135) (347)

Recategorized as
Category "A"
September 30, 1966
By Warren A. Henderson

August 22, 1961

51

CONFIDENTIAL

Downgraded To: ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL
EO 11652: XGDS 0 2 6 4
Authorized By: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975 NWD

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: Chester Bowles

This is in reply to your request of August 20 for my comments on our difficulties in obtaining support among the neutral nations for our position on Berlin.

First, let me say that from my recent conversations with leaders in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia I do not feel hopeless by any means about the degree of understanding of our Berlin position in those countries. Generally speaking I found our position better understood than I had feared.

In most cases the degree of understanding and support depended on the context in which our Berlin views have been presented. This is the aspect of the problem which I stressed in my August 15 speech before the National Press Club. As you can see from the marked text of that speech, which I am enclosing, I do not feel we have done so badly to date.

I do feel strongly, however, that we have not yet developed to its real potential the kind of widespread understanding of our Berlin position which can and must be achieved. Understanding, sympathy, and support will accrue to that position to the degree that we can identify Berlin with the same dynamic struggle for freedom of choice which has permeated the recent histories of those neutral nations themselves.

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I fully agree that our position on Berlin has been a balanced one, that our military buildup has been measured and sober, that we have not over emphasized military measures in our public statements, and that we have placed ample emphasis on our readiness to negotiate reasonable solutions. Indeed, I myself have not encountered the "heavy criticism for our limited military buildup" of which your memorandum speaks. By contrast, the Soviet position is seen in most parts of the world for what it actually is -- belligerent, angry and threatening.

The real difficulty lies elsewhere - in the frequent lack of direct interest, empathy, and emotional involvement which a crisis in Europe often has for non-Europeans.

If it were not for the fact that the situation is very far removed from the experience of most Asians and Africans, the contrast between our moderation and Soviet belligerency might be sufficient. However, the general feeling in these "neutral" countries is, I believe, that while the Soviets are indeed belligerent, both sides must somehow be to blame for bringing the world close to the brink of destruction. A lingering "plague on both your houses" reaction is sometimes apparent.

However, in press conferences, public discussions and meetings with various leaders I found it was invariably possible to maximize an understanding of our position when I concentrated on the right of self-determination for the people of West Berlin.

Repeated stress on our legal rights in Berlin, important as they are, usually elicited little but indifference in those parts of the world. The West has too often used similar sounding legal arguments to maintain positions of special privilege in areas where the tide of nationalism has risen above the danger mark for Asians and Africans to be impressed by legal briefs.

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But while they are indifferent to legalities, they do not want us to sacrifice the people of West Berlin in order to reach some sort of compromise with the Soviets. When you speak of our obligation to protect 2½ million Berliners from being subjugated by a regime which they reject, you strike a sympathetic chord. This emphasis on free choice and self-determination is fundamental. It can be even more effectively used in getting our story across, for it is directly related to the recent political struggles in all of these countries.

I found a ready response when I pointed out that any failure by the United States to defend the right of the West Berliners to determine their political system would inevitably undermine the rights of Asians and Africans to determine their own political destinies. All our reports from our embassies in these areas agree that the self-determination issue is the only one which brings Berlin home to these nations. Ed Murrow has been doing a very effective job of pressing this case and should be encouraged to redouble his efforts.

The Asian and African leaders have come a long way in the past two or three years toward a better understanding of the Soviet threat. They instinctively shrink from a confrontation which could plunge the world into chaos. For this reason I am convinced that, if we pitch our case with the right tone and on the right arguments, the more responsible neutrals can be helpful to us in the U.N. and elsewhere.

The Belgrade Conference of non-aligned nations and states will, I think, be characterized by moderation rather than extremism on Berlin. Tito, Nehru and other major figures who will be at that meeting are very deeply concerned about Berlin and, at least when I saw them, were in no mood to contribute to our dilemmas. I think our show of firmness tempered with moderation has thus far struck a responsive chord.

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They will expect us to move on from here, however. By that I mean that we must soon make it clear that we are prepared to come forward with some thoughtful negotiating proposals of our own if we are to maintain or increase their sympathy. A posture of continuing firmness tied to an appearance of negotiating unreasonableness could destroy much of the satisfactory response we have thus far attracted.

In this connection there is a real danger for us in pressing the self-determination argument on Berlin unless we continue to uphold it elsewhere. Asians and Africans immediately ask: Why, if you are so interested in the rights of self-determination for the white people of West Berlin, are you indifferent about these rights in Angola, Goa, Taiwan and Tunisia? I think this question can be effectively answered in our policies, our public attitudes and our U.N. votes. In trying to answer this question, I have stressed our fundamental attachment to the principle of self-determination originally expressed in our Declaration of Independence and I have reaffirmed our continuing commitment to that principle as the ideal for peoples on every continent.

However, I have distinguished between those situations where we have a clear legal or moral commitment to defend presently existing rights already enjoyed for the local populace, as in Berlin, and those other situations where no such direct commitment as yet exists. To say that America believes in the importance of self-determination for peoples everywhere does not preclude us from candidly admitting that we are not omnipotent, and we cannot obtain these rights for every people in every corner of the earth all at the same time. All we can do is to try to stand squarely in favor of the principle and take what steps we can to assist in achieving it wherever possible - and at least, as in Berlin, not allow the frontier of freedom to [redacted].

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This explanation seems usually to be accepted with one caveat: that the least we can do is to express support for the principle consistently by our votes in the U.N.

This is why it is so essential that we couple our words about self-determination with continuing deeds. Our U.N. vote on Angola last spring and our subsequent policy toward Angola is viewed throughout Africa and Asia as an heartening improvement. Nevertheless, there is the unspoken conviction that Americans generally consider dark-skinned people inferior and that when the chips are down they are likely to side with Portugal, France, and our other white-skinned European allies.

This conviction runs deep in Africa and the Middle East, and only slightly less so in Asia. Everywhere just under the surface lies the assumption that our revolutionary commitment largely concerns itself with those who have white skins. We must assume that our every move directly involving Africa and Africans themselves will be viewed with deep suspicion and that compromises by us will create bitterly irrational reactions. The depth and potential ugliness of this mood cannot be exaggerated.

If we are to preach the doctrine of self-determination in Europe we cannot and must not allow Portugal, France or any other European nation to veto our support for that principle in Asia and Africa. I do not minimize the dangers that an embittered France or Portugal pose for our position in Europe or the importance of allied unity in a time of crisis. But our European allies, as much as we, have a tremendous stake in obtaining world support for our Berlin position. One of the greatest tasks now before us is to find the courage to lead our alliance rather than to follow it and to raise the vision of some of our NATO allies to the requirements of a world rather than a European power balance.

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Another dangerous reef on which our argument for self-determination in West Berlin can be wrecked in Asia and Africa is that of our public position on Communist China. The rationale we employ for our position that Communist China lacks the necessary peace-loving qualities for U.N. membership carries little conviction to Afghans and Indians who rightly or wrongly feel threatened by Pakistan, to many Europeans who still fear the Germans and are now mortally threatened by the Soviets, to Arabs who fear the military threat of the Israelis, and to Africans who fear military repression by Portuguese or French. The only argument which the world generally can be made to accept as reasonable to justify our continued opposition to Communist China's admission to the United Nations is our universal commitment to self-determination and free choice for the people on Taiwan. Peking's repeated threat to overrun Taiwan runs counter to this principle. The people of Taiwan have the same right to determine their own future as the people of West Berlin, Nigeria, or Tunisia. If we hammer away at this theme our position is generally understood and frequently approved.

As long as we feel compelled to subscribe publicly to the Chinese Nationalists' reasons for opposing Peking we dissipate respect and support in many countries for other policies; not only does the Generalissimo appear to control U.S. policy toward China, but he also appears to control even the way in which we describe that policy for world opinion.

* * * * *

If this analysis is valid, there are several steps we can take to gain greater acceptance among the neutral leaders for our position in West Berlin:

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1. A speech or public statement at a press conference by you just prior to the Belgrade meeting would have great impact on these nations, particularly if it stressed the self-determination issue and the overriding question of free choice for West Berliners. You could relate the Berlin crisis to the struggle against colonial oppression and for self-determination throughout the world. You should insist that the cause of free choice in Africa and Asia is inseparably linked to the safeguarding of freedom in West Berlin.

2. At the U.N. we should vote in favor of a moderate resolution on Bizerte with full knowledge that our problems in Paris will be seriously exacerbated. If we fail Bourguiba on this question we cannot expect other African leaders to make similar efforts for many years to come to reach an accommodation between their European ties and the historical forces of nationalism which have already swept Europeans from much of the African continent. Moreover, we can be sure that Bourguiba's bitterness will explode at the Belgrade conference to sweep away the effect of our arguments in favor of self-determination in Berlin.

3. We are asking key posts abroad to tell us what seem to be the weak spots in our Berlin case in the eyes of the neutrals and are trying to shape our propaganda line accordingly. Reports thus far support the conclusion that self-determination is the only issue which has much impact. We are therefore instructing our missions in neutral countries to stress this principle in all their discussions of the Berlin question.

4. We must insist, despite current French opposition, that we prepare a full set of negotiating proposals covering a range of issues in central Europe, and we must take discreet steps to assure key neutrals that we are

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doing so - without, of course, in any sense detracting from the importance of our military buildup. Only if they are really convinced that we are ready for responsible negotiations will the neutrals be prepared to support us should the Berlin case come before the U.N. this fall (as it almost inevitably will).

* * * * *

In conclusion, let me say once again that I am not pessimistic about our ability to get our position across to the Afro-Asian leaders if we concentrate on the question of self-determination and if we can demonstrate in the next two or three months by our votes in the United Nations that we support this principle around the world.

We cannot expect the neutrals to share our point of view completely, but there is a greater identity of interest than has been so far apparent. This realization is now growing and can be steadily strengthened if we do not negate all our arguments by compromises in other areas reached in the cause of NATO solidarity. That solidarity is vital but I am convinced that our allies will follow us on Berlin in their own interests if we are wise and prudent. We cannot let them lower our vision elsewhere. To do so would be disastrous outside Europe and could cost a heavy price on Berlin as well.

Enclosure:

National Press Club
Speech, August 13, 1961.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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August 22, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: S - The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: G - U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: Organization for Mobilizing World Opinion.

In accordance with his request, I met with General Taylor today on the foregoing subject. The Attorney General, Ed Murrow, and Allen Dulles were also present.

There was a long and somewhat diffuse discussion on the foregoing subject, particularly with respect to the handling of the Berlin question. Ed Murrow, Allen Dulles and I outlined how we operated in this field, generally taking the position that, while there was always of course room for improvement, we felt our present organizations were fairly effective. However, we did agree that we probably could be more effective in mobilizing and using private American public opinion leaders with their counterparts and contacts abroad. I pointed out that, [redacted] the P area maintains a wide range of contacts that probably could be utilized more effectively and said I would explore this possibility with Roger Tubby. We all agreed that probably more should be done with labor and student groups in this regard.

As there was considerable sentiment that the matter should be otherwise looked into more thoroughly, I agreed to the formation of a Presidential committee, to be formed of outside citizens, to examine how the Berlin matter had been handled and to make recommendations to the President for any organizational or other changes thought necessary. (The example of the Killian committee on intelligence was cited.) It was agreed that the committee should be formed of three or four persons selected from the fields of labor, education, business and public media and that we would communicate nominations for such a committee to General Taylor by Thursday afternoon. While I will discuss the matter with Roger Tubby, I would also appreciate any suggestions for nominations that you may have. I will follow up on other aspects of the matter and do not see any need for further action on your part at this time.

Copies to: B - Mr. Ball
P - Mr. Tubby
O - Mr. Roger Jones
IOR - Mr. Hughes

G:UAJohnson:ges

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

137

American Embassy, Belgrade,
August 22, 1961

Downgraded To: SECRET
EO 11652: XGDS
Authorized By: [illegible]
August 4, 1975
Declassified as
Category "A"
September 30, 1988
By Warren A. Henderson

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Taking advantage of an invitation he had extended to me before my departure for Paris and Washington, I visited my Soviet colleague (Alekssi Yepishev) yesterday, and spent two pleasant hours with him in his garden. I took occasion to say to him, in the course of the conversation, that while obviously neither of us was in a position to commit his government in any way on matters which were the subject of discussion at official levels, I thought it might just possibly be useful, and certainly could do no harm, if he and I occasionally exchanged opinions about such matters, with a view to seeing whether the official exchanges could not be expedited and made more fruitful. To this, he responded in such a way as to give me the impression that his government had had the same thought. I have the distinct feeling that in extending his original invitation, two weeks ago, he had had something of this sort in mind, and that his government had authorized this initiative.

I stressed to him that such discussions could be useful only if they were held in the utmost discretion -- otherwise they would only duplicate the official exchanges and throw further confusion into channels already too numerous and confused. For this, he professed complete understanding.

I referred to the various efforts the President had made, since taking office, to improve relations with Russia and to resolve individual outstanding problems, and to the disappointment and bewilderment many of us had felt over the rebuffs with which these efforts had met. Both in Laos and in the talks on atomic tests, we had made substantial concessions; but we could not feel that they had been in any way reciprocated. Perhaps it would be easier, I said, to make some progress in the larger problems if we had some idea why we had been so unsuccessful in the smaller ones. I referred particularly to Laos. What was it that had gone wrong here? We were willing to settle things on a reasonable basis; but we could not simply deliver the place up to the Pathet Lao for military conquest, with the prospect that all this process would spread and would be exploited against us. Could he find out whether his government had any suggestions as to

Signed by:
George F. Kennan

The Honorable
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Washington.

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TOP SECRET

as to how this question could be more fruitfully approached, with a view to finding a solution not disastrous to either side?

He asked me whether any new element had come into the Laotian question since the President discussed it with Khrushchev at Vienna. I said: not that I knew of; but I had the impression that the two statesmen had confined themselves to general statements of their respective points of view and had not attempted to get into the details of a possible settlement.

The Soviet Government, too, he said, was anxious to settle the Laos affair. "We have our own troubles," he said, cryptically. I cannot guess what he meant by this; I had the impression it referred to internal affairs; but it may have been the Chinese he had in mind. At another point he said: "You have trouble with your allies, and we have trouble with ours."

He brought up the subject of Berlin and discoursed on it at some length, stressing -- as he has on previous occasions -- the peacefulness of Soviet intentions. I told him I would prefer not to talk of Berlin on this occasion. I explained that I was leaving Belgrade for several days, but would get into touch with him at once on my return, and hoped that we would then be able to speak in somewhat greater detail about Laos. He did not reject this suggestion but said he thought it might turn out to be necessary to discuss both subjects, Berlin and Laos, at the same time.

So much for our conversation. I am writing this letter primarily to keep you informed. But I also wish to say that I am somewhat at a loss, in the light of my briefing by Mr. Johnson last Friday, to see any concrete possibility for compromise in the Laotian situation. I can conceive, hypothetically, of an unwritten understanding on the basis of which the Pathet Lao might gradually decrease its pressures, the Soviet airlift be terminated, and the Viet Minh commanders be withdrawn, whereas we, for our part, would also proceed with the dismantling of our military-advisers establishment. (All this assumes, of course, the establishment of a government under Souvanna Phouma). But when I asked Mr. Johnson whether we would have the facilities for knowing whether the Soviet side was carrying out its part of the bargain, I understood him to say we would not. This brings us right back to the question of the ICC, where I am sure we have gone as far as we can go at Geneva.

All this does not encourage me to feel that anything very fruitful can come out of the discussion of this subject, as an isolated question, with my Soviet colleague. Perhaps this is what he meant when he said that it might turn out to be better to discuss Berlin and Laos simultaneously; there may, in other words, be a greater possibility of Khrushchev's moderating his policy with regard to Laos if there is some evidence that progress is being made with regard to Berlin.

He that

Be that as it may, we shall see what Mr. Yepishev has to say next time. Meanwhile, if there is anything further in the way of guidance that you or Johnson could give me, I should greatly appreciate it. A thought that has been in my mind, in suggesting such discussions, is that problems can sometimes be solved by a series of reciprocal unilateral steps, the nature and order of which is tacitly agreed, than by formal negotiated documents. If you see any possibility of such a course being used in Laos, I should appreciate guidance along these lines; for it is in just such matters as these that private talks can be useful.

[redacted]

Very sincerely yours,

George F. Kennan

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LOT 72 D192

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(402)

WEDNESDAY
August 23, 1961
3:14 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR BOHLEN

B said the VP called and he is going up and wondered what our general thinking is. Mac Bundy called about the latest measure. The only point B sees is that this is a restriction to one access. The Sec said although this is an additional violation of the quadripartite status of the City it is a part of the same effort to close out the Eastern sector and we are expecting some rather quiet but local countermeasures which we don't want to inflame into major issues - things the Senate has under consideration but are being taken locally and rather not give much publicity at this stage. B asked what? The Sec said a little more selectivity on East Germans going into West Germany - also the West Germans are prepared to talk over the Interzonal Trade Agreement because some aspects are affected. B will fuzz it - not different in kind but in degree.

The Sec said he would like to see B before he leaves today.

pdb

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THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

799 United Nations Plaza
New York 17, New York
August 23, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

In response to your inquiry of August 20 addressed to Chester Bowles, George Kennan and myself about the neutral attitude toward our arguments about our rights and obligations in West Berlin, I am enclosing a hastily prepared memorandum which incorporates some of my reactions to your perplexity. Perhaps I should add that I am constantly perplexed myself!

Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson

The President,

The White House.

2

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SECRET - LIMITED

THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

August 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Adlai E. Stevenson

I share your annoyance almost daily that two measurements are often applied to the US and USSR by neutrals, and that the latter are all too liable to equate our firmness with belligerence and our moderation with weakness. I might make these comments on this disagreeable phenomenon.

First, much of this super-critical attitude is the inescapable consequence of world leadership on our part, and understandable fear and frustration among relatively powerless neutrals and allies. Whatever we do affects them so profoundly that their reactions are bound to be intense and emotional. When our actions are "strong" and primarily military, the immediate impression of those not directly benefiting from our protection is one of fear that they may be involved in unwanted war. When our actions are "moderate," those in the threatened area (e.g. Southeast Asia) feel unprotected and abandoned.

Second, on questions appearing to raise the danger of war but not involving their own interests, neutrals will almost inevitably favor compromises between Western and Communist positions with little regard for the rights and wrongs of the case. They can often be swung around to some extent by hard work if the Western case is good, but their instinct is for compromise to avoid conflict on matters that don't interest them. To dampen the fires of the cold war regardless of right and wrong seems to be a standard reaction.

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Third, contrasting treatment of the US and USSR, while most aggravating, is in a sense a compliment to the US. Most neutrals expect the USSR to indulge in minatory statements and gestures and feel these are characteristic and inevitable. From the US, however, they count on both more decency and moderation, and more sympathetic response to neutral concern and world opinion.

Fourth, we have to also bear in mind that most of the so-called neutrals are former colonial areas and their anti-colonialism rubs off more on us than on the USSR because of our alliances, because of incessant Soviet propaganda, and because of mistakes in our diplomacy, such as tying economic aid to military alliance, Dulles' pact-omania, etc.

The goodwill generated by our action at Suez, for example, was short lived. The judgments of these new countries remind us of Barkley's story about the constituent who asked: "What have you done for me lately?" And if we can't count on their enduring gratitude for what we do that they approve, we can count on their enduring memory of what we do that they disapprove.

I suspect we have no choice but to be patient and philosophic about this astigmatism, but it can be partially met by policies and tactics which I know you have much in mind: (1) a careful balancing of military moves, when these are necessary, by explicit, repeated and sincere offers of conciliation and negotiation; (2) patient explanation to neutrals and allies, in and out of the UN, of our policies, to demonstrate their reasonableness and practicality (which means they must be reasonable and practical!); (3) parallel demonstration that the rights, interests and apprehensions of neutrals are taken fully into account in the formulation of our policies; and (4) a consistent behavior in the UN based not on expediency but on principles of right and justice, i.e. practising what we preach.

On the latter point our vote on Bizerte will, I fear, cost us dearly, especially coming just after our refusal to support the call for the special session of the General Assembly and the reversal of our position on consideration of recognition for Outer Mongolia.

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As to Germany specifically, without doubt our widely publicized "credibility" military build up and daily news stories about new draft calls, mobilizing the National Guard, and even declaring a national emergency may have been useful in Congress and the country, but they were not helpful elsewhere. Maybe we talk too much about what we do. And certainly we have to get used to a double standard of conduct, because they all expect -- and rightly -- more responsible conduct from us than Russia.

But I don't think it is certain by any means that we won't have widespread support on Berlin, especially if we emphasize self-determination by the people of Berlin, rather than our rights of conquest or our obligations. Self-determination is dear to the hearts of the neutrals and much more persuasive than legalistic arguments -- particularly arguments based on that distasteful word "conquest."

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VLK, NSF 58 Ger/Berlin Steering Group

(140)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1961

TOP SECRET

Meeting of the Steering Group, August 23, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

Present were: Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, The Attorney General, Director CIA, Director USIA, Chairman JCS, General Taylor, Mr. Kohler and Mr. Bundy

1. Negotiating Calendar

The Secretary of State circulated a draft of a reply to the Soviet note of August 3, and attention centered specifically upon the proposal in the last paragraph of the draft note that discussion of negotiations should take place between the four Foreign Ministers at the UN General Assembly meeting in September. This proposal was approved. The Secretary discussed reasons for it briefly and indicated that if De Gaulle should turn out to be wholly resistant, it might be better to proceed through other diplomatic channels.

2. Economic Countermeasures

The Secretary reported that on economic countermeasures there is now good clear Four-Power agreement that the next step is to get action in NATO to get agreement in support of the Four-Power position. He warned against the tendency of other governments to wish to be made whole by the U. S. for any losses they might sustain through such application of sanctions, and reminded the group that the current policy of the U. S. is not to offer any such indemnity except in some special cases, as perhaps the fish trade in Iceland. Mr. Dulles called attention to the fact that the Italians might be difficult on this issue because of the magnitude of their Soviet trade, and suggested that they might require special treatment.

3. Military Build-Up

The Secretary of Defense said that the military build-up is proceeding quite satisfactorily. The West German build-up in particular is moving well. General Taylor asked whether we were in fact doing more than we are yet getting credit for. Mr. Murrow warned that he had found universal opinion in Europe that any removal of military dependents would "pull the plug."

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The Secretary of Defense and General Lemnitzer reported that many members of Congress believed we could hardly be preparing seriously for action in Europe as long as we left our women and children there. The question obviously has two sides.

4. Military Planning

It was reported that Four-Power discussions of the possible military planning directive had produced heavy pressure from the Germans against any extended non-nuclear action beyond an autobahn probe. Moreover, a similar lack of enthusiasm was indicated by the British and the French. At the most recent meeting, it was the consensus -- except for the U. S. representative -- that no further contingency planning should be undertaken beyond an updating of papers already agreed. The Secretary of State indicated that this evidence suggested the need for serious conversations at a different level and asked Mr. Kohler to arrange a meeting for himself and Secretary McNamara with the ambassadorial group.

5. East Berlin Access

There was discussion of the restrictions announced on August 22. General Taylor put forward the view that a relatively active response was desirable. The Secretary indicated that it continued to be most important to distinguish shooting from non-shooting issues. Mr. Bundy suggested that perhaps we should now move in the direction of indicating that if the status of East Berlin is to be less and less quadripartite, the status of West Berlin should be more sharply aligned to the Western allies and West Germany. Mr. Kohler left to participate in a Four-Power discussion of the same discussion, and it was understood that the Secretary of State would make further recommendations either to the Steering Group or directly to the President as soon as possible.

6. Information

Mr. Murrow reported a number of items on the propaganda front: our delay in protesting the earlier action had done no good; we were making more money on humanitarian than on legal grounds; the British public opinion seemed to be hardened, though there were no clear statistical measures. Good films were going into circulation on the Berlin problem from both the U. S. and the British side. It was agreed that the joint movie of the President and Khrushchev should not be pursued

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at this time, and Mr. Murrow agreed to inform Eric Johnston of this view. The meeting of the Subcommittee on Propaganda was briefly reported; there will be a proposal for a small action committee to be brought in from outside the government.

7. Negotiating Position

The Secretary reported briefly on preparations for a clear U. S. negotiating position.

McGeorge Bundy

B-247

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State [redacted]

PRESIDENT RECEIPT

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Control: 18188
Rec'd: August 24, 1961
4:31 p.m.

405

51
Action

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EYES ONLY

141

FROM: New Delhi

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 610, August 24, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

Dear Bobby 610

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NIACT

CAP 5204-61

TO THE PRESIDENT, WHITE HOUSE

FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH, NEW DELHI

762.00/8-2461

The questions you ask have been much on my mind and I am delighted to respond. To restate them:

Why are we failing to get across our position on Berlin to neutrals? Why do moderate measures on our part create greater impression of belligerency than more impressive military action by Russians? Is it our dilemma that we repel both by show of strength as in Berlin and the suspicion of weakness associated with willingness to negotiate as in Laos? What do we do? Let me answer in four parts. The first is a partial dissent from one of your premises. The second is the diagnosis of those difficulties where there is no remedy and hence where we must grin and bear. The third is a diagnosis of the remediable disorders. The fourth summarizes the action I would urge.

I.

I would dissent from your suggestion that willingness to negotiate in Laos has here been taken as an indication of weakness. We are recognized to be playing a weak hand. And it is noted that we did not come to negotiation until by

(3)

XR 751J.00/8-2461

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Send this to Amb. Bowles

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various misadventures our hand had become weak. However military intervention in Laos, with the risk of large scale Chinese counter-intervention, would not have been taken in India as a manifestation of strength but as a manifestation of unwisdom. Our reluctance to seek a military solution has indeed been taken as a sign of weakness in Thailand, Pakistan and South Vietnam. But these are military regimes. They think in military terms for that is the faith on which their own survival depends. The Indian view, reflected generally in the press, is that we have been following the only possible course in Laos since the advent of your administration. I might add that we can get little pleasure at the way this approval has been reflected thru Krishna Menon in Geneva.

II.

Mt ool* officers feel that in the Berlin crisis the Russians have got more of a reputation for intransigeance and belligerency with official Indians than we. I am not sure I agree. But in any case we have received far more of a public reputation for such belligerency than we deserve. And while we have had support on critical points such as our right of access to Berlin, we should have more. I cite first three factors working against us that are beyond our control.

The first is the obvious one that Berlin, from here paints a long way distant and, as with all new nations including for a long while US, India's eyes are turned inward on her own engrossing problems. The Punjab has rated far bigger headlines in recent weeks than Berlin. So it is easy to cry a plague on both houses. These European quarrels are not for Asia. The outcome short of war has little implication for Indian national interest.

Second there is the obvious contrast in the decision-making process as between the two states and the vastly greater news

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-3- 610, August 24, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF THREE) from New Delhi

emphasis on what we do. For weeks the papers here have carried substantial accounts of the pros and cons of an American mobilization. Opinions, or alleged opinions of Acheson, the Joint Chiefs, Joe Alsop and numerous other statesmen and sages have been exhaustively cited. The lineage from the USSR has been infinitely less, a decision, a few statements and speeches, no more. One could scarcely avoid the impression that a lot was happening in a military way in Washington and very little in Moscow.

GALBRAITH

LRR

*As received.

PASSED White House 8/24/61 7:30 p.m.

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Control: 18235
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5:32 p.m.

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FROM: New Delhi

001
21

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 610, August 24, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

NIACT

CAP 5204-61

TO THE PRESIDENT, WHITE HOUSE

FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH, NEW DELHI

Third and a more subtle point. A much higher standard of behavior is implicitly expected from us than from the Russians and we are known to be responsive to public criticism where they are not. As a result there is mileage in criticizing us for it might have some effect. The Indians are deeply apprehensive of war anywhere in the world. We can perhaps be persuaded to be pacific because we are persuadable as the Russians are not. Reporters swarm to my press conferences to ask critical questions and to lecture me on the errors of our policy. We have repeatedly observed that the more friendly the papers the more insulting the questions. They would not dream of asking Benediktov, the Soviet Ambassador, such questions were he to risk holding such conferences. The projection of all these attitudes is both more discussion and much more criticism of US policy than of Soviet policy. I am not at all sure that this is to be deplored. Certainly we would not wish to change places with the Russians.

762.00/8-2461

Fourth. USSR public appeal is simple, easily presented, visceral-peace and peace treaty, free Berlin, UN guarantee, settlement.

III. I come

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III. I come now to the correctible faults in our situation. First there is the deep and pervasive sogginess in our policy and hence in the articulation of our policy. This is true of Berlin and much more. Our reaction to the Berlin crisis so far seems to me admirable. We have shown ourselves to be serious without being violent or excitable. But of policy we have had little to go on. We have spoken vaguely of negotiation but a hint or two in your speech apart, there has not been a prayer as to what we are willing to talk about. I can not lecture Nehru and other leaders on the post-war history of Germany from Potsdam to date as justification of our position. I need to say a few simple, direct things. We cannot compromise at all on the rights of these free men. If we desert them there is no stopping and this everyone should know. That the Berliners do not want to be part of East Germany is plain for neither do the East Germans. But then one needs an affirmative idea or two. We do not argue for the reunification of Germany for that is patently improbable. And as long as our access to Berlin is absolute, the international status of the East German State is negotiable. We recognize the concern over atomic arms in the hands of a German army and will give every guarantee on this. Or something along these lines. But nothing along these lines has been hinted. Evidently out of need to please everyone we say nothing. Not being able to indicate reasonable areas of negotiations we obviously cannot persuade anyone of our desire to negotiate.

Second. Our information policy is partly the victim of the reluctance of our policy. On Berlin we should drive home a few essentials. Since these have not been articulated we are stuck with either generalities about freedom or extensive legal justifications of our position. Under any circumstances our information policy should be confined to a narrow range of understandable and compelling issues.

Third. Though

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Third. Though improving, our information people have yet to escape the old habits. This includes a penchant for the heroic stance and a desire to hit the communists where it hurts and, implicitly, to establish one's own credentials as an anti-communist. To cite example without attributing fault, the first local reaction to your speech was to play up the troop mobilization, defense budget and "hard as nails" aspect. An initial draft of releases on Bowles press conference on Berlin omitted all references to negotiation in that old warmongerer's presentation. I am persuaded that KD and his people have a clear view but their people must also be assured that a crisis like Berlin is not a signal to again start talking like Harry Truman.

GALBRAITH

AAL

Note: Passed White House, 8/24/61, 8 p.m.

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Control: 18189
Rec'd: August 24, 1961
4:31 p.m.

FROM: New Delhi

001
21

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 610, August 24, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

NIACT

CAP 5204-61

TO THE PRESIDENT, WHITE HOUSE

FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH, NEW DELHI

4TH. We still suffer from past belligerency of the military. It is very important to keep both speeches and on-the-record congressional presentations toned down. Likewise glowing descriptions of lethal new weapons. One small thing that worries me is the fetching color pictures of missiles and bombers in the widely-circulated magazine advertisements of contractors. Incidentally, are these tax deductible under the new frontier?

5TH. We are badly hurt in this part of the world by the military aid to Pakistan. This is all but universally believed to be directed not at Russia but India. If we are so militaristic as to wish to arm the ancient Moslem rulers and enemies here in distant Asia we must be militaristic in Europe and it is easy to believe that the Russians have a point. More immediately it is the great point of strength for people like Krishna Menon whose position in the Cabinet (and at Geneva and New York) depends on anti-American sentiment cultivated largely by the Pakistan issue. This, indeed, is now almost their sole reliance.

6TH. To be persuasive on the liberties of the West Berliners we must be consistent and show that we believe in this as a policy.

In the
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In the last few weeks there have been rumors that because of the Berlin situation and the Azores base we would yield to Portugal on Angola. This would be taken to mean that we are interested in the self-determination of white men in Berlin but not of black men in Angola and, Pari Passu of Indians in GOA. Recognizing difficulty of problem this would be very bad here.

Part IV.

Summarizing immediate action, then, we should (1) get a simple plausible policy on where we stand and where we negotiate and not let need to satisfy all our allies dictate total immobility, (2) build on our information policy on simple themes and at a more confidential level have reasonable negotiating goals to outline to leaders, (3) stress to USIA and thru it to our information people everywhere that crises do not mean a return to vintage belligerency, (4) keep the military toned down to the maximum, (5) recognize that our claim to defend freedom in Berlin requires a consistency of posture elsewhere. Finally there is the longer run problem of the difficult but essential shift from military to ECON assistance in this part of the world. This will require time and much tact but it can be done and is the only way of consolidating a strong position in the whole sub-continent. Warm regards.

GALBRAITH

DMJ/1

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NSC-T2-64
NSC-21-59

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

(142)

25 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of Berlin Planning and Build-Up

(40d)

In response to your memorandum of 21 August, the status of each of the three main questions you raised is described below. At your convenience I am ready to discuss these matters further.

Progress of the NATO Build-Up in Conventional Forces

It is still not wholly clear what conventional build-up will result from the US example and appeal to NATO. Attached is a status report of what we know to date. By mid-September, according to present NATO schedules, we should have a fuller picture. I shall keep you informed of significant developments.

The general tone of the response, however, exceeds what most observers had anticipated, and should improve as the situation becomes more grave. Even so, I am not completely satisfied with what I foresee. Until more specifics are in, including SACEUR's judgments and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would rather suspend definite judgment.

Allied Review of Military Contingency Plans

As to 4-Power agreement about military plans for Berlin contingencies, consensus is developing on many elements, but not yet on the crucial issue of how to act in the climactic stages. The US has sought agreement to direct that four new sets of plans be made, for expanded non-nuclear naval, air and ground action, and for discriminate use of nuclear weapons. The UK and FRG still resist this, although the French indicate willingness to have planning done. Even if 4-Power plans are prepared, agreement to execute them will be hard, and possibly infeasible, to get before the event. The FRG has expressed strong opposition to the idea of non-nuclear action, lest that consume too much of our capability for general nuclear war and bring an irreversible Soviet occupation of some West German territory. While the FRG seems to prefer that negotiations be backed essentially by the full nuclear threat, the UK has expressed preference for backing them only by a generally improved defense posture.

I believe our allies have not yet faced the realities of the choice at the end of the road. Either they think the

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SecDef Cont: No. TS-916

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choice will never actually confront them, or they have not recognized what that choice means in terms of their national survival. We are trying to show them how real this choice may become before many weeks have passed. We are stressing the importance of trying all possibly productive steps before taking the final nuclear action. If they will look the problem in the eye, I believe they will come to the conclusions we have reached. Whether in the weeks allowed we shall have time to bring them face-to-face with the real meaning of the choice is questionable. You will recall the difficulties in gaining the still incomplete understanding and agreement within the US Government.

We will continue trying in the Military Subcommittee of the Washington Ambassadorial Group to get agreement that the four new sets of plans should be prepared. Meanwhile, General Norstad and other US commanders are being directed to prepare corresponding plans on a unilateral US basis.

Response to Access Blockage

As to military measures after blockage of our access, these too are under active consideration. The Ambassadorial Group and its Military Subcommittee will be treating those in detail, but it is questionable how much commitment other governments will undertake in advance. All agree in principle that military measures should be taken on a scale riring from modest through moderate, especially outside Central Europe, and including naval blockade. There has not been enough specific analysis yet to establish the probabilities that these may effectively influence Soviet decisions over Berlin. Such analysis is under way, however, with preliminary showings due in a day or two.

I expect that we will find no magic answers but only the possibility of new increments of pressure on the Soviets, increments hurtful but not decisive for them.

Naval blockade would apply limited pressure under conditions where escalation to general war is less likely than for most other active military measures. Such a blockade would, however, be quite apt to bring on more-or-less completely unrestricted submarine warfare, and possibly other types of combat at sea. The submarine menace is believed manageable, though it will entail losses among our forces and substantial inroads into sea-borne supply of our Allies. While the US Navy could blockade the Mediterranean and the northern sea approaches to the Bloc, Allied assistance in bases and forces would be invaluable if the sea war escalated. Further studies of the blockade problem are under way.

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In sum, we are part way along toward building the military preparedness essential for dealing with Berlin. We do not yet have the additional forces needed to expand our military options, nor do we have Allied agreement that non-nuclear options are necessary and possible. But some Allied build-up has already begun, and intense review of contingency plans is under way.

Robert S. McNamara

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EUR:FDKohler:mt

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13709

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

762.00/8-2661

XR 396.1-WA

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 26, 1961

SUBJECT: BERLIN

SEP 13 1961

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor of French Embassy
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

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762.00/8-2661

The Ambassador presented the Secretary a copy of a reply from President de Gaulle dated today to President Kennedy's letter of August 25. After the Secretary had read the letter the Ambassador said that while this message indicated that the French would not participate in procedural talks, they would of course agree to talk on substance if possibilities of such talks developed. If the United States would agree to explore these possibilities through diplomatic channels, the French would not object. If the results were negative, then the Allies would apply the contingency planning. If the results were positive, the French Government would join on substantive negotiations. Thus the French in fact agreed that there should be negotiations as soon as possible on a real basis and this could result from a United States diplomatic approach. However, they considered it would be imprudent in advance to commit ourselves to negotiations without knowing what the results might be.

If the United States should agree that this procedure would be a way out of the present impasse, then it would be possible for the three to concert a reply to the Soviet note of August 1, omitting the last

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last paragraph of the American text and substituting a paragraph proposed by the French (text attached) reading roughly as follows:

> "Taking account of recent events and of the Soviet notes which have followed that of August 3, the French Government can only again warn the Soviet Government against any miscalculation on its part in an extremely grave situation for which it alone is responsible. The French Government continues to consider that a general solution of the principal problems on which peace depends is a desirable objective. It is ready as always to discuss on a reasonable basis in the absence of any threat or ultimatum and in an atmosphere of detente unresolved problems relating to Germany as well as other essential questions."

The Ambassador continued that if the United States could not accept this procedure and language but insist on its own formula then it could not speak on behalf of four Governments since France was not willing to be associated. Consequently, it was up to the US to choose.

The Secretary said that the US was clear that it wanted to say something publicly with respect to negotiations, to which the Ambassador replied that it was not clear in his instructions as to whether the French would agree or disagree on a public announcement as to exploratory diplomatic talks.

The Secretary said that with respect to the French point as to what might be the result of negotiations, the United States recognizes there is a relationship between substance and scheduling of negotiations. However, the broad policy of the Allies was well set even though the details had not been well worked out. Ambassador Alphand was dubious as to whether Allied policies were agreed, referring in this connection to his talk with President Kennedy. He cited the President as mentioning the Oder-Neisse line and de facto acceptance of the GDR. This, he said, he considered to be new in the US position. If we went ahead on such lines, it would have to be without the Germans. The Secretary reiterated that the basic policies of the Allies with respect to Germany had been fixed for 16 years. If arrangements for talks were made in September there would be plenty of time to work out detailed positions. He suggested that perhaps the United States alone could say to the Soviets that the Secretary of State would explore with the British, French and Soviet Foreign Ministers at the General Assembly the "possibilities of negotiations." The French could

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could take a reserved position on this. The Ambassador thought it would be better if we sent a common agreed note and then the United States made exploratory approaches through the normal diplomatic channel. He did not consider Foreign Ministers talks to be the normal diplomatic channel.

The Secretary pointed out to the Ambassador that the United States was hardly in a position to discuss substantive positions with the Soviets while General de Gaulle was sitting in the background with a veto. The Ambassador demurred, saying France did not have a veto. The Secretary replied that France certainly had in effect a veto since it was with us in Berlin and in the Alliance. The Ambassador said there was a great difference between discussion of arrangements for negotiations on the one hand and exploring "the possibilities of serious negotiations" on the other. The Secretary reiterated that the United States did not want to be in the position of a middle man between the Soviets and the French as to what might be "serious possibilities of negotiated settlements." He then raised the question as to whether any reply to the Soviet note was necessary at all after nearly a full month, if we were not going to use the final paragraph of the US draft. The Ambassador then suggested that if we agreed on a common note he would propose to Paris that they agree that the Secretary of State should say publicly that exploratory talks would take place. The Secretary suggested in turn that perhaps it would be possible to arrange for a Western Foreign Ministers meeting prior to the UNGA meeting and any discussion which might take place with Gromyko there. He pointed out that the US formulation left open the question as to whether talks with Gromyko would uncover any possibilities of serious negotiations. In Paris he said the United States had been concerned that there should be some leadership in NATO. Added to that, we now think that if there is no action on the Western side and no schedule proposed we face increasing difficulties as regards factual development of the situation. The Ambassador replied that on this latter question the French held a contrary view and apparently our views were irreconcilable. He asked again whether the United States would not accept the course of an ambassadorial probe of the Soviets. The Secretary replied that we would not do so in lieu of a public statement. The Ambassador asked whether it would not be enough simply to say that the Ambassador was probing. The Secretary replied in the negative saying that the Ambassador could only explore the place and timing of negotiations. He then asked the Ambassador whether, if he should say publicly that he would discuss these questions with the Foreign Ministers, Couve would say that he refused to discuss the matter. The Ambassador replied that perhaps Couve would not be in New York. In any event, he

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he continued, his instructions were clear that the French would agree to a US diplomatic probe but they would not be associated with it. We were thus faced with only three possibilities: a warning to Moscow as proposed by the French; US exploratory talks in Moscow; or the US formula which was not acceptable to the French.

The Secretary then returned to his suggestion of a Western Foreign Ministers meeting in Washington about September 14 or 15 before the UNGA. The Ambassador replied that he had no reason to believe that Couve would not come to such a meeting. The Secretary assumed that the United States could ascertain through diplomatic channels whether Gromyko was coming to New York. If he were, as was likely, the other Ministers would inevitably see him. He, for example, was giving a reception for all delegates the first week of the meeting. It would be insane to believe that Berlin would not be discussed when the Foreign Ministers met. If the Western Foreign Ministers should meet in advance of UNGA, we could expedite our work and try to agree on the details of negotiating positions. If we did not put something into the works we might well be faced with the signature by the Soviets of their "peace treaty" in September.

The Secretary then inquired whether de Gaulle's position was based on international considerations, or whether there were some special domestic problems of which we were not fully aware. The Ambassador replied that de Gaulle's position was based on international considerations. De Gaulle had told him that he wanted to finish with Algeria before the end of the year because he was preoccupied with Berlin.

The Secretary then reverted to the possibility of a Western Foreign Ministers meeting, saying that if this were agreed the French obviously would not be in a position to prejudge what the results would be. If it were at the same time confirmed that Gromyko were coming to New York, speculation would then be inevitable to the effect that there would be talks with him. Naturally if Gromyko were in New York, he, the Secretary, would talk to him about Berlin. He then asked the Ambassador whether he was saying that the French would not be present if the other Foreign Ministers felt that it was necessary to talk in New York. The Ambassador replied that if the discussion were about negotiations France would not be there. The Secretary reiterated that the United States could not be in a position of negotiating between Khrushchev on one side and de Gaulle on the other.

In conclusion

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In conclusion it was agreed that the Secretary would consider the French communication and the Ambassador's remarks and be in touch with him later, probably in the morning. The Ambassador said that meanwhile he would not report to Paris.

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PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

REFERENCE: BERLIN'S 332 DEPARTMENT, 295 BONN

US COMMANDANT GEN WATSON OPENED MEETING WITH SOV COMMANDANT COL SOLOVYEV BY POINTING OUT THAT WHEN THEY FIRST MET THREE MONTHS AGO THEY MET ON FRIENDLY TERMS, EVERYTHING IN BERLIN WAS QUIET AND NORMAL. IN RECENT WEEKS BERLIN SITUATION HAD BEEN DRASTICALLY CHANGED BY ILLEGAL MEASURES TAKEN BY EAST GERMAN AUTHORITIES. HE WAS COMING TO CALL ON COL SOLOVYEV, HENCE, TO PROTEST AGAINST THESE MEASURES, AND PARTICULARLY AGAINST THE RESTRICTIONS OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN BERLIN IMPOSED ON US PERSONNEL. HE THEN MADE POINTS CONTAINED REFERENCE TELEGRAM AND AT REQUEST PAPER CONTAINING THESE POINTS WAS LEFT WITH COL SOLOVYEV.

(3)

IN REPLY COL SOLOVYEV STATED HE HOPED NOTHING THAT HAPPENED CAN DISTURB FRIENDLY RELATION BETWEEN HIM AND GEN WATSON. HE HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED THAT US ARMY BUSES HAD BEEN HELD UP AT FRIEDRICH STRASSE. THE VARIOUS REGULATIONS MADE IN THE PAST TEN DAYS, SUCH AS RESTRICTION ON NUMBER OF CROSSINGS HAD BEEN ENTIRELY GDR DECISION. AS TO RESTRICTION OF ALLIED PERSONNEL TO ONE CROSSING POINT AT FRIEDRICHSTRASSE, SOV PERSONNEL HAD LIKEWISE BEEN RESTRICTED TO THIS ONE CROSSING POINT. COL SOLOVYEV STATED HE HAD TAKEN INTEREST IN MATTER OF FREE PASSAGE OF US PERSONNEL AND HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT THERE WERE NO OBSTACLES RE US PERSONNEL.

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HE THEN COMPLAINED THAT SOV PERSONNEL IN THEIR VEHICLES HAD EXPERIENCED IN RECENT DAYS UNPLEASANTNESS AND DIFFICULTIES AT SECTOR CROSSING AND IN WEST BERLIN. THESE FACTS, HOWEVER, CANNOT SPOIL OUR RELATIONS. HE REFERRED TO WEST BERLIN DEMONSTRATIONS AT SECTOR CROSSING POINTS AS UNPLEASANT AND DANGEROUS. BERLIN'S SITUATION HAS CHANGED, HE ADMITTED, BUT WE ARE MILITARY MEN AND NOT RESPONSIBLE. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD STUDY GEN WATSON'S PAPER, NOTIFY HIS HDQRS AND DO HIS BEST TO INFORM GEN WATSON ON MATTER.

GEN WATSON THEN STATED IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT STEPS BE TAKEN ON EACH SIDE TO PREVENT INCONVENIENCE AND DIFFICULTIES WITH RESPECT TO MOVEMENT THEIR PERSONNEL WITHIN CITY. APPARENTLY VOPOS HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY INSTRUCTED HAD FULL CONFIDENCE THAT SOV MILITARY OFFICER LIKE COL SOLOVYEV WOULD BE ABLE ARRANGE THAT PROPER INSTRUCTION BE ISSUED.

FINAL POINT COL SOLOVYEV MADE WAS THAT RELATIONS IN BERLIN DEPEND ON BOTH OF US, THEY CAN BE GOOD OR BAD, AND MOVEMENTS OF TANKS AND ARTILLERY IN CITY ARE BAD AND VERY DANGEROUS. CAN'T WE DO WITHOUT IT?

GEN WATSON CLOSED BY REMARKING EMPHATICALLY THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO RESTORE SITUATION IN CITY TO PERIOD BEFORE AUG 13.

MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF VISIT WAS EXCEEDINGLY FRIENDLY MANNER OF ALL SOV MILITARY PERSONNEL THROUGHOUT WHOLE VISIT. COL SOLOVYEV'S REMARKS, AND EVEN HIS COMPLAINTS ABOUT TREATMENT SOV PERSONNEL IN WEST BERLIN, WERE MADE IN UNUSUALLY MILD TERMS. WE INTERPRET THIS FRIENDLINESS AS SIGNIFYING THAT SOV MILITARY IN BERLIN ARE UNCERTAIN AND WORRIED ABOUT CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES.

LIGHTNER

MEM

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Note: Advance copy to GER 8/26/1:30 p.m. FMH

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

SECRET

August 28, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

ISSUES TO BE SETTLED WITH GENERAL CLAY

There are two sets of issues here.

1. The first set is procedural and [illegible]. Who does Clay command and who does he report to? He should obviously be the Senior American in Berlin -- and his seniority may give him a certain leverage on the British and French Commandants, at a moment of crisis. I believe he should report directly to the Secretary of State and to you with information to Dowling and to the military. He should leave all routine military channels alone, but for command decisions he should have full control of the Berlin garrison. This is not entirely from Norstad's point of view, but it is good from yours.

2. The second set of issues is more subtle. Clay is a soldier, but opinion is sharply divided on his ability to carry out a policy set by others, unless he fully agrees with it. You want no risk of setting up another MacArthur-Truman affair. Even without any public explosion, (which I think unlikely) Clay will be a burden to you if he takes a line more belligerent than yours: an intelligent Drumright or a powerful Lightner would be made use of by Strobuge like Maggie Higgins.

What makes this urgent is that the main line of thought among those who are now at work on the substance of our negotiating position is that we can and should shift substantially toward acceptance of the ODR, the Oder-Neisse line, a non-aggression pact, and even the idea of two Berlin treaties. All of these have been unpalatable to the West Germans, though opinion is shifting. Even "occupation rights" seem less important, we find, when you ask about their long-term value. We are inclined instead to focus attention on

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

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Ambassadorial Group today agreed on advance transmission of instructions quoted below to General Norstad. British however made acceptance subject to text being given to Stikker so his advice could be obtained re best way to handle in NATO context. French not authorized permit transmission to Stikker and have requested further instructions. Planning on basis following text should therefore not begin until final British and French concurrence indicated in subsequent cable.

BEGIN TEXT

1. The basic objectives of Allied policy in regard to Berlin are:

a. The maintenance of the presence and security of their forces in West Berlin.

b. The maintenance of the freedom and viability of West Berlin.

c. The maintenance of freedom of access to West Berlin;

2. Although attainment of the foregoing objectives will be sought through the application worldwide of non-military measures wherever possible, it is necessary to prepare for the contingency that such measures may not in

Drafted by: GER:JHillenbrand:cb 8/23/61
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR - Foy Kohler

DOD/ISA - Col. Shoualter
[redacted]

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themselves deter the Soviet Union or the so-called "German Democratic Republic" from taking action to block Allied access to Berlin or otherwise infringe on basic Allied rights. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, joined by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, are therefore determined to improve Allied military posture as a clear indication of the capability and will to apply appropriate military measures if need be. The Four Powers are individually and collectively undertaking programs to build added military strength for Europe and have requested other NATO Allies to undertake comparable programs.

3. The purpose of the following planning instructions is to modify and amplify the terms of reference given the military authorities of the Three Powers on 4 April 1959, within which tripartite planning is currently being conducted under your general supervision in your capacity as Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, Europe.

General Considerations

4. The following considerations should underlie the preparation of plans:

a. The military actions within the competence of SACEUR, whether within the framework of LIVE OAK or the larger framework of the Allied Command in Europe, will have to be integrated into a general, over-all strategy applicable on a worldwide scale and comprising political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, military and paramilitary measures. The selective application of these measures, both worldwide and in Europe, would contribute to our purpose of arriving at a settlement of the problem of Berlin while progressively making the Soviets aware of the danger of general war.

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b. Allied military measures to restore access to Berlin should be graduated but determined, applying increasing pressure which will present with unmistakable clarity to the Soviets the enormous risks involved in continued denial of access. At the same time, they should leave the Soviet government as many opportunities as possible to pause and reassess the desirability of continuing on a dangerous course of action.

c. Any military operation risks rapid escalation and/or pre-emptive enemy action. Therefore, while the immediate political objective of all actions will be to induce the Soviets to re-open access, military plans must take account of and be consistent with current defensive concepts of NATO strategy. They must, therefore, retain the survival of the Western Allies as a central consideration, and they must not commit capabilities to the prejudice of the overall capacity to defend NATO territory. The magnitude of resources which might be committed in operations at Allied initiative in reaction to Soviet moves would depend on results of the Allied build-up as well as circumstances existing at the time.

d. The Alliance will stand ready for nuclear action at all times. However, planned recourse to nuclear weapons in these operations can be envisaged only under the three circumstances of (1) prior use by the enemy, (2) the necessity to avoid defeat of major military operations, and (3) a specific political decision to employ nuclear weapons selectively in order to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them. (see paragraph 6 b (3))

4. Revision of Present Plans (LIVE OAK and Berlin Defense Plan)

a. Existing tripartite plans and agreements, which retain their present status, should be modified as necessary and kept current. These include (without

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prejudice to the sequence of execution) the following:

(1) Plans for small-scale ground probes to determine Soviet intentions (Free Style).

(2) Plans for more extensive use of ground forces (Trade Wind).

(3) Plans to implement airlift operations (Jack Pine I and QBAL Plan).

(4) Plans to utilize tactical air forces to support airlift operations as appropriate (Jack PineII).

(5) Berlin Defense Plan (Ops Instruction No. 7, Allied Staff Berlin). This will require coordination between Live Oak and the three Ambassadors in Bonn.

(6) Agreements related to the preparation and tactical control of the forces involved in these plans.

b. Because of the immediate threats that the recent Soviet notes hold over air access, examination of plans relative to airlifts should receive priority.

6. Additional Military Plans

a. For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, it is requested that you prepare and submit for governmental approval additional military plans covering broader land, air and naval measures within the purview of your command. In each case, the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. It would be understood that the execution of approved plans would be the subject of separate political decisions to be taken at the time.

b. In particular, it is requested that you study urgently and submit recommended plans to provide for the following:

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(1) Expanded non-nuclear air operations.

(2) Expanded non-nuclear ground operations, with necessary air support.

(3) Selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them.

c. In connection with your naval planning, you will be kept informed of studies now underway in Washington regarding worldwide blockade and lesser measures.

7. Questions of Organization and Competence

As regards questions of organization and of competence, the following points should be taken into consideration:

a. You should make necessary arrangements to establish pmanent liaison with the Ambassadorial Group in Washington.

b. You should make recommendations concerning means of assuring continuity of military control during transition from tripartite Berlin measures to control by established NATO mechanisms.

c. While you may proceed forthwith to carry out these instructions, the governments concerned will take steps to effect coordination with the appropriate NATO authorities regarding those provisions which fall within NATO competence.

RUSK

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TO: JCS

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN LEMNITZER FROM GEN NORSTAD.

In commenting on memorandum forwarded by your JCS 1235-61, [checked] I must state at the outset that my own position lies between the two extremes of the surprising surprised concern of the subject paper and the complacency suggested by Macmillan at Gleneagles on Saturday. I have shared with all those who have had to follow the Berlin situation over the years the judgment that the Soviets would harass and pressure us to the limits of our endurance, trying to stay just within those limits. I feel, therefore, that the events since 13 August have tended to support, not invalidate, the US decisions of July. The particular nature of the present Berlin problem, the threat to air access implied in the Russian note, and the timing of these actions certainly fall well within the limits of what surely was expected when the July decisions were taken.

Before taking any action to expand the build-up the JCS should consider seriously, I hope in close coordination with this headquarters, the question of "additional military options." What are the new options? Are they based on real probability or thin possibility? Would we be in a position to exercise them in any event by 1 Jan 1962? By 1 July 1962?

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As the responsible commander I would, of course, welcome any improvement in my capability, conventional or nuclear, repeat nuclear. However, I believe the best course for the President is for the time being to stand on his July decision and see that it is implemented fully and with force and vigor. We should continue to apply pressure on our Allies to make an increased effort.

We have informally but frequently announced that we are going to negotiate. This has been agreed to publicly by the United Kingdom and has certainly not been opposed by Adenauer. France continues to show strong opposition. It seems to me that in addition to demonstrating a degree of paralysis in our policy-making machinery, we are in danger of reaping the disadvantages of negotiations without gathering any of the advantages that would come from initiating positive action.

A further problem is that our Allies outside of the Four are becoming increasingly concerned over the dangers of the situation and restive under a system which they feel does not respect their desire for adequate consultation. By this time, the worst fears of those who opposed de Gaulle's tripartitism on the basis that it would be control by veto, must have been confirmed. Hasn't the time arrived for independent U.S. initiatives [illegible]?

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My thoughts run along the following lines:

a. Carry out the President's July decisions with force and vigor, but do not go to mobilization at this time.

b. Decide the basis, which by this time must be quite well established, on which we would participate in negotiations with the Soviets and the objectives we would seek to obtain.

c. Present b to the NATO Council with the statement that we wish to initiate action at the first favorable moment. The reaction to this would almost surely be strong encouragement from 12 or 13 NATO members and blessings on our head for bringing this important matter to the Council for consultation. It would surely exert the greatest influence on the French, although it may well be that it would not be ~~[illegible]~~ changing their minds.

d. In the meantime, be calm but firm on Berlin and air access harassments. By firm, I mean asserting and supporting our rights by using pressure where necessary, and by using force where vital interests are involved.

I note the reference to sending Clay to Berlin, or permitting me to go there. It may be possible that the President at some future date may wish to send another message to Brandt, at which time Clay might well be considered for this purpose. It is not clear to me how he could be used effectively for any other purpose, however, without

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serious disruption of channels and chains of command and inevitably undermining the very men whose authority and stature we should be building up at this time and who have demonstrated by their conduct in crisis that they are worthy of our complete confidence. I refer specifically to Dowling, to Watson and to Lightner, for instance. As for my visiting Berlin, this might be useful as [redacted] if it is desired to demonstrate NATO interest in and responsibility for West Berlin. To go quietly as an American would make of me a poor man's Lyndon Johnson and would scarcely be effective. I fail to see any useful purpose to be served by sending anyone at the present moment.

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NLK, PTF (Germany (412)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(148)

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August 28, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Issues on Berlin Negotiations

1. This is a complex subject -- and the most important one you have. So be patient with a complex memorandum.

2. Timing and Forum. The present position is that French have refused to join in exploratory discussions of negotiations by four Foreign Ministers in New York in September. We have now asked French if they'll agree publicly to let us do this exploring. If they do, and probably if they don't, Rusk plans to seek talks with Gromyko.

(a) What to say to Gromyko. It is not clear whether these talks would go deeply into substance or not. Probably not. But this is a question to put to the Secretary. One possibility, which has been discussed, would be to make this the occasion for a public presentation of our standard proposals for German unity, to get this on the record, and discuss with Gromyko possible means of continuing the dialogue.

(b) Next Steps. We also need to know whether Rusk means to propose to Gromyko that this dialogue be continued through a 4-Power meeting or a different method. My own increasing preference is for a bilateral discussion in which we use Thompson (with attached experts as necessary) and keep our three allies informed as we go -- with the understanding that the discussion will be converted into a formal multilateral Foreign Ministers' meeting if it seems to be hitting pay dirt. This is, in effect, what de Gaulle has proposed to you, whether he admits it or not. Thompson has a better grip on the Berlin problem and on the nature of negotiations with the Soviets than most, and you can control him from Washington with Rusk at your side more easily than you can control Rusk himself, as I think the Paris meeting suggests. A 4-Power Foreign Ministers' meeting,

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7 (F.V.)
to JFK e/o Aug 29
to Rusk

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moreover, is a prescription in futility, to judge by experience -- at least unless it is preceded by serious preparatory talks.

3. Substance. The question of timing and form is tightly tied to the question of substance, and here there is a real split in your tight little working group. The Secretary, I think, sees the negotiation problem like this: They have made proposals that we obviously cannot accept; we should make some proposals that we like and they won't -- for a unified Germany and a unified Berlin. We'll reject their proposals and they'll reject ours, and then we'll come down to at least tacit agreement on something much like the status quo, though they will sign an East German Peace Treaty while we let East German personnel replace the Soviets along the access routes. (Solution "C".) They probably won't test our will on access to West Berlin if we are tough enough about it.

Many of us, including Thompson, Kissinger, Acheson, and myself (while we don't agree in all details) think this is not good enough. We think that no all-German or all-Berlin proposal will get anything but a flat NO from the Soviets, and we think we'll look silly if we push very hard or long for what we know is unattainable. While we should make our position clear enough to harvest the benefits of favoring these desirable ends, and stick the Soviets with the continuous blame for blocking them, we should make clear that this is only a prologue to negotiations -- it is not a real negotiating position. Nor is there any real negotiating position in anything yet discussed among the 4 Powers -- nothing that would stop Khrushchev from signing his separate treaty, and nothing that would be thought of as a good Western counter-proposal among neutrals or Englishmen or even among our more reflective critics in the United States. The great problem of thought and planning at the moment is whether we can get such a posture. Most of us think we can -- but only at the price of some hard bargaining with the West Germans, and only if the U. S. takes a strong lead. We have taken a strong lead in military policy -- but not on negotiating proposals.

Only you can decide the negotiating position of the United States, and so far you have no basis for decision. But the kinds of questions worth asking are these:

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NARA, Date 12-18-78

(a) New Status for West Berlin. Can we propose forms of guarantees for our rights and those of West Berlin that are better than what we now have, and that are worth proposing to the Soviets--either because they might be accepted or because they would have international appeal, or both? If the answer is yes, should we not make such proposals? One example is the so-called "guaranteed city," in which all the rights that now exist might be rebased on the free choice of people of West Berlin and then guaranteed by all concerned, with the Government of West Berlin being allowed to request stationing of any forces it wishes in West Berlin --up to the present ceiling of 11,000. Some form of international control over traffic along the access routes might be sought as part of such an arrangement.

(b) European Security. Can we, in partial return for such an arrangement, offer some agreements on European security -- such as acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line, West German abstinence from nuclear weapons, a 4-Power Standing Commission to explore other European security arrangements, and a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Powers? Most of these are harmless or advantageous to the United States -- but they do raise problems with the Germans. We should not exaggerate their leverage with the Soviets (except perhaps keeping the Germans non-nuclear) but their effect on "world opinion" would be substantial, and in that sense they would make it harder for Khrushchev to resist an agreement, or help to save his face, if he concluded one.

(c) East German Status. The hardest question of all is how far to go in offering some degree of recognition or heightened status to the Ulbricht regime. You could end this crisis tomorrow by recognizing Ulbricht, and you could probably get some fairly juicy guarantees in return. But the West Germans would feel deeply betrayed. This is foolish, but factual. Since the Ulbricht regime does exist, however, and since the West Germans have given it rather more de facto recognition than we have (by trade and business relations), there is room for maneuver. There are several possibilities here, far short of outright recognition; they need most careful exploration. This may be your most powerful lever with Khrushchev, and the most sensitive point for all Germans. But here, with no choice, we went quite a distance on August 13th, and we might now be able to make a virtue of necessity.

1-279

The main point to get across, in discussion with the Secretary, is that you do not wish to settle on a mere tacit agreement to prolong the status quo before you have had a chance to explore additional and alternative arrangements. You might refer to the number of such arrangements which are adduced in the all-German and European security fields by Mr. Acheson in his report. You might ask the Secretary if the negotiations working group could evaluate the pro's and con's of these alternatives, and of such additional ones as a new legal status for West Berlin, and assemble them into a possible negotiating package as a basis for further discussion and decision by you. Failing some such indication of strong Presidential interest, the Secretary's own inclinations may unduly narrow the range of choice presented to you. You may wish to ask him for a preliminary report which you could take to the Cape over the Labor Day week end.

4. Approach to the Allies. There is one other major issue to be raised with the Secretary: the means of exploring these substantive proposals with our allies. A 4-power Western working group is to jazz up our standard proposals on German unity before the Secretary talks to Gromyko, but this would not be a useful forum for exploration of more sensitive matters. That exploration might be reserved for a Western heads of government meeting, to be held just before our first real encounter with the Soviets (e.g., the Thompson discussions) -- or after that encounter has begun to yield fruit. A useful prelude to such a meeting would be a trip to Bonn by a confidant of the Chancellor, if and as the need arose. In any event, this crucial question of how to negotiate with our allies should be pursued with the Secretary; it has been little discussed at lower levels to date.

McG. B.

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TO: Secretary of State

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1961 AUG 30 AM 7 32 OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS MESSAGE CENTER

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1103, INFORMATION BONN 128, BERLIN 76, LONDON 236.

FONMIN AND I DISCUSSED BERLIN SITUATION THIS MORNING.

I OPENED DISCUSSION BY ASKING COUVE WHETHER HE WILL ATTEND FONMIN MEETING IN WASHINGTON ABOUT SEPTEMBER 14. HE SAID HE WOULD BE THERE. ALTHOUGH POSSIBLY SEPTEMBER 10 MIGHT BE BETTER DATE, GOF IS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE TIMING. I THEN REFERRED TO RUSK-GROMYKO MEETING TO FOLLOW AND HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE A GOOD THING IF IT WERE NOTHING MORE THAN AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION ABOUT BERLIN AND THE SITUATION THAT CONFRONTS ALL OF US.

COUVE COMMENTED THAT MOST PEOPLE STILL DO NOT REALIZE HOW SERIOUS SITUATION IS THAT CONFRONTS US IN BERLIN, THAT THE SOVIET LINE HAS BEEN CONSISTENT AND CLEAR AND THAT THEY ARE DETERMINED TO ISOLATE WEST BERLIN FROM THE WEST. SEALING OFF EAST BERLIN WAS THE FIRST STEP AND CONTROL OF AIR TRAVEL BY WEST GERMANS INTO BERLIN WILL BE THE NEXT. THE USSR WILL BE QUITE CONTENT TO HAVE SMALL FORCES FROM THE WESTERN NATIONS PRESENT IN BERLIN AND WILL GUARANTEE ACCESS FOR THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT. THEY WILL, HOWEVER, PUT A STOP TO THE TRAVEL OF WEST GERMANS TO WEST BERLIN AND THIS WILL BE THE CRITICAL PROBLEM WE WILL HAVE TO FACE UP TO. I ASKED IF HE DID NOT THINK THAT BY BREAKING UP GREATER BERLIN, SOVIETS HAD NOT EMPHASIZED THE EAST BERLIN AS CONTRASTED TO WEST BERLIN ASPECT OF THE SITUATION, AND THUS UNDERSCORED THE WESTERN ORIENTATION OF BERLIN

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BERLIN. HE AGREED BUT BELIEVES THAT STOPPING THE FLOW OF REFUGEES WAS THE OVER-RIDING CONSIDERATION IN PUTTING UP THE FENCE.

COUVE STATED GOF STILL FEELS THAT TO ANNOUNCE WE ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE WILL MEAN TO EVERYONE THAT BERLIN PROBLEM IS REALLY SETTLED AND THAT WE ARE STARTING TO SURRENDER OUR RIGHTS THERE THROUGH NEGOTIATION. HE THEN REPEATED HIS OBSERVATION THAT THE SOVIET LINE IS QUITE CLEAR AND THE SITUATION THAT WILL CONFRONT US WILL BE MUCH MORE SERIOUS THAN PEOPLE REALIZE.

I CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY POINTING OUT THAT US IS NOW TAKING STEPS TO INCREASE ITS READINESS TO DEAL WITH BERLIN SITUATION AND THAT, IN GENERAL, ATTITUDE OF OUR PEOPLE SEEMS TO BE MUCH BETTER GEARED TO ACCEPT WAR THAN IS ATTITUDE NOW PREVALENT IN FRANCE. HERE PEOPLE ARE GOING ABOUT THEIR DAILY ACTIVITIES PAYING LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE DANGER AND EXCEPT FOR THE AUGMENTATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND THE MOVEMENT OF DIVISIONS FROM ALGERIA, THERE IS NO APPARENT MOVE TO READY THE PUBLIC FOR A WAR THAT MIGHT OCCUR. HE AGREED, SAYING THAT YES, THIS IS SO, BUT THAT THE FRENCH PEOPLE ARE NOT PARTICULARLY RESPONSIVE TO THE BERLIN PROBLEM AS SUCH.

GAVIN

KEA

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150

Memorandum From Colonel Lawrence J. Legere to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)

Washington, August 29, 1961.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, 38 Negotiations. No classification marking. 1 page of source text not declassified.

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Lot 66D204
151

TRANSLATION

RM/R
FILE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
THE CHANCELLOR

Bonn, August 29, 1961

Personal and confidential

My dear Mr. President;

I am availing myself of the opportunity offered by the return to Washington of our Ambassador to convey these lines to you. They derive from my conviction that it is of the utmost importance in the present situation that we should constantly and as intensively as possible exchange our ideas and considerations and harmonize our policies and attitudes.

The events of recent weeks have been a severe trial for us all. We are in the midst of a crisis that is likely, as far as can be foreseen, to be aggravated and grow more acute at a rapid pace.

In this situation I have understood your desire to negotiate with the Soviet Union and have supported it in the quadripartite discussions of recent weeks.

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His Excellency
John F. Kennedy
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D. C.

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At the same time, I understand General de Gaulle's concern that any initiative to negotiate might be misinterpreted as a sign of Western weakness. I am confident that the allied governments will preclude any such misunderstanding in the weeks to come. I am most glad, therefore, that the foreign ministers will meet on 14 September. I think it necessary for the discussion of the objectives and strategy of negotiations to be started even earlier so that it may be concluded at that meeting.

Apart from the possibility of the Western readiness to negotiate being misinterpreted by the Soviets, I am above all concerned about the danger of further unilateral actions taking place before or during the envisaged negotiations and during the period in which the build-up of a Western position of military strength is not yet far enough advanced.

I am of the opinion that there cannot possibly be any acquiescence in any further acts of force of the kind that occurred in Berlin on 13 August and after. It therefore appears to me to be indispensable that we should cause a fresh examination to be made of non-military counter-measures that might be taken at moments when important rights and interests of the citizens of West Berlin other than access to Berlin or the integrity of West Berlin territory are endangered. When he visited me in Cadenabbia I drew Secretary Rusk's attention to the necessity of discussing a system of economic measures directed against the Eastern bloc so that economic sanctions of an ever increasing degree can be applied. The more

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intensively I study economic conditions in the Eastern bloc, the more I am convinced that we are able to cause inconvenience to the Eastern bloc in the economic field.

I have asked Ambassador Grewe to present my ideas to you orally. Ambassador Grewe knows my considerations and has my full confidence. I should be most grateful if you would hold with him such a conversation, which would probably bring out my thoughts more distinctly than a long letter could.

With warm regards,

Yours very sincerely,

(sgd.) Adenauer

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Rec'd: August 31, 1961
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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 243, AUGUST 31, 6 P M

Downgraded to: SECRET
EO 11652: XGDS (2) 2 G
Auth: 3 E, [illegible] Amendment
August 4, 1978

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 243 INFORMATION LONDON POLTO 58, BONN POLTO 55

LONDON AND BONN FOR AMBASSADOR

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

I HAVE JUST SEEN DEPTELS 1152, 1156 AND 1206 RE INSTRUCTIONS TO NORSTAD ON MILITARY PLANNING RE BERLIN, WHICH WERE DELAYED IN RECEIPT. (SEPARATE TEL.)

THEY SHARPLY RAISE A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION WHIC WE WILL HAVE TO FACE UP TO SOMETIME, AND IN MY VIEW, SHOULD FACE UP TO NOW RATHER THAN LATER.

THE PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS TO NORSTAD (DEPTEL 1152) COULD EASILY BE SANITIZED BY THE REMOVAL OF REFERENCES TO PRIOR DIRECTIVES IN NUMBERED PARAS 3 AND 5, AND THERE IS NO OTHER PART THEREOF WHICH SHOULD NOT PROPERLY BE MADE AVAILABLE TO NAC.

WHILE IT IS OF COURSE ESSENTIAL VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS THAT ACTION WITH REGARD TO BERLIN BE PATENTLY UNDERTAKEN BY FRANCE-UK-US, IT IS RECOGNIZED BY EVERYONE THAT TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY MEASURES ON THE PART OF THE THREE MAY IMMEDIATELY BRING ABOUT COLLECTIVE DEFENSIVE ACTION BY THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. THIS IS AN INESCAPABLE FACT. THIS WAS INHERENT IN SECRETARY RUSK'S AUGUST 8 PRESENTATION AND

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WAS MADE CRYSTAL CLEAR BY NORSTAD'S PRESENTATION TO THE NAC AUGUST 23, WHO UNDERLINED THAT, AT THE TIME WHEN THE THREE WESTERN POWERS WOULD UNDERTAKE SOME SORT OF PROBING ACTION, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL THAT ALL NATO FORCES BE IN A POSTURE OF ALERT.

IT IS THUS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO DRAW ARTIFICIAL LINES BETWEEN THREE-POWER PLANNING AND NATO PLANNING, ALTHOUGH TECHNICAL TRANSFER OF MILITARY CONTROL, AS RECOGNIZED IN PARA 7 B OF DRAFT DIRECTIVE, WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT MERELY TO ENSURE SMOOTHNESS OF OPERATION.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IT MUST BE RECALLED THAT SACEUR IS AN OFFICER RESPONSIBLE TO NAC AND NOT RESPONSIBLE TO THREE OR FOUR WESTERN POWERS. DIRECTIVES TO SACEUR PROPERLY COME FROM THE COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL ALONE. THIS IS CLEARLY RECOGNIZED IN PARA 7 C OF HE DRAFT DIRECTIVE, AND IN RESPECT THERETO, I REPEAT THAT SUBJECT TO THE MINOR SANITIZATION I HAVE SUGGESTED, ALL OF THE REST OF THE DIRECTIVE ARE "PROVISIONS WHICH FALL WITHIN NATO COMPETENCE."

WHILE IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT PARA 5 RE REVISION OF PRESENT PLANS OF DIRECTIVE STILL CONSTITUTES "LIVE OAK" PLANNING AND THEREFORE RESPONSIBILITY OF THREE, THIS PARA CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM REST OF DIRECTIVE WHICH IS NATO-WIDE, AND IN ANY EVENT WHILE ACTION UNDER PARA 4 CONTINGENCIES MIGHT INITIALLY BE TRIPARTITE THEY COULD IMMEDIATELY INVOLVE ALL NATO, WHICH IN ANY EVENT SHOULD AT LEAST BE ON ALERT BEFORE TRIPARTITE ACTION TAKEN.

I AM THEREFORE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED TO SEE FROM DEPTEL 1206 THAT WE HAVE ACCEPTED MERELY TO INFORM NATO ABOUT THE DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL NORSTAD. THIS IS AN ARROGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE FOUR POWERS WHICH SIMPLY WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE. THE ALLIANCE WILL HAVE TO APPROVE ANY DIRECTIVE TO SACEUR.

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-3-, POLTO 243, AUGUST 31, 6 P.M. FROM PARIS

I AM CONFIDENT THAT IF WE PROPOSE THE DIRECTIVE SANITIZED AS I HAVE SUGGESTED WE WILL OBTAIN SPEEDY APPROVAL BY THE NAC. I AM EQUALLY CONFIDENT THAT IF WE MERELY INFORM THE COUNCIL OF A DIRECTIVE BY THE FOUR POWERS WE WILL CREATE THE MOST DIVISIVE SITUATION POSSIBLE WITH MOST GRAVE OVERTONES FOR SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE NOT ONLY IN OUR MILITARY PLANNING AND OUR WHOLE PROGRAM FOR BERLIN, BUT THE WHOLE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE.

I INFER WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE ACTED AS I HAVE INDICATED, BUT IN LIGHT OF THE FRENCH ATTITUDE HAVE ACCEPTED HE PROCEDURE RECOMMENDED IN DEPTEL 1206. IF IT IS THOUGHT THAT TAKING A SOUNDING WITH STIKKER WILL EVOKE THE SAME REACTION THAT I HAVE JUST SET FORTH, I CAN STATE WITH FULL CONFIDENCE THAT IT WILL GET THAT REACTION FROM HIM.

TO SUMMARIZE, WHAT I FEAR DEEPLY IS THAT IF WE MERELY INFORM THE NAC OF THIS DIRECTIVE, OR, EVEN MORE COMPLETELY UNSATISFACTORILY, OF A SUMMARY THEREOF, WE WOULD PUT AN INTOLERABLE STRAIN ON THE ALLIANCE AT THIS CRITICAL TIME, AND DO SO UNNECESSARILY.

I THEREFORE URGENTLY RECOMMEND YOUR MOST SERIOUS RECONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER.

X I SHALL AWAIT FURTHER WORD FROM YOU BEFORE PROCEEDING.

FINLETTER

MGG

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

762.00/8-3161

Approved in S: 9/19/61

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Memorandum of Conversation

153

DATE: August 31, 1961
2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Berlin

The Secretary's Office

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
The British Ambassador, Sir Harold Caccia
Lord Hood, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. Kohler - EUR
Mr. Holloway - GER

FOIC

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			[redacted] BERLIN

September 22, 1961

762.00/8-3161

Request for U.S. Statement on Negotiations with Soviets

Ambassador Caccia called at his own request to deliver an urgent message from the Foreign Secretary.

The Ambassador was instructed to urge that after the North Atlantic Council meeting of today either the President or the Secretary of State come out in a public statement, putting the onus upon the Soviets for lack of apparent progress toward negotiation over Berlin. The British are disturbed that Gromyko seems to be putting us off on our inquiry regarding his availability to receive a message from the Secretary of State at the United Nations General Assembly.

The Ambassador went on to say that while there are many people who will claim that the Soviet announcement of resumption of nuclear testing shows merely that negotiations are in any event hopeless, there are many more who will say that it is just one more "kick in the pants" which has been given to the West because it has not made any move toward negotiations which would tend to keep the Soviets from taking unilateral actions such as this. The Ambassador mentioned that George Brown (M.P.), who is at the moment acting for the Labour Party in foreign affairs, had made the latter point to the Foreign Office. The Ambassador said that such a statement would also leave to General de Gaulle the question of whether or not he would wish to disassociate himself from this announcement. Ambassador Caccia noted that both the

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United States and UK had done their utmost to accommodate the French on the matter of offering negotiations over Berlin.

The Secretary replied that our appreciation of the situation is very much the same as that of the British and that we do feel some public statement must be forthcoming. Ambassador Thompson is returning to Moscow this weekend and he will be instructed to press the point of attendance at the UNGA with Gromyko. The Secretary remarked that there could be a genuine side to USSR reluctance to reply if indeed Khrushchev is to lead the Soviet delegation at New York, but that this, of course, was not our question; we had asked specifically if Gromyko would be there. He also noted that should the Soviets be planning any unilateral action, particularly this weekend with regard to civil air access to Berlin, they might not want to cut across such action by prematurely disclosing anything which would indicate that channels for possible conversations had been opened.

The Ambassador said he was sure we agreed that the Soviet irresponsibility in this matter could not condone Western countries behaving irresponsibly toward their own peoples. Therefore, some statement would seem to be called for.

Arrangements for Western Foreign Ministers Meeting

The Ambassador went on to say that Lord Home was arriving on the 13th and would be entirely at the disposal of the Secretary for any meeting on the 14th. These could include luncheon, dinner, etc. Lord Home would like to see the Secretary first and if it would appear fruitful, he would then be prepared to see Couve de Murville.

Ambassador Caccia did say that he had to report that Lord Home was not enthusiastic about coming on the 14th as he thought any attempt to establish negotiating positions before the German elections would be unrealistic. The Secretary offered a general statement to this which, he said he was aware, needed details but which he sketched as follows. He felt the West should now prepare opening positions, as was decided at Paris, aiming toward an improvement of the status quo in Berlin and Germany. We would do this being well aware that while we would be delighted to have the Soviets accept these, we did not seriously expect them to. The Secretary said that he would envision that we could discuss with the USSR what are really both sides' proposals for improvements in the status quo. Then, in the face of disagreement over these, we would seek to find an alternative

to going to war, i.e., negotiate. The Secretary said he felt that the preparation of these opening positions could go ahead before the German elections on September 17.

The Secretary noted that we had heretofore believed that Premier Khrushchev was operating on a timetable, but that it now appeared there had been a change in the kind of program he had lead us to believe he had in mind. The Secretary presumed that the deterioration of the situation in Eastern Germany had dictated this speed-up.

Mr. Kohler and the Ambassador discussed the possibility of beginning work on Western positions on the 7th or on the 9th when Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh is planning to come to Washington.

Ambassador Caccia wanted to know if the Foreign Ministers could meet the President after their meeting on the 14th and the Secretary said he thought this could be arranged.

The Ambassador said Lord Home would like to meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Secretary said we would see to that.

GER:JKHolloway:fw
9/5/61

National Defense University [redacted]

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August 31, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The development of the international situation during recent weeks in Europe and elsewhere has considerably increased the tensions which led to the initial moves of our military build-up. In addition to the possible military requirements in support of our position on Berlin, we have engaged in planning for Southeast Asia which could result in the commitment of U.S. forces.

Our principal adversary, the USSR, is responding to the situation by halting the demobilization of several hundred thousand men, and by resuming nuclear testing. What should we do at this juncture?

As a first step, I should like to take another hard look at the progress of our military build-up, with particular reference to those measures which we originally decided to defer. For this purpose, I am asking the Secretary of State to call a meeting of the Steering Group next week. At this meeting, I would like to have you present your analysis of the military situation with recommendations as to any further expansion of our military forces in the light of the events of recent weeks.

/s/ John F. Kennedy

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cc:
Secretary of State

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SEP 5 - 1961

The Commander in Chief, United States Army Europe

1 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

1. I was taken in by General Clifton to meet the President about 1745 yesterday afternoon. Although the President must have had a terrific day, he was most interested and my 10 or 15 minutes were spent in answering rapid fire questions about many things. I do not think that at any time did I make a statement except to answer his questions because they came at me one after another and as fast as I answered the previous one. He asked questions about the morale of the troops; about how many troops I had; about how many dependents I had; about how good the troops were in Berlin; about the integration of colored troops in the command; and he asked questions as to where I got some of my decorations. He asked if there was anything to the report as to the troops in Berlin having inadequate or ineffective weapons. He made the statement as to the movement of the battle group into Berlin and pointed out that it was a fine operation. He ended by wishing me and my command well and pointing out the heavy responsibilities that probably would be facing us in the days ahead.

2. I mentioned no problems to him and, as I have pointed out, was kept on my toes answering questions. He did ask what General Goodpaster was doing and how he was doing.

Bruce

BRUCE C. CLARKE
General USA
Commander in Chief

Many thanks - it was a great honor to call on the President. Thanks for the lunch -
Bruce

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C-D/DST 71A 6487

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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1. There are indications that Soviets may invoke increased strictures on allied rights in Berlin including forceful interference with air access commencing as early as this weekend. As counter to such actions plan for and be prepared to institute reprisal measures at sea against USSR and GDR shipping when ordered by JCS.

.NOFORN

ZFF-6

DATE 1 TIME

MONTH Sep YEAR 61

WRITER

SYMBOL J-3

TYPED NAME AND TITLE W. D. Geddis, Capt, USN

PHONE 53772 PAGE NO. 1 NO. OF PAGES 3

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RELEASER

SIGNATURE Earle G. Wheeler

TYPED NAME AND TITLE EARLE G. WHEELER Lt General, USA Director

(N)

JCS 1342 (Sep 61) PAGE NR 1

JCS (SECDEF HAS SEEN)

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050-DA-JS-006-19

2. It is anticipated that stringency of measures and employment of force will be commensurate with provocation in Berlin. Reprisals may vary from control measures to ultimate seizure or sinking. Specific rules of engagement will be issued by JCS.

3. We anticipate that FRG, France, UK and other Allies will support or participate after consultation. However, plans should also envisage possible unilateral action. Minimal degradation of General War posture is desired at this time.

4. At this time the following actions are desired:

a. Within scope of current operations and employment conduct general surveillance of Soviet and GDR shipping is practicable.

b. Report to JCS location of any lend-lease ships under Soviet flag and other particularly appropriate shipping that are vulnerable to seizure or harassment.

5. Pending further instructions, planning should proceed on the basis that the following escalating action may be directed by the JCS:

a. Close surveillance, trailing USSR and GDR shipping to the extent that the surveillance is obvious.

b. Stopping of selected ships for visit and search.

c. Diversion of ships from selected areas.

d. Siezure of ships.

e. Sinking of Soviet and GDR shipping when encountered.

The above actions, unless directed otherwise, will be carried out only on the high seas or within the territorial waters of participating allies.

6. Planning should be on basis that interdiction of USSR and GDR shipping will be directed in one or more of the following specific areas:

a. North Sea and Aegean approaches to Danish and Turkish straits.

b. Approaches to CONUS.

c. Caribbean.

d. Approaches to Sea of Japan.

7. It should be appreciated that depending on severity of measures taken and Soviet reaction, the situation could deteriorate rapidly and lead quickly to expanded operations, including war at sea involving full scale ASW operations.

8. Comments and recommendations by addressees are invited. SCP 3.

ORIGIN : JCS
DISTR : CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC, DCSOP, ACSI, DCSPER, DCSLOG
JCS 1342 (Sep 61) DTG: 012213Z PAGE NR bjm/8

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State (421)

Lot 66D204

SECRET

EYES ONLY

Control: 1602
Rec'd: Sept 2 1961
5:08 PM

Action
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Info

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1200, SEPTEMBER 2, 4 PM

157

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT

AT CLOSE OF MY TALK WITH DE GAULLE THIS MORNING (REPORTED SEPARATELY) HE REQUESTED ME TO TAKE A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY MOST SINCERE AND LEANED FORWARD ON HIS DESK TO SAY, "I UNDERSTAND FULL WELL, BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE, THE WEIGHT AND SCOPE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S RESPONSIBILITIES. HE IS THE HEAD OF THE STATE WHICH IN THE WEST IS THE MOST POWERFUL. THEREFORE EVERYTHING DEPENDS MORE OR LESS ON HIM. THIS GIVES HIM A TREMENDOUS BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY. I AM AWARE OF THE WEIGHT OF THIS BURDEN AND IT IS WITH GREAT SYMPATHY AND FRIENDSHIP THAT I FOLLOW AND WITNESS HIS EFFORTS. IF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS TURNS FROM BAD TO WORSE WE WILL ENTER A CATASTROPHE. IF SUCH A CATASTROPHE OCCURS, FRANCE WILL ENTER IT TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES, IN ANY CASE. I SAY THIS ON BEHALF OF FRANCE, AND I CAN VOUCH FOR FRANCE. IF THERE IS TO BE NO CATASTROPHE, IT WILL HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT FOR THE FREE WORLD TO HAVE SHOWN FIRMNESS."

(IT IS GENERAL DE GAULLE'S IMPRESSION THAT I WILL PERSONALLY GIVE THE FOREGOING TO THE PRESIDENT, SO I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE WELL FOR ME TO SEE THE PRESIDENT EVEN THOUGH VERY BRIEFLY).

GAVIN

SECRET

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EYES ONLY

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XP France CF ("C")

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TOP SECRET

Control: 2192
Rec'd: SEPT 5, 1961
12:48 AM FOR

158

FROM: Belgrade

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 400, September 4, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

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APR 1964

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

Soviet Ambassador delivered personally to me Saturday night ten-page memo, without letterhead, of oral remarks he had been instructed to make to me, and had endeavored to make, on previous evening. In view length and tenor this document, shall not send it on over-burdened telegraphic channels but will pouch text earliest.

Document of interest primarily in that it formally accepts this channel communication saying that favorable attitude is taken in Moscow with regard these confidential contacts, that "in this initiative of the President, N. S. Khrushchev sees a manifestation of good will, and we are prepared from our side to reciprocate this manifestation." This relieves me of anxiety lest channel be jeopardized by minor intrigues or leaks in neither echelons in Soviet Embassy. I am taken back, however, by extent to which Soviet reply portrays my words as coming direct from President and exchanges as representing continuation Vienna exchange. Cannot recall saying anything to Ambassador that could have justified this other than pointing out, as had already been published in press, that I had seen both President and Secretary when recently in Washington. Reference to Vienna talks no doubt occasioned by Soviet impression that this, as distinct from formal exchanges with Embassy Moscow, represents strictly bilateral channel, involving no obligation of consultation or information vis-a-vis their allies or ours.

Substance of Ambassador's memo directed largely to Berlin /and

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and does little more than present Soviet views on this subject as made known on countless occasions. Of possible special interest is the following: "Neither the Soviet Government nor the GDR needs West Berlin ... in the capacity of a free city West Berlin will be able to maintain unhindered communications with any state in the world, and in whatever scope it itself considers necessary ... we have stated repeatedly that there can be no blockade of West Berlin".

This seems to go a bit farther than anything said publicly in offering unlimited communications to West Berlin on basis of agreement recognizing status as a free city.

Of further interest is a passage evidently designed to indicate that even after signature of peace treaty Soviet Government does not intend to take any immediate measures which would create practical difficulties for us in Berlin. In event of conclusion of unilateral treaty and establishment of West Berlin as demilitarized free city, the results, it is stated, "would be such that no vital interests of the US or of other Western Powers would be violated." Passage goes on, however, to say that GDR would have to be recognized de facto and its sovereignty accepted.

Ambassador ends passage about Berlin by saying, "I am ready, of course, to listen to anything which you have to communicate to the Government of the USSR".

Passage about Laos follows closely what I have already reported. Following excerpt is of special interest: "The Soviet Government has listened with satisfaction to the considerations in this respect put forward by Ambassador Kennan. Its understanding is that the Government of the USA is ready to move to a solution of the question of Laos on the basis of the recognition of the independence and neutrality of this country. The Soviet Government is following a similar approach to this question of Laos".

At another point it is said of our two governments "appear /to be

-3- 400, September 4, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF THREE) from Belgrade.

to be not far apart". Evidently referring to Pathet Lao, statement says, "we are aware that certain forces in Laos favor the independence and neutrality of that country, would support such a solution of the Laotian problem". It then goes on with cryptic suggestion that US has "possibility of influencing other forces in Laos in this direction". It ends with statement "I think it will be useful to continue the exchange of views on Laos". And invites views of our side. Final sentence: "We will be grateful if Ambassador Kennan will transmit the observations put forward here to President Kennedy and will in turn communicate his opinion to the head of the Soviet Government, N. S. Khrushchev".

KENNAN

AAL

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FROM: Belgrade

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 400, September 4, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

My own comments: Passage on Berlin differs so little, if at all, from publicized Soviet view that I can attach little importance to it. It fails, furthermore, to take account of recent menacing actions on Soviet side, notably splitting of Berlin, action on atomic tests, and opening of question of air corridors. Assuming your reaction to this is roughly same as mine, I think it might be best if I were authorized to make to Soviet Ambassador, when I see him on Wednesday, communication roughly on following lines, confirming it in writing as he did to me:

"I have noted carefully the statements you made to me on September 1 setting forth confidentially certain of your Government's views in the problems of Berlin and Laos, and I have not failed to communicate these views to the appropriate echelons of the US Government. So far as Berlin is concerned, I am authorized to say that while the Soviet view on Berlin, as you have set it forth, gives rise to many questions and contains certain assumptions to fact which it would be impossible for us to accept, it is one on which I might have been able to express certain views had it accorded better with the actions the Soviet Government has carried out in this recent period. If, as you say the Soviet Government believes, there are 'possibilities for seeking a peaceful solution which would correspond to the vital interests of both countries and would not diminish the honor and dignity of the Soviet Union, the USA or of our allies', we find this statement difficult to reconcile with the provocative actions

/taken

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-2- 400, September 4 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE) from Belgrade.

taken in Berlin, with manner of announcement of Soviet resumption of tests of nuclear weapons and reasons given therefor, and with action of Soviet Government in raising publicly question of air corridors to Berlin. These actions give us impression that if, as you claim, it is a purpose of Soviet Union to solve Berlin problem by peaceful negotiations and to achieve a relaxation of the present tension, this is not today the only tendency of Soviet foreign policy: there are other tendencies of a contradictory nature which are moving in precisely the opposite direction and which are dictating the actions of the Soviet Government while the sentiments you mention dictate its words. People in Washington have been obliged to question whether any useful purpose could be served by informal exchanges about the Berlin problem so long as such a situation endures".

KENNAN

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Control: 2194
Rec'd: SEPT 5, 1961 12:39 AM

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FROM: Belgrade

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 400, September 4, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

This might be followed by anything we have to say on Laos.

This would not give Soviet Ambassador much satisfaction at moment, but would serve to hold open channel of communication which I still believe at some point will prove valuable and perhaps even important to us.

Would like to add one word of personal comment on present situation. I find no encouraging explanations for recent Soviet behavior. I think we are already in zone of serious danger, and that greatest possible vigilance on part of our armed forces is in order. I cannot feel that this turn of events represents Khrushchev's preference, since I consider that for all his blustering, the program of economic development in which Russia is now engaged represents his pride and his passion and he does not wish to see it interrupted. He is, furthermore, aware of the general unpredictability, with the likelihood of tremendous devastations, which attaches to any general war. I feel, therefore, that his mind must be being forced by elements to which, for some reason, these considerations of restraint are less persuasive. I think we must take full account of danger this presents. On other hand, as prospect of war comes closer, I think it possible further divisive effect may be produced on Soviet leadership by gravity of policy decisions that present themselves. We ought to have, together with greatest military

vigilance,

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vigilance, public diplomatic position of complete readiness to negotiate and compose outstanding differences this way. So long as present tension exists, such posture will encourage divisive tendencies by holding out plausible alternative to war. If then, as we may still hope, there is at any time a moderation of present Soviet course, we will be in position to take advantage of it and to encourage it, instead of being caught flat-footed.

One more point. Present situation is so grave and our own responsibility in non-Communist world so great that we are essentially on our own. We must, of course, do our utmost to preserve unity and confidence in NATO camp but we cannot let petty inhibitions of our allies, or even desire for moral support in unaligned camp, paralyze our action in any of the great decisions. In last analysis, everyone is counting on us and will hold us ultimately responsible. This being so, I think we must be prepared to act in the great decisions primarily on our own conscience and responsibility.

Hope you and President will forgive my stating these views, which represent my deep convictions as I watch current events unfold against background of Belgrade conference and which, having once stated, I shall endeavor not to repeat.

KENNAN

LM

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(3)

Control: 2600
Rec'd: September 5, 1961
2:54 pm

(159)

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 423, SEPTEMBER 5, 5 PM

PRIORITY

762.0221
NK. 762.00

ACTION DEPARTMENT 423, BONN PRIORITY 376, INFORMATION LONDON 288, PARIS 300, MOSCOW 279, POLAD USAREUR 239.

PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE.

REF OURTEL 419 DEPT, 374 BONN

MEETING BETWEEN US COMMANDANT GENERAL WATSON AND SOVIET COMMANDANT COL SOLOYVEV TOOK PLACE AT US HEADQUARTERS AS SCHEDULED AT 10 AM THIS MORNING.

COL SOLOVYYEV'S REMARKS FOLLOWED IN GENERAL BROAD LINES OF ADN PRESS RELEASE. HOWEVER HIS PRESENTATION WAS ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT IN TONE. IN PARTICULAR HE DID NOT USE INSULTING WORDING THAT "SOVIET HIGH COMMAND, NOT AMERICAN COMMANDANT IN WEST BERLIN, DETERMINES POWERS OF SOVIET COMMANDANT." INSTEAD HE STATED HIS POWERS WERE DETERMINED BY SOVIET HIGH COMMAND JUST AS POWERS US COMMANDANT WERE DETERMINED BY US HIGH COMMAND. IN EMBARRASSED FASHION, COL SOLOYVEV OPENED HIS REMARKS BY REFERENCE TO PREMATURE PRESS RELEASE, BUT GAVE NO EXPLANATION.

GENERAL WATSON COMMENTED FIRST THAT SOVIET PRESS RELEASE ABOUT VISIT HAD BEEN ERRONEOUS, AND IN FACT, ISSUED BEFORE VISIT TOOK PLACE. IT WAS DIFFICULT, HE SAID, TO DISCUSS AND SETTLE ANY MATTERS WHEN THEY ARE PUT OUT TO PRESS IN ADVANCE. GENERAL WATSON VALUED HIS CANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO SOVIET COMMANDANT, BUT SUCH PROCEDURI DID NOT FACILITATE GOOD COMMUNICATION.

GENERAL WATSON STATED THAT WE ADHERED TO ORIGINAL FOUR-POWER

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AGREEMENTS CONCERNIG BERLIN, THAT WE REJECTED COMPLETELY THE NOTION THAT WEST BERLIN IS LOCATED ON TERRITORY OF SO-CALLED GDR AND THAT WE RECOGNIZE ONLY SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT TAKES PLACE IN SOVIET SECTOR BERLIN. DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL IN WEST BERLIN, GERMAN WATSON STATED, RESULTED FROM ACTIONS OF CERTAIN CIVILIANS, BUT THAT IN EVERY INSTAN WEST BERLIN POLICE AND US MILITARY WHEN ON HAND HAD INTERVENED TO ASSIST SOVIET PERSONNEL. IT WAS COMPLETELY ERRONEOUS THAT US PERSONNEL HAVE CONDONED OR PARTICIPATED IN ANY ACTIONS AGAINST SOVIET PERSONNEL. IN FACT, OFFERS OF US MILITARY ESCORT TO SOVIET PERSONNEL HAD BEEN MADE TO AVOID INCIDENTS. IN CONTRAST TO CIVILIAN SOURCES OF SOVIET DIFFICULTIES IN WEST BERLIN, US PERSONNEL HAD EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES FROM UNIFORMED PERSONNEL IN EAST BERLIN. GENERAL WATSON THEN REFERRED TO DIFFICULTIES AT SECTOR BORDERS AND FACT EAST GERMAN BORDER GUARDS WERE STILL THROWING TEAR GAS AND WATER INDISCRIMINATELY INTO WEST BERLIN - US PATROLS ON WEST BERLIN TERRITORY THEMSELVES HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO TEAR GAS AND WATER THROWN. IN ADDITION THERE HAD BEEN RIFLE FIRE INTO WEST BERLIN TERRITORY. HE THEN MENTIONED COL SOLOYVEV'S REFERENCE TO VERY FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN SOVIETS AND EAST GERMAN REGIME AND SUGGESTED THAT COL MIGHT USE THESE FRIENDLY RELATIONS TO PUT A STOP TO SUCH INCIDENTS.

LIGHTNER

SGC

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NLK, NSF 12

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September 5, 1961
11:07 p.m.

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ACTION: ~~SECSTATE~~

Amembassy BONN Priority 576
Amembassy PARIS Priority 1312
Amembassy LONDON Priority 1186
USBER BERLIN Priority 264

Paris pass USRO Stoessel McGuire

Deptel 577 to BONN, PARIS 1313, LONDON 1187, BERLIN 265, MOSCOW 684

Following are instructions to Norstad referred to reftel:

QUOTE.

1. As USCINCEUR, you will take the following actions in the event civil air access to West Berlin is impeded by USSR/GDR actions:

a. In the event that civil air traffic to Berlin is stopped by administrative actions on the part of the USSR/GDR (refusal by Soviet Controller in Berlin Air Safety Center to guarantee safety of flights in corridor or imposing regulations requiring civil flights to land in East Berlin or East German airfield), U. S. military air transport will be substituted for U. S. civil aircraft and flights will proceed without repeat without fighter escort.

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Drafted by: GER:JKHOLLOWAY

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: GER - M.J.Hillenbrand

Clearances:

Defense: JCS: General Gray (in substance)

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2. In carrying out the above actions the following Rules of Engagement will apply:

a. In the event U.S. military aircraft flying in the Berlin air corridors come under USSR/GDR air attack fighter aircraft ordered to the assistance of these U.S. xxxxx transport aircraft may take aggressive protective measures against the attacking force (during the course of the attack) including, if necessary and feasible, IMMEDIATE PURSUIT of the attacking force into hostile air space. The use of IMMEDIATE PURSUIT is subject to the following restrictions:

(1) Such pursuit will not include prolonged pursuit deep into hostile air space;

(2) Commanders are not authorized deliberately and systematically to organize a pursuing force.

b. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT of USSR/GDR aircraft into hostile air space is solely an authorized measure for USAFE fighter pilots to protect themselves and transport aircraft. USAFE fighter pilots will not persist in the attack when it is clearly determined that the hostile aircraft has withdrawn and the safety of the USAFE personnel and aircraft is assured.

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b. If U.S. civil air traffic is stopped by USSR/GDR military action, U.S. military air transport will be substituted for civil U.S. aircraft and you are authorized at your discretion to provide them with fighter protection. You are similarly authorized to provide fighter protection if military transports are harassed by USSR/GDR military action.

If the event the USSR/GDR military action involves ground-to-air action and you consider it unwise to provide escort under Rules of Engagement (see below), you should request new instructions Washington.

c. If unescorted U.S. military air transports are harassed by USSR/GDR fighters, the pilot, in consideration of the safety of his aircraft, passengers and crew, will determine whether he should proceed on course, return to West Germany/Berlin or land at an East German/Berlin airfield.

In carrying out the provisions of paragraph 1 c, briefing of pilots should emphasize that the important principle of U.S. right of access to West Berlin is involved and the pilot should make every effort to continue on course to destination despite harassment.

d. The first U.S. military air transpott flight immediately following stoppage of U.S. ~~x~~ civil air traffic ~~xhxk~~ should be made without passengers.

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3. In the event U.S. aircraft come under attack by AAA fire or missiles positioned inside or outside the corridors, aircraft under attack will take a evasive action and withdraw. The incident will be reported to Washington and further guidance will be provided. AAA, missile sites, or other ground targets will not repeat not be attacked with without specific approval of Washington. UNQUOTE.

RUSK

Rusk Files, Lot 72 D 192

(424)

(161)

WEDNESDAY
September 6, 1961
7:27 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO AMB GREWE

The Sec said he is very much concerned by the release of the essential elements in the Pres' reply to Adenauer by their Fonoff. G said "Did they?" The Sec told of the substance in Dowling's wire. The Sec said he recognizes this is a difficult time in Germany in the heat of an election but it is extremely embarrassing to us to be caught up in these problems in a way which may prejudice our good relations later on. He gathers too the VP has been drawn into it and he is determined not to have any further part in it under these conditions. The Sec hopes G will let them know we are distressed about any involvement of the US in the election campaign. G does not know if the Sec got word from Hillenbrand about what he talked with him this p.m. The Sec said no - he had been talking with Kohler. The problem, said G, is during the last few days the advertising of the Democratic Party gives an historical account of the critical days and it is entirely wrong. They were very much interested only to give the historical account of events - wanted to get out of this embarrassment. G does not know if it is in connection with this letter, but that has been a problem. The Sec said he supposed we will have to live through this strenuous period but it is embarrassing for us to be drawn into these problems - and he asked that it be passed on.

pdb

S/S

EUR

Done 9/6/61

Rusk Files
Lot 72D192
(426)
162

WEDNESDAY
September 6, 1961
10:38 a. m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR BUNDY

The Sec returned the call and B said he has set up a Steering Group meeting Thursday but not sure about Friday morning on the political side. Thursday is military planning. The Sec said actually the smaller the better - McNamara, two at the WH, Kohler and Nitze if McNamara so wishes. B said if there is going to be a piece of paper for Friday the easy point of distribution would be the end of the Thursday meeting. The Sec will talk with Kohler on it. B will set the mtg up. TheSec thinks we are not going to be able at the FM mtg to go beyond an offer to which B agreed.

B asked if the Pres should be started off the things he was talking about for the 21st or can something be done. The Sec thinks something can be done but he did not want to argue about it yesterday. The Sec does not believe we can get this settled without war if we play it on a week-to-week public relations point of view. We have to handle it ... if ever we needed prayers, skill and professionalism, we need it for this problem but they agreed fresh ideas and keeping the people informed are important too. If some things were said publicly it would be a shock in Germany. The Bonn-Berlin telegrams are the troublesome ones. The Sec knows what is bothering the Pres and hopes in a couple of days we will be in a position to say more publicly. B said the Pres mentioned it to him and B talked with Kohler. Intelligence gossip says it looks as though they are cooking something for next week and the Pres' position should be clear by the end of the week. B mentioned that on the PM's letter which crossed the Pres' to him the Pres' inclination is to say while the matter is being studied it is not profitable to go into the SC. The GA is a longer-range matter.

pdb

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SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE — of — Copies Series

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

(163) SEP 7 1961 (427)

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S
G

FROM: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

SUBJECT: White House Meeting Scheduled for 11:00 A.M. September 8 on Berlin Negotiations

I shall have with me for distribution at the meeting copies of the attached papers: (a) Ministerial decisions on Report of Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin, covering inter alia, the work to be done by the Ambassadorial Steering Group on possible negotiating positions, and (b) the two versions of a modified Western Peace Plan which I sent to you yesterday. The following are suggested talking points which you may wish to use in describing where we are at present:

1. For various reasons, including the German elections and the problem of leaks, we are not yet in a position to come to grips with our Allies in developing basic negotiating positions. Internally, within the Department of State, we have been giving some thought to what these might be, but on a very restricted basis.

2. Hence, at the forthcoming meeting of the Four Western Foreign Ministers (scheduled to begin in Washington on September 14) and in the preparatory work to be done in the Four-Power Working Group, it would seem wise not to try, on American initiative, to go beyond the preparation of the Western opening position at any conference.

3. As far as our public position is concerned, the President is in a reasonably good position, if pressed to say something on negotiations, to point out that it takes two sides to negotiate. We have indicated publicly that the Soviet peace treaty and the free city demands are unacceptable. People are generally aware that the U.S. favors entering into negotiations with the Soviets in order to attempt to seek a peaceful solution of the Berlin crisis, while at the same time we are increasing our military strength and urging our Allies to do likewise.

4. Under no circumstances should the President attempt to discuss publicly the possible substance of our negotiating position until after the Foreign Ministers meeting in mid-September. This is not a subject on which we should comment unilaterally.

5. After the

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5. After the Foreign Ministers' meeting it may be possible to put forward certain proposals, e.g., the possible all-German plebiscite, or to indicate that we have a revised version of the Western Peace Plan.

6. As far as our Allies are concerned, during the forthcoming meetings we contemplate stressing the immediate need to come up with an agreed revision of the Western Peace Plan, an agreed proposal for an all-German plebiscite, an all-Berlin proposal, a possible West Berlin plebiscite, and possibly certain refinements of Solution C with a view to defining what might be for us satisfactory practical arrangements which would safeguard in fact the present system of access to Berlin.

7. Should the six points come up which were discussed at a White House meeting as indicated in the attached TOP SECRET paper, you may wish to note that this seems to be a rather disparate bag, one item of which, such as the plebiscite in West Berlin, will be considered in the forthcoming meetings. The item on the International Court of Justice was rejected by our Allies in drafting the reply to the Soviet Aide Memoire handed to the President in Vienna, and there has been little enthusiasm for it since.

8. Drawing up language for any of these items will not be difficult, and certain texts are already available. The problem is making up our minds whether we want to espouse any or all of them in the light of their implications for U.S. policy and the Western Alliance. In any event, we certainly would not wish to air iii, iv or v in the forthcoming meetings. (Some of these have been embodied in the six-part package prepared as a result of the discussion by the small group in your office.)

Attachments:

Tab A - Ministerial Decisions on Report of Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin
Tab B - Two Versions of Modified Western Peace Plan
Tab C - Excerpt from Report of White House Meeting (TOP SECRET)

EUR:GER:LJWillenbrand:all
9/7/61

TOP SECRET
ATTACHMENT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State [redacted] PERMANENT RE

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TOP SECRET

Control: 4443
Rec'd: September 7, 1961
6 pm

FROM: Belgrade

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 438, September 7, Noon

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EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

Met with my Soviet colleague last evening. Transmitted to him statement approved by Department's instructions. Told him that was all I could say to him on behalf of people at home with regard to general state of tension in Berlin. He had no particular statement to make to me under instructions on this occasion.

I put to him questions indicated about Laos. He will try to get answers. He said it was his understanding Soviet readiness to see foreign armed personnel removed from Laos included CMICOMS and Viet Minh. He inquired our thoughts as to time limit on a control organization, ie whether its life should be considered indefinite or whether it should be for period of removal of foreign personnel. I undertook to get clarification our views on this.

There then followed long conversation in which I made it plain I could only speak as individual. Following of particular interest.

I pointed to high state of tension and nervousness and desirability that more normal atmosphere be created in interests possible future negotiation. He said he did not think atmosphere would become more normal unless both of us made positive effort to normalize it. I asked what he thought we could do in this situation, pointing out danger that any conciliatory move we might make would be exploited by Soviet propaganda machine as sign of weakness and used to undermine confidence in us in Berlin and elsewhere. He

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REVIEW	REVIEW
ASSIGNED TO	TODAY
NAME OF OFFICER	DATE OF ACTION
OFFICE SYMBOL	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

said he could assure me with greatest of certainty that such a move would be appreciated and reciprocated.

He complained that all proposals to date had come from their side. We had come forward with nothing. So long as this was the case, he thought atmosphere would continue to deteriorate. He said Soviet Government had not intended to confront us with ultimatum. They felt they had no choice but to go ahead with peace treaty. Within that framework there were many alternatives. If we could only accept existence of two Germanies, which did not necessarily mean de jure recognition of GDR, matters could be settled in many ways. Let us have your proposals, he said, about Western Berlin. How do you want the communications? What would you like to do about troops? We can play it in a number of ways. You can propose your own troops, you can propose UN Forces, you can propose neutrals; we will consider any sort of proposal along these lines.

I gathered from his observations Soviet Government has only two wholly irreducible demands: (A) That they must be permitted to sign peace treaty and (B) That we give de facto recognition to Ulbricht under formula of recognition of two Germanies. About remainder, he inferred they were prepared to be flexible.

I said I would pass this view along. I emphasized again, however, that recent Soviet actions had not served to create confidence in Soviet good will when it came to negotiations. These actions seemed to have been dictated by elements within the Soviet Government whose preservation of peace and peaceful settlements of disputes was not main purpose. Here, pointing to his membership in Central Committee and his acquaintanceship with Khrushchev, he assured me with great definiteness that there was no group in the Soviet Union which wanted war and which had anything to do with running affairs. I pointed to Communist China, saying that as he knew there was nothing would suit Peking better than war between Russia and the US and

 that

that we could never tell how much these sentiments were shared in Soviet apparatus of power. He would not comment on China but reasserted categorically his denials concerning Soviet Union.

Since both of us have to leave Belgrade to attend opening of Zagreb Fair, we arranged to meet next Wednesday.

I have feeling this channel of communication is now well established; original nervousness is gone, and we have better idea how now to achieve clarity in our discussions.

KENNAN

FH

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State NLK, NSF 92

43-W
Action

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Info

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TOP SECRET

Control: 6126
Rec'd: Sept. 9, 1961
1:04 A.M.

165

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

022

NO: 1341, SEPTEMBER 8, 8 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1341; INFORMATION BONN 152, BERLIN 84

FROM SHOESMITH.

REFERENCE: BONN'S 161 TO PARIS.

GENERAL NORSTAD FULLY CONCURS IN AMBASSADOR DOWLING'S RECOMMENDATION THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO SHORT AGGRESSIVE COURSE OF ACTION IN FORCING ENTRY AT FRIEDRICHSTRASSE CROSSING POINT. AS INSTRUCTIONS STAND AT PRESENT, HE CONSIDERS THEM WEAK AND FEARS THAT OUR BACKING DOWN IN FACE OF OBSTACLES WHICH MIGHT BE SET UP AT CROSSING POINT WOULD GREATLY DAMAGE OUR PRESTIGE. GENERAL NORSTAD PREVIOUSLY SENT MESSAGE TO GENERAL LEMNITZER IN THIS SENSE.

GENERAL NORSTAD ALSO SUPPORTS AMBASSADOR DOWLING'S RECOMMENDATION THAT INSTRUCTIONS BE ISSUED TO ENSURE MORE CONSISTENT RESPONSES TO ALL GDR ENCROACHMENTS ON SECTOR BORDER. HE ASSUMES THIS SUBJECT WILL BE CONSIDERED BY AMBASSADORIAL GROUP IN WASHINGTON, BUT HE HAS ALSO REFERRED MATTER TO LIVE OAK GROUP HERE FOR STUDY.

LYON

ELP/22

Reference is Bonn's 540 to Department, Sept. 7, 1961.

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Pretty Correspondence
See Vol V p. 5

77D163

-130

SECRET

The New York Times
37 Rue Caumartin
NOD Paris, France

Col A

Reviewed by P. Walker, FSO-3
10/Dec 1973

C.L. SULZBERGER

166

Sept. 10, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

Mr. Khrushchev asked me to deliver a message to you which I am herewith doing. I am most embarrassed about the circumstances involved and being in a position of serving as his messenger and by-passing Ambassador Thompson, my old and valued friend.

I specifically told Mr. Khrushchev the quickest, safest and most effective way of sending you a message was via Ambassador Thompson. But he adduced curious reasons, which are appended to the message I enclose, for not using that channel.

I talked to Ambassador Thompson about all this -- without passing on the message itself which I felt obligated not to do. Tommy suggested that as soon as I reached the "outer world" I should send the message directly which I am now doing.

If, without being presumptuous, I may express the hope that Tommy be filled in as soon as conveniently possible, I do so. I do not like this position. And naturally that applies to Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bohlen.

It had been my original intention to leave Moscow for Baghdad and then Belgrade and, after a short stay in Paris and London, to go to the U.S.A. in early October. However, if for any reason it was desired that I should come to the United States earlier in order to be of small service in giving my impressions of all this, I would of course be happy to do so; if a message could be sent to me.

Assuring you of my embarrassment in connection with the attached and of my best wishes, I am,

Respectfully yours,

Cy Sulzberger

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"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

Lot 77D163

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

431

167

~~EYES ONLY~~

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

TOP SECRET

American Embassy,
Paris, France,
September 10, 1961.

Dear Dean:

I would be grateful if you would see that the enclosed envelope is handed directly to Mr. Sorenson as quickly as possible. It is important.

Best regards,

Hastily,

Cecil B. Lyon

Dean Brown, Esquire,
Deputy Director,
Office of Western European Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosures:
Envelope addressed to Mr. Sorenson.
Copy, my letter to Mr. Sorenson.

TOP SECRET

NODIS REVIEW
Cat. A) Caption removed;
Cat. B - Transferred
with enclosure
Cat. C - Caption on
removed by
Reviewed by: P. Vaughan, FJO-1
10/24

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

77D163

~~EYES ONLY~~

TOP SECRET

American Embassy,
Paris, France,
September 10, 1961.

Dear Mr. Sorenson:

Cy Sulzberger was given a message from Mr. Khruschev with the request that it be delivered promptly to the President by Cy. He immediately told Mr. Khruschev that the quickest way to get a message to Mr. Kennedy was through Ambassador Thompson. Mr. Khruschev indicated that he had high confidence in Ambassador Thompson but there were particular reasons why he wanted the message to go directly and only to the President.

Mr. Sulzberger talked this over with Tommy Thompson, explaining how embarrassing it was for him. Tommy advised Cy that once he got outside Russia that he get the message to the President through us here in Paris. Here it is, sealed as Cy handed it to me. Cy trusts that you will be able to deliver it to the President.

The Ambassador is not getting back from the United States until late tonight, that is why I am writing you.

NODIS REVIEW
Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S
1994
Reviewed by P. Wilson F10-3
Date 10/Lx

With every good wish,

Hastily,

Yours sincerely,

Cecil B. Lyon

The Honorable
Theodore C. Sorenson,
Special Counsel to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

PS: Cy did not think the message so urgent as require mo rapid means of tr mission.

Enclosure: Sealed envelope, as stated.

CBL:mer 9/10/61

~~TOP~~ SECRET

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"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE

SECRET

~~EYES ONLY~~

-o-

This was given to me on Tuesday, September 5. Mr. K. had been talking at length off-the-record, giving his impressions of President Kennedy. He then said, adjuring me once again that this was off-the-record:

"If you are personally in a position to meet President Kennedy, I wish you would tell him that I would not be loath to establishin some sort of informal contact with him to find a means of settling the crisis without damaging the prestige of the United States -- but on the basis of a German peace treaty and a Free City of West Berlin.

"The President might say what is in his mind concerning ways of solving the problem -- if he agrees in principle with the peace treaty and a Free City. Otherwise, there is no use in contacts.

"If he does wish some settlement he could, through informal contact voice his opinion on various forms and stages and on how to prepare public opinion and not endanger the prestige of the United States or Mr. Kennedy."

-o-

I then expressed the opinion that this message left no leeway for discussion by "informal contacts" since it stated unacceptable preconditions and he himself had said that without their acceptanc there was "no use in contacts."

Furthermore, I said the quickest, most trustworthy way of passing on such ideas to the President was through Ambassador Thompson.

Mr. Khrushchev then said he regarded Ambassador Thompson as an "able and well-informed, reliable" ambassador but that he would be duty-bound to pass on any such message through Secretary Rusk. Secretary Rusk would then tell President Kennedy what was "wrong" with Mr. Khrushchev's ideas before the President had had a chance to read it. Rusk was, in effect, a "tool" of the "Rockefellers" and would be seeking to influence President Kennedy's reactions a priori.

Mr. Khrushchev then again asked me to pass this message on direct to the President which I am doing. He stressed the fact that he considered "informal contacts" would be very useful and that it would be helpful if President Kennedy got word to him on how and by what means he wished to make such "informal contacts", should he do so.

(more)

NODIS REVIEW
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END

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On Wednesday,Sept.6,Yuri Zhukov (who was present at this talk) raisedx the matter with me again. I expressed the view that the message was not nearly so important as Mr. Khrushchev seemed to think and that the pre-conditions stated made it virtually useles Zhukov said that on the contrary Mr. Khrushchev regarded it as most important.

He repeated this to me with much urgency again on Thursday,Sept. 7,after he had spent some time with Mr. Khrushchev.I said that si Mr. Khrushchev had expressed interest in seeing Mr. Kennedy himself (by a special note to me on Thursday) that it seemed wiser for him to establish direct contacts through the usual channels. Zhukov strongly contradicted this and urged upon me once again the importance of passing on the message.

-o-

I did not feel I could flatly refuse to bear this message since I am in no position to judge its importance -- which still seems no questionable to me. Nevertheless,Mr. Khrushchev enjoined me as "a honorable man" not to reveal the contents of our off-the-record talk -- which,of course,I shall not publish but some of which I append herewith as a clue to his thinking.And he also enjoined me to see that this got directly to the President and not via the State Department,a most embarrassing task as I said to Mr. Khrushchev.

And I apologize to all concerned for this strange dodging act.

-o-

Mr. Khrushchev expressed the opinion that President Kennedy was in a difficult political position although he had a much "broader outlook than President Eisenhower and that Mr. Kennedy was "a wor partner" to him,Mr. Khrushchev. But he was "contaminated" by Rusk the Rockefeller agent,as Eisenhower had been by Dulles. Etcetera, etcetera.Mr. Kennedy understood that the U.S.A. "can't win" on this Berlin issue "but he can't back out;he's not a lawyer,he's a President." Roosevelt would have settled;but Mr. Kennedy "lacks the necessary prestige.He doesn't want to fight. Only an idiot wants war."

Mr. Khrushchev continually expressed a desire in "helping" Mr. Kennedy to find his way out of the impasse.

-o-

MY IMPRESSION

It is possible to accept Mr. Khrushchev's rigid ideas at face value. If so this message is ridiculous. However -- and this is why I am rushing to send the message scrupulously as he wished -- it is also possible that something quite different is involved.

(more)

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The two points seemingly stressed by Mr. Khrushchev were "prestige" and "informal contacts" which should not be through normal diplomatic channels. The prestige,as he expressed it,only applied to President Kennedy and tye United States. The mistrust of usual diplomacy,as he expressed it,was because of that Rockefeller ager Secretary Rusk.

However,it is entirely possible that Mr. Khrushchev is thinking o his own and Russia's prestige and that he mistrusts his own forei office (possibly for internal political reasons) more than our State Department, and wants help getting off the hook.

Obviously,I am in no position to know this;perhaps not even to speculate.

Nevertheless,I think it worth noting these possibilities -- the only ones which,to me,make any sense at all to the message and his apparently urgent desire to see it delivered.

-o-

Paris,Sept. 10,1961

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National Defense University 38 505 Berlin Conf Files ③

(CORRECTED COPY)

Berlin Conf Mem

168

September 11, 1961

432

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

This week I should like to resume our discussion of Berlin contingencies with a run-down of planned reactions - political, military, and economic - to the most likely situations which may arise, and a review of the status of Allied agreement to these reactions. I have appended a list of a number of areas which I would like to cover in this review. You may wish to add others.

In considering these contingencies I would like to be reminded of the length of time required to react effectively in the way we propose, the degree of acceptance of dealing with East Germans implicit in our plans, and the circumstances under which our armed forces will be authorized to use their weapons.

I am also interested in knowing when and under what circumstances we would expect to use West German forces if the East Germans confront us. What if it is the East German air force which obstructs air access?

JFK addition

/s/ J.F.K.

COPIES: Mr. Bundy
The Attorney General
Mr. Hitch

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CONFIDENTIAL

September 12, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 93

TO: Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Berlin Build-up

The President approved, on September 7, 1961, the following actions recommended in Secretary of Defense McNamara's September 7, 1961 memorandum, entitled Status of Berlin Build-up and Planning:

1. Outward movements to Western Europe of dependents of U.S. armed forces personnel serving in that area are to be suspended, effective 30 days after the prompt announcement to do so. Appropriate exceptions would be made, including an exception for dependents of personnel assigned to Berlin.

2. [redacted] movement to Europe of 37,000 Army personnel to bring the Seventh Army and other Army units to full strength.

McGeorge Bundy

[redacted]

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General Taylor

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cy 3, 4 declassified 8/17/[illegible]

170

434

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1961

9/13/61

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary Rusk

FROM: W. W. Rostow

You may wish to consider the following proposal: namely, that a part of General Clay's mission should be to launch forthwith certain concrete initiatives in West Berlin designed to strengthen the long-run foundations for West Berlin morale by providing a mission which transcends the reasonably comfortable life within the enclave.

I assume it is agreed that in order to preserve the viability of West Berlin as a community, something more will be required in the face of the barbed wire than, merely, guaranteed access. Since Berlin's East-West mission is in doubt, it is appropriate to look for larger missions within the free world.

Once this concept is accepted, I am sure many suggestions will be forthcoming. At the moment, there are two: the expansion of training for men from the underdeveloped areas within the West Berlin University; and the purposeful focusing of the West Berlin electrical industry on the training of men, the manufacture of equipment and the provision of technical assistance in the electricity and electronics fields for the underdeveloped areas.

General Clay's great energies might fruitfully be put to work on these and other projects. In particular, his prestige and bargaining skill could induce increased commitments of talent and attention (as well as money) from West Germany for West Berlin.

But most important of all, I think it is time to start now -- in the midst of the crisis itself -- to build these longer-run bases for the psychological life of West Berlin rather than to do these things in the wake of the further deterioration of morale which might set in as the shape of the settlement emerges.

These proposals should not make us -- or our Allies -- flag in our efforts to find some new East-West missions for West Berlin (e.g., the transfer of the Economic Commission for Europe from Geneva); nor, indeed, to flag in our efforts to get the barbed wire and concrete down by peaceful means.

SECRET

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Alexis USF 56 Clay

(171)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

13 September 1961

(437)

MEMORANDUM FOR

HONORABLE FOY D. KOHLER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Berlin Items Raised at White House Staff Meeting this Morning.

At the regular White House Staff Meeting this morning, a few suggestions were raised, and I was asked to refer them to an appropriate forum for consideration. It occurred to me immediately that an appropriate forum would be the Berlin Task Force, and, if you agree, perhaps you would raise these matters there at what you consider to be an opportune time.

In no special order, the points raised were as follows:

a. It was pointed out that despite the necessary current stress on such matters as Allied access rights, it was becoming increasingly important to develop measures and proposals which will have the effect of sustaining and raising the morale of the West Berliners. In this connection, it was specifically suggested that General Clay might be able to devote some of his time to the promotion of West Berlin's industrial health, especially in ways which would clearly imply confidence in the long range future viability of the city. Even more specifically, it was suggested that greater attention might be devoted to placing in West Berlin orders for products required in the several under-developed areas of the world.

b. In response to reports from several sources concerning the alleged planning of provocations in Berlin by East Germans (and in one case even by Poles disguised as West Germans), it was suggested that it might be appropriate to arrange to leak some of this information to the press, thus putting the East Germans on notice that we are aware of this activity and, conceivably, helping to scotch it. There have been press reports on this subject recently, but apparently from German sources only.

(Signed) L. L. Legere Jr.
Colonel, USA

g. As a part of promoting an increasingly international aspect to Berlin's image, it might be appropriate to explore the removal of the Economic Commission for Europe from Geneva to West Berlin.

L. J. LECHEE, Jr.
Colonel, USA
Assistant to the Military
Representative of the President

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State NLK NSF 9/1

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SO

ACTION: USMER BERLIN 330 PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy BONN 701 PRIORITY
Amembassy LONDON 1371 PRIORITY
Amembassy MOSCOW 775 PRIORITY
Amembassy PARIS 1521 PRIORITY

022

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PARIS FOR STOESSEL, McGUIRE, USRO

REF: USCINCEUR 391 and 164; BONN'S 501 and 510; MERSHAD'S FCS 222b and USMER msg ALO 70b

Following decisions taken today at White House on action to be taken in event difficulties at Steinstuecken and Friedrichstrasse crossing points:

1. Steinstuecken: In event incident inside Steinstuecken or interrupted German access caused by GOSR/GER, US Commander, Berlin authorized to despatch vehicular mounted and/or helicopter borne military police patrol to Steinstuecken to test Communist intentions. In event situation requires assembly in assembly area outlined in Course of Action B (EC-CPLAN 3-3 dated 18 April 1961), or despatch of task force outlined in Course of Action C, instructions must first be obtained from Washington.

2. Friedrichstrasse: Previous instructions contained in JCS msg 1265 of August 26 still effective. In addition when access point Friedrichstrasse first closed to Allied movements, USCINCEUR authorized order movement additional military forces to sector border area generally. At same time (subject to tripartite approval which being sought here)

S/S:EUR:SOV:DSteinhall 9/1/61	GER - Martin J. Hillenbrand

EUR - Mr. Kohler (in draft)
S/S - Mr. Olsen

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FORM DS-322

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here) all Soviet personnel except those assigned BASC will be barred from West Berlin.

RUSK

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"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

OF 1950

[redacted]

September 15, 1961.

437

EYES ONLY - [redacted]

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE [redacted]

Subject: Breakfast Meeting with Ambassador Menshikov
Soviet Embassy, Washington, 8:45 a.m.

Menshikov stated that he had seen Khrushchev before he left and that he had reported the general tenor of our conversations at the Hyde Park; that since the visit things had worsened and there was real danger of war. "K" had urged speed in connection with the negotiations and Menshikov spoke of the little time within which conclusions could be reached. He mentioned two months. He did not say why two months and he rather avoided further discussion of this point; but I gained the impression that they had set two months as the period in which they hoped to work something out -- after which they would proceed unilaterally.

Menshikov reiterated the unnegotiability of "self-determination" with the same old arguments that it all came down to the fact that they were opposed to unification and "K" placed great stress on the fact that their contact with the Allies always indicated little if any enthusiasm for unification -- in fact, the contrary.

I asked him whether "K" was really prepared to negotiate on anything beyond his own terms. He said he was. I said I always gained the impression it was only on Soviet terms. Self-determination was not negotiable. All Berlin rather than West Berlin was also unnegotiable. What was negotiable other than "K"'s scheme. He said, your proposals for access. What you mean by access, what guarantees have you in mind, etc.

He added if Rusk only talks self determination and unification with Gromyko, nothing will come of it all.

EYES ONLY -- CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] we should insist on all Berlin, we [redacted]. There are strong arguments in favor of this. And I should make a strong plea for self-determination on the ground that it is the best way of stabilizing Europe in the long run — but agree to disagree on this. Then say that in return for an East German Treaty and our relinquishment of insistence on prompt unification based on free elections with firming up of the Oder Neisse, etc., we must have our plan of access accepted. "X" has said that if we agreed to an East German Treaty, we could write our own ticket — or, at least he said it to me though I do not place much reliance on his off-hand statements. Certainly we should demand an access arrangement which was so far reaching that we might be able to modify it to some degree in the course of the negotiations without loss of prestige or substance. I gather that Acheson would not have us go this far as he feels this is the disintegration of NATO. This, however, is the only middle ground I see unless we are prepared to have a show-down and a substantially increased danger of war.

John J. McCloy
Adviser to the President
on Disarmament

[redacted]

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Rusk Files
Lot 72D192

(174)

(138)

SATURDAY
September 16, 1961
4:51 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. KOHLER FROM SECRETARY

Sec. said the Pres. rather expects us to get Tommy Thompson back for full briefing so he can take a hand if we need him. We either have to convince the Pres. or call Thompson. Mr. K. said he and Mr. Bohlen have discussed this and think it would not serve any real purpose to have him here in the early stages -- all the material is here. If it develops it could better be pursued in Moscow we could bring him back then. It could be done quickly but don't think there is a real need in the first few rounds to have him back here -- we probably will need him there to appeal a point to the big boss. Recommendation against bringing him back now should go to Pres.

jmr

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(N)

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Rusk Files
Lot 72 D 192

(175)

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Sunday
September 17, 1961
1:05 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM AMB. STEVENSON TO THE SECRETARY

Amb. Stevenson reported his conversation with Menshikov - they would have a treaty of two months, declare West Berlin a free demilitarized city with free access for everybody. Communications with East Germans will have to be arranged with them but not for military traffic. Military occupation rights cease with signing of treaty. Some nominal troops might be possible; then expressed ghastly fear of the Germans. Sure they are getting ready to strike; felt we were very near war. Sec. said this is somewhat more severe than their standard line, partly because Menshikov plays things that way. Sec. said he would see Gromyko early in the Assembly, would set the hour when he got to NY, does not expect too much to come out of any first conversation.

Amb. and Sec. then discussed questions which might come to the Amb. on "Meet the Press" tonight. If pressed on Berlin, Sec. said two things: one, vital interests and commitments there, and two, relatively easy to work out long-term solution if Germans themselves should have chance to express themselves on the matter and if the various powers would sit down and work on things such as disarmanent and tries to ease the tensions in that area. Be careful until after talk with Gromyko; situation still potentially quite dangerous; might remind the people that the West Germans did not arm until a year after the Russians armed the East Berlins. Sec. contrasted German treaty with that in Japan following the war. Re two Chinas, if questioned, Amb. might say we have not resolved it. On this point Sec. said this year it might be better to throw responsibility for that into the respective Chinas. Sec. said re the ministerial meeting, if he seemed to be unforthcoming he would talk to the Amb. when he got there; we on the American side with full understanding of the British were deliberately stalling because of the German election. Re the possible question as to whether the US would get out of the UN if Communist China is admitted, reply personally hope not but that is up to the Administration and the Congress, might say can't imagine that we would. Re whether the US has brought pressure on the representative of China to be more flexialb on Outer Mongolia, should say we have consulted very closely on all aspects and all considerations that bear on it. Sec. said he was sending telegram to Drumright urging him not to be so passive about these things.

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NLK NSF 83

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CONFIDENTIAL

September 18, 1961

(440)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Henry Kissinger called me late Sunday night, September 17, from Geneva where he has been participating in the US-USSR scientific conclave. He said he had been very disturbed by the statement in one of their meetings by an American scientist (not identified) who said the US was bluffing in professing to be ready to go to the end of the road on Berlin.

Henry said he had had several talks with the Russian participants in an attempt to correct this and to emphasize that the two countries were in fact on a collision course if the Soviets went ahead with their peace treaty and tried to terminate our rights. He said that the Soviets had said that their real concern was the question of the non-recognition of the eastern frontiers of Germany. If these were recognized then there could be guarantees and a new status for Berlin with Soviet troops participating in the guarantees. Soviet troops, they said, would withdraw from East Germany if the Occupation were terminated. Henry demurred, of course, at the Soviet participation in West Berlin. When he pointed out the difficulties connected with the GDR and mentioned the "agency" theory, the Soviet scientists said they thought that for recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, Berlin access could be covered in the peace treaty with provision for East German substitution in the procedures. Henry said that since they were the ones seeking the change they should make a new proposition. Yesterday, two days later, one of the Russians asked him how such an offer should be made. Henry replied it should be through normal diplomatic channels and not through Pravda.

In conclusion Henry said he had the impression that these particular Russians at least were not insistent on forcing Western recognition of the GDR and were seeking a way out.

Foy D. Kohler

cc: Mr. Bundy, White House
S/S, S/B, GER, SOV, IRR

EUR:FDKohler:mt

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

(177)

9/18/61

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Build-up and Possible Action in Europe

This memorandum is in response to your memorandum dated 8 September 1961 in which you ask ten questions on the build-up and deployment of non-nuclear forces.

We believe that further mobilization and deployment actions should be taken at this time in order to convey to the USSR and to our Allies a firm determination and resolve to defend our interests in Berlin and to remedy the unfavorable balance of ground forces in and readily deployable to Central Europe. We propose the early deployment of at least one additional U. S. division to Europe; others may be sent later. In order that we can be assured of having an adequate strategic reserve in the coming months, we recommend that 4 National Guard Divisions be called to active duty at this time.

Taken in conjunction with other measures now underway, these additional actions should reduce the likelihood that our position in Berlin will be challenged; our negotiating position would be strengthened; and, if open conflict nonetheless occurs, our capability for waging it without resort to nuclear warfare would be substantially increased.

QUESTION 1:

What will the presence in Europe of 6 additional U. S. divisions accomplish

a. In meeting the Berlin situation?

b. In vitalizing NATO and strengthening the long-term defense of Western Europe?

ANSWER:

Six additional U. S. divisions, temporarily deployed in Europe, would achieve important political and military objectives. Specifically, the presence in Europe of 6 additional U. S. divisions would:

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a. Clearly show that the U. S. regards its Berlin interests most seriously and is taking the lead in responding to the Soviet challenge.

b. By example and leadership, strengthen Allied will to face up to possible military operations growing out of the Berlin crisis and spur the Allies to build up their forces. If our Allies fail to support the U. S. by their own build-up, the onus of failure to take positive measures to strengthen NATO will not be placed on the U. S.

c. Add substantially (about 35% in effective fighting strength), to NATO's ground strength in the Central Region. (See Question 3.)

d. Strengthen the alternatives between inaction and nuclear war.

e. Put us in a stronger position to engage in negotiations.

The presence in Europe of 6 more divisions would not give us the capability to overcome all determined Soviet opposition on the way to Berlin, nor the capability to launch offensive operations on a broad front. But the six divisions, if accompanied by a commensurate build-up by our Allies, would give us the capability for conducting limited operations in East Germany toward Berlin, should it be decided to try to reopen ground access in reaction to a Soviet political decision to block access.

Additionally, it would guard against a possible Soviet seizure of some territory in the west, e.g., Hamburg, possibly in response to an Allied naval blockade, limited air attack, or ground probe. At the present time, the Allies would have to resort to the use of nuclear weapons to stop such an attack. Reinforcement of NATO's non-nuclear capability would serve to broaden the choice of response, depending on the nature of the attack and the circumstances prevailing at the time.

It is the stated view of many of our allies that nuclear weapons must be used at the outset of a conflict in Europe. This view in part reflects the belief that nuclear threats will deter the Soviets from serious action. It also reflects the real non-nuclear weakness of NATO on the continent. If the U. S. build-up in Europe is to have the desired vitalizing effect, it is important that we communicate to our Allies our belief that this move substantially increases the non-nuclear capabilities of NATO; that it is much to be preferred to the alternative of being in a week non-nuclear position and thus depending crucially on the efficacy of the threat of immediate nuclear attack against the Soviet Union in response to Berlin or other provocations.

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The Allied response to our build-up and exhortations that they do likewise has been fair. Substantial progress is being made toward the goals we set forth in our August 8 proposal which calls for 32 active, fully manned, combat ready divisions backed up by 8 combat ready divisions in reserve. More vigorous actions can be taken, especially by the Germans after September 17. Further build-up by the U. S. will make it less difficult for the Germans to call on their people for a greater effort.

The need for a long term build-up of the non-nuclear defense of Europe has been clearly recognized by the U. S. Government. It is not clear, however, at this time what the scale and composition of the U. S. contribution to the direct defense of Europe should be over the long term. If the U. S. sends 6 divisions to Europe, it should not plan on keeping them there indefinitely. The European members of NATO have the resources to do more for their defense; it is essential that they do so. If a total of 11 U. S. divisions are placed in Europe, the U. S. should press for the replacement of at least the 6 additional, and possibly some of the 5 already there, by newly formed European units. How this shift from U. S. to European ground forces should be managed is uncertain; this issue should certainly not be raised with our Allies now.

QUESTION 2:

Will an increase in our conventional forces in Europe convince Khrushchev of our readiness to fight to a finish for West Berlin, or will it have the opposite effect? What other steps of all kinds may help to carry conviction on this point?

ANSWER:

Inevitably it must be quite uncertain what would convince Khrushchev of our willingness to fight to a finish over Berlin. While a conventional build-up alone would be unlikely to convince him, the absence of a build-up would probably increase his doubt of our determination. To continue efforts focused mostly on nuclear forces and nuclear threats would carry less conviction than building up both non-nuclear and nuclear forces.

Khrushchev's knowledge of the Soviets' own nuclear strength and of Allied apprehension has apparently made him confident that our nuclear threats would not in fact be carried out and that the Alliance would be split over the issue of using nuclear force. To the extent that a conventional build-up stiffens Allied determination, it should

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therefore make Khrushchev less certain of his estimate of eventual Allied disunity. At present, however, Khrushchev probably has no good reason to question his low estimate of Allied resolution, and perhaps only an explicit indication that the U. S. is prepared to act alone and leave the Allies no alternative but to follow, could effectively influence him. Moreover, the non-nuclear responses to Soviet political aggression, implied by the build-up, carry with them major risks of nuclear war evolving from a non-nuclear conflict. For this reason, this course should prove persuasive to Khrushchev. It is probably a more convincing course for the Allies actively to prepare to engage in substantial non-nuclear conflict in Central Europe -- a conflict which inevitably would carry a substantial risk of nuclear war -- than to threaten, unconvincingly, the certainty of a nuclear response to a political aggression.

Finally, the non-nuclear program proposed to NATO by the U. S. provides for a greatly strengthened defense of Western Europe. While it does not put the Allies in the position of being able to liberate Berlin, it puts us in a much better position to engage in limited ground, air, and naval action over Berlin with attendant dangers of the escalation which Khrushchev almost certainly wants to avoid. It makes it apparent that the U. S. is in Europe to stay regardless of the scale or intensity of any Soviet pressure or action. In this regard, deployment of forces toward the north of Germany increases our capabilities in an area where NATO is extremely weak and where the main effort of any initial USSR ground offensive would likely occur. In our judgment, Khrushchev will assess this build-up policy as significantly strengthening his opposition over Berlin.

Some other steps that might be taken in addition to a non-nuclear build-up in Europe that may help to carry conviction include:

a. Holding maneuvers and exercises appropriate to a higher alert posture.

b. Stepping up of strategic force operations (e.g., expanding the airborne alert).

c. Covertly preparing for a possible East Germany and Eastern European uprising in the event of an East-West conflict.

d. Long term increases in our defense establishment.

e. Increased reconnaissance activities.

f. Giving authority to commanders to respond quickly to certain Soviet or GDR provocations.

g. Demonstrations of Allied unity on the importance of defending Berlin rights and on the appropriate actions for doing so.

h. Positioning units in Europe so that it is clear that they are in a good position for initiating actions.

i. The call up of additional reserve units.

j. Implementing SEATO Plan 5, or a suitable variation thereof, if the Communists resume offensive operations in Laos.

QUESTION 3:

Supposing that we and our Allies raise the (Central Front) ground strength of NATO to 30 effective divisions, what have we accomplished? Specifically:

a. Can NATO then defend Western Europe against a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Bloc?

b. Can we safely mount a corps-size probe to reopen access to Berlin and at the same time present an adequate ground Shield?

c. How long can 30 divisions be supported logistically in combat?

ANSWER:

If the 32 division Central Front build-up, contemplated in our plan, is accomplished, Western Europe can be defended against a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Bloc for a significant period of time without having to use nuclear weapons. Although the exact time cannot be determined with any precision because of the imponderables of combat action, it will be sufficient to demonstrate the resoluteness of NATO and to permit national-level decisions as to future courses of action in event the USSR persists in aggression. A recently completed study of the defense of Europe concludes that a forward line could be held for at least a month a/ and possibly longer with a force of this order of magnitude.

Briefly, a NATO force in Central Europe of 32 fully effective divisions can accomplish this mission because:

a/ General Norstad considers this unduly optimistic.

a. There is a limit to the size of force that the Soviet Bloc can effectively deploy in an attack against Central Europe. This force is of the order of 55 divisions.a/

b. The lines of communication supporting the Soviet forces have vulnerabilities that can be exploited by NATO forces. Soviet forces will be operating at a considerable distance from the USSR homeland and the lines of communication run through areas occupied by potentially hostile peoples. Special Forces activities and air interdiction could further reduce Soviet support capabilities.

c. The capability to defend by sustained conventional operations for a substantial period will allow for the build-up of the second echelon forces in Europe. NATO combat capabilities would therefore increase with the passage of time if the line could be held during the initial weeks.b/

An 11 division U. S. force within a total NATO Central Front force of 32 effective divisions would permit the mounting of a corps-size probe to reopen access to Berlin without degrading the ground Shield. In fact, any additional forces assigned, for example, to the vicinity of Helmstedt for a probe would increase the defensive capabilities of the Shield forces. Forces deployed in the probe and in support of such an action will be positioned to cover the Eisenach-Erfurt gap and the North German plain, the two most likely avenues of Soviet attack. The over-all combat posture of NATO will thus be strengthened. Although a corps-size probe could not open access to Berlin against full Soviet resistance, it has a number of advantages. It could provide a tangible test of Soviet intentions by its capability to defeat GDR forces and, if resisted by Soviet forces, to hold a salient in East Germany for a period adequate to permit necessary political decisions.

Assuming a D-Day of 1 January 1962, stocks can be available in Europe for the support of 11 U. S. and 9 FRG divisions for between 30 and 60 days of intensive combat. Non-compatibility of equipment limits the U. S. support of the other 12 divisions in varying degrees but it is estimated that they can be sustained in combat operations for 30 to 40 days.

a/ General Norstad states: "Our intelligence credits the Soviets with a capability of committing, employing, and supporting upwards to 100 divisions in Central Europe."

b/ General Norstad states: "The second echelon, non-U.S. forces of Central European nations would, even on an optimistic basis, not exceed ten division equivalents on limited capability. There is little or no air force replacement or build-up capability beyond the M-Day forces."

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The ability to support the 32 divisions cannot be separated from the logistic and combat capabilities of the NATO air forces which would be required to support the ground action.

With regard to non-U. S. NATO air forces in Central Europe, it appears that supplies of most categories of conventional armaments would be adequate -- depending on the success of operations to defend ground areas both from air and ground attack. Critical shortages would be in certain specialized ordnance. However, with expected attrition, use of cannibalizing measures, and substitute armament loads, it appears the approximately 100 squadrons of non U. S., conventionally armed, NATO air forces (including 27 squadrons in Central Europe) could be logistically supported for at least 30 to 60 days.

The 31 U. S. fighter bomber squadrons that would be available to USAFE for use in non-nuclear operations in Europe could be supported for a period of at least 30 to 60 days at U. S. sortie rates. If initial operations were sporadic, the period of available logistic support would be extended appreciably.

These estimates take account of recent decisions to expand ammunition production. A further major expansion could not materially improve this situation until approximately six months after the decision is made.

QUESTION 4:

It has been my understanding that we would need to call additional divisions only as we actually decided to send existing divisions to Europe. Since our current plan is to send only one such division, why is it necessary now to call 4 divisions from the Reserve?

ANSWER:

Developments over Berlin and elsewhere in the world make it prudent for us to seriously consider sending 6 divisions to Europe. We propose that one division be sent within the next 6 weeks. In the event the six are sent, we would be left with inadequate reserves in the U. S. In addition, a further deterioration of the Berlin situation would have world-wide implications, for example in Iran, for U. S. force requirements. It would be improvident of us to contemplate denuding the U. S. of combat ready forces especially in view of the fact that, at present, it takes about four months to get reserve divisions in good shape for combat. Consequently, in our judgment the 4 National Guard divisions should be called up at this time, rather than after the deployment of available units.

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QUESTION 5:

If we call up four additional National Guard divisions now and do not send them to Europe, how can they be usefully employed? How long would it take to convert them to Army of the U. S. divisions? How long would it take to create effective A.U.S. divisions by other means?

ANSWER:

If from 4 to 6 Army divisions are sent to Europe, the 4 additional National Guard divisions will constitute the bulk of our strategic reserve available for further reinforcing Europe or for other contingencies throughout the world.

If it is not deemed necessary to send extra divisions to Europe, these divisions would be occupied in a training program. After about 4 months we would then have 10 Army and 2 Marine Corps combat ready divisions in the U. S. available for deployment. This 12 division force would not only increase the level of our non-nuclear capability, it would enable us to move forces to, or near, potential trouble spots at an early stage with less danger of having our forces maldeployed.

After demobilization, the 4 Guard divisions and their supporting units, a total of approximately 150,000 men, would be maintained in reserve status at full strength and a high level of training, thereby increasing our combat readiness above present levels.

It would take from 6 to 12 months to convert these divisions to Army of the U. S. status. The exact time would depend on the availability of trained replacements and the degree of combat readiness maintained during conversion.

Formation of new combat ready divisions by using a partially regular and partially reserve cadre and untrained fillers would take about 9 months.

QUESTION 6:

How much of the 4 division build-up would be justified in view of the over-all world situation if Berlin were not an immediate issue?

ANSWER:

If Berlin were not an immediate issue there would be substantially less justification for calling up the 4 National Guard divisions. There would remain, nevertheless, a good

case for strengthening the combat readiness of our ground forces. This conclusion is based on the view that:

a. The strength of our ability to deter Communist encroachment on areas contiguous to the Sino-Soviet Bloc through the threat of nuclear war has unmistakably weakened;

b. The Communist Bloc is challenging us world-wide -- most directly, apart from Europe, in Southeast Asia;

c. It is both important and feasible for the U. S. and its Allies to defend the majority of the threatened areas; the ability to do so will probably help to deter overt aggression against them.

The conversion of the 3 STRAF divisions to STRAC status gives us 8 combat ready divisions in the U. S. readily available for deployment. This is a sizeable force. However, we would still be short of being able adequately to meet two limited war situations at the same time (for example, 9 divisions were involved in the Korean War) unless fully manned, well trained reserve divisions were available for call.

QUESTION 7:

What tactical air support is needed for the planned forces in Europe and what is the plan for providing such support?

ANSWER:

On 1 September there were about 500 U. S. and 2000 non-U. S. fighter aircraft (excluding air defense fighters) committed to NATO. With planned reinforcements from the U. S. of 24 tactical squadrons, the Allied total could be increased to about 2900 aircraft. The majority of the U. S. aircraft previously assigned to NATO (approximately 425 out of 500) were reserved for nuclear strike missions. However, current plans provide for approximately 31 USAFE tactical fighter squadrons, about 525 aircraft, to be assigned to non-nuclear support.

The majority of non-U. S. NATO committed fighter aircraft (approximately 1900 out of 2000) are configured primarily for the delivery of non-nuclear weapons.

The amount of tactical air support needed for the planned NATO forces is difficult to determine. However, it is believed that the approximately 2425 conventionally armed

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fighter aircraft that present plans would make available to NATO could provide non-nuclear air support for a significant period. It is estimated that the total fighter and tactical bomber force of the Soviet Union and its satellites (excluding air defense fighters and aircraft based in Asia) approximates 3250 aircraft.

In the event of either extended ground action or extended air action, it may be necessary to divert nuclear armed NATO fighters to non-nuclear missions (replacing their nuclear capabilities with B-47's) and to expand the total NATO fighter force by the addition of squadrons from the uncommitted reserves of both the U. S. and its Allies. a/

QUESTION 8:

The reduction in terms of days of combat of the supply backup of U. S. forces in Europe which will result from increasing our forces and from supplying the West Germans has been noted. Would this result in putting U. S. troops in a possible combat situation without adequate supplies?

ANSWER:

As indicated in the answer to Question 3, both FRG and U. S. forces can be adequately supplied for approximately 30 to 60 days of intensive combat.

QUESTION 9:

If we add six divisions to NATO, may not Khrushchev add six or more divisions to the conventional forces facing NATO? Or will logistical problems, fear of attack by atomic weapons and preoccupations in the Satellites set a limit on the Soviet conventional forces available for immediate use against NATO?

ANSWER:

Yes. He may add divisions at any time. He could increase his strength in Eastern Europe, within several weeks, from 26 divisions to a total of 61 divisions, of which the six presently in Poland and Hungary would probably remain in place.

This resultant net total of 55 Soviet divisions, however, probably could not be increased materially because of logistical problems, dispersal required by the threat of

a/ General Norstad states: "With marginal ground force resources, air assistance, effective and continuing, is absolutely essential. ACE air capabilities are limited and vulnerable, particularly when required to conduct sustained conventional operations."

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nuclear operations, potentially hostile populations, vulnerability of the LOCs (particularly the rail net) to sabotage and air interdiction, and the restrictive geography of the European peninsula.

Consequently the ratio of superiority of (a) Soviet deployed divisions plus those readily deployable, over (b) NATO divisions on the line plus those which could be gotten on the line in time to be effective, would be substantially reduced by the contemplated NATO build-up. Any Soviet offensive action would thereby become proportionately more hazardous from the Soviet standpoint, (see Question 3) and NATO capabilities for any initiative would be increased.

QUESTION 10:

What is the estimated net gold cost per year of the movement of six divisions to Europe and what can be done to reduce it?

ANSWER:

The movement to Europe of six divisions (220,000 men) and the related readiness measures including the deployment to Europe of 28 tactical squadrons (26,000 men), if the movement took place between January 1 and March 1, 1962, would increase U. S. Defense expenditures overseas by $350 million in FY'62 and $760 million in FY'63. Of these sums $250 and $545 million respectively would be spent in Germany. To help offset this increase in the present U. S. balance of payments deficit, Germany could be expected to make dollar payments to the U. S. for

a. Increased military procurement in the U. S.

b. Joint use of some U. S. facilities in Germany, and

c. Purchases of U. S. reserve stocks in Germany.

The extent to which such German payments would diminish the balance of payments impact of increased U. S. overseas deployment will depend on the outcome of negotiations which are now in progress between U. S. and Germany and which will be stepped up after the German national elections.

The suspension of movement of dependents to the European area, which will take effect in October 1961, will benefit the U. S. balance of payments by $10 million in FY'62 and $100 million in FY'63. If all dependents now in Europe were returned to the U. S. before March 31, 1962, U. S. overseas expenditures would be reduced by approximately $90 million in FY'62 and about $300 million annually thereafter.

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It will be the U. S. objective in the forthcoming negotiations with the Germans to agree upon arrangements which would essentially eliminate the entire foreign exchange costs of U. S. troops in Germany. A Treasury-Defense paper spelling out in more detail the problems and possibilities of such negotiations is being submitted separately.

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With reference to the total U. S. program, General Lemnitzer offered these general observations:

"Although there are deficiencies in the logistical field, we can, in my opinion, undertake effective military action. The magnitude of these logistic shortages is not sufficient to be considered a bar to taking the action required to meet the threat.

"An additional point which I wish to emphasize is that if NATO deploys 30 effective divisions on the central front and accelerates production of critical items and conventional ammunition, and if we also expand our organic depot repair and supply support activities as soon as possible, our resultant capabilities can far exceed that provided solely by the 30 divisions. Short of the Soviets initiating nuclear war, these forces would give us the capability to defend by sustained conventional operations for a sufficient period to allow for the build-up of the second echelon forces in Europe. This factor, taken in conjunction with the fact that there is a finite upper limit to the number of forces the USSR can effectively employ on the peninsula of Western Europe, convinces me that the West, with 30 divisions deployed in Central Europe, would be in a much better position to wage either nuclear or non-nuclear war than we are now. As a minimum, considerable additional time would be provided the President before he had to make the decision to initiate tactical nuclear war or general nuclear war.

"As an over-all observation, I believe that we must convey to our allies and the USSR an increased sense of urgency on our part. Substantive build-up and deployments along the lines outlined in the answers to the President's questions, if taken now or in the near future, should generate a commensurate build-up on the part of our Allies and should serve as a deterrent to the USSR making a grab in Berlin. This build-up would further our purposes both in Europe and world-wide. Taken in conjunction with other measures, the credibility of our over-all posture would be greatly enhanced, thereby lessening the chance that we

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would have to use these forces in combat. Moreover, if the deterrent fails, our capability for successfully conducting combat operations, conventional or nuclear, would be substantially increased."

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——General Norstad's general comments on my answers to the questions are stated in Appendix A.

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APPENDIX A

(General Norstad's General Comments on the Secretary of Defense's Answers to the Ten Questions)

1. I HAVE STUDIED YOUR PROPOSED ANSWERS TO THE TEN QUESTIONS WHICH WILL BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO CALL TO ACTIVE DUTY FOUR NATIONAL GUARD DIVS. OUR RESPECTIVE REACTIONS TO THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS POSED ARE CONDITIONED BY THE BASIC VIEWS WE HOLD, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE NATO STRATEGY, AND TO THE MEASURES REQUIRED TO MEET THE CURRENT THREAT TO BERLIN AND ELSEWHERE. I BELIEVE THAT YOUR PAPER REFLECTS TO A LARGE DEGREE MY THOUGHTS ON THESE BROADER QUESTIONS. IT IS IN DEGREE RATHER THAN IN PRINCIPLE THAT OUR VIEWS MAY VARY. I HOPE THAT THE ANSWERS EVENTUALLY SUBMITTED WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH PRINCIPLE AND DETAIL. TO THIS END, I WILL FIRST OUTLINE MY VIEWS ON WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE THE BASIC ISSUES, SINCE THESE ARE LARGELY THE SOURCE OF THE RELATED SPECIFIC COMMENTS.

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2. I FULLY APPRECIATE AND SUPPORT THE NEED TO CREATE A POSITION FROM WHICH WE WOULD BE ABLE TO RESPOND, WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS, TO ANY FORM OF SOVIET AGGRESSION IN THE NATO AREA, FORCEFULLY, BUT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF GENERAL WAR. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT REALISTIC PLANNING MUST SEEK TO EXPLOIT OUR STRENGTHS WITHOUT OVERLOOKING OUR WEAKNESSES; ABOVE ALL, IT MUST WEIGH IMMEDIATE NEEDS AGAINST INTERESTS OF THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE POSTURE OF THE WEST. WHILE PREPARING TO EXPLOIT ANY FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS, WE MUST NOT CONFUSE THE WISH WITH THE FACT. WE SHOULD THEREFORE CONSIDER, VERY CAREFULLY, OUR ABILITY TO ENFORCE A GRADUAL, CONTROLLED DEVELOPMENT OF THE BATTLE, AND NOT OVERESTIMATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE CAN DICTATE THE SOVIET RESPONSE, PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION WHERE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WE WOULD HAVE THE INITIATIVE. TO ASSUME THAT WE COULD EXERCISE INDEPENDENT, UNILATERAL CONTROL OVER THE BATTLE WOULD BE AS WRONG IN 1961 AS IT WAS WRONG IN 1953 TO SPEAK OF "A TIME AND PLACE OF OUR OWN CHOOSING."

3. BASED UPON THE PRINCIPLE THAT IT IS SOUND PRACTICE TO BE CONFIDENT IN EXECUTION BUT QUESTIONING AND CONCERNED IN PLANNING, I AM DISTURBED BY WHAT MAY BE OVER-OPTIMISM WITH RESPECT TO:

A. THE ALTERNATIVES THAT WILL, IN FACT, BECOME AVAILABLE TO USE BY MEASURES THAT ESSENTIALLY MEET FORCE GOALS PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED BY NATO AS THE MINIMUM REQUIRED FOR AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF EUROPE, WITH NUCLEAR SUPPORT WHEN NECESSARY.

B. WHAT MORE WE CAN ACHIEVE, BECAUSE OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE BUILD-UP ENVISIONED, IN TERMS OF EITHER DETERRING SOVIET

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ACTION AGAINST OUR ACCESS ROUTES TO BERLIN, INDUCING THEM TO REOPEN ACCESS IF IT IS DENIED, OR ACTUALLY FORCING A REOPENING OF ACCESS AGAINST DETERMINED OPPOSITION.

C. OUR ABILITY TO DEFEND WESTERN EUROPE AGAINST A MASSIVE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK BY THE SOVIET BLOC FOR AS MUCH AS A MONTH OR MORE, WITHOUT HAVING TO RESORT TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

D. THE IMPACT OF THE MEASURES WHICH WE PROPOSE TO TAKE ON BOTH THE SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM EFFORTS OF OUR ALLIES.

4. OUR FORCE POSTURE SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO PERMIT US TO RESPOND TO THE WHOLE RANGE OF THE SOVIET THREAT. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE CREDIBILITY OF THE DETERRENT CAN BE DESTROYED BY EMPHASIZING A POLICY THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED BY THE SOVIETS AS PERMITTING THEM TO BECOME INVOLVED, AND THEN, IF THEY DECIDE THE RISKS ARE TOO GREAT, TO DISENGAGE. THAT THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A MISCONCEPTION IS EVIDENCED BY THE QUESTIONS IN THE MINDS OF SOME OF OUR ALLIES AS TO OUR CONCEPTS AND OUR POLICY. IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT THE SOVIETS BE FORCED TO ACT AND MOVE AT ALL TIMES IN FULL AWARENESS THAT IF THEY USE FORCE THEY RISK GENERAL WAR WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

5. THE SOVIET CAPABILITY TO AUGMENT FORCES IN EUROPE IS CLEARLY GREATER THAN OURS. OUR BUILD-UP TO THE 30-DIVISION LEVEL WILL GREATLY INCREASE OUR FLEXIBILITY, EXTEND THE PERIOD OVER WHICH WE COULD DEFEND SUCCESSFULLY AND RAISE THE THRESHOLD AT WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD HAVE TO BE INTRODUCED INTO THE

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BATTLE. IT WILL NOT, HOWEVER, PROVIDE A REAL BASIS FOR ASSURANCE THAT WE COULD SUCCESSFULLY SUSTAIN A DEFENSE AGAINST MASSIVE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. IT CERTAINLY WILL NOT PERMIT US TO CONSIDER CONDUCTING ANY MAJOR CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST DETERMINED SOVIET RESISTANCE.

6. WHILE NOT WISHING TO OVERESTIMATE SOVIET CAPABILITIES OR TO UNDERESTIMATE OUR OWN, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY WELL START WITH SUPERIOR FORCES, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE THE INITIATIVE AND WOULD ENJOY SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL AIR OPERATIONS FROM THE OUTSET. ASSUMING A NORMAL ALLIED COMBAT LOSS RATE, TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN AIR SUPERIORITY OVER WESTERN EUROPE PRESENTS A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE ALLIANCE. UNDER THIS CONDITION, OUR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES AND OUR ABILITY TO CARRY OUT ATOMIC DEFENSE PLANS WOULD DETERIORATE QUICKLY.

7. LASTLY, WE MUST KEEP IN MIND THE FACT THAT OUR NATO STRATEGY MUST BE GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TO OUR ALLIES IF THEY ARE TO HAVE EITHER THE WILL TO FACE UP TO POSSIBLE MILITARY OPERATIONS OR THE INCLINATION TO BUILD UP THEIR FORCES. UNREASONABLE AS SUCH AN INTERPRETATION WOULD BE, ANY POLICY WHICH MIGHT APPEAR TO SUGGEST TRADING LARGE AREAS OF EUROPE FOR TIME IN WHICH TO SEEK TO AVOID THE SPREAD OF WAR TO THE U.S. OR WHICH APPEARS TO DENY THE USE OF CAPABILITIES AND WEAPONS WHICH MIGHT DIVERT OR DESTROY THE SOVIET THREAT TO EUROPEAN LIVES AND TERRITORY, WILL HAVE HARD GOING. I AM SURE YOU AGREE THAT NOTHING WE DO SHOULD SUGGEST THAT OUR GOAL IS TO CONFINE THE FIGHT FOR ALLIED RIGHTS IN EUROPE TO EUROPE. NOR SHOULD THE MEASURES WE TAKE TO MEET THE BERLIN CRISIS GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO INDEPENDENT

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NATIONAL ATOMIC DEFENSE EFFORTS ON THE ARGUMENT THAT, WHEN FACED WITH A REAL THREAT, THE U.S. WILL HESITATE TO COMMIT ANY AND ALL FORCES TO NATO'S DEFENSE.

3. I FULLY ENDORSE THE STRENGTHENING OF OUR CAPABILITIES AND OUR EFFORTS TO GET OUR ALLIES TO DO LIKEWISE. I HAVE ALWAYS ADVOCATED A POSTURE HERE IN EUROPE WHICH WOULD PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE ACROSS THE FULL RANGE OF THREATS, AND THUS ONE WHICH MUST BE BASED UPON A BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES. I FULLY AGREE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF USING THE MINIMUM ADEQUATE FORCE AND EMPLOYING IT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. IF THE DETERRENT IS TO HAVE ANY VALIDITY, HOWEVER, IT MUST BE CLEAR TO EVERYONE AT ALL TIMES THAT WE ARE PREPARED, FIRST, TO FIGHT, AND, SECOND, TO USE ATOMIC WEAPONS IF NECESSARY. WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, IN THESE TIMES NO OPERATION REGARDLESS OF HOW LIMITED, CAN HAVE REAL CREDIBILITY EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF A NUCLEAR THREAT, DIRECT OR IMPLIED.

4. WHERE DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS APPEARS TO EXIST, IN MOST CASES IT SPRINGS FROM DIFFERING ESTIMATES AS TO THE EXTENT OF THE BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM THE PLANNED INCREASES IN MILITARY STRENGTH, NATIONAL AND NATO, AND OF THE DEGREE OF DEPENDENCE WE ARE WARRANTED IN PLACING ON THESE BENEFITS. THE STRENGTHENING OF NATO FORCES TO DEAL IN A FLEXIBLE MANNER WITH LESSER ACTS OF AGGRESSION AS WELL AS MEET MAJOR THREATS TO ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE IS BADLY NEEDED, AND IS LONG OVER-DUE. I HAVE ADVOCATED SUCH STRENGTHENING OF OUR CAPABILITY FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS. I SPECIFICALLY ENDORSE THE EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF THE PLANNED 40,000 U.S. TROOP AUGMENTATION IN EUROPE, THE PROPOSED INCREASE

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IN US STRATEGIC RESERVE CAPABILITIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUITABLE MEANS TO DEPLOY RAPIDLY THESE RESERVE FORCES.

25.- IN THE LIGHT OF THE SITUATION EXISTING TODAY, I WOULD SUGGEST NO FURTHER DEPLOYMENT TO EUROPE UNTIL WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ABSORB EFFECTIVELY THE 40,000 AUGMENTATION NOW PLANNED. SHOULD THE POLITICAL OR MILITARY SITUATION CHANGE, AS IT MIGHT WELL DO OVER ANY 24-HOUR PERIOD, THE INITIAL OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS SHOULD BE MADE ON AN EXERCISE BASIS, SEVERAL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN PLANNED. IN THIS WAY, A SUBSTANTIAL BUILD-UP COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT FREEZING US IN A "FOR THE DURATION" POSITION SO DESTRUCTIVE OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL FLEXIBILITY. IN CASE OF VERY SERIOUS DETERIORATION, THESE FORCES SHOULD BE MOVED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

(Note: Above paragraphs extracted from General Norstad's message of 16 September 1961).

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Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy

Washington, September 19, 1961.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, 38 500 A Air Access. Top Secret. 5 pages of source text not declassified.

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SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

179

September 19, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: The Attorney General AK

Subject: Berlin

I am enclosing a memorandum on Berlin written by Nick Katzenbach.

As he points out, there are no particularly new thoughts. However, I think it has the advantage of bringing up some points that I have not heard discussed in the last month or so and which should be kept in mind.

I think we should really get across the point sometime that the signing of the peace treaty with East Germany is not, in of itself, a defeat for the West and, in fact, is an expected event of no particular concern.

In addition, I think we should establish that we are prepared to permit the East Germans to examine travel documents under certain circumstances. We don't want these events -- when they occur and which are unimportant -- to be considered tremendous defeats for the West.

Enclosure

SECRET

PNP

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SECRET

Department of Justice

Washington

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: Berlin

Herewith a few unsensational thoughts with respect to the current situation respecting Berlin.

I assume that the major U. S. objective in West Berlin is simply to remain there and thus guarantee the freedom of the population of West Berlin and their contacts with West Germany. I assume further that this is a position from which we cannot retreat at all, and that the Russians know and, in my judgment, accept this fact. Clearly this means maintaining access through East Germany irrespective of who is in control of the routes of access, but I am not sure myself, and therefore assume the Russians are not sure, that this position precludes dealing with the East German Government with respect to problems in West Berlin and any problems with regard to access to West Berlin.

In other words, while we can effectively threaten the use of force to maintain our access to Berlin, I doubt that we can effectively use force to refuse to deal with the East Berlin Government with respect to access; that is, to present the various papers concerned to the East German Government.

I assume that an ultimate objective of the Russians is to incorporate West Berlin into East Germany. The treaty with East Germany is obviously consistent with this objective. However, I also assume that Russia is not now willing to cause a war to accomplish that objective and it seems unlikely that, even after the treaty, it would permit East Germany to do so. Accordingly, I think it likely that the United States objectives in West Berlin can, subject of course to the maximum annoyances which the East Germans can devise, be maintained whether or not the treaty is signed.

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The Russians have announced their intention of going ahead unilaterally with a peace treaty with East Germany. I have every confidence that they will do so, and some doubts that we can even delay this process by the offer of negotiations. Indeed, I expect an announcement almost daily. And I do not think we can expect the Russians to back away from this position any more than they can expect us to back away from our position in Berlin, and for essentially the same reasons. Any compromise on either point would involve a loss of face which would be intolerable.

To date we have been somewhat equivocal as to what we would do at the point that East Germany claims the formal control over routes of access and the formal authority to deal with respect to East Berlin and East Germany generally. We have hinted a refusal to deal with East Germany in this or other respects, but we have not stated this position unequivocally, and certainly we have not stated it in a way which commits us in the eyes of the Russians. I do not think they find it believable that we would go to war or use force simply to avoid presenting credentials to East German officials. Therefore, I assume that they will proceed on their side and leave us holding the bag. If at this point we refuse to present credentials to East German officials, when these officials have not actually forbidden us access to West Berlin, it seems to me we would be in an untenable position if we attempted to force our way through. To me it seems to reduce our genuine interest in West Germany to a rather technical point and one on which we would have relatively little support. In point of fact, there may be some advantages to dealing with East German officials rather than the Russians, since I think we can more quickly assert force to keep open the routes of access than we could dealing directly with the Russians.

In this state of affairs one asks in what respects we could hope through negotiation to strengthen our position in Berlin without giving on the only essential point; that is, the freedom of West Berlin. Since we already claim the right to stay there indefinitely and the right to maintain access in connections with West Germany--and these claims can in my judgment be made effective--I do not think there

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would be substantial benefit from securing such a guarantee from the Russians, or through the Russians, from East Germany. Nor do I think they would be very likely to acquiesce in any arrangement which substantially improved our rights to Berlin or even accurately reflected those rights in terms of what we now claim. I do not see how we could take less.

For these reasons I am somewhat bearish about negotiating at all, and tend to see at least as much danger in negotiations as I see possibilities of benefit--at least insofar as we are treating the negotiations as representing a genuine effort on our part at seeking mutual accommodation. This is particularly true insofar as the Russians have often used negotiations in the past as a means of separating the Allies, and with respect to German problems this is all too easy. In addition, our general foreign policy requires us to pay some attention to the views of the uncommitted, and often we make the mistake of thinking that the Russians care equally what these countries think. I do not believe that they do, and believe there is considerable evidence for the fact that Russian foreign policy is based to a considerable extent on creating the image of strength and intransigence, rather than reasonableness and a willingness to make accommodations in the interests of others.

For these reasons I think we should take a quite hard attitude in our negotiations, if these come to pass, and not be willing to fall back very far from it. There is relatively little we can afford to give which is desired by the Russians and relatively little they can afford to give in directions desired by us. With respect to Berlin, I would be inclined to put forward various all Berlin solutions, including the possibility of United Nations or neutral supervision of the agreement, but be unwilling to negotiate our own continued occupation status in West Berlin. There is no necessary incompatibility between the two, and I would not substitute a UN presence for a US presence. I am opposed to the proposal that UN headquarters be shifted to a unified Berlin, because I think this is too easy for the Russians to convert into a proposal that UN headquarters be moved from New York to a more suitable location and to convert to their own ends in

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other respects. They will insist on the fact that East Berlin is the capital of East Germany, and since their major objective is to strengthen the East German government, I do not see how we can expect them to agree to measures which would weaken it.

In addition, I think we could express a willingness to negotiate for a unified Germany, perhaps along the lines proposed by Mr. Acheson. I doubt that we should make further concessions than he has made prior to negotiating, and I am very dubious whether putting this proposal forward would have the effect to stopping at this point a separate peace treaty by Russia with East Germany.

I think the Russian position is strong in terms of forcing us and the West Germans to deal in some respects with the East German Government. I doubt we can avoid this. At best we can hold this to a minimum. While such dealings constitute in some respects "recognition" of the continued existence of two Germanies, I think most of the world accepts this as a fact. I do not believe negotiations would materially strengthen the East German Government, which is weak for other reasons than nonrecognition.

Obviously, I am less sanguine about the possibilities of successful negotiations than some others better informed than I. But I think there is relatively little to gain and potentially a great deal to lose by making concessions to the Russians at this point. I think the President would have more stature internationally and domestically if he continued a hard line with respect to Russia. He must avoid backing down, and he must avoid the appearances of backing down. What concerns me most is that having made our big pitch with respect to freedom of West Berlin we will be made to appear to back down if maintaining that freedom should also require some dealings with the East Germans.

To avoid this, it might be appropriate for the President now to announce publicly that (a) the basic problem is one of the unification of Germany which we will continue to support, (b) that the United States will continue to attempt

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to negotiate with Russia on that question, (c) that it will not recognize ~~with~~ East Germany, and (d) that insofar as West Berlin is concerned, our principle interest is in its freedom and right of association with and access to West Germany and that we regard it as of no significance whether Russians or East Germans claim to control these routes of access. Neither has a legal right to interfere. And we will no more tolerate interference by the one than the other.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State NLK NSF 92 Lot 477

47-41

TOP SECRET

Action EUR

Info SS C SP L H SB SO NEA IO D P INR RMR

Control: 13547
Rec'd: Sept. 20, 1961
12:51 A.M.

(180)

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 354, SEPTEMBER 19, 9 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 354, USUN POLTO 8.

FOR THE SECRETARY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE BERLIN CRISIS:

I AM MOVED TO SEND THIS MESSAGE BECAUSE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN LAST 48 HOURS ON PROPOSED PLANNING DIRECTIVE TO NORSTAD CONVINCE ME THAT WE HAVE QUICKLY TAKE FURTHER STEP THAT WILL CLEARLY INDICATE TO ALLIES THAT WE REALLY MEAN FULL CONSULTATION ON THE WHOLE BERLIN MATTER. IN SESSIONS ON THE NORSTAD DIRECTIVE STIKKER STRESSED THAT UNLESS THE THREE POWERS ARE REALLY FORTHCOMING, THE ALLIANCE WILL NOT FOLLOW ON BERLIN AND MIGHT EVEN FALL APART. IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, HAVE LEARNED CANADA, ITALY AND NETHERLANDS ARE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE INDICATED REAL DISSATISFACTION ON PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS AND HAVE IMPLIED THAT IF THE MATTER IS NOT CURED THEY CANNOT BE COUNTED ON. (POLTO 346) I THINK STIKKER MAY HAVE OVERPLAYED POINT FOR TACTICAL REASONS TO SOME LIMITED EXTENT, BUT AM PERSUADED THAT HE DEEPLY WORRIED, AS AM NOT ONLY I AM BUT ALSO PAUL MASON AND, I BELIEVE, DE LEUSSE. DESPITE ALL YOUR HELP, AND EXCELLENT BACKSTOPPING FROM KOHLER AND RA, THERE IS A REAL TIDE RUNNING THAT THREE POWERS ARE NOT DEALING REST OF THE ALLIANCE IN. REPORT WE MADE TO NAC ON THE FAST-MOVING FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE WASHINGTON CONTAINED NO REFLECTION THAT NAC

SUGGESTIONS

[TO]

TOP SECRET

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FNd to Polto 375 9/22

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SUGGESTIONS WERE EVEN CONSIDERED BY THE FOUR, AND THIS HAS ALREADY EVOKED STRONG COMMENT. FACT MINISTERS REPORT TO NAC SAYS MANY UNREPORTED SUBJECTS DISCUSSED HAS NOT HELPED UNLESS LAIGY & SHUCKBURGH CAN SATISFACTORILY ANSWER POINTED QUESTIONS. TOMORROW WE MEET TO DEBATE THE FOUR POWER REPORT, AND I ANTICIPATE REAL TROUBLE. THIS REGARD MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING, IS MOST CRITICAL SUBJECT OF ALL. NORSTAD'S RECENT PRESENTATION TO COUNCIL HAS MADE THEM AWARE THAT PROBES AT DIVISION LEVEL OR HIGHER ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION IS CAUSING GREAT CONCERN AMONG THEM. BLUNTLY, THE ALLIANCE NEEDS REAL REASSURANCE THAT IT WILL BE CONSULTED AND ITS VIEWS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT SO THAT IT CAN ACT AS A WHOLE, AND IT NEEDS THIS IN WORDS GOING BEYOND ANY TECHNICAL DRAFTING IN THE DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDERS. I THEREFORE SEND YOU THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS.

I UNDERSTAND OUR PURPOSE, AND USRO'S RESPONSIBILITY, IS TO USE EVERY EFFORT TO LEAD OTHER MEMBERS OF NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SO THAT THEY WILL BE READY TO FOLLOW AND SUPPORT, WITH REAL NATO SOLIDARITY, COURSES OF MILITARY ACTION WHICH WE MAY BE CONSTRAINED TO TAKE IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM.

OUR TASK IS MADE DIFFICULT BY THREE FACTORS:

A. ANY MILITARY ACTION, WHETHER TAKEN BY THE THREE OR BY NATO AS A WHOLE, CAN LEAD TO THE SOVIETS' EXPANDING IT INTO WAR AGAINST ALL MEMBERS OF NATO;

B. GREATER THE SCALE OF MILITARY ACTION TAKEN BY WEST AT ITS OWN INITIATIVE, CLOSER, IT CAN BE ARGUED, DO ALL NATO MEMBERS COME TO ALL-OUT WAR;

C. THUS, THOUGH FATE OF ALL NATO MEMBERS IS POTENTIALTY INVOLVED IN ACTIONS OF THREE POWERS (OR FOUR), FEAR OF BEING COMMITTED IN FACT BY ACTIONS OF THREE, WITHOUT HAVING A VOICE IN DECISIONS: IS UNDERSTANDABLE AND IS AT HIGHER LEVEL THAN EVER BEFORE AS CRISIS BECOMES MORE REAL.

WHILE

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WHILE DECISION TO PUT PLANS INTO ACTION IS RESERVED TO GOVERNMENTS UNDER ALL OUR PROPOSALS, OUR ALLIES ARE EXPERIENCED ENOUGH TO KNOW THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH CHAIN OF EVENTS WHERE TIME FOR ADEQUATE CONSULTATION AS WE MOVE FROM STEP TO STEP MAY NOT OFFER ITSELF INSOFAR AS THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE IS CONCERNED. THEY THEREFORE FEAR THAT PLANS DEVELOPED BY THREE MAY LEAD TO DECISIONS FROM WHICH THEY WILL BE EXCLUDED.

THIS IS WHAT STIKKER HAS BEEN TRYING TO SAY TO US IN OUR DRAFTING SESSIONS ON NORSTAD DIRECTIVE. UNLESS WE WORK OUT SOMETHING TO TAKE CARE OF THIS, IT WILL BE STRONGLY REFLECTED IN NAC DISCUSSION OF THIS MATTER. IN THIS RESPECT, I CANNOT TOO STRONGLY EMPHASIZE THE DANGER OF DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WHICH THE SOVIETS CAN EXPLOIT. I THINK WE HAVE A MAJOR TASK TO KEEP IT UNDER CONTROL, AND I THINK WE CAN, IF WE ARE PREPARED TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP RATHER THAN KEEPING A RIGID DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE THREE AND REST OF NATO.

FINLETTER

KEA

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Action

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TOP SECRET

Control: 13549
Rec'd: Sept. 20, 1961
12:59 AM

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 354, SEPTEMBER 19, 9 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 354; USUN PRIORITY POLTO 8

FOR THE SECRETARY.

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IN THIS MORNING'S SESSION ON DRAFTING THE DIRECTIVE TO NORSTAD THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF TALK, BY BOTH THE UK AND FRENCH PERMREPS, OF DROPPING THE DIRECTIVE ENTIRELY. I SAID THAT I NOT ONLY THOUGHT THAT THE DIRECTIVE WAS RIGHT, BUT WAS WHAT WASHINGTON WANTED, IF PUT IN RIGHT WAY, IT COULD BE USED TO BUILD STRENGTH, PROVIDED WE COULD GET STIKKER TO TAKE LEAD IN THAT DIRECTION. HE SEEMED RATHER INCLINED TO FOLLOW THIS COURSE OF ACTION AND CERTAINLY WANTS TO HELP AND LEAD IN THIS CRITICAL TASK. I AGAIN EMPHASIZE THAT WHILE I TAKE A SOMEWHAT MORE FAVORABLE VIEW OF THINGS THAN STIKKER OR MASON OR DE LEUSSE, I FEAR THE MATTER IS SERIOUS AND NEW MOVE ON BROADER BASE INDICATED.

I THEREFORE PROPOSE THAT I BE SPEEDILY AUTHORIZED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING TO STIKKER AS A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH HE MIGHT PRESENT THE NAC DIRECTIVE APAPER TO THE COUNCIL AND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED, IF HE FOLLOWS THIS GENERAL LINE, TO STATE IN THE COUNCIL THAT THE US ACCEPTS HIS PRESENTATION.

BEGIN TEXT OF STIKKER PRESENTATION;

1. THE COUNCIL HAS KNOWN FOR SOME TIME THAT THE THREE POWERS HAVE DEVELOPED CONTINGENCY PLANS WITH REGARD TO BERLIN, AS

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-2- POLTO 354, SEPTEMBER 19, 9 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)
FROM: PARIS

FURTHER THOUGHT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE PROBLEM. IT HAS BECOME CLEAR TO ALL OF US THAT MILITARY ACTION TAKEN TO SUPPORT WESTERN RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO BERLIN INVOLVE THE RISK OF WAR FOR ALL. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT AND DESIRABLE THAT THE ALLIANCE ACT IN UNISON WITH REGARD TO ANY SUCH MEASURES, NOT ONLY TO INCREASE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NATO DETERRENT, BUT IN ORDER TO PUT ITSELF IN THE POSTURE MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED.

2. THIS REQUIRES THAT PLANNING OF THE THREE POWERS AND THE PLANS FOR NATO ACTION BE UP-DATED, EXPANDED, AND BE MADE KNOWN TO THIS COUNCIL AS A WHOLE.

3. WHAT THEN IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS COUNCIL AND OF THE MEMBER GOVERNMENTS? IT IS TO HAVE A FULL AND SPEEDY EXCHANGE OF GOVERNMENTAL VIEWS ON THESE PLANS, SO THAT EACH MEMBER WILL KNOW THE EXTENT TO WHICH EACH OTHER MEMBER IS LIKELY TO RESPOND WITH REGARD TO MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMON PLEDGE WITH REGARD TO BERLIN. THIS MUST BE A FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. THE SUBJECT IS TOO IMPORTANT FOR ANYTHING ELSE. IT REQUIRES THOSE WHO HAVE NOT BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE THREE POWERS IN THEIR PLANNING TO STATE FULLY THEIR REACTIONS TO THE THREE POWER PLANS AND IT REQUIRES THE THREE POWERS TO RESPOND TO THOSE COMMENTS IN THE COUNCIL. ONLY THUS CAN WE FIND THE BASIS FOR THE COMMON ACTION WHICH IS INDISPENSABLE.

4. THIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SHOULD TAKE PLACE UPON THE BASIS OF PLANS AS PLANS. IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REPLACE THE COMMON CONSULTATION THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED, IF TIME PERMITS, BEFORE PLANS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED, WHICH IS IN ANY CASE A QUESTION FOR DECISION BY EACH GOVERNMENT IN THE EVENT. BUT IT WOULD LA- THE GROUNDWORK WHICH IS SO BADLY NEEDED FOR A COMMON UNDERSTANDING AND ACCOMMON PROGRAM OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE ON THIS VITAL MATTER. END TEXT.

I SHOULD LIKE TO MOVE ON THIS JUST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AS EACH DAY COUNTS. IN CONNECTION TOMORROW'S NAC MEETING I AM MEETING WITH SHUCKBURGH AND MASON TONIGHT TO TRY TO GET THEM

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TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE. BUT THE KEY THING IS THE MILITARY INFORMATION AND OUR GENERAL APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM. AND I AM REALLY PERSUADED THAT I NEED THE ABILITY TO COMMIT YOU PERSONALLY TO THE APPROACH I HAVE OUTLINED ABOVE. IF I CAN, I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL QUICKLY ESTABLISH THE SOLIDARITY AND CONFIDENCE THAT WILL ENABLE US TO GET OUR ALLIES TO FOLLOW OUR LEADERSHIP.

FINLETTER

ELP/22

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

15192

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(181)

September 22, 1961

To: The Acting Secretary

Through: S/S

From: Foy D. Kohler

I assume you saw a copy of my memorandum to the Secretary reporting a brief telephone account Henry Kissinger made to me regarding his conversations with some Russians at the recent Stowe, Vermont, meeting. Henry has now sent me the attached written account. It represents a very interesting exchange and Henry did an excellent job, as I have told him. I gave a copy to the Secretary in New York yesterday. Henry also sent a copy of this memorandum of conversation to Mac Bundy who has passed it on to the President.

Attachment

M/C dated 9/19/61.

[redacted]

cc: S/S - Mr. Bohlen
S/P - Mr. McGhee
Mr. Owen
INR

EUR:FDKohler:mt

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[redacted]

September 19, 1961

Memorandum of Conversations with Soviet Delegates (Khvostov, Tolenskiy, Tsuzo and Blasskyan) at Stowe, Vermont, September 13, 14 and 16

From: Henry A. Kissinger

During the Pugwash Conference at Stowe, Vermont, I had an opportunity to talk to a number of Soviet delegates about the Berlin problem. The issue came up in the following context: at the plenary session on Wednesday, September 13, Eugene Rabinowitch made the statement that the American government was conducting nineteenth century politics over Berlin at a moment when such measures were completely insane. As a result, he said, such phrases as "if we are pushed around too much over Berlin we will fight" were sheer bluff and were not taken seriously by any American.

I did not respond to this at the plenary session because the composition of our delegation made it likely that a rejoinder would produce an acrimonious debate within the Western group and thus reinforce Rabinowitch's point. After the meeting, however, I saw Rabinowitch sitting with the whole Russian delegation working on a draft statement for the conference. I asked Robert Bowie to join me in correcting any misapprehension that might have been left by the afternoon session. We joined the group and asked Rabinowitch to explain to our Soviet colleagues that in order to avoid a public clash we had been silent at the plenary session. At the same time, we did not wish them to return to the Soviet Union with any misapprehension about our views. I said that I had seen something of the operation of our government. I could assure them that our threats over Berlin were meant utterly seriously. A Soviet policy based on the assumption that we were bluffing could only lead to disaster.

Rabinowitch at first refused to translate this but a number of the Russians understood English and he was finally prevailed upon to interpret. Khvostov said that my remarks proved the correctness of the Soviet policy of resuming nuclear testing. I said that if the Soviets were prepared unilaterally to interrupt our access to Berlin they were indeed correct in resuming testing, because any interruption of our access would lead to war. However, it seemed to me that my comments could also be construed another way, namely, that the Soviet Union could avoid a clash by negotiating over disputed issues rather than proceeding on the basis of unilateral threats. At this point,

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[redacted] me for the information and I left.

The next day, Thursday, September 14, one of the Soviet interpreters came to me and asked me whether some of the participants from the Soviet Union could speak to me after dinner. I agreed. Present at this meeting were Khvostov, General Talensky, and later on, Sisakhyan. These three seemed to me in the plenary sessions the most influential of the Soviet group.

They began by asking me to repeat what I had said the day before. I said that I was not a diplomat and would speak with absolute frankness. They had to understand that I had attended the conference as a private citizen. I had heard a number of them say that they had been misled by the American participants at the Moscow conference about the likely future policy of the Kennedy Administration. I therefore did not want them to leave the Stowe conference with a misapprehension. I had heard many of them speak at the plenary session about the need to recognize facts and to act realistically. It therefore seemed to me that they should recognize one basic fact about American foreign policy: any interruption of our access to Berlin or any threat to the freedom of Berlin would mean war. Nor would we agree to any subterfuge by which the freedom of Berlin would be jeopardized. Khvostov replied that it was illogical to kill tens of millions to protect two million people. I said that it was a waste of time to discuss logic. The only thing that mattered was what we were going to do. The Soviet Union would make a terrible mistake if it assumed that we would proceed on the basis of Khvostov's calculation.

Talensky then gave a long explanation along familiar Soviet lines about revanchism in Western Germany and the fact that Germany would soon dominate NATO. He also argued that the interests of Western Germany were not the interests of the United States and that if it were not for Germany the United States and the Soviet Union could have most excellent relations. I replied that it seemed to me a fruitless approach to attempt to distinguish in this manner between the interests of the United States and our close allies. Talensky had to understand that we could not cooperate with the Soviet attempt to isolate one of our partners. There followed a rather inconclusive discussion of the meaning of self-determination for Germany; the need for a peace treaty, and similar matters on which both sides restated fairly familiar positions.

After about an hour of this, I asked Khvostov whether the only kind of settlement conceivable was one involving the whole German problem. It seemed to me that our positions as expressed during this conversation were almost irreconcilable. Khvostov, seconded by Talensky, said that the thought had crossed his mind whether a settlement of the Berlin issue might not be separated from the German problem as a whole.

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I said that whatever the relationship of Adenauer's interests to ours, I could discern a great difference between the interests of Ulbricht and the Soviet Union. It seemed to me that the fruitful line for the Soviet Union to pursue would be not to support Ulbricht's aspirations within Germany but to obtain security guarantees where it could. Khvostov seemed to agree that there was indeed some difference between Ulbricht's interests and those of the Soviet Union. Tolenskiy raised the question of what security guarantees I had in mind.

I said that since the Soviet Union considered its security was being threatened it seemed more appropriate for them to tell me what they had in mind. I would then tell them whether in my judgment as a private citizen it was within the realm of the conceivable, and where I did not know, I would say so. General Tolenskiy then gave another long statement about the suffering of the Soviet Union in World War II, the gist of which was that it was imperative to obtain a recognition of Germany's Eastern frontier. I asked whether they connected the issue of the Eastern frontiers of Germany with the Berlin problem. Both of them said, "Yes." I replied that the Oder-Neisse frontier was probably a subject which could be usefully discussed.

Khvostov interjected whether my comment applied to the Czech-German border as well as the Polish-German border. I replied that I had never heard anyone question the Czech-German border. However, if the Soviet Union wanted to raise some doubt with respect to it by making an issue of it in negotiations, it would seem to me a subject about which the United States government would almost certainly be prepared to talk.

I then asked how they proposed to relate the border problem to the Berlin issue. Khvostov gave a long explanation of the Soviet position on Berlin, insisting that our access rights had never been questioned. All the Soviet Union wanted was to find a status appropriate to the present situation. In particular, the Soviet Union felt that our occupation rights were a weak basis even though no one was questioning their validity. He repeated the last statement and said emphatically that no one in the Soviet Union was questioning the validity of our occupation rights. However, people were puzzled why we insisted on a legal basis that was being outstripped by events. (He used the German word here: "verjaehrt.")

I said that I could not believe that Mr. Khrushchev had awakened one morning and decided that the Western position in Berlin had an inadequate legal foundation and that he was therefore going to bring the world to the brink of war in order to improve our position. The Soviet group, which had meanwhile been joined by Sinenkyan, laughed about this and Tolenskiy said: "Of course not, we are trying to get something too. We are trying to get the stability of the East German frontier."

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I asked how they would visualize connecting the problem of the frontier with guarantees of access to Berlin. At first Tolensky said that the only realistic procedure was for the United States to sign a German peace treaty. I decided to see how far I could press them and said that was absolutely out of the question. They then asked whether I thought signing a separate protocol which would be attached to their own peace treaty would be acceptable. This, they explained, would mean that we would not sign the same document as Ulbricht. I said that this too seemed to me out of the question.

They then asked whether I thought it possible that we would make an agreement with the Soviet Union in which they would guarantee access to Berlin in return for our guarantee of Germany's Eastern frontiers. The access guarantees to Berlin could then be made part of a peace treaty which the Soviet Union would sign separately with the GDR.

I asked whether they had in mind something like the Bolz-Zorin agreements of 1955. Tolensky replied this seemed a useful model. (I am not sure the others knew what this agreement was.) I said that while I could not know what the United [illegible] government might think, my personal view was that such a proposal could well be the subject of negotiation.

We then turned to the question of the status of Berlin. Tolensky acted as spokesman for the Soviet group and proposed a status very similar to that of the Soviet position at the 1959 foreign ministers' conference: a free city guaranteed by the four victors, with Soviet troops joining those of the West to guarantee the new status. I told him that in the light of what had gone before, I was disappointed at his lack of realism. He should know that such a proposal was totally unacceptable to us.

Khvostov intervened to ask whether this objection applied even to token Soviet forces in West Berlin. I said yes. Soviet forces in West Berlin were likely to magnify a feeling of insecurity. Khvostov replied that the Soviet Union was not too interested in having its own forces in West Berlin. They were more concerned about obtaining some limitations on the size of the Western forces and about a promise not to station nuclear weapons there. I said that as a military expert I was only interested in a force in West Berlin of sufficient size so that it could not easily be overrun. As for nuclear weapons, Berlin was an unlikely place to station them.

Khvostov asked how I felt about United Nations forces in West Berlin. I said my personal opinion was that it would be unwise to create a status for West Berlin that left too much confusion as to who was responsible for its security. I saw no particularly useful function

for United Nations troops except for a very small token force to supplement, but not replace, those of the West.

Talensky asked whether I thought it necessary for West Berlin to be part of the Federal Republic. I said it was not necessary for it to be part of the Federal Republic politically, but it would have to be part of the same economic and currency system. Any proposal to the contrary would be unacceptable. Khvostov said in English "that's alright."

Talensky said that a proposal along the lines of what we suggested would be a bitter pill for Ulbricht to swallow. He asked whether we could not sweeten the pill somewhat by agreeing to engage in some kind of technical negotiations with Ulbricht. I said my sympathy for Ulbricht's plight was extremely limited. It seemed to me that he was their problem and not ours. All the Russians laughed at this point and Khvostov said, "Yes, this is true; he is our problem." He repeated whether we could not engage in some technical negotiations with Ulbricht nevertheless. I asked what was meant by this term.

Talensky said this meant some business-like negotiations which did not imply diplomatic recognition. After all, we were dealing with Franco too, even though we did not like him. I ignored the last remark and said that many of our difficulties in dealing with Ulbricht would be lessened if the Soviet Union would declare him their agent. For example, if the Soviet Union guaranteed access rights, if it made itself finally responsible for these rights and if the East Germans were declared agents for the execution of these rights, I could conceive personally that we would consider letting East German troops exercise the same procedures on the access routes as are now exercised by Soviet troops. Talensky indicated that this might prove to be a possible basis for discussion from the Soviet point of view.

I then told Talensky that I had been impressed at the sessions at how often the American and Soviet delegates had misunderstood what they had just discussed. In order to avoid this problem, I would appreciate it if Talensky would summarize the conditions which he thought might supply the basis for agreement. He did so, as follows:

(1) Recognition by the West that the Eastern frontiers of Germany were final.

(2) A guarantee by the Soviet Union of our access rights to Berlin and of some status for Berlin which would be protected by the present three Western occupation powers.

(3) The signature of a peace treaty between the USSR and East Germany in which these access rights would be specifically guaranteed.

(4) The carrying out of access procedures by the East Germans as agents of the Soviet Union.

[redacted]

Khvostov concurred and asked whether I wanted to add anything. I repeated that I was speaking as a private citizen. In this capacity, one thought had occurred to me. It seemed to me that since the Soviet Union was the party desirous of changing the status quo it would not be proper for us to make a proposal along the lines indicated by Talensky. Rather, the right course was for the Soviet Union to indicate its willingness to accept such a scheme. This, I pointed out, seemed to me all the more necessary as the danger existed that if we made an offer along the lines outlined by Talensky, the Soviet Union might simply bank the guarantee of Germany's Eastern frontier as a unilateral concession without slackening the pressure on Berlin.

Talensky said that I was a very suspicious man. I replied that one very useful part of the Stowe conference had been the admission by the Soviet delegation that disarmament negotiations had to take into account the existing distrust. Khvostov at that point said they would like to think the last point over.

Saturday morning, September 16, after the last plenary session and just before the Soviet delegates had to board a bus for the airport, Tsarapkin and Khvostov took me aside. Tsarapkin this time was the spokesman and said he wanted to explore two things about my conversation with his colleagues: first, whether I was really adamant about having no Soviet troops in West Berlin. I said that if the Soviet Union was really interested in stability in Berlin, it should not insist on Soviet troops in West Berlin. The best basis for insuring the freedom of Berlin was by forces from the West.

Tsarapkin then asked whether the occupation status was equally essential. I replied that our irreducible condition was the freedom of Berlin as we understood that term. If they could think of a status to guarantee this freedom other than the occupation rights, it was up to the Soviet Union to propose it. However, it was important to get clear that we would not agree to a status which jeopardized the freedom of Berlin by a subterfuge.

Tsarapkin asked whether a United Nations guarantee would be acceptable if Soviet troops could stay there as United Nations agents. I said that it was very hard to answer such questions with so little time to think about them. It seemed clear, however, that we would not agree to a status which could be changed every year by a majority in the General Assembly. Tsarapkin asked how about a guarantee for five years. I said that was too short. He then asked how about ten years. I replied that if this kept up I would suggest one hundred and fifty years and perhaps we could meet in the middle. He laughed and said we understood each other. I said, "I am not sure we do."

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Tsuu then said that a more important question on his mind was what I had meant by the phrase that the Soviet government should take the initiative in making the proposal his colleagues had discussed with me. What did I think of a letter by him to Pravda? I said that I did not know how such things were handled in the Soviet Union, but it would not seem to me proper for the American government to respond to a letter by a Soviet scientist, however distinguished. He then asked me what I thought of an article in Pravda. I said I was a student of diplomatic history, not of Soviet affairs. As such, it seemed to me that the best course was for a responsible official of the Soviet government to make a statement to which our government could then respond. I mentioned that Malik's reference in the United Nations which initiated the Korean truce talks appeared to me an appropriate model.

Khvostov, who had been silent throughout this discussion, said at this point that as a fellow historian he wanted to tell me that I had learned my lessons well. The Soviet group then had to rush for the bus, which was actually being held for them in order for them to complete this conversation.

Conclusions:

(1) Most of the above is rather self-explanatory. However, what may not be apparent from the conversation was my sense that the Soviet delegates seemed eager to avoid a showdown over Berlin. Though they began the conversation of each topic with the usual bluster and the usual threats, they subsided very quickly when I made it clear the official Soviet position would prove absolutely unacceptable. At least with this particular group, it proved helpful not to debate the logic of our case but simply to state our positionsas a fact.

(2) My overwhelming impression was that this particular group seemed much more interested in the recognition of Germany's frontiers than in the recognition of East Germany--even the de facto recognition of East Germany. It would seem to me that in any exploratory talks with Gromyko that this would be the most useful area to explore initially. Also, this group seemed more prepared to discuss the agent theory than I had previously assumed.

(3) This particular group seemed extremely eager to advance ideas for possible solutions themselves and proved ready to settle for much less than they stated originally on almost every issue.

(4) Of course, I do not know whom, if anybody, the Soviet group represents in a Soviet context.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

(Sent to V.P. Week-end of 9/22)

445

182

September 22, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. During the weekend of September 8 - 11, a Berlin political-military game was played at Camp David. One side (Blue) represented the U.S. Government, one side (Red) the Soviet Union. A Control team managed and directed the game. All the participants were officers of the State and Defense Departments and the White House staff who are involved in the problems of Berlin planning. A roster of the teams is attached. What follows is an attempt to make some observations on the game experience which are relevant to our real problems in Berlin.

2. All the participants in the game agreed that the U.S. found it difficult to use its military power flexibly and effectively for tactical purposes in the conduct of the day to day political struggle with the Soviet Union. This difficulty reflected a number of aspects of the real world which were fairly well mirrored in the game situation. The first is what might be called "alliance drag": the difficulty of getting agreement among a number of allies on day to day measures involving the controlled application of force in response to a changing tactical situation. In the game, this was reflected in the inability of the Blue team to agree on what the allies would be willing to do and what they would not, as well as in a general tendency to tone down military measures of response for fear of allied non-cooperation. A second source of irresoluteness arose simply from difference of opinion within the team on what was advisable. It is noteworthy that these differences were wider and more persistent within the Blue team than within Red. It is difficult to say how much of this difference was the product of the game situation, in which the Blue team members were repeating to a substantial degree their real life roles, while the Red team members had the advantage of being more free from the constraints imposed by intimate knowledge of the situation. Even allowing for this, however, there does seem to be some real difference between the two sides in this respect. Finally, the element of irreversibility that many

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military measures have in a democratic society, further contributes to U.S. weakness in this respect. Having once stepped up the degree of military activity in any situation, we find it difficult indeed in internal political terms to step it down.

The game also showed a rigidity in Blue's political stance on the problems of Germany and Berlin. Blue felt strongly committed to certain specific formulae on these problems. Here again the game parallels our real situation: we have in the past made strong public commitments to unification of Germany by free elections, non-recognition of the GDR, and the like. But in real life, as in the game, the combination of inhibition on flexible military response with rigid adherence to specific political formulae produces weakness, not strength.

These observations point to the desirability of achieving a more flexible capacity for response in the process of continuous bargaining with the Soviets, not only in making a show of force, but also in making a real application of force in a carefully graded and controlled manner. However desirable it is to move in this direction, it is important to assess the amount of movement possible: the constraints mentioned above are deeply rooted in our situation as a democratic nation allied with other democratic nations.

An equally important way to lessen the contradiction between the rigidity of our political position and our inability to move quickly and flexibly in the military dimension, is to introduce more flexibility into our political positions. In particular we may need to be more concerned with the current substance of our position in Berlin and Germany in terms of U.S. and NATO interests and less concerned with the verbal formulations of our position and literal adherence to what we have said in the past.

In making these movements in both military and political spheres, it appears necessary and desirable for us to take more initiative in relation to our allies, and to assume a degree of independent leadership which corresponds more nearly with the degree of responsibility we bear for the final result.

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3. The single most striking event in the game as played at Camp David was the revolt in East Berlin and its consequences. The revolt itself was manufactured by Control. What is striking was the response. Red immediately moved in to surround Berlin by Soviet divisions and sent two divisions into the city to crush the revolt. Blue in substance cooperated with Red by using the Berlin garrison to seal off West Berlin and to prevent West Berliners from going to the aid of revolting East Berliners, providing them with arms, etc. In the game situation, both sides appealed for peace, and both sides used their military forces to help achieve it. Peace was indeed achieved, to the advantage of the Red Team. Blue helped Red to achieve another Budapest victory.

In discussing this at the end of the game, the participants agreed that Blue might have done much better to take advantage of the occasion, use the garrison even at considerable risk, to hold a perimeter around Berlin, while continuing, of course, to call for calm and agreeing with Red that allowing the situation to spread to a general revolt in East Germany was a threat to world peace. In the play of the game, it was agreed that, given the cooperation as it were, to the Blue forces, Red could suppress the revolt within 48 hours. In the later discussion, the military members of the teams agreed that the allied Berlin garrison, plus an armed populace, could present a very difficult problem to the Soviet forces, and that reduction of the city so defended might take several weeks. Clearly such a course of action by us would involve serious risks, but these would be risks shared by the Soviets. A bold move of this sort, backed by our willingness to lose the garrison if necessary, would be much more indicative of our will to resist when necessary than any amount of protestation. Further, it is noteworthy that we might have a justification for such a line of action in the four-power status of Berlin and our responsibility for keeping order in East Berlin should a revolt in fact break out.

The similarity of this imaginary situation and the actual situation on the night of August 12 - 13 is clear.

4. Another interesting point which emerged from the game was the disagreement between the teams, contrasted with the unanimity within teams, as to who had "won" the game. Control interrupted the game in a situation in which the outcome was still uncertain. Blue air access to Berlin had been first interrupted, then restored, but harrassed. At the end of the game, access was open, but without any clear understanding of whether or not it could continue. Negotiations between Red and Blue had begun, but Blue had withdrawn. At

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the time of interruption, both were calling for new negotiations, but on quite inconsistent bases. The unanimous view of the Red team was that during the play of the game, Red had gained significantly, and Blue had lost significantly. Red's conclusion rested squarely on the tremendous deterioration in the confidence of West Berliners which Red's successful suppression of the revolt in the face of Blue's failure to act must have caused. Blue's contrary evaluation emphasized that, at that final moment, access was still open and that Blue had resisted accepting the verbal formulations which Red had offered as a basis for negotiation. Two things are noteworthy in this situation. First, that two groups of quite similar people in terms of training, present activity, etc., should come to such strikingly different conclusions. The implication of this is the real difficulty that we have in seeing our position as it looks to the other side in the real world, as well as in a game. Second, Blue indeed paid too much attention to the verbal form and too little attention to the political substance. As remarked above, this is a conclusion which appears to apply to the U.S. Government in fact, as well as to the Blue team in the game.

5. The greatest value of the game was the stimulus to imaginative thought about Berlin it provided for the participants. Its greatest weakness as played was that none of the participants involved held positions of the highest responsibility in the government. It would appear to be well worth their expenditure of time to arrange for another run of the game in which the participants included General Taylor, Messrs. Johnson and Kohler of the State Department; Mr. Nitze of the Defense Department; Mr. Amory of the CIA; and Messrs. Bundy and Rostow of the White House Staff.

6. Attached to this memorandum are two individual documents. The first is a more detailed set of comments on the lessons of the game by T. C. Schelling. Schelling was the organizer of this game; he has previously run similar games, and has written extensively on the strategy of bargaining. He is a RAND consultant and professor at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

The second is a summary history of the actual play of the game at Camp David. The history makes more comprehensible Schelling's comments, as well as this memorandum, but it is not indispensable to understanding them.

Carl Kaysen

Gen'l Correspondence
Lot 70D163

(183) (446)

TOP SECRET September 24, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President
The Secretary of State

On Friday evening, September 22, 1961, Georgi Bolshikov, Editor of USSR (the American language Soviet magazine) contacted me from Washington and said it was urgent that I have dinner on Sunday night with him and Mikhail Khalarmov, Chief of the Soviet Press Office. I indicated to Bolshikov that I had other plans for dinner but that I would be delighted to see them for as long as necessary in my room at the Carlyle Hotel at 7:15 p.m. on Sunday, September 24th.

Khalarmov and Bolshikov arrived in my room shortly after 7:15 p.m. on Sunday evening having been brought into the hotel by the back way in order to avoid the press in the lobby.

Khalarmov opened the conversation by saying that "the storm was over". He said that he brought me greetings from Alexei Adzubei and that both he and Adzubei were extremely desirous of my coming to the Soviet Union next summer with my children; that my children would stay with Adzubei's children. I replied that I was happy to hear that the storm was over but unfortunately that was not yet apparent to the American people or to me.

Khalarmov then asked if Cyrus L. Sulzberger of the New York TIMES had delivered a message to me from Khrushchev. I replied that he had not but that it was possible he had delivered the message to the President. Kharlamov said that he did not believe that Sulzberger had delivered Khrushchev's message and that he wanted me to know what Khrushchev had said to Sulzberger.

He said that Khrushchev had told Sulzberger that he was very much aware of the President's political problem at home and that he wanted to arrange a settlement over Germany so that the President would not lose face. He said that Mr. Khrushchev wanted to meet with the President but that he would leave the timing up to the President; that he was waiting for the President to make proposals which would lead to the settlement of the German question. He said there was great pressure in the Soviet Union

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for settlement of the German question. He said that except for one speech, Mr. Khrushchev had not been disturbed by any of the President's statements. The one speech which disturbed him was the Berlin speech of July 25th. He said that McCloy had been talking to Khrushchev in Sochi and that the talks had gone extremely well on the first day but that following the President's speech on July 25th, Khrushchev became exceedingly angry.

Khalarmov then pointed to the McCloy-Zorin agreement on disarmament and said there was an indication that the Soviet Union and the United States could come to agreements. The reason there had been no agreement in Geneva was that Arthur Dean was a very poor negotiator and that McCloy and Zorin had worked together and found common ground.

I remarked to Khalarmov about the ease with which Mr. Khrushchev was able to get across his viewpoint in American newspapers. I pointed out the interviews he had had with Walter Lippmann, Cy Sulzberger and Drew Pearson. He said it was an unfortunate fact that the Soviet people did not have a similar opportunity to come to know and understand the President's views. I suggested that perhaps a leading Soviet journalist might want to interview the President and carry the transcript verbatim in the Soviet press. Mr. Khalarmov thought it was a particularly inappropriate time to make such a request inasmuch as 15 Soviet journalists, due to arrive on September 15th, were denied visas by the State Department.

I said I would look into the matter but that that was not the central issue. While on the subject of communications, I said that I was puzzled and disturbed by the fact that the Soviet Union, after personal agreement with Mr. Khalarmov, had not yet run the tape of the debate I had with him and Mr. Adzubei on NBC/TV in New York. Mr. Khalarmov said that that was a technical problem; that NBC had failed to provide them with the right kind of tape for the equipment they have in the Soviet Union. Besides they said they would rather have me appear live over Russian TV.

We then resumed the discussion of the President being interviewed by a Soviet journalist. Khalarmov thought it was a good idea; that he would discuss it with Adzubei (who is in Italy) tomorrow afternoon "after the President's speech." Khalarmov hoped the President's speech "would not be an ultimatum like the July 25th speech."

Khalarmov and Bolshikov both agreed we would be in contact at 5:00 p. m. on Monday.

Pierre Salinger

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

447 15491

762.00/9-2561
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DATE: September 25, 1961

USSR Embassy

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov
The Under Secretary of State

762.00/9-2661

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I met with Ambassador Menshikov at the Soviet Chancery at 16th Street at 12:00 noon on September 25th. He has suggested lunch on several occasions, stressing that while he had no specific instructions, he would like to see me to exchange views. I left at 1:25 p.m.

Nothing of importance came out of the discussion. For the most part, Menshikov advanced the line that Khrushchev had opened up in Vienna and which is now readily available to us in Pravda and elsewhere. His purpose apparently was to induce me to spell out more specifically what we were willing to do.

I repeated what the Secretary said to Gromyko, and suggested that since Menshikov and I were unlikely to be able to negotiate a settlement, it was a waste of time for us to go over the same ground in general terms. At some stage it would be necessary for them to spell out precisely what they mean by their assertion that they would not interfere with access to Berlin. It would be up to the negotiators to find common ground if, as I hoped, common ground existed.

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I added that in my opinion it would be a mistake for Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy to go into any conference unless it was well established in advance that agreement would result from it; that if they negotiated directly and the negotiations failed, the danger of war would vastly increase, since it would appear there was no other alternative.

Menshikov asserted that Attorney General Robert Kennedy's speech was provocative and threatening and that it would undoubtedly require some response from Moscow. I asked him if he had really read what the Attorney General had said. When he said he had only seen the newspaper reports, I pointed out that the Attorney General had referred to the use of nuclear weapons only in defense of Berlin and our interest there, and not in any threatening sense; it was a clear statement of an obvious fact, i.e. that if we were attacked, we would defend ourselves with whatever weapons were necessary.

I pointed out that Khrushchev on many occasions had used more provocative words, i.e. he could destroy Britain with eight or ten bombs, that he could blow up Italy with even fewer, and that the Acropolis would be one of the casualties along with the Greek people if Greece did not cooperate with the U.S.S.R.

Menshikov responded mildly, stressing that Khrushchev's remarks had been made in private conversations and not intended for publication. They were simply his way of expressing his concern over the possibility of war, etc.

I then asked Menshikov what Khrushchev had meant by his willingness to see the United Nations facilities transferred to Berlin. Menshikov stated that he had no instructions on this subject and had only heard indirectly that Khrushchev had said this.

He went on to say that the United Nations should not be in New York, that this was not good for us or others, since there were groups of Americans with violent views. From what he knew, therefore, the Soviets would be willing to negotiate the development of United Nations activities in Berlin. I said that we had no position on the subject, but that in one way or another it might come up in discussions later.

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In the last ten minutes I expressed the strong hope to Menshikov that he and his government have a better understanding of our country and its interests and objectives than I sometimes felt they had. In the course of this particular discussion I made the following points:

1. That President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk, Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Dean, Jack McCloy, myself, and others in the Administration had come into office with a strong desire to reach some kind of agreement with the Soviet Union which would allow us to work constructively to establish a peaceful and rational world;

2. That none of us could be classed as haters of the Soviet Union or in any way antagonistic to the interests of the Soviet people. And although we were disappointed and felt that we had been rebuffed, we had in no sense given up hope that some better relationship could develop in the future;

3. That if the present leadership of the United States is unable to reach reasonable agreements with the Soviet Union, we will be replaced by others who will follow a far harder line.

Even though the Kremlin should somehow maneuver us into a position over Berlin that was to their immediate advantage and to our disadvantage, it would be a pyrrhic victory, since it would leave America embittered, and no less militarily powerful;

4. That he must realize that while we were anxious to find ways of living and working with the Soviet Union, we were not afraid, and they should not ever assume that we lacked the will to protect our interests.

I pointed out that he personally had made remarks suggesting that we lacked that will and that this was dangerous. Anyone who had not known the British people in 1939 might have assumed their unwillingness to fight as they did in 1940 and 41 when they faced up to the entire Nazi power. I said that while the British, French, and Americans were often divided on small matters, they were united on large issues, and it was important that he understand this.

Menshikov hastened to comment on my reference to the story that he had said we would not fight. He said that the question

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had been asked him by someone in the German Embassy whose name he did not know, and it was taken entirely out of context. He seemed particularly anxious to correct what he said was a false impression.

My general impression was that Menshikov was less anxious to argue than usual and was almost mellow in his general approach. There were none of the angry replies encountered on previous occasions.

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NDU 0.4 Taylor National Defense University Taylor Papers

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(185) 27 September 1961

(448)

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Interview on Political Subjects with the President 28 September 1961

1. What follows is an attempt which may be helpful in preparation for what you have described as a political session with the President at Newport tomorrow. It is based on the assumption that the President is probably a little upset or concerned at the accusations, in the press and elsewhere, of American weakness, based on General Clay's alleged remarks over the weekend and even on some of the things the President said or failed to say in his UN speech.

2. There is no question about the accuracy of General Clay's comments and of the President's hints concerning the concessions we will be willing to make, provided our "basic rights" on Berlin manage to survive. However, the members of the pro-concessions school should realize that it is now apparent that the concessions they contemplate are not going to satisfy the Soviets.

3. For example, the pro-concessions school probably took heart at the reports of the conversation Spaak had with Khrushchev. You will recall Spaak's saying that Khrushchev was willing for the four occupation powers to conclude a little side agreement of their own, and that this side agreement would then be incorporated in the Soviet Union's separate treaty with the GDR; thus, all our Berlin rights and vital interests might have been protected without our even sitting in the same room with Ulbricht company. It now turns out that Spaak was either an inaccurate reporter or did not have the full story. At the Berlin Task Force meeting this morning it was reported that Lord Home and Gromyko had a chat in New York which included a discussion of this 4-Power treaty angle of which Spaak spoke. Gromyko was good enough to inform the Foreign Secretary in effect that any such 4-Power agreement would have to include respect of GDR sovereignty, Western access agreements with the GDR, and demilitarization in Central Europe, inter alia.

4. To counteract the impression of eagerness to compromise, the President might be interested in discussing counter-weighing ideas:

a. The point General Clay makes in his first cable of general impressions from Berlin -- viz, that regardless of how we intend to concede in the future, we should, until the time for concession comes,

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continue and continue vigorously to exercise our rights and to resist strongly all harassments which affect those rights. A thought which I would add is that we should visibly intensify our exercise of those rights. For example, there is no real question about our right to use the autobahn as we see fit, and yet just because in recent days a few soldiers have been stopped by VOPOs while enroute to or from Berlin, there has been some talk of making them wear uniforms so that their identity will be unmistakable and thus the VOPOs will not raise a delicate point by asking them for identification. On the contrary, we should encourage our soldiers to wear civilian clothes while on the autobahn and, as General Clay has already done, if the VOPOs try any hanky-panky, we should increase our MP "Assistance Patrols" to whatever extent we choose. This proposal is the sort of thing which could be left in general language of instruction issued to the responsible people, such as General Clay.

b. We must face up to the fact that our Allies have already been dragging their feet and will undoubtedly drag them worse in the future. This suggests two courses of action:

(1) We must be certain that we have "covered the waterfront" with unilateral plans on every contingency with which we are dealing quadripartitely. The United States has certain irreducible vital interests, control of which it can in the last analysis neither surrender nor share with anyone, neither the new nations of the UN nor even our NATO Allies, neither Nehru nor MacMillan, neither Bohemey nor DeGaulle.

(2) While pressing ahead with unilateral plans we must make more of an effort to pressure our Allies. There has been too much compromise of US positions at working group and subcommittee levels, while the President of the United States has been asked to decide matters of the order of Steinstuecken.

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 640, SEPTEMBER 29, 11 AM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 640, BONN 567

BONN FOR AMBASSADOR

FROM CLAY TO RUSK

I AM NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR AS TO THE DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN. I REALIZE THAT WE REGARD IT AS IMPORTANT BUT NOT AS ONE OF THE RIGHTS WE ARE COMMITTED TO DEFEND. ALTHOUGH IN PRINCIPLE THIS RIGHT HAS NEVER BEEN CHALLENGED IT IS IN FACT NOW RESTRICTED TO ONE PLACE OF ENTRY ON FRIEDRICH STRASSE.

TODAY, WE ARE ENCOURAGING AMERICAN VISITORS AS WELL AS OUR OWN PEOPLE TO VISIT EAST BERLIN AS EVIDENCE OF OUR INTENT TO MAINTAIN THIS RIGHT. WE HAVE ALSO INCREASED OUR MILITARY PATROLS AS COMPARED TO PATROLS USED PRIOR TO AUGUST 13 AND THIS IS IMPORTANT AS THEY DO SECURE SOME INFORMATION. NEVERTHELESS OUR ENCOURAGEMENT OF VISITS TO EAST BERLIN CONTINUES TO BUILD UP IN WEST BERLIN THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS IS A RIGHT WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO DEFEND.

OBVIOUSLY, IF THE ENTRANCE IS BLOCKED, THE REMOVAL OF THE OBSTACLE WOULD STILL NOT ASSURE ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN EXCEPT IN THEORY AS WE COULD NOT PROTECT SUCH VISITS EVEN IF WE ARE PREPARED TO USE FORCE.

IN SOME RESPECTS I WOULD RATHER THAT WE PLAY DOWN VISITS TO EAST BERLIN AND IF SITUATION TIGHTENED TO CLOSE IT OF OUR OWN VOLITION RATHER THAN TO HAVE IT CLOSED BY THE EAST GERMAN POLICE. HOWEVER, EVEN IF WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS RIGHT TO BE WORTH FIGHTING TO

762.00/9-2961

XR-EC2.181

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Ltr to 624 9/29

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RETAIN, I THINK IT ONE OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO GDR TO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL NEGOTIATING VALUE IF NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE. IF THIS IS TRUE, THE EAST GERMAN POLICE MIGHT WELL MOVE TO CLOSE IT PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO HAVE AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT.

IF THEY DO ACT TO CLOSE IT, THEY WOULD PROBABLY ANNOUNCE IT PUBLICLY AS A LEGAL MEASURE AT TIME OF CLOSURE. IN ANY CASE, ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD QUICKLY DRAW CORRESPONDENTS, REPORTERS, AND WEST GERMANS TO SEE WHAT THE ALLIES WOULD DO.

OUR PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO ASK AT THE SITE FOR HELP IN THE REMOVAL OF THE OBSTACLE, TO ATTEMPT REMOVAL BY HAND IF POSSIBLE, AND IF NO SOVIET OFFICER IS BROUGHT TO THE SCENE, TO PROTEST IMMEDIATELY AT HIGHEST LEVEL HERE. TO MAKE ANY CONTACTS HERE MIGHT REQUIRE SEVERAL HOURS AND DURING THIS INTERVAL WE COULD LOOK MOST INEFFECTIVE AND FOOLISH.

I WOULD SUGGEST TWO ALTERNATIVES TO THIS APPROACH. THE FIRST WOULD BE TO DO NOTHING AT THE SITE BUT FOR THE BERLIN COMMANDER TO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY THAT HE IS ADVISING THE LOCAL SOVIET COMMANDER THAT THIS ACTION IS SO FLAGRANT AND SERIOUS THAT HE HAS REQUESTED OUR GOVERNMENT TO TAKE IT UP AS A MATTER OF URGENCY WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE WHICH WOULD BETTER DEVELOP THE REAL DETERMINATION BEHIND THE CLOSURE WOULD BE TO USE TANK OR OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT TO KNOCK DOWN THE OBSTACLE AT FRIEDRICH STRASSE OR A PLACE OF OUR OWN CHOICE, STOPPING ONLY IF MET WITH SMALL ARMS FIRE BUT WITHOUT FIRING BACK WHILE REPORTING TO GOVERNMENT AND AWAITING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZE THAT THE END RESULTS FROM EITHER ALTERNATIVE WILL BE THE SAME, I PERSONALLY FAVOR THE LATTER ALTERNATIVE AS I AM CONVINCED WE MUST PUSH HARD LOCALLY TO DETERMINE THE POINT AT

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WHICH THE EAST GERMAN POLICE WILL FIRE OR CALL FOR THEIR SOVIET MASTERS. I AM SURE THAT HALF-HEARTED MEASURES WILL ACCOMPLISH NOTHING EXCEPT DAMAGE TO OUR PRESTIGE AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED. BELIEVE ALL OTHER INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT SATISFACTORY.

LIGHTNER

BA

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S/S:GER:MJHillenbrand:jit
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 29, 1961

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe
Dr. Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy

Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER

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Ambassador Grewe began by noting that, in a telegram from Dr. Carstens, the Foreign Office had admitted that a number of unpleasant and critical remarks had appeared in the German press following the President's UN speech. The Foreign Office regretted these but could not prevent them, although it had done everything it could to put a favorable interpretation on the speech, including two radio addresses by Foreign Minister von Brentano. The Foreign Office's opinion was that the President's speech itself was not the main cause of criticism, but rather its coming in the wake of extensive discussion of statements attributed to General Clay, speculative stories in the U.S. press, and statements made by prominent U.S. Senators. It was against this background that Foreign Minister von Brentano had written the letter (copy attached) to the Secretary of State, which he was handing to Mr. Kohler. The crucial point was how the two Governments could act to avoid continuing press speculation and commentary about the U.S. position on Germany.

Mr. Kohler said this was a difficult problem involving as it did hypersensitive German public opinion. He did not think the Soviets had any illusions about U.S. policy. The Secretary had been forthright with Gromyko. However, it would be misleading at this point to imply in a public statement that there was real hope for achievement of reunification in the near future, even though this remained an object

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of long-term policy. The President in his UN speech had likewise stressed that an important objective is settlement of the satellite problem on the basis of self-determination.

Ambassador Grewe indicated that he thought von Brentano had in mind something which would calm down the rumors in Germany to the effect that the U.S. was moving towards recognition of the GDR. Perhaps a better method could be found to do this than the issuance of a formal statement. Mr. Kohler observed that we had tried to have such a high-level formal statement in the President's speech. The Ambassador said this had been too general to have the necessary counter-active effect in the Federal Republic. Mr. Kohler commented that, for German purposes, any statement should perhaps come from the Chancellor. It was hopeless to try to deal with every speculative story.

Ambassador Grewe stressed the problem for German public opinion created by a "certain change of official terminology" from "reunification of Germany" to "self-determination behind the Iron Curtain". The traditional distinction between the German problem and the general problem of the other satellites was now no longer being made.

Mr. Kohler said this was perhaps the precise point involved. It was hard to see any serious prospect for agreement with the Soviets. We might be faced with a serious crisis following a separate peace treaty. This was a pressing problem and in a crisis situation it would be misleading to lay stress on the feasibility of reunification. It was a question of emphasis and arousing false expectations.

Ambassador Grewe emphasized that the Western response to the Soviet peace treaty proposals should stress the Western maximum position on the all-German question. Mr. Kohler noted that the Secretary had been trying to say to Gromyko that if he pushed too hard on the Berlin question how could discussion of broader questions take place. The Secretary was trying to focus on the major point of immediate challenge. If any satisfaction was obtained on this then there would be a possible opening for broader negotiations in which we could consider whether the revised Western Peace Plan would be our opening gambit. He said that, in all frankness, a source of weakness to the Alliance had been that the Federal Republic had not acted more vigorously on military build-up and required emergency legislation. In the face of East German mobilization and emergency measures, firm German reaction was also important in overcoming speculation and bickering.

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Ambassador Grewe also expressed the concern of his Government about certain language in the President's speech which had given some people the impression that European security arrangements could be considered as a concession for an arrangement on Berlin. He felt that Ambassador Dowling's remarks to Dr. Carstens on this subject had been a little weak. The President's language might have led some people to take the recent article of Gaston Coblentz on disengagement which appeared in the WASHINGTON POST and the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE seriously.

When Mr. Kohler indicated that the kind of security provisions to which the President's statement referred were those of which we thought in connection with the Western Peace Plan, Ambassador Grewe observed that in the Peace Plan these measures were specifically linked to the achievement of German reunification. The point that worried his Government was the separation of the two. Another thing which worried him was the implication of the Secretary's remarks to Gromyko, as reported yesterday in the Ambassadorial Group, on this subject.

Mr. Kohler said this subject was a little difficult to discuss since we had not completed our studies of it. There were really two aspects, the disarmament aspect and the regional security aspect. Even in our disarmament proposals there were certain steps relating to European security. One of the reasons why we were interested in having the kind of study which the Four Foreign Ministers had agreed on, was to see whether there were any measures in this field which it might be to advantage of the West to put forward in the context of negotiations. If so, their association with discussions on Berlin might be a good thing. We have never really explored whether certain measures in the security field might be valuable in themselves to us; even the provisions in the Western Peace Plan had never thoroughly been explored. At the time, he recalled, we had some difficulties with our disarmament people who did not want the security provisions detached from the disarmament package and linked to the German problem.

Ambassador Grewe observed that we really had two sets of ideas: (a) the old Geneva points on surprise attack and inspection zones which contemplates only large zones unrelated to Berlin or reunification; (b) in the Western Peace Plan the possibility of narrower zones was contemplated in connection with phases of reunification. The term European security had not been normally used in connection with (a), i.e., the Geneva talks on surprise attack. What worried his Government was the linking of the term European security to discussion of Berlin alone.

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Mr. Kohler commented that this is what we wanted to study. We fully realized the apprehensions of the Chancellor and the Federal Government with respect to anything discriminatory to the Federal Republic or which moved towards neutralization or unilateral disarmament of Germany. He did not think German policy could be any stronger on this than ours. The integration of German strength into NATO has had and will continue to have our strong support. In 1959 we had pulled out certain security elements from the disarmament field to sweeten our package. Mr. Kohler said that he had to confess that, in going over the President's speech in draft, this was not a point which he had thought would cause any trouble. He wanted to talk to the Secretary about this general subject and to show him the von Brentano letter.

Ambassador Grewe said that certain remarks of the Secretary during the recent Foreign Ministers' meeting, when the security study was being discussed, had also caused concern, but von Brentano had decided not to press the point. In referring to the connection of this study and a political settlement, the Secretary had said that he did not see any close connection and had indicated that it might well be that security arrangements in Europe as such could be useful and valuable because of the closeness of the military forces on both sides in Europe. This was an argument about which the Federal Republic had grave doubts. The closeness of the confrontation was perhaps an advantage rather than a disadvantage. Mr. Kohler said that the Secretary thought it would be a good thing if we could get the Soviet divisions in East Germany below their present twenty. This was a reason for studying these matters. It might be useful if we could say that the U.S. has only six divisions in Germany and there is, therefore, no reason for the Soviets to have twenty. We frankly do not believe there is much we can do in this general field, Mr. Kohler continued, but we do feel that there has been a lack of adequate study. He was, therefore, a little surprised at the German concern. At the very least, if we get into discussions with the Soviets, we should have agreed responses to any initiatives they might make on the subject of security.

Ambassador Grewe said that the Chancellor's main concern was really not the point of discrimination against Germany, although this was important in terms of public presentation, but rather that any concept of narrow inspection zones would imply the pulling out of certain types of weapons and a corresponding weakening of the Western defensive posture. Mr. Kohler observed that this gets one into all sorts of technical problems with respect to range and types of weapons. It was a subject for experts, but it was conceivable that the West might be better off with weapons not at the very front line where they could easily be overrun. Ambassador Grewe agreed these points might be studied.

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Referring to the President's mention of a possible plebiscite in his UN speech, Ambassador Grewe noted the obscurity of the language to the effect that a plebiscite on the Allied presence in Berlin might be submitted to a free vote not only in Berlin but among all the German people. He assumed this was not precisely what was meant. As far as the idea of a plebiscite proposal was concerned, the German Government continued to favor this and might come back to the possibility of an initiative in this field before a conference with the Soviets. Mr. Kohler commented that the President was talking about translating the principle of self-determination into practice in general terms. He referred to the existence of a specific paper on a possible plebiscite in the Working Group Report although noting that it would have to be reviewed in the light of circumstances should the West decide actively to pursue the subject.

At a later point in the conversation (separate memorandum discusses other subjects covered), Ambassador Grewe stated his personal support for the idea of making the Berlin an Eleventh Land of the Federal Republic. He felt that an informal exchange of views on this subject might be useful since the proposal would have considerable psychological appeal to the Berliners. Mr. Kohler said we had for several years considered this possibility; its essential weakness seemed to be that it would appear to destroy the basis for the Western presence and free access to the city. Ambassador Grewe said that obviously some provision for maintenance of occupation rights would have to be included.

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TRANSLATION

THE FEDERAL MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Bonn, September 26th, 1961

His Excellency Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
of the United States of America
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister,

dear friend:

The recent conference of the four foreign ministers in Washington has given me great satisfaction. All talks we had together and also the discussion with President Kennedy and the Defense Minister, Mr. McNamara, in the White House have convinced me that the four Western Powers are in complete agreement over the critical problems of the German and Berlin policies. This was particularly important since you have undertaken the difficult task of holding the first clarifying talks with Mr. Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. On viewing the reports, I believe that we all have cause to thank you for that first discussion. No one could expect that a first contact could so soon lead to concrete results, and it seems to me that the door was open for further talks.

It is all the more regrettable that a section of the Western press has, during the last few days, occupied itself in increasing measure with speculative reflections which convey the impression that the West is prepared to surrender crucial positions. These articles which appear in the American, the British and in the German press, deal, amongst other things, with the imminent recognition of the Soviet-occupied zone as a second German state. Unfortunately, there is also a remark made by General Clay apparently before a small select group, which has reached the public through indiscretion and has been interpreted in the above sense. The denial by General Clay and the clear rectification by the State Department have still not removed the ensuing confusion.

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I feel that this public discussion must unfavorably influence the forthcoming difficult negotiations with the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union gains the impression that such far-reaching concessions are advocated by authoritative quarters then, in my opinion, it will become even more excessive in its demands.

I wonder how we can prevent such a dangerous development. Statements from German quarters would be certainly insufficient. Nor would they be harmless since they will be too easily interpreted as the expression of an unadmitted distrust in the action of our allies.

I need hardly say to you, dear Mr. Rusk, that the Federal Government and the German people have complete and unlimited confidence in their allies, with whom we have established a common policy throughout many years of cooperation. The speech made yesterday by President Kennedy precisely helped to strengthen this confidence.

I wonder whether, in view of the contradictory press reports and the confusing interpretation, it would not be of value for the American Government to make a clarifying statement to the effect that it is determined to abide by this common policy on Germany and that the objectives of the American policy are, as before, the restoration of German unity on the basis of the right to self-determination. I believe that such a statement would put an end to the undesirable speculations. And I am convinced that it would facilitate the forthcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union; that is, in the sense that it would cause the Soviet Union to abandon illusions which consist of nothing more than the fallacious hope of being able to weaken the solidarity of the Western world and to disintegrate the Atlantic Alliance.

I would be sincerely grateful to you if you would consider my deliberations and let me know what you think of them.

With deepest regards,

Yours sincerely,

(sgd.) Heinrich von Brentano

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(With Top Secret Attachment)

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MEMORANDUM

188

OCT 2 1961

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

SUBJECT: Berlin Military Planning

Downgraded To: SECRET [redacted]
EO 11652: XGDS (1) 2 (3) 4
Authorized by: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975

I attach a draft paper we have just received from Paul Nitze which is an excellent analysis of the latest views of General Norstad and the JCS on strategy issues involved in Berlin Military Planning. You will probably wish to read this prior to the meeting we are trying to arrange for you with Secretary McNamara and General Norstad on Tuesday morning to prepare for the meeting with the President (which we now understand will be Tuesday afternoon).

Attachment:

Analysis of SACEUR and JCS Proposals

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Analysis of SACEUR and JCS Proposals

This paper presents a summary analysis of General Norstad's latest cable (ALO 855, 29 Sept) and the recent JCS Memo for Sec Def (World-wide Military Actions), together with some conclusions drawn therefrom.

General Norstad's Views

This cable can be interpreted as moving Gen Norstad's position somewhat closer to the strategy of graduated, non-nuclear military measures. However, it appears to adhere basically to his former views and requires considerable amplification.

The combination of actions he proposes, if the Soviets persist in denial of access, involves: 1) a "limited" probe, the "size and tactics" of which would clearly indicate that subsequent "use of significant force" by us is "logical and inevitable"; 2) "limited, selected offensive actions" to seize objectives which "enhance our defensive position" but which somehow also "emphasize special attention to Berlin and/or access thereto"; 3) these operations would be "initiated" on a conventional basis, but the US and NATO "must succeed" and thus must use nuclear weapons "intensively at the time and to the extent" necessary for success.

For valid analysis, this combination would require considerable spelling out, both in its detail and in its relation to the forces assumed to be available. Appropriate questions would include: 1) What would be the timing of the probe in relation to forcible denial of access, and of the "limited selected offensives" in relation to the probe?

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2) How

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2) How would operations "emphasize special attention to Berlin"? 3) What is the definition of "success" -- holding objectives seized against any Soviet Bloc attack?, forcing open access to Berlin?, preserving integrity of forces?; 4) How soon might it be expected that nuclear weapons would be required?

Subject to the detailed answers to such questions, the proposal seems to amount to the taking of military actions which would bring on the early use of nuclear weapons, perhaps in a limited way, with NATO forces in the best possible defensive posture. If this is a valid appraisal, it becomes important to analyse: 1) What non-nuclear capabilities General Norstad visualizes having available; and 2) What the probable developments in nuclear action might be.

General Norstad recommends the following preparatory measures: 1) immediate completion of the 40,000 personnel augmentation; 2) maintenance of the Sixth Fleet at full strength, especially in ASW capabilities; 3) logistic preparations for the support of additional forces to be deployed; and 4) readying of sea and air lift for rapid subsequent deployments. He does Not recommend deployment of additional divisions at this time. General Norstad must therefore contemplate one of two situations: 1) access will remain denied (before or after a probe) for an appreciable time while a buildup is undertaken; or 2) he will initiate actions rapidly with the forces he has available. He appears to favor the second, since he states: "We must undertake the line of action outlined ... whether or not we are better prepared than at present."

If this is the case (and it might well be politically necessary at

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the time), then forces to sustain operations by conventional means would be relatively limited, and hence the use of nuclear weapons would come earlier.

The most probable results of such nuclear action under these circumstances would be escalation, gradual or rapid, in Europe or world-wide, depending on subsequent reactions on both sides. It is difficult to conceive of conditions under which the resulting exchange could end, short of all-out war, in which the US would occupy a relatively advantageous position. At any intermediate stopping point, assuming as we must that the Soviets had at least matched us in kind, the politico-military situation would be one in which we were still out-matched in usable conventional strength and under extreme pressure to avoid any further use of nuclears.

A possible (although less likely) alternative Soviet response to our initial use might be to fail to reply in kind, but to protest and warn the Europeans that they must get the "American madmen" out before all Europe was destroyed. Then we would have to: 1) press our temporary military advantage -- almost certainly to general war, or 2) desist under very adverse military and political circumstances.

General Norstad states that NATO would support his proposed actions, "if it is the manifest intent of the US to proceed along these lines, particularly with respect to the determination to use atomic weapons". While General Norstad's opinion in this regard should certainly be given due weight, there is at least some evidence that NATO would not find this an easy course to adopt. The current attitudes of NATO nations appear

divided

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divided and conflicting. On the one hand, they tend to reject any deviation from the purely defensive, nuclear-oriented NATO strategy of the past. On the other hand, many NATO governments (e.g. Canada) refuse to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in any hostilities over Berlin. (The net result of accommodation to all these attitudes could be complete inaction.) Many Europeans seem to be particularly sensitive to "offensive actions" on our part -- especially if such operations are not clearly focused, politically and geographically, on a "legalistic" objective (.eg. the British worry about moving off the Autobahn proper).

In view of the foregoing, General Norstad's proposal (unless more adequately explained) does not seem a wholly consistent and practicable alternative.

Thus, other possibilities should be more carefully examined. These include: 1) an immediate increase in mobilization and deployment schedules to provide in Europe the resources required for more graduated, and more extensive non-nuclear operations; and 2) world-wide actions to bring military pressure to bear, as an alternative or complementary measure to action in Germany.

JCS Views

These other possibilities are covered in the recent JCS recommendations which include actions in Europe and world-wide under the two conditions of "administrative" or "forcible" denial of access by the Soviet Bloc.

The combination of actions in Germany visualized by the JCS should access be forcibly denied may be compared with General Norstad's proposal. The JCS combination includes: 1) a platoon probe with simultaneous fighter

sweeps

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sweeps of the border; 2) a battalion probe, with air support and a Corps in reserve in the vicinity of Helmstedt; 3) commitment of the lead division of this Corps on a Helmstedt-Berlin axis, followed by remaining elements if necessary, all with direct air support; and 4) no use of nuclear weapons except if necessary to reply in kind, to meet a massive attack and retain integrity of forces, or in response to the overrunning of West Berlin.

This proposal is essentially different from General Norstad's in several respects: 1) it goes into some detail as to the nature of operations; 2) it represents a more graduated approach; 3) it focuses more closely on the political issue; 4) it appreciably delays resort to nuclear weapons. There are however some key considerations involved: 1) the actions are proposed "if fully supported by NATO"; and 2) they assume a substantial non-nuclear capability which may not be available at the time required.

The question of NATO support has been examined in connection with General Norstad's views. Regardless of the course of action we finally adopt, these allies must somehow be persuaded that the US-proposed strategy is also in their best interests.

The JCS proposal is not clear on the timing of additional deployments to Europe to create the desirable non-nuclear capability. It would appear that the JCS may contemplate earlier action than does General Norstad, since they associate with "administrative" denial of access an action to "complete the deployment of augmentation forces to Europe."

The world-wide actions proposed by the JCS seem in cases quite severe under both of the warning conditions. In case of "administrative"

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denial, these include, for example: 1) declaration of national emergency and mobilization of the 1,000,000-man ready reserve; 2) naval harassment and denial actions; 3) deployment of the 25th Division from Hawaii to the Philippines; 4) initiation of a series of atmospheric nuclear tests; and 5) closure of the Kiel and Panama canals to Bloc shipping. Examples under the condition of denial "by force of arms" are: 1) implementation of SEATO/CENTO plans to regain Laos or support action against Vietnam, ("If the situation in Southeast Asia has not improved"); 2) closure of the Baltic exits and Turkish straits; and 3) seizure and sinking of Soviet ships, and shooting down of their aircraft.

There is no doubt that such actions world-wide would bring great pressure on the Soviets. However, they would also have certain potential disadvantages which should be carefully examined: 1) possible Soviet reactions are not easily predictable; 2) the over-all "geographic escalation" might lead quickly to general war; 3) there could be great pressure applied (e.g. by "neutrals") against such "geographic escalation"; 4) these actions could absorb resources which might be more urgently required for the immediate problem in Europe (e.g. Admiral Felt has recently strongly recommended that an additional division be deployed from general reserve to the Philippines; this could be done only at the expense of available reinforcements for Europe); and 5) at the termination of any local hostilities involved, we could be in a disadvantageous politico-military position in the respective areas similar to that earlier described in connection with the limited use of nuclear weapons in Europe.'

A possible alternative which might avoid some of these potential disadvantages

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disadvantages would be to concentrate on measures in sea areas of the world. There is, however, some doubt that any but the most violent measures in these areas would bring adequate pressure to bear. (CINCLANT, for example, in his reply to JCS questions has expressed the opinion that such measures would have to be associated with complementary actions in Europe.)

Conclusions

This summary analysis would lead to the following principal conclusions:

a. Any kind of nuclear action should be deferred until all other possibilities have been exhausted.

b. Some world-wide actions are certainly desirable, but these should be limited in magnitude so as to avoid depletion of resources.

c. As a general principle, it is preferable to focus military effort as closely as possible on and in the area of the basic political issue.

d. For these reasons, the JCS concept of operations in Europe should be preferred over General Norstad's proposals.

e. In order to pursue this concept, further mobilization and deployment actions should be expedited to make resources available at the time they will be required.

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SUBJECT FILE

(184) TOP SECRET (452)

DRAFT/HFW/6 Oct 61

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: General Norstad's Discussions with the JCS on Monday, 2 Oct 61

The discussions did not appear to follow any set agenda, although the agenda attached at Tab ___ gives a general guide.

I. MORNING MEETING. During the morning meeting, General Norstad met with the Joint Chiefs and their Operations Deputies.

1. General Norstad was asked what could be done in Europe with regard to the Berlin problem. He replied that the United States could bring into position a statement of policy of which we could expect full NATO support. He stated that NATO would not agree to a 12 division assault up the autobahn in an attempt to reach Berlin. One of our needs is a clear statement of policy that will let our Allies know precisely where we stand. The wording of some of the questions and statements made by U.S. representatives leads other NATO countries to question our willingness to use atomic weapons to prevent the over-running of Europe. He stated further that some NATO countries do not agree with the "ordered escalation" which some of our people seem to think is possible. He compared escalation to a chemical reaction wherein a certain series of steps is followed. However, the reaction could be so rapid that it is uncontrollable.

2. When asked how do we restore our rights in Berlin, General Norstad replied that his thinking along this line is reflected in his reply to General Lemnitzer's question and he also believes that this reflects NATO thinking. (See JCS 1653 and ALO 855.) He quoted from his remarks on the draft Quadripartite Directive. He stated that NATO approves the LIVE OAK type planning and is giving authority to go beyond this.

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3. At this point, Colonel Ware gave a short briefing on General Norstad's directive to CINCENT on limited offensive actions and reviewed General Speidel's reply. General Norstad pointed out that it was not suggested that these actions should be taken but that we should certainly plan for them. *

4. The subject of reinforcement of Europe was brought up. General Norstad stated that he wanted the following:

a. 40,000 Army personnel to round out the units presently in Europe;

b. An armored cavalry regiment as soon as he could get it; and

c. An infantry battle group to replace the one presently in Berlin. This unit should remain in Europe after deployment on Exercise LONG THRUST.

He stated that he did not, at the present time, want any divisions deployed to Europe. His feeling was that this would stimulate a like reaction on the part of the Soviets and such a process would serve no useful purpose. Further, deployment of divisions to Europe would commit all our reserves too early in the game. In any case, these divisions could not make the difference between success and failure in general war. Such action could permit the Soviets to call us war-mongers should they decide to sign a peace treaty with provisions which would not change current rights for access to West Berlin.

General Norstad stated that he did not wish to discuss the Air Force build-up in Europe at this time but wanted to give it further study.

* Briefing repeated at afternoon meeting.

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11. AFTERNOON MEETING. Secretary McNamara and Assistant Secretaries Gilpatric and Nitze joined those who attended the morning meeting. This meeting followed the same program as the morning meeting, and the following additional points were made:

1. Secretary McNamara stated his concern that Allied requirements for material and equipment for the short term build-up in NATO were not being sufficiently expedited. He said there was no single agency to handle this in that certain countries dealt through MAP and others had bilateral arrangements with the United States. General Norstad offered to contact all NATO countries and ask them to expedite their plans on these requirements. Secretary McNamara will direct DOD personnel to study the U.S. aspects of this problem.

2. Secretary McNamara asked how soon after his call for reinforcement would General Norstad want augmentation divisions to arrive in Europe. General Norstad replied as follows:

a. He would want the first 2 to 3 divisions within 10 to 14 days.

b. The remaining 3 or 4 Army and 2 Marine divisions should follow within 30 days after warning. However, this could change with the situation existing at the time.

c. Secretary McNamara agreed to inform General Norstad the ability of the U.S. to meet the above requirements.

3. When asked when he would evacuate dependents from Europe, General Norstad replied that he would evacuate them when their presence interfered with actions in Europe. He thought that he would recommend evacuation of dependents at the time he called for the 6 divisions. The transportation deploying the 6 divisions would be used to return dependents.

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In this respect, the present plan does not provide for sufficiently rapid evacuation of dependents. A new plan will be developed for more rapid evacuation.

5. In response to the question of what General Norstad thought might be negotiable regarding the Berlin situation, he replied as follows:

a. The Oder-Nieese line.

b. Berlin as a capital of West Germany.

c. Access procedures.

d. Control and inspection areas.

He summarized by stating that the political people must use their imagination and come up with ideas on this subject.

6. After again discussing possible plans for limited actions in Europe, Secretary McNamara agreed with General Norstad that what is required is:

a. A catalog of plans which would provide us with options as opposed to serialized steps.

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b. A review of forces in relation to these plans and improvement of their readiness.

c. An appraisal and refinement of the plans.

7. During the discussion of possible actions which could be taken on a world-wide basis, General Norstad stated he would want ACE reinforcements immediately in the event of a naval blockade which involved shooting.

8. General Norstad was asked what sort of incident would warrant a decision to send the 8 U.S. divisions to Europe. He replied:

a. Interference with air access, which would be serious but not final.

b. Certain political developments which might arise.

9. General Norstad made clear in the discussions that NATO is involved from the first shot and that under certain conditions atomic weapons might be required from the outset. In any case, we should make clear to our NATO Allies and to the Soviets our determination to use as many nuclear weapons as soon as required to insure success of our actions.

10. With regard to the timing of our response to any Soviet action to blockade Berlin, General Norstad stated that our reaction must be immediate and must relate to the action taken by the Soviets. This would not, however, preclude our reacting in other areas not directly related to the Soviet action. Secretary McNamara agreed that any response on our part must be immediate.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1961

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Norstad Meeting

Your big problem is to decide how far you want to probe for Norstad's basic views. At the root he is a nuclear war man, and all his preferences move accordingly. On this McNamara and Taylor agree. Where they disagree is on the tactics of our present relation to Norstad.

McNamara wants to emphasize the areas of agreement. These are:

(1) Norstad agrees to prepare a "catalogue of plans," both nuclear and non-nuclear. These plans will then be reviewed, and choices made in the light of the evidence.

(2) Norstad and Defense are agreed on the immediate requirement of the U.S. and NATO build-up in Europe. They are agreed that when the build-up is complete, NATO will have a substantially increased conventional capability.

(3) They are strongly agreed that planning and action should be set up on a NATO, not a tripartite, basis.

Taylor thinks you should not avoid the areas of disagreement, and that it is enormously important for Norstad to know that you are in charge and that your views will govern. Norstad is well aware, himself, of the basic differences between himself and Defense, but he may well hope or believe that you are not aware of them. This is dangerous, because in a crisis Norstad must know your mind clearly.

So Taylor thinks you should probe Norstad by direct questions on basic issues. Here, in substance, is his list:

1. If ground access to Berlin is blocked by the East Germans, what military action would you take? What difference if the USSR does the blocking or comes in to assist the East Germans? In the execution of Berlin contingency plans, when and how do you think nuclear weapons might become necessary?

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2. How far can you execute the limited offensives which you have been asked to plan with available forces without endangering your defensive front?

3. I understand that you do not want additional U. S. divisions deployed to Europe, but that you do want several available on a short term call. Under what conditions might you wish to call them? Is it not better to have them in place before a possible showdown? (In a separate memo, Taylor states his belief that Norstad is just pretending to want these on-call divisions.)

4. How can you convert this U. S. contingency planning into NATO planning? How can we get our Allies, particularly the Germans, to share our political and military responsibilities and risks? (This comes near to your deep present concern for avoiding a German attempt to put all the blame for any settlement on us. But both McNamara and I strongly agree that the wider political aspects of this not be discussed with Norstad. He should not be an agent for political arrangements, and he or someone else present might even misinterpret your concern as reflecting some decision to give in to the Soviets.)

5. Are you satisfied with the efforts of our NATO Allies to increase their military readiness? What additional measures can we take to stimulate them?

6. Does he think there is a risk that a conventional build-up will undermine the credibility of the deterrent? (This has been Strauss' view, widely held in NATO, and some, like Nitze, believe Norstad has given it encouragement.)

I should emphasize that McNamara is as clear about his differences with Norstad as anyone. He simply does not see the good in pressing discussion of divisive issues when there is a growing area of agreement -- and no disagreement on current courses of action. He would put off the hard argument over contingency planning on ground access until we have specific plans to choose from. Norstad probably shares McNamara's preference -- though for reasons of his own.

My conclusion is that you can and should adopt both lines of discussion. It is important to work with Norstad; he is a very able and devoted officer; he is just about indispensable for NATO; and we all need to get on with an agreed effort. But it is also important to begin the hard dialogue between the President of the United States and his crucial Field Commander. If Norstad sets a very different weight on the uses

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of nuclear war from your own, you need to know it and you need to make him know who is boss.

My suggestion (in which Max Taylor joins) is that if you find Norstad's discussion in the larger group leaving doubt in your mind, you may want to have a much more private talk with him at the end of the meeting, perhaps with only Bob McNamara present. Then you could tell him -- or ask him -- about what nuclear war means -- to Europe particularly -- and tell him -- or ask him -- how many NATO leaders will really approve such a course at the moment of truth.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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October 4, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Tuesday, October 3, 1961, 4:30 PM
Present: President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense General Taylor, General Norstad, General Lemnitzer, Admiral Anderson, General Smith - (Vice Chief of Staff of Air Force), Lt. Gen. Munn - (Assistant Commandant, Marine Corps), Mr. Allen Dulles, Secretary Gilpatric, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Nitze, General Eddleman, Mr. Bundy

The President asked Secretary McNamara to summarize the results of his discussions with General Norstad. Secretary McNamara reported that agreement, and some disagreement, had been clarified in four categories.

1. It was agreed that our capability for different kinds of war would be increased, but there was disagreement as to how conventional warfare could or should be sustained. General Norstad thought this would be a matter of days, while the Department of Defense were thinking in terms of about a month.

2. The response to a block-off of ground access had been discussed. There was agreement about response to interruption of air access, but not on response to a blockade of ground access. The Department of Defense was inclined to non-nuclear and diversified responses, while General Norstad was undecided.

3. The broad needs of a military build-up were agreed, and there was also agreement that there need be no immediate deployment of additional U. S. divisions to Europe. General Norstad had asked that two to three divisions be on call in the U.S., for delivery within ten to fourteen days, and that six to eight divisions be on call for delivery in thirty days. There was doubt in the Department of Defense that the second request could be met. On the other hand there was agreement on the trading of air squadrons so that those which could be rapidly deployed would be in the U.S., while squadrons with a slower reaction time would be transferred to Europe now.

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4. There was clear agreement to prepare a catalogue of plans for a response in various contingencies.

At this point the President asked for General Norstad's views. General Norstad began by stating that he was often astonished to find how little resemblance there was between his real views and those which he read about in newspapers or in memoranda. In general, he had always advocated a balanced NATO force. All NATO programs call for strong conventional forces. There was no misunderstanding of the need for such forces, and they should -- if possible -- be used first. But once major forces were engaged, the United States must be in a position to use whatever forces were necessary.

General Norstad believed that words often become rigid and misleading, and he felt this way about the words "graduation" and "escalation". He thought he himself had the responsibility for injecting "pause" and "threshold" into strategic discussions, and he wished he had not done so. "Graduation" and "escalation" suggest a serial progression in which we move easily and by prepared steps from one stage to another of a development within our own control. This seemed to him unrealistic; he believed that in normal war escalation is apt to be explosive.

General Norstad had himself initiated LIVE OAK planning, two and a half years ago. These plans now include a series of probes graduated up to the battalion level. He had planned the probes for use, but you could not decide which one to use today. The probes, of course, include conventional weapons only.

General Norstad noted the interest in expanded planning expressed to the North Atlantic Council by the Ambassadorial group. Two months ago, with his NATO hat on, he had asked General Speidel to plan for a raised level of action, to be used if other responses had failed and if the probes were unsuccessful or indecisive. These were selected offensive efforts, in three categories: 1) the purely conventional; 2) conventional with selected nuclear weapons; 3) a separate and selective use of nuclear weapons. General Speidel had presented six plans. General Norstad did not like them all, but they did show what could be done.

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General Norstad emphasized that we do not yet know whether there will be a form of action available between the battalion probe and general war. This is not a matter which we can control. The Soviets have at least an equal voice in the matter. General Norstad himself suggested that action at the division level would in all probability mean general war. He had reviewed a division, and it included a lot of people and tanks and trucks.

In concluding his opening statement, General Norstad emphasized that the deterrent has no meaning except in the context of the readiness to use atomic weapons. Repeatedly the question is raised in Europe whether the United States is in fact ready for such use. The Germans and the Chancellor ask the question again and again. These doubts, in General Norstad's view, could be straightened out by a sentence or two in public. The one central point of concern is this: do we intend to use our nuclear power if necessary?

The President said that in his judgment statements were not the answer to this problem. We had indicated our position often enough. He had done so himself at the UN; the Attorney General had done so recently; and earlier statements by himself and others had repeatedly emphasized the will of the United States on this point. In his judgment, what was creating uncertainty was not statements or silence in the United States, but the facts of the developing balance of capabilities. It is the growing relative atomic strength of the Soviet Union, and the increasingly terrible character of any general war, which is affecting the expectations of our allies. The President asked for comment on what we could usefully say or do in addition to what we have done. The Secretary of State asked what the Europeans themselves thought of the prospect of nuclear war. General Norstad said that the United States could avoid the submission of documents which, by emphasizing strengthened conventional capabilities, appeared to cast doubt on the importance of nuclear warfare. Later in the meeting he indicated again that while conventional weapons should be strengthened, along with all NATO forces, the specific indication of absolute priority on this point was dangerous to the confidence of our allies. Mr. Nitze, in this later discussion, pointed out that in fact it is conventional reinforcement which we do want from our allies at present, but the consensus appeared to be that we could work for specific improvements in the build-up without indicating a theoretical commitment to one kind of weapons, or one specific strategy as against another.

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The President asked why General Norstad himself could not indicate the determination of the U.S. to use nuclear weapons if necessary, and General Norstad said that he could find an opportunity to make such a statement, informally and on his own responsibility. He would, however, like to have such a statement cleared and approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Discussion then turned to the circumstances in which nuclear weapons would or would not be used. The President pointed out that a general war was a form of "pulling the house down". We clearly would not do it unless we had no other choice. General Norstad said with emphasis that he would not use nuclear weapons if there were any other alternative. As to when such weapons could be used, he noted that when you have started a serious ground action, you cannot afford to get thrown back.

The President asked whether General Norstad felt that tactical nuclear weapons might be used in a limited area. General Norstad believed that this was possible, depending on the situation. He himself doubted whether the situation would develop in this way, but in some circumstances it might give one more chance of action before proceeding to general war. It was not impossible that the use of a limited number of small-yield weapons, precisely delivered on specific targets, would be a sensible course, and though it was unlikely, we should be prepared.

The President then asked whether we ought not to have a clear decision ahead of time on our proposed responses. General Norstad said that if he had to respond today he would choose Probe C, from his LIVE OAK plans. This is a probe of engineers and cars. A month from now he might want a battalion probe instead. The President asked what would happen if Probe C was stopped, and General Norstad replied that at that point he would force a fight with the battalion. If the battalion was beaten, there would have to be a prompt and larger reaction. Although he did not say so flatly, it was clear in the context of the discussion that General Norstad believed it would probably be necessary at this point to move rapidly toward nuclear warfare.

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The President then asked Mr. Nitze what other governments' responses are, and Mr. Nitze reported that all LIVE OAK plans require government decision at the moment of action. There is no agreement in advance to approve any one of them. The President then asked how we could get our allies into agreement on political and military planning. General Norstad reported de Gaulle's belief that there must be consultation on every decision. Couve de Murville had recently called him in to say that the French were "tough as hell" on the Berlin question, even while reporting their unwillingness to give advanced approval for procedures for use in the event of interruption of air access. The British have done well on air access but have reserved the right to respond to anti-aircraft fire, probably on Macmillan's own decision. Other countries have insisted on a rightful opportunity to share in the responsibility of planning. The President asked if we can't somehow get some definite agreement on planning. General Norstad responded that planning is going forward. The President noted the French refusal to make an advance commitment and General Norstad thought that when we knew our view we should give them a further chance to make such commitments.

The Secretary of State believed that we could not get allied agreement in advance for decisions implying open war. What we could and should seek is agreement to 1) a catalogue of plans; and 2) taking of steps to put forces in proper position. General Norstad remarked that we have plans up to the level of division probe which are accepted as reasonable by other governments, subject to later decision on execution. The President asked whether General Norstad believed in the division probe. General Norstad answered that we should have plans for such a probe, and repeated his conviction that we must have a fight if ground access is interrupted.

The President remarked that as soon as somebody gets killed, the danger of major involvement is very great.

Returning to the question of allied agreement, the President asked how we can get them to say what they will do if there is a fight. The Secretary of Defense said that in his view we should get the NATO planning directive approved and passed to General Norstad so that the catalogue of plans could be developed in response to this directive. Then the President asked about our own views on these options, and especially our view of proper action once a

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probe is beaten. The Secretary of Defense reported that the Department of Defense has views but has not discussed them with our allies and does not think they should be discussed in this way. The President asked whether we ourselves should not make such a plan and take some decision. General Norstad commented that if we know what we are going to do -- if we take the lead and show that we mean it -- we can carry these people. Even Adenauer is ready to lean on someone who knows his own mind.

General Norstad asked if we are firmly decided among ourselves on some form of probe in response to an interruption of ground access. The President said that we had considered reliance for a period on air supply but that we ought to decide. The Secretary of State said that there was a lot of paper on this point, that our current plan was that if there were interruptions there should be an airlift and not a ground probe and that there must be a delay before any such drastic action is taken. General Norstad disagreed, stating that if there is an interruption next week, it will be necessary to act, not wait -- to engage ourselves in a fight -- and not to let the interruption of our rights stand unchallenged. You have to react immediately, in order to see if the other man means war. Where will your allies be if you wait?

The Secretary of State said that the Western world is not ready for decisions which would mean a clear road to general war. There should be many other actions in between, like complete economic sanctions, a naval blockade and air action. General Norstad replied that he hoped before there was any such proposal, the European temperature would be taken. He does not believe that the Europeans are in favor of this course. He believes that they want a nuclear reaction. The Secretary of State said he doubted it. General Norstad said we should find out. Mr. Nitze remarked that it might be dangerous to find out. The President indicated his own doubt that Europeans would wish to go so far so fast. General Norstad offered in support of this conclusion the fact that countries are taking actions which are politically tough. The Chancellor held people in service before the election (but it was asked whether this action was not to his advantage politically). The Italians are taking steps,

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although the British are not good. But it was noted again that there was no decisive agreement in advance on the battalion probe.

The President then turned the discussion to the build-up of conventional forces. General Norstad said that in strictly military terms he ought to ask for six to eight divisions now but that he did not wish to ask for them. There followed discussion of specific modest adjustments of other forces, and it became plain that in the view of the Department of Defense an on-call limit of thirty days for six divisions was not feasible. General Norstad then indicated that what he meant to do was ask for the best available time.

The President remarked upon the importance of the gold drain and the need for obtaining German help on this point. General Norstad said it was a great question whether enlarged U. S. forces would lead Europeans to do more or relax. He thought the Germans need another "good, hard crack" taken at them soon, and he thought that we might, by hitting hard and early, get something substantial. The President returned to the question of nuclear weapons and asked General Norstad if he would use them quickly. General Norstad said that you have to use them if necessary.

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General Taylor then asked General Norstad under what conditions he would want these six to eight divisions in the light of his statement that by the military book he should want them now. General Norstad thought the book answer was wrong in this case. He thought it was useless to stack up more forces on both sides in a situation in which the end result would leave us still outnumbered. He thought it not unreasonable to look at this situation as one of two snowballs in which an addition to the mass and acceleration on one side led to similar action on the other. He doubted whether this movement would psychologically be a good thing for our allies. He believed that we were in a poker game and he pointed out that when this card has been played, we will

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not have it left to play later. When General Taylor asked under what circumstances he would play the card, General Norstad replied that he would do it only when the situation seemed bound to deteriorate. He remarked that there was no great desire in Europe for these forces, and although he did not say so directly, he may have believed that an early deployment would appear to indicate a shift away from reliance on nuclear weapons if needed. The President repeated the American position: we will not accept anything that we regard as a defeat, and we are just as determined as de Gaulle. We would proceed to meet both our nuclear and conventional goals under MC-70; we would defer the debate on MRBMs; we would avoid abstract discussion of absolute priorities, and we would seek agreement on the things which we immediately need to do on the military build-up. The President had earlier stated his conclusions from this meeting as follows:

We must privately clarify our own decisions on contingency planning.

General Norstad will press to clarify European understanding that we will use nuclear weapons if we have to.

McGeorge Bundy

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INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

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EYES ONLY PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.

VIEWING THE EVENTS OF THE PAST MONTH FROM HERE HAS CAUSED ME TO FEEL THAT WHAT STARTED OUT AS A TRIPARTITE DISCUSSION, AMONG US, UK AND FRANCE, HAS CHANGED ITS FORM SOMEWHAT, AND IN A MANNER INIMICAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF US AND FRANCE AND OUR ALLIES. THIS IS MERELY AN IMPRESSION ONE GATHERS FROM KEEPING A FINGER ON LOCAL PULSE AND READING TELEGRAMS COMING FROM WASHINGTON. TO USE A SIMILE, WHAT WAS AT FIRST IN THE FORM OF AN EQUILATERAL TRIANGLE HAS NOW DISTORTED ITS SHAPE TO AN ISOSCELES TRIANGLE WITH DE GAULLE AWAY OUT AT THE APEX WITH INDICATIONS THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO GO FURTHER OUT UNLESS DRAWN BACK IN BY THE INITIATIVE OF THE US.

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THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THIS PAST SUMMER IN FRANCE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSIVE AND SO FAR THE FALL HAS NOT YET BROUGHT OUT THE UNREST AND DISTURBANCES THAT WE ANTICIPATED. ALTHOUGH SITUATION REMAINS EXTREMELY TOUCHY. THIS IS ALMOST ENTIRELY DUE TO DE GAULLE'S HANDLING OF AGRICULTURAL SITUATION, LABOR PROBLEM, BIZERTE AND ALGERIA. NOW WITH THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY BODIES MEETING AND HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH MANY DOMESTIC PROBLEMS THAT CONTINUE TO TAKE MUCH OF HIS TIME, THERE IS AN INCREASING DANGER THAT HE WILL BE ISOLATED FROM WHAT MAY TAKE PLACE BETWEEN US AND UK IN RELATION TO BERLIN SITUATION. I AM SURE THAT HE WILL NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND ASK TO BE BROUGHT INTO US-UK COUNCILS. YET, IT IS APPARENT THAT HE IS BECOMING QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT MAY COME OUT OF PRESENT RUSK-GROMYKO DISCUSSIONS. IT SEEMS HIGHLY ADVISABLE, THEREFORE, FOR PRESIDENT TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN APPROACHING DE GAULLE

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AND INFORMING HIM OF WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED AND WHAT OUR THINKING IS ON WHERE WE GO FROM HERE.

AS A FIRST SUGGESTION, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT SEND A MESSAGE, THROUGH ME I WOULD HOPE, TO GENERAL DE GAULLE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER HIS TALK WITH GROMYKO INFORMING DE GAULLE OF WHAT TOOK PLACE AND OUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN KEEPING HIM INFORMED AND SEEKING HIS ADVICE. NEXT, IT SEEMS FROM HERE TO BE VERY MUCH IN ORDER TO HAVE A MEETING OF A QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THEN HEADS OF STATE BEFORE GOING ANY FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD TOWARD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. DE GAULLE HAS ACCOMPLISHED MUCH IN HIS OWN COUNTRY IN PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND HE SHOWS A CONTINUING IMPROVED POSTURE TOWARD THE USSR. BECAUSE OF THE PERSONALITY OF THE MAN AND THE SENSITIVITY OF FRANCE'S RELATIONSHIP TO US AND UK, I WOULD CONSIDER IT HIGHLY IMPORTANT THAT US TAKE INITIATIVE IN KEEPING DE GAULLE IN CLOSE AFFINITY WITH OUR THINKING AND PLANNING. I SENSE A DEGREE OF CRITICISM IN THE AMERICAN PRESS OF DE GAULLE'S TENDENCY "TO GO IT ALONE" ONCE AGAIN. THIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME FURTHER AGGRAVATED AND THE INTEREST OF ALL CONCERNED WILL BEST BE SERVED WHEN WE TAKE STEPS TO RESTORE THE EQUILATERAL BALANCE TO OUR TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Approved in S
10/12/61

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 4, 1961
5:00 P.M.
Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: Reunification and European Security.

PARTICIPANTS:

Germany:
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Schnippenkoetter

United States:
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Cash

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Ambassador Grewe said he would start with the questions the Secretary had posed in yesterday's meeting, i.e., what does reunification mean, and how do we get there?

He said that the common policy of reunification started in 1951 and 1952 with the negotiations concerning EDC, the liquidation of the occupation, and the Federal Republic's entry into NATO. At that time there was no practical prospect for reunification in the near future, and in this respect there is no basic difference today. There was, perhaps, a chance for reunification on the basis of the Soviet note of March 1952, but only on the basis of German neutrality. The Germans had rejected this because they felt that neutrality was not safe, as it would mean that Germany would eventually become a Communist satellite. They had entered into the EDC and NATO negotiations and had obtained solemn pledges on a common reunification policy. The Germans feel there is no basic difference today.

Reunification means preserving a Western offensive -- using reunification as the opening position in all East-West talks on Germany in all future negotiations. It is important that it be used as a maximum opening position, and that nothing be done to damage this. In addition, the Germans feel that it is of the utmost importance to keep the question at the present level without adding additional obstacles. The status quo cannot, of course, be changed, but it is important to keep the status quo as a nonrecognized status quo. If a certain

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a certain amount of recognition were given the status quo, this would damage the spirit of resistance in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

At this point Ambassador Grewe quoted -- from a paper published by Polish exiles in London -- an article supporting German reunification with the argument that a hardening of the division of Germany would mean a hardening of the division of Europe.

The Ambassador continued by saying that the German government felt that any serious damage to the idea of reunification would give the Soviets added security, increase their self-confidence, and widen their freedom of action.

Any damage to the idea of reunification would, he continued, damage existing confidence of West Germans in the West. It would create an internal psychological danger in West Germany. It would seriously hurt those who favored the closest ties to the West. Up to the present time, the Soviet note of March 1952, had been the most crucial point in the Federal Republic's history. When taxed with their failure to seize this opportunity for reunification despite the neutralization aspect, those who supported close ties to the West always cited Western pledges of support for reunification as what West Germany had obtained instead.

The Secretary said that the US had no problem with reunification as a policy objective. If the road to reunification were not held open, tension would be increased in both West and East Germany. The aspirations of a divided people could not be ignored in the long run. The US was puzzled, however, as to how to move toward this objective. In its view certain things would -- over time -- contribute toward reunification in a sophisticated way. First among these was the arrangement -- the relationship -- the West Germans could establish with the East Germans. The more the West Germans became involved with the East Germans, the more they moved toward reunification.

Ambassador Grewe said this was exactly the point of difference. Over the years others had urged this line, including Secretary Dulles. The Germans had never accepted this idea because they didn't see how it could promote reunification. There were, first of all, technical contacts such as the railroad, the waterways, the interzonal trade, and travel. With regard to the latter, there is a big difference whether it is private German citizens who submit to East German control or the Occupation Powers. As far as trade is concerned, interzonal trade was established on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement provision that Germany should be administered as an economic unit. In addition, the 1949 agreement had urged the expansion of such contacts, and thus the Germans were acting with a mandate from the Occupation Powers. The German dealings did not involve the problem of

international

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international recognition especially as they were kept at a low, administrative level. These technical contacts they hoped to maintain. Secondly, there were private contacts, which the Federal Government strongly favors increasing. This, however, is difficult because of East German restrictions.

The Secretary asked whether the Germans saw the possibility of expanding technical contacts in order to increase the attractive power of West Germany for East Germans.

Ambassador Grewe said they saw no need to increase this attractive power, which is already overwhelming. In addition, it does not influence the situation. It does not add to the political chances of reunification.

The Secretary observed that it appeared to him that a multiplication of contacts would improve the attractive power as compared with a severance of the contacts.

Ambassador Grewe agreed in principle but observed that in practice this would not be so because the East would demand a very high political price for any increase in contacts. They would demand the establishment of political contacts pointing toward confederation. In any increased traffic the East would only let the politically reliable travel, and thus there was always an imbalance in such exchanges. Confederation would not restore freedom in East Germany.

The Secretary pointed out that one major obstacle in developing more contact between Eastern Europe and the West was the large Soviet force in East Germany. He asked whether the Federal Government would not see some advantage in the thinning out of this force.

Ambassador Grewe responded that it would all depend on what price was involved in thinning out Western forces in West Germany. He felt the price would be very high indeed. The Soviets would require the removal of 16 divisions on each side, and West Germany would thus be denuded of all protection.

The Secretary observed that the Soviets would not get very far with such a proposal. He felt that if there were fewer Soviet troops to the West of them, Eastern Europeans would think much more in national terms. He envisaged a proposal whereby the US would say to the Soviets that it would keep no more than 5 divisions in other NATO countries if the Soviets kept no more than 5 divisions in other Warsaw Pact countries.

Ambassador Grewe said the situation would not be changed much as long as the Soviets could return in 24 hours.

The Secretary

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The Secretary pointed out that he wasn't speaking of disengagement, which was not profitable because it would create a vacuum. The thinning out concept was bound to come up in disarmament discussions, and he thought it would be a political gain.

Ambassador Grewe said it was hard for him to believe that the Soviets would withdraw more forces than would the West.

The Secretary observed that the great difference was that Western divisions would not have to be in Western countries to sustain the loyalty of the peoples of those countries, whereas Soviet divisions must remain in Eastern countries to sustain the loyalty of those countries.

Ambassador Grewe said that the big factor since the Hungarian Revolution had been the rapidity with which the Soviet troops could return.

Mr. Kohler interjected that, at the same time the Hungarian Revolution was going on, the Poles had been able to make certain gains along national lines. Once Soviet troops were withdrawn, there would be national opposition to their return. In addition, a considerable political price would have to be paid if they were to return.

Ambassador Grewe reiterated that the Federal Government would be gravely concerned over any thinning out on the Western side.

The Secretary said he didn't believe the Soviets would buy a US-USSR disengagement now because Western Europe is stronger than the satellites.

Mr. Kohler observed that the Soviets would pay a high price to get the US out.

The Secretary replied that this was probably true, but that the US was not going to get out.

Ambassador Grewe said that everything short of disengagement would be of the gravest concern to the Germans.

The Secretary said that European security measures could affect Germans in two different ways: 1) as Germans; and 2) simply because of the geographical position they occupy. For example, an arrangement aimed at providing security against surprise attack could not help but affect the Germans, not because they were Germans, but simply because they were where they were.

Ambassador Grewe said the Federal Government had the strongest objections to narrow zones of inspection because this would be the first step

toward creation

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toward creation of a special status for central Europe, and because it would hurt Western defense. It would involve a complete change in the present NATO strategic concept. Secondly, not much could be expected of the Bundeswehr if they knew they were equipped with second-class arms.

The Secretary said that he had been thinking only in terms of inspections of troop concentrations, order of battle, etc.

Ambassador Grewe said the Germans could accept large zones of inspection, zones from the Atlantic to the Urals, but they could never agree to small zones.

The Secretary said he wished to emphasize that he had not mentioned narrow zones to Gromyko.

Ambassador Grewe said to be perfectly frank he must say that Bonn had been concerned over the fact that European security had been broached at all. To Gromyko this meant Rapacki plan, withdrawal of troops, narrow zones of inspection, and a general trend toward the neutralization and demilitarization of central Europe. This was of the utmost concern to the Germans.

The Secretary asked what attitude the Federal Government had toward the disarmament proposals the US had presented to the UN.

Ambassador Grewe said these had evoked a very favorable response, and he was certain the Federal Government would like to participate if these proposals did not imply a special status for central Europe, which would be the first step toward neutralization.

The Secretary asked if the keeping of the doctrine of reunification clear was the central preoccupation of the Germans, inasmuch as they did not seem to see any practical steps toward its achievement.

Ambassador Grewe responded affirmatively saying that the Germans had tried to be flexible in the case of the East Germans at the check points, but, he added, this could be made very difficult for his Government if it were presented as the first step toward recognition of the so-called "GDR".

The Secretary said the US was not thinking of recognition.

But, Ambassador Grewe responded, the whole Western press was talking of recognition, and the Secretary himself had said that there was no real difference between de facto recognition and de jure recognition. The Ambassador continued that recognition would be considered a serious retreat

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on the part of the West and do great damage. In addition, it would have the greatest impact on the people of East Germany and would be a psychological catastrophe.

The Secretary said that the US was not talking about recognition. It was, instead, thinging of the fact that East Germany was, after all, there. The West -- above all West Germany -- had had a wide variety of contacts with East Germany. He saw no prospect of a change in the fact of the existence of East Germany any time soon. Our problem was how to accept this fact while ruling out recognition.

Ambassador Grewe said this fact had been lived with for 12 years, and he saw no reason why it couldn't be lived with for years to come. The crucial point was not the question of diplomatic relations, but was, as Mr. Gromyko indicated, "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR." He said he hoped the Secretary understood the sensitivity of the Germans when they heard recognition on all sides.

The Secretary observed that he didn't believe Gromyko expected recognition of the "GDR." Ambassador Grewe agreed that Gromyko certainly would not expect formal recognition, but he would attempt to come as close to it as possible. For example, a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries would imply recognition of the "GDR." Dealings between East and West German delegations might also.

The Secretary asked whether an agreement not to resort to the use of force to change the existing situation would be considered recognition.

Ambassador Grewe said at first glance no. He said this could be done in an arrangement with the Soviet Union, but not so as to establish a treaty relationship with the "GDR."

Mr. Kohler said this could be handled through reciprocal declarations similar to "Solution C."

Ambassador Grewe said this would be possible and would also be a way for handling the Oder-Neisse problem.

The Secretary said he would like to continue these talks with the Ambassador and would be in touch with him about time. He would like to get to the question of how we should now proceed, and what the timing should be.

Ambassador Grewe said he would have two leading refugee representatives in town soon, one the chairman of the refugee organization, and the other a leading socialist, Kruger and Jaksch. It might be useful, if the Secretary had the time, if he could talk with them.

The Secretary

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The Secretary said that in closing he would like to remind the Ambassador that sensitivity worked both ways, and that people here were sensitive to the expressions of distrust coming out of Germany. He wished to point out that this was a mutual problem. He hoped that the whole process could be speeded up so that normal conditions could be recreated soon.

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Rec'd: October 5, 1961
1:50 p.m.

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 674, OCTOBER 5, 4 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 674, BONN 595.

FROM CLAY FOR RUSK

BONN FOR AMBASSADOR

REF DEPTEL 469 TO BERLIN 933 TO BONN, AND BERLIN 640

WHILE I UNDERSTAND FULLY OUR INSTRUCTIONS AND THE DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING ALLIED AGREEMENT TO THEM, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT IT WOULD BE OF GREAT ADVANTAGE TO US IF WE COULD FORCE SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN EVENT FRIEDRICH STRASSE IS CLOSED. RECENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT EAST GERMANY MAY SOON DECLARE BERLIN WALL AS NATIONAL BOUNDARY AND THIS COULD LEAD TO EARLY ATTEMPT AT CLOSURE. IF THIS SUCCEEDS, IT COULD LEAD TO IMMEDIATE AND SERIOUS LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN WEST BERLIN.

I REALIZE THAT KEEPING AN ENTRANCE OPEN MAINTAINS THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCESSIBILITY ONLY AS WE COULD NOT PROTECT PATROLS AND/OR ALLIED VISITORS INTO EAST BERLIN. THUS, I WOULD FORCE THE BARRIER WITH A SMALL NUMBER OF TANKS, SAY THREE, EVEN IN FACE OF DESULTORY FIRE. THESE TANKS WOULD THEN TAKE DEFENSIVE POSITION IN EAST BERLIN IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF ENTRANCE WHERE THEY COULD NOT BE CUT OFF AWAITING FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. OUR BERLIN COMMANDER WOULD DEMAND IMMEDIATE CONFERENCE WITH SOVIET COMMANDER AND IN SUCH CONFERENCE, WOULD INSIST ON RESTORATION OF OUR ENTRY RIGHTS SO THAT OUR TANKS COULD BE WITHDRAWN. IF SERIOUSLY ATTACKED BY EAST GERMAN FORCES OR IF CONFRONTED BY SOVIET FORCES, OUR TANKS WOULD WITHDRAW TO DEFENSIVE POSITION IN WEST BERLIN ENGAGING IN ACTION ONLY IF NECESSARY TO WITHDRAW OR IF FOLLOWED INTO WEST

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762.00/10-561

FWD 10/14 M

BERLIN. WHILE SUCH WITHDRAWAL MAY BE CONSTRUED AS WEAKNESS, IT IS FAR LESS WEAK THAN NO ACTION AT ALL AND NO ACTION COULD BE INTERPRETED AS ABANDONMENT OF RIGHT. I BELIEVE IT ADDS LITTLE TO RISK OF ACCIDENTAL WAR AND THE LITTLE IT DOES ADD MUST BE TAKEN IF WE ARE TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE RISKY COURSE IT PURSUES. IT DOES MAINTAIN OUR RIGHT IN PRINCIPLE; IT MAY FORCE THE SOVIET FORCES TO SHOW THEIR HAND; AND IN ANY CASE IT WILL FURTHER DEVELOP THEIR INTENT AND THE DETERMINATION BEHIND IT. I BELIVE STRONGLY IT WOULD RESULT IN KEEPING THE ENTRANCE OPEN WITHOUT MILITARY ACTION. IF WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO GO THIS FAR, WE SHOULD DO NOTHING. WHILE THIS WOULD DAMAGE MORALE SERIOUSLY, HALF-HEARTED MEASURES WOULD BE FAR MORE DAMAGING.

OF COURSE, I WILL ASK COMMANDANT TO DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE.

LIGHTNER

RJT

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FROM: Belgrade

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 589, October 6, 3 p.m.

PRIORITY

ATTENTION AMBASSADOR THOMPSON

Feel obliged record, for whatever it is worth, my own wide disagreement with section on Soviet motives and intentions of revised four-power working group paper on Berlin and Germany of September 14-16, 61 points of disagreement are following.

1. Report seems to me to be still based on what I believe to be incorrect appraisal of Soviet policy prior to end of August in sense that much too much emphasis was given to element of intimidation of West and too little to defensive considerations concerning the desire to save the Ulbricht regime from complete disintegration. Having misinterpreted Soviet intentions prior to end of August, working group, as it appears to me, has found itself unable to analyze correctly change of Soviet policy which has occurred since that time and which does indeed have highly menacing overtones.

2. Paper continues convey impression that Moscow is merely trying intimidate West; that it does not believe West prepared to accept war; and that if it could be persuaded West was willing to fight, it would in the end itself desist from carrying its pressures to ultimate conclusion. I question all these propositions. I see recent Soviet measures as in part designed to save Ulbricht, but also in part as perfectly bona fide measures of preparation for war Moscow thinks

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thinks may very well come. In my opinion Moscow knows that we are capable of going to war over Berlin issue, but has taken this possibility into account, and is not bluffing in its determination to obtain new status for Berlin that will reduce city's capability for impeding stabilization of power of Ulbricht regime. It seems to me greatly dangerous to assume Russians not prepared to make war or to believe they assume this of US.

3. Paper treats Soviet policy as though it were exclusively matter of Khrushchev's personal whims and desires. Only reference to internal political situation in Russia is denial that recent military measures have been due to pressures "by Soviet armed forces." This seems to me highly oversimplified manner of dismissing very complicated subject. Aside from whether his personal position is affected, thesis that Khrushchev is faced with heavy internal pressures from elements in party wishing to see harder line taken toward West is widely believed not only in informed circles here but evidently among Italian Communist circles and in other Eastern European countries. In case of Chinese, we know such opposition exists; and I think it risky to assume Chinese views enjoy no appreciable sympathy or support in Russia itself or anywhere else in Communist movement except Albania. Can well believe there is no evidence any group of generals bringing pressure to bear on Khrushchev for professional reasons; but this does not preclude possibility of widespread opposition within party with regard to relative patience with which Khrushchev has accepted delay of three years in his efforts to obtain new solution Berlin problem, or prove that this opposition has not put him under heavy pressures. My own impression is that recent events, notably resumption tests and aggressive harrassement air corridors, reflect

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reflect tendencies within Soviet hierarchy which are not those of Khrushchev personally and which either assume early hostilities to be inevitable or actually desire them. These measures were most unconducive to suitable atmosphere for negotiation and appear in fact almost designed to sabotage movement in this direction. In case resumption tests, motive of intimidation seems to me quite implausible in view of nature of measures themselves, which suggest weakness Soviet atomic capability and did not even promise any immediate strengthening of it. This measure strikes me as expressing something much more like contempt for feelings of Afro-Asian Nationalist leaders whom Khrushchev had tried so assiduously to cultivate, and reckless determination to get Soviet Union into acceptable state of preparation for hostilities at earliest possible moment.

KENNAN

SGC

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EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY.

762.00/10-661

Appreciate suggestion your 1811 about high level communication after Gromyko visit to Washington. Will consider it in light of Gromyko's call upon President.

Meanwhile let me assure you that if GOF is somewhat withdrawn from present discussions it is by their election and not ours. Naturally I kept in close touch with Lord Home in New York, but he was there and Couve had elected to return to Paris. Nevertheless French through Ambassadorial group have been briefed in greatest detail on my talks with Gromyko but thus far with minimum French participation in these Quadripartite discussions.

We do wish to have France intimately associated with us on German-Berlin problems but this will not be possible unless this attitude is reciprocal at least to some degree. You should know that we cannot escape asking ourselves whether DeGaulle anticipates that any peaceful settlement might include at least the appearance of some concession

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S:DRusk:jmr 10/6/61 The Secretary

S/S - Mr. Manfull

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by the West and that he wishes to insure that the Anglo-Saxons take full responsibility for such concessions as contrasted with French determination. No one is more anxious than we to deal with France as a great power but it would help if they would exert themselves to act like one.

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Memorandum of Conversation

197

DATE: October 6, 1961

SUBJECT: Tripartite Meeting October 6, 1961: Decisions by governments to Execute Allied Military Plans on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS:
US
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler, EUR
Mr. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Rice, NE

British
Lord Hood, Chargé
Mr. Thomson, First Secretary

French
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. Lebel, Minister
Mr. Winckler, Counselor
Mr. Pelen, Counselor

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The Secretary opened by saying that he was happy to return to tripartite consultations again. He then read off the agenda:

1. Decisions by Governments to Execute Allied Military Plans on Berlin.
2. Tripartite Reaction to Soviet Interference with Air Access to Berlin.
3. Analysis of the Syrian Situation.
4. Angola.

In response to a question concerning additional suggestions, neither the French nor the British representative proposed additional items.

The Secretary said he thought he should mention that he did not expect that Gromyko's call on the President would advance the discussions which had been held in New York. Gromyko had said from the very first that he wanted to call on the President while in the United States to present Mr. Khrushchev's warm regards. The Secretary added he did not expect any new subjects to be introduced by Mr. Gromyko.

In introducing the first subject on the agenda, the Secretary asked Ambassador Alphand if he would like to comment. The French Ambassador said that, as the Secretary knew, two directives have been issued to General Norstad, but the question remained as to who would take the decision for the implementation of these plans. He said there were three main cases to be considered, the first being the

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decision in the tripartite phase, the second after NATO had come into the operation, and the third was the special problem of the use of atomic weapons. With reference to the first phase, he said there was no question but that the decision and operation was tripartite, but what would happen if the Council is asked for an alert and one of the members says no. He said that this must not be allowed to paralyze the Tripartite or Quadripartite operation.

As for the second phase, i.e., the NATO aspect, the legal position is that it rests in the hands of the appropriate political authority, the authority presumably being the North Atlantic Council. He then asked what could be done if in case of an agreement by the four, there would not be a unanimous decision by the Council? He wondered if orders could be given directly to the NATO Commander as a U.S. Commander, as it would be a tripartite matter.

The Ambassador then raised the subject of MC 95 and mentioned two hypothetical cases. In the first instance an immediate decision (ten to fifteen minutes) would be required in case of a direct attack with conventional weapons followed by a nuclear attack. In this connection he referred to paragraphs 61 and 62 of the instructions to Norstad. He said that it was clear that the authority must be delegated in this case to the U.S, which is the leader. But, he asked whether the Supreme Commander or the President was in charge?

In the second case he said there would be more time, perhaps a few hours or a few days, when a conventional attack would be faced and resisted with conventional arms. Here, he said, we have a chance of consultation on the use of nuclear weapons, but what will happen if there were unanimity? He asked what would the Three do? Now is the time to study this matter. He said he realized that perhaps these questions could not be answered today but they should be discussed confidentially in this small group.

The Secretary then asked Lord Hood for his comments. The British Chargé said that he would take up the questions raised by the French Ambassador in turn. On the tripartite problem, he said it was the feeling of his Government that in order to avoid the difficulties mentioned by the French Ambassador we would obtain general approval in advance both for tripartite plans and necessary NATO alert measures. We had asked for plans for appropriate NATO alert measures and these would be submitted to NATO and the NATO countries would have approved them in principle in advance. In addition we must share equally with them our knowledge of our tripartite plans so that when the time comes to take a decision it rests with the three. As far the implementation of NATO plans it must rest with the North Atlantic Council, but we must address ourselves as to how this is to be most efficiently taken. Lord Hood said he understood that this matter had come up in the NATO Council this week and that the Secretary-General had put forth some ideas and would be circulating a paper. He indicated that the Secretary-General's ideas would be in the direction of weighted voting, which the British Government did not think was too satisfactory, but that it was necessary to await Dr. Stikker's paper before a decision is reached. It would be unfortunate, he added, if this discussion delayed the directive to General Norstad as planning was most important now and the other matter we could deal with at a later stage. He mentioned that there were also proposals for a smaller group within NATO. If this is agreed to by the Council the British believe this would be a useful thing.

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As for the questions raised by the Ambassador concerning nuclear weapons, he said he was not informed on this paper and would have to reserve his position.

The Secretary said that he would also like to comment although his comments were not to be considered his final views. He said it was of greatest importance to anticipate a series of probable contingencies and our tripartite and quadripartite reactions to them. He thought it would then be necessary to let our NATO allies know our views so that they would not be caught by surprise. He said it was wise to take the temperature of our allies as they consider these matters as a high degree of participation in the planning would facilitate a decision in the end. In this way we would have the alliance fully braced for any eventuality. In this way we would have full allied unity on the policy of the West. He said that he thought a good start had been made on an agreement "on vital and shooting matters". He added that it was more profitable to concentrate on initiatives on the part of the West, indeed, that his present thoughts were centered hereon rather than on a nuclear attack from the other side. He said he thought it was advisable to discuss contingency planning in NATO as much as possible and in the process obtain the views of other Governments.

The Secretary doubted that an objection from a single NATO Government would prevent the Three from doing things which had to be done, but it might, of course, put a strain on the alliance. He said that these issues are so grave that each Government must consider what is necessary to preserve the life of the nation; that each Government feels that it must be seized of these issues. He added that in terms of combatting the NATO battle, there were problems that could not be settled in advance. Indeed, until Governments are confronted with the issues at a late stage they are unlikely to yield participation in the decision to go to war. As we near a crisis he said it will be clear that decisions by fifteen governments cannot govern the conduct of the battle. On the question of an executive agent he said that even during World War II when there were only two Governments involved, there had to be agreement on an executive agent and it may be necessary to decide who in fact will give orders to the Commander.

With reference to nuclear weapons the Secretary said we have already committed ourselves in Mr. Dulles' commitment to NATO to take every possible step to consult on the use of these weapons and we would wish to consult to the maximum extent. We would hope that we could do this in advance but this might not always be possible. He cited as an example the launching of a corps probe which might lead to the use of nuclear weapons unless the other side decided to withdraw. The Secretary stated that the U.S. has also agreed we will fully support NATO with nuclear weapons. Any fighting could lead to the use of nuclear weapons, and as we cannot always count on unanimity in NATO we must decide what to do if one or the other government objected. Of course, if one of the countries on the periphery objected we could go ahead without crippling NATO. The Secretary said he was not certain that he had answered all of the Ambassador's questions, but that we should anticipate as much as possible by advance planning.

The French Ambassador said he would like to know, in the case of an initiative by the Russians leading to a full scale atomic attack, whether the delegation of authority would operate or whether the decision still rested in the hands of the President. The Secretary said the decision was basically in the hands of the President. He said that we are reviewing contingency planning in case there is no Washington or there is no President, but that the matter now rests with the President.

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The French Ambassador said that he agreed that we must try to anticipate as much as possible among ourselves and in NATO, and search for unanimity in advance, but that lack of agreement in NATO should not be allowed to stop action. The Secretary agreed that it would be a serious matter if the Four decided to go ahead and most of the rest of the alliance would refuse to do so, but he thought this unlikely. Lord Hood added that this is why we must take them into our confidence and prepare them for a decision. The Secretary said that we should come back to this subject on an early occasion. In response to a question from the French Ambassador on the participation of military advisers in these meetings, the Secretary said that as the decisions are highly political he would have to look into the matter, but would inform the Ambassador of his views before the next meeting.

Mr. Kohler, who took over the meeting on the departure of the Secretary, noted that the second item on the agenda (The Tripartite Reaction to Soviet Interference with Air Access to Berlin) was highly related to the first. When the French Ambassador replied that he had not had any response from Paris on this question, Mr. Kohler said it would be discussed further when the French got some word from Paris.

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October 9, 1961

Mac:

Foy Kohler announced at this morning's meeting of the Berlin Task Force that the attached paper would be sent to General Taylor for discussion with the President at a meeting on contingency planning tomorrow morning. I was asked to send you a copy. The burden of the paper is that:

1. General Clay wants to force any blockage of the Friedrichstrasse crossing with a small number of tanks, even in the face of desultory fire. The tanks would then take a defensive position in East Berlin immediately inside the entry point.

2. The Department agrees to this course of action, if:

(a) reference to using the tanks even if there is desultory fire is omitted;

(b) it is clear that the tanks would be withdrawn to the Western Sector, after demolishing the obstacle, instead of remaining in East Berlin.

3. The people in State are getting worried about the fact that they are turning down all of General Clay's suggestions; hence they wanted to meet him half-way on this one. This compromise would represent a change in the instructions which the President approved after presiding over a meeting on this and allied subjects (while you were on leave).

4. I suggested to the drafter that he should make more clear than the attached paper does that this course should not be prosecuted if the East Germans fire upon the tank or interpose their forces, so that casualties

would

Mr Bundy

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would have to be inflicted or suffered in the course of the operation. To go ahead in this circumstance would be (i) foolish, since we're not prepared to fight over the issue; (ii) a dramatic reversal of the previous Presidential decision, with the possible general disadvantages I mentioned the other day. [illegible]

Henry Owen

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VERBATIM TEXT

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

1893

Downgraded To: SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
EO 11652: XGDS (1) 2 (3) 4
Authorized By: H. D. [illegible]
August 4, 1975

Subj.: Berlin

Dear Mr. President,

I was very glad to have a talk with you on the telephone yesterday and it seems that we share the same anxieties about the next step forward. I have not of course yet received the account of your talks with Gromyko. These meth thoughts therefore are preliminary to receiving the message which you kindly said you would send me. However I assume that your talks are probably on the same kind of line as those which Rusk and Home had.

This is the dilemma. In order to discourage Khrushchev from forcing g the issue at his Party conference on October 17, it seems desirable to continue in some form before that date the kind of probing negotiation which Rusk, Home and yourself have already carried out with Gromyko. But if these probing negotiations continue without the agreement of the Germans and the French you and I may find ourselves out on a limb.

My own feeling is that the main reason for the French attitude is their long-term anxiety about the Germans. They have devoted their whole policy over recent years to attracting the West Germans into the Western European system -- the Common Market is only one form of this political exercise --

(1)

NLK-00-126

S/O:EUR:GER:FRCash:mds 10/9/61

GER - Foy D. Kohler

GER - M.J.Hillenbrand

S/S - Mr. Sanfull

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DS-322

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and they fear both in the immediate and perhaps still more in the long-term a German resentment amounting almost to a sense of betrayal which may lead to very undesirable and dangerous movements in a future Germany. I believe therefore that if the Germans can be got to accept something on the lines of the Rusk-Home plan the French will fall into line. How then are we to approach the Germans? The result of the German election has been very unfortunate in the sense that it has put off everything for a month. If Adenauer had had a clear majority we could have gone forward. On the other hand there may be this good side to it; if a Coalition government is formed in Germany there will be more likelihood of national acceptance of the inevitable which will in the long run be helpful. Nevertheless it seems difficult to force the pace with Adenauer until his own negotiations with the various parties are completed and his position is assured.

If we rate the danger of Khrushchev forcing the issue high, then we must act before October 17, in order at least to keep the preliminary negotiations in being and continued perhaps in Moscow rather than in Washington. On this assumption we have only about a week to get the Germans into the mood that we want. In the long run I feel that we may have to have either a Three-Power meeting of you, me and de Gaulle, or a Four-Power meeting including Adenauer, but I do not see how we can arrange this in time to meet the immediate difficulty. And of course as you pointed out on the telephone, this idea has the risk that with all the publicity attached failure to reach agreement would be serious. If a Heads of Government meeting is not practicable in the immediate future, are we to try for a Four-Power meeting of Foreign Secretaries next week perhaps in Paris and hope that this would give the green light

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green light for Thompson and Roberts to carry on quietly in Moscow on the same lines that Rusk and Home have done in New York? Should such a meeting be preceded by some action in Bonn -- perhaps a special emissary? If it seems hopeless to get a meeting of Foreign Ministers arranged so soon and we are therefore unable to go ahead with the probe in Moscow before October 17, would it help if we got agreement on some Western meeting to be held after October 17 but announced beforehand and indicated to the Russians that we hoped to resume contacts with them soon thereafter?

I am frankly puzzled by this. I am only sending you this preliminary picture of the problem as I see it and will await your thoughts before sending you a further message or telephoning you again. I fear this is not very constructive; it poses the problem but offers no solution. Still it is perhaps as well if we can at least get the problem clearly set out.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Harold Macmillan

RUSK

October 7, 1961

Rusk
(Sent)

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DDE LIB NORSTAD PAPERS
POLICY FILE
Berlin - June Dec 1961 (200)
1 Sep - 31 Dec (3)

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE
(By Special Means)

LN/dcm
10 October 1961 1815 hrs

TO: JCS

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN LEMNITZER FROM GEN NORSTAD.

This is "Communique No. 2" on the Battle of Berlin.

Following msg has just been received from Clay:

"FROM CLAY FOR NORSTAD ONLY.

"I am not interested in cable polemics and will not send any further EYES ONLY. I deemed it essential for you to know my views which are definite and firm and I assure you not polemics. I am prepared to defend them anywhere at any time as I do not propose to sit quietly in Berlin and let any of the few remaining rights we have disappear because of inaction and delay. I cannot accept any restrictions on expressing my views to any Headquarters which concerns itself with my recommendations. Since you now know my views, I see no useful purpose in our meeting at Heidelberg at this time. I have hoped you would visit Berlin soon."

I propose to take the following action:

a. Thru CINCUSAREUR insure that use of military personnel

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and equipment in Berlin continue under military control according to established policy; that is, I will continue to exercise normal command thru established channels.

b. Continue to meet fully the letter and the spirit of the directive to Clay as given in Department of State msg 1509 sent Berlin 328, 14 Sept. to the extent that it applies to the relationship with military authorities.

c. Since a personal meeting now appears out of the question, for the time being, reply by letter to both of Clay's messages. The record must be set straight and a personal letter is the quietest and now the most effective way in which this can be accomplished.

In order to keep you and Secretary McNamara informed, I will provide you a copy of my letter when it is written. In the meantime, I suggest no action in Washington unless subject is raised on someone else's initiative.

There are more important battles to worry about.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

(201) (464)

10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Following extended discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Norstad, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have concluded that the following specific actions will increase our non-nuclear military power in Europe while protecting the greatest number of options in response to the Berlin contingency.

1. Deploy to Europe, starting on 1 November, eleven Air National Guard squadrons and one Tactical Control Group.

2. Return from Europe to the continental United States seven Air Force squadrons of the Tactical Air Command.

3. Preposition in Europe the equipment of one Armored Division and one Infantry Division.

4. Revise Operation LONG THRUST to deploy battle groups from the 4th Infantry Division in place of the 101st Airborne Division, and through a series of such exercises to provide for the rotation among the five battle groups of the 4th Infantry Division so as to have in Europe for an indefinite period, after the initiation of Operation LONG THRUST, at least two combat ready battle groups plus supporting elements.

The eleven Air National Guard squadrons include three F-104 fighter interceptor squadrons for corridor escort duty and eight tactical fighter bomber squadrons, some of which are equipped for air refueling. The seven Tactical Air Command squadrons are so equipped and are therefore capable of rapid response and will provide a better reserve in the United States. Since the Air National Guard squadrons are at a 25 aircraft per squadron strength while the regular Tactical Air Command squadrons have only 17 aircraft per squadron, the USAFE non-nuclear equipped tactical fighter bomber strength will increase from 300 to 400 aircraft. Bases have been selected and are being readied to receive these units. Personnel transfers to support these actions will result in a net increase in

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cc dest

FWD to 10/10 mtg

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Air Force strength in Europe of 9500 personnel.

By prepositioning in Europe the stocks and equipment for one Armored and one Infantry division, we will then be able to move to Europe the personnel of the two divisions in about 30 days. Equipment to be prepositioned will come from Army stocks in Europe plus depot stocks in the United States with the balance from low priority units of the reserve and five regular Army units in the United States. Sufficient equipment will be retained by the regular Army divisions to provide training to insure combat qualification. A limited number of personnel will be moved with the equipment to receive, store, maintain and safeguard it in Europe.

Exercise LONG THRUST will be revised to employ elements of the 4th Infantry Division in place of the 101st Airborne Division. By substituting the 4th Infantry for the 101st Airborne, we will retain in the continental United States reserve force the Airborne Division with its quicker response time and greater flexibility. Through a series of LONG THRUST type exercises we can arrange always to have at least two battle groups in Europe at all times. Exercise LONG THRUST is planned with no execution date set at present.

These actions were agreed to by General Norstad and are in addition to:

1. The augmentation of the Seventh Army by 37,000 personnel which you approved and which is being implemented.

2. The deployment of a "Hunter Killer" group to the eastern North Atlantic where it will be available to augment our anti-submarine warfare forces and to join with British navy forces in exercises this fall.

3. The deployment of the Third Armored Regiment from the United States to Europe which was recommended by my memorandum of 7 October 1961.

I therefore recommend that you approve:

1. The movement to Europe, starting 1 November 1961, of eleven Air National Guard Squadrons and one Tactical Control Group.

2. The return from Europe to the United States of seven Tactical Air Command squadrons.

3. The prepositioning in Europe of the equipment for one Armored and one Infantry division.

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4. The revision of planning for exercise LONG THRUST to include elements of the 4th Infantry Division in place of the 101st Airborne Division and to provide for the rotation of battle groups from the 4th Infantry Division, through a series of such exercises so as to retain indefinitely in Europe two battle groups plus supporting elements.

Robert S. McNamara

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OSD/ISA Files

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
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1961 OCT 14 11 27

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JCSM-728-61

13 OCT 1961

465

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict (C)

1. Within the context of national policy and in consideration of the political-military factors involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared a "Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict" which is appended hereto.

2. This preferred sequencing of actions presents a series of militarily acceptable and interrelated courses of action which could be implemented as required. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that possible US and Allied actions and Soviet/GDR actions and reactions provide a number of permutations and combinations which cannot be predicted in advance nor can a valid forecast be made of specifically how the conflict will develop. In addition, Soviet/GDR initiative may greatly influence the sequence of action. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the proposed sequencing of military actions presents a militarily sound approach to the fundamental problems involved. They further consider that the listing of military actions in the Appendix hereto constitutes a basis for the development of required interdepartmental and eventually intergovernmental plans in which nonmilitary actions can be added as appropriate.

3. The sequence of military actions recommended herein is designed to:

a. Improve the credibility of both our policy and our total deterrent posture.

315

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b. Place us in a better position to implement selective military operations on both a scale less than general war and in general war.

c. Induce the Soviets to enter into negotiations on terms acceptable to the United States and deter denial of our rights to Berlin.

d. If access be denied, induce the Soviets to reopen access by impressing them with the risks of continuing to deny or impede our access to Berlin.

e. Retain the cohesiveness of NATO and engender the maximum participation of our NATO Allies.

4. To these ends the proposed operations have been designed to take into account that:

a. All courses of action should be conducted in light of the interrelationship of our nuclear and nonnuclear forces. Our nonnuclear capabilities will thus be enhanced by making it clear in all actions that our nuclear power is available for use at any time, and that we will not hesitate to use it if required.

b. Actions should be designed to apply increasing pressure, as required, and to be conducted on a scale and in a manner so as to convince the USSR that the United States is willing to accept the consequences of general war rather than back down.

c. The operations should be conducted in such a manner as to afford us the maximum opportunity to preemptively use our power - both nuclear and nonnuclear.

5. The timing of the operations should be designed to:

a. Place the onus of the initial attack on the Soviets by our determined maintenance of the continuity of Allied access rights in Berlin.

b. Provide maximum military initiative to us.

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c. Prevent a Soviet action or reaction from stabilizing into a fait accompli.

6. With regard to timing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there is a direct relationship between NATO military strategy, US and NATO force posture, free world determination and decisiveness of action and the rapidity with which low order military actions might develop into higher levels of conflict requiring us to employ nuclear weapons tactically or resort to general war in order to achieve our objective.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that positive action to oppose communist aggression in any geographical area will be evidence of the determination of the United States and will influence the Berlin situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the present situation and have agreed that intervention in Southeast Asia is militarily desirable to counter communist insurgency. This action should have the effect of making our determination unmistakably clear to the Soviets.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the possibility that expanded maritime actions in areas outside of Europe could be implemented prior to expanding the ground and air operations in Central Europe. In this regard, the three principal commanders concerned, General Norstad, Admiral Dennison, and Admiral Felt, have stated their opposition to such timing for this course of action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with these judgments and consider that actions outside of Germany should be complementary to, and not substitutes for, actions to be taken in Central Europe to maintain our rights in Berlin and prevent denial of access.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the concept that if one method of access is denied, the Allies should plan on utilizing the other method of access with increased traffic (i.e., if ground access is denied, initiate an airlift and negotiate to regain the ground access). The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagree with such a concept and recommend that any interference with access should be directly and immediately opposed with

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appropriate Allied forces. The preferred sequencing of military actions to regain the specific access method (ground or air) could be followed through to the highest intensity as listed in the Appendix. At the same time, we should continue to utilize the other access method (air or ground) and should also initiate military actions to the degree necessary to assure that it is maintained open.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that these views and the "Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict," appended hereto, be endorsed by you and forwarded to the President for his consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further suggest that these views be considered by the President as either a substitute for, or as a minimum, in connection with his review of the Department of Defense-Department of State paper on this subject.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Assistant Secretary

SECRET

October 16, 1961

To: The Secretary

Through: S/S

From: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

Subject: French Position on Quadripartite Consultation

I think Ambassador Alphand was not very happy with the instructions he had to carry out on Friday and Saturday. After the meeting on Saturday he took me aside and said that speaking personally he thought it was becoming a matter of some urgency that there be some meeting between President Kennedy and General de Gaulle. He thought they had got on famously in Paris and that a meeting might help bring them together again. I agreed they got on well and that a meeting would be useful though of course it also had its dangers if the present differences still persist. Alphand commented that if there were a meeting his own view would be that de Gaulle might well come here since the President had already visited him in Paris. I said actually it might be more important first to get our lines straight with Chancellor Adenauer. We realized that General de Gaulle was influenced by his desire to do nothing which would offend or estrange the Chancellor or the Germans. We shared this view. Thus if there were agreement on where we go from here with Adenauer this might be easy for de Gaulle to accept.

The conversation terminated inconclusively.

cc: Mr. Ball
Mr. Bohlen
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Hillenbrand - S/O
Mr. Blue - WE
Embassy Paris, Bonn, London, Moscow

EUR:FDKohler:mt

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Rec'd: OCTOBER 18, 1961 1:41 a.m.

42 Action

EUR Info

SS C SP SA L SB SO IO DAC P USIA IMR RMR

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2080, OCTOBER 17, 6 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2080, INFORMATION BONN 230, BERLIN 132, LONDON 374, MOSCOW 114.

WHEN DE GAULLE DECIDED THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT AT ALL AVERSE TO OUR TAKING SOUNDINGS, HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO ENTER DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS OVER BERLIN AT THIS STATE, IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT HIS POSITION WOULD PLACE STRAIN ON FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS HAVE PROVED THIS TO BE CASE. IT IS ALWAYS EASY TO LOOK OVER SHOULDER OF THOSE ENGAGED IN SERIOUS CONVERSATION AND KIBITZ. THIS IS WHAT FRENCH PRESS AT FIRST DID ON RUSK-GROMYKO AND SUBSEQUENTLY PRESIDENT KENNEDY-GROMYKO CONVERSATIONS.

IN REFUSING APPROVAL OF LONDON MEETING WESTERN EXPERTS BERLIN PROBLEM, DE GAULLE GAVE ANOTHER INDICATION HIS OBJECTION TREND WESTERN POLICY. HE PROBABLY FEELS LONDON MEETING POINTED TOWARD EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS IN SITUATION WHERE THESE WILL BE FRUITLESS OR WORSE. PRELIMINARY REACTIONS INDICATE THAT DE GAULLE MAY NOT ENGAGE MUCH SYMPATHY AMONG FRENCH PUBLIC IN STAND "SPLENDID ISOLATION." SOME ASPECTS DE GAULLE POSITION DO HAVE MORE SUPPORT, AS EMBASSY HAS INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, BOTH AMONG THOSE PROFESSIONALLY INTERESTED AND AMONG LARGER PUBLIC.

THUS, CERTAIN FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED ANXIETY THAT AREA OF EXPLORATION HAD BEEN OVERLY EXTENDED BEYOND IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF BERLIN. REFERENCES TO EUROPEAN SECURITY CAUSED THEM PARTICULAR ANXIETY, LARGELY BECAUSE OF THEIR APPREHENSION CONCERNING UNFAVORABLE GERMAN REACTION ON THIS SCORE. FRENCH OVERLY SENSITIVE ABOUT DOING ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT UPSET, DISTRACT OR OFFEND GERMANS IN

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL: GEL-FE	DATE OF ACTION: 18 Oct	DISPOSITIONS TO RM/R

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IN PRESENT SITUATION OR LEAD TO EVENTUAL LOSS OF VITAL WEST GERMAN ROLE IN WESTERN ALLIANCE. THEY UNCERTAIN HOW GERMANS WILL REACT AND WANT TO RUN NO RISKS.

ON WHOLE OFFICIAL AND JOURNALISTIC SPIRIT AT MOMENT IS ONE OF OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH CONDUCT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH RUSSIANS TO DATE, COMBINED WITH CERTAIN FEELING OF "I TOLD YOU SO" AT NEGATIVE RESULTS, AND CONCERN OVER WEST GERMAN REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE CONCESSIONS AT GERMAN EXPENSE.

GOVERNMENT STILL ADVOCATES TOUGH, DETERMINED RESOLUTE STAND ON NO YIELDING IN FACE OF SOVIET MENANCES. CARRIED TO ULTIMATE CONCLUSION THIS COURSE MIGHT LEAD TO WAR. FRENCH PEOPLE DIMLY REALIZE THIS TOO, BUT IMMEDIATELY DISMISS IT FROM THEIR MINDS WITH CHARACTERISTIC GALLIC SHRUG OF SHOULDERS.

PROSPECT OF WAR OVERTLY FOUGHT OVER BERLIN AROUSES LESS THAN WHOLEHEARTED ENDORSEMENT BECAUSE OF MIXED FEELINGS STEMMING FROM PAST REGARDING GERMANY AND ARTIFICIAL POSITION OF CITY. MANY FRENCH SAY "IT'S NOT A GOOD CAUSE, " AND MANY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THEY ARE FIGHTING IN THEIR OWN DEFENSE AND NOT JUST FOR THE GERMANS. THESE FEELINGS ARE STRENGTHENED BY URGENT PREOCCUPATIONS AT HOME AND IN ALGERIA. DE GAULLE, WHO LOOKS INWARD WHEN HE WANT TO KNOW WHAT FRENCH PEOPLE THINK, MUST BE DEEPLY AWARE OF THIS RELUCTANCE OF HIS COUNTRY-MEN TO FACE UP TO FACT ON BERLIN.

IN FRENCH CIRCLES ESPECIALLY CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS WE THINK FOLLOWING ARE ELEMENTS OF DE GAULLE'S POLICY WHICH FIND MOST SUPPORT:

A. CAUTION IN REGARD TO TAKING STEPS WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN OR "EUROPEAN SECURITY" WHICH COULD LOOSEN TIES OF WEST GERMANY WITH WEST WHICH HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY BUILT UP DURING RECENT YEARS.

B. RELUCTANCE

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B. RELUCTANCE TO NEGOTIATE IN FACE OF THREATS, BOLSTERED BY ESTIMATE -- LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN OURS -- THAT SOVIETS DO NOT WISH TO GO OVER BRINK OF WAR. THEREFORE, THERE IS LITTLE POINT IN BARGAINING WITH THEM AT THIS STAGE.

C. DESIRE TO POSTPONE BERLIN AND GERMAN SETTLEMENT UNTIL ALGERIAN SETTLEMENT WILL MAKE POSSIBLE MOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL RESOURCES AND SOLIDARITY OF MILITARY FORCES. THESE IN TURN WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR FRANCE TO EXERT MORE WEIGHT IN NEGOTIATION WITH SOVIETS.

GAVIN

KEA

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T20316 (205)

1 RECEIVED BY STATE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

16515 (468)

October 18, 1961

XR-94

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 107

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Friedrichstrasse Crossing Point

The President has approved the following course of action, as recommended in your memorandum of October 14, 1961, for dealing with the possible closing of the Friedrichstrasse entry point into East Berlin:

If the Friedrichstrasse crossing point is closed either by unacceptable demands for documentation by the GDR or by the erection of a barrier, we would run two or three tanks up to the checkpoint to demolish whatever was barring our entry (even if only a custom-type gate), and then have them withdraw and stationed nearby inside the Western Sector. The Commandant in the Kommandatura chair for the month, or alternatively the US Commandant (Friedrichstrasse is in the US Sector), would then immediately call Karlshorst to protest the situation and demand an urgent meeting with the Soviet Commandant as well as assurance of safe conduct through the sector boundary for purposes of such meeting. He would immediately release a statement explaining that the Allied forces had destroyed a barrier which the East Germans illegally erected to bar Allied passage, and that the matter was being protested to the Soviet Commandant. He also would make it clear that, following our initial action, this was a problem to be resolved with the Soviets, who continue to bear full responsibility for the

Sent Berlin 19 Oct 61 P

Action: EUR-2

INFO: S-1
G-2
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S/PRS-6
S/P-7
S/S-8-9
INR-10
IO-11
L-L

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Filed
to Sec. 10/18

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situation. If, as is likely, access continued to be denied us, we would take the further position that the Soviets had violated existing agreements and that we would take appropriate countering measures.

This course of action is subject to the agreement of the British and French. It supplements the actions approved by the President on September 12, 1961 in National Security Action Memorandum No. 94.

/s/ McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Maxwell Taylor
Director of Central Intelligence
Director, U.S. Information Agency

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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8502

ACTION: Ambassador BONN PRIORITY 1088

INFO: LONDON 2071
PARIS 2218

020

PARIS FOR WSNO

EYES ONLY

[redacted]

EYES ONLY

Following for delivery/[redacted] Oct. 19 is letter from the President to Chancellor re Gilpatric visit. Advise date and time delivery.

VERBATIM TEXT

QUOTE.

October 18, 1961

Dear Chancellor Adenauer:

The threat to the Alliance arising out of Soviet pressure on Berlin requires that our two nations and the North Atlantic Alliance move quickly and decisively to improve our military strength. I believe it would be timely and appropriate for consultations between our two governments on a wide range of defense matters to make sure the actions we are taking to strengthen NATO's defenses are both adequate and fully coordinated. If you agree, within the next few days, I will send Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to Bonn, who, accompanied by Ambassador Dowling, will undertake discussions with your representatives. Secretary Gilpatric,

EUR:GER:CAFreshman:jg 10/18/61 | GER - Robert M. Brandin

DOD - Admiral McCormick S/S - Mr. [redacted] Brubeck

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EYES ONLY

TAB 11

FN

to Tel 952 10/19

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SECRET

as my personal representative, will be prepared to explain in detail U.S. preparedness measures and to outline U.S. views on joint preparedness actions required of our two nations and the Alliance.

My government, as you know, is increasing substantially both its non-nuclear and its nuclear military strength. Preparations are underway for the deployment to Germany, if required, of up to six additional U.S. divisions, accompanied by major tactical air support. My government is determined to take whatever actions are required for our security and the security of the Alliance. We trust that other governments within the Alliance will do the same, and I hope I can count on your support in urging the others to do so with determination and dispatch.

I need not emphasize the importance of the defense measures to be taken by the Federal Republic. A major strengthening of Federal Republic forces is essential to the successful deterrence of Communist aggression in Europe.

As one means of facilitating the German build-up and improving our combined military strength, my government has been exploring measures for improving the logistics capability of the German armed forces in addition to measures already under discussion in Bonn. The United States has over the years developed a comprehensive logistics system to support our forces in Europe. We are prepared to share this system, to the maximum practicable extent, with the Federal Republic. The cooperative

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[redacted]

logistics system we are contemplating should substantially improve our combined capabilities. Secretary Gilpatric will be prepared to discuss this matter in detail.

Since the beginning of my administration, our government has increased its defense budget by $6 billion, including $3.5 billion appropriated by the Congress last July, after my message on the need for preparedness measures looking toward a crisis over Berlin. The United States is prepared to shoulder these additional build-up costs and more, if necessary, but we must at the same time take measures to minimize the adverse impact on our balance of payments of our international security programs. In other words, our problem is not budgetary but balance of payments. We look to the Federal Republic to work out with us arrangements to insure that U.S. military expenditures in Germany do not drain foreign exchange reserves from the U.S. to Germany.

I believe, Mr. Chancellor, that immediate action on these measures to strengthen NATO's defenses will provide persuasive evidence of our determination to fight to preserve the freedom of the people of West Berlin and our rights there.

In view of the urgency of this matter, I have asked Ambassador Bruce to deliver this message to you personally and to make the necessary plans for these meetings.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. [redacted]

[redacted]

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His Excellency
Dr. Konrad Adenauer,
Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany,
Bonn, Germany.

UNQUOTE

Signed original being pouched.

RUSK

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207 470

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

19 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Background Material For Berlin Meeting, 20 October

1. Mr. Nitze has forwarded General Taylor three papers -- the JCS broad views on the preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict, (Tab A), their detailed horse blanket in support of their views, (Tab B), and a memorandum to General Lemnitzer from Secretary Gilpatric requesting a discussion on the JCS papers, (Tab C).

2. At the OSD/JCS meeting, it was decided that what was needed now was a poodle blanket, with the weaving of a horse blanket possibly to follow. As a result, the poodle blanket you received yesterday was approved by both JCS and OSD. That paper appears to resolve the three issues raised by Mr. Gilpatric in his memorandum, although as Colonel Legare stressed yesterday, it does not appear to satisfy completely General Taylor's point.

3. The operative paragraphs of the Chiefs memorandum are 3-9. They provide an insight into JCS thinking. Of especial interest are paragraphs 7 and 9. Paragraph 9 was written before the meeting with Mr. Gilpatric. The Chiefs therefore have evidently accepted the idea that if an immediate response to restore access by small forces fail, non-military measures must be attempted before large scale military action is attempted.

4. There is no need to read the detailed actions proposed by the Chiefs. You may desire, however, to glance at the major categories of contingencies circled in red.

5. These papers are not scheduled for discussion with the President. They have been furnished you as a possible source of additional background for the meeting tomorrow. Their return for referral to General Taylor on his return would be appreciated.

W. Y. Smith
W. Y. SMITH
Major, USAF

Enclosures

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NLK NSF 8-3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

208 471

TOP SECRET October 20, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Berlin meeting, 10 o'clock, Friday, October 20

Two papers will be presented for approval today: (1) a revised State-Defense draft of the preferred sequence of military actions to be taken in response to a blockage of access in Berlin; (2) a letter to Norstad which would accomplish this. This preferred sequence as a statement of your policy. These documents have the agreement of State, Defense, and the JCS, but this agreement covers a deep-seated difference between the civilians in both departments and the military both here and in Paris. Indeed, this is the difference between those who would expect a period of non-military action: sanctions, naval harassment and UN action -- and those who believe we should act promptly and continuously by military means to restore access once it is blocked.

Both the "preferred sequence" and the Norstad letter fudge this issue. This is deliberate, I am sure: Bob McNamara thinks the consequences of a sharp division now would be serious. Before reaching your own judgment on this point, you will want to read the two documents.

Detailed comments on the preferred sequence follow:

(I) relates to probes, not offensive military actions, and is quite well agreed. The only rock in the channel here is that a fighter escort operation might well escalate very rapidly.

(II) is about non-combatant activity. The economic embargo is the most important item here, and a report from Joe Fowler makes clear that there is much still to be done. This is TAB 1 of the supporting papers for today. In substance, it reports that only France, Germany and The Netherlands are in full agreement on this one. A number of efforts are going forward to strengthen the souls of the unrighteous. You may want to ask whether more pressure should be put on the British at a high level.

But the most important part of II is in the parenthesis, which states, without resolving, the issue between "delay" and "prompt action." This is the issue which divides the soldiers and the civilians.

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(III) describes naval, air and ground action of a non-nuclear sort. The points to be noted are these:

(A) None of the military believe in a naval blockade without accompanying ground action in Europe. You may want to ask General Lemnitzer why this is.

(B) Non-nuclear air war is regarded as attractive by a number of the experts, but apparently not by the Air Force itself. Thus planning for this one may be approved in principle and neglected in fact. The Air Force both here and in Europe prefers its nuclear capability and has been leaking its point of view to the papers. You may wish to press on this point too.

(C) General Taylor believes that the description of the non-nuclear ground advance should make clear its specific function of exposing Soviet intention as distinct from the DDR. Otherwise, there is no major disagreement here.

If you approve of (III) as it stands, you can perhaps insure your own control over the course of planning and thinking by requesting regular reports of readiness and of the progress of planning. This is particularly important in the field of non-nuclear air action.

(IV) is about nuclear action, and it leaves unresolved the great issue which was touched on between McNamara and Nitze in our last meeting. This issue, bluntly, is whether we can and should have nuclear strikes short of the massive strategic attack which is the current basic plan for general war. I do not think much additional work has been done on this, and again you may wish to press for continued analysis and multiple planning. McNamara has just called to say they are not prepared on this for today.
But all of the issues in (III) and (IV) are essentially subordinate clauses in the main question, which is still the question between our view and Norstad's: Are there a variety of steps between blocked access and general nuclear war, or not?

McG. B.

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(209)

(472)

October 20, 1961

SECRET - PERSONAL - INFORMAL

Dear George,

I am leaving tomorrow to return to Moscow. Since the President has replied to your telegram, which I appreciated receiving, there is perhaps no need for me to reply separately, but I thought I might give you a few of my own thoughts.

In general, I agree with your point that Khrushchev's moves over Berlin and Germany have been mainly defensive, arising out of the failure of the East German regime. But I attach importance, as does Chip, to his public statement to the Congress putting off the deadline. This is probably related not only to the evidences of our willingness to negotiate but also to the "correlation of forces." I don't think they have an answer to the Polaris and, moreover, you will doubtless have seen in the public press (Joe Alsop, Drew Pearson, and others) that there has been a reappraisal here of Soviet ICBM capabilities very much downward. I think the U.S. is now evolving a policy on Berlin which would be negotiable if we can persuade our Allies to go along. The key to the situation will be the German attitude.

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I think the Soviet military has been able to successfully exert pressure on Khrushchev on military matters such as atomic testing. I also think that under the way the system now operates Khrushchev himself allows, if not encourages, discussion at the top over policy. But he is still capable of pushing his own views through whenever he wants to. The Chinese stance is, however, something he must always worry about.

On the all-Berlin solution, there are still a number of people here pushing this. I suspect we may put it forward as a negotiating position. My view is that the Russians would demand a greatly increased price for this which would make a solution practically impossible. Moreover, it would still leave

us

The Honorable
George F. Kennan,
American Ambassador,
American Embassy,
Belgrade.

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us with difficult problems about access, security of the City, and particularly ties with West Germany. The latter would probably have to be broken completely; in such case and in view of the dilapidated state of East Berlin the financial need would be even greater. If one considers that West Germany is now putting in about one-half billion a year into West Berlin, and other supports such as pension funds, orders placed in West Berlin to help it out, etc., the financial problem could loom very large indeed.

These are hasty thoughts and if time permits I will elaborate when I get back to Moscow, provided the 50 megaton does not misfire and eliminate us from consideration. (My guess is that they will not actually fire it.)

Best regards to Annalise.

Sincerely,

Llewellyn E. Thompson

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Diary Correspondence
Lot
64D204

Also in
762A.00/10-2561
473

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

210

US 63/b-II

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Bonn, October 21, 1961

THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for your letter of October 14, 1961. I share your opinion that a frank exchange of views is of utmost importance for the preservation of Western unity. This is especially true in the present critical situation, in which the Soviets are attempting to undermine this unity by a great variety of means.

I am grateful to you and Secretary Rusk for having informed me and my Government about the talks with Mr. Gromyko, and I believe that the time has now come for consultation concerning the conclusions to be drawn from these meetings and whether a basis for formal negotiations already exists. In any event, there is obviously need for clarification as to whether the three powers who together bear the responsibility for Berlin are in agreement on this question.

Like you, I am of the opinion that every effort should be made to settle the problems before us by peaceful and diplomatic means in order not to allow a desperate collision to take place.

For this

His Excellency
John F. Kennedy,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

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For this reason I also consider it necessary to continue the talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister, and I hope that we will reach agreement in advance on the aims and limits of such talks.

The limits are where vital interests are affected. In this connection, I should like to state that the Federal Republic identifies itself completely with the vital interests of the Three Western Powers that must be defended by force, if necessary; but not everything outside these interests is negotiable.

This is especially true of the security interests of the Federal Republic which I dealt with in my last letter. It is also true of Berlin's political and constitutional ties with the Federal Republic, without which Berlin is not viable and would soon become a dying city in which there would be nothing left to defend but empty houses.

Furthermore, the Federal Republic of Germany cannot [redacted] the basis laid down in the Paris Treaties of [redacted] common policy on Germany. Neither can she renounce [redacted] contractually agreed principle that the Eastern borders of Germany can only be determined in a peace treaty.

Some of these points have been questioned during the last weeks in the discussions of the ambassadorial group. I must confess that I would consider it dangerous if this tendency were to continue in the discussions.

After the

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After the catastrophe of the Hitler period and the war, the German people put all their hopes on the West, on the Atlantic Alliance, and especially on the United States. They withstood all Soviet blandishments to reunify Germany on the basis of neutralization. In so doing they relied on the promises of their allies to pursue together with us a policy of re-establishment of a Germany unified in freedom and security, although it was clear to all that concrete success of this policy in the near future could not be expected. We must not disappoint this confidence, and we must also not destroy for the Germans behind the Iron Curtain the last glimmer of hope for liberation from their present fate.

I am very grateful to you for your explanation on the subject of "European security."

I agree with you that a special military status for some European countries or even for the Federal Republic of Germany alone is unacceptable; that disengagement cannot be considered; [redacted] efforts toward disengagement must be taken very seri-

I should be grateful if--through our Ambassador or through whatever channel you may deem appropriate--I could have a clarification of your idea that the confrontation in Central Europe could perhaps be reduced. My impression has always been that it is not the confrontation which is dangerous but rather the reduction of confrontation. Korea is a good example. But the experience at the Israeli-Arab border also proves it; almost

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all the clashes occurred within the demilitarized or neutralized zones and not where the Israelis and Arabs confronted each other directly. It would, of course, be an advantage if the number of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe could be reduced. But we all know that the Soviets would counter such a proposal with a demand for a proportionate reduction in the number of Western troops.

As to nuclear weapons, the security of the Federal Republic of Germany at present rests on the general NATO agreement that the Bundeswehr, too, will have at its disposal, in case of war, the atomic warheads which in peacetime are in American custody. Inasmuch as the Federal Republic of Germany, at the request of her allies, is the only country in the world to have renounced the production of atomic weapons, she must be able to rely on this fundamental basis of NATO policy. Any agreement with the Soviets which encroaches upon or actually vitiates this basis of our defense policy would endanger the security of the Federal Republic of Germany—and thereby also the security of our allies.

For these reasons Mr. Gromyko's demands in this area must, in my opinion, be rejected.

Measures against surprise attacks could be useful, but they can only be significant today in the form of very extensive zones.

I would welcome a personal discussion with you, Mr. President, on all these questions and on the present situation in general, after the formation

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[redacted] the formation of our new government, which will probably take place next week.

I shall answer your letter of October 19 concerning Mr. Gilpatrick's visit after his arrival here.

With respectful and cordial regards,

Yours

[redacted]

Adenauer

[redacted]

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Presidential Correspondence
Lot 66D204

France

Letter from de Gaulle

Paris, October 21, 1961

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#1

Dear Mr. President:

In your letter of October 14, you were good enough to outline to me the conclusions that seem to you to flow from the recent talks that you and Mr. Dean Rusk had with Mr. Gromyko regarding Germany. You believe that they may have caused the Soviets to realize the serious danger to which their present policy exposes them. You consider, moreover, that the main guidelines of the framework for possible negotiation seem to have emerged therefrom and that it is advisable, in order to define them more clearly, to have your Ambassador in Moscow continue to explore them. You foresee that around mid-November, our Ministers of Foreign Affairs could, if need be, meet in order to see whether we should propose negotiations in good and due form to the Soviets.

I can only rejoice at the warning that you gave the Soviets and hope that they will keep it in mind. However, the fact that they concede that the negotiations on Germany and on Berlin must take place between us and not between us and the "German Democratic Republic," does not seem to me to introduce a factor that is important.

Indeed, for Mr. Khrushchev concluding a "treaty" with Mr. Ulbricht amounts to signing a paper with himself. As for us, we know full well that whatever the Pankow communists may do in Berlin, it is still with the Soviet Union that we are, and shall continue to be, confronted. It alone is and will be responsible.

That is

His Excellency
John F. Kennedy,
President of the United States of America.

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That is why it does not seem to me that there is any justification for considering this procedure as a concession from the Soviets. [illegible] it even more inconceivable that we Westerners should have "to pay a price" because the Kremlin, by inviting us to settle the matter first with it, without going directly through Pankow, seems to admit that Pankow is nothing, which is only too obvious. And if it doesn't admit it, in what way will the matter actually be different or more difficult for us? Indeed, I do not consider that this procedural point changes the Soviet demands or lessens the serious disadvantages that would arise at present from negotiations properly speaking.

For that is the root of the matter. The very fact that negotiations have begun--and they really have--cannot fail to give the impression that the United States is accepting a change in the present status of Berlin and, at the same time, is conceding that the situation of Germany (partition into two States, borders, defense, participation in the Atlantic Alliance, etc....) may be at least discussed, as demanded by the Soviets. And conceding this without there being any point of departure for the negotiations other than the demands of the Kremlin or any immediate reason for beginning them other than the public threat that they raise against the West. Under these conditions, and unless the negotiations were broken off, with a consequent worsening of the situation, it is difficult to see how the negotiations could result in anything but concessions by the United States, which concessions will, inevitably, change more or less the relationship of the political forces, be liable to create a psychological demoralization, difficult to contain, in the countries that belong to our alliance, particularly in Germany, and could encourage the Soviets to undertake a further advance.

I must

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I must say, Mr. President, that today, more than ever, I believe that the policy to be pursued jointly by the United States, Great Britain, and France, should be as follows: to refuse to consider changing the status of Berlin and the present situation of Germany, and consequently to negotiate concerning them, so long as the Soviet Union does not refrain from acting unilaterally and so long as it does not cease to threaten. In my opinion, you, Mr. Macmillan, and I should state jointly and publicly to Mr. Khrushchev: "You wish to negotiate with us. Well then, instead of launching into abuse and demands, give us proof of your desire for peace and of your respect for our rights and the rights of others, and then we can talk. But bear well in mind that if you attempt to use force against us, wherever it may be, we shall use force against you. It is up to you to make the choice."

I am, furthermore, sure that Soviet Russia, while having extremely powerful means of destruction, while showing them off in a sensational manner to impress the West and terrify the non-aligned nations, while it is undoubtedly resolved to risk total war if attacked, has no intention of starting, itself, a conflict that would be as disastrous for it as it would be for others. Thus, the Berlin affair, in which for three years the warnings, the deadlines, the time limits, periodically given by the Soviet Union, have, one by one, always been postponed, does not give the impression that the Kremlin is really prepared to hurl the thunderbolt. A wild beast that is going to spring does so without waiting that long.

However, I must admit that this way of seeing things, although it is France's way, may not coincide with the views of the United States. Although this can in no way jeopardize our fundamental solidarity, you and we are not on the same continent and we have not had the same experiences. That is why I cannot object to the fact that, for your part and in view of American public opinion, you deem it advisable to put out

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[redacted]

[redacted] failure to [redacted], which, however, cannot fail to resemble [redacted]. But France does not contemplate participating, under the present circumstances, [redacted] processes which find their explanation in the very nature of France herself and in her basic concern for maintaining, as much as possible, the solidarity which is proper to Western Europe. That will certainly not prevent my Government from remaining in close contact with yours. For the time being, I believe that in this respect the best system is and continues to be that of regular talks between our Ambassador in Washington and your Secretary of State.

In any event, I welcome as very salutary and very important the measures that you are taking to strengthen the military potential of the United States, both on its own soil and in Europe. That is, without doubt, the essential asset of our alliance. As for ourselves, to the extent of our capabilities, we are also increasing our combat forces in France and in Germany. As I led you to expect a short time ago, we have increased them during the last three months, by withdrawing from the forces in Algeria about fifty thousand men, with all their equipment, and several squadrons. We plan to continue and develop this movement during the coming months. At the same time, we are continuing to work to provide ourselves with an atomic force, as well as with airplanes and, later, with rockets capable of carrying our warheads. I hope that before the end of next year, the reappearance of a real French military power in Europe will be a fait accompli. If, at that time, this should cause the structure of the Atlantic Defense Organization to be changed, I am sure that our alliance itself will be all the stronger for it.

Sincerely,

C. de Gaulle

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NLK-NSF-93 16/23

TO

S-2129

O [redacted] 2251Z

FM GEN NORSTAD SHAPE PARIS

TO GEN LEMNITZER, JCS

S E C R E T

[redacted] EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

A FEW HOURS AGO A CAR BEARING U.S. FORCES LICENSE PLATES AND CARRYING LIGHTNER, U.S. POLAD BERLIN, AND HIS WIFE WAS STOPPED AT FRIEDRICHSTRASSE GATE. WHEN OTHER MEANS FAILED AND RUSSIANS DID NOT APPEAR IN REASONABLE TIME AS REQUESTED, LIGHTNER'S CAR WAS TAKEN THROUGH TWICE ESCORTED BY MILITARY VEHICLES WITH ARMED SOLDIERS IN FRONT AND IN REAR AND ARMED SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE. HE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITHOUT ESCORT.

PROTEST IS BEING MADE TO KARLSHORST AND IN THE MEANTIME CARS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY ARMED ESCORT AS NEEDED.

EARLIER THIS EVENING I HAD AUTHORIZED THE USE OF A BULLDOZER IF NECESSARY TO GET LIGHTNER'S CAR THROUGH. IT WAS NOT NEEDED. I MAY RECOMMEND SUCH TACTICS IF PROTEST IS UNPRODUCTIVE AND SOVIETS DO TAKE ACTION.

I WILL AUTHORIZE SUCH ACTION TOMORROW IF NECESSARY.

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NLK
NSF 322

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October 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Impact on USSR of US Military Build-Up in Berlin Crisis

Ray Garthoff, perhaps our savviest Soviet military analyst, has analyzed the effect on the Soviets of US preparedness moves to date in the Berlin crisis. Unlike in the past, when there was often little correlation between Soviet and US military measures, he sees a reciprocal pattern of challenge and response.

Just as our military measures to date have been aimed at persuading the Soviet leaders of our determination to protect our vital interests in Berlin, so too the Soviets have felt compelled to respond in like vein, and in some cases (e.g. the 100 megaton weapon) to go further toward open terror tactics. A review of the military measures taken on both sides from May through September buttresses this conclusion.

Touching off the spiral was your proposal on 25 May to increase defense outlays by $3.4 billion. After six weeks to develop a response, Khrushchev announced on 8 July a precisely equivalent increase in his defense budget (in terms of the official dollar/ruble exchange rate). He also suspended the force cut program begun in January 1960 which we know had continued at a modest rate into spring 1961. Next the Soviet Air Force Day (9 July) and Navy Day (30 July) displays involved an unusual amount of new equipment, especially a supersonic "dash" medium bomber.

Your 25 July address outlined a number of additional build-up measures, such as another $3 billion plus defense increase, an add-on of 225,000 plus authorization to call up more, etc. From many sources, particularly the Khrushchev/McCloy interview, we know that Khrushchev was especially stung by this speech. His response was a speech on 7 August stressing the horrendous consequences of nuclear war which paralleled point by point yours of 25 July. Warsaw Pact meetings were held. Konev was recalled from retirement to be C-in-C in Germany, and on 17 August foreign military attaches in Moscow were invited to observe a maneuver featuring employment of tactical nuclear weapons.

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We made a number of moves in August to beef up the strength of all three services, retained men due for release, and alerted or called up reservists. On 9 September we publicized the order to send 40,000 troops to Europe. The Soviets responded with a new series of measures to "match" this program and to emphasize Soviet strategic nuclear strength. On 30 August a decree retaining "temporarily" troops due for annual release was published; it was specifically said to be linked to the parallel US actions. The next day the USSR announced resumption of nuclear testing (although the actual decision was probably made shortly after your 25 July speech).

There has also been a broadly reciprocal series of publicized maneuvers. NATO exercises and CHECKMATE II were denounced in the Soviet press in September. Then on 25 September Warsaw Pact maneuvers to take place within the next two months were announced, with explicit reference to CHECKMATE.

Garthoff's conclusions as to the chief effects on the Soviets of our military moves are worth reading in full.

(1) A Soviet conclusion that the US intends to contest the Berlin issue vigorously, by further committing prestige and resources and permitting an increase in the level of tension (which would be self-defeating if we were later to back down). This does not, however, mean that they have concluded that the US cannot be brought to backing down. Thus, in general, military demonstrations by the US have probably led the Soviet leaders to raise their estimate of US determination, but without making clear the point at which the West would resort to use of military means to stop political encroachments.

(2) The US build-up in conventional forces, more than token though less than an indication of reliance on such forces, is probably seen as supporting our statements of intent to resist local actions for which a nuclear response would be unsuitable. Parallel moves to increase the alert status and size of the strategic nuclear force militate against Soviet conclusion that any decisions have been taken to stop our response short of nuclear war if resort to it were necessary.

(3) The Soviet leaders probably now believe that they themselves have been challenged by the whole of the military measures announced

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and taken, and that it would be an affront to their prestige to back down under military "pressure." At least an initial result has been a hardening of the Soviet position, and initiation of some Soviet military moves that would not otherwise have been taken.

(4) The Soviet measures to increase their own conventional forces have in general been in response to similar US measures. The announced suspension of the 1960 reduction in force program would probably have been made in any event, largely for its psychological effect. However, other measures such as retention of servicemen due for release, while doubtless desired by the military leaders to increase the effectiveness of their forces, would probably not have been made if the US had not done so. The same judgment is probably true for the future in respect to Soviet matching or overmatching of increased deployment forward in or into Europe.

(5) The readiness of the NATO Allies to follow the US lead in increasing military preparedness has not been impressive to the Soviets. There have been no evident serious fissures, but the US seems to be well ahead of the Alliance as a whole in seeing a need for further military strengthening. The Soviets probably consider NATO reluctance to follow the US lead in military preparations as indicative more of Allied unwillingness to resort to military means, than of Allied desire to use nuclear weapons, in the kind of confrontation which they intend to pose (i.e., pressure for Western dealings with the GDR and some limitations on activities in Berlin.

(6) The Soviets have sought to intimidate Western peoples by demonstrating nuclear and missile strength, and at the same time to influence official Western estimates of Soviet strategic striking power. Their evaluation of the effectiveness of the latter are uncertain, but they probably believe they have achieved much in respect to the former aim. The Soviets may recognise that insofar as their resumption of nuclear testing was intended, among other things, to impress the West, it has probably not succeeded. The dominant reaction in the West has tended to be that the Soviets were led to accept political costs of resumption by military needs, that is, by relative military weakness in the nuclear field.

(7) Since the Soviets intend to present the West with political challenges (e.g., not forcible denial of access to West Berlin, but demands for the political concession of dealing with the GDR to arrange terms of

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access), they probably believe that if a spiral of military moves and countermoves leads to greater popular reluctance to see use of force to deal with such political challenges, the Western governments may in the last analysis be less inclined to do so.

(8) From the standpoint of effect on Soviet evaluations of US determination, the call-up of reservists and increase in draft calls has probably been of some consequence. Soviet officials have on occasion given indications that they are more impressed by signs of willingness of the US government, and people, to undergo sacrifices of military service, than by budgetary increases which in their view are less a sacrifice than a gain by arms industries and perhaps the general economy.

(9) The Soviets are probably not pleased at the need to increase their own military effort in various ways now necessitated by US measures. As noted earlier, they have felt a need to react by building their own forces in ways they would otherwise not have done. Moreover, the uncertainty on long-term Western military levels adds uncertainty to their own economic plans, just as they are embarking on a new twenty-year plan. A need to react to Western military moves by parallel Soviet ones has not generally characterized determination of Soviet force levels in past years, but it does tend to do so in what has become a spiral of military demonstrations.

(10) The Soviet leaders probably believe that Western "militaristic" circles are using the occasion of the Berlin crisis to push for a higher future sustained level of military strength in the US and if possible in NATO. They may, therefore, later press in any negotiated settlement for return to the January 1, 1961 strength levels and military budgetary levels.

R. W. KOMER

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FOR CLAY

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Thank you for your 787 concerning possible incorporation West Berlin into Federal Republic.

This continues under consideration as one of several possible courses of action.

As Embassy Moscow pointed out recently, at proper time this might be useful as a threat to the Soviets but would certainly prove non-negotiable.

There are in addition reports from Paris and London that French and British would not support and from Bonn (646 Sept 16) that Germans would not necessarily welcome enthusiastically.

Our main concern is that such a scheme ending occupation would also end legal basis for our access rights.

In addition we would be changing occupation rights by unilateral action and transferring such rights to others, both of which we have told Soviets were unacceptable.

On whole inclined agree with Bonn that such action at this stage might put us in position which might be difficult to maintain and embarrassing to surrender.

Rusk (OSD)

Drafted by: S/O:EUR:GER:FBCash:eda 10/24/61

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

Clearances: GER - M. J. Hillenbrand

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6:20 p.m.

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 840, OCTOBER 25, 9 PM

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 840, BONN PRIORITY 741; INFORMATION PARIS 591, LONDON 547, MOSCOW 523, POLAD USAREUR 455

PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE.

REFERENCE: BERLIN'S 836 DEPT, 737 BONN.

AT 3:10 P.M. TODAY, CIVILIAN-OCCUPIED US FORCES-LICENSED VEHICLE ATTEMPTING ENTER EAST BERLIN AT FRIEDRICHSTRASSE WAS DENIED ENTRY OWING REFUSAL VOPO DEMAND FOR SHOWING IDENTIFICATION. NO SOV OFFICER WAS PRESENT. IN RESPONSE DEMAND FOR SUMMONING OF SOV OFFICER, VOPO STATED SOV OFFICER EN ROUTE. ABOUT 20 MINUTES LATER VOPO STATED SOV OFFICER WOULD NOT BE SUMMONED. VEHICLE WAS THEN SENT THROUGH CROSSING POINT ESCORTED BY ARMED SOLDIERS IN JEEPS. VOPOS MADE NO ATTEMPT RESIST PASSAGE.

AFTER NEGOTIATING CROSSING POINT, ARMED ESCORT RETURNED TO CHECKPOINT CHARLIE WHILE CIVILIAN VEHICLE DROVE ON INTO EAST BERLIN AND MADE BRIEF TOUR. UPON RETURN TO EAST SIDE OF CROSSING POINT, VEHICLE WAS AGAIN STOPPED BY VOPOS WHO DEMANDED IDENTIFICATION. THIS DEMAND WAS REFUSED. AFTER SHORT ATTEMPT ARGUE WAY THROUGH HAD FAILED, ARMED ESCORT FROM WEST SIDE EXTRICATED VEHICLE WITHOUT OPPOSITION.

FURTHER PROBES OF SIMILAR KIND ARE PLANNED FROM TIME TO TIME AT IRREGULAR INTERVALS. GEN WATSON HAS INSTRUCTIONS FROM GEN NORSTAD TO MAINTAIN BAN ON US CIVILIAN TRAVEL TO EAST BERLIN.

LIGHTNER

ELP/22

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MING TELEGRAM *Department of State* [redacted]

SECRET

31
Action

SS
Info

Control: 15754
Rec'd: October 25, 1961
12:34 p.m.

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 824, OCTOBER 25, 4 PM

EYES ONLY

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NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT 824, BONN NIACT 727

EYES ONLY

BONN FOR DOWLING ONLY

FROM CLAY FOR RUSK ONLY

Downgraded To: SECRET [redacted]
EO 11652: XGDS(1) 2 [redacted]
Authorized By: H. D. [redacted]
August 4, 1975

RE OURTEL 813 DEPT, 716 BONN; DEPTEL 586 BERLIN, 1154 BONN.

(1) WHILE OUR ARMED ESCORT HAS AGAIN SUCCESSFULLY TAKEN A U.S. LICENSED VEHICLE THROUGH THE CROSSING THUS RE-ESTABLISHING OUR RIGHT OF FREE ENTRY, THE NEXT EFFORT WILL AGAIN BE STOPPED AND WE HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE SAME EXERCISE.

IF WE ARE PREPARED TO RAID IN FORCE FOR QUICK PENETRATION RATHER DEEPLY TEARING DOWN THE MAZE WALLS AS WE RETURN I BELIEVE IT WOULD BRING SOVIET CONFRONTATION. ANYTHING LESS AT THIS TIME OFFERS LITTLE PROMISE.

THUS I MUST AGAIN AND WITH FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED RECOMMEND CALLING IN SOVIET AMBASSADOR. IF THIS RESULTS IN PUBLIC REFUSAL TO TALK UNDER DURESS WE CAN CLOSE FRIEDRICHSTRASSE TO OUR CARS, RESUME OUR DEFENSIVE POSTURE UNTIL THREATENED ELSEWHERE, AND WAIT FOR DEVELOPMENTS WHICH I BELIEVE COULD NOT WORSEN AND MIGHT WELL IMPROVE ALLIED POSTURE. OUR ACTION IN REFUSING TO TALK IN PRESENT ATMOSPHERE WOULD IN MY OPINION IMPROVE MORALE HERE EVEN WITH FRIEDRICH STRASSE CLOSED.

DT

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(217)

#1

Oct. 25, 1961

[redacted]

O 250945Z
FM AMB DOWLING, BONN
TO GEN WATSON BERLIN
INFO GEN NORSTAD SHAPE PARIS
GEN PALMER USEUCOM DES LOGES
GEN DOLEMAN HEIDELBERG
SECY STATE RUSK (OR SECY KOHLER) WASHINGTON

ZEN
S E C R E T
BON 238 STAFF EYES ONLY
I FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE MUST USE MILITARY FORCE WITHOUT DELAY, AND WITHIN LIMITS OF WASHINGTON INSTRUCTIONS, TO EXERCISE OUR RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN. THIS IS ONLY WAY WE CAN FACE SOVIETS SQUARELY WITH ISSUE, AND OF COURSE OUR ATTITUDE IN THIS INSTANCE WILL HAVE VITAL INFLUENCE ON COURSE OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.
SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.
SSO NOTE FOR STATE: A SEPARATE REQUEST WILL BE SENT TO FURNISH YOU WITH PREVIOUS MESSAGES.

762.00/10-2561

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(5) F7[illegible]-0581

5 (481)

(218) Oct. 25, 1961

#1

0 2511372

FM AMBASSADOR DOWLING BONN
TO SECY RUSK (OR SECY KOHLER) STATE
GEN WATSON BERLIN
GEN DOLEMAN HEIDELBERG
GEN PALMER USEUCOM DES LOGES
GEN NORSTAD SHAPE PARIS

ZEN
SECRET
BON 240 EYES ONLY
I CAN ONLY REGARD TODAY'S DEVELOPMENTS THUS FAR AS FURTHER PROOF THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO EXERCISE ONLY SUCH RIGHTS IN BERLIN AS WE ARE PREPARED TO STAND UP FOR. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO BE VERY FIRM INDEED.

NLJ 03/10-2561

(1) Cooke

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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PARIS-2273

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Control: 17027
Rec'd: October 27, 1961 12:44 AM

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2273, OCTOBER 25, 8 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2273; INFORMATION LONDON, BONN, BERLIN, MOSCOW UNNUMBERED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN PRES KENNEDY AND DE GAULLE, AND DIFFICULTIES FOLLOWING UPON FRENCH REFUSAL LONDON MEETING BERLIN EXPERTS LEAVES US AT MOST DIFFICULT POINT IN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. WE SEE NO EASY OR IMMEDIATE EXIT. AS WE VIEW SITUATION FOLLOWING ARE KEY ELEMENTS:

1) FRANCE WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE ACTIVE PART IN AMBASSADORS MEETINGS WASHINGTON BUT WILL NOT FOR PRESENT APPARENTLY APPROVE SPECIAL MEETINGS AT MORE SENIOR EXPERT LEVEL OR EVEN FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL IN CONTEXT OF PREPARATIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON BERLIN SO LONG AS KHRUSHCHEV PRESENT TACTICS CONTINUE.

2) FRANCE WILL NOT OBJECT TO CONTINUATION US OR UK SOUNDINGS SOVIET ATTITUDE IN FORM THOMPSON-ROBERTS INTERVIEWS MOSCOW, BUT WILL NOT AGREE TO HAVE THESE IN CONTEXT FOUR-POWER INSTRUCTIONS OR ALLOW HERSELF BE OTHERWISE ASSOCIATED WITH THEM.

3) DE GAULLE NOT CONVINCED NEGOTIATIONS NECESSARY BECAUSE HE BELIEVES KHRUSHCHEV TOO WISE TO JEOPARDIZE SOVIET REGIME BY WAR, OR IF THIS WISDOM LACKING IT IS BECAUSE "K" HAS MADE UP MIND TO TEST WEST STRENGTH IN ARMED CONFLICT.

4) DE GAULLE NOT PREPARED SANCTION ANY NEGOTIATED SOLUTION BERLIN/GERMAN PROBLEM IN PRESENT CONTEXT BECAUSE HE CONSIDERS

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THIS WOULD INVOLVE CONCESSIONS ON PART WEST BOTH UNNECESSARY AND UNMATCHED BY COMPARABLE SOVIET CONCESSIONS.

OBVIOUSLY DE GAULLE IS NOT GOING TO BE EASILY MOVED BY WESTERN ARGUMENTS, EVEN IF ATTEMPTS AT PERSUASION BY US AND UK ARE SUPPLEMENTED BY SERIOUS GERMAN EFFORTS, OF WHICH THERE IS AS YET NO EVIDENCE. DE GAULLE CONFIDENT THAT HIS VISION GOES FARTHER FORWARD, AS HIS EXPERIENCE GOES DEEPER INTO PAST, THAN THAT OF THE LEADERS OF ALLIED POWERS, AND HE HAS NEVER FEARED STANDING ALONE BUT DE GAULLE DOES MOVE--THOUGH IN HIS OWN MYSTERIOUS WAYS--AND WE THINK IN PREVENT STOCK-TAKING WE SHOULD NOT DESPAIR OF RESTORING UNITY IN FACE BERLIN CRISIS.

WITHIN FRANCE AND WITHIN GOVERNMENT THERE ARE PRESSURES IN FAVOR OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY IN FAVOR OF KEEPING CLOSE TO ATLANTIC ALLIES. FULL IMPACT OF DE GAULLE POSITION ON ALLIED CONSULTATIONS HAS NOT YET SUNK IN ON FRENCH PUBLIC, BUT EVEN CONSERVATIVE CIRCLES (FIGARO FOR EXAMPLE) ARE CRITICAL DE GAULLE "ABSTENTION." ALTHOUGH SOVIET CONDITIONAL LIFTING OF DEADLINE HAS WORKED IN FAVOR DE GAULLE IDEA THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS ONLY BLUFFING. PROBABLE RESUMPTION OF TENSION AND APPROACH TO SITUATION WHERE DANGER OF WAR INCREASES WILL ADD TO PRESSURES IN FRANCE FOR WESTERN SOLIDARITY AND FOR EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS. HOW RESPONSIVE DE GAULLE WILL BE TO THESE PRESSURES IF QUESTIONABLE BUT HE IS CERTAINLY NOT ENTIRELY OBLIVIOUS TO PUBLIC FEELINGS.

LYON

ELP/22

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35-H

SECRET

Control: 17901

1961 OCT 27 PM

OCTOBER 28, 1961
11:27 AM

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FROM: PARIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2273, OCTOBER 25, 8 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO SECTIONS)

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2273, INFORMATION LONDON, BONN, BERLIN, MOSCOW UNNUMBERED.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

WE HAD EARLIER EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT PROSPECT OF FRANCE CUTTING HERSELF OUT OF BIG-POWER NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT RPT NOT MATERIALIZE BECAUSE DE GAULLE TOO DEVOTED TO NOTION OF ESTABLISHING FRANCE AS EQUAL MEMBER OF WESTERN THREE. WE STILL THINKS THIS HOLDS FOR LONG RUN THOUGH DE GAULLE HAS RECENTLY, HOWEVER, APPEARED TO ACCEPT POSSIBILITY THAT US RPT US AND UK RPT UK WOULD GO ON WITHOUT HIM, AND TO FIX EYES ON HIS WESTERN EUROPEAN POSITION (AS HE SEES IT) WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE PARIS-BONN LIES.

FOLLOWING STEPS APPEAR TO BE INDICATED:

1) CONTINUE, WITHOUT GREAT HOPE OF SUCCESS, TO PRESENT TO DE GAULLE AND GOF A VIEW OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS AND ON US(UK) POLICIES MORE IN KEEPING WITH REALITY THAN THOSE HE HOLDS. IF POSSIBLE, ENLIST WEST-GERMAN SUPPORT IN THIS. MESSAGES LIKE RECENT ONE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY (DEPCIRTEL 723) WILL BE HELPFUL IN THESE EFFORTS.

2) CONTINUE US-UK SOUNDINGS IN MOSCOW ON BASIS THESE COUNTRIES SPEAKING FOR THEMSELVES ALONE. WE DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE FRENCH ATTITUDE NEED PREVENT THIS, (PARTICULARLY AS DE GAULLE HAS STATED HE SEES NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO OUR SO DOING) ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY IT MAKES IT

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-2- 2273, OCTOBER 25, 8 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO SECTIONS) FROM PARIS

MORE DIFFICULT. COULD WE NOT RPT NOT PROCEED QUIETLY WITH SOUNDINGS AND REFRAIN FROM ANY COMMENT ON FRENCH NON-ASSOCIATION?

3) DEPENDING ON WHAT EMERGES FROM THE MOSCOW SOUNDINGS, WE MIGHT LATER AGAIN PROPOSE TRIPARTITE MEETING FONMINS IN NOV OR EARLY DEC. (WITH PARTIAL GERMAN PARTICIPATION), POSSIBLY IN PARIS AND GIVE THE AGENDA SUFFICIENTLY GLOBAL CHARACTER AS TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR DE GAULLE TO RESIST AND EASIER TO ACCEPT (BECAUSE NOT OPENLY A MANDATE FOR EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS).

4) CONTINUE TO ASSUME THAT NEGS ON AN EAST-WEST BASIS WILL BE ARRANGED AND THAT FRANCE WILL FINALLY DECIDE TO PARTICIPATE. WE RECALL THAT DE GAULLE FINALLY AGREED TO SUMMIT OF 60 IN SLEIGHT-OF-HAND THAT INTERPRETED "GOOD PREPARATION" AS MEANING PRIOR BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH SOVIET LEADER, SOMETHING THAT "GOOD PREPARATION" HAD NEVER MEANT UNTIL DE GAULLE HIT UPON IDEA. IF THOMPSON DISCUSSIONS MOSCOW SHOULD INDICATE POSSIBILITY FINDING ARRANGEMENT THAT WILL HANDLE BERLIN WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO WESTERN POSITIONS AND PARTICULARLY TO THOSE OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC DE GAULLE WOULD BE IN DIFFICULT POSITION TO CONTINUE BLOCKING TACTICS. HE AND FRANCE REMAIN AFTER ALL CONSIDERABLE ASSET AND HIS POSITION WHILE VEXING IN PRESENT CONTEXT IS CERTAINLY ONE OF FUNDAMENTAL SOLIDARITY WITH US. WE SHOULD THEREFORE PROCEED ON HYPOTHESIS HE WILL SOONER OR LATER REJOIN US RPT US ON TACTICS AS WELL AS STRATEGY AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE SHOW MAXIMUM PATIENCE AND COMPREHENSION SO THAT THIS MAY HAPPEN SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

LYON

MEM

SECRET

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SPECIAL MEANS FILE

DDE_LIB NORSTAD PA
POLICY FILE

TOP SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE
(By Special Means)

LN/dem 25 Oct 61
0940 hrs

TO: CJCS

Please deliver immediately.

PERSONAL FOR GEN LEMNITZER FROM GEN NORSTAD.

Last night U.S. licensed vehicles with passengers in civilian clothes were stopped by the GDR at the Friedrichstrasse Gate. This morning at 0530Z a privately-owned U.S. licensed vehicle with a passenger in civilian clothes was sent in as a probe, which entered and exited without incident. Another similar probe at 0625Z was stopped. U.S. officer, Berlin, demanded a Soviet officer within an hour. Watson has just reported that the Soviet officer appeared and stated that the GDR had taken the decision not to recognise U.S. license plates and to stop privately-owned vehicles whose passengers did not show identification as demanded. The Soviet officer further indicated that on the basis of the GDR decision, U.S. vehicles in this category could not enter. At this time they are still talking at the border, but it appears that we may be faced with a showdown.

Watson has been instructed to demand that the Soviet officer raise this question with his own highest local authorities. If this is done,

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no action will be taken pending reaction from these high Russian authorities. If, however, the Soviet officer indicates that he is speaking with the authority of his higher authorities, or refuses to take the matter further, the vehicle that has been stopped will be escorted by a limited number of U.S. military personnel, but with an effort not to exceed that which took Lightner in on Sunday night. Watson has been authorized to use force to extricate vehicle and escort should this be necessary. Every effort will be made to avoid combat in any form unless it is absolutely essential to protect U.S. personnel.

Like other incidents of this kind over the last month or so, this may well blow over. On the other hand, a foundation has certainly been established for a showdown and I believe that the U.S. Government should be made aware of this at once.

550 - Info D/CINCEUR -

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Since dictating the above, further contact with Watson indicates that discussions are still taking place with the Russian Officer, who is awaiting his Political Advisor. I have again reiterated the necessity of the highest local Russian authority having knowledge of this incident.

SSO - Info for Gen Palmer

B-498

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INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State** [redacted] ACTION CO

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(221) SECRET (484)

Control: 16376
Rec'd: October 26, 1961 9:03 a.m.

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FROM: BERLIN

Downgraded To: SECRET
EO 11652: XGDS (3) 4
Authorized by [illegible]
August 4, 1975

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 835, OCTOBER 26, 1 PM

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NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT 835, BONN NIACT 736.

BONN EYES ONLY FOR DOWLING

EYES ONLY FROM CLAY FOR RUSK ONLY

RE DEPTEL 596 BERLIN, 1173 BONN, AND OURTEL 834 DEPT, 735 BONN.

(1) NOW THAT WE HAVE ESTABLISHED FIRM SOVIET INTENT TO BACK EAST GERMANS WE ARE DEMANDING THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET OFFICER TO CHECK IDENTIFICATION AT A PROBE WHICH WE WILL MAKE THIS AFTERNOON TO BE FOLLOWED, IF IT FAILS, WITH USE OF MILITARY ESCORT. AGAIN, WHILE WE MUST CONTINUE SUCH PROBES FROM TIME TO TIME THEY DO NOT PROMISE ANY REAL RESULTS.

THUS, I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR REACTION TO MY ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL IN OURTEL 824 DEPT, (727 BONN), WHICH WAS FOR A RAID IN FORCE FOR A QUICK BUT RATHER DEEP PENETRATION, TEARING DOWN PARTS OF THE WALL AS WE RETURN.

REQUEST REPLY SOONEST.

LIGHTNER

BP

Berlin 835

76.2.02221/10-2661

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(455) NLK, NOF 80

SECRET 26 Oct

222

EYES ONLY

R-2174

T 26[illegible]

FM GEN NORSTAD SHAPE PARIS

TO GEN LEMNITZER

S E C R E T

PRS 2725 EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT OF MESSAGE FROM WATSON GIVES THE SITUATION AS OF LATE THIS AFTERNOON.

PLN 749 EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING IS SITUATION AS OF 1600Z 26OCT.

2. NY MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET POB AT 1210Z. POV WAS TOLD THAT WE WOULD SEND CAR THROUGH AT 1410Z.

3. AT 1410Z POV ATTEMPTED TO ENTER EAST BERLIN, BUT WAS REFUSED ENTRY. NO SOVIET OFFICER WAS PRESENT. VOPO AT CROSSING POINT STATED THAT A SOVIET OFFICER WAS ON THE WAY TO THE CROSSING POINT. SEVERAL MINUTES LATER VOPO STATED THAT HE WAS CHECKING WITH HIS SUPERIORS TO DETERMINE IF THEY WANTED TO CALL A SOVIET OFFICER.

4. U.S. HELICOPTER REPORTED THAT FIVE OR SIX RUSSIAN SEDANS WERE APPROXIMATELY THREE HUNDRED YARDS FROM THE CHECKPOINT TRAVELING IN CIRCLES. 36 VOPOS WERE OBSERVED GETTING OUT OF A TRUCK ONE AND A HALF BLOCKS FROM THE CHECKPOINT.

5. AT 1437Z THE VOPO STATED THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND TO SUMMON

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A SOVIET OFFICER, AND THE JEEP WAS TURNED
BERLIN UNDER ARMED ESCORT. (FROM TRAVELER'S
HUNDRED YARDS PAST THE WALL AND TURNED
TO WEST BERLIN, WHILE POPO MOVED ON
THERE FOR APPROX EIGHT MINUTES WITHOUT
TO RETURN, ALONE, IT WAS STOPPED BY POPO
DEMANDED IDENTIFICATION, FOUR MAN RETINUE
ARMED ESCORT THEN WENT BACK IN AND BROUGHT
INCIDENT.

6. FIVE MINUTES AFTER PROBE RETURNED
ARMORED CAR WAS OBSERVED MOVING UP FRIEDRICH
ON A SIDE STREET TWO BLOCKS AWAY AND HALTED

7. THE SITUATION ON OUR SIDE IS NOT
CONDITIONS WHICH PERTAINED AT THE CLOSE

8. A INFORMATION OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITY
OF 13SEP FOLLOWS:

A. A TOTAL OF 3 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
30 POPOS IN BATTLE GEAR ON E. BERLIN SIDE OF FRIEDRICH

B. APCS ARE DEPLOYED IN REAR OF POPO TRUCK/CREW AND CHECK
POINT.

C. SEARCHLIGHTS ARE IN REAR OF POPO TRUCKS AT
DIRECTED TOWARD U.S. CHECKPOINT. WE ARE KEEPING
OBSERVATION. REPORTS WILL BE RENDERED IMMEDIATELY

2. I STRONGLY URGE THAT THOMPSON'S EFFORTS IN POTSDAM
BE DIRECTED TOWARD GETTING A SOVIET OFFICER AT THE FRIEDRICH
CHECKPOINT. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL IS

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THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS WILL BE ALLEVIATED

THOMPSON CAN ARGUE THAT WE ARE REACTING

THAT THE TROUBLE WILL BE THAT OF THE

LESSER EXTENT THAT OF THE S.P.R. FURTHER

THE RESPONSIBILITY SINCE EVEN THEY HAVE

NOW SIGNED A TREATY WITH THE GDR.

WE MUST HOLD THE SOVIETS COMPLETELY

SITUATION. THEY SHOULD KNOW THAT

OR EVEN PRELIMINARIES TO NEGOTIATIONS

3. IN THE MEANTIME WE

4. MAINTAIN THE RESTRICTIONS

ENTERING EAST BERLIN

B. CONDUCT PROBES TWICE A DAY

USING MILITARY ESCORT, AS NEEDED.

C. MAINTAIN OUR PLANS TO "PUSH" OUR

STRASSE GATE IS ACTUALLY PHYSICALLY BLOCKED

B. PREPARE ON A CONTINGENCY

TO CALL AT SEVERAL DIFFERENT

A. [illegible]

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DDE LIB NORSTAD PAPERS
POLICY FILE

SPECIAL MEANS FILE

SECRET

PRIORITY: EMERGENCY
FM: WATSON, BERLIN
TO: NORSTAD, SHAPE PARIS
PALMER, USEUCOM DESLOGES
CLARKE, HEIDELBERG
DOWLING, BONN
REP NR: BLN 756

SECRET: 97455
DTG: 271452 Oct
TOR: 271750Z Oct
TYPED: KLS

Berlin - Live Oak 1961
BERLIN (2)
(486)
27 Oct 61

DTF 271752Z

[FRIDAY, 21 Oct.]

AT 1655Z, GENERAL CLAY DISCUSSED SUTUATION HERE WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE STATED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT:

WE WILL NOT RPT NOT ALLOW ANY MORE AMERICANS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES TO ENTER EAST BERLIN UNTIL WE HAVE REPORTED BACK TO HIM.

WE WILL NOT RPT NOT PROBE BEFORE MONDAY, AND WILL REPORT TO HIM HOW WE WILL PROBE BEFORE SO DOING.

FM GEN NORSTAD, PARIS
TO GEN WATSON BERLIN
GEN PALMER EUCOM
GEN CLARKE HEIDELBERG

DTG 271425Z

27 Oct 61

E F T O

DLO 1697

BERLIN 756 RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD.

FND to 856 10/27

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MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY — STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

487

SECRET

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)	ASSIGNED SYMBOL	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION PRIORITY	ROUTINE / X / CRYPTO	DA	
INFO PRIORITY			

FROM: CJCS

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Exclusive JCS Distribution plus OSD, SDLO and White House

TO: USCINCEUR

INFO: JACK, AJCC FT RITCHIE MD

224

SECRET JCS 2026 From CJCS.

EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL NORSTAD SIGNED LEMNITZER

ZFF-1

1. At top level meeting at White House this afternoon to discuss Freidrichstrasse situation and results of Gromyko-Thompson discussions in Moscow today it was decided, pending further demarche by Ambassador Thompson in Moscow; that:

a. Probes to date have accomplished their purpose.

b. Further probes by U. S. personnel wearing civilian clothes and riding in official U. S. vehicles or privately owned vehicles bearing plates of U. S. Armed Forces and using armed guards or military escort will be deferred.

c. U. S. civilian officials will for the

OSR	
Sec. Staff	X
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Admin. Sec.	
Compt.	
Management	
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Gen. Cns.	
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Atomic E.	
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[illegible]	

DATE 2105 ACTION X INFO X YEAR 1961

WRITER: SYMBOL CJCS; TYPED NAME AND TITLE CAPTAIN [illegible], USN; PHONE 53640; COPY NO. 1; NO. OF PAGES 2; SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET

RELEASER: POSITION [signature]; TYPED NAME AND TITLE L. L. LEMNITZER JCSDC, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCS 2026 PAGE NR 1

Ey has already gone to Mr. McN.

SBB.

5 p.m.

DD FORM 358 REPLACES DD FORMS 173-4, 173-5, 173-6, WHICH MAY BE USED

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03.

IFNP to the 622

12-SOL

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time being refrain from going into East Berlin except that one civilian official will attempt occasionally to enter East Berlin in a privately owned vehicle without armed escort. (change to mil)

d. All U. S. military personnel entering East Berlin will wear uniform.

2. State will inform Ambassador Dowling and General Clay of foregoing. SCP-3.

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JCS 2026

290130Z Oct 61

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488

225

27 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Friedrichstrasse

At the Berlin Task Force meeting this morning, Mr. Bitse reported that JCS believe that now -- under pressure and before getting any reaction to Ambassador Thompson's demarche in Moscow -- would be the worst possible time to abandon our armed MP escorts on a daily or erratic basis into East Berlin. He added, however, that Secretary McNamara did not appear to agree completely with this assessment.

Mr. Kohler quite clearly feels that we now should call off these escorts. He adduces the moving of Soviet tanks to within a few blocks of Friedrichstrasse in support of his contention that we have succeeded in "flushing out" the Soviets in the matter of their continuing responsibility within the Eastern Sector: "It is enough for our purposes that they move their tanks up." He added that even if Friedrichstrasse were to be physically closed, no knock-down by tanks could be considered because of the strongly negative UK position apparently expressed at yesterday's Ambassadorial meeting. Anyhow, he continued: "This is not an issue on which we wish to become engaged."

It was agreed that State-Defense would be getting together on this subject this afternoon and Mr. Kohler planned tentatively to see Secretary Rusk concerning the possibility of raising this subject at the meeting today, already scheduled with the President at 3 P.M.

From Bonn, and in contrast to Mr. Kohler's thinking, Dowling recommends continuing the "probe escorts" despite the admitted risks; and Lightner reports strongly favorable reactions among West Berlin political and journalistic figures to firmness of US stand, and to US wisdom in seeing that issue is not superficial one of identification cards but rather basic confrontation of wills.

Any decision taken should consider that a backing-away by the US would probably reinforce the worst fears of those who see August 13 as the turning point in the viability of West Berlin, and perhaps, in US-West German relations.

Lawrence J. Legere
Colonel, USA

SECRET

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Control: 18072
Rec'd: October 28, 1961 12:54 p.m.

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FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1388, OCTOBER 28, 1 PM

(489) (226)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1388, INFORMATION BONN PRIORITY 204, BERLIN PRIORITY 155, PARIS 210, LONDON 246.

APPEARS TO ME WE MUST IMMEDIATELY DECIDE WHETHER TO HANDLE BERLIN SITUATION IN HIGH OR LOW KEY. IN MAKING THIS DECISION BELIEVE WE SHOULD THINK OUR POLICY ALL THE WAY THROUGH. I WAS INCLINED AGREE WITH GEN CLAY'S OPINION OF UNWISDOM MY MAKING OFFICIAL PROTEST (BERLIN TEL 519) BUT DID NOT COMMENT AS DEPT HAD ALREADY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED DO SO. WHILE DEPT MAY HAVE HAD VALID REASONS FOR THIS, APPEARS TO ME IN CASE OF THIS KIND BETTER TO WITHSTAND PRESSURE OF PRESS IN ORDER KEEP OUR FLEXIBILITY AND NOT SO CLEARLY FORWARN OTHER SIDE. LIKELY SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IF RECOMMENDATION BERLIN 534 AS AMENDED BY BONN 157 IS FOLLOWED IS THAT SOVIETS WILL PREVENT ALL WESTERN ENTRY INTO EAST BERLIN AND WILL WITHDRAW FROM BASIC. ALSO PROBABLE THAT THEY WILL DEMAND THAT CIVILIANS TRAVELING IN MILITARY VEHICLES ON AUTOBAHN SHOW IDENTIFICATION TO EAST GERMAN AUTHORITIES.

APART FROM BRITISH POINT OF UNWISDOM FURNISHING PRECEDENT FOR SOVIET ARMED ENTRY INTO WESTERN SECTORS I CONSIDER IT MORE THAN LIKELY THAT ANY FURTHER ARMED INCURSION ON OUR PART WILL BE MET WITH FORCE. SHOULD EAST GERMANS SEIZE PERSONNEL OF PROBE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY TELL US TO ADDRESS OURSELVES TO GDR. I DO NOT KNOW ON WHAT BASIS BERLIN CONSIDERS SOVIETS COULD BE INTIMIDATED IN AREA IN WHICH THEY HOLD ADVANTAGE AND WHERE OUR CASE HAS LITTLE APPEAL TO PUBLIC

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CLASSIFIED FILE 762.00/10-2861

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OR OTHER GOVTS AS EVIDENCED BY ATTITUDE REPS NAC.

RE BONN TEL 157 WISH POINT OUT THAT IN PARA 4 MYTEL 1386 I DID NOT SUGGEST THIS PROPOSAL COULD BE PAINTED AS SUCCESS BUT AS MEANS REDUCE DAMAGE SHOULD WE DECIDE TO YIELD. I AM PERSONALLY MORE INCLINED TO RECONSIDER PARA 3 ACCOMPANIED BY APPLYING IDENTICAL PROCEDURE TO SOVIETS AS EAST GERMANS APPLY TO US.

KEY POINT WOULD APPEAR TO BE WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD DECIDE TAKE UP CHALLENGE POSED IN SOVIET PROTEST AND GROMYKO'S REMARKS TO ME IN WHICH SOVIETS TAKE POSITION THAT SECTOR BORDER IS STATE FRONTIER AND GDR SOVEREIGN IN EAST BERLIN. ONLY ADEQUATE ANSWER TO THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE TO THREATEN OR ANNOUNCE THAT WE CONSIDER OURSELVES FREE TO ALLOW INCORPORATION WEST BERLIN INTO WEST GERMANY SUBJECT TO MAINTENANCE NECESSARY OCCUPATION AUTHORITY IN WEST BERLIN. THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR SOVIETS TO COUNTER ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD DOUBTLESS COMPLETELY CLOSE SECTOR BORDER AND POSSIBLY TAKE MEASURES ON AUTOBAHN.

QUESTION OF WEST BERLIN TIES WITH WEST GERMANY IS IN MY OPINION LIKELY TO BE MOST DIFFICULT POINT IN REACHING AGREED POSITION WITH WEST GERMANS AND IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION. ACTION ON OUR PART ALONG LINE SUGGESTED MIGHT ADD TO OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH WEST GERMANS BUT WOULD PLACE US IN BETTER BARGAINING POSITION WITH SOVIETS WHO ALREADY CONSIDER STATUS OF EAST BERLIN DECIDED. IT WOULD GIVE US BETTER BASIS FOR PRESSING ALL-BERLIN SOLUTION. AN INTERMEDIATE STEP WOULD BE TO BRING IN WEST GERMAN POLICE TO MAN CHECK POINTS. THIS WOULD MAKE SOVIETS WILD AND LIKELY REACTION WOULD BE COMPLETE CLOSURE OF SECTOR BORDER. IF WE TAKE UP THIS POINT AT ALL I AM INCLINED TO RECOMMEND THAT IF FRENCH AGREEMENT CAN BE SECURED WE SIMPLY ANNOUNCE THAT IF SOVIETS PERSIST IN TREATING SECTOR BORDER AS STATE FRONTIER AND GDR SOVEREIGN IN EAST BERLIN, WE WILL CONSIDER OURSELVES FREE TO REMOVE RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND WEST BERLIN,

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BUT THAT WE NOT TAKE ANY SPECIFIC ACTION TO IMPLEMENT THIS ANNOUNCEMENT. AS MINIMUM IN ANY REPLY TO SOVIET PROTEST BELIEVE WE SHOULD REASSERT OUR POSITION THAT WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE GDR SOVEREIGNTY EITHER IN EAST GERMANY OR EAST BERLIN.

THOMPSON

RJT

: INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action
S/S

Control: 18459
Rec'd: October 29, 1961
7:55 p.m.

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1398, OCTOBER 29, 6 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1398 INFORMATION BONN PRIORITY 209 BERLIN PRIORITY 158 LONDON PRIORITY 250 PARIS PRIORITY 275

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS

PARIS FOR FINLETTER AND STOESSEL

RE DEPTEL 1165

I ASKED SEE GROMYKO BUT WAS RECEIVED BY KUZNETSOV 3PM. AFTER HEARING MY REMARKS AND READING AIDE MEMOIRE HE SAID HE COULD ONLY EMPHASIZE WHAT GROMYKO HAD ALREADY SAID TO ME. HE BELIEVED IDEA SET FORTH BY GROMYKO PROVIDED REPLY TO MATTERS DISCUSSED IN AIDE MEMOIRE BUT HE WOULD OF COURSE TRANSMIT IT TO MINISTER AND INFORM HIM OF MY REMARKS. HE OBSERVED THAT IT APPEARED US GOVT HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT SUCH PROVOCATIVE ACTS AS FORCIBLE ENTRY INTO EAST BERLIN BE ENDED AND HE CONSIDERED THIS REASONABLE STEP. HE SAID SOV GOVT AGREED THAT NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD INCREASE TENSION OR MAKE NEGOTIATIONS DIFFICULT IF WE WERE SERIOUSLY SOLICITOUS OF ACHIEVING UNDERSTANDING. SOVIET SIDE HAD ALWAYS TAKEN STEPS TO PREVENT SUCH ACTIONS ON ITS PART. IT HAD NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTIONS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE AND THESE COULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED EITHER FROM LEGAL OR FACTUAL POINT OF VIEW. HE SAID THIS GAME WITH TIN SOLDIERS COULD ONLY EXACERBATE SITUATION. IT HAD BEEN ONLY PATIENCE AND TOLERANCE OF GDR POLICE WHICH HAD PREVENTED SERIOUS CONFLICT.

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SECRET

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F.I.d

to H/S, III Secd

I POINTED OUT THIS SITUATION HAD ARISEN BY ACTION TAKEN BY GDR POLICE TO CHANGE PRACTICE WHICH HAD BEEN FOLLOWED FOR 16 YEARS AND WHICH HAD SURPRISED US. I THOUGHT QUESTION OF IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT IN ITSELF OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE AND COULD BE RESOLVED AND DANGEROUS SITUATION THAT HAD BEEN CREATED COULD BE ENDED.

KUZNETSOV REPEATED HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO GROMYKO'S REMARKS BUT WENT ON TO SAY THAT MANY CHANGES HAD BEEN MADE IN AGREEMENTS OVER PAST 16 YEARS. WESTERN POWERS HAD MADE CHANGES ON MANY POINTS AND IT WAS RATHER FOR SOVIET SIDE TO COMPLAIN. WITH REFERENCE TO NORMALIZATION OF SITUATION, SOVIET SIDE HAD OVER AND OVER AGAIN EXPRESSED ITS DESIRE TO SETTLE THIS PROBLEM. IT WAS UP TO WESTERN POWERS TO SHOW MORE DESIRE TO DO SO AND TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS ON SOVIET PROPOSALS.

I POINTED OUT THERE WERE OTHER RECENT ACTIONS ON SOVIET SIDE INCLUDING THAT OF CONSTRUCTION OF FAMOUS OR RATHER INFAMOUS WALL AND POINTED OUT THAT ACTION NOW COMPLAINED OF HAD COME ON TOP OF THIS ACTION AND THAT OF RESTRICTING US TO ONE ENTRY POINT INTO EAST BERLIN.

KUZNETSOV COUNTED THAT MAIN VIOLATION WAS REFUSAL OF WESTERN POWERS TO REMOVE FASCISM IN WEST GERMANY WHERE GERMAN MILITARISTS WERE PREPARING AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS. WESTERN POWERS DID NOT RECOGNIZE GDR AND APPARENTLY DID NOT LIKE SYSTEM THERE. GDR MUST THINK OF ITS SECURITY. THIS WAS NATURAL AND HE COULD UNDERSTAND HOW AMERICANS WOULD HAVE REACTED IF MILITARY UNIT HAD GONE INTO WESTERN SECTOR. HE DID NOT THINK THEY WOULD SIMPLY STAND AND WATCH. THIS WAS ANOTHER INDICATION THAT WESTERN POWERS WANTED TO USE WEST BERLIN TO CONTINUE SUBVERSIVE WORK AGAINST GDR AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. AS KHRUSHCHEV HAD SAID, TIME WAS RIPE TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM AND FIND SOLUTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ERADICATE TRACES OF SECOND WORLD WAR. SENDING OF MILITARY ARMED UNIT TO TERRITORY OF GDR WAS ATTEMPT INCREASE TENSION AND PROVOKE WIDE CONFLICT. GDR POLICE HAD STRICT INSTRUCTIONS TO BE

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TOLERANT AND NOT WIDEN CONFLICT. DECISION ON OUR PART TO STOP THIS DANGEROUS EXPERIMENT WAS WISE STEP.

I SAID IT WAS TRUE WE DID NOT RECOGNIZE GDR BUT WE HAD BEEN IN COURSE OF PREPARING FOR POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS ON WIDER PROBLEMS INVOLVED. COMING ON TOP OF CONSTRUCTION OF WALL AND LIMITING US TO ONE CROSSING POINT, THIS FURTHER ACTION TO CHANGE EXISTING PRACTICE APPEARED TO BE DELIBERATE ATTEMPT ERODE OUR POSITION WHILE WE WERE PREPARING FOR POSSIBLE TALKS. I POINTED OUT WHILE WE HAD SUSPENDED ACTION IN ORDER AVOID INCREASING TENSION, PROBLEM STILL REMAINED. I THOUGHT IT COULD BE SOLVED IF THERE WAS DESIRE ON PART OF SOVIET UNION TO DO SO. IF NOT WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT ACTION WE SHOULD TAKE AND AS MR. RUSK HAD POINTED OUT THIS SITUATION DID NOT PROVIDE PROPER ATMOSPHERE FOR TALKS ON BROADER QUESTIONS. IT SEEMED TO ME SENSIBLE THING TO DO WAS TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM OF IDENTIFICATION WHICH WAS IN ITSELF

DML THOMPSON

Note: Advance copy S-O per S/S:DO 11/29/CWO-JRL

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SECRET

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Action
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Control: 18460
Rec'd: October 29, 1961
7:58 p.m.

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1398, OCTOBER 29, 6 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1398 INFORMATION BONN PRIORITY 209 BERLIN PRIORITY 158 LONDON PRIORITY 250 PARIS PRIORITY 275

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS

PARIS FOR FINLETTER AND STOESSEL

RE DEPTEL 1165

NOT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE.

KUZNETSOV THEN REFERRED TO REMARKS BY SECRETARY STRESSING US STRENGTH AND SAYING US WOULD TALK WITH SOVIET UNION FROM POSITION OF STRENGTH. SUCH STATEMENTS WERE NOT NEW AND AS KHRUSHCHEV HAD POINTED OUT THIS WAS NOT SUITABLE WAY TO APPROACH SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEMS. WITH REGARD TO GERMAN QUESTION IT WAS ALREADY NEARLY THREE YEARS SINCE SOVIET UNION HAD RAISED THIS PROBLEM IN AN EFFORT NOT ONLY TRY PERSUADE WESTERN POWERS TO DEAL WITH IT BUT HAD SUBMITTED SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. A SOLUTION WOULD BE IN INTERESTS OF GREAT POWERS AND ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. REFERRING TO MY REMARK THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO OUR POSITION HE SAID THIS WAS NOT USEFUL APPROACH TO PROBLEM. IT WAS NATURAL THAT GDR MUST CONSIDER ITS SECURITY, PARTICULARLY AT TIME WHEN WESTERN PRESS WAS WHIPPING UP SITUATION. THEY HAD TO BE SURE THAT PERSONS WERE NOT CARRYING WITH THEM MATERIALS FOR SABOTAGE. EVEN PERSONS IN UNIFORM MIGHT NOT IN FACT BE MILITARY PERSONNEL. HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT US MILITARY EXAMINED DOCUMENTS EVEN OF THEIR OWN /PERSONNEL

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PERSONNEL. GDR FULLY ENTITLED TAKE SUCH STEPS AS IT CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS.

I SAID THAT IF SOVIET UNION CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO CHANGE EXISTING PROCEDURE THEY SHOULD HAVE APPROACHED US AND DISCUSSED IT AND PERHAPS WE COULD HAVE FOUND SOLUTION.

HE ASKED IF I MEANT THAT US THOUGHT IT SHOULD PRESCRIBE TO GDR HOW IT SHOULD CARRY OUT ITS SECURITY MEASURES.

I REPLIED WE HAD CERTAIN RIGHTS IN BERLIN AND CERTAIN UNDERSTANDINGS WITH SOVIET UNION AND THERE WERE PRACTICES WHICH HAD BEEN WELL ESTABLISHED. IF THESE WERE TO BE CHANGED THIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH US.

KUZNETSOV SAID THIS WAS MATTER OF SECURITY OF COUNTRY. WHEN I ASKED HIM IF THIS MEANT HIS POSITION WAS THAT WE HAD NO MORE RIGHTS IN EAST BERLIN HE SMILED AND SAID "DON'T TRY TO PUT ME ON THE SPOT." HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WOULD INFORM HIS MINISTER BUT HAD REALLY NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAT GROMYKO HAD ALREADY TOLD ME.

COMMENT: ALTHOUGH I REPEATEDLY INDICATED A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM COULD BE FOUND HE SHOWED NO INTEREST WHATEVER IN DRAWING ME OUT AND I DID NOT THEREFORE PUT FORWARD SUGGESTIONS IN DEPTEL 1146. THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION WHICH LASTED ONE HOUR KUZNETSOV WAS CORDIAL BUT UNYIELDING.

DML THOMPSON

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 883, OCTOBER 30, 2 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 883, BONN 783

BONN FOR AMBASSADOR

FROM CLAY

BRANDT SPENT AN HOUR AND HALF WITH ME IN MY HOME SUNDAY MORNING. WHEN I EXPLAINED OUR POSITION HE REPORTED THAT HE WAS FULLY SATISIFED WITH IT BUT INTIMATED HE HAD NOT BEEN FULLY INFORMED. I POINTED OUT THAT AS EVENTS STARTED HE WAS IN ROME. HE RETURNED ON WEDNESDAY NIGHT AND ASKED ON FRIDAY FOR A SUNDAY MEETING AND WAS TOLD IMMEDIATELY THAT SUNDAY OR ANY TIME EARLIER WAS SATISFACTORY. HE THEN CHANGED HIS STORY TO HOW BUSY HE HAD BEEN TO CATCH UP ON HIS OWN WORK.

HE REPORTED WEST BERLIN MORALE HIGHER THAN A MONTH AGO AND THAT CAPITAL WAS RETURNING. HE SAID THERE WERE SOME WHO WERE GRUMBLING THAT OUR EVIDENCE OF WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE TO PROTECT OUR RIGHT TO CROSS DID NOT MEAN MUCH TO WEST BERLINERS WHEN WE HAD DONE NOTHING ABOUT THE WALL. HE ADDED THESE WERE RELATIVELY FEW AND THAT THE GREATER MASS OF WEST BERLINERS WERE APPRECIATIVE OF AND RESPONSIVE TO OUR SHOW OF FORCE.

HE BELIEVED THAT ADENAUER WOULD BE ELECTED TOMORROW BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE STRONG ENOUGH UNDER THE EXISTING SITUATION. HE DISCLAIMED INTEREST NOW IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER ADENAUER IN VIEW OF LATTER'S LOSS OF PRESTIGE IN WEST GERMANY.

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HE DID URGE THAT HERE OR IN MOSCOW OUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEAK OUT ON THE UNNECESSARY CRUELTY INVOLVED IN SEPARATING FAMILIES IN BERLIN AND URGE THAT SMALL CHECK POINTS BE ESTABLISHED EXACTLY ONTHE BORDER LINE WITH A PARTITION SEPARATING EAST AND WEST BERLIN POLICE WHO COULD ISSUE PASSES ON THE SPOT. HE BELIEVES SUCH AN EFFORT BY US WOULD HAVE GREAT MORALE VALUE TO WEST BERLIN AND WOULD INDICATE OUR CONCERN FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE WEST BERLINER AS WELL AS OUR OWN RIGHTS. THIS SUGGESTION SEEMS TO ME TO HAVE REAL VALUE. I ALSO ADVISED HIM THAT THE EMOTIONAL OUTBURSTS OF LEMMER AND LIPSCHITZ AT THE CROSSING WERE NOT HELPFUL; THAT WE WOULD GLADLY ESCORT GERMAN OFFICALS TO THE CROSSING BUT THAT IT WAS NOT THE PLACE NOW FOR EMOTIONAL ACTIONS.

THERE IS SOMETHING BOTHERING BRANDT WHICH I HAVE NOT YET SMOKED OUT ALTHOUGH I THINK IT MORE CONCERNED WITH POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY THAN ANYTHING ON THE BERLIN SCENE.

LIGHTNER

MEM

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Control: 18712
Rec'd: October 30, 1961 8:15 PM

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 884, OCTOBER 30, 4 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 884, INFORMATION BONN PRIORITY 784, LONDON PRIORITY 582, MOSCOW PRIORITY 557, PARIS PRIORITY 628, POLAD USAREUR PRIORITY 490.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

FROM CLAY

FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH AT THIS TIME MY ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS OF THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS IS THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TOOK THE MOST CAUTIOUS STEPS IT COULD TAKE TO UPHOLD ITS PRESTIGE. ALTHOUGH EVENTS AT FRIEDRICHSTRASSE WERE DESIGNED TO FORCE THEIR HAND, THEY CAME SOONER THAN ANTICIPATED. THAT THEY DID NOT SEND THE EAST GERMAN ARMY WAS MOST IMPORTANT AS THEY EITHER CONSIDERED IT UNRELIABLE OR THAT WE MIGHT ATTACK IT. I BELIEVE IT WAS THE LATTER POSSIBILITY WHICH WORRIED THEM AS THE SOVIET INTERVENTION WAS A REAL HUMILIATION FOR ULBRICHT. LIKEWISE IN STOPPING OUR ASSISTANCE VEHICLES, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT THEY HAVE STARTED ONCE AGAIN PATROLLING THE AUTOBAHN. WHILE TOO EARLY TO BE SURE OF THEIR INTENT, IT COULD BE A RETREAT FROM THEIR TRANSFER OF THIS CONTROL TO EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

I ALSO THINK THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR TANKS FIRST AT FRIEDRICHSTRASSE TO SOME DEGREE SUPPORTS THIS ANALYSIS.

IT IS

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-2- 884, OCTOBER 30, 4 PM FROM BERLIN

IT IS OF COURSE TOO EARLY FOR ANY ANALYSIS TO BE OTHER THAN SPECULATIVE. THE APPARENT UNWILLINGNESS TO FIND A SOLUTION IN MOSCOW MIGHT INDICATE A HARDENING OF THE SOVIET POSITION ALTHOUGH WE HAVE OFTEN FOUND THAT WHEN THEY TALK THE TOUGHEST THEY ACTUALLY RELAX PRESSURES ON THE GROUND.

LIGHTNER

KEA

NOTE: Advance copies to SS and SO, 10/30/61. EH.

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NLK NSF 83 (250

SECRET October 30, 1961

(493)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Friedrichstrasse, Monday at 4 PM

Right now, our position seems clear and good, as follows:

1. We are urgently seeking four-power agreement to a line of strict reciprocity on the treatment of civilians. Kohler is hopeful that we will get it by the end of the day.

2. We do not currently plan to block entrance of properly identified Soviet civilians unless our own access is so blocked. In this we are not accepting Lightner's and Clay's suggestions. It is understood that this position will be reviewed if responses from Moscow to the Secretary's cables are unsatisfactory, but the truth is that outside Germany there is little sentiment for such a course.

3. Washington opinion (Kohler, Bohlen, Bundy) is sympathetic to Norstad's view that when we announce a policy of reciprocity, we should get ready to have our civilians show their identification, and pretty soon. But this requires allied support, and Kohler is going to take a temperature reading this afternoon with the Ambassadors. (If we had a stronger government in Bonn, I would urge a more direct approach, but at the moment I think Kohler's forum is as good as any.)

4. The situation on the Autobahn has been calm since yesterday. It appears that our patrols have been unmolested since they removed their MP armbands! It would be nice if all problems were as simple.

5. There remains one problem: we are seeking an agreed position on pass-showing by military personnel, and Hood has asked for instructions from London. But if we adopt Norstad's doctrine of strict reciprocity, we should probably issue instructions to Clay not to make another fancy issue when this one comes up, but rather to apply our new practice promptly to the Soviets.

McG. B.

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Control: 15610
Rec'd: Oct. 31, 1961
2:23pm

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FROM: BERLIN

Downgraded To: SECRET [redacted]
EO 11652: XGDS-2 [redacted]
Authorized By: H. [redacted]
Auth: [redacted]

MICROFILMED BY C. KENNEDY APR. 11

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 896, OCTOBER 31, 6 PM

EYES ONLY

762.0221 .80

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 896, INFORMATION BONN NIACT 793, PARIS NIACT 637

PARIS EYES ONLY FOR STOESSEL FOR NORSTAD

BONN EYES ONLY FOR DOWLING FROM CLAY

RE OURTEL 893 DEPT, 791 BONN, 635 PARIS; OURTEL 894 DEPT, 792 BONN, 636 PARIS

NOW THAT I HAVE RECEIVED NORSTAD'S RECOMMENDATIONS I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT I DO NOT AGREE WITH HIS PREMISES NOR DO I BELIEVE THAT RECIPROCITY IN THE SHOWING OF IDENTIFICATION CARDS WOULD SERVE ANY USEFUL PURPOSE NOW. TO MY MIND WE ARE IN A STRONGER POSITION STOPPING OUR CIVILIANS IN THE FACE OF SOVIET SHOW OF FORCE THAN WE WOULD BE TO SUBMIT IDENTIFICATION CARDS TO VOPOS, PARTICULARLY AS THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALWAYS INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO SHOW IDENTIFICATION CARDS. SOMEHOW I HAD INTERPRETED THE RECOMMENDATION AS INVOLVING BRINGING IN WEST GERMAN POLICE NOT WEST BERLIN POLICE TO DO THE CHECKING AT FRIEDRICH STRASSE, AND THIS I BELIEVE WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD. I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT NOW TO DEMAND IDENTIFICATION FROM SOVIET CIVILIANS ENTERING WEST BERLIN, THIS CHECK TO BE MADE AT ALL ENTRANCES INCLUDING FRIEDRICH STRASSE BY WEST BERLIN POLICE, AND IS TO GO INTO EFFECT WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO.

BEFORE USE OF ARMED ESCORT, OUR CIVILIAN TRAVEL WAS STOPPED BY

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~~SECRET~~ TOP SECRET

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Berlin 896

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TOP SECRET
SECRET

VOPOS. AFTER USE OF ARMED ESCORT IT REMAINS STOPPED BUT ONLY AFTER SHOW OF SOVIET FORCE. THIS IS ONLY CHANGE IN SITUATION WHICH WE THINK GIVES US IMPROVED POSTURE. SENDING A FEW CARS WITH CIVILIANS IN IS NOT IMPORTANT TO MISSION AS THEY STILL ENTER ON FOOT OR BY S-BAHN. OTHER THAN RESTRICTING SOVIET PERSONNEL TO ONRE CROSSING AND REQUIRING IDENTIFICATION, I SEE NO REASON FOR US TO RUSH INTO HAVING OUR PERSONNEL SUBMIT IDENTIFICATION TO VOPOS. I SEE NO GAIN AND I URGE WE TAKE LONGER TO DECIDE THIS QUESTION.

LIGHTNER

DT

TOP SECRET
SECRET

B521

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State NSF 86 Berlin Crisis

TOP SECRET

H
Action
SS

Control: 546
Rec'd: November 1, 1961
3:35 p.m.

232

Info

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 916, NOVEMBER 1, 7 PM

495

PRIORITY

ACTION PARIS PRIORITY 653, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 916.

PARIS FOR NORSTAD AND STOESSEL ONLY; DEPT FOR SECRETARY ONLY

EYES ONLY FROM CLAY

REFTEL PARIS 159 BERLIN, 2319 DEPT

MY DISTRESS AT LACK OF COMMON ALLIED FRONT ON FRIDAY 27 OCTOBER WAS NOT IN CRITICISM OF ANYONE BUT WAS BASED ON THE FACTUAL SITUATION WHICH DEFINITELY CREATED IMPRESSION OF LACK OF ALLIED UNITY.

MOREOVER FRIEDRICH STRASSE DID PROVE THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE VERY MUCH ADVANCE WARNING IF ATTACK CAME AND PERHAPS NO TIME TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU.

I WOULD URGE THAT CHAIRMAN COMMANDANT BE AUTHORIZED IN ANY EMERGENCY AND AT THE REQUEST OF ANY COMMANDANT TO ACTIVATE ALLIED COMMAND POST; TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS SUCH AS INCREASING BORDER PATROLLING ALL; ACTIVATING AND SENDING INTO POSITIONS FORCES LESS THAN A FULL ALERT THUS PERMITTING DESIGNATED SINGLE COMMANDER TO TAKE ON A GOING CONCERN ON YOUR ORDERS OR BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT IF COMMUNICATIONS FAIL OR ARE TOO LATE.

PERHAPS THIS COULD HAVE BEEN DONE BY TELEPHONE CONFERENCES FRIDAY EVENING ALTHOUGH I DOUBT IT. I DO BELIEVE ALLIED BORDER PATROLLING SHOULD HAVE BEEN AUGMENTED ON FRIDAY AND SOME FORCES PLACED IN

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NW 0224 11-161

Rec'd: 11-1-61 3:35 p.m.

TOP SECRET

-2- 916, NOVEMBER 1, 7 PM, FROM BERLIN

READINESS FAR SHORT OF FULL ALERT. WE MUST NOT BE CAUGHT NAPPING BY WHICH I MEAN WITH TOO LITTLE TIME TO PRESENT OUR FULL ALLIED STRENGTH.

LIGHTNER

BP

TOP SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State** [redacted]

PERMANENT [redacted]

41 (2)

Action

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Info

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(233)

Control: 2185
Rec'd: Nov. 4, 1961
2:01 AM

(496) 1443 Moscow 2

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1443, NOVEMBER 3, 6:00 P.M.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1443, INFORMATION BELGRADE 55.

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BELGRADE EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

RE BELGRADE TEL 686.

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WHILE I WOULD NOT REJECT OUT OF HAND ANY HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THIS UNPREDICTABLE PLACE, I AM BOUND DISAGREE WITH MUCH OF REASONING IN REFTEL AND PARTICULARLY WITH EXTENT TO WHICH CONCLUSION IS CARRIED. MANY OF FACTS ADDUCED IN SUPPORT HAVE EQUAL OR MORE RATIONAL EXPLANATIONS. WHILE REASON GIVEN FOR DEFERMENT PEACE TREATY MOVE CANNOT BE EXCLUDED, KHRUSHCHEV HAS PREVIOUSLY PUT OFF DEADLINE AND IN PRESENT INSTANCE MAY WELL HAVE DESIRED REMOVE EXCUSE FOR FRENCH UNWILLINGNESS PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS UNDER PRESSURE.

THERE ARE ALSO POSSIBLE NON-MILITARY EXPLANATIONS FOR INVOCATION FINNISH TREATY; PRESSURE ON NORWAY AND DENMARK, DESIRE FORCE FINNISH PARTICIPATION IN PEACE CONFERENCE, FINNISH RECOGNITION EAST GERMANY, ETC.

I DO AGREE HOWEVER THAT KHRUSHCHEV CLEARLY INTENDS CARRY BERLIN QUESTION TO EXTREME EDGE OF BRINK AND IT IS POSSIBLE SOV MILITARY WANT MORE TIME ALTHOUGH IT IS OF COURSE DEBATABLE WHOSE TEAM TIME IS PLAYING ON. I SHOULD THINK IN ANY EVENT CRISIS WOULD COME BEFORE WEAPONS RESULTING FROM RECENT TEST SERIES COULD BE AVAILABLE.

663.00 1/11-361

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I DO
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OFFICE SYMBOL	ACTION	TO RM/R

Rec'd Filed to Subj. file AFK 12/20 ltr

HSF 9

A-524

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-2- 1443, NOVEMBER 3, 6:00 P.M. FROM MOSCOW.

I DO NOT UNDERSTAND REFERENCE TO "INCLUSION WHOLE SERIES PARTY FIGURES AMONG TARGETS 5 AS THESE REFERENCES WERE NOT RELATED TO ANTI-PARTY GROUP BUT RATHER FAILURES IN PERFORMANCE AND SINGLING OUT INDIVIDUALS IN THIS WAY HAS BEEN STANDARD PRACTICE OF KHRUSHCHEV REGIME. ONLY POSSIBLE SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO KHRUSHCHEV'S LEADERSHIP WHICH I CAN SEE WOULD BE MILITARY AND THEN IN MY OPINION ONLY SO FAR AS MILITARY MATTERS ARE CONCERNED. IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT POSITION OF PRESENT MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE NOT ONLY MAINTAINED BUT SOMEWHAT ENHANCED. I BELIEVE STRONGLY HOWEVER THAT ONLY ISSUE ON WHICH MILITARY OR ANY OTHER GROUP COULD OR WOULD ACT AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV WOULD BE TO OPPOSE POLICY WHICH THEY THOUGHT INVOLVED TOO GREAT RISK OF WAR. I AM CONVINCED THAT HATRED OF WAR IS GENUINE AND DEEP EVEN AMONG SOV MILITARY. AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN WILLINGNESS OF MILITARY TO SUPPORT BOLD POLICY RE GERMANY IS THEIR APPARENT BELIEF THAT AS THINGS ARE GOING WEST GERMANS WILL ACQUIRE ATOMIC CAPABILITY. IN SUM, I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT IF WAR COMES IT WILL BE ENTIRELY DUE TO SOV MISCALCULATION RATHER THAN DELIBERATE PLAN.

THOMPSON

OKY

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SECRET

Control: 3270
Rec'd: November 6, 1961
1:19 p.m.

FILED NOV 6 PM 2 11

39-W
Action

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RMR

FROM: Berlin

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 953, November 6, 5 p.m.

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 953, INFORMATION BONN PRIORITY 844, PARIS PRIORITY 684, LONDON PRIORITY 637, MOSCOW PRIORITY 609

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL, MCGUIRE

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

FROM CLAY

Reference: DEPTEL 680. Berlin, 1313 Bonn, 2594 Paris, 2500 London 1229 Moscow

Barring of Soviets from West Berlin can only be done without loss of morale in West Berlin under the conditions which I had understood established. These conditions were complete rejection of our protest to Soviet government followed by public statement of our government that further talks to develop a possible base for negotiation could serve no purpose under the changed conditions created by Soviet unilateral action. This would, I believe, be understood and accepted here.

LIGHTNER

RGD

762.0221/11-661

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[redacted] TELEGRAM **Department of State** [redacted] PERMANENT RECORD COPY

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(498)

(235)

H
Action

Control: 4322
Rec'd: November 7, 15:1
3:50 pm

SS
Info

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1881, NOVEMBER 7, 7 P.M.

EYES ONLY

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NIACT

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY FROM BRUCE

AFTER CONVERSATION TONIGHT WITH HOME ABOUT ANOTHER MATTER, HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BOTHER YOU DIRECTLY BUT WOULD LIKE ME TO CONVEY FOLLOWING:

HE HAS RECEIVED REPORTS FROM BERLIN SOURCES HE TRUSTS THAT IN EVENT OF CLOSURE FRIEDERICHSTRASSE ENTRANCE US INTENDS ACCEPT NO ALTERNATIVE CROSSING POINT, OR POINTS, AND WILL USE FORCE TO BATTER DOWN BARRIERS ON FREIDERICHSTRASSE. FOR THIS PURPOSE AN AMERICAN MILITARY ELEMENT IS ON A TWENTY MINUTE ALERT. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO HOME WHETHER SUCH REPORTS RELATE TO A BARRIER SUCH AS A POLE WHICH WOULD SERVE AS AN OBSTRUCTION WHILE DEMANDS ARE MADE FOR DOCUMENTATION, OR WHETHER THEY ARE ADDRESSED TO SITUATION WHERE ENTRY IS SEALED OFF COMPLETELY.

HE IS INFORMING ORMSBY GORE OF THE ABOVE, AND IN GREATER DETAIL. SUGGEST GORE BE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED BY KOHLER, SINCE HOME IS EVIDENTLY NOT FAMILIAR WITH OUR PLANS IN THIS RESPECT.

(1) FYI: I BELIEVE HOME HAS PROBABLY BEEN TOLD THAT GENERAL CLAY IS IN A BELLICOSE MOOD, AND THAT HE WONDERS WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT IS FULLY AWARE OF HIS INTENTIONS. WHEN HOME SAW NORSTAD LAST WEEK LATTER DID NOT REFER TO FRIEDRICHSTRASSE AFFAIR.

BRUCE

VLH

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO: S/S	ACTION TAKEN: None Required
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL: GER-Hillenbrand	DATE OF ACTION: ———
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London-1881 7/2.00/11-761

B-527

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Also in GSA 34611 + 71A6[illegible]

TOP SECRET

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Defense Chronology

499

7 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Norstad - November 7, 1961

Present: The President
Secretary McNamara
General Norstad
General Taylor

The discussion, which lasted approximately 45 minutes, covered the following points:

a. Relations with General Clay. General Norstad reported on his relations with General Clay in Berlin.

b. National Security Action Memorandum No. 109. In response to a question from the President as to how General Norstad anticipated dealing with an interruption of traffic on the autobahn, General Norstad commented on several features of National Security Action Memorandum No. 109. Referring to Section I, he indicated agreement that a small probe should be instituted at once to establish the fact that the Soviets were using force in barring access. This action would take place whether or not air communications had been interrupted. Referring to Section II, he indicated agreement that a number of political actions should take place in this phase to include an appeal to the United Nations. He indicated that he was not particularly impressed by the need of further mobilization in this period, but stressed the importance of taking some dramatic political action. As an example, he suggested that President Kennedy might summon Khrushchev to an emergency meeting in Berlin to talk over the crisis. The President expressed interest in this thought and directed the preparation of a memorandum to Secretary Rusk on the subject.

General Norstad indicated an understanding that this phase under Section II might drag for several weeks or perhaps two months. He does not think, however, that this should be prolonged simply to allow more divisions to be brought to Europe. In this phase he does not expect any large air operations, pointing out that, while the matter was before the United Nations, it would be necessary to keep air operations within the corridors.

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Asked about his views as to additional divisions for Europe now, General Norstad repeated his previously expressed thought that an addition of some two divisions now was not very important. When pressed for his reasons, he conceded that two divisions would improve his military posture by a substantial amount. However, his commanders would not be able to do much more than what they can do at present, although they would be able to do it better and for a longer period of time.

Asked how he expected to get our Allies to adjust to the policy contained in Memorandum 109, he expressed confidence in his ability to accomplish this. He intends to prepare for presentation to Washington a paper based upon Memorandum 109, which he believes can receive Allied acceptance and at the same time be consistent with the thoughts expressed by the President and the Secretary of Defense in Memorandum 109. He observed that, in its present form, this memorandum would create concern in NATO, particularly among the Germans. He mentioned several times there was ambiguous language in the paper as he read it, but that he would produce a document for his planners which stated clearly his understanding of the President's desires.

c. The Adenauer visit. General Norstad strongly recommended that Minister Strauss accompany Adenauer to the United States. Strauss himself has shown interest in coming, asking Norstad who in the past had kept him, Strauss, from seeing President Kennedy. The President asked that Strauss be informed that he would be very happy to see him, at an appropriate time, and indicated that he wanted State to prepare a program for negotiations with Adenauer. With regard to the new paper based on Memorandum 109 mentioned in the preceding paragraph, General Norstad undertook to have it in the hands of the President before Adenauer's arrival on November 20th.

d. Friedrichstrasse. Asked to comment on the situation in Berlin and possible future harrassments of communications with the East Sector, General Norstad suggested that the next move might be to change our entry point from Friedrichstrasse to the British Sector. General Norstad does not see that we have much ground for reaction if the substitute entry point offers essentially the same facilities as Friedrichstrasse. If the USSR/GDR went all the way and barred all access, Norstad would then knock down one of the more closed entry points. He considers that he has this authority now.

With regard to the showing of passes, Norstad feels that we should get together on a sensible position. He noted that we were showing passes at the subway station near Friedrichstrasse, whereas we declined to show passes above ground. The President directed a memorandum to the Department of State calling for a recommended position on the question of a change in the location of access and of the showing of identification documents.

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NLK,NSF 5-7

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U. S. INFORMATION SERVICE

237

American Embassy
Rome, Italy
November 7, 1961

500

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dear Mac:

I talked privately last week in Berlin with General Clay, General Watson, Allan Lightner, [redacted] and USIS people, Egon Bahr (Brandt's political advisor and confidant), Peter Boenisch (the ablest journalist in Berlin; Springer's editor) and a number of other Berliners and Americans, principally newspapermen. My observations:

1. For Berliners the crisis is still chiefly a crisis of confidence, confidence in American ability to resist Soviet erosion of our position. West Berlin morale is directly and wholly related to our ability in this respect, and there are widely varying views on the state of morale. Clay and the Mission people think it is quite good, much better than six weeks ago. Boenisch agrees, citing the large number of Berliners who left in August and September but are now returning. Other Berliners, notably Bahr (who said explicitly he was speaking for Brandt), believe it is very bad. All agree that a major development, one way or another, could radically affect the situation.

A distinction must be made between Berliners' confidence in our motivation, our determination to maintain free Berlin, and our ability to do so. As a result of the President's U.N. speech, General Clay's presence and Lyndon Johnson's visit, confidence in our motivation is high. Confidence in our ability to resist Soviet "salami" tactics is low, and this lack of confidence is widespread among Americans as well as Germans.

2. As you indicated, General Clay attaches great importance to the state of morale among West Berliners. I am not prepared to say whether he attaches too much importance to it. He points out that an exodus of frightened West Berliners would leave us little to defend and nothing worth fighting for.

Clay impressed

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

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Clay impressed me as a selfless, devoted soldier who respects the President as a man as well as his Commander-in-Chief. He made it clear he had the highest confidence in the President and "the men around him", but confessed to doubts about the courage and ability of "people lower down"--[redacted] Clay said he would stay in Berlin as long as the President wanted him there, even if he should sharply disagree with a U.S. position. Clay said he had "no use" (his words) for generals who did not obey their superiors and explicitly stated that under no circumstances would he leave Berlin under conditions which would give an appearance of policy conflict. It did, of course, interest me that Clay felt obliged to make these disclaimers although his remarks did--as you will see--stem naturally from a discussion of methods and policy.

E

I do not see how Clay can, and I do not think he does, wholly ignore the fact that he is a hero if not a deity in West Berlin and that his office is located on Clayallee. He puts his country and his President above his own reputation and prestige, but the latter are clearly at stake in Berlin and he knows it although he did not say so. He believes his duty and his prestige are not entirely separable, as demonstrated by his remark (which he repeated for emphasis) that if the U.S. yields on the credentials issue and permits GDR examination of civilian documents under any circumstances, his "credibility" would be "destroyed" in the eyes of Berliners. He said "credibility;" he may have meant "usefulness." By the time you receive this letter, events may have overtaken this issue; at the moment, he felt extremely strong on the subject.

3. Clay said he did not think the U.S. should go to war over East Berlin and that he has not and will not undertake or recommend actions which would risk such a war. (He is aware that there are differing views as to what constitutes such a risk.) Clay does believe, however, that it is important we not reveal to the Soviets our unwillingness to fight over what is left of our rights in East Berlin because this would cost us an important element of our negotiating position. Lightner also underscored this point.

4. Clay's principal concern is that NATO consultation at every step means, in his judgment, "lowest-common-denominator" responses which invariably are weak and ineffective. Clay believes such responses encourage Soviet "salami" tactics which could cost us Berlin without affording a suitable opportunity to confront the Soviets with force. He believes these tactics will eventually bring not a highway blockade (which would permit a military probe) but "technical difficulties" with

the railroads

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the railroads and waterways which could not be clearly and cleanly challenged with force.

The General believes our posture is weaker than our position warrants, and he blames this on timidity on the part of our NATO allies and the heretofore mentioned "lower echelon" people. [redacted] E

Clay believes the Soviets are far more nervous about Berlin than we are--or at least than we should be. In his view the Soviets moved their tanks into East Berlin to Friedrichstrasse to avoid a clash between the VOPOS and U.S. troops which could have forced the Soviets into a war they do not want.

5. The General believes U.S. access to East Berlin is relatively unimportant and that it is far better we not enter the Soviet Zone at all rather than yield our firm stand and agree to show credentials. (As you know, the West Berliners were extremely unhappy with our decision requiring Soviets to show credentials on entering West Berlin, seeing this as a first step to our doing likewise.)

6. With respect to bureaucratic arrangements and local division of responsibility, Clay appeared satisfied as did Watson and Lightner. The latter two accept Clay's leadership and the three now seem to be working very well together.

7. Both Clay and Watson expressed the hope there might be better coordination between messages going out from State for Berlin (i.e., Lightner) and those going from the JCS to Watson via Norstad and Clark. Watson noted he has no authority to act on the basis of State instructions, and the parallel instructions coming via Paris and Heidelburg usually arrive several hours later.

Lightner believes the Mission probably has enough authority "but perhaps could use a little more." He said the "scrambler" telephone to Clark and Norstad was a great help. Lightner said Clay is "secretly very pleased" with the amount of authority he has.

8. Clay expressed the hope that you and other senior advisors to the President on Berlin could pay brief, quiet visits to the city and see the situation for yourselves. Judging from my own experience, I think there is merit in this.

G. Bron Buhr.

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This document consists of 4 pages
Number 1 of 3 copies, Series A.

9. Egon Bahr, stating he spoke for Brandt who unfortunately was not available, made three points in addition to his remarks about the low state of West Berliners' morale: (a) Any agreement with the Soviets over Berlin must not be described as "limited"--unless, of course, it is tied to reunification of Germany. Otherwise the psychological consequences in West Berlin will be "disastrous." (b) There should be an early announcement of a specific date for U.S.-Soviet negotiations on Berlin. This would bolster West Berliners' confidence, he said, because they wish an end to the present state of uncertainty and believe "the Americans will take a firm position in negotiations." (c) Bahr reaffirmed Brandt's support for fuller integration of West Berlin into the Federal Republic.

10. Bahr's view of the state of morale is, I believe, deliberately exaggerated to prompt us to take more forceful steps. Of course, any important event could change the picture quickly. I have recommended to Ed Murrow that we put a first-rate, German-speaking officer in USIS -Berlin who will work full-time with the Berlin press and have no operating responsibilities which would tie him down to a desk.

Meanwhile, we should do whatever is required to make certain that the city remains viable both psychologically and economically. The initiative, it seems to me, should come from the Germans but we should support them. Boenisch, Ted and I discussed this at lunch when Boenisch was in Washington six weeks ago. At that time, Boenisch promised to send Ted a "plan", and he handed me an outline in Berlin. I have sent this along to Ted; you may wish to see it.

Much of what I have reported to you is already well known; much is necessarily superficial. I hope, nonetheless, that these observations will prove useful.

Faithfully yours,

Tom Sorensen

Thomas C. Sorensen
Deputy Director (Policy and Plans)

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN

=NLK NSF 8/6 Clay (11 of 11) (501)

November 9, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I had a most satisfactory talk with General Clay. He was most grateful for assurance of your confidence; he agreed entirely with our tactics on public comment once they were explained; he thinks no further public notice should be given to the matter.

He is delighted to be asked back for consultation during the Chancellor's visit and will plan to come in on Sunday, the 19th, and will be available to you the moment you get back from your Western swing. I think that if your schedule makes this too tight, we can probably find some other arrangement for him. In any event, the invitation to be present during the Chancellor's visit was important to him and I think will be useful to us.

McG. B.

CC: Mr. Kohler

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Pkg. Gorbachev Letter 770163

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Copy for the Secretary of State

NSSS REVIEW
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Cat. B)
Cat. C)
By ... NARA, Date ... 1973

TOP SECRET TOP SECRET

November 11, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At 12:15 a.m., Saturday, November 11, Georgi Bolshikov, editor of USSR, delivered to this writer a twenty-six page letter from Soviet Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy. At the same time Mr. Bolshikov informed this writer that this was only one of two messages and that a second message would be ready later this morning. The first message dealt with the problem of Berlin and the second with Laos and South Vietnam. Arrangements were made to pick up the second document at 8:30 this morning in front of the apartment house of Georgi Bolshikov at 1301 Clydesdale Road, N.W. Delivery of the second letter was accomplished at that time.

At the time of the delivery of the first message, Mr. Bolshikov stated that he thought there was a great improvement in the situation and that we could now reach a peaceful settlement on Berlin. He went on to say that at some future time he would like to explain to me the actions of the 22nd Party Congress with respect to Stalin. He stated that he thought that there was now beginning to be a greater understanding between our two countries. He said in the past there had been only limited contact and that one or two people in the Soviet Union were considered to be the absolute experts on the United States and that one or two people such as Bohlen and Kennan were considered to be the only people in the United States who knew about the Soviet Union. He said that in 1957 he was in Moscow when the Soviet Union unveiled its new automobile. He was standing next to Voroshilov and Voroshilov expressed the opinion that the new automobile was the best in the world. Bolshikov said he told Voroshilov that the new car was not the best car in the world. It was actually only

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about as good as the 1952 or 1953 model American car. Voroshilov expressed displeasure at this attitude and told Bolshikov "you young men are all alike." Bolshikov went on to say that now is the time for bold thinking in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. He said it was an unfortunate fact that the differences between the two countries always produced the greatest news in the United States while our agreements were buried. He cited the recent agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Antarctic as an example. He said this was a great and mutually beneficial pact yet it received scant notice in the American press. He said this was particularly true in Berlin where the slightest altercation between the Soviet Union and East German personnel and Allied personnel was immediately built up into an international incident.

Bolshikov laid great stress on the fact that "we are equals." He said that the United States and Soviet Union should treat each other as equals. He said, "You are ahead in some things and we are ahead in some things, but we are equals."

Bolshikov said the forthcoming interview of the President by Adzhubey will be a journalistic milestone in Soviet history and that top Soviet newsmen were extremely excited about the forthcoming visit. Bolshikov left the White House at approximately 1:15 a.m. and returned home to translate the second message. Bolshikov stated that if the President wished to make an answer to Mr. Khrushchev that this writer should deliver such message to he, Bolshikov, for return to Khrushchev.

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Rusk Files, Lot 72D192

240

503

S/S
Mr. McAl
G&R

MONDAY
November 13, 1961
12:37 p. m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR MC CLOY

The Sec returned the call and M said he has a feeling in this NY area there is a good bit of uncertainty about the German position and M wondered whether it would be consistent with the Sec's general thinking if a group asked Adenauer to come there with no publicity - get a knowledgeable group together particularly publishers etc. - to have a talk. M does not know whether it is wise or not and has no intimation from him. M could have a luncheon or dinner at the Century with no publicity. The Sec said on his way out and M agreed. M mentioned the 22nd or 24th. The Sec thinks it might be a good idea. M asked if he could take it up with Grewe and the Sec said yes. The Sec said he can't be sure A will relieve their uncertainty at that point. Maybe it should be left to his and M's final judgment. The Sec suggested laying it on a tentative basis and let him decide. Another problem M might be thinking about - and there could be a good deal of pulling and hauling within his own entourage about who should come with him and this is something that affects what you are talking about and his trip here. The situation there is not very happy on that kind of thing. It is an alliance rather than a team. They agreed it is better by himself with an interpreter. M will think it over. The Sec said there is the problem of people wondering what he will say when they are not present so M may sound out Grewe on that. The Sec suggested someone from here coming up and giving a full briefing. M thinks that will be helpful and will think it over.

McCloy

M said he just had a call from Menshikov hoping he would come to lunch in the near future and would like to talk things over. The Sec said to play it cool - there are all sorts of contacts. M has not seen him since early contacts - did see him when he came back from Khrushchev M said it was on the basis of when M is in Washington.

pdb

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241

504

SECRET

PERSONAL

American Embassy,
Moscow,
November 13, 1961.

Dear Foy:

I am distressed at the great difference of opinion that has developed between Berlin and myself over current policy tactics. I am conscious of the fact that General Clay may know his top but believe I know the call the turn as I see it. It seemed to me that the action of entry of armed troops in East Berlin should at least have been considered on the top level at home before it was taken. I can imagine how galling it is to our people in Berlin to be faced with arrogant East German actions, but feel strongly that if we are going to precipitate a crisis we should pick the best issue possible. I resent the fact that somebody in Berlin is feeding out stuff to the press tagging me with specific views. CBS correspondent Dan Schorr told me in Frankfurt when I was passing through that there was a feeling in Germany that German affairs were being decided by the Russian boys - Kohler, Bohlen, and Thompson - and that the German boys were not being heard.

In some respects I do not think I am getting sufficient prompt information on what is going on. Some of the material comes by pouch which takes a week and sometimes more. Although I have had some reports of the discussion of the Crowe paper I never received the paper itself and the reports of the discussions of it were very late. Even a brief summary would be helpful and I find both my British and French colleagues better informed than I on these matters. If at some stage I am to discuss major questions with Khrushchev I believe I should be fully informed on essential problems but of course we do not want to be flooded with detailed material. What I suggest is a brief cable covering high-lights of the four-power discussions.

The Honorable
Foy D. Kohler,
Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

762.00/11-1361

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You may wish to pass this letter on to Chip Bohlen.

We got our first snow yesterday and I suspect we're in for a hard winter in more ways than one.

All the best,

Llewellyn E. Thompson

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

PARIS, FRANCE

(242)

November 16, 1961

(505)

Dear Mr. President:

You will recall that at our last meeting, at which we discussed the actions which might be taken in connection with the access to Berlin, I informed you that I was working on instructions to my planners which would carry out the intent of your letter of October 20, 1961, and of the NATO directive to me on the same general subject (PO/61/808, approved by the NAC 25 Oct 61). I am forwarding to you herewith a draft of this paper, which up to this time has not been considered outside of my own office and which will not be circulated until I am advised of your reaction.

I have tried to develop a rather specific line of action which would meet your requirements and at the same time have a chance of being accepted by our Allies. Although the ground would have to be prepared before presenting this proposal, and the tactics carefully worked out to meet or bypass the sensitivities of some of our Allies, I am convinced that the position I suggest in the attached paper would receive serious and sympathetic consideration. It should, for instance, meet most of the current fears of the Germans.

As you know, I believe that we will weather this particular round of crises without becoming involved in a shooting war. However, a well established and, if possible, agreed position on the part of the Alliance will enhance this possibility by permitting us to show, to the Soviets and to the world, firmness, good order and strength.

Faithfully yours,

LAURIS NORSTAD
General USAF

Incl:
SACEUR's Instructions
to SHAPE Planners

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

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C-541

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SACEUR'S INSTRUCTIONS TO SHAPE PLANNERS

GENERAL

1. Planning for military action in connection with air or ground access to Berlin will be guided by the following general principles:

a. We must prepare a broad catalog of plans to meet the situation at ascending levels of political and military involvement, but we must do so with full awareness that the choice of timing and action rests at least as much with the Soviets as with us. We must plan for many contingencies on various levels, but cannot with complete assurance plan on any particular pattern or sequence.

b. Whatever action is taken, political or military, should if possible improve our over-all military position, but under no circumstances can it be permitted to detract therefrom.

c. No military operation, even the smallest probe, should be conducted except on the basis of a strong defensive posture and general readiness to defend along the entire NATO front. We cannot afford to exchange ground meter by meter with the Soviets. There is no way in which Satellite territory can be equated with that of NATO countries we are charged with defending.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. If Western access to Berlin is effectively blocked, there will be a prompt reaction by the Tripartite Powers, with the general support of NATO, in a manner and place directly related to Berlin or the access thereto.

3. The initial Western reaction will be selected at the time from the catalog of plans prepared by LIVE OAK, but in any event it will involve the use of some degree of armed force.

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4. The use of armed force, even in limited quantity, risks the danger of explosive expansion to higher levels of conflict, including the highest level. This risk is accepted, and therefore we stand ready to use all forces and weapons available, including nuclear weapons, if necessary, to protect the territory and people of the NATO nations and to defend our other vital interests.

5. The timing of military actions initiated by us in response to a Berlin crisis will be regulated primarily by the critical points on the curve of the developing political situation.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

Ground Access

6. In the event that access to Berlin via the autobahn is blocked:

a. NATO will adopt a reinforced alert, the forces moving to their established defensive positions, and the Strategic Air Command, United Kingdom Bomber Command, and other national strategic forces will be placed on an appropriate alert status.

b. Other means of access to Berlin will continue to be used, if available.

c. The Soviet Government will be notified that the Tripartite nations, with the support of NATO, will move a military convoy, including armed guards and combat vehicles, along the autobahn to Berlin, and that any restrictions or obstacles to the movement of this convoy must be immediately removed.

d. The Tripartite Powers will promptly launch a probe on the autobahn. The most likely choice would be the battalion-level TRADE WIND or the smaller FREE STYLE C, both of which are joint British, French and American efforts. FREE STYLE C consists of a total of 120 men and 27 vehicles, including one bulldozer, two APC's, and two armored cars. The purpose of this initial probe is to confront the Soviet/East German forces with a convoy to which wide

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publicity would have been given, thereby forcing them to allow the convoy free passage or to use force, preferably military, to prevent the passage of an Allied movement. The convoy commander will be instructed to take all necessary action within the capabilities of his force, short of offensive firing of his weapons, to overcome, breach or bypass within the confines of the autobahn and its verges, any obstruction or interference with free passage of the convoy under his command. If his force is fired upon he will be instructed to take whatever defensive action, including returning fire, as may be necessary to extricate and withdraw his force. The probe commander will be directed to establish beyond doubt that the Tripartite Powers are being denied access to Berlin and, if possible, to establish that the denial of access is being accomplished by use of Communist military force. The probe commander will be instructed to so conduct his action as to create the best foundation on which the Western Powers may take political initiatives or, if that proves impossible, further military action.

e. It is recognised that the Tripartite probe can be met and overwhelmed by a superior enemy force. Depending on its purpose and momentum, the enemy action could result in:

(1) The annihilation of the probe.

(2) The dispatch of larger forces to rescue the probe, thus enlarging the battle.

(3) Immediate action on the part of the Soviets to carry the battle into NATO territory.

(4) An attack against West Berlin.

In any one of these cases, the development of the conflict could be explosive.

f. If, as may be probable, the Tripartite probe is halted without resort to the extreme measures cited in par e above, the West would take immediate political initiatives. These actions could include:

B-544

(1) Referral of the problem to the United Nations or to another world body. It would not be expected that the U.N. would resolve the Berlin problem or even make any substantial contribution to a solution, but, rather, that referral to that body would provide a dignified intermediate step as a result of which time would be available to prepare for subsequent actions, political or military, and to mobilize further public opinion in support of the position of the West.

(2) Announcement by the President of the United States that he would arrive in West Berlin within, say, 12 hours for the purpose of talking face to face with Mr. Khrushchev. He might be joined for this purpose by the President of France and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. This action might be taken in addition to the U.N. referral, or independently thereof.

(3) Application of political pressure, worldwide, wherever possible, for the purpose of confusing and distracting the Soviet leadership.

(4) In addition to those actions which may already have been taken in these fields, initiation of a naval blockade and economic measures designed to emphasize the seriousness of the Western attitude.

g. Should all the measures taken up to this point fail to improve the situation, there is then no acceptable alternative to direct military action. This action might be general war, initiated by the West. If, however, there is reason to believe that the Soviets doubt the seriousness of the West, or if the Western public is not yet prepared for such large-scale military action, NATO forces will launch one or more limited offensive operations, as indicated below:

(1) An operation to establish a salient along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis, but not to attempt a penetration beyond the Elbe.

(2) An operation to seize and occupy the high ground in the Thuringer Wald area.

(3) An operation to reduce the Kassel salient.

B-345

[redacted]

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(4) Air operations, using conventional weapons, which may be in support of the ground operations indicated above, but which alternatively could operate beyond the support role, primarily for the purpose of gaining and maintaining air superiority.

(5) Action involving the limited and selective use of nuclear weapons, independently or in connection with the foregoing military actions, in order to demonstrate the will and the ability of the Alliance to use these weapons.

h. The selected, limited-objective offensive operations discussed above are short-term actions which will have served their purpose soon after initiation, probably within hours. By initiating any operation in this category, the commitment of the West will become complete. Whether this step will lead to general war will be determined by the Soviet reaction, which may be prompt and total.

Air Access

7. In case of interference with air access to Berlin, the Tripartite Powers will act in accordance with the plans prepared and approved under LIVE OAK procedures, the broad nature of which is known to the North Atlantic Council. In this connection, two points should be noted:

a. The principles governing Western reaction to the problem of ground access are generally applicable to the problem of air access.

b. The question of reaction to Communist military force interfering with air access may involve wide-scale air-superiority operations, outside as well as inside the air corridors. Even if initially such action were limited to the use of conventional weapons, our involvement would be raised quickly to a very high level. The situation would be further aggravated by Soviet attacks against Western air installations, a development which NATO can tolerate only briefly if we are to maintain our over-all defense posture, particularly the full power of our nuclear capability.

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8. Should both ground and air access be blocked, appropriate action will be taken in both areas. However, where a choice must be made, requirements of the ground access problem should determine the timing and the nature of our efforts.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1017, NOVEMBER 17, 1 PM

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Downgraded To: SECRET [redacted]
EO 11652: XGDS 2 0 4
Authorized By: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975

RE DEPTEL 725 BERLIN.

TO ME, A DAILY MEETING OF BERLIN COMMANDANTS IS ABOUT AS UNNECESSARY A WASTE OF TIME AS I CAN IMAGINE AS THE COMBINED AUTHORITY OF ALL THE COMMANDANTS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO GOVERNMENTS COULD BE PLACED IN A THIMBLE WITHOUT RUNNING OVER. I HAVE NEVER YET HEARD OF A COMMITTEE RUNNING A MILITARY ACTION WITH ANY SUCCESS AND I SUBMIT THAT IF THE SOVIETS EVER ATTACK WEST BERLIN WITHOUT A SINGLE COMMAND HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED WELL BEFORE THE ATTACK IT WILL NEVER BE ESTABLISHED AND THE WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP WILL HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME FINDING ANYTHING TO COORDINATE. MOREOVER, IF WE ALWAYS WAIT FOR ALLIED AGREEMENT TO REACT WHEN INCIDENTS INVOLVE ONLY OUR PEOPLE, WE SHALL CERTAINLY BE PUSHED AROUND ALL OVER THE MAP AND I WOULD EXPECT TO THE SHAME AND CONSTERNATION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

IN POINT OF FACT, THERE ARE ONLY TWO CHOICES IN DEFENDING WEST BERLIN. ONE IS A LAST DITCH STAND IF NEEDED TO GAIN TIME ELSEWHERE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE FULL USE OF POLICE AND FIGHTING FROM STREET TO STREET. IN SUCH A FIGHT THERE WOULD BE GREAT DESTRUCTION AND MANY CIVILIANS INCLUDING SOME DEPENDENTS MIGHT BE KILLED. OTHERWISE, ONLY A TOKEN DEFENSE IS POSSIBLE. PSYCHOLOGICALLY REGARDLESS OF WHAT OUR ALLIES DO, I WOULD LIKE OUR PLAN TO CALL FOR OUR ARMORED AND MECHANIZED FORCES HERE TO BREAK OUT TO THE EAST USING THE DAY OR TWO THEY WOULD LAST TO CUT SOVIET

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COMMUNICATIONS BEHIND THEIR LINES RATHER THAN TO DEFEND A DEFENSELESS POSITION. I REALIZE THAT THERE IS LITTLE MILITARY VALUE TO SUCH A MOVE, BUT IT IS BETTER THAN SURRENDER IN BERLIN AND A WILLINGNESS ON OUR PART TO PLAN TO MOVE ON THE OFFENSIVE ANYWHERE WOULD DO MORE FOR OUR MORALE, OR AT LEAST FOR MINE, THAN ANYTHING I CAN THINK OF.

I ALSO FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE HAVE CHANGED OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO FRIEDRICHSTRASSE AND NOW PROPOSE TO DO NOTHING IF IT IS CLOSED; NOT EVEN TO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY THAT IT MAKES NEGOTIATIONS IMPOSSIBLE. I CAN NOT OVER EMPHASIZE THE LOSS OF MORALE THIS WILL CAUSE HERE AND IS SUSPECT AT HOME, TOO.

FROM THE CABLEGRAMS OF THE PAST TEN DAYS, I FEEL A DISTINCT DETERIORATION IN OUR POSITION AND I CAN NOT HELP BUT FEEL THAT WE ARE MORE INTERESTED IN HAVING A NEGOTIATION THAN WE ARE IN WINNING IT, AND THAT ALLIED AGREEMENT IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN A POSITION FROM WHICH WE MIGHT WIN. I HAVE STATED MY VIEWS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND I REALIZE THAT THEY HAVE HAD NO APPRECIABLE EFFECT. HOWEVER, TO ME, TO ARGUE ON THE DETAILS OF AN ALLIED POSITION WITHOUT ESTABLISHING A BASIC PHILOSOPHY CAN LEAD ONLY TO FURTHER DETERIORATION. ARE WE PREPARED TO DEFEND WITH FORCE, EVERYTHING WE STILL HAVE IN BERLIN, UNILATERALLY IF NECESSARY OR WITH THOSE ALLIES WHO WILL MOVE WITH US? IF WE ARE AND ACT ACCORDINGLY, WE CAN TAKE ALL OF THE TIME WE WANT WHILE WE WAIT FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO SEEK NEGOTIATION OR TO ACT AND WE NEED NOT CARE WHICH THEY DO.

LIGHTNER

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

507

NSF

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November 18, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Paper on Objectives and Talking Points.

There is enclosed, for transmission to the President, a paper containing a general statement of U.S. objectives in connection with the Adenauer visit and suggested talking points for your first conversation with the Chancellor on Monday afternoon.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

As Stated Above.

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"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

ADENAUER VISIT

Washington, D.C., November 20-22, 1961

1. Objectives.

a. We want the Chancellor, and the two rival younger Ministers accompanying him, to leave Washington reassured that the U.S. Government has a clear sense of national purpose, firm leadership and a capacity not to be deflected from basic goals by particular crises. This purpose includes a closer partnership between the U.S. and an integrated Europe in meeting the needs of the Free World. Our aim is to convince the German leadership that our Berlin strategy has been formulated within such a broad framework, is not a prelude to disengagement or recognition of the GDR but rather the outgrowth of a common long-term purpose which precludes these actions. We would hope to maintain German confidence that a promising future lies open to the Federal Republic in an increasingly cohesive Atlantic Community within which new enterprises can absorb German aspirations whose frustration to the East may be accentuated by developments in the Berlin crisis which the West cannot prevent. At the same time we would want to provide a realistic impression of our true military strength along with an appreciation of the heavy responsibility which its possession brings with it.

b. Our objective then would be acceptance by German leaders of our approach to negotiations and, to the maximum degree possible, an understanding on the substance of a negotiating position. We would hope that the Chancellor might be a persuasive advocate in their meeting on November 30 in convincing de Gaulle that the U.S. position does not derive from infirmity of purpose but from strength and a rational evaluation of how broadest Western purposes may best be served.

SUGGESTED POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE (first meeting)

2. General.

a. The West now stands at a turning point in progress toward that integrated Europe within a developing Atlantic Community which the Chancellor has done so much to bring about. If we can overcome the present crisis preserving our unity and vital interests, we can make more rapid progress than before. The U.S. is prepared to take the lead to this end. This would crown the Chancellor's efforts.

b. If we

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b. If we fail because we either yield vital positions through fear, or sacrifice unity through unwillingness to negotiate on sound positions, we will lose the mutual confidence and sense of momentum needed for further progress.

c. In the decisions he now takes, the Chancellor will be determining to a considerable extent whether or not the vision of the future we share can be fulfilled.

3. Economic.

a. We plan to seek authority to negotiate with the enlarged European Community broad reduction of industrial tariffs within the Atlantic Community, but with the benefits to be available to other areas of the Free World.

b. We also plan increasingly close coordination within the OECD, between an integrated Europe and the U.S. regarding fiscal policy and aid to less developed countries.

4. Military.

a. In NATO, we look to creation of the multilaterally owned and controlled sea-borne MLRM force of which the President spoke at Ottawa. This would cement NATO cohesion and give Europe the role it now lacks in the control and use of strategic nuclear power. Creation of national nuclear capabilities would disrupt Europe and make it impossible to achieve a truly cohesive Atlantic Community.

b. We would welcome suggestions from our Allies regarding decision as to the use of this force.

c. We will move promptly to commit five Polaris submarines to NATO.

5. Framework for Berlin Strategy.

a. Our grand design therefore is closer partnership between a strengthened U.S. and the strong, integrated Europe (which the Chancellor is doing so much to bring about) as the hard core of strength of a viable free world community. We will gear our Berlin strategy to this design and launch major new programs to assist its fulfillment.

b. Negotiations

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b. Negotiations with the Soviets prior to signature of their separate peace treaty and based on a realistic Western negotiating position, which will command itself to Western public opinion, are necessary to get us through the crisis in shape to prosecute our larger common purpose.

c. If an acceptable agreement with the Soviets proves unobtainable, we will have done what we need to do to warrant the support of our people in the climactic confrontation which may follow.

d. Negotiations do not involve: allowing the Soviets a victory on Berlin through sacrifice of our vital interests related thereto; recognition of the "GDR"; or endangering the security of the Western Community.

e. We are counting on the Chancellor's support in convincing de Gaulle to agree to the necessary initiative.

6. Negotiating Position.

a. We want to work closely with the Chancellor in developing an Allied negotiating position which will protect our interests and serve as a basis for serious East-West negotiations.

b. Much useful spade work by the Ambassadorial Group has already been done, but a number of points remain troublesome. We hope to discuss these in some detail in Tuesday morning's meeting. In brief they are principally:

i. Framework. While a satisfactory arrangement within the narrow framework of Berlin access would be preferable, the West must be prepared, if necessary, to deal with certain broader questions.

ii. Status of West Berlin. We maintain that the suspending action of the Three Powers of 1949 prevented West Berlin from becoming a "Land" of the Federal Republic; the Federal Republic holds otherwise.

iii. Dealings with "GDR". This is a troublesome problem. There can be no direct negotiation with the "GDR" on Allied access rights, but many practical problems will arise in the concrete when only East Germans rather than Soviets are left at the access checkpoints.

iv. Boundaries.

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iv. Boundaries. We think the three Western Powers could guarantee an undertaking by the Federal Republic not to try to modify its boundaries or achieve reunification by force. We would also want to keep open the possibility, if it became a critical issue, of accepting a formula that Germany should be reunited within its existing frontiers.

v. Nuclear Weapons. The Federal Republic seems unwilling to reaffirm their renunciation of the manufacture of ABC weapons or to see an agreement on nontransfer of nuclear warheads. U.S. policy continues to oppose any extension of national control of nuclear warheads.

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NLK, NSF 53

November 20, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Acheson says he thinks the sector border in Berlin is the wrong place for fooling around. We would not have the French and British with us; we have only 10,000 men and they can be capped easily and calmly; what do we do after the first move against a new barrier, or the second or the third? He sees no good in making a sharp issue where we are bound to lose. If it were his job, he would ask Clay to explain what happens next at each stage if the "forceful" course is chosen on this issue.

Acheson repeats that, as you know, he is all for force in the right place and at the right time, but he thinks it should be for access to West Berlin, not access to East Berlin.

McG. B.

P. S. I attach an excellent summary of the Kroll conversations to go with your other Berlin papers.

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CMR

November 20, 1961

FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Downgraded To: ~~[illegible]~~ CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 11652: XGDS (1) 2 (3) 4
Authorized By: H. U. Dowdy
Date: 1973

Subject: Possible Meeting with Khrushchev in [illegible] August 4, 1975

In your memorandum of November 8 you asked for my comments on a suggestion made by General Norstad that you might summon Khrushchev to a meeting in Berlin at some stage in the Berlin crisis.

We must distinguish, of course, between the sort of meeting General Norstad suggests, which would be a response to a particular and critical contingency, and the sort that could occur in the course of negotiations on a Berlin settlement. The latter might have occurred prior to a contingency of this gravity, and the meeting in question would then be a second meeting.

In our planning for the Berlin situation we have always had in mind that at some point, in a situation of this nature, a meeting at the highest level with the Soviet Union might be desirable. We have not discussed this extensively with our Allies, but we have included a proposal which would involve such a meeting in our quadripartite planning for the contingency that Allied or German land access to Berlin is blocked. The meeting would be consistent with our planning for other contingencies as well, and there is nothing in existing contingency plans which would be incompatible with the holding of such a meeting.

It is difficult to say this far in advance whether a bilateral meeting would be preferable to one at which other Eastern statesmen would be present. Our quadripartite contingency planning would normally envisage a Four-Power summit meeting. However, I think it would be well to plan privately for a possible bilateral meeting for the event that this should appear in the circumstances to be the most promising.

With respect to location, Berlin would certainly provide a desirable site for such an event. A number of considerations must be weighed in the final choice, however, among them the possibility that our Allies would feel that a bilateral meeting would be particularly inappropriate in Berlin, given the Four-Power character of the city.

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Also, the likelihood of the meeting proving successful would have to be considered, since lack of success in Berlin might have a particularly depressing effect on the Berlin population.

In summary, the idea of a bilateral meeting certainly merits our further consideration. The Department will prepare more detailed plans, of a unilateral US nature, regarding it. This planning will include consideration of site and composition, but the final determination on these points will likely have to be made at a stage closer to the actual contingency.

/s/ Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

S/S - RO
NOV 20 1961
A true copy of signed original

S/O:EUR:GER:AlGyrall
11/16/61

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12/7/94

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November 21, 1961
TIME: 5:00 P.M.
PLACE: Cabinet Room - White House

510

Berlin Contingency Planning I

UNITED STATES

The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Nitze
General Lemnitzer
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Hillenbrand

GERMANY

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Defense Minister Strauss
Dr. Carstens
Ambassador Grewe
General Speidel

(See Last page for distribution)

The present conversation flowed over from the exchange which took place at the end of the restricted military briefing given at 4:00 to Chancellor Adenauer and the German Foreign Minister and Defense Minister.

Defense Minister Strauss commented that the figures for Soviet ground strength given during the briefing obviously did not jibe with those which have been disseminated at NATO. British and American officers in Paris have spoken of 130 to 148 Soviet divisions, and the figure of 180 divisions had become so fixed in NATO thinking that anyone who claimed it to be too high was automatically labeled an optimist. Now the US had given a figure which was one half as large as that considered obligatory in NATO.. He recognized that sometimes inflated figures are given in order to encourage the NATO countries to more effort, but he felt that it was urgently necessary to discuss the new US figures and to arrive at a commonly-agreed estimate. This should be a priority matter for the Chiefs of Staff of the NATO Military Committee which would be meeting in Paris in December. One of the implications of the larger figure commonly used was that it meant the nuclear threshold had to be very low. Other data which required correction were those commonly accepted for comparative tank strength. The President observed that the relative equipment of the Soviet and Western divisions and their size also needed to be compared. Strauss said that the Soviet divisions in the GDR are essentially assault divisions and that they lack infantry. Although they have more artillery and tanks than NATO divisions, the strength of the Soviet divisions is roughly 9,000 to 10,000 as compared to the 15,000 in the standard NATO divisions. This meant that the Soviet divisions would be weak on the defensive. If the new US figures for Soviet divisional strength were correct, then instructions should be issued to NATO committees so that the

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defense line would no longer be along the Weser-Lech line but on the basis of a more forward strategy. He recognized that the US troops operated on the basis of a forward strategy now, but this was not true of the British Army of the Rhine or of the French forces. Secretary McNamara said he agreed the figures needed refinement. The total of 150-160 Soviet divisions is obviously excessive. He also agreed that modification of NATO plans should be based upon a more realistic estimate of Soviet strength plus the fact of the recent NATO build-up.

The President said that when we stressed the desirability of a build-up of conventional forces, we had aroused doubts as to our intentions regarding the use of our nuclear forces. He wondered what Strauss' thoughts were on this subject. Strauss said that no one in Europe had so great an interest as the Germans in avoiding a thermonuclear war. His Government favored balanced collective forces including a strong conventional component. It had always rejected the Radford theory and General Heusinger had been sent to Washington on a special mission in 1956, when the so-called Radford Plan was being discussed, to emphasize the need for a strong conventional component in NATO forces. The Federal Republic is not "nuclear-obsessed" - a term which the Defense Minister had heard for the first time from an American. The Federal Government did, however, support the concept of a credible deterrent as the chief objective of NATO. It opposed the idea that the opponents could safely operate within the nuclear threshold, knowing how far they could go without nuclear retaliation. The other side should never know where the nuclear threshold is. We live in Europe because of the impossibility of war not because of the possibility of conventional war. Even large-scale conventional war would be disastrous for Europe under current conditions.

The President asked whether, based on his information, he believed NATO should build up enough conventional forces to defend Germany without nuclear weapons. Strauss said that Norstad was supposed to have at least 30 divisions on the central front. Assuming these 30 divisions to be really there and using only conventional means, NATO would be able to resist the Soviet divisions now in the GDR. It could not cope with Soviet reserves or interdict the movement of these reserves forward. He pointed out that, even with the 12 full German divisions in the line, the state of the French divisions was such that NATO would not really have the 30 full divisions of which he had spoken.

General Lemnitzer said he agreed that there was a great disparity in estimates regarding the number of Soviet divisions, particularly for those in central Europe. Our estimate was that there were 55 in all the latter area whereas the German estimate was 70 and 9 Satellite divisions. This discrepancy had to be worked out in the Military Committee and as Chairman he would see that it was. He did not believe however that all these Soviet divisions could be used against the NATO shield. Large forces were tied down in rear area defense. Moreover, our nuclear capability in Europe was very great. We would like to see 30 divisions on the central front. This would provide a difficult military problem for the Soviets in central Europe. If the Soviets moved westward their lines of communication would be very vulnerable. The question of when we would employ nuclear weapons could only be determined under the circumstances at the time.

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Defense Minister Strauss said he welcomed the fact that one of the effects of the Berlin crisis had been to achieve the NATO force goals which had been established for non-Berlin crisis conditions. It was hazardous to think that with the divisional strength indicated NATO could fight a conventional war. The Soviets were traditionally willing to expend men and material, and would not be inhibited from doing so if this would achieve their objectives. Hence the German position that, if the West had to commit more than one division, there should be a selective use of nuclear weapons and then full-scale nuclear war. Khrushchev regards himself as the consummation of the Communist revolution. He had attacked the Stalinists for their adventuresome policy. He knows that a nuclear war would mean the end of the central leadership system in the Soviet Union, and he fears this. In the last few years, the credibility of the Western nuclear deterrent has suffered. Perhaps the talks of the Secretary and of the President with Gromyko had increased this once again.

Chancellor Adenauer said he saw the problem in somewhat simpler terms. If no agreement were reached on Berlin in negotiations, the Soviets would take West Berlin within 48 hours, and one hour thereafter they could be moreover in Hamburg; Munich was only 80 kilometers from the East German border. The Soviets would have deployed troops to achieve these objectives, while NATO forces stayed at their same level. The Soviets would build up all the forces they required. Therefore, he said the situation was very serious. The President said he did not doubt that, if the events described took place, we would be in a nuclear war. The seizure of Berlin would be enough to trigger off such a war. He could not see the Soviets giving up the advantage of a first strike by providing this kind of warning, the nuclear situation being what it is now. He thought they would either cut off access, the autobahn or in the air.

The Chancellor asked if he believed that, if the Soviets occupied West Berlin and Hamburg and Munich, that the Italians or other NATO countries would want to fight. The President said the important point was whether the Germans, the Americans, the British and the French would be willing to resist. He asked what, in his judgment, would be the German view if it were realized that use of nuclear weapons by the US would lead to the destruction of Germany. Chancellor Adenauer said he had seen from the military briefing that Western Europe was the target of the main Soviet nuclear strength. Western Europe would indeed be destroyed. Would the Europeans be of a mind to do much fighting under these conditions?

Strauss said he wished to summarize. It was agreed that the Norstad build-up proposals, as agreed by the Foreign Ministers in Paris, must be carried out. If the access routes to Berlin are blockaded because negotiations failed or because they have not taken place, the Western Powers would try to win time by creating an air bridge, though admittedly this would not solve the problem. The Western Powers would make the three kinds of probes contemplated to sound out Soviet intentions. However, the considerations mentioned by Chancellor Adenauer regarding the destruction of Europe had led the Germans to put forward proposals on the use of sea and naval action. Once land and air forces are locked in combat it would be difficult to control the development of the situation. The Allies would then develop action involving up to one

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[redacted] Chancellor Adenauer said he agreed with Strauss. A naval blockade would be a serious warning to the Soviets. He did not know why the British were so opposed to it. The West was far superior at sea. The President commented that the British were on such a narrow ledge as far as the financial situation was concerned that they were fearful of the effects of a blockade. Secretary McNamara said there was also a question of the efficacy of a blockade. It was a useful tool and should be used at a certain point. He believed the Germans would be interested to know that we had reactivated 40 destroyers and taken other measures specifically to add to our naval blockade capabilities. We considered this such a potentially useful measure that we were prepared to undertake it if the necessity arose. The Chancellor observed that the UK and Germany supported the idea but the British objected.

The President asked whether the Germans had any reaction to our MRBM offer as contained in his Ottawa speech. Strauss said that there was not a unified European attitude. He did not think that NATO as a whole could meet the President's request for suggestions on the central problem. The Italians, the Benelux, the Federal Republic, Greece and Turkey would support such a move, and the Federal Republic would soon make proposals as to how it might be translated into reality. Neither the French nor the British were interested, for different reasons. The Germans would make their proposals in the NATO meeting in December. He hoped to discuss certain details with Secretary McNamara during his present visit to Washington.

DISTRIBUTION: Secretary Rusk, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Bohlen, Ambassador Dowling, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Hitch, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Ball

[redacted] TOP SECRET

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

(248)

(511)

November 25, 1961

PERSONAL - SECRET

Dear Tommy:

Thanks for your notes of November 13 and November 16. I shall try to see to it that you are kept better informed.

You are not alone in having differences with Berlin. Headquarters is having some too, as you may have noted from the cables. Certainly you should continue to call the turn as you see it from Moscow. There is a high degree of infectious emotionalism in Berlin and your reports and observations are a most necessary element of balance.

The talks with the Germans went better on the whole than any of us had anticipated. We still have quite a distance to go especially as respects de Gaulle. However the Chancellor undertook to work on him and I hope he will do so effectively. Meanwhile I think we can go ahead in the Ambassadorial group and remove most of the brackets from the substantive paper. We can also make some revision in the draft declaration without, I believe, doing too much damage to the package. As you may have noticed, we have made considerable progress in convincing the Ambassadorial group that further exploration is not an acceptable idea unless it is limited possibly to a few specifics immediately preceding negotiations, with the decision to negotiate having been made in advance.

762.00/11-2561

Sincerely,

Foy

Foy D. Kohler

The Honorable
Llewellyn E. Thompson,
American Ambassador,
Moscow.

FN

(2)

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

NLK, NSF 562

(249)

Saturday, 2 Dec.

(517)

Dear Dean -

I am hand-writing and sending this letter by regular air mail as the surest way for it to reach you without it being seen by many others.

Since my return, I have given careful thought to my value here and I find it insufficient to warrant continuance. I learned quickly in Washington that I am not on the team. In fact, I had to return here to see some of the briefing papers. My cablegrams have not been acceptable except in small part and have had at most a nuisance value. I think it has become quite obvious in our own government as well as here that I have no authority and little influence.

Thus, I knew in Washington that I should not return. I appreciated the personal consideration which the President gave me and I thought, too, that it would be misunderstood if I left just as we reached accord with West Germany. Thus, when the President surprised me by asking in front of the Chancellor if I was returning, I replied Yes and to the further query if I was returning to stay, I also answered in the affirmative. Fortunately, the word "stay" has no dimensions in time.

Here in Berlin without authority or influence, I serve only a symbol and I am not even sure as a symbol of what. I suspected this would result when the President's oral instructions were changed in the written instructions. However, I determined to give it a try. Certain reactions taken here since my arrival have resulted in a Soviet resumption of controls which, at least, for the moment, they are exercising properly. I believe these actions convinced them they could gain no more without use of force and they now propose to maintain the existing status quo until negotiations take place. If this is true, they do want to negotiate.

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However, I find no basic error in our philosophy, which as I see it, is so flexible that it becomes quite ineffective when blended with Allied philosophy results in timidity in action and in the positions we take. I have a deep conviction that if we lose Berlin, we lose Europe and that we can save Berlin only if we are determined to meet the Soviet threat head-on and unilaterally if we must. I am neither an extremist nor an advocate of war as the only way to stop Communism but I see no way to peace that avoids taking the risk of war.

While my departure from Berlin may cause a few hours of consternation here, to stay with whatever symbolic value I may have constantly eroded by my lack of authority and influence would be far worse.

I am writing to you now rather than to the President to work out an orderly way for me to go before writing to him. I am not egotistical enough to think my departure a matter of great concern. Indeed, it may relieve certain apprehensions held by our Allies and perhaps by some of your associates. I am sure it will be happily received in East Germany and perhaps would help create the climate we want. Of course, I can leave on a few hours' notice. However, to minimize any possible ill effects, I would suggest I write the President towards the end of the month stating there appears to be no immediate emergency and asking his permission to return. I could then leave here shortly after the first of the year. If you have other thoughts as to how it should be done, please let me know.

I came prepared to stay as long as my presence seemed helpful. Perhaps I drew too hasty a conclusion that my own views on how to deal with the Russians were well-known and that we were prepared to resist any further invasion of our rights, no matter how small. For me to do otherwise is out of character and indeed destructive of my value here. I am not angry at anyone nor critical of anyone as no one can be wholly right about this complex problem. Nevertheless, my convictions have been formed over too many years and are too deeply seated to be shed lightly or to permit me to stay as a symbol of a determination which I fear will be exercised in conjuration with our Allies, if at all, too late to be effective. I pray to God, I am proved wrong.

With highest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lucius

Berlin
2 December, 1961

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MESSAGE — STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE — TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET JCS 2465 From JCS.

1. Study being conducted here on the military implications of the US and Allied policy objective of maintaining the viability of West Berlin.

2. For your information the following extracts from the study are quoted:

"a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

"(1) The viability of West Berlin is dependent on the maintenance near present levels of civilian access to and from the city by means currently in use, i.e., highway, railroad, inland waterway and air.

"(2) Civilian access, primarily West German, is an outstanding problem which should be addressed for the follo-ing

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DATE GRP: 1530

PAGES: Doc 1 Pt 1

WRITER: JCS (J-5)

RELEASER: P. A. LEMARIE, JR. Lt. Colonel, USMC Chief, Implementation Division

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

JCS 2465 PAGE NR 1

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reasons:

"(a) The United States and its Allies have announced their commitment to support the policy objective of viability, as well as the freedom of and access to West Berlin.

"(b) The vulnerability of civilian surface traffic to interference or denial is obvious; and the threat thereto is increasing.

"(c) The economic life of West Berlin is especially dependent upon uninterrupted surface access to and from the city.

"(d) An unresisted blockage of civil surface access, supplementing the 13 August 1961 division of Berlin, would undermine Allied political objectives just as surely as would an unresisted challenge to Allied military rights of access.

"b. In view of the above considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded, with regard to the viability policy objective, that:

"(1) The primary military implication could be a requirement for military support of civilian access, primarily West German, which could vary from simple demonstrative actions, such as escort of surface traffic, to full-scale military operations.

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"(2) The United States and its Allies should clarify their positions with regard to the military requirements inherent in supporting this policy objective."

3. On the assumption that an affirmative position will be established on the military implication set forth in paragraph 2 b (1) above, request your views on type and scope of additional military contingency plans, or modifications of current plans, which should be developed in support of viability policy objective.

SCP 1.

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FOR CLAY.
Your 1136, INFO BONN 1008
Since 1949 three western occupying powers have consistently taken position that West Berlin is not rpt not a Land of Federal Republic. In Washington Adenauer accepted this as undisputed in international law in consequence allied reservation to that aspect FEDREP constitution. Also in Washington we gave complete assurance Adenauer our policy is to retain the freedom of West Berlin to establish its own relations and other ties with the Federal Republic, including location in Berlin of certain FEDREP agencies and to retain full access. FEDREP statutes now become applicable West Berlin thru reenactment West Berlin legislature subject Allied approval. Many other matters subject to direct arrangement between FEDREP and West Berlin. Thus, in our view, relations between West Berlin and FEDREP are now on a form of contractual basis subject to reserved authority of occupying powers.

762.00/12-661

While

Drafted by: The Secretary/L-AChayes:ejs 12/6/61 | Cleared with: | Approved by: The Secretary

EUR - Mr. Tyler

S/S - Mr. Colloff

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While it may become desirable under some circumstances to remove Allied reservation FEDREP constitution, one basic problem is that FEDREP as such does not have access rights to West Berlin. Civilian access is derivative from Allied occupation rights.

Conclusion your 1136 therefore not correct as to our position. Relationship we have in mind is substantially that now obtaining.

Above points fully covered [redacted] White House meeting Memcon of November 21 which indicates you present. Copy was pouched Mission. See pages 1, 2, and 5, and 6.

RUSK
(2c)

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FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1378, DECEMBER 7, 7 PM

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

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GENERAL CLARKE TOLD ME AT HEIDELBERG TODAY THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER DESPATCH OF MILITARY UNITS OVER HELMSTEDT-BERLIN AFTER MOVEMENT OF BATTLE GROUP WHICH BEGAN TODAY. I DEMURRED, BUT HE THEN SAID CURRENT MOVEMENT WOULD BE AS COMPANY UNITS, AND WOULD BE SPREAD OVER TEN DAYS. I SAID THIS RELIEVED MY CONCERN FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE, BUT I THOUGHT FROM POLITICAL VIEWPOINT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE, DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS, TO MOVE OTHER UNITS FROM TIME TO TIME AFTER FIRST OF YEAR.

SUBSEQUENTLY, I HAVE SEEN TODAY'S EAST GERMAN PROPAGANDA ALLEGING IN EFFECT THAT OUR MILITARY MOVEMENTS OVER AUTOBAHN ARE NOT A RIGHT BUT SUBJECT TO SOVIET APPROVAL. I HAVE ALSO SUBSEQUENTLY SEEN MESSAGE FROM CINCEUR TO CINCUSAUER WHICH STATES " FUTURE UTILIZATION OF ARMED CONVOY TRAFFIC TO MAINTAIN AN INDICATION OF UNRESTRICTED USE OF BERLIN-HELMSTEDT AUTOBAHN CAN BE ATTAINED ADEQUATELY BY FORCES FROM THE BERLIN GARRISON IN CONJUNCTION WITH REGULARLY SCHEDULED TRAINING MISSIONS WHICH REQUIRE THEIR PRESENCE IN WEST GERMANY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT," AND WHICH SEEMS TO INDICATE THERE WILL BE FURTHER MOVEMENTS ALTHOUGH PERHAPS INFREQUENTLY. WE ARE COMMENTING DIRECTLY TO CINCEUR ON THIS MESSAGE.

I FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO DESPATCH OCCASIONAL UNITS AT FAIRLY FREQUENT INTERVALS. TO FOREGO MOVEMENTS FOR

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ANY LENGTH OF TIME IN FACE OF COMMUNIST CONTENTIONS COULD, I THINK, ONLY LEAD THEM TO BELIEVE WE HAD TAKEN THEIR ALLEGATIONS SERIOUSLY, AND COULD WELL BRING ABOUT DIFFICULTIES WHEN MOVEMENT REQUIRED AT SOME LATER DATE.

DOWLING

KEA

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253

Memorandum From Major William Y. Smith to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)

Washington, December 11, 1961.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Clay Cables. Top Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.

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NLK.80F Fr...

This memorandum supplements a memcon prepared by William Tyler which includes the texts on which discussion turned.

517

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

254

December 12, 1961

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

The President called General de Gaulle today. The episode began when Dean Rusk telephoned JFK to say that Couve had been unable to get de Gaulle's agreement to a NATO Council statement prepared and agreed by four Foreign Ministers. Rusk thought only JFK could help. So the call was set up, with Bill Tyler interpreting and Ball and Bundy standing around. The connection was established about 1:15 PM. The President began by stating his deep concern at the prospect of division among the Allies in a fashion that could only benefit Khrushchev. He thought it important to preserve the unity of the Alliance, and while negotiations might well be unsuccessful, he believed they were a necessary means of testing Soviet intentions before we faced the danger of a possible war. General de Gaulle stated his belief that Soviets did not want war and would use negotiation to extract unnecessary concessions.

Discussion turned to the draft paper. General de Gaulle at first suggested that he might accept language which would authorize "certain countries" to "continue" diplomatic contacts, but the President urged the avoidance of language which might seem to indicate that only these "certain countries" favored "continuing" such a course, since this could only mean the U. S. (and U.K.) alone. Neutral and passive language was then accepted: "diplomatic contacts would be undertaken." After further discussion General de Gaulle accepted the notion that such contacts might show whether negotiation was possible. ("Formal negotiations, we suggested; "negotiations objectifs," he proposed; compromise: drop the adjectives.)

What General de Gaulle would not accept was any notion that the contacts would proceed on the basis of "agreed positions." He rejected this phrase and provided the language about safeguarding peace which appears in the revised text. He rejected "carefully prepared positions" (which at one cheerful moment we thought he had accepted because he did not reject it as Tyler read a draft of which it was a part). He rejected "substantive explorations through diplomatic controls." As he repeatedly explained to Tyler, and Tyler to the President, he simply

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

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did not wish to suggest agreement where it did not exist, or support for substantive positions he did not accept. "Carefully prepared positions" (Bundy's favorite) he got rid of by saying that obviously one would not talk without knowing what one wanted to say.

When it was clear that nothing further could be obtained --(General de Gaulle explained that on other points he had made serious concessions; he obviously would go no further) -- the two Presidents exchanged serious and friendly regrets that they could not agree better. They agreed to refer the matter to their Foreign Ministers and to talk again the next day if the Ministers could not agree.

The call was a long one, lasting over half an hour. During its course the President controlled the dialogue throughout, using comments and suggestions from his three advisers. His object was to prevent a split at this early stage -- and only once did he seem discouraged, remarking at a low point in the call that "we don't have enough paper to cover this difference." Tyler was a bilingual and skillful intermediary. Ball rightly urged that the President should keep pressing for the fullest possible effort with de Gaulle, on the ground that de Gaulle would give JFK what he would never give Couve.

McG. B.

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 28, DECEMBER 13, 10 AM

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PRIORITY

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EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUGGEST YOU SEND CLAY BRIEF MESSAGE PRIOR YOUR DEPARTURE FOR LATIN AMERICA. HIS LETTER AGREEING TO STAY PUT FOLLOWS:

QUOTE:

DEAR DEAN: I PROMISED YOU AN ANSWER BEFORE YOU LEFT PARIS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I HAVE THOUGHT A GREAT DEAL SINCE OUR TALK.

I CAME TO BERLIN ONLY BECAUSE OF MY DEEP CONCERN FOR ITS PEOPLE AND MY CONVICTION OF ITS IMPORTANCE TO US. I BELIEVED I COULD HELP RESTORE THEIR CONFIDENCE IN US AND IN THEIR OWN FUTURE. TO DO THIS, I MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE MYSELF.

IN OUR INABILITY TO SPECIFICALLY DEFINE WITH ALLIED AGREEMENT WHEN AND HOW WE SHALL ACT, I HAVE LOST MUCH OF MY CONFIDENCE; NOT THAT WE WILL PERMIT WEST BERLIN TO BE CAPTURED BUT THAT WE ARE REALLY DETERMINED TO KEEP IT FULLY ALIVE. AGAINST THESE DOUBTS, I HAVE YOUR ASSURANCES OF OUR INTENT.

HOWEVER, YOU DISTURBED ME GREATLY WHEN YOU SAID THAT IN LEAVING I WOULD BE LETTING THE PRESIDENT DOWN. THIS I DO NOT INTEND NOR WILL I DO. THUS, IF MY DEPARTURE NOW ADDS TO HIS PROBLEMS, I MUST PUT IT OFF UNTIL HE SAYS THE WORD.

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-2- SECTO 28, DECEMBER 13, 10 AM, FROM PARIS

FAITHFULLY YOURS, LUCIUS

UNQUOTE:

RUSK

BAP

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(256)

519

20166

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary of State

December 13, 1961

FROM: Charles E. Bohlen CEB

There is one possibility in regard to Berlin which cannot be dismissed and might well be worth discussing privately with the Ministers. This possibility is that the Soviet Union has come to the conclusion that there will be no negotiations, or at least no basis on which to negotiate, and has decided to sign their peace treaty with the GDR in the very near future, possibly before the end of the year.

The evidence, as is always the case, is extremely inconclusive but the following recent developments seem to tend in that direction: the recent speech of Khrushchev in which he emphasized Soviet unwillingness to negotiate on Berlin alone and, more importantly, Menshikov's talk to the National Press Club in which he virtually said that there was no basis for negotiation if the West were to insist upon their existing rights in Berlin. The Menshikov speech is of particular interest since it was obviously made by Moscow direction, and Menshikov particularly asked the National Press Club for the opportunity to deliver it.

There is also an item from Berlin (Airgram A-210 of December 7, 1961) reporting a conversation with the Soviet Controller of the Berlin Air Safety Center (copy attached). This Soviet official, in a conversation with his American counterpart, stated that he was particularly gratified to be at BASC at this time since the "closing of BASC would be a most historic occasion". When asked when this would occur, he answered "perhaps in January or maybe in December".

[redacted]

The only reason I mention this possibility to you is so that if there is anything in it we will at least have had a brief discussion with our Allies as to what we do in the event of Soviet action in regard to the Peace Treaty in the near future and not be caught as we were by the August 13 wall building. There may well be nothing to it, but it is well to be prepared.

cc: Mr. Kohler

[redacted] None

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TO: Secretary of State

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FOR DOWLING FROM THE SECRETARY.

YOU WILL HAVE GATHERED FROM REPORTING CABLES BOTH ON QUADRIPARTITE AND NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS THAT DE GAULLE REMAINS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO JOINING WITH OTHER THREE POWERS IN SPONSORING FURTHER APPROACH TO SOVIETS ON NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH HE CONTINUES WILLING TO SET UNILATERAL DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS BE MADE IN MOSCOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER A BASIS MIGHT BE FOUND FOR NEGOTIATIONS, THESE WILL NOT PROCEED FROM COMMON POSITION TO WHICH FRENCH WILL HAVE AGREED. LANGUAGE IN NATO COMMUNIQUE IS INTERPRETED BY FRENCH IN THIS SENSE.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WITH WHICH CHANCELLOR PRESUMABLY FAMILIAR FROM SCHROEDER'S REPORTS, I CAN ONLY SUGGEST THAT ON MONDAY YOU REVIEW SITUATION WITH HIM AND SEEK HIS ADVICE ON POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS. ALTHOUGH I NOTE FROM BONN'S 441 THAT IN YOUR RECENT TALK WITH HIM, CHANCELLOR WAS NOT VERY CLEAR AS TO WHETHER FRENCH WOULD JOIN IN PRELIMINARY TALKS BUT ASSUMED THEY WOULD NOT, HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF DECEMBER 11 SEEMED SOMEWHAT MORE OPTIMISTIC REGARDING RESULTS OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH DE GAULLE, ALTHOUGH VIEW EXPRESSED THAT LATTER COULD NOT BE EXPECTED PUBLICLY TO AGREE WITH US IMMEDIATELY. FACT IS, OF COURSE, THAT DE GAULLE'S POSITION SEEMS TO HAVE REMAINED COMPLETELY UNCHANGED.

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-2- SECTO 43, DECEMBER 15, 10 PM FROM PARIS

THIS PLACES US IN MOST DIFFICULT SITUATION. EXPLORATORY TALKS IN MOSCOW WHICH DO NOT START FROM AGREED SUBSTANTIVE POSITION ARE HARDLY LIKELY TO GET ANYWHERE IN ESTABLISHING WHETHER BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS EXIST, YET FRENCH ARE UNWILLING TO JOIN IN WORKING OUT SUCH AN AGREED POSITION. NET RESULT IS EITHER THAT FRENCH VIEW PREVAILS MERELY BY CREATION OF STALEMATE WHICH PREVENTS ANY FURTHER MOVEMENT, OR OTHER THREE POWERS PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED MUST DEVISE SOME NEW FORMULA.

WE WILL HAVE TO BE IN FURTHER TOUCH WITH CHANCELLOR ABOUT PROBLEM, BUT IN MEANWHILE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUGGESTIONS HE MAY HAVE. DOES HE FEEL THAT FURTHER APPROACH TO DE GAULLE WOULD SERVE ANY PURPOSE?

RUSK

GDW

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TOP SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

258

CM-489-62
JAN 4 1962

521

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

Subject: Publicity Concerning Rotation of Berlin Units

References: a. USCINCEUR msg to ECJCJ, DA IN 152679, dtd 20 Sep 61
b. USCINCEUR msg to ECJCJ, DA IN 154491, dtd 25 Sep 61
c. JCS msg to USCINCEUR, No. 2186, dtd 15 Nov 61
d. STATE 769 to Berlin for Clay, dtd 1 Dec 61
e. Berlin 1123 to STATE from Clay, dtd 4 Dec 61

1. In response to your query concerning the possible unnecessary exacerbation of East - West relations through releases to the press of rotation of units into and out of Berlin, the following is submitted:

2. CINCEUR, on 20 September by reference a, recommended that the rotation of Battle Groups, if approved, be announced publicly asserting the following advantages:

a. Would preclude rumors in Germany which could offset USAREUR mission.

b. Would reaffirm determination to maintain augmentation as long as required.

c. Would capitalize on morale benefits of plan.

3. CINCEUR, on 25 September by reference b, recommended the theater commander be authorized to announce the policy of rotation of battle groups followed by minimum publicity at the time of exchange which would be announced as routine.

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4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 15 November by reference c, concurred in CINCEUR's plan for public release of information on rotation of battle groups and, noting the previous unfortunate press stress on the unusual nature of autobahn movements, requested that the policy announcement indicate the rotation was entirely a routine operation for training, morale, etc. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further requested that they and the Department of Defense be advised at least fifteen days in advance of each rotation, the planned date for the operation and the public information announcement including the date of release.

5. No report has been made of movements of small units, but CINCEUR makes factual releases to the press in low key as a matter of routine.

6. STATE, on 1 December by reference d, cautioned General Clay that we should not distort the significance of normal exercise movements indicating that the President was concerned to avoid providing the SOVIETS with a lever with which to divide the Allies by a plausible claim that trouble originated from a US provocation.

7. General Clay, on 4 December by reference e, replied that from the beginning announcements have been called routine and they had tried to handle them in low key adding that "we cannot control a press which tries to make every incident sensational".

8. General Gray discussed the "provocative" aspects of these press releases with CINCEUR personnel at the NATO Paris meeting and was assured that the releases had been in low key but that news media had chosen to blow them up.

9. If CINCEUR did not announce movements to the press in advance, speculation on the reasons for the movements would probably result in a larger news story than would be the case

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otherwise. Some press recognition is inevitable and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved policy now being implemented tends to minimize the press play given. I, therefore, believe this has been handled properly and that CINCEUR should continue his factual press releases in low key.

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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TO: Secretary of State

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762.00 / 12-661

MOSCOW'S 1854; BERLIN'S 1138

WE AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR THOMPSON THAT GROMYKO MAY TAKE POSITION HE CANNOT FURTHER DISCUSS ACCESS DETAILS UNTIL HE HAS SOME IDEA OF WESTERN THINKING ON FUTURE STATUS OF BERLIN. THERE IS NOT, HOWEVER, MUCH INITIAL FLEXIBILITY IN WESTERN POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT, SINCE POINT (D) OF SECTION 2, ANNEX III (WHICH EMB UNDERSTANDS IS NOT RPT NOT QUADRIPARTITE PAPER APPROVED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS) PROVIDES THAT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRG AND WEST BERLIN MUST REMAIN "IN GENERAL" AS IS.

762.00 / 1-662

IN SPITE OF ADVANTAGES IN TERMS OF RECONNAISANCE OF SOVIET POSITION, THERE IS IN OUR VIEW PROCEDURAL BARRIER TO INTRODUCING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON STATUS AT THIS STAGE. THIS BARRIER IS NEED FOR FOUR POWER AGREEMENT, LACK OF WHICH PRECLUDES DISCUSSION NOW WITH GROMYKO OF ANY DETAILED PROPOSALS ON STATUS OF BERLIN. AT PRESENT STAGE IN THOMPSON-GROMYKO TALKS IT WOULD SEEM DIFFICULT EVEN TO START DISCUSSION OF AMBASSADOR THOMPSON'S PROPOSAL ON FUTURE BERLIN STATUS WITH FEDERAL AND WEST BERLIN OFFICIALS, SINCE THEIR HAND WOULD, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, BE TO INSIST ON PRESENT STATUS OR BETTER.

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-2-1582, JANUARY 6, 2 P.M. FROM BONN.

WE RECOGNIZE URGENCY OF AMBASSADOR THOMPSON'S REQUIREMENT TO HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY IF GROMYKO PRESSES STATUS ISSUE.

IN ORDER TO AVOID REMAINING SILENT ON THIS SUBJECT, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PRESENT SOME SIMPLIFIED CONCEPT OF WEST BERLIN AS IT NOW EXISTS AS PHYSICAL ENTITY, EXPRESSED SOMEWHAT IN FRAMEWORK OF OUR "THREE ESSENTIALS," I.E. FREEDOM AND WELFARE OF POPULATION, PRESENCE OF WESTERN GUARANTORS, AND ACCESS. THIS WOULD AVOID VIOLATING CONSENSUS OF OUR ALLIES AND ANTICIPATING THEIR AGREEMENT, BUT COULD STILL AFFORD ENOUGH TALKING POINTS TO ELICIT SOMETHING OF GROMYKO'S CONCEPTS OF RELATIONSHIP OF WEST BERLIN TO GDR, WHICH IS CRITICAL POINT TO BE CLARIFIED.

WITH REFERENCE TO SUBSTANCE GREATER BERLIN CONFEDERATION IDEA AS OUTLINED, THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO SOVIETS NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF CLAIM EAST BERLIN IS CAPITOL GDR BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT WOULD AFFORD MEANS OF ESCAPE TO EAST BERLIN'S 1,500,000 INHABITANTS AND NECESSITATE BUILDING LONGER WALL AROUND ENTIRE CIRCUMFERENCE EAST SECTOR. EVEN THOUGH SUCH SCHEME MIGHT BE UNPALATABLE TO COMMUNISTS, HOWEVER, IT HAS CERTAIN PLAUSIBILITY WHICH MIGHT MAKE IT TACTICALLY USEFUL IN LATER NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE THINK IDEA SHOULD THEREFORE BE EXPLORED WITH OUR ALLIES.

DOULING

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January 9, 1962

SECRET Enclosure

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Assessment of Current Soviet Intentions in the Berlin Crisis

762.00/1-962

Enclosed is a paper prepared in the Department which I think will be of particular interest to you.

The Special Eyes Only Supplement has received extremely limited distribution in the Department corresponding to that received by the Eyes Only telegrams on this subject.

s/ McManguld
L. D. Battle

(1)

Enclosures:
Report NSAM-3.16

Special Supplement
dated 1/4/62 (Eyes Only)

SECRET Enclosure

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Research Memorandum
RSB 3.16, January 4, 1962

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS
December 28 - January 3

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Negotiations. The January 2 conversation between Ambassador Thompson and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko indicated no basic change from the Soviet negotiating position on Berlin and Germany expounded in earlier talks (Bundy-Gromyko) and official speeches. The Soviet Foreign Minister did express willingness to resume discussions at any time suitable to both parties.

The series of New Year's greetings to East Germany from the rest of the bloc conspicuously avoided any passages linking the idea of a peace treaty with a 1962, or any other, deadline. Ulbricht, on the other hand, stated in his greeting to the GDR populace that conclusion of a treaty continued to be a task of "supreme importance and urgency in 1962."

Reports stemming from Soviet diplomatic sources hinted at the existence of a timetable for the operational guidance of Soviet representatives abroad. According to the reports, Moscow allegedly expected a Four-Power meeting on the Berlin question to be convened during January or February. If, however, agreement for such a conference could not be reached, the USSR would itself convene a peace conference during the first half of March, inviting all states which had participated in the war against Germany. The conference purportedly would ignore completely the question of an occupation status in West Berlin, leaving this issue to be resolved exclusively by the Allies vis-a-vis East Germany once a peace treaty was signed.

Other Soviet diplomatic channels reported consideration being given in Moscow to the idea of prolonging discussions on Berlin indefinitely, somewhat in the nature of the disarmament talks.

Military Preparations and Demonstrations. No changes in the bloc military posture related to Berlin and Germany have been reported in the past week.

Harassment of the US Military Mission in East Germany apparently ceased after the first week in December, following the initiation of counter-harassment tactics against the Soviet military missions in West Germany.

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Berlin and Germany. Despite a series of rumors that GDR authorities intended to impose visa and custom controls on all foreigners at the Berlin sector border during the holiday season, no changes in access procedure or interference with access were reported during the past week.

US protests concerning the barring of General Watson from East Berlin unless the civilian officials accompanying him submitted to GDR identification controls elicited no satisfactory response from the Soviet authorities. In retaliation, the US sector officials barred the Soviet commandant and his political advisor from entering West Berlin through the American sector.

Both Soviet and East German media renewed charges of FRG provocative action in West Berlin, citing in particular plans of various FRG Bundestag (parliament) groups to meet in Berlin during January. An East German railroad official also reiterated earlier accusations of vandalism and sabotage in S-bahn installations in West Berlin.

Additional reports of the arrival or pending arrival of foreign workers in at least three industrial areas of East Germany appeared through various channels. In two instances the workers were identified as Russians.

In an article in Pravda (December 30) outlining and justifying the course of developments in East Germany, Ulbricht cited for the Soviet public a figure of 30 billion marks as the estimated cost to the GDR economy of the refugee exodus. He also stressed the role played by the Soviet army in the establishment and support of the East German state, emphasizing the advice and assistance given by army officers — "Soviet communists, at that time in military uniform." Other Ulbricht pronouncements over the New Year's holidays also referred to the economic tasks facing the GDR and the necessity of a bloc role in strengthening the GDR against Western "economic troublemakers." The GDR greetings to the USSR made a point of the "establishment of close economic union with the Soviet Union."

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

The course of the Thompson-Gromyko conversations indicated the USSR was, for the moment at least, interested in continuing diplomatic discussions and in maintaining an atmosphere conducive to further soundings. The evident Soviet interest in continuing the talks would imply the USSR does not intend to embark on major moves relating to Germany until some further diplomatic probings have taken place in Moscow.

The various reports of Soviet timetables and alternate plans of action would appear to reflect Soviet planning for varying contingencies. The reported March deadlines in particular do not necessarily imply a Soviet commitment to act, but probably concern plans and preparations (diplomatic, military, etc.) to be completed at a certain time which would enhance the USSR's freedom of maneuver during the period in question.

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The various recent East German pronouncements, and particularly the Ulbricht Pravda article, may well reflect GDR concern with the course of Soviet policy toward Germany and represent attempts to pressure the USSR to a GDR-favored line. Ulbricht's specific references to the role played by the Red Army in the establishment of the GDR appears to be at variance with Khrushchev's oft-repeated thesis that communism cannot be imposed by arms, and in any event touches upon a subject rarely mentioned in public by East German communists. Ulbricht may have intended to underscore the USSR's responsibility for the future of its own creation, conceivably to counter those in Moscow who may be advocating a lessened Soviet commitment in East Germany.

In this connection, Ulbricht's references to economic problems and the cost of the refugees to the GDR economy could foreshadow large-scale Soviet or bloc economic assistance to East Germany or GDR pressure for such assistance. In any event, Ulbricht's justification of the communist course of action in East Germany would seem to reflect the existence of a certain amount of questioning within the USSR as to basic reasons behind the refugee exodus and the consequent need for the wall.

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Special Supplement to Research Memorandum RSB 3.16, dated January 4, 1962

ANALYSIS OF THOMPSON-GROMYKO TALK, JANUARY 2, 1962

Gromyko reiterated the general lines of the now-standard Soviet "submarinum" position calling for a separate four-power agreement on West Berlin which the USSR would subsequently incorporate in a separate treaty with the GDR. The agreement would provide for a change in West Berlin's status, guarantee free access, and "respect for GDR sovereignty" (a formula subject to many interpretations and exploitations). The GDR would assume "obligations" under the four-power agreement, but the form of the GDR's association with the agreement was left unclear. The agreement, Gromyko stated, should not be concluded in "isolation" from agreements on other, unspecified, issues.

As was to be expected, Gromyko insisted on the need to change the status of West Berlin and sought to create the impression, without being categorical, that this was a precondition for an agreement on access. However, he apparently did not specifically call for the abrogation of occupation rights in West Berlin.

It was evident from the course and the tone of the discussion that Gromyko was not adverse — or did not wish to appear adverse — to giving serious consideration to any "reasonable" Western proposals. In particular, he evinced a surprising amount of interest in the suggested international authority for the Berlin access routes, surprising considering that he conveyed this interest intentionally or otherwise during the first round of discussions. Gromyko also conceded that the USSR in principle considered it possible to reach an agreement on freedom of access to Berlin.

It would appear, however, that Gromyko's negotiating tactics were directed at least as much toward insuring a mere continuation of the talks as toward developing a substantive base for possible agreement. He linked his reference to the possibility of an access agreement to simultaneous agreement on other points "in which the USSR was interested," but refused to spell out the latter. (This response also was an obvious counter move to Ambassador Thompson's insistence that the nature of the access agreement obtainable would determine whether questions other than access could be negotiable.) Gromyko also introduced the broader concept of European security into the discussion (noting pointedly that Secretary Rusk himself had raised the issue.) Soviet spokesmen in the past have repeatedly contended that the introduction of European security matters into negotiations on Berlin and Germany was a Western device to sidetrack the talks or prolong them indefinitely.

In sum, Gromyko provided no firm indications as to the future course of the Soviet negotiating line. While indicating a willingness to consider

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such proposals as the international access authority, he did not stray significantly from the standard Soviet position. However, the line of his argumentation indicates that the USSR:

(a) is definitely interested in prolonging the talks;

(b) intends to strive to broaden the substantive base;

(c) is likely to produce in the near future a counter plan in some form linking the international access authority with a formal change in the status in West Berlin which without being specific about it will in effect alter the occupation status; and

(d) failing agreement here, may venture in the broad range of European security arrangements.

For the time being, however, it would appear Gromyko intends first to probe how firm Western commitment to the present occupation status in West Berlin will remain. The future course of Soviet negotiating tactics will then probably proceed from that estimate.

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NLK NSF186 Gromyko Talks

261

SECRET

January 10, 1962

524

Mac:

Disenchantment with the latest instruction to Thompson moves me to the following suggestion: That your boss and the Secretary hold the following conversation --

1. It's time the U.S. Government decide what it wants to come out of the current Moscow talks. This objective should be:

(a) To move the Soviets as far as possible toward agreement on the basis of State's proposed Berlin 10-point declaration.

(b) Then to agree on a Foreign Ministers' Conference -- a deux, or a trois-- even if only modest progress is achieved in the talks.

This objective is not to engage in dialectic argument with the Soviets; quis bono? Nor is the objective to get enough progress to engage the French; this is an objective too unlikely of achievement to warrant major emphasis.

2. Having clearly fixed its objective, the U.S. Government should advise Thompson of this view in answer to his 1907. That telegram, which asks what we're after, is being given only a "hold" answer in a one-sentence addition to the current supplementary instruction to Thompson. In elaborating to Thompson what the U.S. objective is, the U.S. Government should also:

(a) Forward the latest draft (#10) of the 10-point declaration;

(b) Ask for Thompson's view as to the best way of fulfilling the stated objective in future talks;

(c) Send Thompson any further documents, if any, necessary to give him a clear view of German attitudes. (I suspect he has this already.)

3. From then on, the procedure of sending Thompson instructions should be as follows:

(1)

(a) A query to Thompson before each meeting as to how he believes that our basic purpose could best be served in the coming meeting.

(b) Then sending back an instruction to Thompson which, failing some overpowering objection here, simply confirms his proposals as to what he should say. We would clear as much of this instruction as we could with our allies, and send the rest of it to him in a unilateral supplementary instruction (a device to which we already resort for some purposes).

4. What this proposal is designed to accomplish is:

(a) Ends: Get a clear consensus, to which the key figures here concerned with Thompson's instructions subscribe and which is known to Thompson, as to what we want out of these talks. I have the feeling part of the problem now is that such a consensus is lacking: Some think it's a debating exercise; some are out to entice the French; some view it as a prelude to a U.S./Soviet conference; and you can't do all these things simultaneously.

(b) Means: Get Washington out of the business of telling Thompson how to punctuate sentences, how to argue, in short, how to deal with a wide variety of tactical issues that he is probably a lot better fitted to cope with than we are. I think the talks would be a lot more effectively conducted if he had a clear view of our purpose and of allied attitudes, and then left to plot his course -- subject to our approval.

Henry Owen

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Despite Spaak's lack of certainty, Department believes most obvious explanation Soviet December 27 memo is also essentially correct one, i.e., that it is attempt to drive wedges between FRG and its Allies, create discord, and woo former toward better relations with Soviets with blatent offer of advantages which might accrue from improved bilateral relationship.

Although attempt may appear clumsy or crude to sophisticated reader, this very bluntness and lack of subtlety may cause document to appear as honest straightforward rational argument to less experienced. Memo contains appeals to various possibly vulnerable elements — neutralists, pacifists, business circles, as well as both political left and political right. Repeated appeals to German nationalistic sentiment rather ironic.

Point worth noting was/that West German national interests impeded by adherence to NATO and could be advanced by reorientation Eastern policy and bettering relations with Soviet Bloc.

In flattering tone adopted at outset and used throughout main Soviet argument is of course that Western Powers wholly uninterested in advancing West German national interests and merely using FRG for own selfish purposes primarily

Drafted by EUR

Marshall 1/11/62

GER - Martin J. Hillenbrand

SOV - Mr. Anderson

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primarily to lessen German economic competition. Tactic of warning Western Powers against Bonn's militarism and aggressive purposes thus reversed to warn Bonn against deviousness of Allies. Emphasis put on natural competition between FRG economy and that of US, UK and France as opposed complimentary nature FRG and Soviet economies. Memo attempts provide strong argument to West German elements interested in expansion of trade and reorientation Eastern policy. In this appeal to FDP elements Soviets may hope to put strain on coalition.

While memo contains nothing essentially new does include one formulation which may possibly be meaningful variation of Soviet negotiating position on Berlin. Memo states: "We have no objectionto the liveliest connections between the Federal Republic and West Berlin in economic, political [REPEAT POLITICAL], and cultural affairs. These connections, however, must rest on a proper legal foundation, including respect for the sovereignty and rights of other countries, irrespective of the types of relationship which the Federal Republic has chosen to adopt toward them."

Although as Ambassador Thompson points out, in not attaching much importance to this statement, as practical matter Soviets must recognize that such contacts are inevitable, it should also be noted that past Soviet pronouncements have been adamant regarding necessity eliminating these political ties. In November Khrushchev said he "adamant as iron" on this and in December Soviet Ambassador in Bonn publicly insisted such ties would never be tolerated. Although precise meaning this passage not wholly clear, Soviets do seem seek change basis of political contacts and arrangement

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arrangement precluding possibility eventual incorporation West Berlin in FRG. Probably means special FRG-Berlin ties could not exist but such ties would have to be like those with any other foreign country.

Also of some interest are Soviet comments regarding West Berlin's economic viability which probably both further attempt appeal West German economic interests and hint of possible Soviet economic assistance to prevent Berlin from "wasting away" under arrangement ending occupation status.

Soviet sensitiveness to European integration indicated by argument that Sixes and Sevens can only increase competition within internal national markets.

Regarding West Berlin morale, although on whole it appears to be holding up relatively well there does seem to be some cause for concern. Since August 13 GDR has greatly intensified its propaganda war and there are some signs that much vaunted immunity of West Berliners is no longer as effective as it used to be. Rumors circulated by the East and stories given currency by East radio and through word-of-mouth and letter writing campaigns apparently do have some effect in West Berlin not in sense that people believe what East says but in generally increasing their nervousness.

Our Mission in Berlin reports sensing growing unease and concern in business community only partly accounted for in statistics and despite fact many individual businessmen insist business holding up extremely well. However orders in producers goods sector show substantial decline at time when orders generally on seasonal rise. On other hand industrial orders for consumers goods have increased substantially. On whole economic indicators at end 1961 showed West Berlin economy adjusted

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adjusted better than would have been expected to sealing off of East Berlin with consequent loss of political confidence.

Loss of population which accelerated after August 13 has gradually declined to around 1,000 weekly which not wholly offset by inflow of persons between 800 and 1,000 weekly. However 60-65% of newcomers are of working age as opposed to 50% of outgoers.

Despite fact Brandt cautiously optimistic regarding spirit population Department somewhat concerned and has initiated broad study to ascertain how West Berlin's viability - in full sense of word including morale - can be improved.

RUSK
(by)

RUSK

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TO: Secretary of State

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BONN FOR AMBASSADOR

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FROM CLAY FOR RUSK

RE DEPTEL 907 BERLIN. I CANNOT COMMENT INTELLIGENTLY ON THE SINGLE QUESTION AS TO THE NEED FOR IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES TO STOP ENTRY OF SOVIET COMMANDANT AND POLAD INTO AMERICAN SECTOR. THE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED ARE NOT STRINGENT. HOWEVER, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT NOTHING DISASTROUS WOULD HAPPEN BY STOPPING THE PROCEDURES OR INDEED BY REMOVING THE PROHIBITION.

I UNDERSTAND THAT WE HAVE AGREED IN TRIPARTITE MEETINGS HERE FOR CHAIRMAN COMMANDANT TO APPROACH SOVIETS IN EFFORT TO RETURN TO NORMAL. HOWEVER, BRITISH AND FRENCH HAVE REJECTED THIS APPROACH UNLESS WE AGREE TO WITHDRAW BAN ON SOVIET POLAD. BRITISH NOW IN THE CHAIR DO NOT WISH TO RAISE THIS QUESTION WHICH, OF COURSE, RESULTS FROM THE LONG TIME PRACTICE OF BRITISH CIVILIANS TO SHOW IDENTIFICATION. IF THIS APPROACH IS MADE IT IS NOT LIKELY TO HAVE ANY FAVORABLE RESULTS AND HENCE WOULD NOT CHANGE THE PRESENT SITUATION.

IF WE ARE NOT GOING TO TAKE THE MINIMUM EFORCEMENT MEASURES NECESSARY TO SHOW OUR INTENT THEN WE SHOULD WITHDRAW THE PROHIBITION ENTIRELY AS IT WOULD SOON BECOME EVIDENT VTHAT WE WERE MAKING NO EFFORT AT ENFORCEMENT. WHILE I REPEAT THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT BE DISASTROUS, I MUST ADD THAT NEITHER HAVE I SEEN ANY ESCALATION OR MAJOR PROBLEM ARISING FROM THE PROHIBITION. FINLETTER IN HIS POLTO 890 DEPT (90 BERLIN) PARAGRAPH ONE EXPRESSES MY VIEWS IN BETTER LANGUAGE THAN I CAN USE.

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THUS, I THINK THE REAL ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION LIES IN AMERICAN POLICY HERE. I HAD UNDERSTOOD WHEN I CAME THAT OUR POLICY HERE WAS TO BE FIRM ON THE GROUND WITHOUT TRUCULENCE, ALTHOUGH I REALIZED THEN THATSUCH A POLICY WOULD NEVER RECEIVE BRITISH AND FRENCH SUPPORT. THE FEW THINGS WE HAVE DONE HERE HAVE ALL BEEN IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET OR EAST GERMAN INVASION OF OUR RIGHTS. AS WE HAVE TAKEN NO ACTION EXCEPT IN SUCH RESPONSE, NO ONE OF THESE COUNTERMEASURES WAS IMPORTANT IN ITSELF. HOWEVER, I STILL ADHERE STRONGLY TO THE VIEW WHICH I HELD WHEN I CAME THAT WE CANNOT LAST FOR LONG IF WE FAIL TO RESPOND TO INSULTS AND INVASIONS OF OUR RIGHTS.

WHILE THIS EXCHANGE OF CABLES WAS TAKING PLACE AN OFFICER ON LIAISON MISSION HAD HIS CAR BROKEN INTO AND WAS STRUCK IN THE FACE. MUST WE ACCEPT SUCH THINGS IN ORDER TO HAVE AN ATMOSPHERE OF PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION?

IF IT WAS NOT OUR POLICY TO BE FIRM ON THE GROUND IN BERLIN, THEN INDEED I HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD IT. I AM NOT TRYING TO MAKE POLICY HERE, ALTHOUGH I FEEL STRONGLY WE MUST HAVE A DEFINITE POLICY TO GOVERN OUR ACTIONS IF WE ARE TO BEHAVE CORRECTLY. I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TRY TO KEEP THINGS AS QUIET AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, IF OUR GOVERNMENT DEEMS THE MAINTENANCE OF ALLIED UNITY IN BERLIN IS PREFERABLE TO A STRONG STAND, THEN WE HERE MUST ACCEPT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH VIEWS WHICH DO COINCIDE HERE ON A "WE MUST DO NOTHING AS ANYTHING DONE IN BERLIN MIGHT ESCALATE". THIS IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH COMPLETE ALLIED UNITY IN BERLIN IS POSSIBLE, AND IF THIS IS WHAT OUR GOVERNMENT DESIRES WE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED ACCORDINGLY.

TRIVERS

HMR

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January 12, 1962

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Dear Rusk:

Fay has mentioned to me one or two problems which have been created for you in General Clay's presence in Berlin and his comings and goings to meet with me and the President. Let me say as directly as possible that these matters in no way affect the complete confidence which the President and I both have in you and in the job you are doing in Bonn. Any consideration of the problem must start, therefore, with that as a basic premise.

The fact is that General Clay is, for understandable historical reasons, a symbol of firmness in Berlin. The President is determined to be firm with respect to our vital interests in West Berlin. At the same time, looking down the cannon's mouth of the awful responsibility he bears, he is also determined to maintain responsible contact with the Soviet Union in an effort to avoid the incineration of the West. He recognized that exploratory discussions, negotiations and efforts to find a peaceful result would inevitably cause uncertainties and misgivings in West Berlin, and possibly in Germany. He felt that the presence of General Clay in West Berlin would help stabilize morale in that city during what must inevitably be a difficult period.

I fully recognize that there is a possibility that your own stature in Bonn may appear to be diminished somewhat because of General Clay's role. This is not an intended result and we shall take advantage of opportunities to underline to the Germans that this is not the case. But in the broadest spectrum of international and domestic politics, General Clay's role is important to us and I hope you will not be unduly anxious about the ramifications of difficulty which might be created thereby.

The Honorable
Walter C. Dowling,
American Ambassador,
Bonn.

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PERSONAL
EYES ONLY

I send you this personal note to let you know that we fully understand these difficulties and greatly appreciate your own understanding in dealing with them during this temporary period.

Cordially,

Dean Rusk

S:DR:fr:pdb

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1338, JANUARY 15, 4 PM

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BONN FOR AMBASSADOR

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762.0221/1-1562

FROM CLAY

RE BONN'S 1650 DEPT, 546 BERLIN.

I WOULD LIKE TO JOIN DOWLING IN EXPRESSING CONCERN AT WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM GERMANY IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WE GAVE GREAT PUBLICITY TO SENDING OF THESE REINFORCEMENTS AS INDICATION OF OUR DETERMINATION TO RESIST SOVIET THREAT. WITHDRAWAL UNTIL THREAT DIMINISHES CAN NOT HELP BUT BE INTERPRETED AS A WEAKENING IN OUR DETERMINATION.

WITHDRAWAL WILL BE PARTICULARLY DAMAGING IF MOSCOW TALKS GO BADLY UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCOUNT CONVENTIONAL WARFARE AS COMPARED TO IMMEDIATE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON IN EXPLANATION.

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12:05 p.m.

266

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1346, JANUARY 16, NOON

EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

FROM CLAY FOR RUSK

PLEASE HOLD TO MINIMUM DISTRIBUTION

WATSON HAS INCREASED INTERVALS BETWEEN CONVOYS ON IRREGULAR PATTERN TO MAINTAIN PRINCIPLE BUT TO REDUCE TRAFFIC INTENSITY IN A WAY WHICH WE HOPE WILL NOT BE DISCOVERED BY PRESS. IF IT IS, WE WILL DENY ANY CHANGE IN PRINCIPLE ON BASIS TRAFFIC HAS ALWAYS BEEN BASED ON MILITARY NEEDS.

HE IS ALSO SLOWLY REMOVING TANK PLATOON FROM POSITION NEAR FRIEDRICH STRASSE CROSSING TO TEMPLEHOF WHERE A PLATOON WILL CONTINUE ON THE ALERT. THIS MOVE WILL OF COURSE BE NOTED SHORTLY SO IT WILL BE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED. IF EXPLANATION IS NEEDED, IT WILL BE THAT TEMPLEHOF IS BETTER MILITARY DISPOSITION.

PLEASE ADVISE TAYLOR.

TRIVERS

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BERLIN 1346

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

(529)

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Control: 10300
Rec'd: January 18, 1962
3:32 p.m.

(267)

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3493, JANUARY 18, 4 PM

MICROFILMED FOR KENNEDY L.B.J. APRIL 1964

EYES ONLY

PARIS-3493

762.0221/1-18-62

FROM AMBASSADOR

EYES ONLY

IN SPITE DE GAULLES FIRM POSITION ON ALLIED RIGHTS IN BERLIN AND ON GERMAN PROBLEM IN GENERAL, IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED FREQUENTLY THAT WHEN CHIPS ARE DOWN THE FRENCH WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO USE FORCE AND THAT ONE OF MOTIVES FOR DE GAULLES REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTS WITH USSR IS FACT THAT FRENCH HAVE SO TO SPEAK WRITTEN OFF BERLIN.

IT OCCURS TO US THAT THERE ARE PASSAGES IN DE GAULLES LETTER JAN 11 TO PRES KENNEDY WHICH COULD BE EXPLOITED IN MANNER WHICH WOULD PUT FRANCES POSITION FIRMLY ON RECORD AND WOULD EFFECTIVELY COUNTERACT ABOVE ALLEGATIONS.

FOR EXAMPLE DE GAULLE PROPOSES IN PENULTIMATE PARA OF HIS LETTER THAT USSR, UK AND FRANCE "AFFIRM TOGETHER THAT THEY WOULD OPPOSE BY ALL METHODS JANS SOV ATTEMPT TO MODIFY BY FORCE THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GERMANY, INCLUDING BERLIN".

IN FIFTH PARA LETTER DE GAULE EMPHASIZES HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT EACH OF THREE WESTERN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY US, CONTINUE GIVE GERMAN PEOPLE VIEW THAT THEY "INTEND TO MAINTAIN EVERYWHERE, IN EVERY CASE AND BY EVERY MEANS, THE SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN TRUE SINCE WAR."

(1)

SHOULD WE WISH TO GET PUBLIC REASSURANCES OF DE GAULLES POSITION IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO FIND APPROPRIATE

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-2- 3493, JANUARY 18, 4 PM FROM PARIS

OCCASIONS FOR MAKING JOINT DECLARATION ALONG LINES OF "IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE AT THIS JUNCTURE FOR US, UK AND FRANCE TO REITERATE AGAIN PUBLICLY THEIR DETERMINATION TO REMAIN IN BERLIN ETC".

NOT ONLY WOULD THIS SERVE AS BASIS FOR GETTING DE GAULLE ON RECORD FOR MAINTAINING STATUS QUO IN BERLIN BUT IT WOULD BE USEFUL AS REASSURANCE TO GERMANY AND PARTICULARLY TO WEST BERLIN.

GAVIN

RJT

SECRET

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Action

SS

Info

SECRET

Control: 10972
Rec'd: Jan. 19, 1962
9:02am

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1988, JANUARY 19, 1 PM

EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

RE DEPTELS 1681, 1682

1) ALTHOUGH I THINK INDICATIONS ARE SOVIETS DO NOT WISH PROLONG TALKS BETWEEN GROMYKO AND MYSELF AND HAVE PROBABLY MADE DECISION IN ABSENCE MAJOR CONCESSIONS BY WEST THEY WILL EVENTUALLY PROCEED WITH SEPARATE TREATY, I DO THINK IT LIKELY THAT FOLLOWING IMPASSE WITH GROMYKO, KHRUSHCHEV WILL HIMSELF EITHER DISCUSS MATTER WITH ME OR ONE OF OTHER WESTERN AMBASSADORS OR PERHAPS COMMUNICATE WITH PRESIDENT OR MACMILLAN OR ADENAUER. IN SUCH EVENT I WOULD EXPECT HIM TO ADOPT SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE POSITION.

2) I SUSPECT FRENCH WILL OBJECT TO TABLING OF DOCUMENTS ON OUR PART BUT I DO SEE ADVANTAGE IN AT LEAST SUBMITTING SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY PROPOSAL AND, IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED, ON ALL-BERLIN PROPOSAL.

3) ON QUESTION MEMORANDUM SUGGEST WE MIGHT FOLLOW GROMYKO PRECEDENT BY PREPARING ORAL STATEMENT WHICH I WOULD READ AND LEAVE TEXT WITH HIM. THIS WOULD BE ALONG LINES INSTRUCTIONS DEPTEL 1681, SLIGHTLY BROADENED TO RESTATE OUR BASIC POSITION AS SET FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS FOR MY FIRST MEETING. SINCE DOCUMENTS IN SUCH STATEMENT LIKELY EVENTUALLY BE PUBLISHED BELIEVE EXACT TEXT SHOULD BE DRAFTED BY DEPT.

(1) 4) IN ANY EVENT HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON INSTRUCTIONS.

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Moscow 1988

26.2.00/1-1962

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I QUESTION WISDOM OF SOME OF ARGUMENTATION IN PARAS 2 AND 3 DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS, PARTICULARLY EMPHASIS ON "EXTREME" POSITIONS. THIS SEEMS TO IMPLY THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AND NOT GENUINE. I WOULD SUGGEST ARGUMENTS AGAINST FREE CITY COULD BE STRENGTHENED, PARTICULARLY BY EMPHASIZING THAT IT IS OPPOSED BY PEOPLE OF WEST BERLIN AND IN THIS CONNECTION WE COULD REPEAT REFERENCE TO WILLINGNESS HOLD PLEBISCITE. RATHER THAN SAYING SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD PROVIDE FOR CONSTANT INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS BY 4 POWERS SUGGEST WE SHOULD STATE THAT SOVIETS, HAVING ATTEMPTED DISPOSE OF EAST BERLIN WITHOUT WESTERN CONCURRENCE, APPEAR TO BE SEEKING BASIS ON WHICH THEY COULD INTERFERE IN AFFAIRS WEST BERLIN. MIGHT ALSO STATE THAT WOULD BE DIFFICULT ESTABLISH INDEPENDENT ALL-BERLIN AS VIABLE ENTITY BUT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE DO THIS FOR SECTION OF CITY.

I QUESTION UTILITY OF ARGUMENT IN PARA 5 AND PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REFERRING TO OVERFLIGHTS SINCE SOVIET ARGUMENT IS THEY PERFECTLY WILLING AGREE PROVIDED, AS IN OTHER CASES, AGREEMENT OF GDR IS SECURED.

SINCE WE ARE IN ESSENCE REPLYING TO GROMYKO'S STATEMENT, SUGGEST BRIEF PARA STATING WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS "OTHER QUESTIONS" WHEN WE KNOW WHAT KIND OF BERLIN SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE.

5) IF GROMYKO SHOULD ATTEMPT PIN ME DOWN ON COMPOSITION BOARD OF GOVERNORS ACCESS AUTHORITY, SUGGEST THAT IN VIEW GERMAN POSITION I MIGHT STATE THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED ENVISAGE REPRESENTATION BOTH PARTS OF GERMANY AND BOTH PARTS OF BERLIN. WERE SUCH PERSONS TO BE APPOINTED AS OFFICIAL OR GOVT REPRESENTATIVES, HOWEVER, THIS WOULD RAISE FOR US PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION AND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE

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FOR THEM TO BE APPOINTED AS INDIVIDUALS BUT WHOLE QUESTION OF COMPOSITION BOARD OF GOVERNORS IS PROBLEM WHICH WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS. DO NOT PROPOSE RAISE THIS QUESTION UNLESS GROMYKO TAKES INITIATIVE.

THOMPSON

DT

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Fle Let

TOP SECRET

269

531

(STATE DRAFT - Not cleared with Department of Defense)

SUBSTANCE OF DISCUSSIONS

OF

STATE-JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING

HELD IN ROOM 2E924, THE PENTAGON BUILDING

ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 19, 1962, AT 11:30 A.M.

PRESENT

Defense

Admiral Anderson, USN
General Smith, USAF
General Decker, USA
General Shoup, USMC
Lt. General Wheeler, USA
Lt. General Hamlett, USA
Vice Admiral Sharp, USN
Maj. General Carpenter, USAF
Maj. General Hayes, USMC
Rear Admiral Wellings, USN
Rear Admiral Blouin, USN
B/General Hutchin, USA

JSSC

Rear Admiral Miller, USN
Maj. General Holtzner, USAF
Maj. General Gray, USA

Office of Chairman, JCS

Maj. General Parker, USA

State

Mr. Johnson
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Morgan
Mr. Rice
Mr. Bell
Mr. West
Mr. Newsom
Col. Robinson

CIA

General Cabell
Mr. Sheldon

OSD/ISA

Mr. Nitze
Mr. Bundy
Rear Admiral Heinz

TOP SECRET

13-608

I. BERLIN

Mr. Kohler opened the discussion of Berlin with the statement that Gromyko, in his January 12 talks with Ambassador Thompson, took an extremely hard line. He reiterated demands for a demilitarized West Berlin with access thereto under East German control. In addition, he restated a demand that Soviet troops be stationed in West Berlin along with those of the allies. He also attempted to widen the negotiations to include a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty, prohibition of nuclear weapons for both East and West Germany and respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. This hard line was formalized in two draft documents on a new status for West Berlin and guarantees therefor which Gromyko handed to Ambassador Thompson.

Mr. Kohler indicated that we really do not have a clear idea of just what the Soviet intentions are with regard to their ultimate objectives in the Gromyko-Thompson exchanges. Ambassador Thompson feels that the Soviets probably will continue a hard uncompromising line after which they will end the talks and proceed to sign a separate peace treaty with the

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with the GDR. Mr. Kohler and Mr. Bohlen do not entirely share this view. They feel that while we may be faced merely with a classic Soviet negotiating tactic, which was to be expected at some stage of the talks, we are not altogether certain that this is the case. The Soviets appear to be motivated partly by pressures from within; or possibly by some development arising out of their nuclear test series. There has been considerable restraint with respect to recent Soviet actions and statements. Khrushchev has been very quiet and the Soviets recently have made small but noticeable gestures of reasonableness which include an unprecedented apology for GDR violence against a U.S. Military Mission car in East Berlin and an offer of assistance to another American car which had broken down. None of these signs, however, augur an early break in the negotiations by the Soviets. On the other hand, Gromyko, for the first time read a talking paper to Ambassador Thompson instead of entering a free discussion as in the past. This, coupled with the presentation of the two draft papers to Ambassador Thompson, may indicate that the Soviets are attempting to establish

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establish a documented record which they might wish to publish at a later date. This record would serve as the basis for a propaganda position from which the Soviets could proceed to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR.

As for the reply to Gromyko, we are in substantial agreement with the British and Germans that we should present a hard position. It is planned that Ambassador Thompson will present a statement and provide two documents to Gromyko which we would be able to publish at a later date if desired. The two documents would cover an all-German solution and an outline of a plan for international guarantees of access to Berlin. The control organization for such access would include representatives from Sweden, Austria and Switzerland in addition to those from the Western and Soviet Bloc governments. The details of this proposed reply are being worked out with Ambassador Thompson and British, French and German representatives--instructions should be sent to Ambassador Thompson by the end of next week and the new round of talks should follow shortly.

Mr. Kohler

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Mr. Kohler emphasized that the Soviets clearly are impressed by the U.S. military buildup, but we are not certain of their estimate of the relative US-USSR strength. The President and the Secretary attach great importance to the continuation of a strong U.S. military posture in Europe, and the Department is concerned about the present planning for U.S. force withdrawals from Europe. While we recognize that these are purely planning measures being taken for budgetary reasons, a public leak would be most harmful. Our posture must remain firm and Long Thrust has been quite helpful in this regard.

Mr. Kohler stated that so long as the Thompson-Gromyko talks continue we probably will not be faced with any major Soviet incursions against our rights in Berlin. However, we are concerned over the outcome of the actions U.S. authorities have taken in Berlin to require the Soviet Commandant and his Political Advisor to present identification papers prior to their entry into the U.S. zone of Berlin. The French and the UK have not agreed to these procedures and, if the Soviets institute similar procedures against our people, and not the French and UK, we will have blockaded

 ourselves.

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ourselves. We are attempting to have the British Commandant, as the senior Western Commandant, meet with the Soviet Commandant to resolve the problem. Mr. Kohler also mentioned that there were rumors that the GDR might invoke procedures at Helmstedt which would require all West Germans proceeding to West Berlin to have passports and visas (West Germans comprise 90% of the Western traffic on this route). The Germans are very edgy about this matter although they do not believe the GDC will institute such procedures until after a complete breakdown of the Thompson-Gromyko talks. However, Mr. Kohler felt that institution of the procedures might occur at any time. He pointed out that the passports did not present too much of a problem since most West Germans possess passports. In addition, visas are now obtained by West Germans for travel to many parts of East Germany and, accordingly, this would not pose a new or great problem except that submission to a GDR requirement for visas to transit the land route to Berlin would inevitably indicate recognition of a certain amount of GDR control over the route.

General Decker

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General Bonesteel asked if Mr. Kohler felt that internal considerations have any significant bearing on the Soviets' desire to continue the talks and if substantial nuclear progress on their part gave them a feeling of confidence. Mr. Kohler replied that there is no hard evidence that Khrushchev is not in full control in the USSR or that he has any real challenge or other cause for uneasiness. Accordingly, we must look elsewhere to find the basis for their actions, and it well may lie in their estimate of their relative military strength position in the present struggle. Further, our nuclear test preparations may have convinced them that they can never achieve a dominant position of nuclear superiority. Mr. Kohler also pointed out that the Soviets obviously are concerned by recent evidences of increased Western unity such as progress toward the Common Market. Mr. Johnson noted that the Soviets have been helpful to us in the past by forcing increases in our military strength through their actions toward Korea and Berlin.

Admiral Anderson said that the Soviets may be deterred from a hard line of action due to their knowledge that we no longer overrate their missile capability. Mr. Hilsman asked

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asked if it were not true that the Soviets could break off negotiations and carry out incursions against us in Berlin in very short order. Mr. Kohler replied that this was certainly true. Admiral Anderson stated that he did not believe that the Soviets would take any steps which they felt might risk or cause a war. Mr. Kohler pointed out that before taking any final action to seal off Berlin the Soviets would probably take many preparatory steps including a propaganda campaign, a meeting of the Warsaw Pact nations to consider a peace treaty with the GDR and the calling of a Peace Conference.

General Decker stated that consideration of U.S. Army withdrawals from Europe is a planning exercise which is required for budgetary reasons. It does not make any military sense to carry out withdrawals at this time. Mr. Kohler indicated that his real concern was over the possibility of leaks concerning this planning and that he was aware that withdrawals would not occur overnight. General Smith stated that, unless Congress acts to extend the present period of call-up, the eleven Air National Guard squadrons deployed

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deployed to Europe must be returned to the ZI and demobilized by October 12, 1962. The USAF cannot replace these squadrons on a one for one basis although some replacement can be effected through rotational deployment of regular TAC squadrons. However, such argumentation will reduce the flexibility of TAC to react to emergency situations. Mr. Kohler asked when a decision must be reached if these units are to be retained in Europe. Generals Decker and Smith replied that such a decision must be reached as soon as possible in view of the long lead time involved. General Decker also pointed out that all of the additional Army units in Europe were regular units and that the reserve units were employed as back-up in the ZI. Mr. Johnson emphasized that, while the actual status of U.S. Air Units in Europe could be fuzzed up through rotation deployments, etc., this could not be so easily accomplished in the case of Army Units. Mr. Johnson then asked if there was a great cost differential in maintaining units in Europe as opposed to retaining them in the ZI. General Decker stated that, aside from the transportation costs involved, there is little actual difference in the relative costs although the balance

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of payments problem does affect the problem. Admiral Anderson said that the Soviets might well recognize our present dilemma and exacerbate it by deliberately prolonging the period of uncertainty around the Berlin question through the Spring and Summer. Mr. Hitch observed that we should be prepared for additional harassments.

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Secretary's Memcons
Lot 65D330

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(532)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

(270)

DATE: January 22, 1962
Mr. Kohler's Office
Time: 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Leak of Presidential Correspondence

PARTICIPANTS:

FRANCE	UNITED STATES
Ambassador Alphand	Mr. Kohler
M. Lebel	Mr. Cash

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RA	USIA		POLAD SACLANT
SOV	White House - Mr. Bundy		

Ambassador Alphand opened the conversation by saying that the French were distressed over the Sulzberger article indicating that he had had access to the correspondence between President de Gaulle and President Kennedy.

Mr. Kohler said that the President was also unhappy about the article.

Ambassador Alphand said the French attach great importance to the secrecy of the exchange of correspondence. There must be no publicity. Paris had made a very strict inquiry into this matter. Sulzberger said he had seen a few French officials, but all of those denied that this was so. Therefore, Sulzberger's story is incorrect. The French have checked with all the officials who know about the correspondence and are certain that the information did not leak from their side. They take great care not to show the correspondence to many people either in Washington or in Paris. For example, it is not always seen by M. Laloy and M. Lucet. Here in Washington only the Ambassador and M. Lebel see it. The French are very much concerned, and they hope proper measures will be taken to prevent such leaks in the future. The Ambassador asked whether or not there had been a U.S. inquiry.

Mr. Kohler

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Mr. Kohler said we had indeed made one. This correspondence was also handled very closely in our Paris Embassy and in Washington. Ambassador Gavin had checked everyone who had had access to it including the code clerks and was convinced that the leak did not come from there. A similar check in Washington had produced similar results. It is very difficult to know where the leak could have originated.

Ambassador Alphand said it was most likely that Sulzberger had read the two documents concerned.

Mr. Kohler said yes either that or he had had a very full fill-in. Mr. Kohler said the only remote suspicion he had had was that the leak might possibly have come from some of the French military in Paris.

Ambassador Alphand said he did not think any of the French military had seen the documents. He asked whether General Norstad had.

Mr. Kohler said he had not.

Ambassador Alphand said that Sulzberger always publishes the most secret papers. This had been especially true when Ambassador Alphand was with NATO.

Mr. Kohler said sometimes leaks occur at the top.

Ambassador Alphand said that General de Gaulle attaches tremendous importance to the secrecy of this correspondence. The French hope lack of secrecy will not hinder future communications. They intend to take even stricter measures on their side.

Mr. Kohler said we would also be even more careful.

Ambassador Alphand said he had seen in the press the story that the Attorney General had received an invitation to visit the Soviet Union.

Mr. Kohler said he was pretty sure that this story came from the Russians. The invitation had been a very casual one passed out by Ambassador Menshikov and Gromyko very noncommittally. Only a half dozen people on the US side knew of it.

Ambassador Alphand said speaking personally it seem to him that the U.S. must not consider accepting this invitation.

Mr. Kohler said he certainly thought we would not do so at this time.

Ambassador Alphand

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Ambassador Alphand said it would be very dangerous to get the President's name involved. He felt it was somehow related to the current developments in Moscow. The French Ambassador there reported that there was uneasiness but no real crisis. It would certainly be unwise to change our policy of firmness because of any imagined Moscow developments. Khrushchev still seemed to be the master. There were, of course, agricultural difficulties, the dispute between the Albanians and Chinese on one side and the Soviets on the other, and the Molotov affair, but all of these were exagerated. The fact that Khrushchev was out in the provinces and Mikoyan was in Africa certainly meant that there was no major crisis.

Mr. Kohler agreed saying all the speculation about Molotov had appeared only in the foreign press.

Ambassador Alphand said he felt it would be a great mistake to consider small fluctuations in Moscow in fixing our policy.

Mr. Kohler agreed.

Ambassador Alphand then inquired as to what the British Ambassador had had to say to the Secretary on Saturday about Berlin.

Mr. Kohler said that it was essentially the same thing that the British Ambassador had told the Ambassadorial Group on Thursday afternoon, i.e., that there need be no rush in the Thompson-Gromyko discussions. The British certainly seemed to take into consideration the possibility that something was happening in the Kremlin, but they didn't seem quite to know what it was.

Mr. Kohler asked if the French had any news about Albania.

Ambassador Alphand said that they had nothing recently.

M. Jobal said the French had been approached by the Greeks some time ago to see if the French could do something. The French had replied that it was not clear to them that the Albanians had requested anything yet. The French, were, however, sending some cultural and technical assistance people to talk to the Albanians.

Mr. Kohler said the U.S. had not yet made up its mind, but he thought we would probably take a "hands off" attitude.

M. Jobal commented that Canadian and Australian wheat that had been purchased by the Chinese was being diverted to Albania.

Mr. Kohler said that was all very well, but he did not think we should move in and give them food or extend them credit. The Albanians were a fine burden for the Chinese Communists to carry.

Ambassador Alphand

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Ambassador Alphand said they would review their information on Albania and inform Mr. Kohler of anything worth noting.

Mr. Kohler said he would appreciate this.

Ambassador Alphand stated that the French were carefully following the Soviet campaign to woo the West Germans, especially as this was General de Gaulle's main preoccupation.

Mr. Kohler said he was inclined to think the Germans were disabused in this regard at present.

Ambassador Alphand said yes but there are always people who are susceptible, and therefore the more we can build the Common Market the more we can hold the West Germans.

Mr. Kohler agreed saying the Common Market was certainly the thing for the long run. He had been delighted at the U.S. decision to face up to its association with the Common Market in a political year.

Ambassador Alphand commented that he felt that the bolder the U.S. plan was, the easier it would be to get accepted.

Mr. Kohler agreed.

Ambassador Alphand, turning to another subject, said he felt there should be a tripartite meeting when the Secretary had returned from South America. He said he would like to inform his Government that Mr. Kohler had proposed this.

Mr. Kohler said he would certainly propose this very shortly after January 31st.

Turning to yet another subject, Ambassador Alphand said that there had been a very good exchange in the military committee, but the subject would have to be taken to the Ambassadorial Group.

Mr. Kohler agreed.

On the subject of the U.S. Commandant's entry into East Berlin, Ambassador Alphand said that Paris agreed to extend the approach to include the Political Adviser, but they did not wish to see the effort fail on this point.

Mr. Kohler said he could not commit himself at this time, but the matter would be reconsidered. He thanked the French for their support.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NLK NSF 84 533

SECRET

January 31, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Points to make to Adzhubei on Berlin

This memorandum suggests 4 notions (paras. 1, 2, 3 & 4 below) that might be pointed out to Adzhubei in appropriate language. All of them rest upon an initial reassertion of our basic rights, as follows:

A. The fundamental interests of the West, which are the same as the fundamental interests of the U. S., are 3:

a. Effective access to West Berlin as it was on July 1, 1961 (a day for convenience).

b. Western troops at present levels as long as West Berliners want them there (Soviet troops unacceptable in West Berlin, as we have explained).

c. The maintenance of effective ties of all appropriate sorts between the West and West Berlin (this language is designed to avoid either stating or explicitly omitting the word "political").

B. We believe that these real interests do not clash with those of the Soviet Union, and we think it is appropriate to make the following comments about matters which may be of concern to the Soviet Union in connection with these interests:

(1) If this basic situation is effectively maintained, it is a matter of much less importance to us what the arrangement is called and whether or not it is said to rest on any particular status. The terms "free city" and "occupation rights" should not be allowed to obscure fundamental realities or to become touchstones of prestige. What matters to us is the real situation (this is a way of offering them some hope on the matter of "occupation status").

(2) We are quite willing to discuss arrangements by which these basic interests can be reconciled with a transfer of local responsibility from the Soviet Government to other authorities. We cannot give formal recognition to the East German regime, but we are quite willing to find ways of doing our business on the basis of its existence as an authority exercising present control over certain parts of Germany. (This is a

[1]

FWD to JFK NC W PT

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way of framing the "degree of recognition"; one might add here that the international access authority seems to us a good way of protecting the interests of all political entities in whose territory it would function.)

(3) As part of a decent understanding on Berlin, we would be glad to talk about other questions, and we believe that progress could be made on such matters as limiting the diffusion of nuclear weapons, declarations of non-aggression, agreement on the eventual borders of Germany, and other subjects.

C. These are the three areas in which we can offer Adzhubei something. On the other hand, you may want to add a stick to go with these three carrots:

(4) *If* there is not an understanding on Berlin, we believe that the present situation is likely to develop in ways that are not in the interest of either of us. Continued tension and uncertainty in Berlin will lead to increased tension and uncertainty in other areas as well. There may follow an intensification of rearmament, and it will be increasingly difficult to restrict the diffusion of nuclear weapons. The two parts of Germany may well be tempted to dangerous courses, and larger powers on each side may feel a need to respond in turn. The Soviet side talks of dangers from Western Germany; Mr. Adzhubei can be assured that we for our part see very great danger in what an East German regime might try to do, if there is not a clear agreement on Berlin among the Great Powers.

McG. B.

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57-51
Action

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Info

Control: 1357
Rec'd: Feb. 2, 1962
4:30 p.m.

272

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1428, FEBRUARY 2, 6 PM

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PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1428, BONN 1275, INFORMATION PARIS 1025, LONDON 959, MOSCOW 933, POLAD USAREUR 827.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

FROM CLAY

12-15-62A
NR-762.00

RE OURTEL 598 DEPT, 526 BONN, SEPTEMBER 25, 1961

I AGAIN CALLED ON FEDREP PRESIDENT LUEBKE AT HIS BERLIN RESIDENCE YESTERDAY. DURING CONVERSATION RANGING GENERALLY OVER VARIOUS ASPECTS BERLIN SITUATION, PRESIDENT MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

1) HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT U.S. BUSINESS FIRMS WERE BEING ASKED TO INVEST IN WEST BERLIN. HE SAID INVESTMENT IN WEST BERLIN, "WHICH SHOULD COME IN LARGEST MEASURE FROM GERMAN FIRMS BUT IN WHICH OTHER NATIONS, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY U.S., ARE MOST WELCOME", CONSTITUTED IMPORTANT EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE IN FUTURE OF BERLIN AND WAS GREATLY APPRECIATED.

2) HE ALSO EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT PLANNED VISIT TO BERLIN AND BONN BY ATTORNEY GENERAL AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT HE MIGHT HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET ATTORNEY GENERAL WHILE LATTER IN BONN ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER HE HIMSELF WOULD BE THERE AT SAME TIME.

Microfilmed by EXR

(3)

3) HE SAID CLOSE TIES BETWEEN BERLIN AND FEDREP WERE VITAL TO EXISTENCE OF WEST BERLIN AND SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. HE SAID

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-2- 1428, FEBRUARY 2, 6 PM; FROM BERLIN - CORRECTED PAGE 2

THAT GERMANS PERHAPS AT TIMES DID NOT EXPRESS THIS CLEARLY AND FIRMLY ENOUGH TO THEIR ALLIES BECAUSE, AFTER YEARS OF OCCUPATION, THEY WERE STILL RELUCTANT TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS FORCEFULLY AS A STRONG EUROPEAN PARTNER IN ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, BUT HE SAID GERMANS FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT FEDREP-BERLIN TIES WERE NECESSARY.

4) PRESIDENT SAID THAT DEFENSE MINISTER STRAUSS FACED COMPLICATED TASK IN ALLOCATING GERMAN ARMS PURCHASES. GERMAN ARMY NOW LARGELY ARMED WITH AMERICAN WEAPONS AND WISHED TO REMAIN SO BECAUSE GERMAN AND U.S. FORCES RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST OF WEST EUROPEAN FRONT AND SUPPLY IN WARTIME WOULD BE EASIER IF ARMS WERE ALIKE. HOWEVER, GERMANS UNDERSTOOD DESIRE OF OTHER NATIONS, PARTICULARLY BRITISH, FOR HAVING GERMANS PURCHASE ARMS FROM THEM IN ORDER TO HELP EASE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS. PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT SOLUTION MIGHT BE FOR GERMANS TO PURCHASE ARMS FROM US WHILE US IN TURN TOOK COMPENSATORY STEPS TO EASE BRITISH OR OTHER AFFECTED NATIONS' PAYMENTS PROBLEMS BY PURCHASING RAW MATERIALS FROM THEM OR BY ALLOWING THEM GREATER CREDITS ON THEIR PURCHASES FROM U.S.

5) PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN VIEW OF PRESENT POWER BALANCE IN WORLD SOVIETS WERE UNLIKELY TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST WEST BERLIN, BUT THEY WOULD TRY TO SAP CITY'S CONFIDENCE BY VARIOUS MEASURES WHICH WOULD AFFECT CITY'S ECONOMY. HE SAID THAT ONLY DETERMINED AND IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES BY WEST AGAINST ENTIRE WARSAW PACT BLOC WOULD SUFFICE TO MAKE SOVIETS RETREAT ONCE THEY HAD TAKEN MEASURES OR TO PREVENT THEM FROM TAKING OTHERS.

6) HE THOUGHT WORLD AT LARGE SHOULD BE BETTER INFORMED ON DEPRESSING CONDITIONS IN SOVIET ZONE AND EAST BERLIN AND URGED THAT U.S. NEWSMEN VISIT ZONE AND REPORT ON CONDITIONS.

7) HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PRESS STORIES WHICH REVEALED REFUGEE ESCAPE ROUTES AND THUS MIGHT PREVENT FUTURE REFUGEE FLIGHTS OVER SAME ROUTES. HE SAID HE WOULD DURING HIS STAY IN BERLIN URGE PRESS TO EXERCISE GREAT RESTRAINT IN PUBLISHING ANY DATA ON FLIGHTS. I AGREED BUT SAID THAT SOME FLIGHTS WERE SO

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HC

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DRAMATIC THAT THEY SHOULD BE REVEALED TO WORLD, ONCE ESCAPE ROUTE WAS CLOSED, IN ORDER TO MAKE WORLD AWARE OF CONDITIONS IN SOVIET ZONE WHICH CAUSED SUCH DESPERATE FLIGHTS.

LIGHTNER

JTC

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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NLK NSF 87 SECRET NSF 87 Box

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

535

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PRIORITY

273

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DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

FROM: USCINCEUR

TO : JCS, CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GER, USAFE LINDSEY AS GER, CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON ENG,

INFO: USAMBASSADOR BONN GERMANY, JACE AJCC FT RITCHIE MD

NR : ECJCJ 9-01888 030923Z FEB 62
USAMBASSADOR BONN FOR USCINCEUR LNO.
Refs: A. JCS 2442 dtd 2 Dec 61 (passed separately)
B. BQD EQ 2 (revised) dtd 4 Dec 61 (NOTAL)
C. JCS 2501 dtd 11 Dec 61 (NOTAL)
D. State msg Berlin to Dept 1223 dtd 21 Dec 61 (NOTAL)

1. (S) Following implementing instructions to subordinate commands have been prepared in accordance with guidance contained in ref A. Paragraphing confirms to that of ref.

"A. Para 2A. Instructions:
(1) The United States andher allies will maintain a sympathetic attitude toward escape of refugees from East Germany.
(2) Any refugee who gains West Berlin or Federal Republic of Germany soil will be afforded instant asylum and protection.
(3) Those refugees who initially come under US military control will be evacuated as soon as possible from the immediate vicinity of the sector or zonal border to the appropriate military intelligence agency for processing and subsequent release to appropriate civil authorities for disposition.
(4) In those cases where refugees initially come under control of civil authorities in West Berlin or West Germany, US military authorities will, in accordance with existing procedures, participate with appropriate civil authorities in administrative processing of refugees to include intelligence gathering actions.
(5) There will be no active intervention on East German territory.

B. Paragraph 2B. Instructions:
(1) Step up in the current pattern of patrol activity will be made in local areas as required to meet the

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prevailing situation and to insure appropriate coordination with local civil authorities.

C. Paragraph 2C. Instructions:

(1) If the Russians or East Germans shoot at refugees who have fled across the border and are already on West Berlin or West German soil, US military personnel will take appropriate measures to protect such refugees under the following conditions:

(A) Local civil authorities should be employed to the extent of their capability prior to commitment of US military forces.

(B) When, in the absence of adequate local civil authorities, US troops deployed along the sector or zonal border become involuntarily involved by virtue of their presence at the scene of the action, they may return fire.

(C) Prior to the use of fire the local US military commander will, whenever possible, make the presence of US forces known to the Communists in the vicinity.

(D) If the action in (C) above fails to restore order or provide adequate protection, or if it is not practicable, the commander may, if necessary, open fire.

(E) Should fire be employed, a warning shot will first be fired over the heads of the East German or Soviet forces concerned. If additional fire is required, shots will be aimed to wound rather than to kill. Every effort will be made to avoid injuring innocent personnel.

(F) The use of fire will be discontinued when no longer necessary to accomplish the immediate purpose.

(G) As soon as the desired effect has been achieved the following action will be taken:

1. Firing will be stopped at once.
2. Immediate assistance will be given to the wounded.
3. Dead bodies will be collected and held.
4. Crowds will be dispersed through coordination with local civil authorities if present or by US troops if local authorities are not present.
5. German refugees taken into military custody will be turned over to local civil authorities. Should other persons be taken into military custody, they will be retained by US military authorities pending transfer to appropriate national authorities.

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6. A record of events, decisions, and orders taken in accordance with procedures outlined above will be maintained and forwarded to appropriate military authorities as soon as possible.

D. Paragraph 2D. Instructions:

(1) If Soviet or East German troops cross the sector or zonal borders into West Berlin or West Germany in "hot pursuit" of escaped refugees, such action will not be tolerated by the US and her allies. Such incursions will be dealt with by firm military action if necessary.

(2) Under these circumstances the following will apply:

(A) Local civil authorities, if present at the scene, should be employed to the limit of their capability prior to commitment of US military forces.

(B) In the absence of civil authorities, or if those present are obviously incapable of coping with the situation, the local US military commander will take prompt action to capture or eject the Communist troops.

(C) Such force as is necessary will be used to insure prompt capture and disarming of Communist forces.

(D) The use of fire will be discontinued when Communist elements have been captured and disarmed, or when they have returned to East Berlin or East German soil.

(E) Paragraph 1C (1) (G) above applies.

E. Paragraph 2E. Instructions:

(1) If East German insurgents gain control of an area contiguous with the sector border of Berlin or the zonal border, an effort will be made to suppress the temptation of West Berlin or West German citizens to cross the border to assist the insurgents.

(2) In no case will US military personnel cross the sector or zonal border without prior orders to do so.

(3) Local civil authorities should to the extent of their capability maintain law and order on West Berlin or West German soil along the sector or zonal border and prevent crowds from gathering in the vicinity of the area held by the insurgents.

(4) US military forces will be employed in the area of the sector or zonal border only to the extent required to insure maintenance or restoration of law and order and to conduct reconnaissance and patrolling to prevent incursions on West Berlin or West German soil by Communist military forces in the vicinity of the area held by insurgents.

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MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

(5) Assistance to the insurgents in the form of weapons, ammunition and supplies will be given without prior orders from proper authorities.

2. (U) As an interim measure, the foregoing revised instructions are issued for guidance to USCINCEUR component commanders and are effective upon receipt to apply when the situation warrants, or when so directed by higher authority.

3. (S) Embassy Bonn, however, holds certain reservations with respect to foregoing instructions which actually pertain to basic policy guidance contained in reference B.

A. With respect to paragraphs 1C (1) (A), 1D (2) (A) and 1E (3) above, Embassy believes that extend of formal US control over border police, particularly in given situation, would be unclear. Also considers it unclear as to what would develop if German "civil authorities" received instructions through own channels conflicting with those of US military authorities.

B. With respect to paragraph 1E (1) Embassy considers suppression of East Berlin or West German citizens crossing border to assist insurgents as onerous policing chore. USCINCEUR recognizes difficulty involved in such an undertaking without complete support of FRG authorities.

C. Embassy Bonn considers that "rules of conduct" as outlined above could project US into disagreeable misunderstanding with FRG and saddle US with job of facing not only East Germans and Soviets but also West Germans.

4. (C) Additional Embassy Bonn views are contained in Bonn msg to Dept 1476 dated 21 Dec 61, and Bonn msg to Dept 1391 dated 9 Dec 61.

5. (S) AmEmb discussions this subject with FRG, British and French Embassies, Bonn, began 3 January 1962 and are continuing. USCINCEUR is currently coordinating the instructions contained in para 1 above with LIVE OAK with a view to their standardization among the military elements concerned.

6. (U) SCP 1.

NOTE: 1223 is DA IN 186090 (21 Dec 61) DCSOP

ACTION: JCS (J-5)

DISTR : CJCS-2, DJS-3, SJCS-4, J1-1, J2-2, J3-7, J4-3, J5-2, J6-3, JWR-1, JSSC-1, RRA-1, USRSG-1, SEC DEF-5
WHITE HOUSE-2, JWRA-1
CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC, DCSOP, ACSI, DCSLOG, DCSPER

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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Operational Immediate						

FROM: JCS

274

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Regular JCS Distribution

TO: USCINCEUR

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USCOB, BERLIN

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SECRET 3198 JCS Sends

1. General Clay has recommended to the SECSTATE that two unarmed U.S. military transports conduct flights in the South Air Corridor to Berlin during the period 0800Z to 1130Z, 8 February. This recommendation has been coordinated by SECSTATE with SECDEF and approved by higher authority.

2. You are authorized to execute this mission in the area and during the time period indicated in para 1. Details of altitudes and exact timing to be determined by you.

3. This message confirms the secure telephonic instructions given the USCINCEUR Duty Officer by the JCS Duty Officer. SCP-3

DATE: 7 TIME: 2120
MONTH: FEB YEAR: 1962

WRITER — SYMBOL: JWR
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required): Frederick C. ROECKER, Jr. Col. USA
PHONE: 78322 PAGE NR: 1 NR OF PAGES: 1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

RELEASER — SIGNATURE
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE:
J. H. WILLIAMS
Rear Admiral, USN
Vice Director, Joint Staff

DISTR: CJCS-2, DJS-3, SJCS-3, J2-2, J3-5, J4-3, J5-2, J6-3, JWR-1, JSSC-1, RRA-1, USRSG-1, JWRA-1
CNO, CSAF, CMC, CSA, DCSOP, ACSI, DCSLOG, DCSPER

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JCS 3198 080233Z FEB 62

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

275

9 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Clay letter to Secretary Rusk, January 30, 1962

In considering how to deal with General Clay's letter, it seems to me that there are only two alternatives. The first would be for Secretary Rusk to give him a sympathetic reply which would make the following points:

a. We agree with the desirability of having a predetermined single Allied commander for Berlin. However, the compromise which General Norstad has accepted is probably the best that we can obtain from our Allies under present conditions.

b. We are not quite clear as to your comments on the instructions governing behavior in case of an East German or East Berlin uprising. I would appreciate your amplifying this point, giving us your views as to the content of these instructions, as well as to the procedure in applying them.

c. With regard to your feeling that we do not give sufficient weight to your advice, I want to assure you that this concern is groundless. I personally receive your messages and personally clear the reply which you receive.

d. The fact that I am getting strongminded advice from you has been a great help to me. Without that advice I am sure that the U.S. position would not be as sound as it is today. It has strengthened my hand both within our own government and at the Allied Council table.

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2. For the foregoing reasons I hope that you will continue to serve in Berlin as you have in the past.

The second alternative would be to invite General Clay to return to Washington for a heart-to-heart talk on the substance of his letter, with the probable outcome a determination for him to remain a short time in Washington in an advisory capacity and then to return to private life.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1897, FEBRUARY 14, 7 PM.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

I CONTINUE TO RECEIVE REPORTS THAT CHANCELLOR IS GREATLY DISTURBED AND DISCOURAGED ABOUT STATE OF THE WORLD. REPORTS HAVE VARIOUSLY ASCRIBED TO HIM (1) ALARM AT COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE; (2) CONCERN AT RENEWED INDICATIONS OF BRITISH "SOFTNESS" ON BERLIN; (3) FEAR THAT NATO IS EVINCING LASTING DISARRAY; AND (4) CONVICTION THAT US IS MISTAKEN IN "RUNNING AFTER" RUSSIANS IN TIME OF CONTINUED DANGER TO ALLIANCE.

I SURMISE THAT WHAT ACTUALLY STARTED ADENAUER ON CURRENT CYCLE OF DEPRESSION WAS FEAR AND DISCOURAGEMENT RE FRENCH DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT WEEKS, ALL OF WHICH HAVE RUN COUNTER TO OPTIMISTIC FORECAST GIVEN HIM BY DE GAULLE AT THEIR MEETING IN EARLY DECEMBER. INFLUENCED THEREBY, HE SEEMS TO BE TAKING DIM VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER AREAS; WORLD IS GENERALLY ROSY OR DARK TO CHANCELLOR, AND PICTURE IS SELDOM MIXED ONE.

I SHALL BE SEEING ADENAUER ON FEBRUARY 16 WITH KISSINGER, AND HE HAS ASKED ME TO SEE HIM FOR PRIVATE TALK ON FEBRUARY 20. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF BY LATTER DATE I COULD HAVE ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY WANT TO GIVE HIM ON THOMPSON-GROMYKO TALKS. I SHOULD LIKE ESPECIALLY TO ASK HIM IN YOUR NAME FOR HIS VIEWS RE FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION.

DOWLING

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Control: 8469
Rec'd: February 14, 1962
6:45 p.m.

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3881, FEBRUARY 14, 8 PM

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT 3881, INFORMATION BONN NIACT 418, BERLIN NIACT 237, LONDON NIACT 685, MOSCOW NIACT 212, POLAD USAREUR NIACT 27, USAFE WIESBADEN NIACT 19, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR JCS UNNUMBERED.

FROM STOESSEL

REF BERLINIS 1082 TO PARIS SENT DEPARTMENT 1513; EMBTEL 3866 TO DEPARTMENT.

1. AS REPORTED EMBTEL 3866, WHEN GENERAL NORSTAD WAS INFORMED THIS MORNING FEBRUARY 14 OF SOVIET STATEMENT THAT AIRCRAFT AT CRITICAL ALTITUDES WOULD BE CONSIDERED TRESPASSERS, HE DIRECTED USAFE TO BRING UP TO 12 THE NUMBER OF F-104S ON GROUND ALERT.

2. GENERAL NORSTAD DOES NOT RPT NOT HAVE US UNILATERAL OR TRIPARTITE DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO DIRECT FIGHTER PROTECTION OF TRANSPORTS IN AIR CORRIDORS UNLESS THERE IS PHYSICAL HARASSMENT BY SOVIET-GDR FIGHTERS. IF SUCH HARASSMENT OCCURS, GENERAL NORSTAD AT HIS DISCRETION IS AUTHORIZED TO USE FIGHTER PROTECTION ON BASIS JCS INSTRUCTIONS AUGUST 31, 1961 AND JACK PIKE II RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

3. ADVISABILITY OF FIGHTERS ORBITING AT CORRIDOR ENTRANCE WAS CONSIDERED TODAY BUT GENERAL NORSTAD DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE ORBITED UNLESS IT BECAME

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CLEARLY NECESSARY TO USE THEM. AS OF TODAY, GENERAL NORSTAD WOULD NOT ORDER FIGHTERS TO ESCORT IN EVENT OF HOSTILE BUZZING. IN THIS EVENT, HOWEVER, HE WOULD PROBABLY ORDER LIMITED NUMBER OF FIGHTERS TO ORBIT AT ENTRANCE OF APPROPRIATE CORRIDORS. IF AN ALLIED TRANSPORT WERE SHOT AT AND HIT OR PHYSICALLY RAMMED, HE WOULD ORDER SUBSEQUENT FLIGHTS TO BE ESCORTED.

4. SHOULD ESCORT OPERATIONS BECOME NECESSARY, GENERAL NORSTAD WOULD ORDER RAF AND USAF FIGHTERS TO PARTICIPATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DELEGATED POWERS. HE WOULD ALSO REQUEST FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO AUTHORIZE FRENCH FIGHTERS TO PARTICIPATE.

GAVIN

GDW

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY
G/PM

February 14, 1962

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO: G - Mr. Johnson

FROM: G/PM - Mr. Weiss

SUBJECT: Berlin Air Corridor Incidents

1. The Soviets again issued a proclamation reserving certain altitudes in the air corridors, effective as of this morning. This was rejected by the West and Military Air Transport probes were flown without incident, though over strong and frequent protests from Russian members in the Berlin Air Safety Center.

2. In addition, the Soviets have threatened to treat aircraft in the "restricted" portions of the corridors as trespassers, implying that appropriate action would be taken. The British are greatly exercised over this threat and have proposed that a protest be made to Moscow. Such a protest is now being worked out.

3. Finally, there were two specific incidents effecting civilian aircraft:

a. Pan Am rerouted several flights at a higher altitude when the Soviets refused to approve flight plans at 5500 to 6500 feet, and,

b. A BEA plane flying at 9500 feet was "escorted" into Berlin by a Soviet Fighter, the Soviets maintaining that the aircraft had not filed flight plans (which was untrue).

4. In brief, the situation looks very edgy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 14 1962
DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE

G/PM - Mr. Weiss

SECRET

762.00/2-1462

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RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

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Distributed to S, U, M, G, EUR(3), S/S, L, S/P, S/P 2/15/62 Q

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NSAM-128

Lot 72D (279)

SECRET

February 14, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Response to Soviet Action Regarding Air Corridors

Problem

To determine the U.S. view regarding an Allied response should the Soviets seek by declaration to prevent Allied aircraft from flying in one or more air corridors below 10,000 feet.

Background

The Soviets have claimed for some time that Allied aircraft cannot fly above 10,000 feet. In 1958 they asserted this in writing and refused to guarantee flight safety for Allied aircraft flying over 10,000 feet. In 1959 U.S. military aircraft made three such flights. Each was harassed by Soviet fighters, and the Soviets protested the flights.

On February 8 and 9, the Soviets sought to prevent Allied aircraft from flying below 7,000 feet. On February 12, they sought to prevent flights below 7,500 feet. The net result was to restrict the altitudes on which they were prepared to guarantee flight safety to a few thousand feet. Although this is sufficient for normal traffic, it would not be adequate if we found it necessary to mount an airlift. We have, therefore, resisted the Soviet effort and flown military aircraft in the prescribed altitudes.

General Norstad (LIVE OAK) has recommended that if the Soviets should seek to close one or more of the corridors up to 10,000 feet or to restrict flights to such a narrow band as to make normal civil flights impracticable, he would like authority to fly either civil planes or civil planes with military pilots (initially without passengers) above 10,000 feet.

The French have proposed to support the Norstad proposal, except that they would consider that only normal civil flights fly above 10,000 feet.

The initial British reaction is that they are not prepared at this time to authorize flights over 10,000 feet. They would prefer any Soviet challenge be met by flying planes below 10,000 feet and, if necessary, switching them to unaffected corridors.

Disposition

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FWD to NSAM 128

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Discussion:

The Berlin Task Force has reviewed this problem and has reached the conclusion that, if the Soviets seek to squeeze Allied aircraft out of flying below 10,000 feet in one or more corridors, they should be authorized to fly above 10,000 feet. The only alternative would be to switch civil aircraft to any unaffected corridors and fly probes below 10,000 feet in the affected corridor. This would involve considerable diminution of our rights of air access.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize State to seek Ambassadorial Group agreement to delegate to General Norstad authority: (a) to urge the civil airlines to fly over 10,000 feet, if the Soviets seek by declaration to prevent flights below 10,000 feet and if, as a result, the civil airlines are unwilling to fly below 10,000 feet, and (b) to fly civil aircraft (initially without passengers) with military pilots over 10,000 feet if the civil airlines decline to fly either above or below 10,000 feet. (General Norstad already has authority also to fly civil aircraft with military crews below 10,000 feet, if the civil airlines decline to do so.)

2. Pending Ambassadorial Group agreement, that the U.S. delegate this authority to General Norstad, contingent upon subsequent tripartite agreement.

The Department of Defense concurs in these recommendations.

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean

S/O:EUR:GER:JCAmbrand:cbe
2/13/62

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B-639

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY
G/PM

SECRET

February 15, 1962

MEMORANDUM

TO: G - Mr. Johnson

FROM: G/PM - Mr. Weiss

SUBJECT: Berlin Air Corridors

1. The situation is becoming increasingly tense. The Soviets issued another warning reserving the corridors up to 7000 feet, which was again rejected. Another Tripartite military transport probe was flown at 5000 feet with fighters put on fifteen minute alert.

2. A number of incidents were reported. Several of the air transports were buzzed, some as close as one aircraft length away. One U.S. C-124 was intercepted by MIGs and was signaled to land. It ignored these directions and flew to Berlin. One Pan Am aircraft was intercepted at 10,000 feet (!) and buzzed.

3. There was extensive discussion this morning in the Berlin Task Force as to what our next action should be. In particular, the questions were raised as to whether (a) we should put fighter aircraft in the corridors, and (b) should increase the publicity to gain a more complete public awareness of what is going on. On the former point, it was concluded that the time was premature and that contingency plans which called for use of fighter aircraft at a later point in time should stand. On the latter point, Mr. Kohler's feelings seemed to be that we should not play these incidents at a higher key just yet. Mr. Nitze seemed slightly inclined in the opposite direction, and Colonel Legere stated that Mac Bundy thought this matter should be given careful consideration against the possibility that a serious incident requiring fighter escort as a response might occur in the near future.

4. There was also some discussion of taking the issue to the Security Council. Tripartite agreed contingency plans call for this action only in the event that fighter aircraft are called upon to escort

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 15 1962

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRET

G/PM : Mr. Weiss/vd

762.00/2-1562

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allied transport. However, the British have indicated they wish to raise the subject of going to the Security Council in this afternoon's Ambassadorial Group Meeting. Their motives are not clear, but one line of speculation was that the British might conceivably urge that we go to the Security Council at an earlier point in time. Their underlying motive would be based upon the assumption that any discussion in the Security Council would result in pressures for an immediate Summit Meeting which, of course, the British would like to see.

5. There was also some question as to whether the March 14 Geneva Conference preparations should not begin to link the incidents in the air corridors and the entire Berlin problem in a more specific way than has heretofore been the case. In this connection the Gromyko-Rusk agreement that both sides should refrain from incidents which endanger the peace while discussions were taking place was referred to.

6. There seemed to be general agreement with Mr. Bohlen's statement that the Soviet action represented a probe of Western intentions, but what else it was intended to do, how long it might go on, and how serious it might get, remained very unclear.

cc: Mr. Kitchen
Mr. Newman
Mr. Garthoff

G/PM/Weiss/vl
2/15/62

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

SECRET
Classification

FEB 19 7 46 PM '62

SENT TO: Amembassy BONN PRIORITY 2282

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR EYES ONLY

INFO: Amem BRUSSELS via Pouch for USEC

REF: BONN'S 1897

When you see Chancellor on February 20 tell him that we have been pleased to receive in Washington report of conversation he had on February 16 with you and Kissinger. We hope that information given him during that talk was helpful both in reassuring him and in clarifying for him approach we have in mind on NATO strategy. As he must appreciate our objective, emerging from profound review which President has had made, is a considerable strengthening of deterrent and defensive posture of West. It is based on fundamental premise that defense of Atlantic Community is indivisible, a concept which we are sure he shares. We are not pessimistic about current discussions of NATO strategy in Paris. While French may be expected to adhere firmly

EYES ONLY

/O:EUR:CERFCash:cbs 2/19/62 The Secretary

GER:MJHillenbrand S/S- Mr. Manfull

BA-Mr. Abrams

EUR-FDKohler FDK

White House - Mr. Bundy (in substance)

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110, 11RU 2-14-67 XR 611.62a

611.62a / 2-1962 XR 740.5

FYI 10 1995 from Bonn 2/23

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firmly to de
[redacted] Gaulle's obdurate position, we believe that otherwise a frank discussion of these matters in the Council should have a reassuring and uniting, rather than divisive result.

It would be most helpful to us to have Chancellor's views re future course of action vis-a-vis the Soviets. In all frankness we are rather uncertain as to their intentions and as to pressures and motivations currently influencing them. It seems likely to us that Soviet leadership is itself faced with many uncertainties and may not have yet reached decisions asto its own future course. In these circumstances it seems to be playing a hard holding line in current talks between Foreign Minister and Ambassador Thompson in Moscow. It seems unlikely that they are prepared to modify their maximum positions sufficiently at this level even to reach a basis for formal quadripartite negotiations on Germany and Berlin.

On other hand, there are no indications yet that Soviets have made up their minds at this time to proceed with a separate treaty. Similarly intelligence indicators re military readiness and contingency preparations do not seem to point to a Soviet decision to hold to a collision course. Soviets are aware that overall strategic military balance is disadvantageous to them and moreover probably

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realize that we now have good idea of extent of relative Soviet weakness.

In light of all this we believe that, although Thompson's exchanges with Gromyko seem to be approaching stage of formalistic ritual dance, they should be allowed to

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to follow their course and that Thompson should therefore request a further meeting.

We agree with Federal Government's view that during next meeting Thompson should hand Gromyko memorandum responding to that Soviets gave us during February 9 meeting in order to establish record for eventual possible publication should Soviets decide release documents they have given us.

It will undoubtedly be necessary for Thompson to observe during next session that Soviet attempts to assert degree of control over Allied air escape in Berlin corridors beyond that permitted by agreed and established procedures has created highly dangerous situation which cannot but affect our appraisal of Soviet intentions and good faith. He would probably end this phase of discussion by commenting that highly volatile situation in air corridors underlines essential correctness of Western emphasis on access problem as requiring primary attention, this being area where both sides might most quickly find themselves in escalating situation involving grave risks.

We will continue to work closely with German embassy in preparation Thompson's instructions.

You may inform Chancellor that we have studied proposed German reply to Soviet memorandum of December 27 and consider it an exceedingly effective response. On bilateralism in general we have full confidence in Chancellor and his Government and know that any decisions made in this connection will be motivated by our common interests. We will of course be interested in Soviet reaction.

Should Chancellor query you on bilateralism following are our conclusions on which you may draw as you see fit:

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On balance there is probably more to be said in favor of than against a German effort to explore whatever possibilities are inherent in the opening represented by memorandum of December 27 and subsequent Soviet campaign to encourage bilateral discussions. However, timing and method of initiating discussions would have to be carefully considered as well as their relationship to other discussions which might be going on with Soviets. We would certainly not wish to drive Germans into bilateral talks against their own better judgment but if they came to us eager to try their luck we would probably have more to gain than to lose by encouraging them as full and trusted partners to play a more active diplomatic role in our common cause.

As Chancellor knows Khrushchev has requested 18-Power summit meeting at Geneva. Our reaction embodied in President's February 14 letter to Khrushchev. You might remind Chancellor President said: "I do not believe that attendance by heads of government at outset of an 18-Nation conference is best way to move forward...This does not mean that conference should stay with routine procedures or arguments or that heads of government should not be interested in negotiations from very outset. It does mean that much clarifying work will have to be done in early stages of negotiation before it is possible for Heads of Government to review situation. This may be necessary in any case before June 1 when a report is to be filed on progress achieved. I do not mean to question utility or perhaps even necessity of a meeting of Heads of Government. Indeed I am quite ready to participate personally at Heads of Government level at any stage of conference when it appears that such participation could positively affect chances of success. Question is rather one if timing."

If opportunity arises you should ask Chancellor for an analysis of his February 13 discussion

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US discussion with de Gaulle on political union of six. Paris 3919 repeated Bonn 423 reports French and Germans were to agree on new text February 18 prior to Feb. 19-20 meeting, Fouchet Committee.

You may assure Chancellor that we welcome his efforts to see that the defense aspects of a political union be related to NATO and that the integrity of the existing Communities be protected. We hope any new step would add to momentum of movement toward meaningful integration.

Additional telegram follows regarding President's conversation with Grewe late today which should be incorporated in these instructions.

Rusk

RUSK

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"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Assistant Secretary

SECRET

TO: The Secretary

DATE: February 19, 1962

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

SUBJECT: Meeting with President on Allied Support for German Access

On February 15 you sent to the President for his approval a precise definition of Allied responsibilities and intentions with respect to support of German access to Berlin. (Tab A). The President, upon reading the memorandum, raised the question whether making Allied intentions on this score so explicit would not:

1. encourage the West Germans to be unduly uncompromising in their dealings with the East Germans on matters relating to access; and

2. lead the West Germans to abandon their own efforts to re-establish access, in the event of blockage, without fully exhausting the means available to them, on the assumption that the Allies would take up the burden on their behalf.

The President wishes to discuss this question with you Tuesday afternoon at 4:30 p.m.

In responding to the questions raised by the President, you may wish to make the following points:

1. There are involved in this issue a question of principle and a question of tactics. The former concerns Allied intentions and plans RSK RR; i.e., what the Allies consider they must do to ensure, ultimately, the continued access to Berlin of needed supplies carried by German traffic, and the means by which they plan to do it. The tactical question concerns the manner in which the Allies make known to the Germans what their intentions are and what they expect of the Germans themselves.

2. Regarding the matter of principle, it is clear that given the present status of Berlin only the Allies can in the last extremity ensure the adequate supply of Berlin in the face of Soviet/GDR efforts to prevent it. Only they can use force to this end.

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3. Present contingency plans do not provide, for dealing with blockage of German access, specific means of bringing to bear this Allied capacity to use force. In addition, there is at present no consensus among the Allies as to how to deal with a blockage of German access which has resisted non-military pressures. A quadripartite airlift has been planned for, but even if resort were made to the air in the face of Soviet/GDR interference on the ground, the airlift and stockpiles available in Berlin would not be sufficient to maintain reasonable economic levels in Berlin for more than 6-9 months.

4. Thus it is necessary for very practical reasons to achieve some consensus with the British and French on this matter and to do the necessary planning.

5. With respect to tactics, we shall have to face the question whether making our intentions clear to the Germans will not have the unfortunate effects the President has suggested.

6. It is not possible to predict with certainty whether the Germans would react in this way. They presumably already realize that, in the end, German access is of as great an interest to the Allies as to them since upon movement of these supplies depends the life of West Berlin. The Germans could thus conclude that at any time their interests dictated sacrificing their traffic to Berlin, the Allies would be forced in their own interests to carry it. This is inherent in the situation and the present proposal does not alter it. What now influences the Germans to want to maintain their traffic -- presumably their own stake in keeping Berlin alive -- will operate no less if they know the precise manner in which the Allies plan to do what it is already obvious they must do (and in fact already have done in 1948-49).

7. It is conceivable, however, that if we should inform the Germans that as soon as German access ran into difficulties we would bring the full weight of Allied support to reestablish it, this would cause some diminution of the German sense of responsibility for maintaining that traffic. But the proposed policy definition makes clear that our support will come only when all other means, including Allied application of economic countermeasures (in addition, of course, to German measures respecting intersonal trade) have been exhausted. Furthermore, the choice of the time to provide an Allied aegis is left to the Allies. Thus the situation would not be fundamentally different from that which exists now except that plans would be prepared and a tripartite consensus would be reached as to means.

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8. If it is thought desirable to keep the Germans in some uncertainty as to the timing and nature of Allied support, detailed planning could conceivably be done tripartitely. This would be subject to serious difficulty, however, and I do not consider it a desirable course of action. The Germans will have to be told something, since the whole question has arisen in the context of quadripartite planning. German cooperation will be required in the course of planning, particularly if eventual use of German trucking is contemplated. The final planning would be done in LIVE OAK, where the Germans have an observer, and the Federal Republic would almost certainly know that something was going on about which they were not fully informed. This would be particularly noticeable since the Germans have been given the LIVE OAK contingency plans which have been prepared to date.

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Rusk Files Lot 72D412

TUESDAY
February 20, 1962
5:39 p. m.

283

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR ACHESON

A returned the call and the Sec asked how much more material would A like to see for background. A said he thinks it depends on what the Sec wants from him. From reading the cables it was perfectly clear they don't want to carry the discussion on. They are going out of their way to make each meeting worse than the one before. He thought Thompson was acute in predicting they would want to go from FM's to Heads of State. A has two impressions: When this occurred that was additional reason to cut it off to force a Summit but even before what the Summit would do when it came along was face us with extreme pressure as with the wall business. Their judgment is we will make a concession and withdraw. We won't stand up to it. So what is the use going on negotiating this way? They would get something if they signed a treaty. We thought they would harrass the air routes as long ago as August. A does not think Thompson meant they were dragging it out - or if he did he meant it another way. A thinks they are building up their record with the neutrals etc. A thinks they want another meeting where he will take his shoes off or break off and say here is the treaty and where do we go from here. Then we will give the boundary etc. A will be glad to do more. The Sec asked when he got back and A said the week of the 20th of March. The Sec said another thing A could do but not before because not enough time with A's leaving Saturday is go through a lot of intelligence business which to the Sec does not add up to a great deal. The Sec asked A to be in touch when he returns. A is glad to do anything he wants.

pdb

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

SECRET
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10687

FEB 22 7 59 PM '62

ACTION: USBER BERLIN PRIORITY 1094
Amembassy BONN PRIORITY 2332

EYES ONLY FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM SECRETARY
After discussion with President, we have following suggestions. Ambassador Dowling is ideally qualified to fill you in on Chancellor's somewhat difficult and suspicious temperament and to guide you as to best line to take in your talk with him Saturday.

In view of Chancellor's need for constant reassurance it will presumably be desirable to give him strong reaffirmation of firmness of our intentions and as to soundness of our views re military strategy and contingency planning along the lines taken by Kissinger (Bonn's tels 1934 and 1935).

You may also wish to reiterate some of the points made by the President to Ambassador Grewe on February 19 (DEPTEL 2283 to Bonn). You will also find useful presentation of our general views on current status of discussions with Soviets contained DEPTEL 2282 to Bonn. You might particularly wish to probe Chancellor for his view on whether, in face of likely complete impasse, we should keep

EUR:FKohler:HJHillenbrand:mt
2/22/62

Foy D. Kohler

RA - Passendorfer
S/S Mr. Olsen

The White House Mr. Bundy
Mr. Ball

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SECRET
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trying to find basis for negotiations with Soviets on Berlin or batten down hatches for possible confrontation.

Finally we have indications that in general way de Gaulle in the meeting at Baden Baden suggested possibility of Franco-German cooperation in developing independent nuclear capability. In order to undercut any temptation which Chancellor may feel along this line it might be well also to talk not only about our own nuclear power and strength of nuclear capability already at disposition of NATO forces but also about our willingness to participate with our European NATO Allies in developing plans for a NATO multilateral nuclear force along lines of President's address in Ottawa last May. You may want to add that we are currently making thorough studies of our own to contribute to NATO Council discussions in this field.

None of reference cables, which have been given very restricted circulation, is available elsewhere than in Bonn. We have cited them so Ambassador Dowling will have them ready for your reading when he briefs you for talk with Chancellor.

RUSK

END

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NSF84 (59) 24

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 22, 1962

285

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac:

I have another suggestion as to a possible counter to the present Soviet pattern of behavior in the air corridors. Assuming that they step up their activity in filing flight plans for their fighter flights in the corridors to the level where there is some problem of running air traffic or even the plausible appearance of one, we might respond in the following twofold manner:

(1) Fly a large enough volume of our fighters in the corridors all with flight plans filed in accordance with standard practice to cause them some fear in respect to the safety of their flights;

(2) Fly transport flights outside the corridors announcing that we are doing so only because the corridors are no longer safe for transport aircraft and passengers and accordingly we are forced to this measure to maintain our traffic.

This would put the next move up to them and put on them the onus of forcing down an aircraft or interfering with its landing. It is obviously a response which increases tension rather than decreases it. Then I find it hard to conceive of any response which meets the threat that does not increase tension. As always, I think whatever moves we make should be accompanied by the continuance of our efforts to get meaningful talks.

CK
Carl Kaysen

TOP SECRET

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(286)

EYES ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

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ACTION: Amembassy BONN 2337

Feb 23 4:50 PM '62

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EYES ONLY ATTY GENL AND AMBASSADOR

EMBTEL 1995 Feb 23. 611.62A / 2-2362-XE 396.12 PE

Supplementing points made in DEPTEL 2332 to Bonn, President wants Chancellor to know that, while he appreciates clarification remarks to CDU conference, he was in no way disturbed by press reports and considers there is no rpt no issue between US and FRG on question of East-West talks. President has no rpt no specific suggestion at moment for further approach to de Gaulle, but he shares Chancellor's concern about divergency of French views and appreciates efforts Chancellor is making to bring these more into line with ours.

END

RUSK

611.62A/2-2362 XE 396.12 PE

EUR:FDKohler:mt
2/23/62

Foy D. Kohler

Mr. Bundy- White House — GER- Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Bohlen - S/S — S/S - Mr. Manfull

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EYES ONLY

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FORM DS-322

FN

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Vertello

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INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

CONFIDENTIAL

55-H
Action
EUR

Control: 6833
Rec'd: February 27, 1962
5:25 pm

Info
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IHR
JUS
RMR

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4033, FEBRUARY 27, 5 PM

287

PRIORITY

FOR TYLER

ATTORNEY GENERAL VISIT

AMBASSADOR LEFT FOR AIRPORT DIRECTLY AFTER ACCOMPANYING ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CALLS ON DE GAULLE, FOREIGN MINISTER, AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE. LATTER TWO ENTIRELY COURTESY.

AMBASSADOR SAID DE GAULLE EXTREMELY COURTEOUS AND FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT VISIT WHICH LASTED NEARLY 45 MINUTES. DE GAULLE VERY TALKATIVE AND TOUCHED ON NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, PARTICULARLY BERLIN. IN GENERAL HE REVIEWED SAME GROUND COVERED DURING RECENT MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR AND IN OTHER CONVERSATIONS. ONLY REALLY NEW ELEMENT WHICH AMBASSADOR NOTED WAS DE GAULLE'S COMMENT ON CHANGE WHICH HAS OCCURRED DURING LAST YEAR IN GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD US. DE GAULLE CONSIDERS GERMANS HAVE BECOME RATHER SUSPICIOUS OF US GOVERNMENT'S MOTIVES WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY, FEARING THAT USG MAY MAKE SOME MOVE IN USSR AFFAIRS COSTLY TO FEDREP. GERMANS CONSEQUENTLY WONDERING WHETHER THEY MIGHT NOT SERVE THEIR OWN CAUSE BETTER BY DIRECT GERMAN-USSR TALKS.

AMBASSADOR PREPARED, IF STENOGRAPHER AVAILABLE TOMORROW AT DEPARTMENT, TO DICTATE MEMORANDA COVERING THESE TALKS.

LYON

Note: Mr. Tyler's office (EUR) informed 2/27 PMH

COT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State PERMANENT RECORD COPY

34

Action EUR

Info SS SR G SP L SB SO IO DAC P USIA INR RMR

SECRET

Control: 16388
Rec'd: Feb 27, 1962 9:37 am

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2290, FEBRUARY 27, 1 PM

001

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2290, INFORMATION LONDON 397, PARIS 430, BERLIN 249, BONN 328

DEPTEL 1997.

HAVING MET WESTERN FIRMNESS ON AIR CORRIDOR QUESTION, SOVIETS LIKELY TO UNDERTAKE PROBE AT ANOTHER POINT OF ACCESS QUESTION. ALTHOUGH IMPOSSIBLE FORECAST WHAT THIS WOULD BE, CONTROLS OVER ALLIED AUTOBAHN ACCESS OBVIOUSLY PROVIDE AREA WHERE SOVIETS MAY ESTIMATE THEY CAN SUCCESSFULLY TAKE STEP TOWARD GREATER GDR ROLE IN CONTROLS. CERTAINLY WOULD CARRY LESS RISK THAN SOVIETS HAVE REVEALED BY AIR CORRIDOR PROBES THEY ARE WILLING ASSUME.

WESTERN STATEMENTS ON AGENT THEORY SINCE NOVEMBER 1958 PROBABLY HAVE PERSUADED SOVIETS WEST PREPARED IN FINAL ANALYSIS TO LIVE WITH GDR CONTROL OVER ALLIED ACCESS AT LEAST ON AGENT BASIS. CONSEQUENTLY SOVIETS LIKELY ASSUME PARTIAL STEP IN THIS DIRECTION UNLIKELY MEET DECISIVE WESTERN OPPOSITION. TRANSPARENT BONN FONOFF LEAK AS DESCRIBED BONN'S TELEGRAM 1889 TO DEPARTMENT UNDOUBTEDLY SERVED DIMINISH SOVIET DOUBTS ON THIS SCORE.

WE QUESTION WHETHER SOVIETS CONSIDER OUR BILATERAL TALKS AS HAVING "BROKEN DOWN", BUT AIR CORRIDOR CRISIS ALSO SERVED PROVE SOVIETS NOT RELUCTANT UNDERTAKE PROBES IN BERLIN EVEN WHEN DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY.

THOMPSON

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RSC

Released by NARA

SECRET

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REVIEW ASSIGNED TO		REVIEW TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL		DATE OF ACTION 2-28-62	DISPOSITION TO RMR

550

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962.72/2-2762

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

Taylor Papers, NDU 34 Clay Letters

March 1, 1962

289

551

Dear General Clay:

My brother has just come back to Washington, and his first report is of your outstanding kindness to him and to his wife during their visit to Berlin. He is sure that with your help it was valuable also for Berlin. So I hasten to send my personal thanks.

We have been watching with close attention the developing situation in the air corridors, and I am impressed by the alertness and coolness of all Americans who are dealing directly with this problem. I know that your own determined presence and quick counsel have been of great importance in this episode as in others since your arrival in Berlin. I want you to know that I have a standing instruction that your cables of comment and advice shall invariably be reported to me, and on a number of occasions a cable from you has led me to order a review of policy or a new and somewhat different emphasis in existing activities. In the press of business and the welter of pressures, the immediate relation between the watchmen's reports and the Washington reaction is often unclear, especially at a distance, but I do want you to know that we continue to count on you -- as much in the moments of relative calm as in those of immediate tension.

Now that my brother is back, I find Max Taylor preparing to go off, and I begin to wonder whether you do not grow weary of Washington visitors. But Max will be coming with my particular instruction to take a measure of the whole position in Western Europe, and I know he is looking forward particularly to a chance to review it

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all with you. If there are any matters which you have not felt able to put in your cables that you would like to raise with me, I will count on you to discuss them most openly with him.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ John Kennedy

The Honorable Lucius Clay
Special Representative of the President
U. S. Mission, Berlin

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"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

NLK-84-75

Germany

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

290

March 3, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I have read and cleared the attached memorandum of conversation between you and Ambassador Grewe which you asked me to check on; Unless you want to review it yourself, I think it is set to go.

Reading it makes me think that there is one part of the story of Kissinger's visit to the Chancellor that you may not know. Kissinger went at my direct request, on a basis cleared with Kohler and Dowling. The reasons for sending him were these:

1. The Chancellor has always trusted Kissinger rather more than he trusts official U. S. military briefers.

2. Some of the Chancellor's skepticism about our military strength appeared to Dowling to be due to a misunderstanding of something Kissinger had told him some months ago.

3. Even at the time of the Chancellor's visit last fall, we got some indications that while he was happy about his talks with you, he was unpersuaded by the military argumentation.

Thus, Kissinger did exactly what we asked him to do, and it worked just as we thought it would. It was probably helpful, just the same, for you to ask Grewe why the old gentleman can't believe what we tell him the first time.

McG. B.

Attach: 1204
Let Sta ltr. 3/5/62

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INCOMING TELEGRAM (47) Department of State [redacted] PERMANENT RECORD COPY

SECRET

SS-4 Action

Control: 5798
Rec'd: March 8, 1962, 2 PM
10 p.m.

SO Info

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

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INR

NO: 1688, MARCH 8, 1 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1688, BONN 1526, INFORMATION PARIS 1287, LONDON 1131, MOSCOW 1182.

BONN PASS ACTION SHAPE 11 - INFO USAREUR 996

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE.

SHAPE FOR NORSTAD AND US ELEMENT LIVE OAK.

RMR

FOLLOWING IS MISSION'S APPRAISAL OF SOVIET MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS IN AIR CORRIDORS BASED ON RECENT SOV CORRIDOR FLIGHTS AND BASC ACTIVITIES.

(1) WEST HAS IN PAST BEEN AWARE ALLIED SURFACE ACCESS TO BERLIN WAS VULNERABLE TO SOV/GDR PRESSURES BUT HAS TAKEN COMFORT IN IDEA AIR ACCESS WAS RELATIVELY INVULNERABLE EXCEPT TO OVERT HOSTILE ACTS. SOVS PRESUMABLY ALSO HAVE BORNE THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND. HOWEVER IN PAST THEY HAVE CONTENTED SELVES WITH FAIRLY STEADY BARRAGE OF SOV/GDR PROPAGANDA BASED ON ALLEGATIONS OF UNSAFETY WEST BERLIN AIRPORTS, ILLEGALITY COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS, CARRIAGE OF REVANCHISTS, ETC. NO LONGER CONTENT WITH MERE PROPAGANDA SOVS ON FEB 7 LAUNCHED ACTIVE CAMPAIGN OF EVER INCREASING INTENSITY AGAINST ALLIED CORRIDOR MOVEMENTS.

INITIAL SOV MANEUVER, ATTEMPTING RESERVE ALTITUDES UP TO 7,000 OR 7,500 FT, WAS CLUMSY BUT NONETHELESS DEMONSTRATED THAT BY AND LARGE, WESTERN COMMERCIAL AIR TRAFFIC WOULD NOT EXPOSE ITSELF TO SAFETY RISKS. SOVS QUICKLY REFINED TECHNIQUE BY FILING FLIGHT PLAN AND THROUGH TIMING AND ROUTING OF FLIGHTS ARE ACHIEVING

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RESULTS SIMILAR TO EARLY ATTEMPT BLOCK GROUP OF ALTITUDES, THAT IS, DENYING WESTERN AIRCRAFT USE OF CERTAIN ALTITUDES IN GIVEN CORRIDOR OR CORRIDORS DURING PERIODS OF SOV OPERATIONS. USE OF SLOW-FLYING AIRCRAFT, OFTEN IN GROUPS TAKING OFF AT SHORT INTERVALS AND FLYING AT ADJACENT ALTITUDES, OBVIOUSLY CALCULATED MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR FASTER-FLYING WESTERN AIRCRAFT TO COMPETE FOR SPACE AT ALTITUDES BEING USED BY SOVS. WEST HAS COUNTERED TO EXTENT POSSIBLE BY SANDWICHING AIRCRAFT (PRIMARILY MILITARY) BETWEEN ALTITUDES BEING USED BY SOVS. SOVS THUS FAR HAVE CONFINED FLIGHTS TO LOWER ALTITUDES, APPARENTLY IN ATTEMPT ESTABLISH PRINCIPLE THAT WESTERN AIRCRAFT SHOULD USE ALTITUDES ROUGHLY 7,ØØØ-1Ø,ØØØ FT. WEST HAS COUNTERED BY SCHEDULING MORE THAN USUAL NUMBER OF FLIGHTS AT LOWER ALTITUDES. IN AT LEAST ONE CASE, SOVS ATTEMPTED COPE WITH THIS WESTERN TACTIC BY SCHEDULING SOV AIRCRAFT FOR SAME ALTITUDE AND NEARLY SAME TIME AS PREVIOUSLY FILED COMMERCIAL FLIGHT. ALTHOUGH WESTERN FLIGHT FLEW AT ALTITUDE FILED, SOME SLOWING DOWN WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT OVERTAKE SOV FLIGHT. THIS DEMONSTRATES PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON ABILITY WESTERN AIRCRAFT, ESPECIALLY COMMERCIAL PASSENGER PLANES, TO COMPETE FOR SPACE IN CORRIDORS.

SOVS HAVE ACCOMPANIED THEIR TACTICS IN THE AIR WITH POTENTIALLY EVEN MORE DANGEROUS CAMPAIGN WAGED AT BASC. BY STATEMENTS OF FEB 15 AND MARCH 5, SOVS HAVE MADE ATTEMPT CHANGE RULES AND PROCEDURES IN WAYS THAT IF ACCEPTED WOULD PUT SOVS IN POSITION HINDER WESTERN TRAFFIC ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS. AT SAME TIME, SINCE SOVS ALLEGE COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR DEMANDS NECESSARY IN INTERESTS OF AIR SAFETY, SOVS MAY WISH MANEUVER WEST INTO POSITION OF APPARENTLY REFUSING TO COOPERATE IN SECURING FLIGHT SAFETY IN CORRIDORS. THIS IS OLD SOV TACTIC WHICH HAS BEEN CHARACTERISTIC THEIR APPROACH TO BERLIN PROBLEM AS A WHOLE: CREATE SITUATION OF TENSION AND DANGER IN ORDER DEMONSTRATE APPARENT NEED FOR CHANGES IN STATUS. SOV AIM IS TO CREATE PICTURE OF CHAOS IN CORRIDORS WITH WHICH BASC INADEQUATE TO DEAL, WITH ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES OF DESTROYING PRESENT QUADRIPARTITE BASIS FOR BERLIN AIR ACCESS AND THEN PROPOSING GDR TAKE OVER CONTROL AND REGULATE ALL AIR TRAFFIC.

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CERTAIN TECHNICAL-LEGAL WEAKNESSES IN WESTERN POSITION ALREADY DEMONSTRATED.

1. WEST HAS THUS FAR NOT OBJECTED TO SOV FLIGHTS IN PRINCIPLE, ACCEPTING THEM AT LEAST TACITLY AS LEGAL;

2. IF SOV ACTIVITIES THUS FAR ARE LEGAL, BIG EXPANSION OF SCALE OF FLIGHTS PRESUMABLY ALSO LEGAL;

3. BY APPLYING LETTER OF QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS, SOVS HAVE CREATED POTENTIAL AIR TRAFFIC PROBLEM BY ALREADY FORCING WEST TO ABANDON AT LEAST ONE LONG EXISTING PRACTICE: IGNORING RULES OF QUADRANTAL HEIGHT SEPARATION;

4. FACT THAT SOV AIRCRAFT NOT UNDER CONTROL OF SAME ATC AS WESTERN AIRCRAFT ENABLES SOVS TO HARASS OUR TRAFFIC IN CORRIDORS WITHOUT VIOLATING FLIGHT RULES.

TO SUM UP, SOVS ARE CLEVERLY EMPLOYING LETTER OF QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS, WHICH WERE WRITTEN ON ASSUMPTION ALL FOUR POWERS INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING AIR TRAFFIC AND IN FURTHERING AIR SAFETY, TO ACHIEVE PRECISELY OPPOSITE RESULT.

CONCLUSION IS THAT WEST WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COPE WITH SOV OFFENSIVE PURELY BY FOLLOWING RULES AND CALLING ON SOVS TO DO SAME. WEST MUST FIND OTHER MEANS TO COMPEL SOVS TO CEASE ACTIVITIES WHICH IF CONTINUED CAN SERIOUSLY ERODE IF NOT DESTROY ENTIRE WESTERN POSITION IN AIR CORRIDORS.

WE SUGGEST CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO IMMEDIATE TANGIBLE DEMONSTRATION OF WEST'S DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE POSITION, FOR EXAMPLE, BY FLIGHTS OVER 10,000 FT AND/OR STATIONING OF SMALL NUMBER TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN BERLIN. FRENCH JETS MIGHT BE STATIONED AT TEGEL AS STARTER. WE SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED FOR ANY ESCALATION THAT MIGHT FOLLOW SUCH MOVES ON OUR PART AND BE READY TO COUNTER FORCE WITH FORCE.

IN ADDITION FOR THE RECORD BELIEVE WEST SHOULD MAKE STRONG DEMARCHE TO SOV GOVT DOCUMENTING IN DETAIL RECENT SOV ACTIVITIES IN CORRIDORS (AND BASC); THIS ACCOUNT WOULD SHOW THAT THESE ACTIVITIES HAD SOLE PURPOSE OF INTERFERING WITH WESTERN AIR TRAFFIC; SOVS SHOULD BE WARNED THAT WEST INTENDS MAINTAIN ITS UNRESTRICTED AIR ACCESS TO BERLIN IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPIRIT OF QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS, REGARDLESS OF ANY PSEUDO-LEGAL SOV ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE. DEMARCHE COULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY CAREFULLY HANDLED PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO EXPOSE SOV MACHINATIONS WITHOUT FRIGHTENING PEOPLE OUT OF AIRPLANES.

LIGHTNER

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File Berlin negots

9 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Modus Vivendi Provisional Arrangements

1. This is a very dangerous paper. I cannot stress too strongly the need to read it deliberately, addressing to every obscure phrase the highest order of challenge. One really needs a lexicon of some kind, but I will try to "translate" some of the key expressions as they occur.

2. Paragraph 1, Purpose.

a. In the past, much of our thinking about dealing with the Soviets was weakly rooted because it presumed the Soviets were interested in fair settlements, peace and quiet, law and order -- which they are not, no matter how much short shrift is accorded to such militant notions as protracted conflict and power. This paper does not go quite so far, but it is just as wrong as far as it goes, because it assumes that, pending a Berlin settlement, the Soviets are interested in a modus vivendi to eliminate tensions and to permit turning their attention and ours to broader paths toward pax hominibus bonae voluntatis. This would be harmless enough in International Relations 101 at Stanford, but as a basis for dealing with the supremely hardheaded Soviets in 1962 it is risky business indeed. For the lexicon, one might ask where the expression "provisional arrangements" comes from. I find "treaty of a provisional character" in Article 8 of the Soviet draft treaty submitted by Gromyko on 31 October 1955; I find "provisional maintenance of certain occupation rights", "provisional recognition of certain occupation rights", and "provisional status of West Berlin" in Gromyko's proposals of 10 June 1959. There is nothing wrong in this, but it is worth knowing that the attached proposal is not quite as world-shatteringly original as might at first appear. (In fairness to the author, one should note that he does cover this point in his para. 4 on p.4 --- after the reader has had plenty of time to savor the flavor of this brilliant idea for three pages.)

3. Paragraph 2, Proposal.

a. This is a meaty summary of the whole paper. It is full of the complex interrelationships ("sophisticated analysis") that some find so precious. The next following subparagraphs will expand the lexicon and flag a few other points from this paragraph 2.

b. "Non-diffusion of nuclear weapons" at least means no nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic. It may include no nuclear weapons on German soil, or even none in Central Europe, or all Europe. "Non-aggression" has overtones covered later in this memorandum.

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Forwd to JFK memo to DK

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c. The alleged guts of this whole proposal is interim acceptance of the Berlin status quo as one of the facts of life for the Russians as well as for us. Yet note, if you please, the little hooker: "maintenance of existing access procedures, irrespective of the nationality of the persons performing these procedures". If I understand the English language, that puts East Germans on the autobahn and in the Berlin Air Safety Center, and is the first time any official proposal has ever countenanced the latter.

d. "Safeguards against war by miscalculation" bears the closest watching; it is pregnant with mischief. I will cover it in a later paragraph, where the paper expands on it a little.

4. Paragraph 3, Advantages.

a. We are here told that this proposal proceeds from the President's initiative, will settle immediate Berlin problems, and will keep the Soviets happy. Very good indeed.

b. In subparagraph 3.b, note the rough-and-gruff colloquialisms "on ice" and "nail down the fact that access procedures are to remain 'as is'"; I have already underlined that what it proposes is not an "as is" arrangement at all, but the transfer to the GDR of control over air and ground access -- one of the most striking and significant retreats conceivable, short of pulling our garrisons out of the city.

c. Subparagraph 3.c approaches dishonesty, in my view. I would translate it as follows: "It would hoodwink our tougher-minded Allies (Adenauer, the Berliners, maybe de Gaulle) and our own people, thus permitting us to bail ourselves out by proceeding with such actions as military budget cuts (translation of 'budgetary planning') and early release of reservists (translation of 'intended release of reservists'), plus the elimination of other security-oriented programs which deflect resources from milk to the Hottentots (translation of 'etc.').

d. Subparagraph 3.d says the Soviets might lay low because we would be discussing with them, presumably in a forthcoming manner, a number of subjects. If the Soviets were really to play along with this exercise, the subjects mentioned require, once again, a little translation from the lexicon. "Non-diffusion" would mean no nuclears by or in Germany, and maybe not in a wider area, as the communists have often proposed. "Non-aggression" would lead down the primrose path of "European security arrangements", as the communists have often insisted. "No forceful change in German borders" would mean formal ratification of the Oder-Neisse line and a lot more besides, for which please see my remarks on "demarcation lines" later on below. "Safeguards against war by miscalculation" tends to stump even my massive suspicions, but the examples of the White House-Kremlin direct telephone line and "periodic summits" are at least questionable and maybe infantile.

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e. Subparagraph 3.e expresses perhaps the most naïf thought in the paper. The Soviets don't care a fig about public opinion when they judge their security interests to be at stake. One would think their test resumption last September would have convinced even the fuzzy fringe in this town, but apparently not. Incidentally, translate "free world public opinion" to mean "Nehru and the leaders of Afrique Noire", because this paper surely doesn't mean the French or the Germans, and probably doesn't mean any of our NATO Allies.

f. I'm not sure what this is all about, and figure I had better not ask anyone, because it may be very sensitive also.

g. No comment, except that de Gaulle's position would probably be further strengthened by his abstention from this slide down the slippery slope.

h. This seems to be a fairly innocuous paragraph on tactics, but is a little hard to follow. It means that we have two subjects: (1) non-diffusion and (2) "certain kinds of safeguards against miscalculation" (what kinds? Méfiez-vous, as de Gaulle would say). We can negotiate these two subjects either in a Berlin forum or in a disarmament forum, depending on circumstances. If a disarmament forum is all right -- and the paper says the US should prefer it -- one gets a further whiff of aroma or flavor.

4. Soviet Reactions.

No comment. The last paragraph is supposed to imply that this proposal jibes with the views of Hileman, Rostow, and "senior policy officers" from all over. Take with a grain of salt.

5. Draft Proposal.

We now come to the text of the Draft Proposal itself.

a. 1. Berlin.

This paragraph seems to state our vital interests, but I find no reference to our garrisons. Maybe they are "understood", or maybe not mentioning them is only "tactical"?? Maybe, but the Western Peace Plan of 1959, in its corresponding paragraph, mentioned them explicitly. What is more, that paragraph did not speak only of West Berlin, but opened thus: "Berlin is one city and belongs to all of Germany. East and West Berlin should, therefore, be united through free elections . . . ." Subparagraph 1.c again indicates our indifference to who controls access.

b. 2. Germany.

(1) Another interesting footnote, not advanced as an argument against the paper: compare the language in subparagraph 2.a

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with the following language from the Soviet-proposed draft peace treaty of 1959: ". . . the right of the German people to reestablish the unity of Germany . . . in accordance with . . . the interests of European and world security." There is nothing intrinsically wrong with borrowing Russian language; the danger is you give them the impression that your understanding of the language is the same as theirs. Any reference to "European security" or "the security of all European peoples" is loaded with dynamite.

(2) The "mixed technical commissions" have been proposed in the past both by us and by the Soviets.

(3) In subparagraph 2.c, BEWARE of the whole sentence. At first blush, it seems to enjoin the Soviets to see that their separate peace treaty does not inhibit our access. A careful reading, however, raises all kinds of questions as to just what it does imply. I wish I knew.

c. 3. Nuclear Diffusion.

(1) In subparagraph 3.a, look out for the expression "into the control of national governments"; it is different from national manufacture and ownership, as in the current French program. The Germans say that without nuclears their forces are second-class forces, but appear satisfied with US warhead control. I'll bet a fig the latter arrangement would be ruled out by "into the control", on the ground that the Germans share control with us.

(2) Subparagraph 3.c gets a little more explicit. Is anyone afraid the Russians will nuclearize the Rumanians and Bulgarians? If not, then does not the language here inhibit us but not them? Can one not clearly envisage here the European NATO nations denuded of nuclear capability, except and unless they can agree on a multilateral seaborne MRBM force? Note how our existing policy of not further stressing nuclear NATO forces and of not helping further proliferation of national nuclear forces is sophisticatedly transformed, or could be by this language, into no nuclears in Europe, or close to it. As you yourself have often asked, what is it these people are up to? This is the sort of thing Colonel Ewell and I keep hammering on: the Eminences Grises around town slip stuff like this past the Secretaries before anyone knows what is happening, and it all looks clever and above-board. But après eux, le déluge.

d. 4. Non-Aggression.

(1) Subparagraph 4.a adds the notion of "demarcation lines" to the notion of "existing frontiers" -- i.e., the Oder-Neisse line. What "demarcation lines" are we talking about? Mark to this language

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from the Bolz-Zorin agreement of 20 September 1955 (GDR FonMin and Soviet Deputy FonMin): "The GDR exercises control over and guards the frontiers of the GDR, the demarcation line between the GDR and the German Federal Republic, at the outer ring of greater Berlin, within Berlin, and on the lines of communication between the German Federal Republic and West Berlin situation on GDR territory." No one is supposed to use force to change anything, of course, so the several "demarcation lines" can safely be referred to in this context. It is only later on that we will be reaping the whirlwind of formally and permanently acknowledging the isolation and internal division of Berlin.

(2) Subparagraph 4.b talks of mere non-aggression declarations, harmless enough in themselves, followed by consideration of "measures which might be taken to enable the governments . . . to establish their non-aggressive intent." What are we getting into here? No one can say for sure, but for what it is worth I submit the following. At the October 1955 Foreign Ministers' meeting in Geneva, the Western draft proposal spoke specifically in one section of the possibility of a zone of arms control in Central Europe. It then went on to say: "In parts of the zone which lie closest to the line of demarcation, there might be special measures relating to the disposition of military forces and installations." What was meant was a completely demilitarized zone; the Western foreign ministers didn't want to say it out loud, but Anthony Eden had done so at the 18 July session of the Summit meeting held three months earlier. One should note that these concessions by the West (control zones, possible demilitarized zones) were conditional on acceptance of the "Eden Plan" for reuniting Germany through free elections; this attached paper is ready to give it all away for free, "to establish their non-aggressive intent".

6. I realize that this long memorandum of mine is a hatchet job which doesn't help the home team coach very much. I submit, nevertheless, that the hatchet job wanted doing. The language may occasionally have come out a little strongly, but at several junctures I did try to restrain the language in compensation. It may not be too little (look at how long it is), but it may be too late, because I shouldn't be surprised if, in a typical tour de short-circuitry, Secretary Rusk has a copy of this Berlin Modus Vivendi paper in his back pocket as he begins winging his way to Geneva tonight. More likely, as Col Ewell suggests, "the boys" have let Rusk take off peacefully. About the time he is quarreling his Dubonnet Saturday afternoon, he will receive an eyes-only cable from the White House which will transmit this paper with some worried opening sentence such as "The President has read the following memorandum and believes it may have sufficient merit to warrant discussion with Gromyko at a juncture you would consider appropriate."

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The President on February 14 authorized Department to seek Ambassadorial Group agreement to delegate to General Norstad authority (1) to urge civil airlines fly over 10,000 feet if Soviets seek by declaration prevent all flights below 10,000 feet and if, as a result, civil airlines are unwilling fly below 10,000 feet and (2) to fly civil aircraft (initially without passengers) with military pilots over 10,000 feet, if civil airlines decline to fly either above or below 10,000 feet. (SHLO 9-0065).

President also approved communication US authority to General Norstad, although he made exercise of authority dependent on UK and French concurrence (JCS 3293 to USCINCEUR).

During discussions in Ambassadorial Group, UK declined to delegate authority requested by Norstad in SHLO 9-0065.

Although I understand Bonn's desire to meet Soviet actions in air corridors

(b)

S/O:EUR:GER:JCAusland:cbs:sms 3/9/62 The Secretary

EUR - Mr. Kohler FOK
GER - Mr. Hillenbrand
SOV - Mr. Anderson (in substance)

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corridors by flying over 10,000 feet, I do not believe it would be desirable do this in present circumstances, unless Soviets attempt block whole corridor. Nor do I belive it desirable use fighters in air corridors, unless Soviets take action which warranted their use within authority delegated Norstad.

I believe, therefore, that Soviet actions should continue to be met within scope JACK PINE plans, military authority delegated Norstad, and political authority delegated Bonn (Deptel 2420 to Bonn), pending examination Bonn quadripartite study and my talks with Gromyko in Geneva.

END

Rusk BALL

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Telegram SHLO 5-00199 From U.S. Element Live Oak to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Paris, March 11, 1962 (1113292 March).

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/3-1162. Secret; Niact. 3 pages of source text not declassified. The source text is the copy repeated to the Department of State.]

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: March 11, 1962
Time: 12 noon
Place: Beau Rivage Palace Hotel, Lausanne

Participants:

United States	Germany
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Schroeder
Mr. Hillenbrand	

Subject: Berlin and Related Subjects

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Foreign Minister Schroeder began by saying that he had not had the slightest doubt about US intentions in the Berlin question. He believed that we approached the matter in the same spirit as during the November conversations in Washington. The Secretary said he appreciated his remarks. We have been disturbed in Washington over press stories and rumors regarding German distrust and suspicion of American policy. This sort of thing erodes the relationship between allies. It was a fundamental fact that the United States was as much interested in the defense of Europe as anyone else; in fact we have put more on the line than any other country in this connection. We also believe that the Federal Republic has the same interest as we in peace with the Soviet Union. Rumors of this kind should not

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divide us. Their main motive seems to be to make mischief. Schroeder conceded that this was true to a large extent. He said that much was explained by the special German situation. A country which finds itself in the midst of tension and dangers as did the Federal Republic, requires reassurance in the same way as a patient requires daily re-assurance from his doctor. The Secretary referred to a recent TV program on which he had appeared and to his comment that a great ally did not depend for strength on weekly injections. Schroeder said that, while he was relaxed and felt certain that U.S. policy was as described by its representatives, it was not easy to keep speculation out of the press, particularly in view of the real uneasiness which existed. This was especially the case in Berlin which required frequent reassurance. He might mention that the Chancellor had welcomed the fact that the Thompson-Gromyko talks had been carried out on approved lines. Schroeder intended to make the point to the press that he had great admiration for Ambassador Thompson's diplomatic achievements in the five talks with Gromyko.

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Schroeder said that to provide liaison during the Disarmament Conference he was leaving four men in Geneva to strengthen the German Delegation to the International Organizations in Geneva. The four would be: Von Haase, Kraft, Foerster and Balken. He would be grateful if they could be shown cooperation.

Noting that the Secretary had asked Ambassador Grewe about the Chancellor's health, Schroeder said that the date for his vacation in Italy had not been fixed, but the Chancellor had hoped to spend four weeks there. He needed the rest and relaxation. He assumed he would go in a week or ten days. If the Secretary could leave via Cadinabbia, the Chancellor would like very much to see him. The Secretary said he did not know yet how long he would be in Geneva; he expected to go back in about 10 days. He probably could not go to Italy, for this would mean a trip to Rome would also be necessary. However, he was grateful for the invitation.

Schroeder then said he wanted to ask for advice. He was seeing Lord Home tomorrow night. He wondered whether it might be useful thereafter, since he had never met Gromyko, if he should take advantage of an opportunity which might arise to pay his respects. He wondered what the Secretary thought. He would not like to discuss Berlin or disarmament with Gromyko, but he did think he might explain about Krell and refer to the German memorandum as representing his Government's views. He was not prepared to go to Geneva, however, since the Secretary and Lord Home would have come to see him somewhere outside of Geneva. He would in any case want to speak to the Chancellor about it first to avoid any misunderstanding. The Secretary said that Schroeder need have no concern over him or, he was sure, Lord Home. No discourtesy would be involved if Schroeder called on Gromyko in Geneva. Nor would the Secretary be disturbed if he discussed Berlin and disarmament with him. Schroeder commented that there were special reasons why he should not discuss these

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questions. He indicated that German public opinion would generally favor such a contact as logical between Foreign Ministers of two countries who have diplomatic relations. Secretary said that, in his view, it would be normal and natural and there was no need to worry about our reaction. Schroeder said he would behave in such a manner, if he had this meeting with Gromyko, that he could really tell the truth to the press about what took place. If it were done, it should be done in an informal manner, not getting in the glare of Conference publicity.

When the Secretary mentioned that the press would learn that the German representatives in Geneva were in close touch with us, Schroeder said he was a little afraid of this. In any event, the Soviets might suggest inviting both Bonn and Pankow to be represented in Geneva. In this event, the Federal Republic would say that it is not prepared to attend. The Secretary said that our view on further invitations to the Conference, whether to the Germans or to the Red Chinese, was that the composition had been carefully negotiated and approved by the General Assembly. Changes in the makeup of the conference would not be considered, unless, the Secretary added, the Germans wanted to be there. Schroeder said "No". The Secretary commented that, if relevant questions arose, we would be in touch with the Germans. Schroeder said he would think over the question of his calling on Gromyko and would let the Secretary know when he had made up his mind. It probably would not come to the point of a call.

With respect to attendance at the conference, the Secretary stated, we were disappointed at the absence of the French. We had thought that they would at least have observers in Geneva. It was not good for NATO to have only four instead of five representatives here. He wondered if Schroeder thought that de Gaulle would change his mind; it was not really a question of the Foreign Office. We have not criticized France because we did not want to add to de Gaulle's difficulties on the Algerian question. Schroeder said the Germans agreed. The matter had been touched on at the recent Baden

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Baden meeting between the Chancellor and de Gaulle. Schroeder noted that he had been present at the entire meeting and in fact had had two hours alone with de Gaulle. The latter had been determined to have nothing to do with the Geneva talks, although at that time, the possibility of sending an observer had apparently not yet been ruled out. French absence was regrettable but there was nothing that could be done about it in a practical sense. De Gaulle was preoccupied with the Algerian problem and had given the impression that he anticipated that the hardest part was still to come. The Secretary commented that we need France's help and were not getting it. De Gaulle's insistence that the Three Powers direct the Free World was really a path to isolation. The Free World will not accept a tri-partite directorate. Schroeder said he also saw a contradiction in the French attitude relative to the Federal Republic. France knew that the concept of a Three Power directorate was painful to the Federal Republic. At the same time, the French doubted that the United States would remain in Europe and stressed, therefore, the need to build up the strength of Western Europe with France as the center of that strength. The Federal Republic and France could work together in the positive sense of developing Western Europe. He hoped that a meeting in early May of the Heads of Governments in Rome would make further progress towards cooperation. This, however, must be in addition to rather than in place of the integration already achieved by the Common Market Organization in the economic sphere.

After a discussion of the German vested assets question reported in a separate memorandum of conversation, the Secretary said that he wanted to discuss with Schroeder the question of where we go on Berlin in view of the fact that the Thompson-Gromyko talks have ended. Schroeder commented that the British differed a little on whether they had ended. At this point the Secretary and Foreign Minister Schroeder joined their colleagues for lunch.

Drafting Officer: Mr. Hillenbrand
March 12, 1962

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Approved in S, 3/22/82

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(296)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

4

Date: March 11, 1962
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Place: Hotel Beau Rivage
Lausanne, Switzerland

Participants:

United States	Germany
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Schroeder
Mr. Foy D. Kohler	State Secretary Carstens
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand	

Subject: Berlin

Copies to:

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After lunch the Secretary and Foreign Minister Schroeder resumed their conversation. The Secretary said we were inclined to believe that the Thompson-Gromyko talks have no future and that the possibilities in this forum have been exhausted unless there were to be some change in Soviet policy. Even if there were such a change, it would probably only be reflected at the Foreign Ministers' level or at the Summit. As we analyse the present situation in terms of what the Soviets are saying and doing, the Secretary continued, we conclude that they feel unable either publicly to change their position or to pass to the point of war. Now, then, can we move to reduce tensions and to prevent a crisis? Perhaps some new and additional forum for discussion could be set up, not by all the participants in the disarmament meetings in Geneva but by the Big Four--possibly at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers. The Deputies could gnaw and talk at various aspects of the situation with no sense of hurry, somewhat as in the Austrian

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case. In such a forum a wide range of subjects could be considered.

As Ambassador Grewe has been told, the Secretary observed, we have a stated and long-standing national policy on the subject of nuclear non-diffusion. The Soviets have no doubts as to what this policy is. We, however, have no commitment from the Soviets on this subject. We are not of course so much interested in East Germany as in Red China. In this kind of framework we would talk only of transfer to national control, and must obviously protect ourselves against confusing this with the NATO problem. If we did not bring subjects of this sort up in the Deputy Foreign Ministers' forum, then they would have to be discussed in the disarmament context where we would get nothing for them.

Mr. Kohler noted that in the discussion which he, Mr. Bohlen and others had had with Dr. Carstens and others prior to lunch (while the Secretary was talking privately to Foreign Minister Schroeder), the subject had been carried somewhat further. He felt that the period which had extended from December 1958 up to the present had now come to an end. Soviet policy, which might be described as one of "Russia first", was affected by the Red China situation, and there was little question but that the Soviet Union was being more decisive in tightening up Eastern Europe. The idea of talking merely for the sake of talking was unacceptable. The possibility of talks focussed only on access had been exhausted in the Thompson-Gromyko exchanges. The same point had been made both with respect to nuclear non-diffusion and to a NATO--Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement, namely, that our best interests would be served in ascertaining whether we could get something for these in the talks which we would have with the Soviets.

Referring to the nine-point paper which the Germans had handed us, Mr. Kohler said it seemed we could accept the German position on talks between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic.

Dr. Carstens said that in the pre-luncheon period there had been a long discussion about bringing the two subjects mentioned by Mr. Kohler into talks on Berlin with the Soviets. He had raised two objections: (a) the West did not want to give the Soviets an excuse for violating an arrangement on Berlin, and (b) if Berlin were linked to nuclear non-transfer the Soviets could say they agreed but the commitment must be confined to the two parts of Germany. On the first point Mr. Kohler commented that we thought of any link as working in precisely the opposite direction, that is, giving the Soviets a motive for observing a Berlin arrangement. Dr. Carstens

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said he was impressed by this argument. The Secretary noted that the Soviets likewise may be stuck on the subjects of West Berlin and access. They had not picked up the general remarks on broader points which he had made during his talks with Gromyko last fall, and which Ambassador Thompson had made in the Moscow talks. On Dr. Carstens' second objection to linking Berlin to nuclear non-diffusion, the Secretary said we obviously could not accept confining a commitment only to the two parts of Germany since this would be contrary to our own fixed policy.

Foreign Minister Schroeder stated that, as Minister of the Interior, he had favored the idea of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organization in the Federal Defense Council. There were two recognised difficulties: recognition of the GDR and possible slackening of Western efforts to keep up NATO force levels. However, despite these, he favored moving ahead on such a non-aggression agreement. He was sure a formula could be found to avoid the GDR recognition problem. One country could sign for all, or some other arrangement could be worked out. The Secretary suggested that perhaps the Senior Permanent officials of both organizations could sign the Pact. Somewhat ironically, Schroeder observed, when he was Minister of the Interior his views on this subject had always been opposed by the Foreign Office. Now that he was Foreign Minister the idea still seemed acceptable to him. Perhaps the West could start by suggesting unilateral declarations. Even if such a pact were a mere formality, if the Soviets seemed to place value on it (given their penchant for formal pacts), he thought it would be good even from the NATO viewpoint to join in it. In a sense, it would have a cohesive effect on the NATO organization. Dr. Carstens said he wanted to point out that NATO as such was not a subject of international law and therefore could not itself conclude a treaty. The Secretary said at this point he wanted to give what he called his "Pufendorf lecture." As Pufendorf had said, there is no better source of international law than governments. If NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization were to enter into such an agreement then international law would grow correspondingly. The Secretary added that we have, of course, no illusions that this would give us any additional security. Schroeder commented that the Soviets have talked for more than five years about the desirability of such a pact. If it was so important to them and the recognition problem could be avoided, he did not think it was a bad idea. He noted that this and the nuclear non-diffusion point seemed to constitute two useful items. Dr. Carstens said he had finally come to the same conclusion.

Referring to the nine-point paper which he had given the

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Secretary, Schroeder noted that it had only been written this morning after having been discussed with his advisers on the train from Bonn yesterday. He had not studied it carefully but he thought it provided a useful reflection of German thinking.

The Secretary said that he fully agreed with two points in the German paper, one stated and one implied. We could not afford to accept disarmament measures affecting the security of the West adversely, even though they might have propaganda value. Moreover, he did not see any profit in disarmament arrangements singling out Germany and therefore discriminating against Germany. The disarmament issues at the Geneva conference were a problem between Moscow and its allies and the United States and its allies. They encompassed the globe. However, they had more to do with what happens in the European area than elsewhere, because that is where the major confrontation of force is located. It was an inescapable fact about the arms situation that Europe was the area where the arms were brought to bear on each other. Anything accomplished on disarmament therefore must affect regional arrangements. We have nothing in mind which would discriminate against Germany or lead to disengagement. However any progress in the disarmament field is bound to affect the military situation in this part of the world. Schroeder observed that Europe was already too small in relation to the Soviet land mass to constitute a meaningful zone in any sense. He referred to the 1957 London conference proposal of a 5 degrees--40 degrees zone, which the Federal Republic and France preferred to amplify as the zone covering the Atlantic to the Urals. Anything narrower than this would be insufficient. The Secretary said that the zonal concept was necessarily enlarged by the greater range of modern missiles, as the President had indicated in his recent press conference.

Schroeder referred to the Secretary's statement made to him during the Adenauer visit last fall that surely the Germans did not want the some twenty-odd Soviet divisions forever in East Germany. This was certainly true, but every discussion of the subject inevitably raised the question of the British and American divisions in the Federal Republic. These could not be equated with the Soviet divisions, since they could not be kept in Europe once they were removed from Germany, and the net result would be greatly increased European vulnerability to conventional war. The Secretary commented that the Germans were understandably nervous about the strategic situation in Europe. However, take two hypothetical cases: (a) supposing we were to say that we will keep no more than five divisions in NATO countries if the Soviets would keep no more than five divisions in the Warsaw Pact area; if the Soviets accepted this, we would surely agree; (b) if, however, the Soviets said that they would take out ten divisions if we would take ten divisions out of NATO, this would obviously be unacceptable. The United States

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is going to be adequately represented in the European defense establishment to ensure the safety of Europe, because this is both our policy and our need. If we in the West eventually find ourselves in the position where we can ensure our security with sea-borne missiles, then it would obviously be in our interest to thin out the Soviet-massed MRBM's. We cannot propose this now because we do not have the capacity, but it would be to our advantage to do something about this kind of Soviet missile deployment if we could. Schroeder commented that it would be impossible to get the Soviets to diminish the number of MRBM's on their own soil. This being the case the West needed more than just a few ships. He would prefer to know there were a few Western MRBM's on European soil. The Secretary said that some day, when he would no longer be in office, it would surely be to the advantage of Europe for the Soviets to know there were no MRBM's in Europe. In response to Schroeder's query as to how the West could have a deterrent under such conditions, the Secretary said that basically the deterrent was provided by an invulnerable weaponry. Schroeder said this might be true but people tended to believe more in the value of having something on solid ground.

Mr. Kohler said that the formulation on frontiers in the nine-point German paper was one which we could perhaps table. The Secretary observed that the frontier point was not worth much. The Soviets knew, after all, that the Oder-Neisse line was not going to be changed. Schroeder said that sound and consistent theory on reunification and an all-German peace treaty required that the final settlement of the border question be reserved until that peace treaty

The Secretary said he had mentioned the possibility of Deputy Foreign Ministers' talking over this range of subjects for a protracted period. Did the Germans anticipate Soviet-Federal Republic talks at any stage? Schroeder said he really did not think so. He wanted to work out his ideas more precisely on talking to the Soviets generally but not specifically on Berlin. The Secretary observed that Gromyko might be very uncommunicative with him either because the Soviets were aiming at a Summit or because they wanted to try out talks with the Germans now that they recognized the Thompson-Gromyko talks had no future. Schroeder said there was no reason to believe the Soviets would do any differently with the Germans than they had in the Thompson-Gromyko talks. He would first prefer a modus vivendi on Berlin; thereafter he would be prepared to have talks with the Soviets. The Germans had to make clear that the Soviets could not have a European settlement not based on self-determination and expect to get a Federal Republic signature

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thereto. The Secretary said that a basis for any further talks with the Soviets must be their abstention from unilateral harassments of Berlin access. Dr. Carstens said that Kroll had made this point when he handed over the German memorandum. Schroeder observed that a modus-vivendi on Berlin would open the way for the Germans to discuss all outstanding issues of mutual concern. Now they were reluctant to get into talks. The pressures on poor little Germany left all alone in this situation would be very intense. Picking up Schroeder's remark the Secretary said he wondered whether the Federal Republic realized how grown up it had become. Schroeder admitted this might be true, but added that the Germans only considered themselves to have the status of sub-lessees in Berlin.

With respect to East Germany, the Secretary stated, the attractions of the Federal Republic must be overwhelming. Schroeder said this would be true if there were a Western type regime in East Germany, but there was a totalitarian regime. He knew of no case where a democracy had successfully accomplished a peaceful penetration of a totalitarian state. The Secretary cited Poland and Mr. Kohler, Yugoslavia. Schroeder said he could not accept this since the developments in these countries had proceeded essentially from nationalistic causes. Mr. Kohler admitted that in Yugoslavia, at a given moment, something had happened which we did not control, but we had responded and exploited the possibilities. Our economic aid to Yugoslavia had so changed the system there that it would probably be impossible to revert back to a purely Marxist form of economy. Schroeder said that if the GDR system could be changed by economic aid, the Federal Republic would extend it. In response to the Secretary's statement that he thought there was some feeling of Germans as Germans in the GDR, just as Poles are Poles in Poland, Schroeder said the basic difference was that Germany was divided and that the intensity of bitterness between East and West Germans was intensified by this. The Secretary said he believed the East Germans would have the same desire to reestablish contacts with Western civilization that he had noted in Poland when he was still with the Rockefeller Foundation. Schroeder repeated his point about the division of Germany and how this had increased the level of bitterness. His government was obviously interested in doing everything to make the East Germans feel a common bond as Germans. Mr. Kohler remarked that, in this context, the establishment of technical commissions could be useful.

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(297) SECRET

March 12, 1962

TO: The Secretary

Through: S-S

From: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

Subject: Your Meeting with Gromyko on March 13.

Since it does not appear that General Norstad will find it necessary to order Allied flights above ten thousand feet in the Berlin air corridors on March 13, you may wish to make only passing reference to the fact that the situation in the corridors remains unsatisfactory. You may want, however, to note that continuation of Soviet harrassing tactics will jeopardize any possibility of useful talks on Berlin in Geneva.

In his conversation with you on March 12, Gromyko particularly stressed the importance of two questions: (a) respect of the sovereignty of the GDR, and (b) the status of West Berlin. You may, therefore, wish to deal with these in some detail, making some or all of the following points:

1. Respect for GDR sovereignty. As the US memorandum handed to Foreign Minister Gromyko by Ambassador Thompson on February 1, 1962, pointed out, the expression "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR", needs to be clarified. In this connection, on January 2, Mr. Gromyko took exception to what was said regarding de jure and de facto recognition of East Germany by citing Soviet acceptance of the existence of certain countries with which it does not have relations. At the same time, Mr. Gromyko claimed that, in actual fact, the US has already recognized East Germany de facto. This suggests that what the Soviet Foreign Minister had in mind is that the Western Powers should not act as if they deny the existence of East Germany. This indeed they do not do. Since Soviet leaders have placed such emphasis on the facts, or the "factual situation", no problem should arise from the inability of the Western Powers to grant some kind of formal de jure or de facto recognition which would go beyond the factual situation.

2. As far as Berlin access is concerned, we understand that the Soviets wish to ensure that access rights would not in fact interfere with authority or life in East Germany. Since the Western Powers do not so wish to interfere, this creates no problems for them. What they require is access which is not interfered with by East Germany. As we have frequently pointed out, there are numerous cases in which means of transit across territory or through air space are used without any interference

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in the affairs of the territory transited. We believe, therefore, that both sides should accept as a point of departure the concept that guaranteed access would not interfere with the affairs of East Germany and that East Germany would not interfere with freedom of access.

3. The Status of West Berlin. The Soviets have repeatedly said they cannot be expected to confirm Western occupation rights. We are not asking for confirmation of occupation rights, which do not require such confirmation. We are asking for acceptance, as one of the facts of the situation, of the presence of Western forces in Berlin. We are prepared to work out new arrangements to deal with the problems involved.

4. As we see the present situation in Berlin, the Western sectors of the city are in an area in which supreme authority continues to be exercised by three Western Powers. The relationship which has grown up between the Federal Republic and Berlin in various areas of activity has been on a permissive basis subject to this authority. While the Constitution of the Federal Republic provides that West Berlin is a Land of the Federal Republic, this portion of the Constitution is inoperative in Berlin by virtue of the suspension by the Western Powers of the pertinent Articles of the Bonn Constitution. One of the effects of the ending of the Western occupation would automatically be to end the suspension of those Articles of the Bonn Constitution referred to above.

5. Soviet leaders have stated that they support the right of the West Berliners to maintain [illegible] economic, political and cultural relations with the Federal Republic. For obvious reasons, the Federal Republic has a very special role to play with respect to West Berlin. This is a fact of life.

6. It may also be desirable once again to make the point that, having attempted to dispose of East Berlin without Western concurrence, the Soviet Government now asserts a right to enter into the disposition of West Berlin. There is no basis on which it can claim such a right, and it cannot give away Western rights over which it has no disposition to the GDR.

7. To the degree relevant, you may also wish to draw further on some of the suggested talking points prepared for your meeting with Gromyko on March 12. As to the various aspects of our modus vivendi which you floated with Gromyko yesterday, you may wish to further explain certain features to him. You may wish to point out that what we have in mind is not only a set of general principles, but also agreement on certain interim steps. The Soviet Foreign Minister yesterday spoke as if the principles which you put forward yesterday favored only [illegible] the Western point of view. We are of the opinion that all of these points are either consistent with what the Soviets have claimed they wanted or represent points on which there is a clear mutuality of interest.

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Miscellaneous Lot 650330

tel con

(298) 2BF811

TELCON
Lemnitzer
Ball
3/14/62, 12:50 p.m.

Lemnitzer said he was calling because he had talked to Norstad. He wanted to alert us were that Clay is coming out of Berlin to Bonn tonight and has filed a return flight from Berlin over 10,000 feet. When they got it to Norstad he would not give authority for the reason that this is contrary to our tripartite agreement. We have the authority to go over it when the situation requires. Lemnitzer wanted to alert Ball to the reasons he turned it down. He may be calling Ball. Lemnitzer talked to Clifton giving the information on the new chaff attack this morning. There was no incident this morning but the dropping was probably the most serious done so far. He has talked to Dean's people in Geneva to relate this to them.

Ball said Dean indicates he wants us to run it out of here because Geneva is a poor place to try to call shots from the Department's point of view. Lemnitzer said he could understand that. Ball continued so we are going to have to do it. He agreed with Lemnitzer that for Clay to go above 10,000 feet would be a violation of anything that we have given Norstad. Lemnitzer said we have given him a unilateral one if the situation required it. This is the basis he turned it down.

Lemnitzer said in his conversation with Clifton he pointed out to him that this filing by Clay indicated the purpose of Norstad's actions so the President will know about it so that if the call comes directly in to him he will have some background on it.

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JFK Bill Taylor

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TELCON
Bundy
Ball
3/14/62, 5 p.m.

Ball told Bundy he had talked to the Secretary. The Secretary had received only one Norstad telegram and not the second one. He now says he is scheduled to speak tomorrow to Gromyko. He proposes, if it is agreeable with us, to go ahead and put in the speech what he had intended to put in, but to have a very strong postscript on the Berlin business, which he is sending in. The reason for this is there are 17 delegations there and he thinks if someone makes a speech blowing this up following the Norstad recommendation in the telegram which we have here, that the other delegations would feel kind of swindled; that we were turning this into a quarrel. We at least want to put in our disarmament business. He is putting it in a wire. Bundy asked what did Norstad say in his other message.

Ball said his impression would be to hit the Soviets hard on this action and state this at the disarmament conference--in effect to filabuster for some time and possibly abolish the commitments. Bundy said after our basic statement he is for saying we find it hard to reconcile the situation--just so the delegates will know what he is doing.

Ball said he was putting on the wire the text of the postscript which he proposes to use, for clearance here. He says, however, if Gromyko should make a bitter attack on the United States in his speech that he wants to have freedom to improvise comments in answer to it. Bundy asked,"I guess we may have to trust him up to par?" Ball said all he was saying was that he could not see how it would turn out. On the question of the problem of Larry and Lucius, he thinks we have to back Larry. Bundy said they all agreed to that and asked if he was sending for Lucius. Ball said he wasn't unless the President definitely tells him to do so. He says that he thinks it would be difficult to have him down there. He suggested we might invite him back here for a report. That might have a good effect. Bundy said he would ask the boss.

Bundy asked if Clay was being kept in Bonn until we know more or was he going to go back to his own alley. Ball said he did not know; he did not think we had any information on whether he was going straight back.

FNB to Weiss memo

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Bundy said he would talk to the President and call Ball back on this. He asked if Ball was going to talk to the Secretary again on the KY-9. Ball said he was going to get back within an hour. Bundy asked "Now what you want cleared is essentially that he wants to make his day speech and then make his Berlin speech in a sort of "You fellows ought to know what's going on here' tone of voice". Ball said that was it. Bundy asked when could they expect the text for clearance and Ball said we were waiting for it now.

Bundy said he could not get to him until later but could get back in the morning. Bundy said he doesn't himself think that Clay to Geneva is a good solvent and recommends rather Clay to Washington. Ball said that was it.

(inaudible) Bundy said it was essentially a statement of his view that Berliners ought not to get into such a windfall and if Clay would politely recite to them what in fact is being done, everybody would be calm.

Ball said the Secretary was very concerned about the press situation there.

(Bundy asked Smith to bring him the second Norstad cable from which he summarized:) Bundy said he sees the problem of Berlin concern, but he sees it among the points which could be exploited to minimize their concern. The fact that a number of commercial flights have not been the main operation, having been conducted with full passengers, crews since Feb. 8, except for the period last year when the list was increased.

Bundy said this fellow just snows these people. He thinks the corridor operation should stay. The powers demonstrate strength and unity and we have agreed to take unilateral action when it is necessary to support the other two--to add strength to our position. He is against judging foreigners except in a case of a few scheduled flights above 10,000, until we get the conditions which he generally stated before. He agrees the time has arrived we should take drastic action of our own outside the Federal Republic. If we continue to maintain our prime objective to maintain our air access to Berlin safely without limitation ... absolutely right that they are talking through their hats. Ball agreed.

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Bundy said once the Secretary has seen this, he thought all would be able to talk to each other on the phone and say "Let's take this course." Ball said he thought he had seen the short one because he was very clear on the fact that we've got to back Larry up on the other thing. Bundy said in the context of this message he would see no excuse for turning Geneva into a shambles. He would check with the President and call Ball back.

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SECRET

March 14, 1962

To: The Secretary

Through: S/S Subject: Norstad's Views on Corridor Situation

From: Foy D. Kohler

With your approval Mr. Hillenbrand telephoned Mr. Stoessel at SHAPE, and was able to establish a KY-9 circuit with him. Despite many interruptions, he was able to transmit the gist of your message of last night. General Norstad then personally entered the conversation, which apparently took place on equipment in his office. He made the following points:

1. As to Berlin's dilemma, he thought the preferable course was obviously to stress the element of continuing safety and that there had been no real deterioration of the situation as the facts showed. If the Soviets did react as feared, then we would be in a much better position to take the next steps. We should, of course, include in any statements a reaffirmation of our intention to maintain our position.

2. He personally strongly opposed the suggestion that fighters be introduced now. The implications of this had not been faced up to. He believed it would be wrong to use fighters in the corridors now.

3. He felt that we had a day or two leeway to see what the other side would do. He felt their efforts had so far been unproductive from their point of view, and doubted whether the point had been reached where a change in our approach was required. (At this point the connection became particularly bad, but he seemed to be saying that press play in Berlin was something we should be able to handle on our side.)

4. As to flights above 10,000 feet, he believed that there would not be a proper cause and effect relationship if they were introduced under current circumstances. He stayed with his position that a flight or flights above 10,000 feet should only take place if a flight or flights below 10,000 feet could not take place.

5. If the Secretary wished to communicate with him privately, the direct cable facilities established for Live Oak messages could be used. Messages would reach him in 20 minutes. In any event, he was taking action to have the KY-9 system to SHAPE headquarters improved.

Mr. Stoessel

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3-15-62

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Mr. Stoessel then came back on and asked about a more formal expression of Norstad's views. Mr. Hillenbrand requested that nothing be put on the wire from SHAPE commenting on these matters until something came out of Washington as might be anticipated. He would report General Norstad's comments to Mr. Kohler and the Secretary and would call Mr. Stoessel back this afternoon to pass on any comments or thoughts on getting General Norstad's views into the hopper.

At the very end Mr. Stoessel added that at SHAPE they thought the idea of taking countermeasures against Soviet civil air traffic in third countries was a good one, but it was recognized that this might involve difficulties with some of our reluctant allies who would actually have to execute the measures.

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3/14/62

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ACTION: GENEVA TOSEC PRIORITY 34

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Amembassy MOSCOW 2158
USBER BERLIN 1166

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PARIS FOR USRO, STOESSEL, MCGUIRE

REF: DEPTEL 2447 to BONN

FOR KOHLER

Following US position subject to USUN comments, proposed for Secretary's approval re resort to Security Council for harassment air access. It follows general lines indicated in your response to British desire make such resort automatic.

[redacted] US agrees in principle to submit question to Council on introduction [redacted] Allied fighters into corridors. Wishes final review at time however. [redacted] Proposes therefore that Ambassadorial Group meet if possible prior to [redacted] but in any case immediately after introduction fighters:

1. [redacted] to make judgment as to whether circumstances surrounding use of fighters in corridors are in fact such as to make resort to Council desirable;

2. [redacted] to request UN Missions concert in sending letter requesting Council meeting to President of Council if decision in 1 above is [redacted]

(1)

Drafted by	Telephone number and authorized by
S/O:EUR:GER:ARDubois:cbs 3/13/62	EUR - Richard H. Davis

Clearances:
GER - Mr. Hillenbrand (in substance)
UNP - Mr. Sisco
IO - Mr. Walker
RA - Mr. Van Hollen
S/S
DS-322

S/S - Mr. Haverd

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is positive; and also, in this case,

3. to send instructions simultaneously to NATO Missions to request NATO Council session for purpose instituting agreed air countermeasures (we consider it important to get this action underway before Security Council meets if possible). info Department

FOR USUN Please cable Geneva whether foregoing procedure acceptable to you.

FYI

Our hope would be that at least UK and German Ambassadorial Group delegations could be authorized agree to these actions at time without prior referral to Governments. Our understanding of French position is that while they might not associate themselves in request for Security Council consideration they would not oppose such initiative by US and UK.

We assume position adopted at time by US in Ambassadorial Group meeting referred to above would be government position arrived at in light of circumstances in urgent consultation between Washington and USUN. Desirable however in proposing procedure quadripartitely to emphasize coordination in Ambassadorial Group as going bit further meet British desire for automaticity than would mere statement our position reserved for government decision at time.

END.

BALL

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SecDel
March 17, 1962

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

302

Date: March 15, 1962
Time: 11:30 a.m.
Place: Hotel Richemond
Geneva, Switzerland

Participants:

United States	USSR
Mr. Kohler	Mr. Semenov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Mr. Akalovsky	Mr. Zolotov

Subject: Berlin and Germany

Copies to:

	C - Mr. Johnson	S/P - Mr. Rostow
SecDel	INR - Mr. Hilsman	USRO Paris (2) for Ambassador Finletter & Mr. Stevens
S/S	American Ambassador MOSCOW	
G/S - Mr. Bohlen	American Ambassador BONN	DOD-Sec. McNamara
EUR - Mr. Kohler	American Ambassador LONDON	CIA - Mr. McCone
GER - Mr. Hillenbrand	American Ambassador PARIS	The White House

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Mr. Kohler was host at a working luncheon with Mr. Semenov. The conversation started at about 11:30 a.m. and lasted until approximately 4:30 p.m.

Mr. Kohler opened the conversation by expressing the view that it might be useful that Mr. Semenov and he, both officials at the working level, talk informally about the problems they deal with on a daily basis.

Mr. Kohler said that he was obliged to say that sometimes he felt somewhat discouraged. Over many years, and particularly since he had been assigned to the Department, he had sought to improve the relations between the US and the USSR and to expand contacts between the two countries. He recalled his efforts to establish and expand cultural contacts and also his part in bringing about such visits as those of Mikoyan and Kosygin to the United States, Vice President Nixon's to the USSR, and Mr. Khrushchev's to the United States. The culmination of these contacts was of course the Vienna meeting between the President and Mr. Khrushchev. But now there are again difficulties, particularly in connection with the Berlin situation, and it is hard to maintain the relations even at the level so far achieved.

Mr. Kohler

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Mr. Kohler recalled his brief conversation with Mr. Semenov at dinner the other day, which may have been somewhat sharp, about the present situation and said that we were still puzzled as to what Soviet intentions are, and why the state we would regard as peaceful coexistence appears to be unsatisfactory from the Soviet standpoint.

Mr. Semenov expressed appreciation for this opportunity to meet with Mr. Kohler and talk with him, particularly in view of the fact that they dealt with the same problems, although from different ends. He compared Mr. Kohler and himself to musicians playing the same instrument but in different orchestras. He said he understood that the talk would be informal and expressed the view that such contacts are useful and could serve the purpose of attempting to bring the positions of the two sides closer. He said this was better than to have verbal duels which serve no useful purpose and can result only in broken dishes.

He stated that he was in a somewhat difficult position in view of the fact that the remarks made by the Secretary the other day contained, in his view, some interesting points which the Soviet side was now trying to digest. Thus the Soviet delegation has no specific instructions and he could express only his personal views. He noted however that this process of digestion could perhaps be facilitated if Mr. Kohler clarified some elements of the US position, so that he could see what was behind the Secretary's words. He observed that sometimes it is more useful to say things than to keep them for oneself.

Mr. Semenov expressed the view that it would be difficult to talk about the whole range of problems and therefore it might be better to start the discussion by taking up individual points in sequence, step by step. He said that he was a poor speaker and no propagandist and therefore he would prefer to listen to Mr. Kohler, particularly because the US had expressed some new considerations which in some aspects were not clear to the Soviet side.

Mr. Kohler stated that the purpose of this meeting was to clarify whatever could be clarified. He stressed that what bothered the US a great deal was that after all these exchanges there were some points which the Soviet side claimed were still unclear or which the Soviet Union would not accept. He said that President Kennedy and the United States Government had tried to communicate to the Soviet side what United States vital interests are, interests which are vital indeed, and that in this connection he wanted to stress the following:

First of all, it should be clearly understood that U.S. troops cannot leave West Berlin unless there is a general settlement. The reason for that should be known to Mr. Semenov. West Berliners, with their different system, have gone through a blockade, and there were threatening noises from East Germany in their direction. The U.S. is obligated to protect them and it must do so. Related to this question is that of West Berlin's having free communications with the outer world, particularly with West Germany, with which West

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Berlin has very close ties in many respects, and particularly in the economic field.

Mr. Kohler continued by saying that we are very much disturbed by the fact that our lines of communication to West Berlin seem to be under attack. Therefore, the question arises what the Soviet intentions are. It has become quite apparent that there is an effort to erode our rights and to interfere with the transit traffic, particularly in the air corridors. This is a very important problem, because, as the Secretary had said to Mr. Gromyko, if the Soviet Union is trying to force us out, that is a very dangerous situation. If it is not, then both sides must accommodate themselves to peaceful coexistence. It is in the hope that the Soviet Union is not trying to force us out that we have attempted to develop ideas as to how to organize such peaceful coexistence.

Mr. Semenov replied that Mr. Kohler must be familiar with the exchanges [illegible] between the President and Mr. Khrushchev and with the exchanges between the two countries through diplomatic channels. (Mr. Kohler indicated that he was.) Therefore, Mr. Semenov felt there was no need for him to give any explanations.

However, he said, he could state that the Soviet side was disappointed that after the trip Mr. Gromyko and himself had made to New York, negotiations had been marking time or even going backwards. This situation had a somewhat discouraging effect on the staff in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Mr. Semenov then said that his impression of the climate in Geneva was that it is similar to the one in New York; it is somewhat cool, but never[illegible]less pleasant, and one could see that spring is coming. The question is what kind of spring we will have.

Mr. Kohler observed that we are looking for a thaw.

Mr. Semenov then turned to Berlin. He said that the two sides had different approaches to this problem; the United States looked at the problem from one standpoint, and the Soviet Union from another. He said he agreed with the significant idea expressed by the Secretary, namely, that it was important to understand each other.

Mr. Semenov said he wanted to take up the question of communications first so as to get it over with. He recalled that he had worked in Germany from 1945 to 1954 and that he had lived with the problem. He remembered that in 1945 and 1946 U.S. and U.K. officers attempted to gain some freedom in the air, which may have been related to the line adopted at the ICAO Conference in Chicago in 1944. But at that time there were no heated emotions or nervousness, although it was quite clear that the two sides had different approaches. In general terms, what US and UK officers stated at that time was that all of the Four Powers had equal rights. As Mr. Kohler knows, the air lanes ran through a considerable part of what was then the Soviet zone.

Therefore

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Therefore, this view could not find approval in the Coordinating Committee or the Control Council. The essence of the differences was that the Soviet Union believed, with full justification, that since the zone of occupation was within its competence, it had greater responsibility and consequently greater rights. Under the agreement the Soviet Union has freedom of movement in West Germany, but since that part of Germany is the primary responsibility of the West, the Soviet Union did not believe it to be sound to claim in that area the same rights as those of the West. In any event, there was no exacerbation of the situation at that time in spite of the differences in views, and a state of peaceful coexistence prevailed. The Soviet Union flew through the corridors, filed plans for flights at different altitudes for various purposes, including military and training purposes. These questions kept popping up all through 1947 and 1948, but there was no difficulty at that time. But now they are regarded as threats. Furthermore, the situation has now changed, since now there are two sovereign German states in existence with which our two countries have respective agreements. Thus the question arises whether the United States is seeking changes. If that was not possible in the past, how does the United States expect to do it now? Mr. Semenov went on to say that he did not understand why the word "threat" should be used. He said that perhaps the US military were sending incorrect reports. He observed that when there appear reports in the press that the Soviet Union is under pressure and that as a result of that pressure certain changes are taking place, that does not improve the situation. Every day one could read in the press reports alleging that the Soviet Union had retreated under pressure. In any event, the question is not that of somebody's driving out somebody else but rather that of settling certain problems which are ripe for solution. We should not look at small things through binoculars and at large things from the opposite end of binoculars, i.e., we should not magnify small things and minimize important ones. Mr. Semenov expressed the hope that Mr. Kohler understood full well that there was no attempt by the Soviet Union to drive out anyone and that the Soviet Union was genuinely seeking a settlement.

Mr. Semenov then turned to the questions of guarantees for West Berlin and of transforming West Berlin into a free city. The United States has been given the Soviet proposals on this subject, but the Soviet side has no clear picture of United States views. The Soviet Union is for complete guarantees. Mr. Semenov expressed the view that apparently the two sides have similar points of departure: (1) the fact that there are two German states in existence; and (2) the fact that there is West Berlin with its different social structure. He asserted that no one wishes to encroach upon West Berlin, which is a small city on a small piece of land. The Soviet Union does not need it at all. The Soviet Union has broader plans and it is more concerned about developing its relations with the United States. The Soviet Union does not wish to fight over a trifle. The Secretary was correct when he said that one should not look upon small things through a magnifying glass. If this is his intention, perhaps peaceful coexistence could be arranged. What is needed is that the basic points of departure be translated into specific language. Mr. Semenov said that, as he understood the Secretary, the United States seems to have the same approach. However, it is not quite clear how the

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United States envisages the settlement of certain problems. The possibility of developing certain principles had been mentioned, and US principles had been enumerated without any mention of Soviet principles. Perhaps the United States expects the Soviet Union to set forth its principles. In any event, this is something for the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko to deal with. Mr. Semmov indicated, however, that while the United States was talking about general principles there were some very specific questions which should be discussed. He wondered whether the United States thought that general principles should be agreed upon before a heads of state meeting or that specific questions should also be discussed so that something concrete could be produced and given to the heads of state for consummation. Of course, if one wishes to procrastinate, the two sides could stay in the same place, or perhaps make two steps forward and two steps backwards or just sway back and forth from one foot to the other as they do in some modern dances. Mr. Semmov said that difficulties do exist and that they are not accidental; perhaps they are due to some incorrect approach in the past. In any event, we must deal with them and settle them. He inquired what Mr. Kohler's views were on how the two sides should dance.

Mr. Kohler observed that he was more confused by Mr. Semmov's statements than by anything he read in the papers. Referring to the question of access, he expressed the hope that Mr. Semmov knew more than he was saying. Mr. Kohler pointed out that there had been no trouble in the air corridors, even during the blockade, until February 2, 1962, when a deliberate campaign was started to erode Western rights, to change the procedure, to frighten the airlines, and in fact to interrupt the traffic. He stressed that we are fully informed as to what goes on in the corridors from hour to hour. The Soviet Union has been attempting to take a number of new actions, none of which it had taken earlier. It has been attempting to preempt flight time in the corridors and the Soviet members of BASC refused to certify our flight plans. The Soviet Union has now also started filing its own flight plans, again something it had not done before. Mr. Kohler pointed out that he did not wish to say that the Soviet Union must not or should not file such plans, but the fact remained that this was something the Soviet Union had not done before. Furthermore, these flight plans have been for flights scheduled exactly at the same time and same altitudes at which airline flights are scheduled. He stressed that this was a dangerous game. Finally, chaff has been dropped in the corridors by Soviet planes and we know where they came from and where they went. All this gives us a clear impression that there is a deliberate attempt to interfere with the traffic and deprive us of our rights. If such attempt indeed exists, the question arises whether there is any basis on which we can develop peaceful coexistence. Mr. Kohler noted that while the United States has some ideas on peaceful coexistence, we must first know what the Soviet intentions are on Berlin. The United States does not seek changes, as Mr. Semmov says. On the contrary, changes are being thrust upon us and they injure our rights.

Mr. Kohler went on to say that access routes are the very lifeline for the population of West Berlin, which we have the obligation to protect. In order to avoid this confrontation, which is very dangerous, we have thought it desirable

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desirable to remove the area of access by road and air from the confrontation with East Germany and the Soviet Union. The United States believes that such a solution would not involve the question of sovereignty since similar arrangements exist in other states. If we can remove access from the area of confrontation we are prepared to live with the East German regime, although we are not prepared to recognize it. The Soviet counterproposal on this problem does not remove it from the area of confrontation; on the contrary, it restricts access. Mr. Kohler stressed that life in West Berlin cannot depend on the caprice of East Germany. Ulbricht has made quite a few statements clearly indicating what his intentions are with regard to the freedom of access. In fact, even when the President's brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, went to Berlin the East Germans claimed that this was an abuse of the corridor. We believe that an international access authority would be a means of arranging free access/which what the Soviet Union has been referring to as the sovereignty of the GDR. On the other hand, we have not seen any proposals by the Soviet Union designed to reconcile the requirements of free access with what the Soviet Union calls respect for sovereignty of GDR, although Mr. Gromyko did say that these two things could be reconciled. The United States has proposed a method of reconciling these two problems, whereas the Soviet Union had not.

Mr. Rusk said he believed both he and Mr. Kohler occupied sufficiently high positions to assume that they have equal knowledge of facts. He denied that Soviet flights had never occurred in the corridors prior to the date mentioned by Mr. Kohler. He said when he was in Germany he knew of these problems. As to flight plans, pertinent documents submitted by US and UK officers contain provision for the filing of such plans. Apparently these arrangements were made only at the Directorate level, although they reflected the US view. If the US believes that the Soviet Union is begging for agreement and that the US achieved something by threats, then this is an improper approach. He reiterated that the US military are probably giving incorrect information.

Mr. Kohler noted that he was speaking only of flight plans. For many years the Soviet member of BASC accepted our plans and never filed Soviet flight plans, except in the case of Mr. Khrushchev's flight to Paris in 1960. Mr. Kohler reiterated that he was not saying that the filing of plans is something that should not be done, but stressed that it had not been done before. In the past, the Soviet member of BASC accepted our flight plans and Soviet aircraft stayed away.

Mr. Rusk asserted that even in the past Soviet aircraft had flown through the sector of East Germany where the air corridors are located. He said that there are air fields in that sector and that it is quite impossible for them not to fly through it.

Mr. Kohler

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Mr. Kohler acknowledged this but repeated that when we filed our flight plans Soviet planes stayed away or flew at different altitudes. On the other hand, Soviet flights scheduled now are such as interfere with the traffic. He said that what made us particularly suspicious was that Soviet aircraft entered the corridors, flew along them, and then, instead of using the corridors for flights to a destination to which the corridors lead, they turn and leave the corridors in the same direction they came from. This makes it quite clear that the corridors are not being used because of actual need but rather for the purpose of interference.

Mr. Semenov said that from what Mr. Kohler has stated he saw that Mr. Kohler knew of the provision in the 1946 agreement which provides for the filing of Soviet flight plans. He also said that the United States had no extraterritorial rights but rather only communication lines, so that if flight time is occupied the United States should use other altitudes available to it. In any event strong words can do no good, and the US attitude has not contributed to facilitating a settlement. He said that he could not add anything to what Mr. Gromyko had said on this point and concluded by stating that if Mr. Kohler believed that this was the most appropriate subject for discussion then perhaps it would be better to turn to a discussion of art or music.

Mr. Kohler suggested that it would be better to talk about facts, because facts are important. He also noted that he had not used any strong words in his remarks. Mr. Kohler stated that what Mr. Semenov had now said indicated that the Soviet Union is in fact trying to preempt the corridors, where for 16 years traffic had flowed without difficulty. It would be quite simple for the Soviet Union to get airlines schedules and flight plans, which are a matter of public knowledge, but now it schedules flights which appear to be intended for no purpose other than to interfere. Mr. Kohler said that he was speaking only of facts. He noted however that he would have raised this question fundamentally anyway, because the proposals the Secretary wished to make depended on our reaching an understanding on Western presence in West Berlin and access to it. Thus, Mr. Kohler said, when he raised this question it was to see whether there is in fact an intention to erode our freedom of access to and from Berlin.

Mr. Semenov stated that he did not hear anything and that he was completely deaf to what Mr. Kohler had said. He suggested that Mr. Kohler read the Soviet note which contained all the information on the Soviet position. He observed that perhaps the local climatic conditions created such deafness.

Mr. Semenov then said that he had not heard from the Secretary of any preconditions for negotiations which Mr. Kohler had just implied existed. As a professional diplomat, he did not quite understand the value of preconditions in discussions between equals.

Mr. Kohler pointed out that what the Secretary had said to Mr. Gromyko was that if both sides would agree that West Berlin should indeed be free to choose its own way of life and to maintain its viability, and that access, which

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which is an essential part of viability, should be free and unrestricted, then perhaps a modus vivendi could be developed. He stressed that this was not a precondition but simply part of an agreement. Mr. Kohler said he had hoped that in view of the fact that neither Mr. Semenov nor himself were principals they could in an informal talk clarify these questions. This is the purpose of [illegible] meeting.

Mr. Kohler then invited Mr. Semenov to adjourn to the luncheon table. As they rose he accused Mr. Semenov of placing him under duress, by threatening to turn the conversation to art and music. While he thought he could hold his own with Mr. Semenov in politics, he admitted he would be defeated from the start on art and music. Mr. Semenov's appreciation of these remarks seemed to ease the situation.

During the actual period of the luncheon (about 45 minutes) the conversation became somewhat more general. There was further discussion of the Berlin situation with particular reference to the wall. Mr. Semenov cited and repeated the statements made in the Soviet memorandum of December 27 to the Federal Republic as to whether the FRG would not have done the same thing if, for example, two-thirds of the city of Frankfurt were in the hands of a regime hostile to the government, whose radio stations poured out abusive propaganda against the government. Mr. Kohler replied that he was sure that neither the Federal Government nor any other Western government would have fear of such a situation. We did not fear other peaceful coexistence or peaceful competition. Above all we believed in a free competition of ideas. Mr. Kohler pointed out in this connection that it was only the Soviet bloc that jams radio broadcasts and otherwise tries to keep ideas from its people.

Mr. Semenov then took up the question of the two sovereign German states. He attempted to rebut Mr. Kohler's remarks about Soviet policy being dangerous even for the Soviets since it was based on the partition of Germany and thus sowed the seeds of nationalism and revanchism. In this connection he delivered a long discourse on his version of the history of the German peoples, asserting that they had been drawn together only by the domination at one time or another of Austrian or Prussian elements. Thus he implied that the unification of the Germanic peoples had been quite artificial and came to the conclusion that there are now four Germanys -- Austria, the Federal Republic, the GDR and West Berlin. He was clearly trying to demonstrate that if Austria could remain independent there was no reason why East Germany could [illegible] other asserted that a separate peace treaty with the GDR would in itself be enough to frustrate and bring an end to the efforts of the revanchists. He also repeated the charge that actually there was no support for the reunification of Germany in the Western countries or even in the Federal Republic itself. Mr. Kohler replied that the very fact that German unity had been achieved rather recently, in historical terms -- the last half of the last century -- made the drive toward reunification stronger than in

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other areas. It was quite true that in all the Allied countries there were anti-Germanic feelings stemming from two world wars. It was also true that there were some elements in Western Germany which did not seek reunification because they thought that it would involve a setback in the West German standard of living and impose sharing with the East Germans to bring their standard of living up to an equal basis. However great states could not afford to base their policies on such transient emotions. It was perfectly clear that the emotional drive for reunification was latent in the German people and that a policy of partition was best calculated to give rise to nationalist and revanchist leadership which would seek such unification at any cost.

Somewhat irrelevantly Mr. Semenov then referred to the fact that the United States had not recognized the Soviet Union for sixteen years (by implication he seemed to mean that we would eventually be forced to recognize the GDR). The United States would never have believed that the Soviet Union would develop into the powerful state that it is today. He said he could assure him that there had indeed been great changes in the Soviet Union. Mr. Kohler replied that we fully accepted this and indeed were delighted by it. Mr. Semenov should be sure that neither the United States Government nor the American people felt anything but pleasure when conditions improved in the Soviet Union and the Russian people had a higher standard of living. Speaking personally, he thought that Russia with its vast resources would have developed more rapidly under a capitalist system than it had under its socialist system and in particular that it would today be producing several times as much agricultural produce as it is. However this was a problem for the Soviets who could certainly have any system they wanted. In this connection Mr. Kohler spoke of his own experience of having been absent from the Soviet Union from 1949 until 1959 when he accompanied Vice President Nixon. The party had included a great many US correspondents who had not been in the Soviet Union previously. These correspondents, as they traveled about the country, had commented on how few automobiles there were, or how few shops, or how drab the clothing seemed. To him, however, it had been a matter of astonishment and pleasure that there had been such a striking increase in the number of automobiles, and in the number of shops, and in the improved quality of the clothing. But even more than these material things, he had accompanied Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Nixon on their famous tour along the Moscow River making political speeches to the assembled crowds along the shores. This was what had given him real pleasure and satisfaction in the way of change and improvement. This would never have happened in Stalin's day. Mr. Semenov agreed with this observation.

Resuming the more specific talk after lunch, Mr. Kohler said that there were a couple of points in Mr. Semenov's earlier remarks which he thought should be made clearer. The United States had tried to make it clear that the presence of Western forces in West Berlin is not a negotiable subject. Mr. Kohler observed that he sometimes wondered whether the effort had been successful and whether this was accepted by the Soviet Union. This was not

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a question of words but of facts, because, rightly or wrongly, West Berlin would not last without the Western forces being there. Removal of Western forces would be a very serious blow to the morale of the West Berlin population. Even Pravda and Izvestiya had said that West Berlin would die on the vine. Mr. Kohler stated that we did not insist on calling this occupation and did not expect the Soviet Union to confirm occupation. He pointed out that the Western forces in Berlin are small and symbolic of the commitment the West has to protect the freedom of West Berlin. Thus this point should be clear. Also the Western forces in West Berlin are not important from the military standpoint; in fact Mr. Khrushchev himself had said that if there were a war he would wish to see more Western troops in Berlin because all of them would be captured right away. Mr. Kohler reiterated that the presence of Western forces in Berlin was not a military factor but only a symbol of West Berlin's protection. He said that he mentioned this because this was our concept of free city, i.e., it cannot be a "demilitarized" city.

Mr. Kohler said that another question he wanted to come back to was that of West Berlin's viability and of access. He reiterated that the United States had searched for means of keeping this problem out of the area of conflict. Semenov had said today that free access and what he called respect for the sovereignty of GDR could be reconciled. It would be very useful if Mr. Semenov could indicate how the Soviet Union proposed to do that, other than by the method proposed by us.

Mr. Semenov recalled that people normally smile when the Palais Rose Conference is mentioned. He had taken part in that conference, together with Mr. Kohler, but the Thompson-Gromyko talks in Moscow appeared to him like Palais Rose in slow motion. He said that President Kennedy was right when he said that it was impossible to create extraterritoriality on the territory of a sovereign state.

Mr. Kohler interjected that such arrangements do exist in a lot of places, and inquired what Mr. Semenov's ideas were on the subject.

Mr. Semenov replied that this was something which should be thought over, but observed that the two sides could not differ significantly on this point. He asked why the two sides should confront each other in such proximity. He thought it would perhaps be better to have UN or neutral troops in West Berlin. That would simplify things and guarantee the situation until it has been normalized completely. He wondered whether the US perhaps wanted to preserve this area of friction and asserted that the Soviet Union was interested in eliminating friction.

Mr. Kohler said that the answer to this question was that: (1) West Berlin is our obligation and responsibility, which we cannot shirk and do not intend to shirk; and (2) neutral or UN troops would not be looked upon by West Berliners as a guarantee of their security; they would start leaving the city and the viability of West Berlin would be undermined. He added that

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he did not see why the presence of the troops of the two sides in proximity to each other should be a source of friction if neither side had bad intentions. He said he wanted to assure Mr. Semenov that we, for our part, have no bad intentions.

Mr. Semenov replied that, objectively speaking, there are some things which breed friction. UN or neutral troops would be better if only because neither of the two sides would have its commandants in Berlin who refuse to let each other into their homes. Commandants are our commandants and they can do all sorts of things.

Mr. Kohler observed that no US commandant who has only three brigades at his disposal could be a menace to a Soviet commandant surrounded by twenty divisions of his own.

Mr. Semenov, referring to Mr. Kohler's remark that Western forces are a guarantee of West Berlin, said that perhaps it would be better if the Soviet Union were to participate in such guarantee. After all, the USSR already has forces in West Berlin -- a company in Spandau -- and there has been no difficulty as a result of that.

Mr. Kohler replied that he thought Mr. Semenov knew as well as he did why this was unacceptable. In spite of everything Berlin is one city and not two cities. The Soviet Union has taken away the part which is its responsibility and now it seemed that it wished to take some more. If the wall were torn down and if Berlin were reunited, we would be delighted to have Soviet troops in the Soviet sector.

Mr. Semenov stated that the Soviet Union had already terminated the occupation status in what had been the Soviet sector. East Berlin is the capital of East Germany and it has the same social system with it, while West Berlin has a different system, the viability of which is to be maintained. He wondered whether and for how long the United States intended to preserve the occupation status if a peace treaty was signed. Is it the intention of the United States to preserve that status for another twenty or fifty years? If the United States indeed has such intentions, that is a very weak position.

Mr. Kohler inquired why Mr. Semenov held this view.

Mr. Semenov said that this was something like virginity; the longer it lasts the less it is valuable.

Mr. Kohler stated that what the Soviet Union calls occupation we call protection. He would reply to Mr. Semenov's question as to how long the Western presence should continue by asking him how long the Soviets intended that the partition of Germany should continue. The dates would be the same.

Mr. Semenov

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Mr. Semenov asserted that Mr. Kohler's remark went further than what his principals had said and that Mr. Kohler was more royal than the king.

Mr. Kohler then suggested that Mr. Semenov give his views on the problem of reconciling the two requirements in connection with access.

Mr. Semenov said that he wished to reserve this question for later. He said he wondered why the United States did not like the idea of a free city. Mr. Khrushchev had advanced this idea on the basis of his knowledge of German history. There had been free cities in Germany throughout German history. The Soviet Union had given Ambassador Thompson a paper on this subject but Ambassador Thompson remained deaf just as he, Mr. Semenov, remained deaf at one point here today.

Mr. Kohler stressed that the fact is that West Berlin is a free city even today, while under the Soviet formula of free city its freedom would be severely limited, as it is not today.

Mr. Semenov wondered what restrictions the Soviet formula for a free city of West Berlin contained.

Mr. Kohler replied that this was a question of words. We believe that West Berlin is a free city now; it has its own government and the freedom to choose that government. If anyone has doubts on this point we would be very happy to have a plebiscite.

Mr. Semenov replied that history has shown that German plebiscites only choke freedom. After all Hitler came to power as a result of a plebiscite.

Mr. Kohler stated that Mr. Semenov must know that the West is in West Berlin because the West Berlin population wants us to be there. Indeed the West Berliners would be frightened to death without us. As to the Soviet draft status agreement, Mr. Kohler said that he thought Ambassador Thompson had answered this. He would be prepared to give Mr. Semenov a paper outlining our views on it. However the main points are: (1) the problem of demilitarization, which has been discussed earlier; and (2) the problem of definition of what is referred to in the Soviet draft as democratic or fascist or revanchist elements.

Mr. Semenov said that revanchist elements are those who want to replay the war all over again. He referred to a meeting in the West Berlin Rathaus at which Brandt spoke and at which flags of Eastern territories belonging to other states, including the Soviet Union, were displayed.

Mr. Kohler said that Germans do not seek revenge when they oppose the Soviet intention to conclude a treaty with East Germany. They oppose it because they see in it perpetuation of the division of Germany. This is why we believe that the Soviet policy with regard to Germany sows seeds of revanchism.

Mr. Semenov

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Mr. Semenov said he believed a peace treaty with Germany, and particularly with both Germanys, would be a strong, even destructive blow to revanchists. While revanchists are vocal, they are not brave. They are as brave as jackals; if one lets them go on they become dangerous, but if one slaps them on their knuckles they become quiet. The Soviet Union has had two wars close to its borders and this is perhaps why it perceives the situation not in the same way as the United States does. Indeed the United States is now allied to these elements and supports them.

Reverting to the question of a free city, Mr. Semenov said that perhaps both sides should sit down and see what is acceptable and what is not acceptable in the Soviet draft. Agreed positions could be set forth while US and USSR respective differences could be sorted out, in accordance with diplomatic practice and then an attempt should be made to reconcile them.

Mr. Kohler replied that Ambassador Thompson had already explained how we see the status of West Berlin. Whether one calls that status occupation status or not, West Berlin is a self-governing city. Although it is not part of the Federal Republic of Germany, it has close ties with it. Its trade is closely linked to the FRG and it uses West German currency. As for legislation it has its own legislative body, although the Senat frequently adopts legislation of the Federal Republic by its own act. Western troops are stationed in West Berlin for purposes of protection, even though the Soviet Union calls them occupation troops. At the same time, the Allied Commandants do have the power to prevent adoption of certain legislation and they do so occasionally in order to prevent trouble, particularly with the Soviet Union. For instance, the West Berlin Senat cannot adopt legislation introducing military conscription. As a free city, West Berlin must be viable and its viability must be maintained through free access not subject to veto of any hostile party. If agreement could be reached on this status, then we could see whether broader arrangements, such as those mentioned by the Secretary, could be worked out. For instance, the Soviet Union has displayed interest in the question of frontiers. While we have no legal right to confirm the borders of Germany in the absence of a peace settlement with all of Germany, we would be prepared to state that forces shall not be used to change the existing frontiers or demarcation lines.

Mr. Semenov rejoined by saying that what Mr. Kohler had stated was a step forward, but even more a step backward. Mr. Kohler had spoken of reservations on legislation that may be adopted in West Berlin but failed to mention FRG's claims to West Berlin. The Soviet Union cannot and will never agree to such claims. In fact, such claims are not in the interest either of West Berlin or the United States itself. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is not against West Berlin's having ties with West Germany, it is only against such ties as he had just described. For instance, Austria has close ties with Germany but Anschluss is prohibited. Mr. Semenov asserted that the question of West Berlin's freedom and viability must be taken seriously and not only in words. West Berlin would become a free city, with

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its own system, with its own ties -- diplomatic, cultural, but not military -- with all countries, including West Germany.

Referring to Mr. Kohler's remark about the fact that no legislation for military conscription is allowed in West Berlin, Mr. Semenov said that when the Soviet Union says "demilitarized," that means that there must be no conscription in West Berlin and that no large forces be stationed there. The term means no more than that. In other words West Berlin must not be a militaristic city. Essentially the situation would be such as was described by Mr. Kohler, but there would be a specific commitment to maintain it.

Referring to the personality of Mr. Brandt, Mr. Semenov said that he was a volatile person and compared him to Figaro, now here, then there, now Mayor of West Berlin, then a candidate in West Germany.

Mr. Kohler stated that it could be argued that since the Soviet Union had seen fit to detach East Berlin and incorporate it in East Germany, the West would be justified in doing the same with West Berlin by incorporating it in West Germany. However we have not done that and do not intend to do it. We undertook the responsibility for Berlin as trustees for the capital of a unified Germany. We do not regard West Berlin as a Land of West Germany and we used our reserve powers -- like the Soviet Union reserve powers in the Zorin-Bolz agreement -- and suspended the application of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany to West Berlin.

Mr. Semenov asserted that there had been no agreement that the four powers should act as trustees. Berlin was only chosen as the seat of the Control Council, although there had been other suggestions, such as to choose a village at the junction of the three zones and make it the seat of the Control Council. However, all this is a thing of the past. Now, the fact is that three entities exist: West Germany, East Germany, and West Berlin, and we should proceed on that basis. Otherwise the ship of negotiation will not be able to move far on the rough seas of international relations.

Mr. Kohler stated that, leaving aside the aspect of trusteeship for the moment, he did not see any fundamental differences between the two sides on this problem in general. He said that West Berlin was a special area, but far from being a state, because it did not have the necessary elements to be a state entity. If the Soviet Union really agrees with the United States and its statements with regard to viability, we can accept West Berlin as a separate entity of a special kind, but the viability of West Berlin depends, to a large degree, on its economic ties with the Federal Republic. That should not present any great problem. Mr. Kohler said he thought it would be nonsense to set up West Berlin as a state, with a full-fledged diplomatic service, because that would create a situation worse than even in some African states. However, as far as the question of a separate entity is concerned,

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with economic ties with the Federal Republic of Germany, the views of the two sides appear to be close. He added that the United States would like to see free movement of persons and goods in all parts of Germany. In fact, before the wall was erected and before the movement was stopped by the Soviet side, the greatest movement of persons had been in Berlin, where something like 500,000 persons a day moved back and forth. Mr. Kohler stressed that the action of stopping that movement had been taken by the Soviet side and not ours. As far as we are concerned we would like to see free movement everywhere in Germany.

Mr. Semenov said dryly that this was an internal affair of German states and not a subject for discussion. He said he had not heard anything Mr. Kohler had said and would not comment on this subject.

Referring to Mr. Kohler's remark about the financial ties between West Berlin and West Germany, Mr. Semenov recalled that at one time there was a special currency called B-Mark. However, now the question has been raised of including West Berlin in the West German financial system, which amounts practically to an Anschluss.

With regard to West Berlin's diplomatic service, Mr. Semenov said he did not quite understand why such a service should be impossible. If such a service were established West Berlin would have diplomatic relations with all states, especially the two German states. On the other hand the form does not matter; the main thing is the principle and Mr. Kohler had said that the principle would not present difficulty.

Mr. Semenov went on to say that in listening to Mr. Kohler he realized how much these minor questions are interconnected with and how they influence the course of the relations between our two countries. It is one thing if the course is set at relaxing tensions. Then the situation becomes calmer, the security of states becomes greater, and these minor questions are easier to resolve. On the other hand if the course is set at preserving or even increasing tensions it becomes quite difficult to find solutions to minor problems. Mr. Semenov then recalled the Secretary's statement that it might be better to seek solution in a broader framework of policy. He said that he welcomed that statement because in that case specific questions might be easier to resolve. He pointed out however that this should not be interpreted as if the Soviet Union is interested only in resolving these larger questions. What he meant was that smaller, specific questions should be resolved in the spirit of peaceful coexistence. In the light of all this, he wondered why the United States is interested in maintaining animosity between the two German states. Observing that in making these remarks he was simply thinking aloud, Mr. Semenov suggested that perhaps Mr. Kohler might wish to enlighten him on this.

Mr. Kohler

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Mr. Kohler said that if West Berlin is to have a free life, the population of that city must have a real choice as to how it arranges its relationships. It is not for us to impose anything. With regard to economic and financial ties between West Berlin and West Germany, they are an intimate part of West Berlin's viability and of the way of life of the West Berlin population. For example, practically the entire population of West Berlin depends on the institutions of the Federal Republic in such matters as pensions, old age benefits, unemployment compensation, and other welfare programs. If no such ties existed the West Berlin population would not enjoy these benefits and would suffer a great deal.

Mr. Gromyko interjected that Mr. Kohler's remarks indicated that the United States wanted to have its cake and eat it ("to take a bath and come out dry").

Mr. Kohler said that these things could not be changed without injury to millions of people whom we are committed to protect. These arrangements must continue.

Mr. Kohler continued that he had tried to probe these questions because this could be the basis, if both sides mean the same thing, on which broader matters could be adjusted. He said he had developed in greater detail the question of the use of force with regard to frontiers, but without intending to exclude the possibility of other broader matters. There could be agreed declarations as well as the possibility of related immediate steps, and the setting up of a forum of Deputy Foreign Ministers to consider such matters as a commitment between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, nondiffusion of nuclear weapons, measures to increase security and reduce the risk of surprise attack, and other similar things. If both sides could agree in principle that at some time Germany should be reunited, then even the establishment of technical commissions composed of representatives of the two parts of Germany might be possible. Furthermore, if we reached such an agreement creating a tranquil situation in Central Europe, it might be worthwhile for the heads of government to come together to confirm that agreement. However, Mr. Kohler said that although some clarification has been achieved today, he was not sure that there was yet sufficient clarity with regard to Berlin and access to make possible such broad understanding between our Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Gromyko said he did not quite understand how Deputy Foreign Ministers could deal with all these questions mentioned by Mr. Kohler, in particular with such questions as surprise attack and security. He said that the Deputy Foreign Ministers could get horses, but the cart will still be stuck.

Mr. Kohler said that there may be some misunderstanding as to what we have in mind. We believe that provided we can find a meeting of minds on these central questions of Berlin and reach an understanding that access should be free as it exists today, then these other things could be agreed upon

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upon in declarations right today. Thus not all the burden would fall upon the Deputy Foreign Ministers. As far as nondiffusion is concerned we could perhaps devise a formula which would be acceptable to both sides. Mr. Kohler said he wanted to stress that there was no intention just to initial some principles and go away. We see concrete steps which could be taken promptly and then further discussions could be conducted by the Deputy Foreign Ministers or some other similar body.

In conclusion Mr. Rusk thanked Mr. Kohler for his time and said that he would think thoroughly about everything said today. However, there is one dark cloud on the horizon; namely, the fact that in the matter of West Berlin the United States does not take into account the Soviet view and presents its maximum position. He of course understood that in this first meeting at this level Mr. Kohler had to give him the whole history since the time of Adam and Eve. However, he believed that the United States should take a fresher look at the situation, part with the nightmares of the old, cold days and look forward in the spirit of spring.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4521

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March 15, 1962

2BF12

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 137

TO: The Secretary of State

(SUBJECT: Restrictions on ~~Soviet Bloc~~ East German Athletes)

The President has reviewed the matter of travel bans on German athletes, and while he recognizes that in the current round of negotiations we are pretty well committed to our present position, he would like it understood that he does not accept the premise of the argument in the Berlin Task Force memorandum submitted on February 22. He believes that it is better to separate international athletic questions from political questions, and he hopes therefore that we can find ways and means of modifying our present position as circumstances permit. Furthermore, no new initiative in the restriction of individual participation in international athletic events should be undertaken without his specific approval.

McGeorge Bundy

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cc:

The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Military Representative of the President

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING

ZBF13/1

AJ 25
FILES

Class: [redacted] Classification: [redacted] Control: 1004

ACTION: [redacted] Date: March 17, 1962 8:30 PM

INFO: Amembassy LONDON 8
Amembassy [redacted] 103
Amembassy [redacted] 207

Copy No. 22 of 26

Following based on Unclassified MacCon.

Secretary met with Rapacki on March 16 for one hour twenty minutes. Little of interest on disarmament matters but interesting discussion Berlin and Germany.

Secretary noted importance of tone of conference, thought both US and USSR speeches set good atmosphere but implied Czechoslovakia's had not. Rapacki agreed. [redacted]

Secretary noted [redacted] had any modifications to his earlier proposals for [redacted] neutral free zone in Central Europe, latter replied no since no specific objections raised.

Secretary noted disarmament not separable from political content. Rapacki said may [redacted] peaceful coexistence. Secretary recalled Greece, first Berlin blockade, Korea as examples not peaceful coexistence. Also that Berlin and South Vietnam today.

Secretary noted other side seemed to have disposed of East Berlin. Why then should we not dispose of West Berlin and [redacted] problem ended. Rapacki did not treat as serious proposal. Rapacki contended real situation existence [redacted] and GDR with capital in Berlin, and West Berlin vestige of war. Secretary commented frankly if East Germans had been as successful internally as Poles question of Berlin not arisen. Rapacki agreed, said candidly would not accept but not argue that all of East Germans favored regime. Many and [redacted] accepted [redacted]. But GDR had renounced all expansionist designs and accepted just frontiers with Poland. These not entirely popular moves

[redacted]

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

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Date:

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in Germany, but they were good.

Secretary inquired frankly did not Rapacki as Pole consider dangers from neighbors East and West, and from this standpoint did he really want to see US troops withdrawn from Europe. Rapacki replied did not propose such withdrawal. Secretary noted others do. Rapacki said favored withdrawal all foreign troops and early abolition all nuclear delivery means. Secretary commented if all nuclear weapons withdrawn and political issues unsolved could mean very large increase conventional arms.

Secretary said if unable solve political differences would note prelist future of northern hemisphere -- this not threat, nor sign pessimism, but recognition real danger. Secretary suggested greatest danger both sides sitting at conference table believing other side would not go to nuclear war. Rapacki and Poles stunned, checked translation non-plussed. Secretary stated with quiet emphasis that US would not repeat not be pushed out of West Berlin. Secretary said US presence Berlin stabilizing influence, Rapacki no reply.

On German question, Rapacki reiterated themes West German revanchism and [illegible] frontiers. Admitted Poles do not now want German reunification, but said Poland and other socialist countries not alone in that stand. Rapacki said Poles frankly do not want all-German elections, know Communists would lose. Secretary supported reunification best long-term guarantee against future expansionist nationalism in West and East Germany. Secretary stressed integration West Germany in Western European community as a safeguard and Rapacki nodded agreement.

Meeting first Secretary held with Bloc foreign ministers, except Gromyko, at Secretary's initiative, at Polish Mission.

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

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[redacted] Classification

Charge: Control: 1854

- 3 -

Date:

Atmosphere cordial. Details in MemCon.

[redacted]

Drafting Officer: R.L.Barthoff RLB

Clearance: [redacted]

EA - Mr. Colloy

ARA - Mr. Spiers

Authorized by: Fay D. Kohler

[redacted] Classification

[redacted]

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MEMORANDUM

(305) ZBF 14

DATE: March 20, 1962

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: Air Corridors

General Clay has again urged that action be taken against Soviet harassment in the air corridors. He has suggested that continued tolerance of Soviet actions will seriously erode West Berlin, and eventually West German, morale to the extent that confidence in Western willingness to defend allied rights will be seriously questioned.

State Department has taken the position -- and has so informed the other occupying powers -- that our ultimate goal should be to induce the Soviets to cease flights along the corridors on the grounds that these air lanes were established for allied flights. This position would seem to be weak and obscure in the face of current Soviet action.

Before countermeasures are taken, State favors additional protests to Moscow although no protest in the past has had any effect. However, a form of countermeasure has been considered but it would be against Soviet Naval activity. State would propose close surveillance of Soviet ships by U.S. or allied ships and planes; announcing the use of areas for Naval exercises at times when Soviet ships were scheduled to pass.

State is currently attempting to rally world opinion behind the proposal to establish an international access authority. Although State feels that the proposal is "reasonable" and that it would apparently eliminate the present impasse, the Soviets have already rejected the proposal completely.

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Memos to VP & Burris
Jan 61 - June 62

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NLK NSF 321 Klein

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

v2
2BF14-11

SECRET March 20, 1962

306

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

FROM: David Klein

SUBJECT: The Soviet's "General Principles" on the Berlin Issue (SECTO 66)

The Secretary has already commented on the substance of Gromyko's "General Principles".

The paper is not forthcoming. The only hopeful signs, and these are indeed very few, include Gromyko's comment on a need for thorough discussion of the "Principles" in Geneva and his remarks concerning an ultimate endorsement of these "Principles" by heads of governments. At least discussions are still theoretically wide open.

On the substantive side, however, the Soviet peace treaty and "free city" proposals are very much intact. The Soviets did the expected about the NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement, deliberately raising the issue of GDR recognition.

Also, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the referenced telegram seemed particularly significant since they spelled out in some detail the ramifications of the concept of "respect for GDR sovereignty".

As Adzhubei indicated earlier to the President, the Soviets have redefined the International Access Authority to suit their own purposes. However, from their language, I would gather that there is considerable room for bargaining on this particular issue.

I personally am not as sanguine as our Delegation in Geneva seems to be about the question of Soviet troops in West Berlin. I think the formula for UN troops as opposed to neutral troops probably leaves the Soviet proposal very much intact.

And one last point: from the context of paragraph 3 it seems that the Soviets are back on the gambit of a temporary arrangement lasting from three to five years.

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If the Soviets move at all, they probably will move slowly. They are essentially oriental tradesmen, with tremendous patience, and I would expect that whatever concessions may be forthcoming will have to come from Khrushchev himself.

I have seen the suggested revisions in our modus vivendi paper which I understand the Secretary will probably table today. In view of the Soviet performance thus far, however, I think it extremely important that we hold back, until some later point, the proposal on our acceptance of East Germans at the access control points. This is an important concession and it would seem to me that it should be held until there is some give on the Soviet side. Perhaps it should even be delayed until we have fully played out the International Access Authority concept.

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ACTION: Amembassy BONN 2582
INFO: USMISSION BERLIN 1195
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Amembassy PARIS 5062
Amembassy MOSCOW 2177
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After more careful consideration Bonn quadripartite study on air access, we have arrived at following conclusions:

1. Soviet objectives. We agree with Embassy Bonn that a major aim of Soviet actions is to degrade Western capability for free air access, with its obvious impact on morale of Berliners. Also, by confronting West with prospect of unilateral changes, Soviets may hope to induce West to negotiate new arrangement rather than face difficult choice of acquiescing in Soviet infringement or facing showdown. At same time, Soviets are apparently trying to minimize their risks by seeking limited gains, which will open way for fundamental change in air access arrangements. This fundamental change probably involves nothing less than eventual GDR control of air access. We do not expect Soviets to move quickly to showdown. Rather they will probably proceed toward changing existing procedures, altering existing institutions, and finally proposing that air access arrangements be worked out with GDR.

(b)

2. US

[redacted]

DRAFTED BY: EUR:GER:JCAmsterdam:mlc:mgc 3/21/62 — EUR - Richard [redacted] Davis

IOA - Mr. Ritze (in draft)
JCS - Gen. Gray (in draft)
SOV - Mr. Anderson (in draft)
S/S - Mr. [redacted] Rogers

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2. US policy. We agree with Bonn that our overall aim is to keep air traffic, both in persons and goods, moving in an unrestricted fashion between Berlin and Federal Republic. We also agree that we should continue to base our rights of air access on basic Allied Control Council agreements of 1945 and 1946. We should maintain in communications with Soviets and publicity principle that primary purpose of air corridors is to provide agreed airways through which aircraft can fly between Berlin and West. We should therefore resist Soviet efforts unilaterally to change regime in air corridors.

3. Procedural questions. We believe we should minimize unilateral Soviet changes in established procedures in BASC, while at same time providing maximum flight safety. We do not envisage at this time acceding to Soviet demand for beacon times, particularly since Soviet response apparently not creating any operational problems. As requested in DEPTEL 2253 to Bonn, we should appreciate your resolving procedural questions with our Allies in Berlin and Bonn if possible.

4. Soviet corridor flights. We agree with Bonn that it would be desirable induce Soviets cease corridor flights. In view, however, limits within which we are at present dealing with flights, we question whether this will prove possible. We should, nevertheless, continue to bring counter-pressure to bear within scope JACK FISH plans and authority delegated General Norstad. We believe we should also carry out appropriate counter- measures. To this end, we are at present seeking quadripartite agreement to initiate limited naval measures and have we suggested that General Norstad (LIVE OAK) submit for quadripartite

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quadripartite consideration any proposals he may have on implementation of possible air counter-measures.

5. Negotiations. At same time, we should keep in mind that US still hopes to arrive at negotiated arrangement on Berlin, including air access. At present, we are aiming at over-all arrangement. If, however, this is not possible, we do not preclude technical negotiations on air access, if these could be brought about under suitable circumstances. Although any negotiations on air access would inevitably be difficult and involved, we cannot assume that they would necessarily lead to worse results than contest of wills with Soviets in air corridors. Before entering into such discussions, it would be necessary to have favorable context and to complete planning for negotiations on air access (BQD - 62, revised, December 2, 1962 and related papers).

END

BALL

[redacted]

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Control: 16203
Rec'd: March 23, 1962
2:24 pm

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1798, MARCH 23, 5 PM

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 1798, BONN 1627, GENEVA 85.

GENEVA EYES ONLY FOR RUSK

BONN EYES ONLY FOR DOWLING

FROM CLAY

AM QUOTING FOR INFORMATION MY RECOMMENDATION TO USAREUR PRIOR TO SHOOTING AMERICAN MISSION VEHICLE.

BEGIN QUOTE DATED MARCH 16

IN VIEW OF THE RECENT SHOOTING OF A MEMBER OF THE BRITISH MISSION IT SEEMS ESSENTIAL TO ME THAT WE HAVE A SPECIFIC PLAN TO FOLLOW IN THE EVENT A SIMILAR INCIDENT DEVELOPS WITH OUR MISSION. THIS BECOMES EVEN MORE NECESSARY AS IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE SOVIETS NOT ONLY PLACED HANDICAPS IN THE WAY OF PROMPT BRITISH ACCESS TO THE INJURED MAN BUT ALSO TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES HAVE REFUSED TO ACCEPT ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SHOOTING ITSELF. IT IS DIFFICULT OF COURSE TO FIND RETALIATORY MEASURES TO DIRECT AGAINST THE EAST GERMANS AND EVEN RETALIATORY MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOVIET PERSONNEL WILL IN THEMSELVES DRAW FURTHER RETALIATORY MEASURES AGAINST OUR PEOPLE. STILL, I THINK IT ESSENTIAL TO REACT PROMPTLY AND FIRMLY IF SUCH AN EVENT TAKES PLACE, EVEN IF IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT RESULTS IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH MISSIONS. IT WOULD BE MY SUGGESTION THAT IF SUCH A SHOOTING DID TAKE PLACE WE ADVISE THE SOVIETS OF INTENT AND

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-2- 1798, MARCH 23, 5 PM, FROM BERLIN

MOVE IMMEDIATELY BY HELICOPTER WITH A MISSION OFFICER AND A MEDICAL OFFICER TO THE VICINITY TO INSURE ADEQUATE MEDICAL ATTENTION AND FREEDOM FROM INTERROGATION WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF AN AMERICAN OFFICER. WHILE THESE MEASURES ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF OUR MISSION SHOULD RETURN TO THE BERLIN AREA. AS SOON AS THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED ALL MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN OUR ZONE SHOULD BE PLACED IN HOUSE ARREST AND KEPT IN HOUSE ARREST UNTIL WE HAVE RECEIVED SATISFACTION OR DETERMINE TO RETURN SOME OR ALL OF THEM TO EAST GERMANY AS NO LONGER DESIRABLE PERSONS TO BE IN OUR AREA. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE CAN AFFORD TO DO LESS, AND TO SUBMIT PROTESTS WITHOUT HAVING DONE ANYTH NG SEEMS TO BE A SHEER WASTE OF TIME.

END QUOTE

LIGHTNER

BAP

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INCOMING TELEGRAM (47) Department of State

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Control: 16796
Rec'd: March 24, 1962 7:29 a.m.

FROM: BONN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

309

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2300, MARCH 24, 10 AM

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PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2300, GENEVA PRIORITY 97, INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL 129, LONDON 633, MOSCOW 397, BERLIN PRIORITY 785.

GENEVA FOR SECRETARY

PARIS FOR USRO STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED MARCH 23 HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM GENERAL CLARKE:

QUOTE.

1. (S) I HAVE CONSIDERED ALL POSSIBILITIES FOR COUNTER-MEASURES FROM INCREASED SURVEILLANCE TO IMPOUNDING THE SMLM BUT BECAUSE OF THE ESSENTIALITY OF KEEPING MY MISSION ACTIVE IN EAST GERMANY I CONSIDER THAT NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN UNTIL I HAVE GIVEN MARSHAL KONIEV AN OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER MY RECENT LETTER OF PROTEST. IF HIS REPLY IS NOT RECEIVED BY 27 MARCH, OR IF THE REPLY IS UNSATISFACTORY, I THEN PROPOSE TO TAKE SOME OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. PUT SURVEILLANCE ON THE SMLM-F INCLUDING ACTUAL AND SIMULATED PHOTOGRAPHING OF MISSION PERSONNEL AND ACTIVITIES BY CIVILIANS UNDER COVER AND BY MILITARY PERSONNEL.

B. TAIL AND STOP SOVIET MISSION VEHICLES BY UNIFORMED AND NON-UNIFORMED PERSONNEL ALLEGING NEED FOR IDENTIFICATION, SPEEDING, TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS, ETC.

C. DETAIN

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SECRET

-2- 2300, MARCH 24, 10 AM, FROM BONN

C. DETAIN SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR ANY PERIOD TIME DEEMED APPROPRIATE WITH REFUSAL OF COURTESIES, E.G., TELEPHONE FACILITIES, FOOD.

D. CLAIM RENUMERATION FOR USMLM VEHICLE DAMAGED.

E. REFUSE ASSISTANCE TO SOVIET MILITARY MISSION WHILE TOURING EXCEPT IN CASE OF INJURY.

F. REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM GERMAN MILITARY IN HARASSMENT OF USMLM.

G. DECLARE SMLM PERSONA NON GRATA AND GIVE TEN HOURS TO LEAVE WEST GERMANY.

2. (S) I DO CONSIDER THAT IMPOUNDING THE MISSION SHOULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN EXCEPT AS LAST RESORT OR UNLESS I CAN SEE BY A PATTERN OF ACTION THAT CINC GSFG IS WORKING TOWARD FORCING MY MISSION FROM EAST GERMANY. MOREOVER, IMPOUNDING ACTION WOULD NOT BE IN OUR OWN BEST INTERESTS IN THAT A RETALIATION IN KIND WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR MY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AND NEGATE THE ADVANTAGES WE NOW RECEIVE FROM USMLM.

3. (C) I REQUEST THAT THE EMBASSY COORDINATE THE ABOVE MEASURES WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH WITH A VIEW TO THEIR ADOPTING MEASURES SIMILAR TO THOSE IN PARAGRAPH 1 AGAINST SOVIET MISSIONS IN THEIR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY IF AND WHEN I ADOPT ANY OR ALL.

4. (U) PLEASE PASS TO THOSE YOU DEEM NEED TO KNOW.

UNQUOTE.

DOWLING

RB/20

SECRET

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

#2

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SecDel MC/50

EYES ONLY

March 26, 1962
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Place: Soviet Mission, Geneva

Germany and Berlin

U.S.	U.S.S.R.
Mr. Kohler	Mr. Semenov
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Kovalev
Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Zolotov
Mr. Akalovsky	

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Mr. Semenov opened by saying it had been agreed to meet today because Mr. Kohler wished to raise some additional points in a preliminary way before the two Foreign Ministers met.

Mr. Kohler said we had reviewed the records of the last two meetings of this group and it seemed that we had gone over the papers of the two sides in great detail. Not much was to be added with regard to the Soviet paper. We continued to feel there was considerable difference between the Soviet paper on principles and ours. Our paper provided for something our Foreign Ministers could reach agreement on here in Geneva. He was not sure that this difference was recognized. Our paper did not push our proposals, which the Soviet Union had said it could not accept, but provided points both sides could agree upon and a basis for further discussion.

Mr. Kohler then expressed the hope that Mr. Semenov and he could discuss the underlying and fundamental problems so that our Foreign Ministers could deal with them rather than with points of detail. He observed that unless there was rapprochement of views with regard to the alternatives the Secretary had mentioned it was hard even to see where we would go from here. Mr. Kohler added that the Secretary hoped that at his meeting with Gromyko he could see where we stood so that he could go back and report to the President and, if developments required, to consult with the allies, something both sides might wish to do.

Mr. Bohlen said he wished to make a few comments with regard to the nature of the

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of the U.S. paper. He said that after the first few conversations here it had become apparent to us that the differences between the two sides were great and that there was little likelihood of reaching agreement on substance here in Geneva. For this reason, we believed that in the given situation it was useful to draw up a paper including points relating to a few general principles on which there appeared to be no disagreement and providing a forum for further discussions. The U.S. paper, while leaving out the U.S. positions on substance, had enough substance to serve as a basis for further discussions. It was here that the basic difference between the U.S. paper and the two Soviet papers lay. The Soviet papers set forth the Soviet substantive position, whereas our paper set forth the common ground for negotiations at a future date.

Mr. Sprague observed that the U.S. side had advertised its draft principles from many angles and he, of course, understood that the U.S. liked its paper. The Soviet side had expressed its views on the U.S. paper during the meetings he had had with Mr. Kohler and his associates. Of course, the fundamental differences remained, and this had been noted in the meeting yesterday. The Soviet side had tried to obtain clarification of the U.S. position on specific issues so as to understand its internal logic. He said he did not wish to predict what Mr. Gromyko would do when he returned to Moscow, but surely he would wish to report to his Government and take appropriate steps in the light of what had been said here and of the trends which had been discerned in these conversations.

Mr. Sprague stated it was not that the USSR merely liked its paper on principles but also that it believed that the principles set forth in that paper were in the interest of peace and European security. The question of how those principles should be formulated was a different matter, but the questions of a peace settlement, of the conclusion of a peace treaty and of normalizing the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty were demanded by life itself and they were not a matter of wording.

As to fundamental questions, Mr. Sprague said they had been discussed in this group and he believed both sides had a rather clear picture of each other's positions. He said he was not quite clear as to what Mr. Kohler had in mind as to what this group should deal with now.

Mr. Kohler responded that he believed it would be useful to clarify what the two Foreign Ministers would be talking about, because he was not sure whether the fundamental question had been clarified; namely, whether we were going to deal with facts, and not merely Soviet facts but all facts. The U.S. was prepared to live in peaceful coexistence with the existing situation, although we did not like that situation. However, we did not believe the Soviet Union was prepared to do the same. The U.S. accepted Soviet presence in East Germany and had said that it was prepared to live with it and not to change the situation by force.

On the

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On the other hand, the USSR did not appear to be prepared to live with the situation involving our presence in West Berlin. Mr. Kohler observed that he did not know what Mr. Semenov's reference to appropriate steps meant, but he hoped it did not mean unilateral measures against our interests. Thus, the fundamental question was whether we would have peaceful coexistence or conflict. If each side insisted on having its own way, conflict would arise; conversely, if neither side pushed its desires and lived with the situation, that would mean peaceful coexistence. The problem was as simple as that.

Mr. Semenov referred to Mr. Kohler's statement that the U.S. had developed its principles for peaceful coexistence on the basis of facts. However, there had been no peace treaty for 17 years, two independent German states had emerged, and an abnormal situation prevailed in West Berlin; all these were facts too. Both sides must now find a solution not on the basis of the past but of the situation as it existed now. After all, we were not negotiating in the smoldering ruins of Berlin as had been the case at the time of Potsdam. It was on this basis that the question of peaceful coexistence should be resolved. The Soviet Union was not proposing anything contrary to the interests of insuring lasting peace or contrary to facts.

On the other hand, Paragraph 2 in the U.S. paper referred to a unified Germany. The U.S. was either referring to the past and its recollections or was engaging in forecasts, since a united Germany might be possible only in the future. In other words, the U.S. was not proceeding from facts. Unfortunately, what the U.S. was saying did not accord with what it was actually doing. Both sides should recognize all facts and not just some of them. It was a curious fact in international relations that the occupation regime was being preserved in West Berlin while it had been abolished throughout the rest of Germany. As to Mr. Kohler's remarks about conflict, Mr. Semenov said he wished to let Mr. Kohler fight his genii alone. However, one should keep in mind that once the genii was let out of the bottle, it might be difficult to put him back into it. He did not wish to participate in such a fight and it was not his problem. Mr. Semenov said that if no agreement was reached, the Soviet Union would take the steps it had been talking about. A peace treaty could not mean war; we were sensible people and only someone who had lost his senses could wage a war over a peace treaty. What we should strive for was a peaceful settlement.

Mr. Kohler observed that at least some fundamental questions were being now discussed. Refe ring to Paragraph 2 of the U.S. paper, he said we believed that the basic principle of unification of Germany was something to which both sides could subscribe. Statements to that effect had been made by the USSR, the U.S., West Germany, and East Germany. The differences between two sides related to the question of when and how unification should be brought about. Mr. Kohler pointed out that the very wording of this paragraph indicated that we had made

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a significant concession to the Soviet Union in omitting reference to free elections, something Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev had subscribed to as recently as in 1955. Since the USSR appeared to have changed its mind, we were not forcing this issue on it, and this indicated a marked concession and a step toward meeting the Soviet point of view.

With regard to sub-paragraph 2(b), Mr. Kohler recalled Mr. Semenov's comments on it yesterday and said that it was our belief that we should see whether the Germans, by meeting on a technical and not political basis, could deal with these problems. After all, Mr. Semenov himself had said that unification of Germany was something for the Germans themselves to resolve. Therefore, this paragraph was a very good example of how we had taken into account the situation and the positions of both sides.

As to occupation status, Mr. Kohler said it was true that occupation was active in West Berlin. In fact, it was the presence of occupation authorities that had prevented West Berlin from becoming a Land of the Federal Republic. It was also true that in recognizing our obligations to our allies we had reserved our occupation powers in West Berlin and, as respects all-German questions, even in West Germany. The Soviets had made similar reservations in their arrangements with East Germany. We did not intend to violate our commitments to the USSR. The question was whether the Soviet Union wished to renounce its commitments.

With regard to the question of peace treaty, Mr. Kohler recalled his earlier statements that the question was not that of the paper itself, but rather of what actions would follow. Referring to Mr. Semenov's remarks that only someone who had lost his senses could wage a war over a peace treaty, Mr. Kohler said he thought only someone who had lost his senses would use a peace treaty as a cover for aggression against the interests of others. He reiterated that the problem was not that of the peace treaty itself but rather what a peace treaty would do, and pointed out that this had been stated at the highest levels.

Mr. Semenov observed that at his meeting with Mr. Kohler on Saturday he had expressed the Soviet views on the U.S. paragraph 2 in great detail and had stated the Soviet position and the basis for it. He reiterated that reunification of Germany was a matter for the two Germanies to resolve and it was they who must reach agreement on this problem. The fact was that there were two German states, one capitalist and one socialist, and that they were developing in ever more diverging directions, although the GDR had made a number of proposals aimed at reunification on the basis of the Potsdam agreements. These proposals were also aimed at peaceful settlement. However, the other Germany did not wish to listen to these proposals, perhaps because it had a different method of reunification in mind. In any event, this was something for the Germans to resolve. A peace treaty would facilitate reunification and our two sides must see to it that it be signed.

Referring

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Referring to Mr. Kohler's statements about vital interests, Mr. Semenov asserted a peace treaty was not directed against such interests and would not undermine them. Its only purpose was to draw a line under World War II and to do away with the vestiges of that war. Soviet vital interests, as well as United States vital interests, required that a new war be prevented.

Mr. Kohler interjected that this was correct and this was what the two sides were talking about.

Mr. Semenov agreed but said that the two sides had a different understanding of the situation. He went on to say that the Soviet Union believed that the present developments led with logical inevitability to an increase in the danger of a new war breaking out. A war we did not want must be prevented before it was too late. Therefore, a peace treaty should be signed.

He went on to say that the U.S. raised a different question, which was of a peripheral and limited nature, i.e., the question of the presence of Western forces in West Berlin, whereas the USSR had raised the general and fundamental problem. Both sides had an obligation to sign a peace treaty, but somehow the United States did not like to remember this obligation. Of course, that obligation should be fulfilled on the basis of existing facts.

Referring to Mr. Kohler's remark that the Western powers had prevented West Berlin from becoming a Land of the GDR, Mr. Semenov asserted that this was true only on paper and that both sides knew that the West had done everything to turn West Berlin into such in fact. He paraphrased a remark he attributed to Edward Bernstein, claiming that the United States was in effect saying: "Dear Willy (Brandt), one does it, but one doesn't talk about it, and much less put it on paper."

Mr. Semenov continued that the Soviet Union agreed with what the U.S. had said in theory, namely, that peaceful commissions should be established, that access could be reconciled with the sovereignty of the GDR, and that there were three independent entities in Germany, as well as with some other points mentioned before. He could associate himself with all this, but what must be done now was to put all this into practice.

He asserted that paragraph 2 of the U.S. draft appeared to be designed for a different purpose, namely, to catch headlines in the papers. Yet propaganda was not our business here; our business was to look for the bringing of the interests of our two sides closer together and for the strengthening of peace.

Mr. Kohler

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Mr. Kohler said he was surprised at this reaction to paragraph 2, inasmuch as it went a long way toward the Soviet position as this had been stated both privately and publically. However, since the reaction was negative, he supposed that it was in fact negative. He denied paragraph 2 was propaganda and said he was glad Mr. Semenov had raised the subject of propaganda. Our task for our Foreign Ministers was to sort out facts from slogans, and Mr. Semenov had mentioned slogans even today. For instance, Mr. Semenov had mentioned the drawing of a line under World War II. However, if this meant our getting out of West Berlin and submitting access to West Berlin to East Germany, those words acquired an entirely different meaning. The question was what the Soviet Union meant. The words did not mean anything in themselves. After all, Mr. Kohler said, he could draw a line under World War II simply by using his pencil.

Mr. Kohler said he wished to make a few observations of the final paragraphs of the U.S. paper. While Mr. Semenov had already made some comments on these paragraphs, he wished to be in a position to report to the Secretary. With regard to nuclear diffusion, Mr. Kohler said this formulation had been completely agreed in New York. Both he and Mr. Bohlen had been present at the meeting in New York and recalled that Mr. Gromyko had asked for a careful repetition of the translation of the formula. The present language reflected the same position. With reference to non-aggression, Mr. Kohler said we believed that in view of the fact that we were not prepared to recognize the GDR, legal formulization in the sense of accession to this commitment by other parties would have to be worked out later. However, we were prepared to meet the Soviet view as far as substance was concerned. As to frontiers and demarkation lines, we were prepared to declare that we would not use force to change them. Thus, in this respect, we were also meeting the Soviet wishes. Mr. Kohler then invited Mr. Semenov to make further comments on these paragraphs and express his thoughts on what should be discussed between the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Semenov thanked Mr. Kohler for clarifications on these points and said he had stated his views yesterday and, therefore, there was no need for repeating them.

As to the question of drawing a line under World War II, the United States seemed to believe it was a slogan, but for the USSR it was not a slogan. For the USSR, it was reality in the light of the developments taking place in their own neighborhood. He suggested that perhaps the two sides looked at the situation from different angles and that this might account for their different approaches to and assessments of the situation, as well as for their differences with regard to the methods and substance of resolving the problem they both recognized.

Referring to Mr. Kohler's expression of surprise at his reaction, Mr. Semenov said his remarks should be taken in the framework of the general content. These were free conversations and each side should understand the remarks made by the other in the framework of the general content. He observed that surprise was the beginning of knowledge; however, one must not remain too long in that state of understanding the world.

SECRET In conclusion,

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In conclusion, Mr. Semenov thanked Mr. Kohler and his associates for these exchanges of views and the pleasant and businesslike atmosphere in which they had been conducted. He expressed the view that these talks might be helpful to the furthering of the relations between our two countries. He said he was not sure whether the two sides had perfectly understood each other, but both of them had seemed to try to do so.

Mr. Kohler reciprocated Mr. Semenov's remarks about the businesslike atmosphere and expressed the view that these talks had clarified the positions to some extent.

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Taylor Papers NDU 34 Clay Cables

TOP SECRET

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2BF20

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Private Conversation with General Clay, March 28, 1962

In discussing his personal position in the Berlin setting, he frankly states the feeling that he has outlived his usefulness. He has never been fully in the stream of information and now feels cut out by the increasing tripartite nature of action in Berlin. He would like to return to the US but is not sure how best to proceed. He makes it clear that he does not intend to play a controversial role upon return to the US.

He is deeply suspicious of the UK and French attitude on Berlin, doubting that either would fight for the city in a pinch. The US may well have to fulfill its commitments without their support.

He detects considerable animosity to himself on the part of the French and British Commandants who, he knows, would like to see him out of Berlin.

Clay thinks we make a mistake in protesting incidents caused by the Soviets, then, after a pause, taking counter-measures. We should react first, then protest. A case in point is our action in the shooting incident involving a US Potsdam mission vehicle.

Clay has high praise for Watson. He sees no need for a more senior officer than Watson after he (Clay) leaves.

General Taylor suggested that Clay return to Washington soon and talk over his future with Higher Authority. If it were thought useful, Clay would be willing to act as a part time Presidential consultant after returning to the US, holding himself available for occasional trips to Berlin.

General Clay doubts that Brandt and Amrehn were entirely frank with Taylor in their optimism over the future of the city. He thinks they share his doubts about Allied firmness.

Maxwell D. Taylor

TOP SECRET

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NLK NSF 321 Klein

Klein

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SECRET

(312)

March 28, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

(Taken from Pres. mail & - and reading book - 3/30/62)

FROM: David Klein

SUBJECT: Post-mortem on Soviet Chaff Drops in the Berlin Air Corridors

In connection with the chaff drops in the Berlin air corridors, I have gone through all the pertinent written material to which I have had access and talked at length with officials of the several agencies concerned.

The results are not as conclusive as I would have liked. While the sins of omission are clear, it is difficult to come up with specific recommendations to assure that similar situations will not arise again.

These are the facts in the chaff case.

a. Chaff drops in the Berlin corridors have a long history. Reports of these incidents have been made to Washington through regular defense and intelligence channels. However, before March 14 of this year the individual reports were never collated.

b. Past drops occurred from early spring to late fall, coinciding with Soviet military exercises. This year, however, the drops coincided with the onset of the Soviet harrassment campaign in the corridors. Both began on February 6. Consequently there was fuller reporting of the incidents and the reporting messages were given wider distribution than the usual intelligence reports. Therefore to many end users the chaff dropping was a new and different development.

c. The Soviet chaff drops of March 9, reported on the eve of the Secretary's departure for Geneva, were apparently of a very special variety and therefore of special interest. However, because of the nature of the information reported, this message received only the most limited distribution. In the Department of State it was only sent to the Secretary and a few selected officers.

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B-732

The officers regularly working on the Berlin air problem were not aware of the message or the contents before the Secretary's departure for Geneva.

d. The following day, taking cognisance of the March 9 chaff drops, General Norstad cabled back to the effect that "although chaff has been dropped by the Soviets on previous occasions, this particular incident, under existing circumstances, should be considered as a direct and deliberate offensive threat to the safety of flight".

e. And on Sunday, March 11, at their first meeting with Gromyko in Geneva, presumably with the March 9 report very much in mind, the Secretary and Lord Home protested not only the Soviet harassing air activities, but also the chaff drops which raised critical safety problems in the corridors.

f. The following Wednesday, March 14, at the request of General Gray (the JCS representative in the Berlin Task Force), and following a discussion of the chaff problem in the Berlin Task Force, DIA produced the report and tabulation (copy attached) which indicated that chaff drops in the corridors had a longer and more documented history than anyone had realized.

g. In commenting on the DIA report, General Norstad said he "had full knowledge of the patterns of previous Soviet chaff operations when he made his report and recommendations concerning Soviet chaff drops on March 9 and 13. He felt that because of the timing, nature, and especially the altitude of the drops, together with the status of Soviet actions in the corridors at that time, the drops of March 9 and 13 were significant and merited protest. . . Moreover, it would appear that these drops, coming at the time they did in relation to the disarmament conference, offered an excellent opportunity to protest Soviet actions endangering corridor operations and that such protests would have had good propaganda effect."

These essentially were the individual facts of the case.

The consensus is that the protests of the Secretary and Lord Home were necessary, useful and properly timed. Despite the history of the chaff drops, the fact is this activity is intended to disrupt our air corridor operations, and coinciding with recent Soviet harassing air activity in the corridors, creates serious safety problems that cannot go unnoted.

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However, the fact remains that at none of the critical points in the decision-making process leading up to the protest action was there evidence that anyone was fully aware of the history of Soviet chaff activity in the corridors. General Norstad in his message referred to the fact that he was aware of "drops on previous occasions". However, it seems fairly clear from his language that he too was not aware of the extent of these "previous occasions".

In reconstructing the events as they occurred, it seems quite clear to me that the first real awareness in Washington of the history of the chaff drops came as a result of the DIA report produced on March 14 at General Gray's behest. The officers in DIA with whom I spoke admitted that until that time they themselves did not have the full story although they had the detailed pieces of information that went into the preparation of the report. Certainly the Task Force did not have the full picture. And apparently no one else did.

The essential question then is where should the responsibility for producing such information rest? On whose initiative should it be produced? What assurances are there that the necessary information will be properly and promptly compiled in the future?

Organisationally, the staff responsibility for preparing the kind of information seems to rest clearly with the intelligence collecting agencies here in Washington. They receive the separate reports. They evaluate them. They are the only ones able to compile and synthesize the bits and pieces of information received. Moreover, they control the distribution of this material. Consequently, it would seem reasonable to assume that they are in the best position to produce the required information in a form and in time for decision-making.

This having been said, however, the fact remains that where critical problems are involved, the staffs of the policy-making officials have to take a critical look at the data furnished and ask the important questions before the final decisions are taken. This requires effective staff work in the agencies involved; and the point at which the questions are asked will vary from case to case, depending on the nature of the problem and the level at which decision-making begins.

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In the case of the chaff drops there clearly were two unusual and perhaps mitigating factors - (1) the odd pattern of distribution of information because of the security problem, and (2) the obvious pressure of time. However the fact remains that the necessary staff work was not carried out as efficiently as it should have been in any of the agencies involved.

In this connection, it occurs to me that the President perhaps might want to discuss the question of staff responsibility - in its very broader context - at his meeting on Friday with the desk officers of the Department.

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NLK NSF 321 Klein

(313)

Klein 2

SECRET

March 29, 1962

2BF22/1

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

FROM: David Klein

SUBJECT: The Potsdam Mission

The attached announcement was released in Heidelberg today.

In accordance with General Norstad's instructions of yesterday, the Soviet military liaison mission operating out of Frankfurt will now have U. S. military escorts. The tours of our own Potsdam mission in East Germany are "temporarily" suspended. According to General Gray of the Joint Chiefs, the lifting of this suspension will depend on the outcome of General Clarke's meeting with Marshal Koniev which General Clarke is now seeking to arrange.

This then is the present situation.

a. The Soviet military mission in the former American zone of Germany operating out of Frankfurt is travelling with American military escorts.

b. The Soviet military missions in the former British and French zones are operating under normal rules.

c. The United States military liaison mission has suspended its tours out of Potsdam and is keeping a skeleton crew at the Mission House in Potsdam.

d. The British and French Potsdam missions are operating normally.

The Clarke-Koniev meeting will determine what happens next. The present series of actions may be the prelude to the elimination of the liaison missions. The ultimate decision will probably depend upon Soviet needs. From an intelligence standpoint, our missions are probably more useful to us than the Soviet missions are to the Kremlin since the Soviets do have alternative intelligence collection means at

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their disposal. The Soviets are aware of this disparity and it is only a matter of time before the present arrangements are broken up. The Soviets may choose to do it one at a time, starting with the American mission. On the other hand, since we do have access to the intelligence produced by the British and French missions, they may curtail the activities of all three at once.

The cancellation of the missions would create problems for us since the missions produce needed intelligence information. However, the elimination of the missions will not necessarily complicate the Berlin problem since, over the years, the two have been considered and handled quite separately.

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(Drafting Office and Office) 3/30/62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Downgraded To: [redacted]

EO 11652: XGDS C 2 C 3

Memorandum of Conversation

EYES ONLY

314

DATE: March 29, 1962
Room 5518
Dept. of State
3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Review of Geneva Talks on Berlin for Quadripartite Ambassadorial Meeting

PARTICIPANTS:	United States	UK	France
	Mr. Kohler	Lord Hood	Ambassador Alphand
	Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Greenhill	Mr. Lebel
	Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Brooke	Mr. Winckler
	Mr. Hitze		Mr. Palen
[redacted]	Mr. Hillenbrand	GERMANY	

COPIES TO: S/S RTF, Amem. Bonn, Amem. Moscow, G, GER, USBER BERLIN, S/P, SOV, S/S-RO, INR/D, OSD-ISA - Mr. Hitze, EUR, Ambassador Grove, Mr. Schnippenkoetter, Mr. Klemmer, The White House - Mr. Bundy

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Mr. Kohler opened by saying that after 12 intensive meetings with the Soviets at Geneva on Berlin, we had no clear understanding of their motivations at this time but that we did recognize they were definitely interested in continuing the talks. The "points of agreement" referred to in the joint communique could be reduced to two:

1. Both sides were interested in avoiding a collision at this time.

2. Both sides were agreed to continue talking.

As for the points of disagreement, these were the usual ones which were based in the conflict between Soviet proposals and Western vital interests.

Mr. Kohler then reviewed TOHOL 1453. He said we would make the three documents exchanged available to the Embassies.

At the conclusion of this review, Mr. Kohler asked Mr. Bohlen and Ambassador Thompson for any supplementary impressions.

Mr. Bohlen said it was clear that the Soviets consider West Berlin a Western advanced post in their area and that it is their intention to reduce that post.

Ambassador Thompson said that there was nothing new in the Soviet positions as advanced by Gromyko, but that in conversations with Semenov there seemed to be

Soviet

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Soviet concern about West Berlin as a forward bastion of NATO which was subject to the NATO guarantees. The Ambassador also noted that there seemed more Soviet concern about the external boundaries of Germany than about any demarcation line between the Germanies.

Mr. Kohler then said that the U.S. side had not reached any firm conclusions about a next step. There was always the possibility that we could retailor our paper to take account of linguistic changes which would make it more attractive to the Soviets. He said that we would appreciate any observations which the others might have after they had read the papers and reviewed his briefing.

Ambassador Thompson then read a list of what he considered to be Soviet priorities in these talks, although he prefaced this by saying that the Soviets by constantly repeating the same proposals had given no really clear idea of the weight they attached to each. The eight items in order of priority were:

1. To prepare for eventual recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state.

2. To prepare for an eventual takeover of West Berlin. This would be done by getting Western troops out of Berlin, by giving the GDR the possibility of controlling Berlin access and by cutting the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic.

3. To obtain formal recognition of the present external borders of Germany.

4. To get agreement on non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, especially to the FRG.

5. To end "Cold War operations" in Berlin. This is obviously linked to their aim of a takeover of West Berlin.

6. To prepare for a separate peace treaty with the GDR.

7. To get some sort of NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty.

8. To weaken confidence of the Western Allies among themselves, particularly between the Federal Republic and the rest of NATO.

Ambassador Thompson also noted that the only issue upon which the Soviets showed any heat during the talks was the question of making West Berlin part of the FRG; on this Semenov seemed to be saying that the only way the West could do this would be "to pack it up and ship it out."

The German ambassador asked if we thought the recognition issue more important to the Soviets than the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. Mr. Kohler replied that Gromyko seemed to believe that non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to the two Germanies would be decided upon no matter what progress was made on agreements about non-diffusion generally.

CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY
SECRET

Ambassador

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Ambassador Grove asked what had been the Soviet reaction to continuing talks at the Deputy Foreign Minister level. Mr. Kohler said there had not been much reaction to this. Instead, Gromyko had remarked that Ambassador Dobrynin had the complete confidence of Khrushchev. For the present, Mr. Kohler added, the US had no firm ideas on where the next round should take place or, for that matter, whether the initiative should come from the Western side. He said that in any event there had been no Soviet initiative on summitry and little reaction when we had mentioned it. Ambassador Alphand said he was glad to receive this correction of press reports which seemed to be assuming that a summit meeting was all but arranged.

It was agreed that there would be another meeting of the Group whenever any of the other Embassies had any observations or suggestions to make as a result of their reflections upon the documents and the briefing.

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NLK PCF Germany

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

315

2BF24/1

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

United States Mission
Berlin, Germany
March 29, 1962

Dear Dean:

I am very much concerned with the time sequences involved in some of our contingency planning. For instance, if we are stopped on the autobahn, we probe first with a small task force which withdraws if it meets resistance and fights only in self defense. The next step involves a much larger force. However, as I understand it, economic measures would be taken between these two events although what these measures would be is not yet agreed. I think it disastrous to move a small task force on the highway only to withdraw it unless we are ready to follow the withdrawal immediately with massive economic blockade. The sequences agreed in contingency planning may suffice if really to be put into effect, one after the other, without delay. Any serious delays between steps would lead to immediate deterioration in Berlin and I think, too, in West Germany. However, all these matters now appear to be tripartite and hence beyond my ability to influence.

I have just talked to Max Taylor and have told him my period of usefulness, if it existed at all, is definitely over now and that I cannot in dignity continue to stay.

Brandt is now in England to return early in April. When he returns, I will talk quietly with him to get his views as to the best way for me to leave without upsetting Berlin too much. Then, perhaps

The Honorable
Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

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it would be wise for me to come to Washington around April 10 to discuss how I can best leave from our government's viewpoint. I have no exact deadline in mind except that an early date should be set now. I have formed no judgment as to whether it should be an immediate departure after announcement or announced somewhat in advance of departure. Brandt may have some feeling about this.

If this is satisfactory to you, please let me know what date on or about April 10 is satisfactory from your viewpoint for me to visit Washington.

Sincerely yours,

Lucius D. Clay
General, Retired
U. S. Army

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

.2BF2S/1

316

United States Mission Berlin,
Berlin, Germany,
March 29, 1962.

OFFICIAL INFORMAL
SECRET

Dear Foy:

I have not been privy to certain correspondence that has taken place between the President and General Clay, but from time to time the General has given me highlights from some of these letters. For example, he told me yesterday that he had written the President a couple of months ago to request the White House to find a way to make it possible for him to leave Berlin; that while there was no great hurry, his decision to leave was final. General Clay mentioned that he had raised the question again not very long ago, reminding the President that he was still waiting to hear from him how and when his recall from Berlin would be arranged. General Clay then said that General Taylor brought up this subject when he was here yesterday; that after ascertaining that General Clay was still adamant on leaving Berlin, General Taylor had tentatively suggested the possibility of the President's designating General Clay as a special consultant on Berlin matters. This, he said, would entail periodic trips to Berlin and visits to Washington from time to time for talks with the President or the Secretary of State. General Clay said he told General Taylor that he didn't care what excuse was used; that he had no objection to this proposal but it should be understood that he had no intention of making any trips to Berlin or going to Washington very often on consultation. He said he had informed General Taylor that he had been patiently waiting for the White House to do something about his return and that he now asked for action within two weeks or he would have to take matters into his own hands.

According to General Clay, the situation of the United States Headquarters in Berlin following his departure was also discussed. General Taylor apparently said something about a replacement for General Watson, possibly a man of higher rank. General Clay told me he had opposed this on the grounds that it would be unwise at this time to appoint a new Commander, unfamiliar with the complicated Berlin situation; that he believed General Watson, who had been here less than a year, should not be moved until the end of his tour; and that in any case the only effect of upgrading the job would be to lead the British and the French to do likewise. (Apparently General Clay would see an advantage in having a higher ranking American officer here only

The Honorable,
Foy D. Kohler,
Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of European Affairs,
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

(Signed) Allen
E. Allen Lightner, Jr.

SECRET

B-743

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

2BF25/2

if that American outranked his British and French colleagues.)

I realize you may be hearing about these matters from General Taylor himself, but it may be of interest to have another version, even though mine is second hand. As you know, with the exception of a telegram to you last November, I have avoided mentioning to you any aspect of General Clay's mission; it now seems to be time for another exception. General Clay has for many years had a propensity while in Government service to tender his resignation periodically. (When Bob Murphy was here recently, he told me that General Clay used to resign once a week.) On this assignment he has been threatening to pull out ever since November. It may be that the present threat will also subside, but both General Clay and his wife seem determined to go. I shall not argue the relative advantages and disadvantages of his staying (or leaving.) I suggest, however, that everyone concerned should be ready to deal with the situation if rather soon and suddenly, for better, for worse, he returns to the United States or announces he is going.

If that happens, I realize that a huge sigh of relief will be heard in the Department and probably in the White House as well. Here, however, General Watson and I, regardless of our personal feelings about such a development, could have a real problem on our hands in the local community. I do not suppose that General Clay would actually leave here in the midst of a really hot crisis. On the other hand, he apparently believes that he could justify leaving here at a time like the present, before a Summit Conference, while the Berlin problem is still the subject of further talks and while the local scene is relatively calm, despite the continuation of the Communist campaign of numerous minor harassments. If General Clay accepts a nominal role of special adviser to the President and refrains from following his natural bent publicly to blast the Administration's Berlin policy, it may be that the Berlin leadership and population will adjust without too much difficulty to life without Uncle Lucius.

The Department, nevertheless, should seriously consider the post-Clay period, not only the details connected with announcing his departure but also the kind of American representation desired for Berlin after he goes. The timing and place of the announcement is of course important as it will have an important effect on the atmosphere of his leaving Berlin. I should think a White House statement should be made shortly before the date of his departure, but allowing time for an appropriate farewell ceremony or two in Berlin. I have not mentioned this to General Clay but I am pretty sure he would prefer to go without any fanfare. It would not be a good idea to have a series of functions, but I would think the Mayor and City Fathers should be entitled to put on at least one affair in his honor. This may appear to be a minor detail but the mode and circumstances of his departure can affect the Berliners' political evaluation of this entire development.

There is not only the impact in West Berlin to think about. There is the Soviet/GDR interpretation of Clay's departure to consider. Every effort should be made in working out the details to guard against

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2BFZS/3

giving the public impression that a change of American policy has occurred. This will be hard to handle with the press. The Soviets may subject us to new local harassments with the main object of testing us out.

With respect to the Americans who will man the Berlin ramparts after Clay goes, I am inclined to agree with him that no very useful purpose would be served by making the U.S. Commander Berlin a three star position and I agree that it would be a mistake to transfer General Watson prematurely. Of course, I hope no new "Special Ambassador" will again be superimposed over the Mission. The question is whether anything should be done to change or bolster American representation? One can argue against making any changes lest this compound the problem by creating an impression that a new policy requires a major shakeup. Watson and I are pretty well identified with a strong Berlin policy. However, you might consider the possibility of replacing me before too long with someone who has previously been an ambassador so that, even if he functioned here as a minister, he would have additional reflected prestige. (In view of the occupation status of Berlin and the intricate relationships with our military forces, the relations with the Ambassador in Bonn and with our Allies, I assume it would be impractical to consider giving the local State Department man the rank of Ambassador.) Mind you, I am not sure that anything dramatic should be done in a transparent effort to fill the gap left by General Clay's departure, but we shouldn't kid ourselves that his departure will not leave a vacuum.

About the only concrete suggestion I can come up with at the moment is to suggest a series of high level official visits from the United States, at appropriate intervals.

It would of course be helpful to know what you and the Secretary have in mind.

All the best,

Sincerely yours,

E. Allan Lightner, Jr.

cc: Ambassador Dowling

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5/11/62 PM

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INFO: Amembassy BONN 2678
USBER BERLIN 1240
Amembassy LONDON 5224
Amembassy MOSCOW 2243
POLAD SACLANT

PARIS PASS STOESSEL FOR ACTION USRO AND MCGUIRE FOR INFORMATION

REF: DEPTEL 5090 TO PARIS 962.72

1. French have approved US proposals for harassment Soviet merchant vessels as counter-measure for Soviet actions in air corridors. They suggest we start them shortly after making request in BASC that Soviets cease flights along corridors, assuming Soviets continue flights. (DEPTEL 5219). French believe execution harassments should be left to national naval commands, with coordination taking place in Washington. They are opposed establishment new naval "LIVE OAK." They believe that we should inform NAC and ask its advice but not allow it to tie our hands. French agree there should be no publicity.

962.72/3-3062

2. We are now awaiting UK views, following Secretary's intervention with [illegible] in Geneva [illegible] urging U.K. reconsideration of opposition to naval countermeasures.

3. If UK approves US proposals, main problem will be coordination of measures. JCS has asked USCINCEUR and CINCLANT for their views, and we are reserving our position on this question until we have USCINCEUR'S reply.

END.
RUSH

EUR:EUR:GER:JCAusland:cbs 3/20/62 | GER - Martin J. Hillenbrand

JCS-Gen. Gray (in substance) | SOV - Mr. Anderson (in substance)

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Control: 39
Rec'd: April 1, 1962 8:42 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1962 APR 2 AM 7 23
OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS MESSAGE CENTER

318

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1867, APRIL 1, 1 PM

2BF27

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1867, BONN PRIORITY 1692, PARIS PRIORITY 1330

STATE FOR SECRETARY

BONN FOR AMBASSADOR

PARIS FOR STOESSEL

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

FROM CLAY

OUR FAILURE TO TAKE FULL MEASURE OF IMPOUNDING SOVIET MISSION HAS NOW RESULTED IN RETURN OF BOTH MISSIONS TO AN EQUALITY STATUS WITH MEMBERS FREE TO MOVE UNDER ESCORT. THUS I FAIL TO SEE WHAT IS TO BE GAINED BY MEETING WITH SOVIET COMMANDER. THIS MEETING CAN RESULT ONLY IN MAINTAINING STATUS QUO, RETURNING TO PRE-SHOOTING NORMAL, OR TO CANCELLATION MISSION AGREEMENT. IF SOVIET COMMANDER REJECTS CLARKE'S PROTEST ON SHOOTING, WE EITHER CONTINUE OR CANCEL MISSION AGREEMENT. IF WE ARE UNWILLING TO DO THE LATTER BECAUSE OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE, THEN INDEED THE MEETING WILL HAVE WEAKENED AND NOT STRENGTHENED OUR POSITION. I REALIZE IT IS TOO LATE TO REFUSE TO MEET SO I HOPE SOVIETS COME TO OUR RESCUE AS THEY OFTEN DO AND REFUSE TO HAVE THE MEETING.

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PARIS FOR STOESSEL

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This telegram summarizes for information all addressees current status and forthcoming steps in planning for dealing with harassment Allied convoy movements on Berlin autobahn:

1. US unilateral planning--Only specific instruction issued by Washington governing use of force by autobahn convoys was August 19, 1961, JCS instruction to General Norstad on August battlegroup movement. Questions subsequently raised with General Norstad re extent to which this instruction covered other than convoy movements and desirability issuance further instructions for such movements. Department interest in matter centered on: a) concern that US actions not at variance agreed tripartite planning; and b) desirability that any new plans designed by US be adopted as tripartite plans.

General Norstad has now invited Generals Clarke and Watson meet in Paris late this week discuss plan submitted by General Watson (Paris 4633, Berlin 1858). Department assumes plan resulting eventually from this consultation will be reported

[illegible] - Mr. Rillembrand (in draft)

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reported to Washington as recommended US rules or guidelines of conduct and as first step in reaching agreed tripartite rules. Department considers such rules or guidelines should have highest clearance Washington before approval, if only in terms general limits of action proposed.

2. Tripartite planning--While it not perhaps absolute necessity that adoption rules of conduct by US be subject their being agreed tripartitely, it obviously highly desirable. As pointed out Berlin's 1858, if Soviets halt with force US convoy movements some countermeasures would be called for. However, countermeasures require at least tripartite and possibly NATO cooperation, which would be much less likely if US had acted solely on basis unilateral plans up to that point.

It was with intention developing autobahn planning on tripartite basis that Department proposed (Deptel to Paris 8hh 5146) priority consideration by LIVE OAK and Quadripartite Committee of autobahn aspects of Four-Power military counter- Department believed it would be highly desirable for General Norstad LIVE OAK capacity to propose in this context rules of conduct for all Allied convoy movements based on whatever plans worked out with Generals Clarke and Watson.

END

RUSK

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Eur:...:MaFreshman:cmj:all
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

3897
3897

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved by the White House 4/5/62

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 3, 1962

SUBJECT: General Clay

Downgraded To: ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL
EO 11652: XGDS 1 2 3 4
Authorized By: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975

PARTICIPANTS: GERMANY
Ambassador Grewe

UNITED STATES
The President
Mr. Freshman

COPIES TO: The Secretary
The Under Secretary
EUR - Mr. Kohler
The White House - Mr. Bundy

1970.3 / 4-3-62

The President commented that he had been giving some thought to the question of General Clay's situation in Berlin. He had gone there in September at the President's request and it is now April. General Clay can't stay there indefinitely; at the present time there isn't enough for him to do and he will become increasingly restless given the present limitations on his authority and responsibility. The President stated that he wants to discuss this matter with General Taylor, who has seen General Clay on his recent trip to Europe and who has just returned. The President said that he would be in touch with Ambassador Grewe further about this.

Ambassador Grewe remarked that General Clay obviously could not be expected to spend the rest of his life in Berlin. On the other hand, if a change in General Clay's role is now indicated, it might be desirable from a psychological standpoint to consider the best means for preparing the Berliners to accept this development.

The President stated that General Clay had performed an outstanding service in Berlin for the United States. Having fulfilled this assignment, however, possibly now would be an appropriate time to consider permitting General Clay to return to his commitments in private industry, given a clearly unhurried arrangement on timing - for example, six weeks or so.

(2)

CATEGORY "A"
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A/ PW. (S/S)

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. If Re/SR of A Freshman: jm
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2BF30/1

Memorandum of Conversation

321

DATE: April 3, 1962

SUBJECT: Views of Chancellor Adenauer and Defense Minister Strauss

PARTICIPANTS:	GERMANY	UNITED STATES
	Ambassador Grewe	The President Mr. Freshman

COPIES TO:		
	The Secretary	Amembassy, Bonn -
	The Under Secretary	Ambassador Dowling
	G - Mr. Johnson	The Secretary of Defense
	EUR - Mr. Kohler	
	DOD/ISA - Mr. Nitze	
	White House - Mr. Bundy (3)	

Ambassador Grewe referred to his meeting of February 19 with the President and stated that he had been instructed to discuss further the President's critical reaction to reported statements by Defense Minister Strauss. At this point the President interjected that although he had read the recent account of Gruson's interview with Strauss and he recalled the references in the February meeting to the U. S. position on conventional forces and forward strategy, actually nothing had been mentioned concerning Strauss. In the course of a brief colloquy on this point, Grewe recalled the President as having stated during the February 19 meeting that Strauss was speaking as if the November conversations had not taken place.

The President reiterated that nothing in the notes of that discussion disclosed any reference to Strauss. The thrust of that discussion had centered on the Kissinger talks in Bonn, pertaining to matters which he had thought had already been covered during the November visit of the Chancellor and Minister Strauss.

Ambassador Grewe then stressed that, in any event, and apropos of the February 19 meeting, he had been instructed several weeks ago to inform the President that the Chancellor has always been one of the strongest protagonists of the Atlantic Community; he has always opposed a national strategy on the part of certain of our allies but rather has favored an integrated NATO strategy. There is no mistrust whatever of the United States on the part of the German Government, nor is there any deviation from the understandings resulting from the November talks. The Chancellor still feels, however, that some points exist in strategic concepts on which there is not complete agreement between our two governments.

SECRET-EYES ONLY

F

NATO

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General Taylor's recent talks in Bonn with the Foreign Minister and State Secretary Hopf of the Defense Ministry had been most useful and it was indeed regrettable that Strauss' illness prevented his participation in these talks. Ambassador Grewe also noted that the forthcoming visit to Germany of Assistant Secretary Wilcox for the Atlantik Brucke meeting should also be helpful in allaying any misunderstandings in Bonn on U. S. strategic policy. According to General Taylor, the Ambassador noted, there had never been any change in the U. S. strategic concept, to which the President smilingly commented that General Taylor's concept had remained unchanged but that there had been a somewhat broader adoption of his point of view, - that General Taylor was undoubtedly speaking in a personal sense.

Ambassador Grewe then moved to a brief account of Strauss' meeting with French Defense Minister Messmer, concerning which he understood there had been U. S. interest. By way of background, this meeting fitted into the general concept of French/German cooperation going back to 1957, and the two Defense Ministers had maintained close contact during this period. The German Government considered it essential to foster their ties with the French, and the U. S. had supported this policy. Strauss and Messmer met regularly to discuss "practical" questions, including questions of logistics. In the absence of a NATO integrated logistics system, the Federal Republic depends heavily on the French for logistics support.

Strauss had discussed NATO forward strategy with Messmer and had explored whether French forces which might hopefully be recalled soon from Algeria could be assigned to areas along the eastern frontier of the Federal Republic. This is still under discussion, Grewe noted, and no decisions have been reached.

Strauss also inquired of Messmer, according to Grewe, whether the French would consider supporting efforts to create a NATO nuclear force, the successful development of which would discourage national efforts to achieve nuclear capability. Grewe added wryly that he had no information on the French response.

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PARIS FOR USRO, STOESSEL, MCGUIRE

Consideration being given here to further reduction now of frequency of armed convoy movements on autobahn for following reasons.

a. These movements began as form of substitute for assistance patrols in context of harassment Allied travelers on autobahn. Such harassment ceased some time ago, but subsequent public Soviet/GDR threats against Allied movements made it impossible reduce movements. These threats have subsided.

b. Apparent Soviet/GDR sensitivity to armed autobahn movements indicates they are useful measure to counter-harassment. Unless we reduce them in absence of harassment, however, their potential further use becomes eroded.

c. Recent interference with movements at checkpoints is factor to consider, but we believe gradual reduction convoys now not likely appear linked that activity.

d. Increased civilian traffic congestion will complicate movements in [illegible] afford Communists opportunity make most of degree to which convoys interfering with civilian traffic.

e. Possibilities

[illegible]

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2. Possibilities for working away from advance notice and headcount procedures probably greater with wider-spaced movements. (Deptel 1234 to Berlin)

Movement on autobahn merely to exercise the right is a new procedure we have established which was never used before. Argument that it is for training is rather transparent since unit doesn't stay long enough to train.

2. We therefore considering suggesting that convoy movements with no other purpose than to demonstrate Allied autobahn presence should be reduced gradually so that by end April demonstrative movements occur no more than one day per week. In weeks when movements for training or other military purposes occur no demonstrative movements would be necessary.

3. Comments Bonn and Berlin requested.

4. JCS requesting Norstad's views this subject.

END.

RUSK

[redacted]

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SECRET EYES ONLY
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ACTION: USBER BERLIN 1264

323 2BF32/1

EYES ONLY FOR CLAY FROM SECRETARY

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I deeply appreciate your 1891 about the situation in Berlin. Of course, we could be wrong within twenty-four hours but I did bring away from Geneva a the clear impression that the Soviets wanted us to believe that they did not wish to move either toward a crisis or to a diplomatic impasse.

These past months have not been easy ones for us or for the people of West Berlin. But of one thing I am certain and that is that your presence in West Berlin during this period has done more than any other single thing to sustain the morale and the sense of assurance among the people of that city. It is not often that one man can make that kind of contribution and I hope you will personally feel some of the satisfaction that you have fully earned.

It seems to me that we must be determined and persistent in further discussions of these problems with the Soviet Union. But I am convinced that President Kennedy's combination of sobriety and a complete commitment to

[redacted]

The Secretary

S/S - Mr. Brubeck

EUR - Fox

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2BF32/2

the vital interests of the West have made a significant impression in Moscow. We must continue to be alert and to work quietly on a further consolidation of the position of the Alliance in order that we might deal effectively with any contingency. Regards.

Rusk (ecs)

BALL

[redacted]

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Tom. 03/4-662

6/9/62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

60 D
IR 711.5611

39

324

DATE: April 6, 1962
Mr. Kohler's Office
3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Berlin and Related Subjects

PARTICIPANTS:

Germany	United States
Ambassador Grewe	Mr. Kohler
Mr. Frederick Ruth	Mr. Rillenbrand

FBL

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EUR	Amembassy Paris		
BTF	Amembassy Paris - USRO		
SOV	Amembassy Paris - SHAPE - Mr. Stoessel		

Ambassador Grewe said he came in full of curiosity as to what was happening in connection with Berlin. The newspapers were full of optimistic accounts and also indicated that consultations between the US and its Allies were going on. He wanted to justify this latter statement, and wondered what the meaning of these developments was. Mr. Kohler said he did not really profess to know the answer. He was a little disturbed by press euphoria, and noted that we were trying to correct this by appropriate backgrounding. We would like to think that the improvement in the Berlin situation was not unrelated to the serious warnings given by Secretary Rusk to Gromyko at Geneva. The last thing the Secretary had said to Gromyko was that he trusted that, when the latter got back to Moscow, he would look into this question of harassments and do something about them. There had been no other significant information throwing light on the meaning of Soviet conduct in this connection. We had heard nothing new from Dobrynin, and it was obvious that he had not received any instructions. As long as we kept the situation in perspective, it was obviously so much the better that harassments had ceased. Gen. Clay was inclined to link the Geneva talks and the warnings given there to the improvement, and thought that we may well be in for a period free from harassments.

In the back of his own mind, Mr. Kohler continued, he wondered if the situation were not related in some way to the nuclear test question in creating a sense of detente intended to make it hard for the US to go ahead with its nuclear tests. If we did go ahead with them, perhaps there might be a recrudescence of harassments. This was purely a personal speculation, Mr. Kohler added. He wondered whether Ambassador Grewe had had any views from Bonn as to the Geneva talks.

Ambassador

FROM: DS:IRA NINE

SECRET

4

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2BF33/2

Ambassador Grewe said that he had not had very much. This might be partly due to the fact that Chancellor Adenauer was on vacation in Italy while Foreign Minister Schroeder was attending an Ambassadorial Conference on the island of Rhodes. He had noted, Ambassador Grewe observed, that a Foreign Office spokesman had taken a firm position in response to rumors about a so-called deal to substitute a new arrangement for Allied occupation rights. The German press apparently had received his statement in a way indicating that it believed the Foreign Office spokesman was convinced of what he was saying.

Mr. Kohler noted that we were at the present moment studying the transcripts of the Geneva talks and were working on a revision of our "Draft Principles Paper" which, without changing the substance, tried to use some of the Soviet language. Ambassador Grewe asked whether he had any idea where the suggestion had come from that Soviets might represent the East Germans under their version of an International Access Authority. Mr. Kohler said he did not know, but perhaps the thought had been suggested by Ulbricht's statement. Mr. Kohler indicated we were wondering whether we should not study our paper on an International Access Authority in the light of this. We thought we would be in touch with our Allies the beginning of next week, and were rather thinking of an approach to Dobrynin perhaps by the end of the week. Ambassador Grewe asked whether we had definitely decided to shift the locus from Moscow to Washington. Mr. Kohler said we were thinking of trying the Dobrynin channel for a change. He came here highly recommended and it might be worthwhile seeing how this channel would work. Perhaps talks might develop both here and in Moscow, but we had not really thought this matter through. In response to Ambassador Grewe's question as to whether we contemplated having talks with Dobrynin at the level of the Secretary of State, Mr. Kohler said perhaps we could use the Geneva formula of varying both the number of people present as well as the level. This would have to be played by ear, but the Secretary would at least probably wish to launch the discussions.

Ambassador Grewe asked whether we felt there were any chance of bringing the French into the conversations. Mr. Kohler said this was a problem we obviously had to consider. He had told this to Alphand the other day. We were reaching the point where it was difficult to distinguish between explorations and negotiations. If we began to get somewhere along the lines of our "Draft Principles", the idea of setting up a Deputy Foreign Ministers' Forum would immediately pose the question of French participation. Alphand had been noncommittal but had not ruled out the possibility of our trying again to bring the French in.

In response to Ambassador Grewe's query as to whether Ambassador Thompson would be going back to Moscow with specific instructions, Mr. Kohler said this would not be the case. Such instructions were, of course, not required if the conversations were to be transferred to Washington. However, after the meeting scheduled with the President tomorrow, he would know about all these things a little more definitely.

Ambassador Grewe

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2BF33|3

Ambassador Grewe wondered how, if the French negative attitude persisted, the procedure of consultation would be carried out. Mr. Kohler indicated that, under the circumstances, we would probably have to operate bilaterally. Ambassador Grewe suggested that we might, as during the Thompson-Gromyko talks, have bilateral discussions before individual talks with the Soviets, and then brief the Allies on the results quadripartitely. Mr. Kohler conceded that the French were a problem. If the Germans had any suggestions as to how De Gaulle might be approached on this, we would be glad to hear them. Many French officials were unhappy with his insistence on abstaining from the Geneva and other talks. The plebiscite which he was having on Sunday by combining Algeria and a general operating carte blanche might strengthen his position. However, Ambassador Grewe commented, if Jeanneney were to take Debre's place he would exercise a healthy influence. Mr. Kohler agreed that he was much more oriented toward the Western Allies. He noted that there were rumors that if the plebiscite came out well De Gaulle might hold new elections in May to strengthen his parliamentary lineup.

Ambassador Grewe said that, although he had not received definitive instructions from Bonn on the subject, he might have to ask for an appointment within a few days to discuss the subject of the U Thant memorandum transmitting the GDR communication. Mr. Kohler commented that he had been annoyed by this but wondered what could be done about it. Ambassador Grewe said that Bonn was considering a formal written protest and might want US support in this connection. The German observers in Geneva had been instructed to make an approach there to have the other countries refuse to accept the memorandum, but the US delegation had concluded that, in view of the lack of authority on the part of such country representatives in Geneva as those of Egypt and Mexico, the problem had really to be handled at the UN in New York. However, it was difficult to see what could be done in New York. Mr. Kohler said it was not clear that it would be any advantage if a West German paper were submitted in New York since it would get the same handling as the GDR paper and thus the two would be equated. Still it was perhaps unfortunate to have only an East German paper on the subject of the German question. Ambassador Grewe said his government did not have a substantive paper in mind, merely a protest. The problem was a difficult one. Bonn had been surprised to learn that U Thant had told the German observer Knappstein that the memorandum had already been sent out at a time when it actually had not been despatched. Grewe noted again that he had not had any definite instructions on this matter, but might receive them within a day or so.

Mr. Kohler noted that he had talked the other day with Bundestag member, Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg. Ambassador Grewe was interested in the impression he had made. Mr. Kohler said that it had been a little mixed. He was obviously a strong young man with decisive views. He had referred to a paper prepared by a small group of CDU-CSU Bundestag members intended to guide the party's foreign policy. Mr. Kohler said he welcomed the first point which stressed that Germany should be prepared to play a role in the defense of Berlin, but was a little dubious about the second point which proposed to increase

political

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political relations between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Guttenberg had answered in the affirmative Mr. Kohler's query as to whether this meant a Bundestag meeting in Berlin in the near future, but had indicated that it should be held "quietly." Mr. Kohler said he had expressed some doubt as to whether this sort of thing could be done quietly. Guttenberg was certainly not very much in favor of any movement toward Poland and Czechoslovakia, Mr. Kohler added. Ambassador Grewe said this was true. He was a strong exponent of the Hallstein doctrine. He was, however, an influential member of the Bundestag in view of his activity and energy. It was useful to have talked with him since he reflected a certain mood in his political party.

[redacted]

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P 0916 52 ZFF-1

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FM GEN. NORSTAD, SHAPE, PARIS

TO GEN. LEMNITZER, CJCS, WASHINGTON

INFO GEN. WHEELER, DUSCINCUER, DES LOGES

(President read)

S E C R E T

PRS 0999 EYES ONLY

CJCS PLEASE PASS TO STATE AND WHITE HOUSE.

I HAVE AUTHORIZED CLARKE TO REDUCE TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM THE ARMED CONVOY MOVEMENTS ON THE AUTOBAHN. PENDING OUR DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT IN GERMANY ON 14 APR, I HAVE LEFT TO HIS DISCRETION WHAT CONSTITUTES THE MINIMUM, BUT I HAVE INDICATED MY BELIEF THAT NO REPEAT NO ARTIFICIALLY CREATED ARMED CONVOYS SHOULD BE INTRODUCED ONTO THE AUTOBAHN FOR THE TIME BEING.

WATSON'S EARLIER PROPOSAL THAT AT LEAST A SQUAD OF ARMED SOLDIERS ESCORT ALL CONVOYS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE PUT INTO EFFECT AT THIS TIME. I WILL DISCUSS WITH CLARKE ON 14 APR THE ADVISABILITY OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING TO COVER THE INTRODUCTION OF ARMED MEN INTO CONVOYS SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY.

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EUR:FDKohler:mt
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Telephone
Memorandum of Conversation

2BF35/1

326

DATE: April 13, 1962

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Wilhelm Grewe, Ambassador of Germany
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

COPIES TO:

S/S (3)	Amembassy London
S/P	Amembassy MOSCOW
White House	Amembassy BONN
EUR (2)	Amembassy PARIS
GER (2)	USRO PARIS

Mr. Kohler telephoned the German Ambassador and began the conversation by saying he was very agitated, that all the main newspapers have, from what they say was a briefing in Bonn, all the main points from the documents we have been discussing with the Ambassador. They will be in the German papers and in the American papers tomorrow morning.

Mr. Kohler said he was instructed to tell the Ambassador that we are distressed at the top levels and that this seriously raises the question of whether purposeful consultation is possible.

The Ambassador asked where Mr. Kohler got this story. Mr. Kohler replied that all the newspapers have the story; it is on the tickers, and it is said that there was a briefing. The main points are all reported with accuracy -- they are all there and this was clearly not an accident.

The Ambassador said that he had transmitted Mr. Kohler's warning about secrecy in the most serious way at the top of his report and that he couldn't understand how such a thing could be.

Mr. Kohler repeated that he was told to pass on the high concern and

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and the almost hopeless feeling about whether we can do any real consultation.

The Ambassador said he would pass this on to Bonn.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

2BF36/1

Refer to I-16826/62

327

APR 26 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, Saturday, April 14, 1962

Participants:

Germans	US
Mayor Brandt	Mr. Nitze
	Mr. Lightner
	Gen. Hertel
	Mr. Miller
	Mr. McQuade

During and after dinner at Lightner's home, the following subjects were discussed.

Brandt said that it would be a good idea if the West had additional topics to raise with the Soviets when, in the course of the talks over Berlin, discussion of the main issues seemed to be at a temporary impasse. He thought, for example, that we could seek arrangements for more freedom of movement within the city of Berlin. This might mean any one of a range of alternatives between taking down the wall to more administrative leniency in allowing families separated by the wall to get together more often. The proposal would have the advantage of great humanitarian appeal and might perhaps even work out to some extent. It could be advanced in talks at both the local level and at the talks currently being held in Washington.

Nitze remarked that most Soviet basic decisions seem to be made cumbersomely and at virtually the highest levels. As a result, lesser officials sometimes err in carrying out such high level decisions by going farther than the decision makers may have intended. If the present thaw is a result of this kind of high level guidance, perhaps the lesser officials might construe the policy as authorizing them to agree to some form of Brandt's proposal.

Brandt said that more coordinated use of the economic interrelationships between the West and East Germany (and the Bloc) might be useful as a crowbar for prying loose political concessions. He pointed out that the problem of food is a very considerable one for the East Germans as it is for the Russians this year. He cited East German attempts to buy food in Denmark, in France, and in Berlin itself. For example, East Germany

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wanted to buy 2000 tons of lard from West Berlin. West Berlin, in fact, does sell to East Germany including things from the blockade stockpile. Turnover of part of the stockpile helps avoid spoilage and contributes in a small way to/economic leverage.
potential

Brandt said that he thinks well of Leopold, the man who negotiates on behalf of West Germany on matters of inter-zonal trade. Some of the lesser officials in the Bonn Economic Ministry disapprove of Leopold, but Erhard himself has a favorable opinion of him.

Nitze recalled a proposal he had once worked out (though it has never been adopted) for a single Western "corporation" which would coordinate all of the commercial relationships between the West and the Bloc. Through such an organization, our opportunity to use economic counter-measures for maximum Western political advantage could be much more effectively exploited. The proposition, of course, would run into a lot of political opposition. It is inconsistent with the doctrine of free enterprise. Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile to examine it again, for it might be appropriate in the highly specialized circumstances of East-West trade.

Brandt referred to the messages from Washington about the 5-5-3 directorate for the International Access Authority and the consternation it was causing in Bonn. He had talked about this with the Chancellor and with Carstens the day before. He knew that the Chancellor had talked to the Bundestag party leaders. The subject matter of such a conference was bound to leak to the press. Brandt said that he did not find the U.S. proposal so startlingly new. It had been implicit in a long series of proposals put forward over the past several years in connection with possible Berlin settlement. Neither he nor Mende objected to the U.S. position. It was really the CDU which objected. His primary concern was that the voting procedure might cast a doubt upon the validity of the tie between Berlin and West Germany. He noted reports that Rusk had told Gromyko in Geneva that Berlin was not a German question but a tripartite matter having nothing to do with the FRG.

Nitze pointed out that the U.S. believed that our primary interest was to maintain the validity of our legal rights in Berlin. These are based upon its occupation in time of war. We have foresworn these rights with respect to West Germany and it would hurt our legal position if we should accept the unambiguous proposition that Berlin and West Germany are the same political entity.

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ZBF 36/3

Brandt acknowledged the dilemma. He agreed with Kitze that the primary interest is maintenance of the legal justification for the presence of the three allied powers in Berlin.

There was general discussion about the merits of confining the Berlin conversations within narrow limits or putting them in a broader focus. It seemed generally agreed that the Russians were unlikely to acquiesce in the narrower focus and that subjects such as the Oder Neisse line and non-diffusion of nuclear weapons were bound to be brought into the conversation. Brandt indicated that he rather favored the broader framework. On the whole, he said, he would prefer some formal arrangement assuring access to Berlin rather than a mere reaffirmation of the status quo. He was clear on this, at least as to ground access, but less sure as to air access which is now wholly unfettered.

Miller asked what the price might be for a formal arrangement on access.

Brandt thought there were some issues in which the Communists could gain something they deem of benefit and which the West could accept without any serious detriment or perhaps without any detriment at all. There were other issues in which the Communists might gain something they deem of benefit and for which they might grant a return concession of at least equal importance to us. He seemed to feel that, in spite of all of the effort put into the Berlin problem since the end of World War II, there is still room for more imaginative exploration of possible alternative negotiating positions. He indicated that the talks with the Soviets over Berlin should not come to any decisions whatsoever without full consultation with the responsible officials in Berlin itself. Too many practical details with quite serious consequences can be overlooked by those not fully familiar with the local scene.

There was a discussion of the rights conferred by the 1947 agreement between the Soviets and the U.S. which has just been reaffirmed by General Clark and Marshall Koniev. Hertel said he thought that this agreement both provided for an exchange of military missions and included provisions assuring military access to Berlin. The other present did not recollect that this agreement included the second feature. All deemed it of importance if the second feature had such a provision.

[Signed] Paul H. Kitze

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328 2BF37

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. KOHLER - SAT., APR. 14, 1962

2:24 p. m.

Mr. Kohler reported on his talk with Grewe this morning involving the leak. Grewe told how carefully they had handled it, etc., etc. [redacted] Kohler had told Grewe that both the President and the Sec were very concerned about this and that we were intending to send a message to Schroeder on the subject. We were thinking about whether there wasn't a more secure method, adding we could not fail to be impressed by the fact that we had not had this kind of leak when we briefed them completely in Geneva. [redacted] Grewe brought the letter from Adenauer which Kohler said would be sent to the White House (they were drafting a response). It was a typical letter asking for pause. Kohler said in the reply he thought reference should be made to the leaks along the lines of the Sec's letter to Schroeder, pointing out we were distressed. Kohler said we might point out that this was not our rationale to keep this thing in movement and might be related to nuclear tests. Also say that in view of his comments the Sec would not put forward a paper on the meeting Monday. Kohler said he would send the draft out to the Secretary's house this afternoon at five o"clock for his approval and then it could go to the White House.

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Rec'd: April 16, 1962
5:30pm

329

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1946, APRIL 16, 8 PM

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 1946, BONN 1762, INFORMATION LONDON 1286, PARIS 1363, MOSCOW 1256.

DEPARTMENT EYES ONLY FOR KOHLER AND HILLENBRAND.

[redacted]

BONN, LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS.

IN [redacted]

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

BRANDT INFORMED ME THAT ON APRIL 14 HE MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO FONMIN SCHROEDER ON US PAPERS GIVEN TO AMB GREWE APR 7.

BRANDT TOLD SCHROEDER HE SHARED TO LARGE EXTENT FONOF COMMENT TO GREWE WHICH WAS COMMUNICATED TO DEPARTMENT. HE TOLD SCHROEDER THAT OVERALL JUDGMENT OF US PAPERS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REALIZATION THAT ATTEMPTED "ISOLATION" OF BERLIN QUESTION WAS NOT ACHIEVED IN PREVIOUS US-USSR DISCUSSIONS.

BRANDT MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS TO FONMIN: (1) WEST BERLIN-FEDREP RELATIONSHIPS MUST BE MORE CLEARLY UNDERLINED, NOT ONLY FOR SAKE OF BERLIN'S VIABILITY BUT ALSO TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT GERMAN LEGAL POSITION AND CLEAR WILL OF BERLIN'S POPULATION; (2) ENVISAGED INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY MUST NOT LEAD TO A RESTRICTION OF EXISTING RIGHTS BUT CAN ONLY BE JUSTIFIED BY FULFILLING BASIC REQUIREMENT OF FREE ACCESS BETTER THAN HERETOFORE THE CASE; (3) QUESTIONS OF INTRA-[redacted] IN BERLIN MUST ALSO BE DISCUSSED. WESTERN PROPOSALS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NEED FOR RESUMPTION OF ORDERLY

EYES ONLY

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762.00/4-16-62 XR 762.0221

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2BF38/2

-2- 1916, APRIL 16, 8 PM FROM BERLIN

TRAFFIC OF PERSONS IN DIVIDED BERLIN. UNDER NEW SETTLEMENT, REMNANTS OF FOUR-POWER AGREEMENTS RE RAILROADS AND WATERWAYS CANNOT BE TOLERATED TO CONTINUE AT EXPENSE OF BERLIN POPULATION.

BRANDT STRESSED TO SCHROEDER THAT HE DID NOT SHARE PUBLICLY VENTED DOUBTS IN US BERLIN POLICY. HE HOPED SCHROEDER WOULD SHARE HIS VIEW THAT CONCERN OVER DIFFICULT, BUT CERTAINLY NOT SURPRISING, DEVELOPMENTS MUST NOT AFFECT GERMAN EFFORTS TO COLLABORATE IN CONFIDENCE WITH AMERICANS.

IN CONNECTION WITH FOREGOING, BRANDT TOLD ME HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE DISCUSS RESUMPTION OF INTRA-CITY MOVEMENT IN CONCURRENT PHASE OF US-USSR TALKS. HIS SUGGESTION WAS THAT THIS SUBJECT MIGHT EVEN PROVIDE WELCOME DIVERSION IN ANY STALEMATE OF ACCESS CONVERSATIONS. AT THE VERY LEAST WEST SHOULD PROPOSE TO EFFECT THROUGH RED CROSS ORGANIZATIONS TRANSFER OF AGED OR SICK PERSONS; SUCH ARRANGEMENT, BRANDT MENTIONED, EXISTS BETWEEN FEDREP AND POLAND DESPITE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

IN CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL CLAY APRIL 16 BRANDT ADDED CONCERN TO EFFECT THERE SHOULD BE MORE EMPHASIS ON REUNIFICATION.

LIGHTNER

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PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL, AND McGUIRE

762A.00/3-2462

Bonn A-1157, repeated Paris A-1448, London A-419, USREP and POLAD USAREUR

Thorough consideration of position US should take on holding Bundestag session in Berlin in near future resulted in following conclusions:

1. Embassy Bonn should discuss question with British and French there.

2. In principle US would favor counseling against Bundestag meeting in Berlin under current circumstances and if necessary. We would hope, however, [illegible] Federal authorities would arrive at same conclusion in their [illegible]

3. Embassies should, in their discretion, determine whether approach to Germans is necessary or desirable and, if so, what nature of such an approach might be and when it should be made. Embassies should insure that decision to hold session in Berlin by Germans is not taken without reference [illegible]

4. At same time, Embassies should avoid if possible assuming [illegible] position against Berlin session [illegible] if not required.

Actions:

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

RUSK

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MEMORANDUM

113

331

2BF4C

DATE: April 17, 1962

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: Adenauer's Reaction to Latest Berlin Proposals

Chancellor Adenauer has said that he will ask DeGaulle to oppose the latest United States proposal for a Berlin settlement. He said the time has come to test German-French friendship.

DeGaulle is expected to be sympathetic to the Adenauer proposal since French-German cooperation has long been a cornerstone of DeGaulle's policy. By acceding to Adenauer's request, DeGaulle would strengthen European ties and would further support his policy of offering the Germans no opportunity for accommodation with the East.

Brentano's response has been especially critical. He has called the U.S. proposalsgive-aways and went on to say that they would never be accepted by Berlin or by West Germany. He complained that the United States has begun to show softness and unreliability and further is unwilling to keep its pledges.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 14194
Rec'd: April 20, 1962
4:20 p.m.

332

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1971, APRIL 20, 5 PM

1971

2BF41/1

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1971, BONN 1784, POLAD USAREUR 1154, INFORMATION LONDON 1298, PARIS 1375, MOSCOW 1268.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

762.00/4-2062

CURRENT APPRAISAL EAST GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS LEADS TO FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON EAST-WEST CLIMATE AS SEEN FROM BERLIN.

SINCE LAST OCTOBER, SOVS HAVE AVOIDED GERMAN PEACE TREATY DEADLINE THREATS. GENEVA FOREIGN MINISTERS' DISCUSSIONS INDICATE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE BERLIN DISCUSSIONS, RATHER THAN PROVOKE MAJOR CRISIS AT THIS TIME. LAST WEEKEND, EAST GERMAN SPOKESMAN SUGGESTED NEED TO SETTLE BERLIN QUESTION BEFORE CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATY, SEEMINGLY IMPLYING PEACE TREATY ITSELF HAS RECEDED INTO FUTURE.

WE CONTINUE REGARD ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES WITHIN EAST GERMANY AS ONE OF BASIC SOVIET MOTIVATIONS IN CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON BERLIN (SEE OURTEL 1295 TO DEPT, 1153 TO BONN). EAST GERMAN DIFFICULTIES ARE CONSIDERABLE. SEVEN-YEAR PLAN IS DEAD. AMBITIOUS PLAN GOALS NOW REPLACED BY MUCH MORE MODEST AND REALISTIC OBJECTIVE OF MAKING EAST GERMANY SPECIALIST WITHIN BLOC IN CERTAIN INDUSTRIAL SECTORS -- MACHINE TOOLS, CHEMICALS, OPTICAL EQUIPMENT. IN ORDER ACCOMPLISH EVEN THIS MODIFIED PLAN, ULBRICHT REGIME HAS EMBARKED ON COURSE OF INTENSIFIED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPRESSION. INVESTMENT FUNDS ARE TO BE REALIZED PRIMARILY THROUGH SQUEEZE ON CONSUMER AND INTENSIFIED WORK DEMANDS ON EAST GERMAN POPULATION BOTH IN TOWN AND COUNTRY.

WE BELIEVE

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2BF41/2

-2-1971, APRIL 20, 5 PM FROM BERLIN

WE BELIEVE SOVIETS REALIZE NEED FOR LENGTHY PERIOD RECUPERATION IN EAST GERMANY AND DANGER OF PROSECUTING BERLIN CRISIS ON UNSTABLE BASIS WHICH EAST GERMANY NOW CONSTITUTES. EAST GERMAN SECURITY FORCES, TO SAY NOTHING OF SOVIET FORCES THEMSELVES, ARE SUFFICIENT INSURE CONTROL IN EVENT OPEN POPULAR DISTURBANCE WHICH, FOR THIS VERY REASON, WE JUDGE UNLIKELY. HOWEVER, THIS CONSIDERATION DOES NOT IN OUR VIEW AFFECT CONSIDERATION THAT SUBSTANTIAL DISAFFECTION AND VARIOUS KINDS OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE TO REGIME EXIST IN EAST GERMANY. SOVIETS HAVE APPARENTLY GIVEN ULBRICHT LICENSE TO DEAL WITH DISAFFECTION BY RESORT TO INCREASED DISCIPLINARY MEASURES. WE SHOULD JUDGE SOVIET GOAL IS IN TIME -- PERHAPS OVER NEXT YEAR OR SO -- TO STABLIZE EAST GERMANY AND THEN GRADUALLY TO TURN IT INTO DOCILE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN-TYPE SATELLITE.

THIS PROCESS WILL NOT, HOWEVER, BE EASY. WHILE IT IS UNDER WAY, AND INDEED UNTIL PROCESS SHOWS SIGNS OF SUCCESS, SOVIETS MAY WISH TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY ON BERLIN. IN INTERIM, IT WOULD APPEAR SUIT SOVIET PURPOSE TO CONTINUE PRESS FOR ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD GRANT GREATER DEGREE RECOGNITION TO GDR. TO THIS END, SOVS MAY PRESS FOR EAST GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL AGENCY CONTROLLING ACCESS ROUTES. THIS COULD BE CONSTRUED AS STEP TOWARD RECOGNITION OF GDR; AND IT COULD HELP TOWARD STABILIZATION OF EAST GERMAN REGIME AND ACCEPTANCE OF REGIME BY EAST GERMAN POPULATION.

WE THINK IT INCORRECT, HOWEVER, TO IMAGINE THAT SOVIETS WOULD REGARD "COMPROMISE" BERLIN ARRANGEMENT, SUCH AS THROUGH CREATION INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY, AS ANYTHING BUT TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT. AFTER CERTAIN PROGRESS MADE TOWARD CONSOLIDATION EAST GERMAN REGIME, SOVS/GDR WOULD BE LIKELY TO RETURN TO POLITICAL ATTACK ON BERLIN IN ORDER PRESS TOWARD CONTINUING GOAL TO SEEK WITHDRAWAL ALLIED FORCES FROM BERLIN. SO LONG AS WEST BERLIN REMAINS FREE, LARGER SOVIET DESIGNS FOR GERMANY AND EUROPE MUST REMAIN ILLUSORY.

DURING PRESENT PERIOD OF RELAXED INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE

GDR

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GDR CAN BE EXPECTED CONTINUE PREPARE WAY FOR FUTURE MOVES TO (1) CHANGE STATUS OF WEST BERLIN; (2) CURTAIL BERLINS POLITICAL ROLE; (3) ENCROACH UPON ALLIED RIGHTS IN THE CITY. THIS PROGRAM IS ALREADY UNDER WAY AS INDICATED BY PASSAGE OF NUMEROUS LAWS, ORDINANCES, ETC., SUCH AS AIR RADIO LAW, CUSTOMS LAW, VISA AND HEALTH REQUIREMENTS; ALTHOUGH ENFORCEMENT THESE LAWS BEING HELD IN SUSPENSE.

FOREGOING ANALYSIS DOES NOT MEAN WE BELIEVE ALLIES SHOULD BE RELUCTANT TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF SOME "COMPROMISE SOLUTION" IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS. HOWEVER, ATTRACTIVENESS OF "COMPROMISE SOLUTION" SHOULD NOT BLIND US TO BASIC SOVIET AIMS ON BERLIN AND TO FACT SOVS WILL ADHERE TO ARRANGEMENTS ONLY SO LONG AS SUITS THEIR PURPOSE. IN THIS RESPECT SOVS WILL BE EAGER EXPLOIT ANY EVIDENCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND BONN, WITH AIM OF PERSUADING GERMANS US IS NOT LOOKING OUT FOR THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THAT WESTERN ALLIANCE IS WORTHLESS OF THEM, ALONG LINES DECEMBER 27 MEMO TO KROLL. IN OUR VIEW EFFORT DISASSOCIATE FEDREP FROM WESTERN ALLIANCE IS A MAJOR SOVIET OBJECTIVE. IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WE SHOULD VIEW SOV MOVES TO SECURE RECOGNITION OF GDR AND RECOGNITION OF THIRD GERMANY STATUS FOR WEST BERLIN.

CURRENT EAST GERMAN SITUATION AND PROSPECTS, AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY ON GERMANY AND BERLIN, ARE DISCUSSED AT LENGTH IN EAS ANALYTICAL DESPATCH BEING POUCHED.

LIGHTNER

WGM

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FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2557, APRIL 26, 11 AM

2BF42/1

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2557, INFORMATION BERLIN 845, LONDON 6ØØ, PARIS TOPOL 164, MOSCOW 423, USAREUR 496.

USAREUR FOR POLAD

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PARIS FOR USRO STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

DEPTEL 2863

EMBASSY AGREES WITH POSITION REFTEL THAT BUNDESTAG MEETING IN BERLIN WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE AT THIS TIME. AS DEPT AWARE, HOWEVER, SENTIMENT FOR SUCH MEETING IS FAIRLY CONSTANT AND WIDESPREAD THROUGH ALL THREE POLITICAL PARTIES.

IT HAS BEEN HELD IN CHECK LARGELY BY FEDGOV'S NEGATIVE ATTITUDE AND BY REALIZATION THAT MEETING WOULD LEAD TO COMPLICATIONS WITH ALLIES PARTICULARLY UK AND FRANCE. BALANCE WE ESTIMATE HAS BECOME SOMEWHAT MORE PRECARIOUS BY GROWTH OF FRUSTRATIONS AMONG SOME CDU (GUTTENBERG) AND SPD (MOMMER) ELEMENTS.

BUNDESTAG PRESIDENT GERSTENMAIER AND BUNDESRAT PRESIDENT MEYERS ISSUED STATEMENTS JUNE 9, 1961, (EMB'S G-1382 JUNE 13, 1961) REAFFIRMING RIGHT OF TWO FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE BODIES TO MEET IN BERLIN. MOREOVER, THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN BUNDESTAG AMONG ALL PARTIES FOR VIEW THAT BUNDESTAG SHOULD NOT LONG POSTPONE SUCH A MEETING LEST FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES IT GIVE UP RIGHT TO MEET IN BERLIN THROUGH FAILURE TO EXERCISE THIS RIGHT. HERETOFORE, GERSTENMAIER HAS SHOWN HIMSELF RESPONSIVE TO GOV

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-2- 2557, APRIL 26, 11 AM FROM BONN - CORRECTED PAGE 2

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WISHES FOR RESTRAINT, BUT THERE EVIDENTLY IS BELIEF IN PARLIAMENTARY CIRCLES THAT HE COULD BE MOVED TO CALL A BERLIN MEETING IF PRESSURE IS STRONG ENOUGH. WE MAY THEREFORE HAVE SHORT PERIOD OF GRACE SINCE NEXT SCHEDULED BUNDESTAG MEETING IS DURING WEEK OF MAY 6 AND ISSUE MIGHT BE PRESSED SOON THEREAFTER.

ALTHOUGH POSSIBILITY SUCH MEETING THUS APPEARS SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS TO WARRANT CONSULTATION ON HOW TO PREVENT IT, A MOVE ALONG LINES REFTEL WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND BRING SOME PUBLIC UPROAR. FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE WAY IN WHICH THREE EMBASSIES CAN REALLY INSURE THAT NO DECISION TO HOLD SESSION IS MADE WITHOUT REFERENCE TO OUR POSITION EXCEPT BY NOTIFYING FEDGOV OF THAT POSITION. AS SOON AS WE DO THIS, THE POSITION IS BOUND TO BECOME PUBLIC AND ACTION WILL INEVITABLY BE PRESENTED AS US PRESSURE ON FEDGOV TO FOREGO THROUGH DISUSE SOME OF ITS RIGHTS IN BERLIN. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WE WOULD PREFER TO KEEP US AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OUT OF FIRST LINE OF FIRE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW MINISTER-PRETATIONS US MOTIVES WHICH WERE WIDELY BRUITED ABOUT THROUGH FRG DURING RECENT "LEAK" EPISODE. WE WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY ATTACKED EVEN IF WE AFFILIATE OURSELVES WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH OBJECTIONS, BUT IF WE INITIATE MATTER TOO OPENLY, US IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WILL BEAR THE ENTIRE BRUNT OF CRITICISM. WE HAVE INQUIRED OF BRITISH AND FRENCH EMBS IF THEY HAVE ANY INFORMATION SUGGESTING THAT AN EFFORT IS IMMINENT AMONG THE POLITICAL PARTIES TO BRING ABOUT BUNDESTAG MEETING IN BERLIN. BOTH PROFESSED TO HAVE NO SUCH INFORMATION BUT ARE LOOKING INTO MATTER. BOTH INDICATED THEIR BELIEF THAT THEIR GOVTS WOULD SEEK TO DISCOURAGE SUCH MEETING.

IN VIEW ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS IT WOULD SEEM PREFERABLE TO EMBASSY IF WE TRY USE TO OUR ADVANTAGE TRADITIONAL UK/FRENCH POSITION OF OPPOSING SUCH MEETING IN CONTRAST TO OUR LONG-STANDING POLICY OF NONINTERFERENCE. OUR FREEDOM TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD DEPEND ON OUR NOT HAVING INFORMED FRENCH OR BRITISH TO DATE OF OUR NEW POSITION, EITHER IN WASHINGTON, PARIS OR LONDON. IF THEY HAVE BEEN INFORMED, WE SHOULD LIKE TO BE ADVISED. IF THEY HAVE NOT, WE BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE IF THIS ISSUE COMES

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UNLESS IT APPEARS LIKELY EVENTS ARE MOVING RAPIDLY TOWARD HOLDING SUCH MEETING. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF NECESSARY AND AT HIGH LEVEL IF REQUIRED, WE COULD TELL GERMANS IN BOTH BONN OR BERLIN THAT WE DO NOT ENCOURAGE A BUNDESTAG MEETING IN BERLIN. WHEN WE DO THIS, IF WE ARE OBLIGED TO DO SO, WE SHALL OF COURSE HAVE TO EXPECT CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM FROM POLITICAL CIRCLES FOR THE US ATTITUDE ON TIES BETWEEN FEDREP AND BERLIN IS CONSIDERED CRITICAL BY THE GERMANS AND HAS ALSO BEEN SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CRITICISM.

DOWLING

RJT

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REF BONN TEL 2557 DEPT, 845 BERLIN

I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I DO NOT SHARE THE WIDELY HELD APPREHENSIONS CONCERNING A BUNDESTAG MEETING IN BERLIN. IT IS EXACTLY THE WAY AND THE TIME TO TEST SOVIET REDUCTION IN PRESSURES. SINCE IT HAS BEEN DONE IN THE PAST, IT IS NOT A NEW DEVELOPMENT WHICH SHOULD AFFECT PRESENT SITUATION. IN ANY CASE, WE ARE NOT GOING TO WIN THE BERLIN DECISION WITH PLEASANT SMILES WHILE BACKING AWAY FROM DOING ANYTHING THAT MIGHT DISPLEASE THE RUSSIANS. I DOUBT IF MEETING MATERIALIZES, BUT I AM SURE BONN WOULD LIKE US TO BE RESPONSIBLE FACT THAT IT IS NOT TAKING PLACE.

HULICK

RJT

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Approved in S
5/15/62

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
TWENTY-EIGHTH MINISTERIAL MEETING
OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Athens, Greece, May 4-6, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF JOINT MEETING

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Date: May 3, 1962
Time: 8:30 P.M.
Place: Residence

Participants:

United States	United Kingdom
The Secretary of State	Foreign Secretary Home
Mr. Kohler	Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
Ambassador Labouisse	Mr. Bernard Ledwidge
Mr. Gilchrist	Mr. Ian Samuel
France	**Germany**
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville	Foreign Minister Schroeder
Mr. Lucet	Mr. Carstens
Mr. Gillet	Mr. von Hase
Mr. Froment-Meurice	Mr. Reinkemeyer

Subject: Berlin

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In an introductory statement the Secretary gave his personal impressions of his three meetings with Dobrynin and the preceding Geneva talks. He said that no progress had been made on points of substantial interest to the West. While broader questions, such as nuclear nondiffusion, nonaggression and joint commissions, were mentioned from time to time, they were not pursued by either side. It is possible tentatively to conclude that, while the Soviets are not withdrawing their Berlin proposals, they recognize that our opposing views are clear and direct and nevertheless want no crisis or

break-off

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break-off of talks. We have throughout stressed that our presence in Berlin is not negotiable, and the Soviets recognize that this is a major issue. The Secretary said that the Soviets have given no indication that they are prepared to acknowledge our vital interests in the situation. The talks, therefore, has not gotten anywhere. This was apparently of no concern to the Soviets. It is interesting to note, the Secretary continued, that the earlier meetings in Geneva were arranged on US initiative. The last four meetings (three at the experts' level and one between the Secretary and Gromyko) were arranged at Soviet initiative. In his remarks to the press after the last meeting, after it had been noted that matters of mutual concern had been discussed, Gromyko added "and these talks will continue".

The Secretary referred to the fact that Home and he had talked sharply to Gromyko at Geneva regarding harassments in the air corridors, and noted that shortly after the Foreign Ministers left Geneva they had ceased.

After the Secretary had said he was inclined to think that the Soviets were looking for a way to let the matter drift but nevertheless had an important commitment on signing of the peace treaty, Home referred to the views of the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Mates, who was recently in London, that Khrushchev could not agree to a Berlin settlement without a spectacular success. He knew he could not get this. Therefore, the tactic to follow was to keep the ball in play but not to press too hard, since the latter would only be embarrassing to Khrushchev. Perhaps this was sound advice, Home commented. Couve said he agreed. Yet we did not want to lose contact, Home added.

The Secretary said he wanted it to be understood that we have had no Soviet formal proposals with specific language on the so-called "broader issues". Discussion of these subjects has been minimal compared to the time spent on West Berlin and access thereto. The Soviets still maintain we must get out of West Berlin and, therefore, it is not possible to say that a basis for negotiations exists. Both sides have been reiterating their well-known positions.

In response to Home's query as to whether others thought the Soviets could be induced to drop their threat to sign a separate peace treaty, Couve commented that they could not drop it but could further postpone it. If they had postponed it for four years, they could postpone it for another four years. State Secretary Carstens added that he believed the threat of peace was more valuable to the Soviets than the signature of a peace treaty.

The Secretary observed that perhaps Khrushchev thought the West Berlin situation would in any event deteriorate during the interim. Schroeder said that the Soviets might think that this deterioration could take place if they waited but that they were also aware that the West could take action to prevent this. Hence they could not count on it. He thought the

Soviets

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- 3 -

Soviets were moving towards some sort of modus vivendi which would enable them to return to broader questions. But he did not believe they could postpone their peace treaty indefinitely. Since they knew that a separate peace treaty with the Federal Republic was out of the question, they wanted to achieve the effects of such a treaty relative to nuclear weapons, boundaries, etc., without actually having it. They likewise knew that they could at best achieve only partially their Berlin goal of a free city. Hence their present tactic was to talk in terms of an eventual modus vivendi, hoping that present Western positions could be watered down.

The Secretary commented that he was not sure the Soviets expected very much in the direction of East German recognition. He recalled that, when Ambassador Thompson said to Gromyko that we were not going to concede either de jure or de facto recognition to the GDR, Gromyko said that we had already recognized the GDR. If all he has in mind is that we should accept existence of the GDR, this would not be without significance. In various talks the Soviets have not pressed for recognition of the GDR but have emphasized "respect for the sovereignty of GDR" in the access field . We might use the formula, as Thompson had following instructions, that we have no intention of interfering with the existence of the GDR and we are not prepared to admit that the GDR should interfere with Berlin access. At Geneva Gromyko came close to saying that prior acceptance by the East Germans of access arrangements would take care of "respect for GDR sovereignty", but this is still admittedly not clear.

Schroeder said he thought that the appeal of the International Access Authority to the Soviets arose out of the fact that their position was that the city should be internationally controlled. Hence they linked it to their free city concept. He reiterated that he believed the Soviets had in mind an eventual modus vivendi which would constitute an acceptable compromise for them. Schroeder added he wanted it understood that the Soviet position was based not on present Western ideas as put forward by US spokesman but on what the Soviets might speculate the eventual Western position would be.

In response to Home's query as to how we saw the next few weeks developing, and whether we felt it necessary to put a further paper to Dobrynin, the Secretary said we were relatively relaxed as to timing. When he returned to Washington we might wait a few days to see if Dobrynin took the initiative. We are in no hurry but want to protect ourselves against any charge of procrastination. In his last talk with Dobrynin he had gotten the impression that the Soviets were getting more rather than less interested in the idea of a modus vivendi. Dobrynin had showed interest in our analysis of Soviet-US exchanges as taking place on three levels. The Secretary then outlined for the Ministers the rationale of our approach, stressing that the "principles paper" was intended to handle the fact of

disagreement,

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disagreement, but was not, therefore, an attempt to state points of disagreement but rather points of agreement. In response to Schroeder's and Home's questions, the Secretary said we were inclined to put in a redraft of the "principles paper", taking account of the comments of our colleagues, in order to test Soviet reactions, but this was something we wanted to discuss with the other three.

The Secretary noted that an important objective of the paper was to provide a continuing forum for discussion of outstanding problems. This raised the possibility of an Austrian-type negotiation going on for years which would not require formal withdrawal of unacceptable Soviet proposals but at the same time would not require them to do anything about them. One possibility, the Secretary said, was that the Soviets have decided that they are in a relatively weak military situation, especially in the nuclear field, and are aware that we have discovered this. They may have embarked on a crash nuclear and missile rearmament program and may want a deliberate postponement on Berlin pending improvement of their military position. Schroeder commented that the idea of an indefinite Four-Power forum is not a bad one for the Germans but they wondered about the jurisdictional problem. Such a forum was appropriate for discussion of German and Berlin questions but not so appropriate for discussion of broader questions such as nuclear nondiffusion and non-aggression pacts. However, he felt a solution to this jurisdictional problem could be found once the Four Power forum was in existence. The Secretary said we were aware of the danger of unsecuring the Berlin problem with other issues and we did not wish to establish the idea that our presence in West Berlin was contingent upon these other questions. At some stage it might be desirable that the subject of nuclear nondiffusion be taken up in the disarmament context, but for the moment we thought its inclusion in Berlin talks might be useful. Home commented he did not think we could keep the discussion of this subject out of the disarmament context much longer. The Secretary agreed, noting we have held back its discussion in the 18-Power context because we thought it might be useful in the Berlin context. Gromyko had said that the Soviets wanted the nondiffusion commitment applied specifically to Germany. For our part we were, of course, not interested in Germany but in Red China, and therefore wanted a more general formulation. Schroeder noted that perhaps one reason Gromyko had put so much stress on nondiffusion in his talks with the Secretary was that the Soviets believed the Geneva forum, with neutrals present, was a more favorable one. If they obtained a Berlin solution they could always tie the Geneva and Berlin settlements together, viewing the former as an "ersatz" for the peace treaty.

Home asked how the Secretary thought "living with disagreement" could work out. Couve said we had been doing this for seventeen years. The Secretary commented that "living with disagreement" necessarily involved

some procedural

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some procedural understanding. With this in mind, we have attempted to provide some formal instrument of consultation such as the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies. It also involved some limitation on any peace treaty the Soviets might sign with the East Germans. If they should attempt to carry out the threatened implications of such a treaty, as we have warned them constantly, this would lead to a serious crisis.

In response to Couve's question as to whether we did not believe the Soviets drew some satisfaction from direct Soviet-US discussions, the Secretary said he must confess that there is something to this. The Soviets are snobs and apparently see some social advantage in bilateral talks. Although we constantly say we must consult our Allies, they enjoy the idea that only the US and the Soviets really count. Some commented that this was the kind of snobbery we should encourage. The Secretary noted Soviet inconsistency in taking pleasure out of bilateral talks with us while at the same time, they charge us with being a "running dog of Dr. Adenauer". We have taken some pains to show we are not acting as an agent but in defense of our vital interests in this matter. Couve observed that, if the Soviets did not take this fact seriously, they would have done something long ago.

Some said he would have hoped the Secretary could present the latest edition of the "principles paper" at his second further meeting with Dobrynin if not at the next meeting. He thought the Soviets did want a modus vivendi and could see nothing harmful in the paper. The Secretary commented that that depended on the Four Powers represented here. If it could be agreed that we were not acting contrary to their basic interests, we could see some advantage to putting in a paper slightly modified from the Geneva version in order to keep the talks alive. Otherwise the Soviets would want to discuss their two papers. A new paper might also be one way to discover at what pace the Soviets wish to proceed. If we could give them a paper after a break of some three weeks in the discussions, we could see how they reacted. If they were in no hurry, they would study the paper for a while. The Secretary noted that, during his discussions with Dobrynin, the latter seemed to have no new instructions of any consequence but merely repeated what had been said at Geneva. Speaking personally, Couve remarked, he thought the idea of giving the Soviets a new paper was not a useful since we have received no real reaction to the first paper. This was purely a professional comment, he added, from a technical or tactical point of view. The Secretary observed there had been some discussion of our paper at Geneva, but Soviet objections had not really been fundamental. They had seized on such minor points as to why the section was headed "Berlin" rather than "West Berlin". Mr. Kohler noted that the section discussed in most detail was that dealing with the all-German question. The Soviets had opposed everything in it.

The Secretary

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The Secretary observed that, in their last discussion Dobrynin had called attention to Khrushchev's interview with Cowles as of special interest. In response to Couve's query, the Secretary said that neither Gromyko nor Dobrynin had talked about a summit. Apparently the Soviet views were coming closer to ours on this, that is, a summit would be justified only if progress were made or to avert the danger of war. Turning to Schroeder, the Secretary said we would appreciate it if we could get an agreed revised paper so that he could have it in his pocket to pull out when talking to Dobrynin if this proved desirable. Schroeder responded that the Germans were still working on suggested changes but in general would not be too happy about putting a revised paper forward in the absence of a more positive Soviet position, since it might otherwise merely provide a basis for additional Soviet demands. However, he could understand that such a paper might have advantages from the propaganda viewpoint, showing that the West has a full concept of a possible modus vivendi. These two considerations had to be weighed against each other. Hence the Germans were working on revisions, but did think we should wait a little longer before putting the paper forward. If the revised paper were acceptable to all concerned, then the Secretary could quietly have it available for use if desirable. Mr. Schroeder indicated that this seemed sensible to him. The Secretary observed that if the paper which we had put forward at Geneva were to be discussed in the direction of clarifying certain points which might come up, there would not be much difference between having an oral or written clarification from us. In any event, we would have to try to get together on substance so that we would know what to say if questions arose.

Schroeder observed that one problem in having a second paper was that people would compare it unfavorably with the first, particularly with respect to the all-German question. Since it was known that the paper at Geneva had not been shown to the Germans in advance of presentation to the Soviets, critics would ask how the German Government could have permitted a deterioration in a paper relative to which it was known it had been consulted in advance.

After some discussion of the relation of the Geneva disarmament talks to "broader questions" such as nuclear nondiffusion, Caruthers asked whether we believed the Soviets had any interest in giving nuclear weapons to Red China. The Secretary said we doubted that they were giving them to the Chinese, who had made little progress in the nuclear field in recent years. He added that he could not imagine that we would be willing to sign any provisions on this subject from which we would not be released if other nonsignatory countries took action in a contrary direction. This was also the case with our nuclear test proposals. We have had Red China very much in mind, of course in this connection. Couve asked whether

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only the nuclear powers would sign a nondiffusion agreement if the matter were handled in the Geneva framework. The Secretary said we would expect the other countries to commit themselves not to try to obtain nuclear weapons. If this were refused, we would have to take this into account in deciding whether to ratify such an agreement. Couve queried whether we would sign a treaty to which Red China was not a party. The Secretary responded that we would have to think very hard about it. He referred to the dissolving clause in the nuclear test treaty if others tested. Some commented that there would be no ratification if not enough signed it.

Home asked whether there were any objections to a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression arrangement. The Secretary said our thought in this connection was modest. Every year we say that NATO is a defensive alliance, and has no aggressive intentions against anyone. We have not yet discussed specific wording with the Soviets. Home said there might be two declarations. Couve commented that, in view of the Secretary's remarks, he wondered why there should be any pact between the two organizations at all. Home observed that it was obviously a facade, and the Secretary said he could assure the Ministers we were sophisticated enough not to take this as highly significant. Schroeder said the idea was originally a Soviet one, and his thought was that we could take their idea and use it to some advantage. The Secretary agreed that our attitude was that, under certain circumstances, there might be no objections to it, but we hoped no arms reductions would take place as a result of it. Schroeder noted that its opponents claimed that this is what would happen. Couve said that the difficulty was to know precisely what the Soviets wanted. The idea itself seemed quite harmless. Home observed that one objection was that it might lead to greater recognition of the GDR, but this could be avoided by parallel declarations. The Secretary observed that, to put it frankly, the Soviets after two world wars were concerned about a strong Germany. They probably believe that in time Germany will dominate NATO and will follow a revanchist policy. This was the way it seemed from their point of view. Schroeder said that for years he had been picking up Soviet suggestions if they were not harmful on the principle of do ut des (I give that you may give). The nonaggression idea was not dangerous if unilateral declarations were used. The Secretary observed that the latter might even be handled by an exchange of letters between the Secretaries General of the organizations or their equivalents.

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Home raised the question of a declaration not to alter frontiers by force. The Secretary observed that this went some distance down the line.

He saw

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He saw no great substantive problem since no one intended to change anything by force, but there was also no need for this if we could not get satisfaction on Berlin. Schroeder said it was necessary to be careful that the revised paper did not contain language that seemed too much like peace treaty language on this subject. After some discussion of the distinction between altering boundaries by force and the fixing of boundaries for all time, as well as of possible nomenclature to distinguish various kinds of lines, the Germans indicated they hoped they could find some language which would meet their difficulties and would get this forward shortly.

Rusk then referred to the point of substance involved in relations between East and West Germany and wondered how far this should be carried. Schroeder explained the rationale underlying the original German concept of three technical commissions to deal with economic matters, freedom of movement and an electoral law. The point of freedom of movement had apparently been misunderstood since the Germans were thinking not only of freedom of access to West Berlin but also of movement between West and East Germany. He stressed that there should be no illusions that such commissions, on which the GDR representatives would be died-in-the-wool Communists, could really lead to any relaxation between East and West Germany. His Government would, however, go along with these commissions, although it did not believe they would change the situation. The question of an inner Berlin commission, as proposed in the revised US paper, was now being discussed with the Berliners. This might be useful at the technical level if the Soviets were politically prepared to permit an improvement of the situation in Berlin. The Secretary noted that Mayor Brandt was much interested in this.

The Ministers then turned to the handling of the Berlin question in the NATO Ministerial Session of May 4. It was agreed that the Secretary would not attempt to report for the Four but merely on his own behalf, and that each of the other Ministers would feel free to make his own comments if he felt it desirable to do so. All likewise agreed that every effort should be made to avoid a lengthy wrangle over Berlin section of the communique similar to that which occurred in Paris during the December Ministerial meeting.

MJTHillenbrand:all
5/5/62

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EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT FROM ACTING SECRETARY

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

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plus mat

There are several straws in wind not yet conclusive that French position may be softening slightly towards US efforts to ascertain whether basis for negotiations on Berlin exists. Apart from Couve's relatively relaxed performance at Four Power meeting last night, French have indicated both to Germans and British that, while concerned about drift into negotiations which seemed to be taking place in US-Soviet talks, if Germans felt that something was evolving which would be in German interest, they would withdraw their objections

Last evening Couve told me privately that Pompidou was much more man of world than his predecessor Debre [redacted] application was that some improvement might be expected in French attitude and willingness to participate in allied consultation.

RUSK

Cleared with: Roy M. Fowler
Drafted by: [illegible]
5/4/62

Approved: Rusk

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NSF84 Anthony of Bromley Smith

337

CAP 5736-62

1962 MAY 4 SECRET 18 55 May 4, 1962

TO PALM BEACH FOR DELIVERY SATURDAY A.M. 2BF46

FOR GENERAL McHUGH FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM MR. BUNDY

Bohlen reports that there was only one Pravda editorial and that after reviewing Thompson's opinion, he shares it. The combined soft and hard noises out of Moscow seem to him to be a standard Soviet tactic. His assessment is that they want talks to continue but are not yet prepared to give way publicly on the central point of Western troop presence. This coincides with the last Rusk-Dobrynin meeting.

Bohlen and I have agreed that we should indicate a cool attitude toward the Malinovsky speech, since it calls into question your own attitudes toward peace and war, and he is doing this Friday afternoon informally to Dobrynin during the Titov reception at the Soviet Embassy

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FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2648, MAY 7, 6 P.M.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2648, INFORMATION MOSCOW 427, LONDON 689, PARIS 793, BERLIN 857, USAREUR 512

762B.00 May Day 5-462

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

PARIS 5181 TO DEPT, BERLIN'S 2812 TO DEPT

XR-74.2312 XR-8142 XR 7620221

WE AGREE WITH BERLIN THAT SOVIETS HAVE COMMITED SERIOUS LAPSE IN THIS EPISODE WHICH SHOULD BE BROUGHT HOME TO THEIR DISCOMFORT. IN EFFECT THEY ELEVATED LEVEL OF MILITARY DISPLAYS IN BERLIN TO TEST OF OVERALL GOOD INTENTIONS, AND AFTER CREATING ARTIFICIAL ISSUE, AND RECEIVING US ASSURANCES, THEY THEN PERMITTED EAST GERMANS TO DISPLAY MISSILE STRENGTH. SINCE SOVIETS DISPLAY CONSIDERABLE SENSITIVITY TO CHARGES OF BREACH OF THEIR "WORD", US SHOULD UNMISTAKABLY INFORM THEM THAT WE INTERPRETED EXCHANGE ON THIS SUBJECT AS MUTUAL COMMITMENT WHICH THEY DID NOT HONOR, AND THAT THIS VIOLATION WAS UNWORTHY EXPLOITATION OF SITUATION.

WITH REFERENCE TO RECOMMENDATIONS IN BOTH REFTELS CONCERNING CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION, WE BELIEVE THAT MESSAGE MIGHT BETTER BE PASSED BY US POLAD TO SOVIET POLAD OR BY GENERAL WATSON TO SOVIET COMMANDANT IF ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT SOON FOR THEM TO MEET AGAIN. SINCE CONTENT OF PROPOSED MESSAGE RELATES TO BERLIN AND IS BASICALLY OF POLITICAL NATURE, THIS MEANS OF CONTACT SEEMS MORE APPROPRIATE TO US. CONTACT BETWEEN VONPAVEL AND YAKUBOVSKY SHOULD TO EXTENT POSSIBLE BE RESERVED FOR MATTERS OF MILITARY CONCERN OR THOSE CONNECTED WITH OPERATIONS OF OUR MILITARY MISSIONS AND SHOULD NORMALLY BE THROUGH SERB. IF ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS CANNOT BE WORKED OUT IN SUFFICIENT TIME, VON PAVEL SHOULD COMMUNICATE MESSAGE TO SERB.

(4)

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FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2666, MAY 8, 8 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2666, INFORMATION BERLIN 860, LONDON 692, MOSCOW 429, PARIS 795.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO AND STOESSEL.

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REFERENCE: BERLIN'S 2030 TO DEPARTMENT.

I HAD BRENTANO TO DINNER LAST NIGHT, AND THEN HAD FOLLOW-UP CONVERSATION THIS MORNING ON RESULTS HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON. HE COULD NOT BE IN BETTER SPIRITS, WITH HIS FEATHERS CALMED DOWN, AND MUCH MORE REASSURANCE AND SELF-ASSURANCE THAN WHEN HE DEPARTED. HE IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR THE CONSIDERATION AND FRIENDLINESS SHOWN HIM, DWELLING AT LENGTH ON HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARIES BALL, KOHLER, AND TYLER, AND HIS CORDIAL VISITS WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, PARTICULARLY SENATORS FULBRIGHT, MANSFIELD, SCOTT, DODD, AND REPRESENTATIVE CARL ALBERT. BRENTANO SAID THAT HE FELT MAIN VALUE OF AN OLD FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE WAS THAT THE PARTNERS CAN SPEAK OPENLY WITH EACH OTHER AND THIS HE HAD DONE, AND THE OTHERS HAD DONE WITH HIM.

HE SAID HE HAD COME AWAY FROM THE WHITE HOUSE WITH DEEP IMPRESSION OF PRESIDENT'S SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO HIS OWN PEOPLE AND TO THE ALLIANCE, INCLUDING GERMANY. HE SAID THAT NATURALLY ONE LOOKS AT CERTAIN THINGS A LITTLE DIFFERENTLY IN GERMANY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE IN WASHINGTON, BUT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF HIS CONFIDENCE IN AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE PRESENT DEALINGS WITH SOVIETS. HE AGREED, AS PRESIDENT HAD INTIMATED, THAT IF ONE WERE PREPARED

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-2- 2666, MAY 8, 8 PM FROM BONN

TO TAKE ULTIMATE RISKS, ONE HAD, IN A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY, TO LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD WILL AND EFFORT IN FORESTALLING ULTIMATE RISKS. BRENTANO SAID HE WAS ENTIRELY IN AGREEMENT THAT CONCESSIONS WOULD NEED TO BE MADE IN SUCH DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVORS. GERMAN HOPE WAS ONLY THAT SOMETHING COMMENSURATE WOULD BE OBTAINED FOR THESE CONCESSIONS. HE SAID THAT IT HAD GIVEN HIM MUCH PLEASURE TO BE ABLE TO CITE THE WORDS OF A "DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN POLITICAL LEADER" FOR THE WAY HE, BRENTANO, ALSO REGARDED SOV NEGOTIATING TACTICS ("WHAT IS MINE IS MINE, AND WHAT IS YOURS WE CAN NEGOTIATE ABOUT"), AND THE PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED THAT IT WAS AWKWARD TO HAVE ONE'S OWN FORMULATION CITED AGAINST ONE.

BRENTANO SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED TO THE CHANCELLOR ON SUNDAY AND LATTER HAD SEEMED PARTICULARLY PLEASED AND REASSURED AS A RESULT OF WHAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD. HE HAD ALSO REPORTED TO PARLIAMENTARY FRACTION OF HIS PARTY, AND HE THOUGHT THAT HERE, TOO, THERE WAS NO SERIOUS QUESTION OF THEIR NOT BEING FULLY BEHIND US (THIS REMAINS TO BE SEEN). HE SAID HE FELT THAT CHANCELLOR AND HE COULD KEEP MATTERS UNDER CONTROL, AND THAT THERE WAS MUCH BETTER UNDERSTANDING THAN COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO. HE SAID HE WAS ALSO GRATEFUL THAT PRESIDENT WAS KIND ENOUGH TO RECEIVE FRITZ ERLER, WHOM HE REGARDED AS VERY SOUND MAN IN THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. IN QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE IN SUBSTANCE BETWEEN HE AND ERLER'S VIEWS. BRENTANO ALSO MENTIONED THAT GENERAL FEELING IN GOVERNMENT WAS THAT ATHENS CONFERENCE HAD BEEN MOST SUCCESSFUL.

DOWLING

GDW

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(340)

American Embassy
Bonn, Germany
May 9, 1962

1/Cy Salinger to Pres

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PIERRE SALINGER

The following is a summary of my conversation this afternoon with German Foreign Minister Schroeder. I went to see Schroeder at his invitation. The invitation came after the two Adenauer press conferences, and after an exchange of pleasantries the Foreign Minister launched into a survey of FRG position obviously aimed at allaying any fears caused by the Adenauer interviews. He made four points:

(1) As he told Secretary Rusk in Athens and as had been the German position for some time, the FRG Government believes the talks between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the Berlin question should continue.

(2) The FRG Government does not have any basic objection to the concept of international authority over the autobahn. It does object, and has stated so previously, to the idea of the thirteen-man group. It was to this latter proposal that Dr. Adenauer was addressing himself in Berlin.

(3) The German Government feels that there is no basis for any negotiation in the Soviet positions taken in the talks up to now. In this it shares the views of Secretary Rusk, most recently expressed in Canberra, Australia yesterday. It would like to see a reasonable basis for negotiation and settlement of the Berlin problem emerge from the talks but it is not very hopeful that this will take place.

(4) The FRG Government does not view the problem of East Germany as a national problem; rather, it views it as a human problem. It earnestly hopes that the conditions of the people in East Germany will improve and to that end the Foreign Minister asked Secretary Rusk in Athens to make representation of this kind to the Soviets in his next talk with Ambassador Dobrynen. Minister Schroeder said he felt that improvement in the plight of the people of East Germany would facilitate a settlement.

I told Minister Schroeder that I had not had an opportunity to read the transcript of Dr. Adenauer's two interviews, but that the reports of these interviews as carried in the American press had caused much concern in Washington.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Assistant Secretary

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May 16, 1962

To: The Secretary
The Under Secretary

Through: S/S

From: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

Subject: Visits to Bonn

I talked with Ambassador Dowling this morning on the subject of visits. I told him of the possibility of a visit by Under Secretary Ball on Wednesday next, May 23, arriving from Rome probably on Tuesday evening and returning to the US Wednesday afternoon. Red said that he would look into the availability of the Chancellor and others and let us have a telegram as soon as possible. He welcomed such a visit as an interim step but was emphatic that it would not take the place of a visit by the Secretary.

On this latter question I told him of the Secretary's Congressional preoccupations but assured him that the Secretary still had in mind to visit Bonn as soon as this could be arranged. I told him, however, that this would probably not be before the latter part of June. Red expressed some disappointment that it could not be sooner but indicated that if plans could be firmed up in due course, this timing could be managed.

I told Red that we thought his suggestion of another visit by the Chancellor was a bit too transparent, as well, perhaps, too much on the order of a one-way street. It seemed to us that the problem was to get some flow going the other way toward Bonn. He accepted this rationale.

I also spoke with Red about the suggestions he has been making for a visit by McGeorge Bundy and explained the reasons why this did not seem to us to be a good idea.

Finally

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Finally, I referred to the efforts we are making with Ambassador Grewe, particularly the President's private talk with him yesterday and the talk the Secretary will have with him today. He was pleased about this and said he would try to see Grewe promptly after the latter's return to Bonn and would let us know what he said.

cc - Mr. McGeorge Bundy

EUR:FDKohler:mt

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

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PARIS ALSO FOR USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

USAREUR FOR POLAD

WATSON-SOLOVYEV MEETING TOOK PLACE AS SCHEDULED MAY 17 1430 HOURS IN POTSDAM, IN PART AT HEADQUARTERS, SOVIET COMMANDANT POTSDAM, IN PART USMLM HOUSE. ACTUAL CONFERENCE TIME WAS ALMOST THREE HOURS. SOLOVYEV ACCOMPANIED BY ALEKSEEV, THREE OTHER AIDES AND INTERPRETER. WATSON ACCOMPANIED BY HULICK, FOOTE, MEEHAN, AND INTERPRETER. ATMOSPHERE OF CONFERENCE WAS BUSINESS-LIKE AND CORRECT, SOCIAL EXCHANGES WERE RELAXED.

SOVIET POSITION FROM START TO FINISH AMOUNTED SIMPLY TO PROPOSAL THAT COMMANDANTS LIFT BANS. SOLOVYEV EXPLAINED THAT AFTER LIFTING OF BANS, CIVILIAN ADVISERS ACCOMPANYING US COMMANDANT ON VISITS TO KARLSHORST WOULD HAVE TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES TO EAST GERMANS AT SECTOR CROSSING POINT. SOVIETS THUS, IN EFFECT, INSISTED THAT WE ACCEPT NOW SITUATION WHICH WAS ORIGINAL CAUSE OF BANS BEING IMPOSED IN FIRST PLACE.

THERE WAS NO REPEAT NO INDICATION OF ANY GIVE IN SOVIET POSITION. SOLOVYEV REPEATEDLY STRESSED HE NOT COMPETENT TO CHANGE IN ANY WAY LAWS OF "SOVEREIGN GDR". WHEN GENERAL WATSON SUGGESTED SOLOVYEV ENDEAVOR SEEK INSTRUCTIONS ENABLING HIM DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM, SOLOVYEV STATED NO SOVIET OFFICIAL WOULD BE INSTRUCTED DISCUSS CHANGES IN GDR LAWS. POSITION OF TWO SIDES SO FAR APART THAT QUESTION OF FURTHER MEETING DID NOT ARISE.

(3)

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BERLIN PRESS OBSERVED WATSON PARTY CROSSING BRIDGE TO POTSDAM. MISSION ISSUED FOLLOWING PRESS STATEMENT 2015 HOURS IN ANSWER TO QUERIES:

QUOTE

GENERAL ALBERT WATSON, II, US COMMANDANT BERLIN, AND GENERAL A.V. SOLOVYEV, COMMANDANT OF THE GARRISON OF SOVIET FORCES IN BERLIN, MET TODAY BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT AT POTSDAM, FIRST AT SOVIET HEADQUARTERS, AND SUBSEQUENTLY AT THE US MILITARY MISSION. THE CONFERENCES LASTED APPROXIMATELY THREE HOURS. GENERAL WATSON AND GENERAL SOLOVYEV EXCHANGED VIEWS ON VARIOUS QUESTIONS CONCERNING CONTACTS BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND THEIR HEADQUARTERS. NO AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WAS BUSINESSLIKE AND CORRECT. THERE ARE NO PLANS AT THIS TIME FOR FURTHER MEETINGS BETWEEN GEN WATSON AND GEN SOLOVYEV.

UNQTE.

LIGHTNER

GDW

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

:3016

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Research Memorandum
RSB RM -109, 19 May, 1962

To : The Secretary
Through : S/S
From : INR - Roger Hilsman

2BF

Subject : Khrushchev's Conversation With Salinger

In response to a request from Mr. Kohler, the following are our comments on Mr. Salinger's talks with Khrushchev.

1. The chief impression that emerges from Khrushchev's remarks to Salinger is that the Soviets still wish to probe the limits of our flexibility to determine whether a negotiated arrangement on Berlin, advantageous from their standpoint, can be obtained. After a period of muting their threats of unilateral action, Khrushchev -- as the recent Pravda Observer and Izvestiya Polyanov articles already indicated -- appears to feel that a revival of threats is useful in stimulating US willingness to negotiate.

2. Meanwhile, the Soviets themselves have made no significant modification in their position which would make that position more negotiable from our standpoint. Khrushchev's major new suggestion is a variant on the past Soviet proposals on military forces in West Berlin. (The Soviets had previously proposed that Soviet forces join Western units in West Berlin, or that neutral or UN forces replace Western forces in the city). Khrushchev now suggests "probing" the variant that forces from NATO countries other than the US, UK, and France (Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland) be stationed in West Berlin together with Warsaw Pact contingents of Polish and Czech troops for a period of 3-5 years. In addition, though not as a formal proposal, Khrushchev suggested at one point that the West might replace its "field" forces with "police" units. But he did not elaborate on this remark.

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3. He also clarified several other points which have been the topic of much discussion in the East-West exchanges:

(1) There can be no international access authority with Federal Republic participation;

Any international authority is contingent on Western troops departing from West Berlin;

Khrushchev envisages the international authority as an arbitration body to study access disputes between the Allies and the GDR on access (if this formulation was reported correctly, it would appear the Soviets

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the Soviets envisage some Allied role in Berlin after a Berlin settlement is made, or that the Allied powers act as agents for all users of the access routes;

The Soviet still insist any access settlement must give the GDR full control of the access routes ("Why give away what we already have?"). The arbitration body is superimposed on this full control.

4. Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty if no agreement is reached on troop withdrawal is standard -- presented in more or less the same fashion as it was in the June 4, 1961 memorandum. It gains in emphasis only because the Soviets have made relatively little use of such a threat in recent months. (The Soviets may feel safe in returning to a separate peace treaty threat since they have apparently been advising their representatives abroad to say that the US has agreed -- in the Rusk-Gromyko exchanges -- not to raise objections to the signing of a separate treaty).

5. The major item of the entire conversation -- and probably the purpose of Khrushchev's talking to Salinger -- was the proposal on stationing token Warsaw Pact-NATO Pact forces in West Berlin. (Moscow evidently intends, in the context of this proposal, that these forces replace the Allied troops, although the point is not explicitly stated. At the same time, Khrushchev demonstrated he was well aware the US is refusing to negotiate on the matter of its presence in the city).

6. Although Khrushchev clearly used Salinger to try to convey directly to the President a new sense of urgency about Soviet intentions respecting Berlin, we do not believe that Khrushchev's threatening tone indicates a decision to proceed with a separate peace treaty. In our view, Moscow is still engaged in probing our firmness and the decision regarding any drastic Soviet unilateral action remains yet to be made. At the same time, we do not exclude the possibility of new harassments designed to give substance to Khrushchev's verbal threats.

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Primary purpose of your detour to Bonn is to assist in process of restoring our relations with Chancellor to more equable basis so that broader interests we have in Berlin and European situations can be dealt with on their merits without confused static from Bonn. Ambassador Dowling's meeting with Adenauer on May 14 was a good beginning, and you will undoubtedly wish to draw heavily on Ambassador's counsel for estimate of Chancellor's present mood and of points in this message and in previous instructions to Dowling which you should particularly stress. Ambassador can also brief you on items which received Chancellor's comment in revised QUOTE principles paper UNQUOTE and International Access Authority paper. Except to degree you believe this desirable, you will undoubtedly not wish to discuss details of our Berlin position with Chancellor, but you may find it helpful to reiterate some of points made in Our 3100/regarding President's general approach. to Bonn

Should question of possible visit to Bonn by Secretary be raised by Chancellor or by Schroeder (who has been urging this strongly), you should take position that many factors combine to make it difficult for me to visit Bonn before mid-June.

2

5-21-62/1 RDVine:cmw

The Secretary;M/Bill Leonhart;RF/Secretariat; The Secretary

EUR - Mr. Kohler White House - Mr. Bundy S/S - Mr. Naven

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Congress needs more attention that I have been giving it lately and we are entering critical period foreign policy bills and appropriations. Also, if I come to Bonn I would also wish to visit Couve de Murville and that requires some preliminary diplomatic preparation. You should be as responsive as possible on principle but explain difficulty about dates without accepting or rejecting any date at this point. Although indications are that German comments will be forthcoming as soon as Chancellor and Schroeder can get together on substance, important that prospect of my visit not develop into excuse for withholding presentation their further views on Berlin pending my visit. If we interrupt unduly our contacts with Soviets during QUOTE lull UNQUOTE, situation may heat up again and Germans and French will then fret about our talking under pressure.

Believe it would be useful for you to run over with Chancellor main outlines of our nuclear policy since this matter is directly relevant to our political strategy for Europe and press reports of our position have been highly misleading.

Our basic object in nuclear field is same as elsewhere: to follow courses of action which will strengthen US-European partnership.

It would not be consistent with this objective for us to aid national nuclear efforts. Such national efforts would divide alliance politically without strengthening it militarily. Nor for similar reasons would we be willing to assist in creation of nationally manned and owned MRBM forces, whether or not they are QUOTE committed UNQUOTE to NATO.

We are prepared however to support a multilateral MRBM force, if our allies desire since this would be consistent with our objectives, although we do not believe

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there is an urgent military need for MRBM's. We note that Defense Minister Strauss recently opined that US was not serious regarding such a force; this is definitely not case. We are willing to proceed in a framework of genuine multilateral ownership, manning, and control.

FYI: It is important to get to Chancellor directly on this point since Strauss' recent remarks to McNamara suggest that he believes that we are not serious on the multilateral force and may believe that we could be brought around to supporting nationally-manned MRBM forces. If political significance of this issue could be made clear to Chancellor we would expect him to be strongly sympathetic to our position and the German view of that position will be of great importance.

On issue of UK entry into EEC and related problems, comments would be superfluous. Framework of our approach to Chancellor has been one of convincing him that UK entry is only way in which Chancellor can achieve long-term goals he posits for European integration, and you may find it useful to continue this tack. You might note our response to Ambassador Dowling on Schroeder's request that we put our views on this issue in writing in form of either an aide-memoire or letter. We are not sure that this is desirable unless there is a clear-cut advantage to be gained. You might wish to discuss this with Ambassador Dowling since there is possibility that request for a written statement may be repeated to you.

You may also wish to note Ambassador Dowling's discussion of this subject with Erhard (Bonn's 2792). Erhard's recommendation that we stress to Chancellor need to avoid onerous conditions for UK entry goes to heart of Commonwealth and EFTA problems and we have tried to take line with Germans that sparing UK heavy terms should not be done at either expense US exports or at expense of integrated Europe.

END

Rusk RUSK

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TO: Secretary of State

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DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 3165.

UNDER SECRETARY AND I HAD LONG, FRIENDLY TALK WITH CHANCELLOR THIS MORNING. ADENAUER WAS IN RELAXED MOOD, OBVIOUSLY PLEASED WITH UNDER SECRETARY'S VISIT.

BALL OPENED TALK BY EXPLAINING HIS PRESENCE IN EUROPE, SAYING HE HAD COME TO BONN FOR TALK WITH CHANCELLOR AT THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST AND CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S GREETINGS. ADENAUER EXPRESSED APPRECIATION, AND ASKED UNDER SECRETARY TO GIVE HIS BEST WISHES TO THE PRESIDENT UPON HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON. BALL STATED THE PRESIDENT WAS PLEASED THAT RELATIONS HAD BEEN RESTORED TO HARMONIOUS BASIS, AND COMMUNICATION REESTABLISHED SO THAT BROADER INTERESTS CAN BE DEALT WITH AS SHOULD BE BETWEEN TWO SUCH GOOD FRIENDS AS FEDREP AND US. CHANCELLOR REPLIED THAT HE TOO WAS GLAD GOOD RELATIONS HAD BEEN RESTORED, ADDING HE HAD BEEN UPSET, NOT SO MUCH PERSONALLY AS OFFICIALLY, BECAUSE OF IMPORTANCE OF QUESTIONS TO BE DEALT WITH. HE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE REGARDED THIS CHAPTER AS NOW CLOSED.

CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, WITH CHANCELLOR EXPRESSING AGREEMENT WITH US VIEWS ON UK ENTRY AS SET OUT BY BALL. HE REFERRED TO NEW GENERATION IN UK, AND ACCEPTED UNDER SECRETARY'S ASSESSMENT RE SERIOUSNESS OF

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BRITISH DECISION TO JOIN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ALTHOUGH HE SAID THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES STILL TO BE OVERCOME, AND APPEARED TO FEEL PROCESS MIGHT TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME YET. HE REFERRED IN THIS CONNECTION TO FACT UK PRODUCED TWICE AS MUCH COAL AS FEDREP, POINTED OUT COAL WAS ONLY IMPORTANT GERMAN MINERAL RESOURCE, AND IMPLIED FEAR OF UK COAL COMPETITION. HE ALSO SAID TEXTILE INDUSTRY WAS SECOND OR THIRD LARGEST EMPLOYER OF LABOR IN FEDREP, AND ITS SITUATION MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. BALL BROUGHT CONVERSATION BACK TO GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, EXPLAINING US DESIRE FOR PARTNERSHIP WITH EUROPE. RE UK ATTITUDE, BALL COMMENTED ON SYMBOLIC VALUE OF UK SIGNATURE OF ROME TREATY, SAYING THIS WOULD HAVE PROFOUND EFFECT ON BRITISH THINKING; HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THEY WOULD DEVOTE THEIR TALENTS AND ENERGIES TO LARGER PURPOSES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. CHANCELLOR APPEARED TO ACCEPT THIS ANALYSIS.

CONVERSATION THEN TURNED BRIEFLY TO NUCLEAR QUESTION, WITH BALL GIVING RUN-THROUGH OF OUR POLICY ON NUCLEAR DIFFUSION, AND TO US POSITION ON NATO MULTINATIONAL FORCE. HE MENTIONED ALSO GERMAN OBSERVATIONS ON THIS POINT IN "PRINCIPLES PAPER", TO WHICH CHANCELLOR REJOINED WITH NEW EXPLANATION THAT DIFFERENCE MAY BE DEVELOPING BETWEEN USE OF TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND FEDREP, WHILE ADHERING TO ITS WEU SELF-DENIAL ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, COULD NOT PLACE ITSELF IN POSITION WHERE IT COULD NOT ACCEPT TACTICAL WEAPONS IF THESE WERE OFFERED BY US AT SOME FUTURE DATE. UNDER SECRETARY EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE USED IN ANY FUTURE WAR WITHOUT SETTING OFF GENERAL NUCLEAR EXCHANGE, WHEREUPON CHANCELLOR WENT OFF ON TANGENT WITH REFERENCE TO BACTERIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, CONCLUDING WITH ASSERTION WE SHOULD PRESS SOVIETS HARDER ON THIS ASPECT OF CONTROLLED DISARMAMENT.

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-3- 2858, MAY 23, 7 PM FROM BONN

CHANCELLOR THEN TURNED TO QUESTION OF US-CHINA POLICY, ASKING WHY US REFUSED TO PROVIDE WHEAT FOR COMMUNIST CHINESE. AFTER UNDER SECRETARY SET FORTH US POSITION, CHANCELLOR RECOUNTED 1955 CONVERSATION WITH KHRUSHCHEV RE RED CHINA, AND ENDED WITH ASSERTION THAT FOOD ASSISTANCE TO COMMUNIST CHINA, THROUGH PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS, WOULD BE CARD WE COULD PLAY IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS. BALL EXPLAINED TO HIM BASIS OF US-CHINA POLICY.

AT END OF CONVERSATION UNDER SECRETARY POINTED TO US CONCERN RE APPARENT PROTECTIONIST TREND OF EEC COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, AND REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO QUESTION OF US POULTRY EXPORTS. CHANCELLOR EVIDENCED CONCERN WHEN IMPACT ON GERMAN DOMESTIC PRICES WAS POINTED OUT, AND INDICATED HE WOULD LOOK INTO MATTER.

CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH ADENAUER'S EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR UNDER SECRETARY'S VISIT, AND RENEWED REQUEST THAT HIS GREETINGS BE CONVEYED TO THE PRESIDENT.

DOWLING

GDW

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Control: 7201
Rec'd: MAY 23, 1962
6:20 P.M.

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2859, MAY 23, 8 P.M.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2859, INFORMATION BRUSSELS 89, LUXEMBOURG 27, PARIS 830, ROME 90, THE HAGUE 54.

BRUSSELS FOR EMBASSY AND BUSEC

PARIS FOR EMBASSY AND USRO

AT LUNCHEON TODAY GIVEN BY SCHROEDER FOR UNDER-SECRETARY, CONVERSATION CENTERED ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND NATO NUCLEAR FORCE. ERHARD, LAHR, CARSTENS AND GREWE ALSO PRESENT.

AT SCHROEDER'S REQUEST, BALL SUMMARIZED HIS CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR. CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, AND UNDER-SECRETARY MENTIONED HIS TALK WITH SWEDISH OFFICIALS, INDICATING NEITHER SIDE HAS CHANGED POSITION ON EEC ASSOCIATION PROBLEM BUT BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND RESPECT FOR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS HAD EMERGED. BALL SUMMARIZED US POSITION RE ASSOCIATION OF NEUTRALS INDICATING WILLINGNESS GIVE SPECIAL CONSIDERATION PROBLEM OF AUSTRIA IN LIGHT ITS "IMPOSED NEUTRALITY." SUGGESTED AS ONE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING GATT WAIVER WHICH WOULD PERMIT BI-LATERAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND SIX. ERHARD AND OTHERS REITERATED STANDARD GERMAN ATTITUDE ON ASSOCIATION OF NEUTRALS, STRESSING HISTORICAL TIES BETWEEN NEUTRALS AND MEMBERS COMMUNITY, DEGREE DEPENDENCE ON TRADE WITH SIX, GENERAL WESTERN ORIENTATION THEIR POLICIES, AND DESIRE TIE NEUTRALS TO SIX WITH EXPECTATION THEY WOULD GRADUALLY MOVE IN DIRECTION CLOSER POLITICAL ALIGNMENT. ERHARD SAID SWISS FRIENDS HAD TOLD HIM SWITZERLAND WOULD ULTIMATELY BE INTEGRATED POLITICALLY WITH COMMUNITY, BUT WOULD TAKE TEN TO TWELVE YEARS.

• This copy must be returned to RM/R Document Regulations. [redacted]

110.12-BA/5-2362 XR-611.624 XR-375.700; 375.7711 740.5MSP-00

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-2-2859, MAY 23, 8 P.M. FROM BONN

TIES WITH SWITZERLAND TO DRAW SWISS TO WEST AND KEEP ECONOMY FROM "WITHERING." BALL RECOGNIZED CLOSE TRADE TIES BETWEEN NEUTRALS AND SIX BUT SAID PRESERVATION THESE TIES DID NOT NECESSITATE ASSOCIATION WITH EEC. TRADE PROBLEM ESSENTIALLY SAME AS THAT FACED BY OTHER NATIONS HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON EUROPEAN TRADE AND THAT US COULD NOT STAND BY AND WATCH NEUTRALS, ASSOCIATED STATES OF AFRICA, COMMONWEALTH AND OTHERS JOIN PREFERENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS OF EEC. THIS WOULD PUT US IN POSITION RESIDUAL SUPPLIER WITH SERIOUS DAMAGE TO OUR TRADING INTERESTS. ALSO, POLITICAL INTEGRITY OF COMMUNITY WOULD BE SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED. BALL STRESSED NECESSITY LIMIT COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP AND ITS DISCRIMINATORY TRADE ASPECTS TO THOSE NATIONS WHO ARE ABLE MAKE CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPE'S POLITICAL INTEGRATION. LAHR ARGUED THAT SOME FORMULA MUST BE FOUND WHICH WOULD PERMIT ECONOMIC INTEGRATION TO PROCEED WITHOUT GIVING EVERY NATION VOICE IN POLITICAL DECISIONS. HIS IMPLICIT SUGGESTION IS THAT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION NEED NOT BE COMPLETELY PARALLEL AND INTER-DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENTS. LAHR DOUBTED SPECIAL GATT WAIVER FOR AUSTRIA POSSIBLE IN VIEW LARGE NUMBER COMMODITIES INVOLVED IN THEIR TRADE WITH COMMUNITY.

BALL TOUCHED ON QUESTION UK ACCESSION, POINTING TO FUNDAMENTAL REORIENTATION BRITISH POLICY TOWARD EUROPE AND AWAY FROM COMMONWEALTH AND IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THEIR FULL MEMBERSHIP EEC AT EARLY DATE. THERE WERE NO DISSENTING VIEWS EXPRESSED, SCHROEDER NODDING HIS AGREEMENT WITH BALL'S REMARKS ON THIS SUBJECT. ERHARD AGREED WITH BALL THAT COMMONWEALTH PREFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE REDUCED GRADUALLY AND EVENTUALLY ABOLISHED.

BALL OUTLINED US POLICY WITH RESPECT TO ESTABLISHMENT NATO MULTINATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE AND STRESSED FOLLY AND WASTE OF FURTHER PROLIFERATION NATIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. SCHROEDER EXPRESSED VIEW PROSPECTS FOR ESTABLISHMENT NATO FORCE NOT BRIGHT IN LIGHT NEGATIVE VIEW BOTH BRITISH AND FRENCH. THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC STATEMENT OF GERMAN POSITION ON THIS MATTER EXCEPT SMILING REFERENCE BY SCHROEDER OF TREMENDOUS COSTS INVOLVED IN ESTABLISHMENT NATO NUCLEAR FORCE.

IN CLOSING, SCHROEDER ASKED BALL IF HE HAD HAD CHANCE TO STUDY

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28FSS 3

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-3-2859, MAY 23, 8 P.M. FROM BONN

FEDREP COMMENTS ON US BERLIN PROPOSALS GIVEN TO ME YESTERDAY TO WHICH BALL REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT HAD CHANCE TO STUDY CAREFULLY BUT THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT REMAING POINTS OF DIFFERENCE.

DOWLING

DMJ/WHC/23

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

SUBJECT: Moving Ahead on the "Principles Paper"

Now that we have had an opportunity to examine the comments on our "Principles Paper" transmitted in the German aide-memoire of May 22, 1962, the following conclusions seem warranted:

1) The public discussion following the Bonn leaks and the Chancellor's Berlin press conference has undoubtedly, but to an unknown extent, weakened our tactical position vis-a-vis the Soviets. It has certainly made the International Access Authority, as we had conceived it, a less usable proposal in negotiations.

2) The German-suggested amendments to the "Principles Paper" are not so destructive of its premises that most of them could not be incorporated for a further round of substantive discussions with the Soviets on the paper. Our recommendation is, however, that we should not accept the German position on nuclear nondiffusion. We could tell the Germans that we are prepared to accept their various other suggestions for modifications in the "Principles Paper", although we are somewhat troubled by the possibility that the British and the French will find their addition to the second paragraph of the preamble difficult to swallow. If they object strongly, we should probably want to go back to our original language.

3) Despite the weakening of our tactical position noted in paragraph one and continued Soviet negativism on Western troop presence, we believe we should still consider proceeding along the lines started at Geneva of further exploring the possibilities of a modus vivendi on the basis of our "Principles" approach. Your meeting with Dobrynin on May 30 laid a foundation for this, and without deciding now how we would actually handle the matter with the Soviets, we should at least complete the necessary preparations on the Western side.

4) As to procedure, we would suggest that we now bilaterally talk with the Germans and British (we have briefed the British fully on the German proposals but not the French) with a view to obtaining their consent to our going ahead, if we consider it advisable, with oral exploration of language changes in the "Principles Paper" which we gave

the Soviets

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the Soviets at Geneva. This would avoid getting into an argument about the desirability of tabling another paper at this time. It would also leave open your visit to Bonn for discussion of broader questions related to Adenauer's visit to de Gaulle rather than the details of our negotiating position on Berlin. If, of course, the Germans were to balk at even oral exploration of language changes in the "Principles Paper", your visit might serve as an occasion for bringing the Chancellor around to this.

5) We believe that we should conduct our consultations with the Germans here in Washington. Ambassador Grewe, who was present in Bonn at the meeting when the aide-memoire was given to Dowling, has now returned to Washington.

6) Attached is an amended version of the "Principles Paper" incorporating all the German-suggested changes except that on nuclear non-diffusion. In Section 3(c), therefore, the language which we want but which the Germans do not, is shown in brackets.

7) We are working on a revised version of the International Access Authority paper, taking account of the German proposals, and will send this forward shortly.

Recommendation

That we be authorized to discuss the German proposals along the lines indicated with the German and British Embassies in Washington.

APPROVE DR MW 1 MR

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment:

Amended Version -
"Principles Paper".

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5/29/62

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May 29, 1962 2BF56/3

DRAFT PRINCIPLES, PROCEDURES, AND INTERIM STEPS
(Amended to reflect German May 22 aide-memoire. New language underlined.)

PREAMBLE

The parties have discussed certain issues related to the reduction of tensions and the strengthening of peace. They have sought to deal with these issues in a way which would accomplish two things:

First, it would create a useful framework for continuing negotiations concerning aspects of these issues on which differences remain to be resolved. To this end, the parties have agreed in regard to each of the issues under discussion: (i) on general principles, which will serve as a basis for continuing negotiations, and (ii) on procedures to govern these continuing negotiations. In this connection, a Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies will be established which France and the UK will be invited to join if and when matters are to be discussed in which they have direct responsibility.

Second, it would permit them to take interim action concerning urgent aspects of these issues on which the parties are already of the same view. To this end, the parties have agreed on certain interim steps to deal with aspects of these issues that pose immediate dangers. These interim steps do not purport to settle the questions for all time but they are needed to meet pressing problems until more comprehensive agreements can be reached in the above-mentioned negotiations.

There follows, therefore, in regard to each of the issues under discussion, a statement of (i) general principles to serve as a basis for future negotiations; (ii) procedures for these future negotiations; (iii) interim steps to be taken in the meantime.

1. Berlin

(a) General Principles: They agree that the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies should, in its continuing negotiations, take account of the general principles that, pending the re-establishment of German unity:

(i) West Berlin should be free to choose its own way of life;

(ii) the parties should undertake to respect the social order that has taken shape therein;

(iii) its viability —including the stability and prosperity of its economy — should be maintained.

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(iv) Unrestricted communication will be assured between West Berlin and West Germany. Subject to the foregoing, an International Access Authority should be established to perform specified functions in order to ensure this unrestricted communication.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to study proposals relating to Berlin in an effort to reach agreements which would give effect to these principles in a way consistent with the vital interests of all parties in the aforementioned Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that access procedures in effect on January 1, 1962 will remain in effect until the Foreign Ministers' Deputies have agreed on improvements of access procedures. Rules and regulations of the competent authorities which the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies agree are compatible with the principle of free access between West Berlin and West Germany will be respected. Included among procedures in effect on January 1, 1962 are the facts that:

(i) transit will proceed along the same communication routes presently used;

(ii) transit vehicles and their passengers are not allowed to deviate from the established transit routes;

(iii) passengers in transit are not allowed to go beyond the limits of the communications routes used for transit;

(iv) passengers in transit are prohibited from giving or receiving any articles; and

(v) no one may board vehicles in transit to Berlin.

They also declare that they will seek the agreement of the authorities in West and East Berlin to establish an all-Berlin technical commission to be composed of officials appointed by the authorities in West and East Berlin to deal with such matters as the facilitation of the movement of persons, transport, and goods between West and East Berlin, and the regulation of public utilities and sewage.

2. Germany

(a) General Principles: They believe that the Germans have the right to determine their own future, and to re-establish the unity of Germany, and they wish to facilitate the exercise of this right in a way that will enhance the security of all European peoples.

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(b) Future Negotiations: They agree that the authorities in West and East Germany should be invited to establish two mixed technical commissions, consisting of officials designated by these authorities, to promote mutually beneficial economic exchanges and to remove existing restrictions concerning the free movement of persons in Germany, including those imposed on cultural and technical contacts.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime they declare they will insure that in any arrangements into which any of them may enter with any part of Germany account will be taken of the provisions in this paper agreed by the parties in advance, except to the extent that these provisions may be modified by agreement such as may result from the continuing negotiations within the Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies.

3. Nuclear Diffusion

(a) General Principles: They believe that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the control of any national government not now owning them would make more difficult the problem of maintaining lasting peace.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek in the above-mentioned Committee (or other appropriate forum) to develop policies regarding non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to which all states owning nuclear weapons might agree and to which states not now owning nuclear weapons might also subscribe.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, as states now owning nuclear weapons, they declare they will not themselves relinquish control over any nuclear weapons to any individual state or regime not now owning such weapons; they will not transmit to such state or regime information, equipment, or material necessary for their manufacture; [and they will urge states or regimes not now owning nuclear weapons to undertake not to try to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states or to seek or receive information, equipment, or material necessary for their manufacture.]*

4. Non-Aggression

(a) General Principles: They believe that force should not be used to change existing frontiers and demarcation lines in Europe or for any other aggressive purpose.

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* Germans wish to eliminate this language.

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(b) Future Negotiations: With a view toward strengthening peace and security, they agree to seek in the above-mentioned Committee (or a Sub-committee thereof):

(i) to develop a suitable declaration which the NATO and Warsaw Pact Organizations might make to register their renunciation of the use of force for the settlement of international questions, and, specifically, the renunciation of the use of force to change existing boundaries and demarcation lines in Europe, and,

(ii) to consider measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime they declare they will not themselves use or support the use of force to change the borders and demarcation lines of Germany including those of West Berlin, and they note with approval declarations by German authorities in the same sense.

5. Procedures

(a) The parties note with approval declarations by the competent German authorities, assuring their allies that they will act in conformity with the above provisions regarding access and other matters relevant to their functions and responsibilities.

(b) Once the proposed Committee of Foreign Ministers' Deputies has been established: (i) the Foreign Ministers of the countries represented on it would meet periodically as seems useful to review its work; (ii) if and as warranted, the Heads of Government could meet to consummate concrete agreements reached by the Foreign Ministers and their Deputies in the proposed Committee.

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862.181/5-1962 XR 800.4531

REF. Deptel 1444 to Berlin repeated TOPOL 1794

US has held line against East German sports travel to Western competitions in conformance with restrictive TTD policy adopted by Allies after restrictions on intra-Berlin movement were imposed by East Germans last summer. It has become increasingly apparent, however, that view persists in several countries that sports are apolitical and that travel by athletes should not be restricted. US therefore considers it advisable to agree to some adjustment in our policy. At same time we should continue to emphasize reasons for retention basic restrictions on GDR travel.

Although agreeing to some relaxation of TTD ban for sports travel, we believe initiative for such relaxation should come from another country. Since French have taken lead in Bonn, they may also do so in Paris at POLAD meeting when this subject next discussed.

We hope inauguration or announcement of modified TTD policy on sports travel, if generally agreed, could be deferred. We have explained to several Americans prominent in international sports circles, including

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Drafted by: BTF:GER:GMcCarthy/agc

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

Clearances:
GER - Mr. Hillenbrand
RA - Mr. Van Hollen
WH - Mr. Bundy (in draft)

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Classification

2B57/2

including Avery Rundage, President of IOC, that TTD ban was invoked as counter-measure to East German restrictions on intra-Berlin movement. The longer any unilateral relaxation of TTD ban is deferred, the more time is allowed for East Germans to consider relaxing their restrictions in order to obtain issuance of more TTDs. We would also hope that relaxation of TTD ban at outset could be limited to travel of East German athletes as members of all-German teams. Such limited relaxation would:

1. Accord with goal of unified Germany.

2. Avoid problem of having QTE GDR national team UNQTE in countries that do not recognize GDR.

3. Minimize possibilities for GDR to use its sports figures to gain international prestige, acceptance and recognition.

4. Provide a less-usable precedent for other relaxations of TTD ban.

5. Accord with earlier Canadian suggestion.

Despite our willingness to modify existing policy we believe it important to explain relationship between travel ban and intra-Berlin restrictions on movement imposed by East Germans. Our goal remains same: to underline for East Germans fact that travel ban represents countermeasure invoked following their restrictive policy in Berlin, with clear indication removal of these restrictions will lead to re-examination our present policy.

Foregoing should guide Bonn in quadripartite discussions and USRO in POLAD if this subject is raised by others (possibly in conjunction with circulation of ATO reply to IOC referred to Bonn tel 837 to Paris).

Airgram follows re travel documentation for East German athletes going to Olympics and other international sporting events.

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2/6/62

WEDNESDAY
June 6, 1962
11:04 a.m.

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2BF58

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR KOHLER

The Sec said if he goes to Berlin before calling on the Chancellor Adenauer will be mad. K does not think so. K talked with Kaysen who talked to Bundy who is in West Point with the Pres and B agrees it is the only thing to do. He is now talking with the Pres and anticipates he will say yes - will let K know by 11:45. Sec was going to call Pres directly but K explained he would be hard to reach. K is inclined to say the Sec should do it. K said our P people want Berlin in the announcement - K will confirm in half an hour.

pdb

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in White House 6/22/62

Memorandum of Conversation

350

033.62A11/6-862

DATE: ~~June 8, 1962~~

XR-762.00

SUBJECT: Call of the West German Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, on The President

2BF59/1

PARTICIPANTS: Franz Josef Strauss, West German Defense Minister
(4) Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Embassy
Mr. Suidbert Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy

The President
[redacted]
General Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Representative of The President
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler, EUR
Mr. Robert M. Brandin, EUR/GER

DISTRIBUTION: (See last page)
(22)

June 28, 1962

After a brief opening discussion of Minister Strauss' schedule, the President raised the question of the ambivalent Soviet attitude toward Berlin. Although the Soviets had internal problems, there was evidence of an intensive Soviet missile build-up in recent months and a hardening of their line on Berlin, particularly as regards the presence of Western troops in Berlin. Unless there was a lessening of their position, we could have another crisis.

Minister Strauss said the question was whether the Soviets were prepared to reach an informal agreement respecting the status quo or whether they were too committed to Ulbricht to do so. He thought they might make some new proposals, taking what they liked out of the Western proposals and combining it with what they wanted, as a final offer.

The President observed that, although the presence of Allied troops in Berlin was the heart of our position, the Soviets had repeated to Mr. Salinger the demand that they be withdrawn.

Mr. Kohler noted that the public Soviet line on Berlin had also hardened.

The President said Allied troop withdrawal did not seem to be a fundamental point when he talked to Gromyko last September. There was no emphasis then that the Soviets considered such withdrawal was necessary.

The President then turned to the size of Allied conventional forces, noting that the problem of West Berlin required the forward strategy. If there were no

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Berlin problem, Western Europe would be the last place the Soviets would attack. Yet, as General Clay had said, we could not be firm on the autobahn if we only had nuclear weapons. Hence, conventional forces increased the credibility of our posture. But the forward strategy with conventional forces only made sense if we carried it out. The President expressed concern that at the rate we were going we would end up short in an untenable position, strategically and politically.

Minister Strauss agreed it would be easy if we did not have the Berlin problem. He could not imagine a local or limited Soviet attack in Central Europe because it would turn into a general attack and total war. In this context, there was no practical problem of a nuclear threshold. On the other hand, the Soviets could block access to Berlin and force us to be the aggressors.

The President remarked that we did have the Berlin problem, however, and asked Minister Strauss whether he supported the forward strategy.

Minister Strauss replied that since the Berlin problem could not be ignored, the conventional build-up had to be supported. He said there would be a hard debate in NATO over the MC 26/4 force goals of thirty divisions.

The President said he was not sure of the genesis of the German concern about the possible loss of Hamburg and Munich.

Minister Strauss explained that this fear related to Soviet counteraction to Western moves in Berlin. If it were not for Berlin, there would be no problem because any Soviet attack would mean general war. For example, fear of general war deterred Soviet moves against Turkey or weakly-defended Northern Norway.

Minister Strauss added that the forward strategy would play a role in the Berlin problem only if there were a Soviet counterattack. He referred to the Emergency Defense Plan in this connection.

The President then asked why it was essential in the present situation to maintain troops all along the border.

Minister Strauss said it resulted from the nuclear stalemate.

Ambassador Creel remarked that it was also required by the lack of depth.

Minister Strauss went on to say that it had not been a problem until the nuclear stalemate developed. He recalled that Admiral Radford had once told him the US would hit the Soviets with everything it had the day after they attacked. This was no longer true and the President was the strongest promoter of the change in strategy.

The President gave the credit to General Taylor, but pointed out that nuclear retaliation had never been used in Southeast Asia.

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Minister Strauss said he was grateful for that. No one wanted a nuclear holocaust.

The President asked Minister Strauss why he supported the forward strategy and conventional build-up.

Minister Strauss referred to Secretary McNamara's speech at Athens and said it was necessary to fill the expanding gap between zero and the point of use of nuclear weapons to make the deterrent credible. In Germany, for example, there was a danger of losing territory to a Soviet attack. Ground would be lost if nuclear weapons were not used, but they could not be used without provoking general war. The question might arise of negotiating with the Soviets over territory they had already grabbed.

The President asked how many divisions would be needed to carry out the forward strategy, given the Berlin problem, and how they would be raised.

Minister Strauss said a minimum of thirty divisions would be needed in Central Europe, but that this total could be reached only if the French contribution were raised from four to six divisions.

The President asked why this should be so difficult. In 1957 it was recognized that France had problems in Algeria and in the French Community. Now it was largely a matter of reequipping divisions for Europe and stationing them beyond the French border. This depended on de Gaulle's judgment and was complicated by history.

Minister Strauss observed that the actual French contribution to NATO was only one and one-half divisions.

The President remarked that since the US had contributed six divisions, it was difficult to understand why Europeans were impressed by the French talk about being firm. The President hoped the Chancellor could influence de Gaulle to increase his contribution; we could not.

Minister Strauss agreed to report the President's views to the Chancellor. He said the French contribution was supposed to be four divisions, but even this was too small. Belgium had two divisions in Germany, but these did not have new equipment. There were no combat units in Belgium, only cadres. In other words, Belgium was now contributing more than France. The Netherlands had two divisions stationed on the German border. Minister Strauss said it would take an armed force of 750,000 in Germany to meet the MC 26/4 goals, but that Germany could only support a 500,000-man force. Hence, it might be necessary to reduce the size of the divisions.

The President said the US maintained 400,000 troops in Europe which created a number of problems. He expressed appreciation for Minister Strauss' help in easing the balance-of-payments problem. Every country could meet its internal budget problem, but the balance of payments problem was difficult.

Minister Strauss said the plan to raise thirty-five brigades in Germany to

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meet peacetime goals would involve about 400,000 troops and might require a budget increase. He acknowledged the President's remark that it would be a burden on the population as well.

The President said we should meet the goals required by our strategy or reconsider the strategy. He thought there was something wrong if the US and Europe could not match the USSR in this field.

Minister Strauss said there should be a fair breakdown in reaching the goal of 31 - 32 divisions on the central front. There was, however, the question of French priorities. If France gave first priority to nuclear weapons and national requirements, it would give low priority to equipping forces assigned to NATO.

The President referred briefly to the offer made by Secretary McNamara to re-equip two French divisions. Then he went on to remark that if our strategy is valid -- i.e. it supports West Berlin, deters war and is supported by Germany -- we ought to carry it out. There was no sense in believing in a strategy, but not implementing it. The President said the US views on nuclear support were well known. He had discussed them last November with Chancellor Adenauer. In 1958, in the atmosphere following sputnik, we had made an agreement with the UK which embarrassed our argument today. The President was of the opinion, however, that the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent had not helped British prestige or security. At the same time, it was very expensive.

The President asked, if the US went ahead with France, what would stop Italy and Germany from making the same argument to the effect that they needed a nuclear capability because the US could not be relied on to defend European cities. The President thought national proliferation would be a dangerous, unnecessary and expensive development.

Minister Strauss added that it would mean the disintegration of NATO as well.

The President said the US policy on non-cooperation in the nuclear field could be wrong. For example, General Taylor thought the possibility of helping France should be explored. In any event, the policy made US-French relations difficult. The President thought de Gaulle would be reluctant to send troops outside France even if he had a nuclear force. Given de Gaulle's reasons for wanting his own nuclear deterrent and his views on NATO, the President believed any US assistance to France would stimulate requests from other countries for similar aid. Under its law, however, the US could not give any assistance until countries had reached a certain level of development. Who would help these countries reach this level? The President acknowledged that some good will would result from helping France, but was dubious about any other gain.

Minister Strauss said the Athens NATO Meeting could have been a beginning in dealing with the French problem. He pointed out that the French tendencies went back at least five years. French views had been ignored in all the NATO meetings. Now we had to face the problem. Perhaps it could be solved in the post-de Gaulle era.

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The President noted we had assigned Polaris submarines to NATO and had offered to consider a NATO multilateral seaborne MRBM force although the latter proposal seemed to be dead now.

Minister Strauss said the development of a multilateral NATO force raised a number of legal, technical and political problems. He referred to the problem of fifteen fingers on the trigger and the question whether NATO was sovereign.

Minister Strauss then outlined the proposals put to him recently by the UK Defense Minister, Mr. Watkinson. After the UK joined the Common Market, it might be possible to develop a genuine political union. UK and French military nuclear production would be pooled under a European authority. National production would expire. The US could then have the same relationship with the European authority that it now has with the UK.

The President asked who would control this British-French authority. He assumed there would be a problem until someone like Norstad were found.

Minister Strauss said the French would waste assets if they continued with their nuclear program. Yet the French Defense Minister, Mr. Messmer, felt an independent nuclear capability was essential for sovereignty.

The President asked Minister Strauss how he felt about this.

Minister Strauss said he agreed that the possession of an independent nuclear capability was essential for unlimited sovereignty, but he did not agree unlimited sovereignty was necessary. He thought no European nation could be fully sovereign now because it could not defend itself. European nations needed US help, otherwise they would have to surrender. The time of national sovereignty in Europe was gone. The present was not like the 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries in this respect.

The President asked, this being the case, why anyone was interested in developing a national nuclear capability. He inquired whether Minister Strauss agreed with the French views.

Minister Strauss favored concentrating on Atlantic cooperation. He thought the French views reflected de Gaulle's philosophy. The French Defense Minister, Mr. Messmer, had also argued that if what Secretary McNamara had said at Athens about the sufficiency of the present nuclear deterrent were true, there would be no reason for the UK to have a nuclear force. In view of the French attitude, Minister Strauss thought the French problem could only be solved in connection with the UK. There were three possibilities: they could give up their nuclear capability; they could pool their capabilities; or a European outfit could be formed. Minister Strauss was sure, however, that the French would not drop their nuclear force unless the UK did so.

The President repeated that the development of a national nuclear capability had not helped Britain's defensive posture. Moreover, with the development of missiles

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missiles, their nuclear air force would become obsolete.

Minister Strauss agreed, but said the French would not believe this.

The President said these matters go back to World War II and, like the US Commander of SHAPE, have a historical rather than logical basis. Nevertheless, if the US assisted France, the USSR would react and the consequences as far as China is concerned would not be clear. Moreover, if we went ahead with the French, what argument would there be against assisting others? He referred to pressures from Germany and elsewhere (e.g., Sweden and Switzerland).

Minister Strauss admitted there was no reasonable argument in this case, but thought it was impossible to stop the French. After de Gaulle, however, the French might be willing to pool their nuclear capability. The US had tried to find a formula at Athens to meet this problem. Agreement had been reached on guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons, but this would not end the problem. It was unlikely that any other NATO country would raise the nuclear problem in the 60s because there were no prerequisites in Italy or Scandinavia and Germany had renounced the production of nuclear weapons. But the matter was still pending. Consequently, an effort should be made to get the UK and France to give up their independent nuclear force and to turn it over to the US or NATO or a European establishment. This would at least gain time. If the UK entry into the Common Market resulted in the development of a European political authority, it might be possible to head off the problem this way. Minister Strauss said, in any event, he fully shared the President's concern about the proliferation of national capabilities.

The President asked whether the US should change its policy. What effect would a change have on others?

With respect to changing US policy, Minister Strauss expressed the opinion that the US need not worry about proliferation for the next five years because no other country would be in a position to develop nuclear weapons in that time. He could not say what effect a change might have. With respect to US opposition to the independent use of nuclear weapons, Minister Strauss said the British Defense Minister, Mr. McKinnon, had pointed out that the UK force was integrated into NATO targeting. In fact, however, the UK still had a potential independent capability even if it never used it. Minister Strauss added that the US seemed to fear that France wanted an independent force to use independently. He wondered whether France would agree to integrate its weapons into the NATO strike plan together with the US and UK and whether such a commitment or pledge could be relied on.

The President acknowledged that the UK in effect had a national capability as did the US. He thought it was a poor argument to use the British case as an example however. In his opinion the 1958 decision to help the UK was probably unwise. The President agreed it was not logical for the US to control Europe's destiny, but said the present situation was a result of history. He asked Minister Strauss whether pressures would rise in Germany for an independent nuclear force if the US helped France develop one. Would the strategic situation require Germany to keep up with developments outside its own frontiers?

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Minister Strauss did not think there would be any immediate demand for a German nuclear force if the US helped France. Public opinion would be against it as long as NATO was effective. It was a question of the reliability and cohesion of NATO including US nuclear support thereof.

The President said that to question US support of NATO would require the totally irrational assumption that the US was not interested from its own point of view in the defense of Western Europe.

Minister Strauss said that if the French sabotaged the integrated NATO defense effort or left NATO, the US position would become very difficult, particularly as regards logistics. If France left NATO, NATO would change, the US would change and Germany would change. There was no doubt about NATO solidarity now, but such changes would lead to a disastrous situation.

The President noted that the French had taken their fleet out of NATO and that most of their forces were not assigned to NATO. If they were to insist that the NATO headquarters be moved elsewhere and that the US withdraw, the situation would indeed become very serious.

Minister Strauss agreed but said that if the US changed its attitude toward France on the nuclear question now, it would appear that French blackmail had succeeded. Others would be attracted to follow suit.

The President then referred to the French proposal to establish a triumvirate, which he considered to be anti-European. The French were not satisfied with the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group. They wanted a formal directorate with worldwide responsibilities. If they had nuclear weapons, they would be in a stronger position to insist on the creation of such a political directorate.

The President thought the French would encounter great difficulties with their nuclear program. It would be extremely costly. The President said de Gaulle seemed to have some mystical argument against assigning troops outside France. The President was not optimistic that the French would come up with troops to support the forward strategy. In that connection, he referred to the fact conscription had not been introduced in the UK, although in his opinion it would have been politically feasible.

Minister Strauss returned to the question of what attitude to take toward the French nuclear program. There were various possibilities things could be allowed to go along as they were; the US could change its position; the UK and France might be induced to drop their military nuclear activity; or the UK and France might be persuaded to pool their capabilities into the NATO system.

The President observed that de Gaulle's views were anchored in the historical past and did not refer just to 1962.

Minister Strauss changed the subject to express his pleasure at the way US-German bilateral military arrangements were developing.

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The President responded by thanking Minister Strauss for his help in dealing with the US balance-of-payments problem.

Minister Strauss remarked that the increase in German conventional forces would raise the German budget.

The President said budget problems could be managed, but balance-of payments problems were more difficult.

Minister Strauss expressed the view that the US and Germany should cooperate in military research and development. He was not impressed with NATO research and development, noting that practically no decisions had been made on twenty-three proposed projects. Decisions had been made on aircraft, but the production runs were too small to be efficient.

The President concluded the conversation by observing that there were some people in the US who thought we should meet our balance-of-payments problems by keeping our troops at home and sending them overseas only when necessary.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

(357)

DATE: June 9, 19--

(2 BRd)

SUBJECT: Strategy of the Western Alliance and Berlin

FILE

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.	GERMANS
The Secretary	Defense Minister Strauss
The Under Secretary	Ambassador Grewe
EUR - Mr. Kohler	Mr. Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy
GER - Mr. Stelzer	

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At the conclusion of his meeting with Minister Strauss, Mr. Kohler escorted him to his appointment with the Secretary. Mr. Kohler briefly informed the Secretary of this meeting as well as of Minister Strauss' earlier meetings with the President, Defense Secretary McNamara, and Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric.

The Secretary mentioned his forthcoming trip to Europe and said one of the things he hoped to learn in Paris is what is meant by the French when they speak of a "reorganized NATO" and of "changes in the situation since 1948". While a "reorganized NATO" is spoken of, no proposals have been put forth; nothing has been spelled out. Yet this might have a bearing on a NATO MRBM force. The Secretary inquired whether Minister Strauss knew what the French had in mind.

Minister Strauss said he had not been able to get any clear answers. However, President DeGaulle's recent press conference made evident at least the outlines — the contours — of French thinking. The French appear to be saying that a defense of the West based only on the United States is a thing of the past; there must be a new system based more or less on a coalition of national armies with a low degree of integration. Such a system — as Minister Strauss interpreted French thinking — must include national nuclear components, a flexible arsenal (not necessarily flexible within the US understanding of this term), and a stronger French position in NATO command posts. Minister Strauss said he did not think the French extended this latter point to include the NATO top side, i.e. to an integrated NATO General Staff.

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The Secretary went on to say that one of the purposes of his forthcoming visits to Paris, Bonn, and London was to see whether elements of pure misunderstanding can be removed and whether, where real differences exist, these differences can be identified more precisely and, if possible, resolved. In inquiring of Minister Strauss what he understood the feelings in Paris to be, he would not wish to seem in any way to appear to be separating one ally from another. He inquired because it is important to know.

The Secretary said he thought one element of misunderstanding with Paris arose from what he understood to be President DeGaulle's feeling that the civic morale of France -- (and of the army, interjected Minister Strauss) -- must be rebuilt. Recalling DeGaulle's personal experiences of 1940, this was understandable. The point of misunderstanding, however, arises when this rebuilding takes place at the expense of one's friends. If DeGaulle seems to be saying that France must do X, Y, or Z because it cannot rely on the US, this is one thing. But if he says he must make it possible for France to assume a larger share in resolving the common problems of the West, this is another matter. The Secretary repeated that we do not feel we know enough about what DeGaulle has in mind.

Mr. Kohler said specific questions had been asked but that there had been no answers.

Minister Strauss said the French system of priorities -- force de frappe, corps d'intervention, territorial defense army -- does not fit into the NATO concept.

The Secretary agreed that there appeared to be certain apparent contradictions. He hoped Minister Strauss had gotten the impression in Athens that the US was moving rapidly in the direction of a multilateral sharing of the great issues and problems in the nuclear field.

Minister Strauss said he had; he considered Athens to have been a turning point.

It was an anomaly, The Secretary continued, that as we move in a direction which we would have supposed the French wanted, the French are moving in another direction.

Minister Strauss said it was all the more important, therefore, that more be learned of what France has in mind before NATO document 26/4 is discussed. Returning to the French system of priorities, he said French planning means that no more than four French divisions can be contributed in the future. At the present time, the French contribution was only 1-1/2 divisions and these were equipped with obsolete material.

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Minister Strauss expressed his surprise at having learned from Secretary McNamara yesterday that the US had offered to reequip the first two divisions returning from Algiers but that this offer had been rejected. He would be very pleased, Strauss went on, if the US could persuade the French to accept.

The Secretary expressed his hope that a common ground could be found. He had no doubts about the essential commitment of all the NATO countries to basic principles. The differences we were experiencing are rather in the nature of family differences. But it was to be hoped these would not grow. To the press, agreement is boring; disagreement is "news". Thus, these much publicized differences could have unfortunate effects on public opinion.

Minister Strauss thought there were, nevertheless, strong differences. He then expressed his appreciation -- not merely as a "foolish compliment" -- for the speeches of the Secretary and Defense Secretary McNamara at Athens. For the first time in NATO, there had been put forward for discussion a strategic concept.

The Secretary said Athens had been important because, by making the facts known, it was possible to explain how we had arrived at our strategic concept. Perhaps because of this the Minister felt that the NATO MRBM idea was dead.

Minister Strauss did not consider the idea dead. He thought rather in terms of its having failed up to now. This failure could not be ascribed to a lack of effort. A too optimistic view of the legal, technical and other problems had, however, been held.

The Secretary inquired whether these were real obstacles, or were they more in the nature of political differences among the capitals. Would France, for example, sit down and work out the legal and technical problems?

Minister Strauss thought France would sit down but would not give in. The establishment of a multilateral MRBM force would not satisfy France now.

The Secretary thought it possible that if the UK joins the Common Market without a serious dilution of the Rome Treaty, these problems might diminish. Meanwhile the US was prepared to get into these questions to the extent that our allies wish us to. We had started with the hope that our allies would discuss this matter and work it out, but there had been no progress. We continue to hope this matter will be discussed, although we would not want to table a US plan.

Minister Strauss went on to say that it was possible to distinguish two aspects of a multilateral MRBM force -- the military and political. First, was it merely military; does NATO need this force to fill a gap -- to have a differentiated weapons system. If the answer is yes, such an MRBM force

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could be set up with no changes in the present nuclear set up. Nuclear weapons would be immediately under SACEUR and control would be under the US. The Pentagon, Strauss said, appeared not to think of the MRBM force as a strong military requirement.

It was perhaps a political rather than a military requirement, the Secretary said.

Minister Strauss thought it had elements of both. Discussing the second aspect -- the political -- he said the question is whether the MRBM force is a good object with which to demonstrate the existence of a multilateral force. It would not change the weapons system, only command and control.

The Secretary expressed the hope that our friends in NATO realize that what has been said to the NATO Council about consultation is an attempt to go as far as possible multilaterally, subject to the physical circumstances at the time decisions must be made.

Minister Strauss inquired whether it could not be said that there are short and long run tasks to be taken up. The short run task is to work out practical guidelines to make a consultation system workable and to prove that consultation is possible. If this is not the case, the idea of a multilateral force should be dropped.

The Secretary referred to what had for a time been a matter of misunderstanding between Washington and Bonn. This related to our references to a buildup of conventional forces. Bonn had not realized that this was being thought of in the context of forward strategy.

Minister Strauss agreed and said that discussion in Bonn had been directed at identifying the borderline between conventional and nuclear weapons. Was it between conventional weapons and all nuclear weapons (including, for example, the Davy Crockett), or was the borderline somewhere within the range of the nuclear arsenal short of general war. There was no experience upon which to base an answer. There was now a new problem; how strong must our conventional forces be and at what point -- i.e. in what types of conflict -- would the lowest yield nuclear weapons be called into action. In other words, how can the nuclear deterrent be made more credible and how long can the use of nuclear weapons be postponed when the conventional fail. This was a matter of concern in Germany. There was every wish to avoid the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Yet Germany could not watch the Soviets overrun part of its territory -- the Ruhr or Hamburg -- and accept the concept that negotiations proceed from the status quo once the conflict has been stopped.

The Secretary said he could agree with this. It was, he went on, very hard to write a scenario which includes another actor who may not play. One

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could imagine, on a purely theoretical basis, in the case of a blockade of West Berlin, the confitment of [illegible] force to probe Soviet intentions, followed by a conventional, a tactical, and finally by a strategic force. The difficulty was that this theoretical circumstance might last only five minutes. We have no illusions about this. In speaking of credibility one must, however, also look at the other side of the coin. The context must be considered. A threat, for example, to invoke the deterrent if one of our jeeps is not permitted to pass through a checkpoint would, of course, not be taken seriously.

The Secretary went on to say that we should have the obvious means thoroughly to engage the two systems -- NATO and Warsaw Pact -- so that they (the Soviets) know the issue is nuclear war. We do not propose to accept deep intrusions into NATO territory by conventional forces. In an aside about The Guns of August, which the Secretary commended to the attention of Minister Strauss, the Secretary spoke of the breakdown of understanding among the European capitals in August 1914. A way must be found not to let this happen again. As he had told the Chancellor, we want to have clear agreement on what our vital interests are and what must be done if these are undermined. We must be sure that if we do what must be done, we can face our people and say that we had done everything possible at the diplomatic level and that our actions in no way were the consequence of negligence or inactivity. It was this that was very much in the mind of the President. Thus far, however, there are no indications that the Soviets accept or recognize our vital interests.

Minister Strauss said the "fatal thing" was that we are fighting with our backs to the wall. If we had on our side an arsenal of negotiating issues -- concessions to trade for concessions -- things would be less difficult.

It was true, the Secretary said, that there existed a whole range of matters which are no longer negotiable as a result of what has happened along the way. With respect to our rights in Berlin, there is nothing to bargain with.

Minister Strauss said the Soviets had dropped all hope of controlling all of Germany. This had been what lay behind the various pre-NATO and post-NATO plans for neutralized zones and the like in Central Europe. Such plans would have meant the dissolution of Europe. However, this period was now ended. The Soviets cannot afford to attack Central Europe. But with Berlin the difficulty is the unfavorable geographic location.

The Secretary spoke briefly of his itinerary. He would visit Berlin very briefly; both Berlin and Bonn had urged him to do so despite the fact that his tight schedule permitted only a few hours there. In Bonn he hoped to have some fundamental talks. Such misunderstandings as existed were, in his view, not serious. There was close to complete agreement on policy and full agreement on all the underlying issues. With respect to the role of East Germany in the

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Access Authority, the Soviets, upon reading this, said they would not have East Germans a member of such an authority. There could, therefore, be no difference with Bonn on this.

Minister Strauss thought an international access authority would be an improvement over the present state of affairs, inasmuch as the East Germans now control most of the traffic.

The Secretary cautioned Minister Strauss not to speak of East German "control". So long as we are in Berlin -- as he had told the Soviet Ambassador on several occasions -- they do not have control.

Minister Strauss recalled in this connection having received a less than perfect grade in an English examination some years ago, because he had translated the word "control" incorrectly; in German the word has a somewhat different meaning.

The Under Secretary inquired whether any serious thought had been given to Franco-German nuclear cooperation.

Minister Strauss stated that France had made not the slightest overture -- nor had the Germans. Germany, he said, was not concerned for reasons of prestige. Moreover, the right to produce nuclear weapons had been renounced.

The Under Secretary said he was, of course, thinking of peaceful uses, although some of these might at some point have military applications.

Minister Strauss said with respect to peaceful uses, German cooperation was 80 percent with the US, 15 percent with the UK and 5 percent with the French.

Referring to his earlier meeting with the President, Minister Strauss spoke of the President's evident concern over a further diffusion of nuclear capabilities; after France more and more NATO, as well as non-NATO, countries could be expected to develop their own capabilities. Sweden, the Minister thought, would have it own capability by 1970.

Turning then to what appeared to be the French arguments for its own nuclear capability, Minister Strauss said these included an apparent belief that the US deterrent is not a reliable one. In addition, there appear to be considerations of prestige involved and, closely related to this, the feeling that what is legitimate for the UK cannot be denied to others.

This, interjected the Secretary, could be extended indefinitely.

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Another apparent French argument, Minister Strauss continued, was of a more objective nature. Would not the deterrent be more credible if it consisted of a number of separate deterrents rather than of a more centralized one?

The Secretary asked to what extent, in the Minister's opinion, was it believed in Europe that the defense of the United States and Europe is indivisible.

Minister Strauss replied that Secretary McNamara at Athens had pointed up a matter of concern. It was that a first nuclear strike by a country such as France would not do too much damage and that such a country would then in turn be wiped out. There would then be the choice for the allies of leaving such a country to its deserved fate or of going to war without regard to whether its action had been right or wrong or the fact that its action had not been given allied approval.

It was difficult to identify any nuclear issues for NATO members, the Secretary said, which was not a nuclear issue for the US.

Turning again to the apparent French belief that nuclear diffusion is desirable because of US unreliability, Minister Strauss said the argument is at times posed in terms of what will happen in 1966 when a US-USSR nuclear stalemate will have been achieved. What then will be the strategic concept? In Athens -- so this argument runs -- the US spoke of an overwhelming arsenal in terms of numbers and ranges of weapons, an indestructible means of delivery, and an indestructible second strike capacity. The USSR cannot yet match this. This -- to interpret this French argument further -- gives the US strong feelings of superiority and the conviction that it is in full control of the world. But will this US concept remain fully as reliable after 1966, or will there have to be expected a modification? It is on this basis of the post-1966 US-USSR nuclear stalement, Minister Strauss said, that the French argue openly for the creation of their own nuclear deterrent. And this concern is not entirely absent in the UK.

If the talk was about 1966, the Secretary noted, this was really a very short time period in the historical context. If there was one thing evident, it is that there is deeply entrenched in the US on the basis of the most selfish, elementary and national considerations, the conviction that there is no security for the United States without Western Europe.

For this reason, Minister Strauss added, one European concept must be rejected as completely wrong -- that of Europe as a third force. To support Europe as a third force is to dissolve the bloc of the free world and to establish in its stead two separate centers -- Europe and the United States.

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All steps toward European unity should rather be viewed as part -- a pillar -- of the Atlantic Community based upon increasing interdependence. Success in achieving European unity would mean establishment of an entity of comparable size to the US. This in turn would lead to an Atlantic Community supported by, or based on, two solid pillars. The existence of such an Atlantic Community would represent a meaningful deterrent.

The Secretary agreed that a third force was not feasible. It overlooked the fact that Europe cannot be a third force inasmuch as it is Europe which is the issue between Washington and Moscow.

Returning to another facet of the French argument about the reliability of the US concept in the post-1963 period, Minister Strauss referred to the concern about placing the release of nuclear warheads exclusively in the hands of the US President. In the event of a conflict -- so the argument runs -- the Soviets may then attempt to blackmail the President by informing him that the release of tactical warheads to defend certain territory would be considered a casus belli. This would place the US President under severe pressure not to release, say, ten warheads, and to accept a Soviet penetration rather than expose the US to danger.

The Under Secretary noted that this was precisely the kind of blackmail the Soviets had attempted over Berlin.

If the Secretary could overcome the French arguments while in Paris, the Minister said, we will have come closer to an understanding.

The Under Secretary thought much of the French (and European thinking) along the lines outlined by the Minister was based upon a cultural lag. It was the US of the 1930's which was still in the minds of many Europeans -- a United States which had never made a total commitment. The US mood and mentality had undergone a great change. Finally, the nature of nuclear war appeared not fully to be understood in Europe.

Minister Strauss expressed his appreciation for the extremely useful talks he had had in Washington and said he hoped to see the Secretary in Bonn.

This was also his hope, the Secretary said.

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June 12, 1962

SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP
JUNE 13-28, 1962

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Position Paper

BERLIN AND GERMANY

(Should be raised at U.S. initiative)

Recommended U.S. Position

In a prolonged crisis such as that over Berlin, which has been more or less continuous since November of 1958, there will naturally be periods of relative relaxation and absence of pressures. During such periods, the normal inclination is to turn to more pleasant subjects or at least to problems which seem more tractable. This sometimes leaves the U.S., which has continuingly regarded the Berlin problem as a major point of peril permitting no relaxation, in the position of appearing more preoccupied, unsure, and determined to press toward some accommodation that the calm of the moment would seem to warrant.

We now appear to be in such a period with Soviet intentions unclear. Recent Soviet pronouncements on the subject have become sharper, but there is no consensus on the prospects. A recent Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-13-62 "Soviet Intentions with Respect to Berlin and Related Issues" [illegible] at the request of the Department, reflects this uncertainty. The Secretary may wish to draw on this as appropriate in discussions of the Berlin question at the various stops on his trip.

Whatever the uncertainties, there is certainly no reason for complacence. Serious incidents continue to occur in the Berlin area, and the Soviets may at any time decide to apply pressure. The possibilities of harassement open to them are multifarious. We must, therefore, continue to press ahead with those aspects of Berlin contingency planning which require completion.

Of immediate importance is to obtain a greater measure of understanding for the underlying rationale of our approach to a possible modus vivendi in the discussions which we have been having with the Soviets. Points to be emphasized will vary from stop to stop and are noted below in relation to the positions which we anticipate will be taken by country spokesmen.

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In explaining the US approach, it might be well to [illegible] once again, the three level analysis of the US-Soviet discussions with which the Secretary is familiar. The following general points might then be made in analysis of the stage we seem to have reached:

1. During the year since the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting many talks have been held with the Soviets. Both sides seem to consider that these talks have been useful in clarifying respective points of view. However, we cannot see that much real progress has been made.

2. The Soviets have advanced various formulae as a substitute for the Western troop presence in Berlin, but these are simply variations of proposals that would eliminate the West from West Berlin, or reduce our position.

3. In the May 3rd meeting with the Soviet Ambassador it was again stressed that our commitments to West Berlin would be honored.

4. The Soviets frequently say it is necessary to draw a line under World War II. If this means the time has come to remove the West from West Berlin, this is something we cannot accept. We have told them this and that we require a greater degree of reciprocity in these conversations.

5. We have also told the Soviets that we believe both sides have a serious national interest in avoiding a head-on conflict over Berlin. We are, therefore, trying to see if we cannot work out with them how this situation can be handled.

6. It would be possible to proceed on the basis of the factual situation, provided that all facts of the situation were taken into account, not only those facts which satisfy the Soviets. Two facts are that Germany is not united and that the West is in West Berlin. We see no reason why the situation could not be temporarily stabilized on the basis of these facts pending an eventual permanent settlement.

7. We have suggested a framework within which we think these discussions might profitably proceed. We had reduced this to a working paper which might provide the basis for a modus vivendi. We think this provides a way of handling our disputes with the Soviets. We have tried to avoid having either side subscribe to points which are publicly known to be contrary to the positions of either side.

8. We have

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8. We have thought that, in this modus vivendi, certain points of agreement might be registered and others put into a process of discussion which would open the way to their solution by peaceful means. This might take some time, but time is less dangerous and expensive than haste if the latter were to involve a direct confrontation of the kind threatened over Berlin.

9. We have, therefore, told the Soviets that both they and we should think carefully about how these matters should be dealt with and in which direction the discussions could be moved forward. We have also stressed that there is no problem at the moment of any real importance between the Allies affecting the discussions with the Soviets. The central problem is with the Soviets over Berlin.

10. We would hope that it might be possible to discuss and clarify some arrangements on access. There is no inherent contradiction between free access and the East Germans' carrying out their responsibilities. We would be willing to respect rules and regulations of the competent authorities which are compatible with the principle of free access between West Berlin and West Germany. And there would seem to be no major difficulty in coming to some sort of agreement on the so-called broader questions if the central question of Berlin could be resolved. We do not find, however, any effort on the part of Moscow to take account of Western vital interests.

11. Despite the facts that we cannot carry the discussions very much further without a greater element of reciprocity on the part of the Soviets and that we do not see enough readiness on their part to take account of Western vital interests, we think these talks should go on because the alternative--a direct confrontation over Berlin--is so much worse. In a situation as potentially explosive as this, a responsible government owes it to its people to exhaust every honorable effort to find a peaceful resolution of differences.

12. As the last conversation with the Soviet Ambassador ended it was agreed that he would report back to Moscow and, when he had received new instructions, would request a further meeting.

It will probably not be necessary for us to take the initiative in discussing the details of our "principles paper" or International Access Authority paper at any of the capitals visited. If, however, the conversations at any point should develop in a way to make this desirable, or should other officials indicate they wish to do this, officials in the Secretary's party will have the appropriate documents and supporting materials available.

Anticipated

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Anticipated British Position

The British are unlikely to take issue with the U.S. assessment. They believe that this period of relative relaxation of pressure on Berlin is an appropriate one in which to move ahead with talks with the Soviets while we are not operating under the disadvantages of duress. The British believe that rather than an agreement, which would involve too much loss of face for the Soviets, we may eventually reach some sort of modus vivendi or agreement to disagree. They are in general agreement with us as to the way in which we should proceed.

Anticipated French Position

The French attitude toward our talks with the Soviets is, of course, negative, although President de Gaulle has said recently that France does not object to employment of our diplomatic resources in this endeavor.

If possible, we should attempt to correct some French misconceptions concerning the underlying rationale of our talks.

They seem to be under the impression that the U.S. is engaged in a definitive attempt to settle the problem of Germany. This may be among the Soviet objectives, but the U.S. is under no illusions on this point. Our position remains, as it has always been, that the only lasting solution to the German and Berlin problems would be reunification of the country in freedom with a reunited Berlin as the capital of this unified Germany. We are also realistic enough to recognize that this goal is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future, given the basically conflicting Communist and Free World interests in Central Europe.

What we are trying to deal with is the factual situation, one of the ingredients of which is the capacity of the Soviets to sign a separate peace treaty with the "GDR" and to refuse any longer to carry out their responsibilities toward the Western Occupation Powers in Berlin. The French Government should be very well aware that a reasonable Western response to this Soviet threat must be first to try to prevent such unilateral action by the Soviets, but if this cannot be done, to attempt in advance to achieve some arrangement or modus vivendi which will enable vital western interests in the Berlin situation to be preserved.

We cannot agree that certain broader elements included in this paper, such as nuclear nondiffusion, NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression statements, and possible West German-East German mixed

commissions

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commissions amount to an attempt to settle the German problem. These are either merely declaratory of existing U.S. policy or attempt to provide mechanisms (as in the case of the mixed commissions, which were suggested by the Germans themselves) to improve the de facto situation for the benefit of the Berliners, the West Germans, and the East Germans.

We are not convinced that mere posturing behind our nuclear deterrent will somehow or other suffice to prevent the Soviets from taking unilateral actions which we cannot prevent and which will necessarily result in de facto deterioration of the Berlin situation. On the other hand, we do not wish to seem to agree, even by implication, with the French assessment that the present U.S.-Soviet exchanges amount to tacit willingness on our part to join with the Soviets in drawing a line under World War II in the manner they desire.

We have consulted fully with the German Government, as we have moved from meeting to meeting with the Soviets, and we have also tried to keep the French fully informed to the extent the French Government, itself, has been willing to permit this. We shall continue our probing of the Soviet position. Maintenance of contacts with the Soviets on this highly charged question is desirable, and we consider that we must continue to explore the possibility, consistent with Western vital interests, of achieving some modus vivendi. In the event of a breakdown and major confrontation over Berlin, we must be able to say that we have discharged fully our responsibility to our people to search for a peaceful solution.

Anticipated NAC Position

The Permanent Representatives (with the possible exception of the French) are unlikely to disagree with the U.S. assessment of the talks with the Soviets. However, they are likely (as they did in the June 6 session, when they were briefed on the Secretary's May 30 talk with the Soviet Ambassador) to take the opportunity to press for increased consultation. If they do, it could be said with the clearest of consciences that we have done our utmost--within the practical limits imposed by the conduct of the talks--to keep NAC fully informed. It might be noted that despite the facts that we have passed the Geneva papers on to them and repeatedly urged their comments, there has been no real response as yet.

Anticipated German Position

Neither the Chancellor (in his present apparently conciliatory mood and if our general presentation in Bonn has the desired effects)

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nor Schroeder, nor Brandt is likely to disagree with the U.S. assessment of the situation.

The Chancellor might be told that we fully agree with his June 3 statement to the CDU National Convention at Dortmund that differences in approach are inevitable--and even desirable--in a healthy alliance, and that they should be fully aired in private. We also agree that the press has been at fault in magnifying differences between us, as has been demonstrated by our ability to accept the great majority of the suggestions for changes in the "principles paper" and the "access paper" put forward in the German aide-memoire of May 22. We were also pleased by the Chancellor's post-Berlin statement to Die Welt that the Federal Government would cooperate with us in continuing the U.S.-Soviet talks.

Foreign Minister Schroeder has continued to support our Berlin proposals. At the CDU gathering in Dortmund he strongly denied that the East German regime would achieve international recognition through the creation of the International Access Authority. He spoke out in favor of further U.S.-Soviet talks even if the basic positions of both sides appear at first glance to be irreconcilable. Schroeder reminded his audience that the U.S. is ready to risk all to defend its position in Berlin. He added that the U.S. attitude is every bit as clear and unequivocal as its statements.

Mayor Brandt has taken every opportunity since the Chancellor's Berlin appearance to express: his full confidence in the U.S. and President Kennedy; his belief that the U.S.-Soviet talks should be continued for an indefinite time if necessary; his hope that the talks would lead to a modus vivendi; his conviction that the U.S. would not come out second-best in discussions with the Soviets; and the determination of the Berlin authorities to do all in their power to help achieve a settlement. All of this culminated at the SPD National Convention in Cologne May 26-30, where solidarity of the Party with the Federal Republic's allies--particularly the U.S.--was one of the main themes, and where a unanimously adopted resolution pledged SPD support for "the efforts for a modus vivendi agreement on Berlin."

Anticipated Italian Position

The Italians are unlikely to disagree with the U.S. assessment. They have followed the course of the U.S.-Soviet talks closely both in NAC and through their Washington Embassy, and they have expressed themselves as being in full agreement with the course

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the U.S. has followed. We might say we particularly appreciate the statement the Italian representative made at Athens when he said: "The Italian Government acknowledges the spirit of initiative of the United States and the firm and clever way in which it has conducted its conversations with the Soviets and believes that every effort must be made to reach a solution safeguarding the fundamental interests of the West and of the German people."

Drafted by: GER-Mr. Hillenbrand Mr. Cash	Cleared by: EUR-Mr. Kohler RFE-Mr. Feaseden G/PM-Mr. Weiss

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DRF:EUR:GER:FCash:cwp
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Approved in S 6/18/62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

962.00/6-1462

DATE: June 14, 1962
4:30 P.M.
Secretary's office

SUBJECT: Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS:

German	US
Ambassador Grewe	The Secretary
Mr. Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy	Mr. Foy D. Kohler, EUR
	Mr. Frank E. Cash, Jr., GER

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The Secretary opened the meeting by asking Mr. Kohler to summarize the current situation concerning the "principles paper" and the "access paper."

Mr. Kohler said that there was fundamental agreement with only two points left for discussion in Bonn and those not for discussion with the Chancellor. On the "principles paper", the UK has certain reservations on the tactical treatment of the nondiffusion item, and the Germans have brought up a small legal point concerning production of atomic weapons. In addition, there is the question of limiting the competence of the Four Power forum. The British have told us that they do not like the German proposal and prefer the language as it now exists. We have suggested to the Germans that they get the British views directly and also that it would be useful if they had the French views. On the "access paper" it was found that all the German observations were useful except one which the Germans will put back to Bonn and their composition proposal. On the latter, we gave the Ambassador today another variant to put to Bonn. We would hope that there would not be too much for discussion during the visit to Bonn.

The Secretary said the chief purpose of his visit to Europe was to follow up on the corridor discussions in Athens with the French and German Foreign Ministers. We must look to the broader questions and be sure that everyone understands that the discussion within the Alliance must be directed toward a creative period. This is a time of considerable discussion within the Atlantic Community, and it should be clear that the discussion has nothing to do with our common commitments. It would also be useful to get some misunderstandings out of the way.

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The United States is not trying to nourish differences between Bonn and Paris. The close association of these two countries is a matter of great importance to us. The Secretary added that he would like very much to get second thoughts concerning what he and the Secretary of Defense had said at Athens. On Berlin, he continued, we need to think together again as to what the present Soviet attitude is. There has been no response as yet to the stress that was put on reciprocity in the last conversation with the Soviet Ambassador. These are the kinds of broad political and psychological subjects that should be discussed, so that if there are any differences we will know what they are and whether or not they are real. The Secretary said he was looking forward to seeing the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister and that he would be disappointed if the talks in Bonn did not leave us in a better position.

Ambassador Grewe said he was very hopeful in this regard. He thought it might be useful for the Secretary to give the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister his ideas concerning NATO reorganization.

The Secretary said this was not too easy at this stage. If the United Kingdom comes into the Common Market, this will help the organization questions. The inner shape of the Common Market will have a bearing on the organization of NATO. It may be that in Paris a clearer idea will be obtained as to just what the French have in mind.

Ambassador Grewe said there had been several exchanges between the Chancellor and President de Gaulle on this subject which always ended with agreement that NATO reorganization was necessary. However, this always covered up the fact that the Chancellor was talking about more integration and de Gaulle less.

The Secretary said the United States favors as much integration as the traffic will bear. It is not up to the United States to say precisely what Europe should do, but the general drive of US policy is toward a deeply integrated Western Europe.

And, Mr. Kohler added, an outward looking Europe.

Ambassador Grewe said it would be useful if the Secretary would also express as precisely as possible what he saw as the repercussions of the United Kingdom entering the Common Market on such things as nuclear arms, trade, etc.

The Secretary said it was a little early yet to know what the likely Common Market views would be. A number of questions will be posed in different form if the United Kingdom comes in.

Ambassador Grewe said Bonn realizes that the United States attaches great importance to this matter but needs to know precisely why.

The Secretary said some things had to be expressed more as hopes than as expectations. The United States hopes the political relations of the Commonwealth

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wealth will not be adversely affected by the Common Market. Western Europe and the United States together provide a nexus of interlocking relations which give the Free World enormous strength. There is no need for the Common Market to be destructive concerning these relations. The Secretary said he would be glad to go into this in Bonn.

Ambassador Grewe said Foreign Minister Schroeder would probably give an outline on Berlin, interzonal trade, and the credits question.

The Secretary asked whether the East Germans had been specific concerning the credits.

Ambassador Grewe replied that the exchange had only been oral within the interzonal trade channel, and no quite clear formal request had been made. This is a point of concern for Bonn. They are not prepared to enter into such an arrangement before a more committing, formal request is received from the other side. The apparent shift in the last few days seems to be primarily for appearances sake, and this matter does not seem to be completely finished.

The Secretary said he had tried to tell the press not to expect dramatic stories from his European trip. As a result, only a few correspondents will go along. He hopes to have intimate and serious talks without the glare of publicity, and he hopes these talks will stay private.

The Secretary asked what kinds of questions he was likely to get from the legislative leaders.

Ambassador Grewe said this would be pretty much the familiar range of subjects, Berlin, NATO, German-American relations, etc.

Ambassador Grewe asked if the Secretary had been satisfied with the Spaak visit.

The Secretary said yes. A considerable amount of time had been spent on African problems, but there had been some follow up on NATO and European matters discussed at Athens.

Ambassador Grewe asked if the Secretary's Sunday meeting with the Soviet Ambassador had produced anything.

The Secretary said it had not. The Ambassador had no further instructions from Moscow. The Secretary had repeated his emphasis on reciprocity. He had also tried to give the Ambassador an opportunity to comment as to why the Soviets were so stirred up about the Common Market, but he did not do so. The Ambassador had expressed surprise that the Secretary was going to Berlin just at this time. The Secretary told Ambassador Grewe that he did not expect to make a big speech in Berlin.

Ambassador Grewe said nevertheless everyone was happy that the Secretary would visit the City.

The Secretary

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The Secretary said he would be interested in hearing Mayor Brandt's views concerning the feeling in Berlin, the movement of people through the wall, etc.

Ambassador Grewe, turning to a new subject, said that former President Truman had been invited to come to Germany to make a speech. He asked whether the Secretary thought this would be a good idea.

The Secretary said he didn't know what Mr. Truman's own reactions would be.

Ambassador Grewe said Mr. Truman had responded that he would get in touch with President Kennedy and then let the Germans know. The Ambassador added that the invitation was issued on private initiative, and the Germans would be glad if it could be accepted.

The Secretary said he would look into this matter.

The Secretary said he felt it was very important that the West display a sense of solidarity particularly at this time when the Soviets were making up their minds as to how they wished to proceed. A lack of Western solidarity now could be very disadvantageous.

Ambassador Grewe said he felt sure Bonn held the same views.

The Secretary closed by asking that if there were any other points about which the Chancellor would like to talk, these be telephoned to him in Paris.

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SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP
JUNE 18-28, 1962

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Background Paper

13

US HANDLING OF BERLIN PROBLEM

SINCE VIENNA MEETING

The US approach to the Berlin problem has been variously criticized in the past year. A main object of attack has been our handling of discussions with the Soviets considered as an exercise in exploratory diplomacy. Such criticism has generally failed to see the relationship of these so-called exploratory talks to our broad approach in other fields such as the military build-up and contingency planning, but some effort at a frank appraisal seems warranted.

Among the points commonly made are:

1. The US is on a diplomatic slippery slope having suggested a number of concessions without compensatory concessions from the Soviets who consider these concessions not as a point of arrival but as a point of departure.

2. By so doing we have, to a large extent, abetted the Soviet effort to draw a line under World War II in their own terms.

3. A year after the Vienna meetings, the Soviets are accordingly in a much more favorable tactical position than they were.

4. While losing ground with the Soviets, we have at the same time brought about a crisis within the Alliance and a breakdown of confidence in the United States on the part of the French and Germans.

In contrast with this line of criticism, a protagonist of the U.S. approach might make the following points (some of these could be made to anyone, others only on a selective basis):

1. Criticism of this sort is out of context. Our talks with the Soviets must be seen as part of a more comprehensive strategy based upon a realistic assessment of the facts of life in our time. The French concept of the US nuclear deterrent is illusory which views it

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as something all-pervasive and self-executing at various levels of conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers.

2. While engaging the Soviets in talks, we have at the same time pursued a military build-up which has materially strengthened our overall position. To the extent this can be induced, this has had a considerable deterrent effect on the Soviets, perhaps not only in terms of what we have done but in terms of what we potentially might do if the Berlin crisis should further heighten.

3. We have used the year since Vienna to perfect our contingency plans. This has made us much more ready to deal with Soviet harassments or execution of threats to precede unilaterally against our position in Berlin. It has at the same time brought a greater sense of realism both as to our strengths and weaknesses rising out of the geographic and other pertinent facts of our position in Berlin.

4. By our talks with the Soviets, we have shown ourselves willing to exhaust all peaceful means of finding an accommodation consistent with our vital interests. No one can reasonably charge that the US has not tried to use all the resources of diplomacy in an effort to prevent a confrontation over Berlin. We have built up a negotiating record which, if made public, would win much support for our position.

5. The fact is that, every time the Soviets have lifted a deadline or otherwise relaxed their pressure on Berlin, this has been accompanied by some public reference to the discussions with the United States and some vague reference to their progress. It is obvious, therefore, that the Soviet Government has used these talks as a pretext or justification for a relaxation of the pressure on the Berlin question. In a situation where the exact Soviet motives are unclear, it is extremely useful, in view of the obviously conflicting currents within the Communist Bloc, to provide, without loss to the Western position, a mechanism which the Russians could and, indeed, have used in the manner indicated.

6. In this process we have not given anything to the Soviets which, in our judgment, represents a concession without adequate compensatory concession from them. Our so-called "concessions" have been contingent concessions just as was the Soviet "concession" in their proposal for a four-power body to settle disputes over access, including German access. Whetting the appetite of an opponent is not the same as feeding it and is a proper function of resourceful diplomacy. We are probably now in a better tactical position to stick on the issue of Western troop

presence

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processes than we were a year ago before the process of intensive clarification of our respective positions began.

7. While it is true that the French have been opposed to our general approach, although not attempting to exercise a veto, and while it is true that we have had our repeated flurries with Chancellor Adenauer, there has been no large-scale public revulsion in either Germany, France or any other NATO country against the U.S. position. The disturbance of some officials has not been reflected in German public opinion. From German press comments it would seem that not only has the SPD and FDP generally supported our approach in its broad outlines, if not in every detail, but also a sizeable segment of the CDU. The German internal political situation is very confused and this whole question has been caught up in internal struggles for power and the succession to Adenauer.

8. Granted that there has been a certain amount of sincere opposition to our approach, the U.S. cannot be stymied diplomatically by this, although we have made every effort to take account of the legitimate interests of our Allies. The various non-Berlin points in our "principles paper" are all items the attainment of which would be consistent with U.S. national policy.

9. While this may be hard to document, it seems likely that all the hubbub and publicity in the past year has tended to inject a new atmosphere of realism into discussions of the German problem. This may be a necessary if unpalatable part of an educational process on the facts of life in the 1960's. At least some of the mythology which has developed in the post-war period has been cleared away without major catastrophe.

10. Apart from the tragic human problems caused by "the wall", the economy and morale of West Berlin have not collapsed or been eroded in the past year, as some had predicted they would be. Instead economic growth has continued and the chief intrinsic limiting factors continue to be demographic.

11. Many observers believe that most Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen and citizens of other NATO countries do not really believe that Berlin is worth fighting a nuclear war over. Their Governments are willing to take refuge behind a mistaken concept of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and do not really believe that a war over Berlin is possible. If this is a correct assessment of basic convictions in this matter, the diplomatic alternative seems all the more sensible.

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12. An incidental by-product of the "principle paper" is that it has smoked out from the Germans sooner than might otherwise had been the case the growing official sentiment against doing anything that would preclude a German independent nuclear capacity, at least in the tactical weapons field.

13. In a negative sense, while there is no doubt that events of the past year have added strength to the conviction of some continentals that there is an Anglo-Saxon axis, this hardly seems to have been a major factor in determining de Gaulle's policy.

To conclude:

1. If we had done nothing, as the French and basically the Germans wanted, the de facto situation in and about Berlin would almost certainly be worse than it is today. In dealing with dictatorships, to follow the French precept and refuse any discussions would undoubtedly crystalize all of the factors in the Soviet camp in favor of some form of action in regard to Berlin. The fact of talking has certainly not been without its influence in helping us at least to have gone through the year without any such action having been taken.

2. Soviet intentions at present are obscure and it is far from clear that a negotiated accommodation on Berlin can be reached.

3. If, however, the Soviets finally do proceed unilaterally to bring about a confrontation on Berlin, the people of the U.S. and of Western Europe are more likely to support a strong and determined position than they would have been in the absence of a sincere Western effort to achieve a peaceful resolution.

Drafted by: GER - Mr. Hillenbrand	Cleared by: EUR-Mr. Kohler RPE-Mr. Pessende S/S-Mr. Bohlen
S/S-S - Mr. Slater, Room 7218, Ext. 4338	

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Following is separate telegram reporting Secretary's informal discussion with NATO permanent representatives on Berlin. Secretary reported on June 18 talk Dobrynin. Gave following analysis Soviet position:

1. Soviets now concentrating almost exclusively on continued presence western forces in Berlin. They are showing no interest in other questions which had been considered, such as non-diffusion nuclear weapons and mutual declarations by NATO and Warsaw Pact. Soviets have advanced several proposals on presence western forces, such as having Soviet forces join US in Berlin, substitution of UN or neutral for US forces, or substitution of Warsaw Pact plus NATO forces (minus major powers). None of these alternatives, of course, acceptable.

2. Second main point in our analysis current Soviet position is that there is no evidence Soviets moving toward immediate crisis over Berlin. Khrushchev's speech Bucharest not warlike in tone. We can not of course rely on this remaining unchanged, but for present

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present Soviet posture seems less belligerent.

3. Third element is that Soviets do not seem to want to register complete diplomatic impasse over Berlin. This is characterized by constant repetition on Soviet side of same themes.

Secretary said felt most serious problem might well be situation East Germany. Concluded essential that alliance go ahead with Berlin contingency planning, and at same time not being overly provocative in public pronouncements and maintaining constant line in talks with Soviets.

Secretary in course of discussion which followed made additional points. Confirmed that it was literally true no agreement has been reached with Soviets. We are still "nose to nose" on central issue. On other hand, talks have been of some use in that Khrushchev himself has used the talks for relieving certain pressures on him. Talks useful also to demonstrate to our peoples that every effort has been made to resolve differences so that public opinion will be better prepared if situation deteriorates.

Secretary said he thought West Berlin morale now in good shape despite certain decline after construction of wall. Economy is prospering and population is increasing. Perhaps bigger danger to stability of situation are pressures within East Berlin and East Germany.

German representative pointed out 11,300 refugees have arrived West Berlin since August 13. In response Netherlands statement regarding importance getting on with contingency planning in present relatively calm period, Secretary fully agreed, adding that Khrushchev's judgments on what action to take are based in part

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in part on what he believes West is preparing to do. Contingency planning obviously important as demonstration of West's will.

In response Canadian question whether US prepared go on discuss other subjects such as non-diffusion, Secretary reiterated that Soviets now sticking entirely to issue of presence of US forces. If they do indicate interest in expanding into other subjects such as non-diffusion or mutual NATO-Warsaw declarations, this will obviously become matter for Allied consultation. Non-diffusion question, in our view, best handled in Geneva disarmament context in order to prevent its too narrow confinement to Germany. Secretary added that Soviets had recently tried to expand non-diffusion proposal to include multilateral arrangements. Secretary said this is something we could not accept because we want to leave open alliance multilateral possibilities. Secretary also pointed up possible relation between Laos settlement and Berlin, pointing out Khrushchev may well be trying bring Laos to successful conclusion partly to demonstrate that an agreement is possible. Such delays as there have been in Laos largely due to getting General Phoumi in line, not due to difficulties with Khrushchev.

In course of discussion, German representative gave interesting appraisal current situation East Germany. (Full text being obtained German delegation). Summary as follows:

Ulbricht's position unshaken. New document has been approved by National Congress in East Germany June 17 which outlines harder course and gives ideological foundation. Despite power position Ulbricht, regime in East Germany has completely failed win over population. Considerable resistance by workers and peasants, resulting in economic breakdown. Soviets previously had reluctantly given large loan to East Germany and are now considering second loan. Regarding GDR request for credits to Federal Republic, Federal Republic determined take no initiative this question

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question. However, highly probable that GDR representatives will approach Leopold of Inter-Zonal Trade Group at its next meeting. In general, no organized resistance by population to regime, perhaps because population sees no prospect of effective western help in case of uprising.

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SECRETARY'S MEMORIAL FILE
(June 18-28, 1962)

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Date: June 22, 1962
Time: 3:00 P.M.
Place: Schoenberg Palace
Chancellor's Conference Room

Participants:

United States	Germans
The Secretary of State	Foreign Minister Schroeder
Ambassador Dowling	Dr. von Eckhardt
Mr. Kohler	Dr. Carstens
Mr. Kohler	Dr. Kempf
Mr. Manning	Dr. von Hase
Mr. Harris	Dr. Osterheld
Mr. Hillenbrand	Dr. von Puttkamer
Mr. Cleveland	Dr. Reinkemeyer

Subject: Berlin Discussions

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Foreign Minister Schroeder began by saying that he would like to review with the Secretary the few outstanding points which had emerged from the discussions on the UK "principles paper" and on the International Access Authority proposal. The first item was the "if clause" in the Preamble to the "principles paper". Although leaving this out created certain problems for the Germans, in view of the negative French and UK positions on this clause, the Germans were inclined to go back to the original UK language.

The Secretary commented that we would, of course, have no particular problem in going back to our original language.

Schroeder then agreed that the original UK formula should be used.

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On the question of nuclear nondiffusion, Schroeder observed that the first time this item had been mentioned was in his lengthy talks with the Secretary. Here it was explained as a possible way of broadening the terms of discussion with the Soviets. The Germans had always understood that a point corresponding to final US policy might be useful to put in a Berlin package from which something might be obtained which could not be obtained in the Geneva disarmament framework. The Federal Republic does not participate in the Geneva discussions. The primary German interest in this matter of long standing US policy was that it would not apply only to Germany. Despite all intentions to the contrary, the danger of using it in the Berlin context was that the other side might say that, if agreement cannot be reached on a general basis, let us limit it to Germany. The Federal Republic would like to avoid any discrimination because of its renunciation of the production of ABC weapons. However, other countries might not want to accept the commitment asked for in the American language. Therefore, it was preferable to handle this matter in Geneva and see what happened there rather than to have it discussed in the Berlin context. The Soviets have shown no recent special interest in having this subject brought within the Berlin framework. We could wait and see what happened in the future, but in any event, must avoid discrimination against the Federal Republic and any further limitations on the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic does not want a US-USSR agreement to urge further German renunciation in a Berlin context, although this would be acceptable in a world-wide context at Geneva.

The Secretary said that our attitude on diffusion of nuclear weapons remains that it was when the Baruch proposals were put forward shortly after World War II. Now that diffusion is even more likely, by applying the [redacted] doctrine, our policy is even more applicable now. This question has come up in the Berlin discussions largely by passing reference. It has not been covered in detail. The Secretary had confirmed to Gromyko our standard policy on this subject. Gromyko said he would want a treaty with a specific reference to Germany, which we indicated was impossible. He then said that, if we have a general agreement, we would not want a violation by Cambodia to lead to a German plea that the restrictions were no longer applicable. The Secretary said that he would respond by saying that violations would release all signers from their obligations. The Secretary observed that there seemed more chance of handling this as a general matter in Geneva rather than in the Berlin context, but we did not want necessarily to leave it out of the Berlin context entirely. We have authorized our delegation in Geneva to agree to opening up a discussion of nondiffusion there. The Soviets also keep referring to groups of states in this connection. We want to avoid any formula which would affect a possible multilateral force. We are not certain that many UN members, who supported the Swedish resolution, would not support restrictions on the possibility of a multilateral force as well. We believe we should try

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to obtain a general agreement rather than a specific one, and such an agreement cannot interfere with the NATO multilateral force.

The difficulty in the position we are taking, Schroeder said, is not in that position, but in the tendency of the Soviets to discuss other problems in the Berlin context. The Soviets say the peace treaty is the greatest problem. The Federal Republic wants to avoid giving them a point of adhesion on which they can bind general subjects to their peace treaty concept; hence the preference for Geneva. The Germans have been clear from the outset that the Americans want to exclude any specific prohibition on Germany or NATO, but the Soviets will try to force the discussion in this direction. The same danger does not exist with reference to the nonaggression pact.

The Secretary commented that the two should say they agree on the underlying policy, and not take the position that this subject cannot be discussed. We have maintained that the presence of Western forces in Berlin is nonnegotiable. If any paper is called for in the discussions with the Soviets, we will consult you. This is now not the case. We believe that, once the subject is discussed in Geneva and positions are clarified, it is unlikely to be discussed in the Berlin context as the full range of disagreement becomes apparent.

Schroeder said he understood how it might be useful to put forward some language on this subject in a paper on which progress seemed likely. We do not have to proceed from the assumption that the paper contains final formulations. We should avoid those which do damage to negotiations. Therefore, in the present stage, we should not try to put atomic policy into the Berlin paper. The US position in principle is clear. It was put forward in the Geneva Disarmament paper and the US is ready to talk about it. Only when the points are discussed there, can the risks be calculated. This is a complex subject and the Western Powers do not want to make a main theme of a subsidiary theme in the Berlin discussions.

The Secretary said he would discuss this matter further with his British and French colleagues. They might have an opportunity to consider it briefly if there were to be a Foreign Ministers' meeting in connection with Laos. He said he did not really know if this was an issue between us and the Germans and he preferred not to deal with it on a hypothetical basis. We understand the policy of the Federal Republic. We oppose the element of discrimination or anything which would prevent a NATO nuclear force. Why do we not just see what the requirements are? Maybe it might be treated in the "principles paper" by reference to the Geneva disarmament discussions.

Schroeder argued that now that all the world knows that we have talked for a long time over the US paper, there is a certain risk if full agreement on that paper were to be interpreted as a definitive German preparedness to assent to the proposed renunciation by nonpossessing countries. Thus German assent

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would indirectly already have been obtained in advance of the agreement of any other countries. A commitment would be anticipated which is to be made only in a world-wide context. The Secretary asked whether Schroeder's problem was that was to be said after the meeting today. In general, the Secretary stated, he did not want to put himself in a position where he had promised not to speak on something or to have said that something would not go in the paper, even though it might not be of active relevance now. We have no plan to put in a paper in the foreseeable future.

Schroeder observed that if we are speaking of a Berlin paper which is to be put in now, he would rather not see anything in it about nonalignment. This was not intended as a critique of the position of the US on this subject in the Geneva disarmament context if it led to a world-wide agreement. So long as a world-wide agreement was not obtained there could be no prior declaration from the Federal Republic.

The Secretary said he thought we would be in touch with the Germans further about this. It was a highly contingent problem. We start discussion in Geneva on nonalignment in mid-July. The Soviets have shown no interest in pursuing these peripheral problems in the Berlin context. He was reluctant, however, to say that, in any future paper to the Soviets, this subject could not be mentioned in some way. Schroeder commented that, if tomorrow a paper were to be put in, then it would be better to leave out the atomic question. Perhaps it would look different in a few weeks to the Federal Republic. It might be assumed that the Soviets would discuss what had been placed on the table at Geneva in the disarmament context. He wanted to avoid a treaty mixing nuclear weapons with the German problem. The Secretary could, of course, talk with Gromyko any time about the disarmament proposals. If the other side raised the question, the Federal Republic would want the US to make the point that this is a world-wide question and not just a German problem.

The Secretary said we had not planned to agree on a final paper here. Schroeder said he agreed the point could not be settled here since no paper was being handed over now.

As to the US proposal for an International Access Authority, Schroeder said he could now accept the US formula for the make-up of the Board of Governors. He had a little hesitation in doing this, however. The Federal Republic would never forget the 1959 Geneva exercise when the representative of the Federal Republic was placed in an invidious position with respect to the GDR Adviser. The more one downgraded the GDR with a formula, the more the Federal Republic would suffer. Hence some actually favored going back to the old US formula of 13 full members rather than 9 full members and 4 advisors. While he was therefore prepared to accept the 9-4 formula, this matter should still be considered open for discussion and not a definitive formula, leaving open the possibility of changes in continuing discussions with the Soviets.

The Secretary

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The Secretary said he had the impression that whatever we say now as to the details of such an arrangement would be far from a final solution. We have not pursued this subject much with the Soviets, although Ambassador Thompson had given Gromyko an outline of our International Access Authority proposal in Moscow. It might be worth considering further alternatives. Actually the Soviets, in their paper given us in Geneva, had been closest to the German Four-Power formula. Perhaps we should see what changes we could make in the Soviet proposal to make it acceptable to the West, giving the Authority a number of operating functions and avoiding any rule of unanimity. In the event the Soviets tell us that the Western presence is no longer a breaking point, then the access problem obviously becomes a larger question. We should continue to think of alternatives in this regard. We might take the Soviet proposal and see what essential elements must be added from the Western paper to make it acceptable. Schroeder said we should not build up the concept of the Authority as a great international body like the UN; it should rather be considered like an International Port Authority. The Secretary said one possibility was that a Secretary General could handle the business and, if there were German advisers, they could have their offices in the same building.

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SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: June 22, 1962
Time: 3:00 p.m.
Place: Palais Schaumburg, Bonn

Participants:

United States	Germany
The Secretary of State	Foreign Minister Schroeder
Ambassador Dowling	Dr. von Eckhart
Mr. Bohlen	Dr. Carstens
Mr. Kohler	Dr. Krapf
Mr. Morris	Dr. van Haas
Mr. Killenbrand	Dr. Osterfeld
Mr. Cleveland	Dr. von Brenn
	Dr. Reinkemeyer

Subject: German-American Relations and Matters for Discussion with the French

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GER		Secretary's Delegation (10)

In concluding the meeting with Foreign Minister Schroeder, the Secretary said he did not want to increase any sense of differences among the West. For this purpose, there were two points on which he believed the Germans could be most helpful during their forthcoming trip to Paris.

1. They could promote an increase in the French conventional contribution in NATO. Such an increase is necessary for the maintenance of the forward strategy. He thought it essential that the Germans should press the French on this point in the interests of our common defense against the Soviet Union.

2. France should take a more active role in the political work of the West. The Secretary referred in this connection to NATO, Berlin, and disarmament. We need French capabilities to help in these multilateral activities, the Secretary said, and we hope the Germans will do their best to persuade the French to fill the "empty chairs."

The Foreign Minister replied that they would have a lot of opportunity to talk to the French as they would be in Paris four days out of the week they would be in France. However, the French were sometimes [illegible] of meeting. This temporary [illegible] expressed itself most strongly

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when it was a question of spending money for troops to be stationed in Bavaria. However, the Foreign Minister added, our interests in these matters are strong and we will do our best to drive the points home. The stationing of conventional forces in the appropriate place to support the forward strategy is an affirmative and not a theoretical contribution to defense.

• • • •

In concluding the meeting, the German Foreign Minister added with some solemnity that trust in the reliability of the United States is the cornerstone of German foreign policy. He, himself, he said, had no doubts on this score. But the United States must understand that Germany is not, politically speaking, as healthy a country as the United States, and the United States will therefore need from time to time to show more understanding for the Germans than the Germans do for the Americans. Our common objective is to promote and defend our traditional friendly relations, and to work together in building and consolidating the peace.

The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for his remarks, and reiterated that our objective also is to reconfirm and extend our cordial relations.

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SECRETARY'S MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
(June 18-25, 1962)

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: June 25, 1962
Time: 8:00 p.m.
Place: Carleton Gardens

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Participants:

United States	UK
Secretary of State	Prime Minister Macmillan
Ambassador Bruce	Lord Home, Foreign Secretary
Mr. Bohlen	Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal
Mr. Kohler	Sir Harold Caccia
	Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
	Mr. Ian Samuels

Subject: Berlin

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Lord Home opened the discussion on Berlin by saying that he wondered whether in this period of relative quiet in the Berlin situation we should not be considering new possibilities that might be put forward to the Soviets, for example, the suggestion that the Western troops be converted to police forces. The Secretary replied that we had the impression that for the time being the Soviets were putting aside all peripheral issues and concentrating on the central question of the presence of occupation forces in Berlin. They seemed to be taking granted the broader issues which had been raised. The Secretary then continued by giving a run-down on the course of the talks he had had with Soviet Ambassador Zaryanin. Both sides, he commented, were trying to penetrate through the words to the realities underneath. There was clearly no chance of making new proposals on the central issue where we had come to the hard core. Perhaps later we could move further on peripheral issues. Also there might be possibilities even in the field of disarmament as well as in expanded contacts between East and West Berlin. We had the impression in Bonn that the East Germans were becoming softer on the question of contacts with the East Germans. At the proper time the trusteeship concept would be worth discussing. In sum, however, he felt that if we could solve

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or leave aside all question of the presence of forces, the other matters would be easy. In theory the Soviets had seemed to hardem up but he felt that in practice they had not done so.

Lord Home said that there had been two ideas he had had in mind as possibilities, the first being the one he had mentioned of turning the armed forces into police forces; the second was the conversion of the occupation into a trusteeship. During the ensuing discussion he clarified that what he had in mind was essentially verbal changes. He did not, for example, contemplate any change in the armament or the numbers of the Western soldiery in Berlin, or the abandonment of our occupational rights.

The Secretary commented that in fact the Soviets have no right to raise any question with respect to Berlin at all except on the basis of their own occupation status. He did not believe that a military crisis is what Khrushchev wants. He added that it was possible that there might be a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in July if the Ministers assembled to emaluate the Laos settlement. In reply to the Prime Minister's inquiry as to what would then be said to Gromyko, the Secretary replied probably the same thing we have been saying in the talks to date. The Secretary then went on to report that German Foreign Minister Schroeder had agreed to the elimination of the phrase in the revised Principles Paper to which the UK and France had objected, which would limit their participation in a Deputy Foreign Ministers Committee. Schroeder had strenuously objected to the inclusion of Paragraph 3 in the revised Principles Paper but had reluctantly accepted our new 3-3-3 formula for membership on the Board of Directors of an International Access Authority. He then reported on his conversations with President de Gaulle and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, commenting that they seemed to have softened up somewhat and that there might be some possibilities of their coming back to participation.

Lord Home said he realized that the evidence seemed to be against it but he continued to be apprehensive that the Soviets might go ahead with the signature of their separate peace treaty. The Secretary, while recognizing that this was a possibility at any time, again expressed the opinion that the weight of the evidence was against the Soviets either bringing on a military crisis or a complete diplomatic impasse. He added that if there were changes in the government in East Germany or perhaps in both East and West Germany, the situation would probably ease. He had had the impression that German opinion was easier about East Germany in any event, particularly in the SPD and the FDP.

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2. SATISFACTION OF CURRENT SOV DEMANDS WILL NOT PUT AN END TO SOV ATTEMPTS UNILATERALLY CHANGE PROCEDURES. RESULT IN FACT WILL BE REVERSE. SOVS WILL VIEW CONCESSIONS NOW AS INVITATION MOVE ON TO FURTHER DEMANDS. THEREFORE, QUITE APART FROM ACCEPTABILITY SOV PROCEDURES ON OWN MERITS, ALLIES SHOULD RESIST CURRENT SOV DEMANDS IN ORDER DISCOURAGE SOVS FROM TRYING TO MOVE ON TO NEW ONES. GOOD ILLUSTRATION THIS PRINCIPLE IS PROVIDED BY INSPECTION ISSUE. IN 1958, SUBSEQUENT TO QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON CONVOY DOCUMENTATION, SOVS ATTEMPTED ASSERT RIGHT INSPECT INTERIOR OF CLOSED ALLIED TRUCKS. ALLIES REJECTED SOV DEMANDS BUT ADOPTED POLICY USING ONLY OPEN TRUCKS ON AUTOBAHN AS MEANS AVOIDING ISSUE. SOVS NOW CLAIMING TAIL GATES OF OPEN VEHICLES SHOULD BE LOWERED SINCE THESE IMPEDE

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-2- JULY 1, NOON, FROM BERLIN

VIEW OF INTERIOR. IF THIS DEMAND TRIPARTITELY COMPLIED WITH, NEXT SOV MOVE MIGHT WELL BE TO INSIST ON BOARDING ALLIED BUSES, SINCE INTERIOR BELOW WINDOW-LINE NOT VISIBLE FROM OUTSIDE AND, UNLIKE TRUCKS, BUSES HAVE NO TAIL GATES THAT CAN BE LOWERED TO FACILITATE VIEW OF INTERIOR. ALLIES ABILITY LOGICALLY RESIST THIS NEXT SOV DEMAND WOULD BE WEAKENED SINCE BY LOWERING TAIL GATES, WE WOULD HAVE MADE OVERT CONCESSION OF SOV INSPECTION RIGHT. CONVERSELY, HOLDING LINE ON TAIL GATE ISSUE MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR SOVS MOVE ON TO FURTHER ATTEMPTS EXTEND INSPECTION PRINCIPLE.

ABOVE ANALYSIS ARGUES FOR COMPLETE REJECTION SOV DEMANDS. HOWEVER, WE CANNOT REALISTICALLY IGNORE FACT OUR POSITION HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT COMPROMISED BY PRACTICES HERETOFORE INSTITUTED THAT PARTIALLY SATISFY SOV DEMANDS. FOR THAT REASON, WE BELIEVE COMPROMISE ALONG LINES US-FRENCH PROPOSALS IN TRIPARTITE PAPER, WHICH FALL SHORT OF SATISFYING SOV DEMANDS, WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. BUT WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO MOVE ANY FURTHER TOWARD BRITISH POSITION FOR REASONS STATED IN NUMBERED PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE. IF TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE ACHIEVED ON US-FRENCH PROPOSALS, WE CONSIDER THEY SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY US UNILATERALLY (OR WITH FRENCH) RATHER THAN BEING FURTHER WATERED DOWN. US SHOULD THEN BE PREPARED UNILATERALLY ISSUE SHLO-5-00288-TYPE DIRECTIVE TO COPE WITH SOV PROCEDURAL HARASSMENTS (IF NOT POSSIBLE OBTAIN EARLY TRIPARTITE ISSUANCE) IN ORDER AVOID GIVING SOVS IMPRESSION HESITATION AND UNCERTAINTY THAT WOULD RESULT FROM LACK OF FIRM RESPONSE TO HARASSMENTS.

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HMR

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16 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Narrative Account of Recent Berlin Ground Access Developments

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to refresh your memory on recent developments concerning the Berlin ground access situation. I will arbitrarily not go farther back than March. Neither will I attach a lengthy series of pertinent documents, although these are, of course, available when and if you want them. Based on recent US-Soviet exchanges and public statements, it would seem that the Soviets are preparing to focus on the status and fact of our garrisons in the city; this suggests that when the squeezing comes, it will be applied to the access of Allied garrisons and not necessarily at the same time to the access of German civilian traffic. I think it will probably come on the ground, where military traffic is easily identifiable and distinguishable from civilian traffic rather than in the air where separation will be difficult. Of course, the Soviets may try some quasi-administrative air harassment, such as pulling their man out of the Berlin Air Safety Center and substituting an East German. However, here I propose to deal only with ground access.

2. At the time of the regular battle group rotation last March, the Soviets began imposing delays and harassments such as head counts, requests for advance notice, and demands that tail gates be lowered. You will recall that General Norstad reached into his files and pulled out the JCS instruction of 19 August which was specifically meant to apply only to the battle group reinforcement which took place the Saturday after the Wall went up. Various individuals and agencies back here were rather upset that General Norstad had done this, but anyhow the battle group rotation ended on 14 March without any really serious incidents.

3. On 30 March we learned of a rather detailed plan which General Watson had prepared for countering harassments and long delays at the checkpoints. This Watson plan was also rather a tough one, but it was reported that Generals Norstad, Clark, and Watson would be meeting on the plan sometime after the middle of April, so no action was taken back here. Meanwhile, the end result of much inter-command and inter-agency communication was an authorization from General Norstad for two "legitimate training mission" convoys between about 5 May and the scheduled beginning of the June battle group rotation.

4. On 5 May, apparently as a result of the Norstad-Clark-Watson meeting, General Norstad cabled the JCS his message ALO 416, which consisted of detailed instructions for the guidance of convoy commanders and Berlin authorities in the event of harassments and delays at the checkpoints or on the autobahn. He requested comments prior to proceeding with his intention of submitting these "rules of conduct" for tripartite approval. Almost

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three weeks went by without any response from JCS; I understand that they were simply bogged down in paper. Unfortunately, in the early morning of 22 May, the Soviets held up a convoy at Babelsberg for something like five hours, and our local authorities in Europe, from General Norstad on down, agreed to apply the principles of ALO 416. However, a few minutes before the announced deadline at the checkpoint had expired, the Soviets let the convoy through.

5. This little incident energized everyone in Washington, and by 25 May State was taking the lead in moving a State-Defense-JCS memorandum to the President which recommended approval of Norstad's ALO 416. However, before the US had completed its knitting back here, General Norstad on 1 June sent his ALO 416, somewhat revised, to the Ministries of Defense in Paris, London, and Bonn, as well as Washington; hence as of this date it became a proposal for tripartite agreement.

6. On 5 June, Secretary Rusk signed a memorandum transmitting to the White House the State-Defense-JCS recommendation that General Norstad's "rules of conduct" in ALO 416 be approved. However, it was not until almost three weeks later that the President did in fact approve the rules of conduct and they thereupon became US unilateral national policy as NSAM 167 dated 25 June (copy at TAB A). The memorandum from Secretary Rusk to the President had recommended that the rules of conduct become US policy and that we announce this fact to the British and French, at the same time requesting that they secure the approval of their governments.

7. Since the rules of conduct were meant to be activated in response to various harassing and delaying demands at the checkpoints, the British proposed in early June that the three Allies coordinate and agree upon their checkpoint procedures, since in fact there were many differences of detail concerning just how much advance notice to give, if any, and just how many trucks would constitute a sufficient number to warrant notification, etc., etc. Therefore, by the end of June the three Allies, with the Germans looking over their shoulder, were at least collating their different procedures with a view to possible uniformity or at least agreement on different procedures, and possibly with a view to notifying the Soviets of the outcome so that everyone would know what to expect from everyone else. Needless to say, there were wide disagreements all over the place, but a fair summary of the principal ones was issued on 29 June as EQD-CC-18 (attached at TAB B).

8. Status.

a. The United States has a detailed position which will unilaterally govern its military convoys at the checkpoints and on the autobahns (NSAM 167 at TAB A).

b. The position adopted by the US for its own people is currently under study by the British and French who will probably agree to most

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of it or come around to something very similar; however, it is necessary to note that tripartite agreement is simply lacking at this point.

c. The various national positions of great detail on what procedures to accept and what procedures to resist are not entirely agreed (BQD-CC-18 at TAB B), but are under discussion in Washington, Bonn, and Berlin; once again, it is necessary to note that tripartite agreement simply does not exist. In this case it should further be noted that a considerable school of thought holds that absolute tripartite agreement on all particulars would by no means necessarily be a good thing, since we would no longer be keeping the Soviets guessing, but instead would in effect be assuming their desire to cooperate by informing them of exactly what the story was going to be from now on. Finally, the British are inclined to negotiate a little bit with the Soviets -- i.e., sort of tell them that we will notify so far in advance for so many trucks if they won't make us dismount, etc.

9. This Berlin Contingency planning has grown so enormously complicated and specialized that very very few officers in State, Defense, and JCS are able to keep up with it. Furthermore, since the situation has been relatively calm for some months now, the policy people at rather high levels have gotten out of touch with developments. I feel that this present memorandum with its two tabs will result in your being sufficiently informed at this time concerning the development and status in the ground access picture. There are, however, some loose ends which I will be following up in the next few days.

LEMNITZER

Attachments.

SECRET

B-865

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SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

SUBJECT: Your Talks in Geneva on Berlin

JUL 15 1962

We will prepare more specific talking points in time for use in your Geneva meetings; the following are intended as general suggestions as to your talks on Berlin. As you know, the French have continued their refusal to participate in any discussions with the Soviets on this subject. The French will, however, attend a quadripartite Allied dinner, and bilateral consultations with our Allies will also take place in Geneva.

There will undoubtedly be a general exchange of views among the Western Foreign Ministers on the intriguing subject of Soviet intentions. We will have a last-minute intelligence estimate with us upon departure on which you can draw. The British have informed us that they continue to receive alarming reports from their Embassy in Moscow. The most current of these, after discussing the position of Khrushchev and recent Soviet statements, both public and private, observes that these "all point to the conclusion that a truly significant decision may have been finally taken by the Soviet leadership, viz., that the period of 'marking time' must end; that the Soviet position must be made unmistakably clear; and that, if the current Soviet-US dialogue does not soon take a more promising turn, the Soviet Union must be prepared to proceed to the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with East Germany on terms that will inevitably affect the Western position in Berlin. It would not be surprising if they now had in mind, if not a time-table, at any rate a rough working programme to that end". The Embassy also argues against the likelihood of Khrushchev's signing a peace treaty which would be largely a treaty in form but not in substance. To what degree these views are shared by the Foreign Office, which has recently been more conservative than the British Embassy in Moscow, is not known, but Lord Home may be somewhat influenced by the Moscow report and may, therefore, press relatively hard for some saving action by the West. The French and the Germans are unlikely to share any British feeling that a climactic point has been reached in the Berlin dialogue, and will argue for more of the same or, in the case of the French, for even less.

In addition to such an exchange of views on Soviet intentions you may also wish to discuss with the Western Foreign Ministers the general state of

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state of Western preparations for meeting the contingency of an early Soviet move towards a peace treaty. You will already have received materials on this subject in a separate memorandum. A further relevant subject of some importance is how the East German request for credits from the Federal Republic fits into this picture and how it can most usefully be turned to Western advantage. The Foreign Ministers will, of course, also want to have your impressions of your last talk with Dobrynin and anything you can give them about the President's conversation with the Soviet Ambassador.

In the thought that you should also have something with a new twist in your possession should Gromyko actually use the Geneva setting for a specific move towards a peace treaty, we have prepared the approach suggested in the attached paper (Tab A) for consideration. You will probably not want to discuss this with the Western Foreign Ministers in advance, but if its use, or something along these lines, does seem desirable, further consultations on the Western side could presumably be held in Geneva.

In your talks on Sunday with Gromyko, a principal effort should be directed towards seeing whether he has anything new to offer which might represent at least recognition of Western vital interests in the Berlin situation. The impression seems to be, however, that it is unlikely that he will come up with anything of this sort, at least in any initial meeting. You will undoubtedly also wish to do the following:

(a) Point out in further detail than in your meeting with Dobrynin why the most recent Soviet proposal is not acceptable;

(b) To probe whether the emphasis in the TASS statement on the NATO role of Western troops in Berlin was intended to suggest a possible basis of verbal compromise or was merely a further argument used by the Soviets against any Western presence;

(c) To warn in general of the dangers of unilateral Soviet action against our position and specifically to point out that Khrushchev's statement to Gorbach, as reported by Kreisky, drawing an analogy between the Western reaction to the wall last August and to the Soviet turn-over to the GDR, is highly dangerous, since our restraint in the first case was deliberate, because a Western vital interest was not directly affected, whereas in the case of access such a vital interest would be directly affected;

(d) To try once again to turn Soviet attention to the possibilities of living with disagreement with our "principles" approach.

Attachment:

Paper: A Possible New Twist for Geneva In Extremis (Tab A)

EUR:GER:MJHillenbrand:all
7/18/62

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2 of 11 B
TAB A

A Possible New Twist for Geneva In Extremis

1. A recent judgment (July 11, 1962) of our Intelligence people is that the Soviets intend to continue the present bilateral talks, but have as yet made neither a final assessment of the ultimate outcome of the negotiations nor a decision regarding their own future course of action. However, the Soviets appear now to be toying with a third alternative to making major concessions or proceeding on the road of unilateral action -- a scaled-down peace treaty which would not be implemented, or fully implemented, immediately after signature.

2. There is a certain inner logic which requires that we continue our efforts at attempting to establish, through exploratory talks, whether a basis for negotiations exists. Thus viewed, the Geneva talks with Gromyko will be a further step in this process. It may be, however, that the Soviets will have concluded that they should proceed to terminate the talks and move toward a separate peace treaty, perhaps of the kind suggested above. Gromyko might, for example, use the talks with you at Geneva to warn of a specific Soviet intention to so proceed. You should probably, therefore, have something with a new twist in it in your pocket so as not completely to be caught by surprise, which you could use if the tactical development of the situation seemed to warrant it.

3. Our modus vivendi proposal (as embodied in the informal working paper which you gave Gromyko on March 22, 1962) was intended to supply a framework of advance agreement as to the consequences of the treaty, which we assumed the Soviets would probably sooner or later conclude. If, as is perhaps likely, this cannot be concluded as a formal agreement with the Soviets, another possibility might be to attempt to implement it on a de facto basis.

4. This might be done, if such an initiative by us seemed desirable, by your suggesting to Gromyko the possibility of unilateral and more or less simultaneous action by the two sides along these lines:

(a) The Soviets and GDR would declare that existing access procedures would be maintained after a treaty and that they would be prepared to set up a Four-Power Access Commission to preside over these procedures.

(b) The US, UK, and France would declare that they were ready in this event to deal with GDR personnel on access on the basis of present procedures and to take part in the Commission.

(c) The US would try to get NATO, and the USSR would try to get the Warsaw Pact, to issue nonaggression declarations.

(d) The US

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(d) The US would relax its insistence at Geneva that nondiffusion be treated as part of a package. (This assumes we would already have taken such a position in the Committee of the Whole.)

(e) The US would not scream too loudly about a treaty and limit our reaction to a formal and propagandistic one. (Our present contingency plans provide for moderate screaming.)

(f) A Deputy Foreign Ministers' Commission would eventually be set up to deal with further Berlin negotiations, nondiffusion, etc.

(g) These things would just happen without any formal agreement relating them to each other and the Soviets could proceed to a treaty.

5. Any such proposal should be accompanied by a clear warning that Soviet action in excess of the points in paragraph 4 would be unacceptable and lead to a highly dangerous confrontation on Berlin.

6. It should be noted that 4(a) and 4(b) above attempt to combine the old Solution C with the Soviet proposal for a Four-Power arbitral body on access which would contain a certain residual Soviet responsibility for this subject as well as provide a continuing point of contact with the Soviets on access questions.

EUR:GER:KJKillenbrand/S/P:HDwen:eaw:all
7/16/62

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MEMORANDUM

23F 72/1

362

DATE: July 19, 1962

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: Berlin Situation

From several Soviet sources comes the information that the Russians consider U.S.-Soviet talks as entering the "crucial stage". These same official sources again challenge the further stay of U.S., U.K. and French occupation forces in Berlin.

A reliable source reports that Khrushchev and Uhlrich in a recent meeting agreed to complete the preparation of a treaty by the 15th of September. In the meantime the crisis situation in Berlin will be intensified beginning about the middle of August, reaching an intensity during the period of September 15th to October 31st. The latter period is to be a "decisive phase" because during or just after this period the Soviets expect to obtain concessions from the U.S.

While the proposed program may not necessarily be followed by the Russians, it does adhere to the usual line and technique. It is to be expected that other aggressive actions will occur, whether or not the long heralded East German Treaty is finally signed. In the latter case, the treaty would probably be drawn up and implemented in such a fashion that the Communist program will be set in motion in a manner and at a tempo just less than that which would invoke Western reaction. In other words, the Western position in Berlin would progressively erode rather than be faced with precipitate action.

One of our principal difficulties in the German situation, as I see it, is our attempt simply to perpetuate the status quo. The Soviet position is flexible and aggressive and takes the usual Soviet form of negotiating U.S. policies, but certainly not its own. Rostow's recent policy statement sets forth the wish that nations of Eastern Europe will eventually become members of the free world by a process of peaceful evolution. It is clear that this same philosophy applies to much of our handling of the East German and Soviet problems. Yet revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, forces are at work in Berlin.

A few years ago the U.S. permitted itself some maneuver room in negotiations by setting forth its own demands. One no longer hears of the Western demand for an all-German plebiscite; there has been a tacit acceptance of the Oder-Neisse boundary; there has been a disquieting cessation of efforts to brand the brutal form of Soviet colonialism, while at the same time permitting -- in certain areas

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July 62 - Apr 63

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at least -- our own aid programs to be labeled as neo-colonialism. The political sector of the U.S. Government, particularly the U.N. element, has for various reasons rejected these policies, not the least of which is the contention that they are aggressive, completely unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and -- once again -- increase tensions. Certainly none of these issues in themselves will precipitate conflict, but surely if some were adopted -- difficult as it would be to restore them at this point -- the U.S. could at least attempt to negotiate Soviet issues rather than to continue the spectacle of trying to hold our own by making fewest concessions to Soviet demands.

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TOP SECRET

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Mr. Gilpatric

RG330 FRC 66B3542

2BF73/11

10 JUL 62

In reply refer to I-25251/62

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

363

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Summary of REDCOM, MARCOM and LIVE OAK Plans

In response to your instructions, the following summary of Berlin contingency plans has been prepared. REDCOM and MARCOM plans are summarized as they now stand. It is anticipated that changes and additions will be made over the next several months as a result of Allience action.

I recommend that distribution of this summary be kept to a minimum since a compilation of this sort is sensitive. These plans have been closely held both here and in the State Department.

REDCOM PLANS

With the exception of REDCOM BRAVO (the nuclear demonstration) and REDCOM DELTA (the naval plan), each of these plans is predicated upon the use of conventional weapons. In addition, however, provisions have been made for the limited use of nuclear weapons to insure the success of the mission when circumstances so warrant. Naval plans provide for the use of nuclear weapons at sea in self defense.

ALPHA ONE. This plan employs the maximum scale of fighter escort for protection of cargo and passenger planes within the Berlin air corridors. Fighter escorts will attack any Communist planes which attack Allied transports. These fighters will also attack any Communist SAM batteries which fire on these transports.

ALPHA TWO. This plan consists of a major air battle to gain and maintain local air superiority over East Germany, initiated with conventional weapons. It includes the attack of Soviet and East German airfields and surface-to-air missile sites in East Germany and selected Communist airfields and SAM sites in the Satellite countries.

Summary 0591 (11 Apr 62)

8593

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BRAVO. This plan is a nuclear demonstration to insure the Communists are aware that the Alliance stands ready for nuclear action. It includes the employment of approximately five low yield air bursts on strictly military targets (such as a group of attacking aircraft, Communist airfield, a SAM site, or a troop concentration) located away from built up areas.

CHARLIE ONE. This plan consists of an attack by a reinforced division along the axis of the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn for the purpose of seizing and holding a salient into East Germany up to the vicinity of Rottmersleben. NATO air forces would operate in a close support role.

CHARLIE TWO. This plan is a two division attack to pinch off and hold the salient East of Kassel up to the general line Duderstadt-Borbis-Hanfried.

CHARLIE THREE. This plan consists of a corps attack of up to four divisions along the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn to seize and hold a salient into East Germany up to the line Mittaland Canal - Elbe River.

CHARLIE FOUR. This plan is an attack by a corps of up to four divisions to seize and hold the high ground areas of the Thuringer-Wald.

DELTA. This plan includes the employment of naval forces for surveillance of Soviet Bloc warships and merchant shipping, hindrance of Soviet Bloc ship activity, board and search measures, seizure of Soviet Bloc merchant ships, and excluding or diverting Soviet Bloc ships from or the blockade of, specific areas. Each of these measures will be specifically ordered executed; therefore, this single plan actually is several plans consolidated into one.

MARCON PLANS

These plans would be carried out with conventional weapons except that nuclear weapons would be used in self defense.

ONE. To shadow designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships in specified areas.

TWO. To shadow Soviet Bloc warships in specified areas.

THREE. To hinder and directly annoy designated Soviet Bloc ships.

FOUR. To board and search designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships.

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FIVE. To seize designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships.

SIX. To blockade or enforce diversion and exclusion of Soviet Bloc ships from specified areas.

LIVE OAK PLANS

AIR PLANS

JACK FIVE. The tripartite plan for air operations designed to maintain air access to Berlin. Part I is concerned with air transport operations (including airlift support of the Berlin garrison); Part II with air tactical operations (fighter escort, etc.).

* QUAL. A quadripartite Berlin airlift plan providing for massive airlift operations in support of Berlin populace in event surface access is blocked. It provides for an airlift of 4,000 metric tons daily into Berlin.

GROUND PLANS

FREE STYLE. A tripartite (France, UK and US) platoon sized probe from Helmstedt to Berlin to determine whether or not the Soviets are prepared to use force to prevent the passage of an Allied convoy on the autobahn. Three alternative courses of action--A, B, or C--include employment of tripartite probe parties of varying sizes and composition.

BACK STROKE. Similar to FREE STYLE, except that it originates in Berlin.

TRADE WIND. A tripartite plan for using force in an attempt to cause the Soviets to reopen autobahn access from Helmstedt to Berlin. A battalion sized force of 1070 personnel and 239 vehicles would be used.

LOOSE SPOKES. Similar to TRADE WIND except that it originates in Berlin and would use a smaller force of 681 personnel and 133 vehicles.

*(Technically this is not a LIVE OAK plan since it is quadripartite rather than tripartite.)

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JUKE BALL. This plan would use a tripartite division sized force to reopen access. Although planning is not yet completed, it is anticipated that assembly of the force would be under LIVE OAK and implementation under NATO.

/s/ Paul H. Nitze

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 98, JULY 26, 2 PM

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PARIS FOR USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

USAREUR FOR POLAD

PART ONE OF THREE-PART MESSAGE

RECENT SOVIET/GDR STATEMENTS AND MOVES INDICATE THAT SOVIETS MAY BE PREPARING FOR FURTHER EROSIVE ACTIONS IN NEAR FUTURE AGAINST ALLIES IN BERLIN AND ON ACCESS ROUTES. EXACT FORMS OF ANTICIPATED SOVIET/GDR INITIATIVES CANNOT BE PREDICTED, BUT WE ASSUME SOVS WILL CONTINUE PREVIOUS PRACTICE OF COMBINED HARASSMENT AND CAUTIOUS PROBING. WE FURTHERMORE BELIEVE THAT SOVS, EVEN IF THEY INTEND TO SIGN SEPARATE GDR PEACE TREATY IN NEAR FUTURE, WOULD STILL WISH TO CARRY OUT PROBES AGAINST ALLIED POSITIONS IN BERLIN PRIOR TO SIGNING SUCH TREATY. IF THIS IS TRUE, WE SUGGEST SOVS LIKELY TO WORK ALONG FOLLOWING LINES DURING NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, WHETHER OR NOT THEY PLAN EARLY SIGNATURE OF PEACE TREATY:

1. EROSION OF ALLIED QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS IN EAST BERLIN BY IGNORING OR FURTHER REDUCING CONTACTS BETWEEN SOV AND WESTERN COMMANDANTS AND BY ATTEMPTS TRANSFER RESIDUAL QUADRIPARTITE RELATIONS FROM COMMANDANT TO CINC LEVELS;

2. ATTEMPT AT INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF FURTHER EROSION OF FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITIES FOR GERMANY AS A WHOLE THROUGH

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-2- 98, JULY 26, 2 PM; FROM BERLIN

CLOSER ASSOCIATION OF WARSAW PACT STATES, ESPECIALLY POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IN CURRENT EAST-WEST CONFRONTATIONS RE BERLIN AND GERMAN PEACE TREATY;

3. SOV/GDR ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE WEST FURTHER BY INCIDENTS AT WALL, IN AIR, ON AUTOBAHN, MAIL, S-BAHN, ETC.; AND TO ASSERT AND DEMONSTRATE GDR "POWER" THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MOVES, PROPAGANDA, RUMORS, ETC. SOVS/GDR MIGHT HOPE THAT, AS RESULT THESE ACTS OF "WAR OF NERVES", ATMOSPHERE OF FRUSTRATION AND "RESIGNATION TO INEVITABLE" MIGHT BE CREATED IN WEST IN WHICH WEST WOULD ACCEPT UNILATERAL SOV/GDR ACTS ON LAND ACCESS ROUTES EVEN PRIOR TO, AND CERTAINLY IN CONNECTION WITH, SOV'S SIGNING SEPARATE GDR PEACE TREATY;

4. INCREASED EXERCISE OF GDR SOVEREIGNTY ON LAND ACCESS ROUTES, WHICH MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED FIRST THROUGH DIRECT ASSOCIATION OF EAST GERMANS WITH SOVS IN EXERCISING "CONTROL" OVER ALLIED ACCESS, AND ULTIMATELY, DEPENDING ON ALLIED REACTIONS, THROUGH COMPLETE TRANSFER OF THIS "CONTROL" TO GDR.

ALTHOUGH ALL OF FOREGOING AVENUES OF INITIATIVES ARE OF CONCERN TO ALLIES, WE WOULD BE CONFRONTED BY PARTICULARLY SERIOUS SITUATION IF POINT 4 WERE ACTED UPON. THIS MESSAGE IS THEREFORE LARGELY DEVOTED TO EXAMINATION THAT PROBLEM.

ON BASIS SOV PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AS WELL AS KHRUSHCHEV'S REMARKS TO KREISKY RE POSSIBLE MOVES ON BERLIN WHICH WOULD NOT GIVE WEST PRETEXT FOR USING FORCE, WE CONCLUDE SOVS MAY ESTIMATE THAT WESTERN ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT GDR ASSOCIATION WITH SOVIET "CONTROLS" OF ALLIED TRAFFIC ON LAND ACCESS ROUTES, PROVIDED ALLIED ACCESS WERE NOT HINDERED AND CONTROL PROCEDURES WERE NOT TECHNICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE NOW IN FORCE. THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, BE HALF-WAY STEP TO COMPLETE SUBSTITUTION GDR FOR SOV "CONTROLS". SOV SUCCESS IN BRINGING ABOUT ALLIED ACCEPTANCE OF VOPO "ASSOCIATION" WOULD DOUBTLESS HASTEN DAY OF COMPLETE SUBSTITUTION GDR FOR SOVS IN LAND ACCESS "CONTROL" FUNCTIONS.

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PROBLEM OF INITIALLY ASSOCIATING AND, IF THIS SUCCESSFUL, LATER SUBSTITUTING GDR FOR SOV CONTROLS MAY APPEAR TO SOVS TO BE ESSENTIALLY THAT OF CREATING SAME "LEGAL" SITUATION ON ACCESS ROUTES AS PRESENT "LEGAL" SITUATION ON ALLIED ACCESS TO SOV SECTOR OF BERLIN, WHERE CONTROLS ARE NOW FORMALLY EXERCISED EXCLUSIVELY BY GDR OFFICIALS. ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "CONTROLS" ON ACCESS ROUTES AND THOSE AT FRIEDRICHSTRASSE WOULD BE THAT, WHEREAS ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL IN UNIFORM DO NOT SHOW DOCUMENTATION TO ENTER EAST BERLIN, FOR AUTOBAHN TRAVEL THEY WOULD NEED TO SUBMIT TO EAST GERMAN OFFICIALS COPIES OF MOVEMENT ORDERS NOW PROCESSED BY SOVIETS.

SOVS PROBABLY UNCERTAIN (A) WHETHER ALLIES WOULD ACCEPT SUCH ATTEMPTS TO SUBSTITUTE GDR FOR SOVIET "CONTROLS" OF MILITARY ACCESS OR (B) WHETHER RESPONSE MIGHT BE (1) ALLIED GROUND PROBES OR (2) GARRISON AIRLIFT. BEING CAUTIOUS, THEREFORE, THEY LIKELY CONFRONT ALLIES FIRST WITH MIXED GDR/SOVIET CONTROL TEAMS. THIS CONCEPT OF MIXED TEAMS, TO BE FOLLOWED LATER BY EXCLUSIVE GDR "CONTROLS", MIGHT THEN BE EXTENDED TO MILITARY TRAINS.

IF THEY ACCOMPLISHED THIS BEFORE PEACE TREATY SOV/GDR WOULD THEREBY ACHIEVE MAJOR POLITICAL VICTORY BY CLAIMING THAT GDR SOVEREIGNTY ALREADY BEING "RESPECTED" BY ALLIES NOT ONLY IN EAST BERLIN BUT ALSO ON ALL LAND ACCESS ROUTES. THUS ONLY OUTSTANDING "LEGAL" ISSUES REMAINING RE "RESPECT" FOR GDR SOVEREIGNTY WOULD BE ACHIEVEMEMENT GDR VOICE IN CONTROL OVER AIR ACCESS, AND IDENTIFICATION ALLIED MILITARY ENTERING EAST BERLIN.

FURTHERMORE, THROUGH THIS MOVE SOVS COULD ACHIEVE BOTH MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN TACTICS AND ABILITY STRATEGICALLY TO "CONTROL THE CRISIS" - - BASIC SOV OBJECTIVE FROM BEGINNING OF CRISIS IN 1958. IF ALLIES WERE TO ACCEPT FIRST STEP (MIXED SOV/GDR ACCESS CONTROLS), SOVIETS WOULD DOUBTLESS MOVE RAPIDLY TO TOTAL SUBSTITUTION GDR FOR SOV PERSONNEL. IF ALLIES RESISTED

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-4- 98, JULY 26, 2 PM; FROM BERLIN

FIRST STEP, AS THEY DID IN FACT OF DEMANDS FOR CHANGE OF CONVOY PROCEDURES, SOVS COULD STILL BACK DOWN IN WAY WHICH PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE IF THIS STEP TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH PEACE TREATY WHEN THEIR PRESTIGE WOULD BE FULLY COMMITTED. THUS IF THESE MEASURES TAKEN BEFORE PEACE TREATY, SOVS WILL BE ABLE TEST OUR FIRMNESS AND EXPLOIT ANY WEAKNESSES. RESULTS WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT BEARING ON THEIR ASSESSMENT WHETHER TO SIGN TREATY AND HOW DAR TREATY SHOULD GO IN DENYING ACCESS. WHILE WE HAVE NO CONCLUSIVE INDICATIONS THESE MOVES ARE PLANNED (SEE PART TWO) THEY APPEAR TO BE LOGICAL STEPS FROM SOV/GDR STANDPOINT AND TO BE IN KEEPING WITH SOVIET CHARACTER.

IN ANY CASE WE BELIEVE IMPORTANT THAT CONTINGENCY PLANS EXPLICITLY TAKE THIS POSSIBILITY INTO ACCOUNT. IN OUR VIEW ALLIES' RESPONSE TO SUCH PROBING ACTION IF MADE BEFORE UNDERLINE BEFORE PEACE TREATY SHOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM ALLIED REACTION TO ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER PEACE TREATY WHEN SOV PRESTIGE COMMITTED.

LIGHTNER

JTC

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TO: Secretary of State

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REFERENCE: BERLIN'S 98 AND 99 DEPT; 85 AND 86 BONN

PART THREE OF THREE-PART MESSAGE

THIS MESSAGE DISCUSSES SOME POSSIBLE SOV MOVES, WHETHER OR NOT SEPARATE PEACE TREATY IS SIGNED, UNDER FOLLOWING HEADINGS: (1) TRANSFER LOCUS THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALLIES FROM BERLIN COMMANDANT TO CINC LEVEL; (2) ASSOCIATE POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA MORE CLOSELY WITH THEIR MOVES ON BERLIN/GERMANY QUESTIONS; AND (3) ATTEMPTS TO INTIMIDATE WEST AND TO ASSERT GDR POWER.

1. SOVS PRINCIPAL INTEREST IN CINC RELATIONS APPEARS TO DERIVE FROM CINCS ROLES IN RELATIONS BETWEEN SOVS AND ALLIES ON PRIMARILY "MILITARY" QUESTIONS (E.G., ACCESS ROUTES, MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS), AS DISTINCT FROM "POLITICAL" SUBJECTS (E.G., FOUR-POWER STATUS BERLIN). AS PART OF POLICY OF ELIMINATING VESTIGES OF QUADRIPARTITE STATUS OF BERLIN, SOVS MIGHT FIND ADVANTAGES IN INCREASINGLY TRANSFERRING LOCUS FOR DISCUSSING QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY HANDLED BY COMMANDANTS TO CINC LEVEL. (IN FACT, THERE HAVE BEEN NO PERSONAL US-SOV COMMANDANT CONTACTS SINCE LATE 1961, APART FROM MAY 17 WATSON-SOLOVYEV MEETING WHICH FAILED

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RESOLVE ISSUES BETWEEN COMMANDANTS.) TO EXTENT THAT WEST ACCEPTED SUCH TRANSFER, SOVS WOULD HAVE SUCCEEDED (1) IN ELIMINATING FROM AREA OF COMPETENCE OF SOVIET OCCUPATION OFFICIALS IN BERLIN VAST COMPLEX OF PROBLEMS DEALING DIRECTLY WITH BERLIN ITSELF, AND (2) IN LIMITING CINC RELATIONS LARGELY OR EXCLUSIVELY TO QUESTIONS INVOLVING USE OF ACCESS ROUTES.

IT WOULD STILL BE NECESSARY MAINTAIN CONTACTS BETWEEN ALLIES AND SOVS ON BERLIN THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS. HOWEVER, ANY MATTERS ON WHICH SOVS WISHED TO HAVE EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH ALLIES OUTSIDE CINC CHANNELS PROBABLY WOULD BE CARRIED OUT AT GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT LEVEL (E.G., SOV JUNE 7 NOTE ON BERLIN INCIDENT), OR MIGHT BE HANDLED THROUGH COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO GDR AS HIGH COMMISSIONER AND ALLIED AMBASSADORS TO BONN AS HIGH COMMISSIONERS. USE OF AMBASSADORIAL CHANNEL, OF COURSE, WOULD HAVE DISADVANTAGE, FROM SOV POINT OF VIEW, OF IMPLYING THAT FEDREP, TO WHOM WESTERN ALLIED AMBASSADORS ACCREDITED, HAS SOME KIND OF JURIDICAL PRESENCE IN BERLIN. THUS IT WOULD APPEAR THAT ON BERLIN PROBLEM SOVS WOULD BE INCLINED TO RESORT TO GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATIONS OR TO RELATIONS BETWEEN CINCS.

IN USING CINC CHANNELS, SOVS PROBABLY WOULD FIND IT USEFUL TO RETAIN MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS INTACT, PERHAPS SEEKING TO TRANSFORM GRADUALLY THEIR FORMAL CHARACTER FROM MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS BETWEEN FOUR OCCUPATION POWERS TO MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT COMMANDERS. SUCH TRANSFORMATION MIGHT NOT APPEAR TO SOVS TO BE TOO DIFFICULT, SINCE ALL WESTERN CINCS HAVE NATO ROLES AND SOV CINC IS SENIOR WARSAW PACT COMMANDER IN SOVZONE.

2. IN THEIR RECENT STATEMENTS SOVIET/GDR HAVE INCREASINGLY EMPLOYED POLISH AND CZECH INTEREST IN CREATION "FREE CITY WEST BERLIN" AND IN GERMAN PEACE TREATY. GDR REGIME HAS ALSO GIVEN GREAT EMPHASIS TO CONCLUSION NON-AGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT. AS SUGGESTED BY GDR PROPAGANDA, SUCH NON-

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AGGRESSION PACT WOULD PROVIDE FRAMEWORK OF "PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE" BETWEEN SOCIALIST AND CAPITALIST SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. FROM GDR STANDPOINT, IT WOULD, MORE IMPORTANTLY, CREATE POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER WHICH FEDREP WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY WORLD PUBLIC OPINION INCREASINGLY IN CONTEXT WESTERN EUROPE AND SOVZONE IN CONTEXT EASTERN EUROPE. THUS, FOUR-POWER OBLIGATION TO BRING ABOUT REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY WOULD GRADUALLY LOSE ALL RELEVANCE, AND EXISTENCE OF TWO GERMAN STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS WOULD BE RECOGNIZED.

LIGHTNER

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 100, BONN 87, INFORMATION LONDON 49, MOSCOW 41, PARIS 52, PRAGUE, WARSAW UNNUMBERED, USAREUR 49,

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REF BERLIN'S 98 AND 99 DEPT; 85 AND 86 BONN

IN FURTHERANCE THIS POLICY, IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SOV/GDR IF THEY COULD CREATE SITUATION IN WHICH THREE WESTERN ALLIES (US, UK, FRANCE) PLUS FEDREP WOULD BE BALANCED BY THREE EASTERN ALLIES (USSR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA) AND GDR. THIS FORMULA HAS ADVANTAGE FROM SOVBLOC SIDE THAT ALL STATES INVOLVED WOULD HAVE BEEN WORLD WAR II ALLIES AND HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST NAZI GERMANY, AND THAT FEDREP AND GDR, IN CONTEXT NATO AND WARSAW PACT, WOULD BE EQUALLY SUCCESSORS TO GERMAN REICH.

IT WOULD SERVE SOV/GDR PURPOSE, AS PART OF EFFORT TO CREATE THIS RELATIONSHIP, IF THEY WERE TO ANNOUNCE JUST PRIOR TO OR DURING FALL MANEUVERS, IN WHICH CZECHS AND POLES ARE EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE, THAT WARSAW PACT STATES HAVE REACHED NEW UNDERSTANDING CALLING FOR MORE ACTIVE ROLES OF CZECHS AND POLES IN GDR TERRITORY TO PROTECT WARSAW PACT'S WESTERN BOUNDARIES FROM NATO'S (ESPECIALLY FEDREP'S "AGGRESSIVE" DESIGNS. BY ASSOCIATING CZECHS AND POLES WITH GERMAN QUESTION, SOVBLOC WOULD HAVE CREATED POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH

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WARSAW PACT STATES AND GDR WOULD HAVE NUMERICAL PARITY WITH WESTERN ALLIES AND FEDREP IN MATTERS DEALING WITH SETTLEMENT OF WEST BERLIN AND GERMAN PEACE TREATY QUESTIONS. PRESENT FOUR-POWER FRAMEWORK, BOTH FOR BERLIN AND GERMAN QUESTIONS, WOULD HAVE BEEN DEALT SERIOUS BLOW WITHOUT NEED FOR SEPARATE PEACE TREATY WITH GDR, WITH RISKS WHICH MIGHT ATTEND SUCH ACTION.

WHEN CARRYING OUT SUCH MOVES, SOVS WOULD PROBABLY PREFER TO USE THOSE EXISTING CHANNELS IN GERMANY LEAST ASSOCIATED WITH FOUR-POWER ARRANGEMENTS AND MOST ASSOCIATED WITH WAR AGAINST NAZI GERMANY. OF THESE CHANNELS, CINC LEVEL APPEARS MOST SUITABLE TO THESE ENDS. RECENT SOV INITIATIVE TO ARRANGE COURTESY CALLS BY YAKUBOVSKY ON US AND BRITISH COUNTERPARTS IN WEST GERMANY OR WEST BERLIN ALSO SUPPORT THEORY SOVIET CINC WILL SEEK TO EXPAND HIS RELATIONS WITH ALLIED CINCS, BOTH DIRECTLY AND THROUGH GREATER USE OF MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS IN COMING MONTHS.

3. RECENT SOV/GDR BEHAVIOR INDICATES THAT, IN PREPARING THEIR NEXT EROSIVE TACTICS AGAINST ALLIED POSITIONS IN BERLIN, SOVS/GDR INTEND INTENSIFY THEIR ACTS OF INTIMIDATION (INCIDENTS, RUMORS, DIPLOMATIC MOVES AND PROPAGANDA) AND WILL SEEK TO FIND OCCASIONS BY WHICH TO ASSERT AND DEMONSTRATE EXTENT OF GDR "POWER". MISSION THUS ANTICIPATES INTENSIFIED SOV HARASSMENTS IN AIR CORRIDORS AND MILITARY ACCESS ROUTES AS WELL AS SELECTED GDR HARASSMENTS OF GERMAN CIVILIAN RAIL AND ROAD TRAVEL. POSSIBLE OTHER ACTS IN "COLD WAR" WHICH MISSION DOES NOT EXCLUDE ARE FOLLOWING: VOPO AND KAMPFGRUPPEN EXERCISES IN EAST BERLIN JUST BEYOND WALL; THREATS AT INTERFERENCE WITH OR INTERRUPTION OF INTERZONAL MAIL DELIVERIES; TRIALS OF ALLEGED WESTERN PROVOCATEURS; ETC. SOV/GDR PURPOSE IN CARRYING OUT SUCH HARASSMENTS WOULD BE TO INCREASE IN WESTERN WORLD SENSE OF "EXPOSED POSITION" OF WEST BERLIN AND GRADUALLY TO CREATE ATMOSPHERE OF FRUSTRATION, EXHAUSTION AND "RESIGNATION TO INEVITABLE." MISSION ALSO EXPECTS THAT AS PART OF "WAR OF NERVES" SOVS ARE LIKELY INCREASINGLY TO USE

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DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO IMPRESS WESTERN GOVERNMENTS THAT SIGNING OF SEPARATE PEACE TREATY IMMINENT UNLESS WEST IS READY TO MAKE FURTHER IMMEDIATE CONCESSIONS TO SOV/GDR DEMANDS ON BERLIN. COLLECTIVELY, FOREGOING ACTS MIGHT BE DESIGNED TO PRECONDITION WEST PSYCHOLOGICALLY TO ACCEPT SUCH SOV/GDR UNILATERAL ACTS AS SUBSTITUTION GDR FOR SOV "CONTROLS".

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28 JUL 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Reappraisal of the Berlin Situation (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently completed a review of the Berlin situation of the past ten months. Attached hereto as Appendix A for information is a copy of the study in abbreviated form. The indicated Enclosures have not been included due to length, but can be made available if desired.

2. As a result of this review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed the following actions:

a. In view of the withdrawal of certain units and personnel augmentations from Europe, plans are being prepared for maintaining personnel and units at a high state of readiness for rapid deployment to Europe to bring EUCOM to operational strength.

b. The concept of joint strategic mobility exercises such as LONG THRUST is being evaluated in order to determine if it is possible to improve the value of these exercises to the CONUS forces in testing over-all US rapid deployment plans, as well as to demonstrate to NATO and the Soviets/GDR, a capability for rapid extensive reinforcement. A demonstrable rapid reinforcing capability will in part offset adverse NATO reaction to a reduction in US Forces.

c. A study of mobilization and deployment capability within the framework of Phase II of NSAM 109 has been instituted.

d. Joint Chiefs of Staff actions with respect to Berlin are being reviewed. Changed conditions during the past year may require reevaluation of previous positions.

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e. US membership in international bodies that include communist nations has not protected US policies to our satisfaction in the past. An analysis, therefore, is being made of existing international control bodies (e.g., ICC) which upon initial US acceptance appeared to provide adequate protection for US national interests, but which when placed in actual operation have worked against US interests. This analysis, when considered in conjunction with the proposed charter of the International Access Authority for Berlin, may indicate dangerous pitfalls to be avoided. The following two areas are evident in this connection:

(1) The Authority itself can be so constituted that the Soviet Bloc representatives can obstruct operations by some type of veto or voting procedure as is the case with the ICC in Southeast Asia.

(2) The GDR can retain physical control of the autobahn and be responsible for road maintenance and control, rather than the Authority having its own maintenance and control personnel and equipment.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note in the reappraisal that the United States and Allies have been most successful in meeting Soviet/GDR challenges when they possess strength, determination and unanimity of purpose, and when situations have been anticipated to the extent that adequate plans have been prepared. In this connection a number of tasks remain to be accomplished. The following appear to be generally the responsibility of the Department of Defense:

a. Continue to press for Allied fulfillment of MC 26/4 force goals at an early date, thus permitting the implementation of a NATO forward strategy.

b. Continue to press for corrective action by NATO in its logistical preparedness for war. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff will, whenever the opportunity is present, continue to impress upon NATO military personnel the urgent need to accomplish the above two tasks.)

c. Continue to press with our quadripartite and NATO Allies and within the US Government for an early and acceptable settlement of those divisive issues which currently tend to fragment and weaken NATO, e.g., differences among quadripartite nations on Berlin negotiating tactics, among NATO nations on MRBM and atomic matters, and among Western European nations over EEC, all of which create problems within NATO.

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d. Press for early favorable resolution of the following unresolved Berlin issues:

(1) Economic countermeasures.

(2) Naval countermeasures.

(3) Quadripartite/NATO version of NSAM 109.

(4) Approval by NAC of BERCON/MARCON plans.

(5) Approval by NAC of the Tripartite-NATO relationship paper.

(6) Tripartite air countermeasures.

e. Coordinate with State Department the initiation of discussions with Allies to determine those areas in which the current "roll back" program may be expanded. (It will be noted that General Norstad's messages ALO 416 and SHLO5-00288 are a start in this direction.)

f. With respect to subparagraph 2 c, investigate the logistical requirements in support of a military mobilization within the framework of Phase II of NSAM 109.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further note in the reappraisal that some of the conclusions require political consideration and evaluation. It is therefore recommended that you forward the memorandum in Appendix B, together with its Annex, to the Secretary of State.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

262.00/8-262

Memorandum of Conversation

367

DATE: August 2, 1962

SUBJECT: Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

COPIES TO: S, U, S/P, S/B, INR, EUR, GER, SOV, ACDA, Embassies Moscow, Bonn, London, Paris, USBER Berlin.

August 8, 1962

Ambassador Dobrynin asked me to lunch by myself today "to get acquainted". The following points of interest emerged:

Referring to Secretary Rusk's idea about a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting on Berlin, Dobrynin said he had the impression that we were expecting to hear further from Gromyko on the subject, and I confirmed this.

Ambassador Dobrynin then mentioned Mr. Kohler's call on Gromyko on July 25 in relation to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said that, according to the memorandum of conversation of that meeting, which he had read, Mr. Rusk intended to give further thought to this matter after his return to Washington, and that he would get in touch with Ambassador Dobrynin on the subject. He said that he was not under instructions to raise this point with us, but that he would appreciate my passing his remarks on to the Secretary and to Mr. Kohler. (This has been done).

Reverting to the topic of a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting, Dobrynin asked me whether, in the event that one should take place, I would be the Deputy Foreign Minister. I said this was most unlikely. He said that on the Soviet side, the Deputy Foreign Minister would be one of the three following officials: Semenov, Kuznetsov or Sobolev. He said that the Soviet Government always named a high official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for such purpose. I commented that our practice was more flexible, and said that, for example, at the meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris in 1951 (Palais

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Rose Conference), Ambassador Jessup had been the Deputy Foreign Minister.

I asked Dobrynin whether Foreign Minister Gromyko would be coming to New York for the opening of the UN General Assembly, and Dobrynin said he would.

I asked whether Premier Khrushchev also planned to come to the General Assembly. Dobrynin said that no official decision had been taken on this as yet and that "it was too early to know". The general sense of his reply suggested that Khrushchev might come later.

I asked Dobrynin whether he could tell me anything about Ulbricht's trip to Moscow. He replied that he had seen the news in the press, but that he had no information and did not care to speculate.

I asked Dobrynin why the Soviet Government was pressing so insistently on the issue of the presence of Western troops in West Berlin, since we had repeatedly stated that this was a matter of vital interest to us, and that there seemed to be no point in continuing to press it. Dobrynin said that the situation in Berlin was a dangerous one since it resulted in continuous friction, and that the presence of Western troops was "like a sore tooth which sometimes hurt more and sometimes hurt less, but gave continuous pain". I said that the only danger and friction arose if one side continued to exert pressure on the other side on points which were unacceptable. Dobrynin smiled and changed the subject.

COMMENT: I had the impression from the gist of Dobrynin's remarks that he expects the coming weeks to be busy. He asked if I had taken any leave this summer. I said "no" and asked him whether he was planning to take some leave. He smiled, and said that he had hoped to be able to go back to the Soviet Union for a few days to join his wife, but that in view of the general trend of events he had given up these plans.

[redacted]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S 8/15/62

Memorandum of Conversation

13441

CATEGORY "A"

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DATE: August 8, 1962.

Removed AUG 25 1972

10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Deputy Foreign Ministers Meeting on Germany (S/S)

FILE RS/R

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EO 11652: XGDS (1) 6 0 4
Authorized By: H. D. [illegible]
August 4, 1975

PARTICIPANTS: Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Embassy of the U.S.S.R.
The Secretary
Mr. Philip Valdes, EUR/SOV

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CIA - Mr. McCone
DOD - Mr. McNamara
DOD/ISA - Mr. Nitze
White House - Mr. Bundy (2)
Amembassy Moscow - Chargé d'Affaires Mr. McSweeney
Amembassy Bonn - Amb. Dowling
Amembassy London - Amb. Bruce
Amembassy Paris - Amb. Gavin

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The Secretary said that Gromyko had said in Geneva he would have something further to say on the proposal for a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting on Germany. He asked if Ambassador Dobrynin had anything new on this.

The Ambassador said he did not. He pointed out Gromyko had also mentioned demilitarized zones, and asked if the Secretary had anything new on that.

The Secretary said he did not. It was an old, old story.

After a discussion of who would attend the UNGA (the Secretary saying he would but did not know when, and Dobrynin saying the Soviet delegation was not yet made up owing to vacations but he thought personally that Gromyko would attend as he usually did) the Secretary said he wanted to make another comment about the Deputy Foreign Minister's proposal. From what Chairman Khrushchev had said to Ambassador Thompson, it appeared that this could be looked at in Moscow as a delaying tactic. There is no question of delay on either side, unless it is on both. We have made proposals the Soviets have not accepted, and they have made proposals we have not accepted. This is not delaying, but disagreement. The question is how to handle disagreement without a crisis. If we could agree on some of the other points, this may have some effect on the more central point, West Berlin. Gromyko said in Geneva you would be glad to discuss these with us on a bilateral basis, but that discussion among the four would be better. The four is also more agreeable to us. I had to remind him that I cannot speak for the others.

Dobrynin

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Dobrynin asked if we then preferred the four.

The Secretary said we did, and said he gathered so did the Soviets. He said that at Geneva Gromyko had once said he was prepared to discuss with us, or better still with the four. The Secretary said he picked this up as an expression of preference for the four.

The Ambassador said he did not know if the remark could be so taken.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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369

FROM: BROMLEY SMITH

TO: CAPT SHEPARD

INFO:

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SENT WHASA AUG 11 21 57

FOR THE PRESIDENTS INFORMATION.

GENERAL GUIDANCE IS TO KEEP U.S. OBSERVANCES OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE BERLIN WALL IN LOW KEY.

GEN. CLAY AND GEORGE MEANY HAVE ORGANIZED A TV PROGRAM ON EACH OF THE FOUR NETWORKS CONSISTING OF A TAPED STATEMENT BY MAYOR BRANDT AND A TWO MINUTE STATEMENT BY A PROMINENT AMERICAN. CLAY AND MEANY HAVE ASKED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE VICE PRESIDENT TO MAKE STATEMENTS. ONLY ONE OF THE FOUR WOULD APPEAR ON EACH NETWORK.

CLAY TOOK EXCEPTION TO THE STATE DEPARTMENTS DECISION TO KEEP WALL ANNIVERSARY OBSERVANCES ON A MODEST SCALE AND SAID HE WOULD LET THE PRESS KNOW THAT THE DEPARTMENT WAS TRYING TO PREVENT PROPER OBSERVANCE OF THE ANNIVERSARY IF HE DID NOT RECEIVE DEPARTMENT'S SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORT.

SECRETARY RUSK DECIDED THAT THE PROGRAMS DESCRIBED ABOVE, ALTHOUGH NOT A LOW KEY AS DESIRABLE, SHOULD NOT BE OPPOSED BECAUSE THE COST OF SO DOING WOULD BE TO RISK HARMFUL NEWS STORIES TO THE EFFECT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO BLOCK ALL OBSERVANCES EVEN THOUGH SPONSORED BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.

PAGE 1 OF 1 NOTE TO CAPT SHEPARD: PLEASE INFORM SALINGER OF THIS ALSO.

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SUBJECT: Possible Soviet/GDR actions in Berlin

REFERENCE: Berlin's 160

We agree that possibility exists of Soviet/GDR actions within Berlin, as well as on access routes.

As you are aware, quadripartite planning on allied access to east Berlin has centered on means of meeting harassment of Allied officials at crossing point between West and East Berlin. Agreement has been reached among US, UK and France as to steps to be taken if Allied access blocked, as well as on question of what GDR documentation demands they will consider as tantamount to blockage (BQD-CC-1, Part III, A.) The US position on which this agreed course of action is based is reflected in JCS 1265 to USCINCEUR of August 25, 1961. Subsequently, the US approved a course of action whereby tanks could be used to destroy any barriers placed across Allied crossing point. Approval was, however, subject to tripartite agreement, which was never obtained, and contingent use of this measure has never been authorized.

BTF:GER:JCAuslanditch 8/11/62

GER - Martin J. Hillenbrand

ISA - Col. Meacham (in substance)
JCS - Gen. Gray (in substance)

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Question West German and West Berliner access to east Berlin, which is treated in BQD-CC-1, Part III.B., is now closely related to general problem possible GDR passport, visa, or customs requirement, on which Contingency Coordinating Sub-Group has just completed working paper (BQD-CC-20).

Allied reaction to possible Soviet/GDR psychological, economic, or political harassment of West Berlin is treated in BQD-CC-1, Part III.C.

We believe best place for review of current planning is Berlin, perhaps with assistance Allied Staff. Review should include in particular possible Soviet/GDR action against Allied personnel in east Berlin. It should also examine any possibilities for prompt counter-measures in addition to those listed in BQD-CC-1, Part III.A. (You should, however, not plan for any action which would prevent Soviet personnel from travelling to and from BASC. If Soviets withdraw from BASC, we want it to be clear that it was their decision, not by-product of some action on our part.)

Accordingly, request you undertake urgent tripartite review planning related to possible Soviet/GDR actions within Berlin, using BQD-CC-1, Part III as point of departure. [redacted] Review should begin with question Allied access to east Berlin. As soon as you receive BQD-CC-20, you should also review planning for German access to east Berlin. As you are able, you should review possible Soviet/GDR psychological, political and economic moves against West Berlin. (We have requested French and British Embassies to ask their governments to send parallel instructions to their Missions

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in Berlin.)

Please keep us informed progress your review. If any specific questions arise on which you wish further guidance, request you submit along with recommendations.

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SECRET JCS 5719 From CJCS EXCLUSIVE FOR General Norstad, Admiral Dennison, General Power and General Adams, signed LEMNITZER

Consideration being given to whether prompt but unprovocative military actions in next few weeks might clearly underline for Soviet government the determination and firmness of US and NATO over Berlin. We wish to examine at this stage some specific ideas rather than recommendations for immediate execution. A main object would be to preclude Soviets from misreading the fact that US mobilization roll-up and gold outflow reductions as indication

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of weakened US resolve in the face of rising Berlin tensions. Any actions taken would be low-key, to avoid either public challenge to Soviets or arousal of populations, but realistic if modest rise in strength should result. Illustrative actions already proposed are shown below. Request you submit direct to me by 19 August any ideas for actions of similar intensity that might be taken within your command. Would also welcome any comment on timing, feasibility, and other relevant features of these illustrative actions:

A. Create and announce a quadripartite Mobilization Information Group, under the Military Subgroup of the Washington Ambassadorial Group.

B. Conduct quadripartite and possibly NATO meetings of Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff to consider strategies and force requirements toward which mobilization planning should be pointed.

C. Activate selected standby production facilities.

D. Expandand speed the production and delivery to combat forces of certain selected items of supply or equipment whose greater, earlier availability may improve NATO military capabilities in the Berlin situation.

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E. Raise supply levels for certain items stockpiled in Berlin, possibly of civilian supplies as well as weapons, ammunition, and selected military equipment.

F. Locate in the vicinity of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn certain forward supply stocks to support BERCON operations.

G. Locate in the general vicinity of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn a bridge park containing enough bridging equipment to span the Elbe in the event the autobahn bridge were taken out.

H. Temporarily deploy to EAST LANT one cruiser and one destroyer squadron.

I. Intensify maritime surveillance of Soviet shipping and naval units.

J. Increase the readiness capability of dispersed operating bases in the European area.

K. Improve U.S. ability to move personnel and materiel to Europe on short notice.

L. Conduct dispersal and mobility exercises of US/Allied air units in Central Europe.

M. Prepare to expand the scope and frequency of large-scale training exercises, on short notice.

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N. Have ground reconnaissance of border areas North and South of Helmstedt conducted by troop leaders of a substantial number of French, UK, and US combat units, making no effort to conceal unit identity.

O. Conduct visibly a number of 2-day or 3-day conferences of commanders and military planners at army group/ATAF through division level to ensure uniform understanding of concepts of operations.

P. Openly train and exercise military crews for assuming civil aircraft operations in the Berlin corridors. SCP 4

DISTR : CJCS-2, DJS-3, SJCS-2, J2-1, J3-1, SACSA-1, JWR-1, JWRA-1, RRA-1, CNO, CSAF, CMC, CSA, DCSOP, ACSI, SEC MCNAMARA, SEC GILPATRIC, ASST SEC NITZE

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TOP SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

AUG 17 1962

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Downgraded To: SECRET [redacted]
EO 11652: XGDS (2) 4
Authorized By: H. D. Brown, Jr.
August 4, 1975

Dear Dean:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently completed a review of the Berlin situation covering developments, domestic and foreign, which have taken place during the past ten months. Their report is, I believe, longer and more detailed than you would find necessary for your purposes, and I am therefore forwarding to you, instead, this letter with pertinent extracts for your information and consideration. The full report can be made available at any time, however, should you believe that to be desirable.

I note that as a result of their reappraisal the Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed that certain specific actions be taken in the area of direct military concern. In addition, they have isolated tasks of a broader nature in the field of preparation and planning with relation to Berlin which remain to be accomplished, the principal ones being:

a. Continue to press for Allied fulfillment of MC 26/4 force goals at an early date.

b. Continue to press for corrective action by NATO in its logistical preparedness for war.

c. Continue to press with our NATO Allies and with the U.S. Government for an early and acceptable settlement of those divisive issues which currently fragment and weaken NATO, namely differences among:

(1) Quadripartite nations on Berlin negotiating tactics

(2) NATO nations on MRBM and atomic matters

(3) Western European nations over EEC

d. Press for early favorable resolution of the following unresolved Berlin issues:

(1) Economic countermeasures

(2) Naval countermeasures

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(3) Quadripartite/NATO version of NSAM 109

(4) Approval by the NAC of BERCOM/MARCOM plans

(5) Approval by the NAC of the Tripartite/NATO relationship paper

(6) Tripartite air countermeasures

In view of the modest success of the "rollback" program which is being carried on with respect to prior notification to Soviet autobahn checkpoints, it may well be that there are other measures which could be utilized in related areas - for example, the military trains and air corridors - with fair prospects of being able to break away from undesirable precedents which have developed primarily through past usage. If you believe that this is worth further exploration, on our own part and in coordination with France and the United Kingdom, I suggest that it might be suitable as a subject for the consideration of the Berlin Task Force.

One of the principal limitations in our position relative to Berlin is the shortage of effective leverage at our disposal in dealing with the Soviets. Even the milder military measures must be reserved for use in a situation of greatly increased strain, not only because of the possible consequences themselves but because of the sense of impending crisis which they would inevitably impart. Any leverage, therefore, which can be further developed in other areas - for example, in economics, travel, and elsewhere - will be most useful.

Other conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their study are the following:

a. Soviet/GDR reactions can be expected when it appears to them that their vital interests are threatened. Therefore, Allied actions which may appear to threaten Soviet/GDR vital interests must be carefully evaluated prior to implementation to determine that a compensatory improvement in the Allied position would result. Allied reactions to situations, not of Allied making, which threaten Soviet/GDR vital interests (e.g. Hungarian uprising of 1956) must be carefully evaluated.

b. While at times the policy of consulting our quadripartite/NATO Allies on plans and actions with respect to Berlin has tended to restrict U.S. initiative, these consultations have also tended to strengthen the resolve and unanimity of action by these Allies.

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c. The U.S. and Allies have been most successful in resisting Soviet/GDR actions in those areas where plans have been thoroughly developed (e.g. in the air corridors), and least successful where plans have not been thought through and developed in advance, in which case surprise has worked to the enemy's advantage (e.g. the Wall).

d. Within the tripartite Allies there exist procedural discrepancies with respect to the use of the autobahn, use of the air corridors, etc. This permits the Soviets to use these discrepancies to their own advantage by demanding that one Allied practice be adopted by all. The result is the erosion of Allied positions vis-a-vis the Soviet/GDR.

e. Negotiations with the Soviets concerning an International Access Authority should be examined with caution, in light of past experience with international control organizations such as the ICC and the [redacted], in order to evaluate the long-term effect on Allied rights in Berlin.

f. Greater participation by the Western Alliance nations in maintaining the viability of West Berlin would strengthen West Berlin and increase the basic interests of Western Allies in the long-term solution to the Berlin problem.

g. The information program related to Berlin should be maintained at a reasonable level during periods of reduced tension, in order to provide on a continuing basis the United States and/or Allied position to our Allies, to the "neutrals," and behind the Iron Curtain. Plans and preparations should be made to increase the tempo of the information program when Soviet/GDR threats or actions increase.

As a result of their Berlin reappraisal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are instituting a review of their past actions in this area to determine whether any revisions may be indicated. If any changes should result which you should be aware of I shall keep you advised.

Sincerely,

Honorable Dean Rusk

Secretary of State

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EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL LEMNITZER FROM GENERAL NORSTAD

REFERENCE: JCS 5719

1. I AM IN THE MOST COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH YOUR PURPOSE OF LIMITING THE CHANCES OF THE SOVIETS MISREADING OUR REDUCTIONS AND REDEPLOYMENTS, AND, WHAT MIGHT BE OF EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE, TAKING TOO SERIOUSLY THE PUBLIC AND EXAGGERATED EMPHASIS WE ARE PUTTING ON DISAGREEMENTS AND DIVERGENCIES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. HOWEVER, THE TIMING AND NATURE OF OUR ACTIONS MUST NOT ONLY AVOID BEING UNDULY PROVOCATIVE BUT IF POSSIBLE SHOULD NOT CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY HAVE TO BE UNDONE AND IN THEIR UNDOING WILL GIVE FURTHER CAUSE FOR MISREADING ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS. WHAT IS DONE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES MUST HAVE A BUILT-IN, NATURAL TERMINATION OR WE MUST ACCEPT THE FACT THAT WE WILL MAINTAIN THE SITUATION AS LONG AS REQUIRED. THIS CATEGORY OF ACTION SHOULD BE EFFECTIVE IN CORRECTING A WRONG IMPRESSION; STEPS BEYOND THIS LEVEL SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR ACTUAL RIPOSTE TO A SOVIET INITIATIVE.

2. THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE ITEMS IN THE LIST OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIONS:

A. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE CREATION OF ONE MORE PLANNING GROUP IN WASHINGTON, PARTIUCLARLY ONE IN THE PUBLIC INFORMATION FIELD WOULD IMPRESS THE SOVIETS WITH OUR DETERMINATION. RULE ONE FOR GENERAL APPLICATION SHOULD BE THAT WE WILL NOT TALK ABOUT WHAT WE ARE DOING ALTHOUGH I REALIZE THE RECORD INDICATES THIS IS PERHAPS TOO MUCH TO ASK. ANY ACTION THAT WILL BE IMPRESSIVE TO THE SOVIETS WILL BE NOTED BY THEIR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

B. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS AT THE PRESENT TIME IS THAT THERE IS TOO MUCH TALK OF DISCUSSION OF STRATEGY AND FORCE REQUIREMENTS. I FEEL THAT A MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS AND CHIEFS OF STAFF PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS IF NOT DIFFERENCES EXIST WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

DA IN 256896

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Mr. McNamara

SCO FORM 35-3 REPLACES OCS FORM 3541 1 AUG 57 WHICH MAY BE USED

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C. STANDBY PRODUCTION FACILITIES SHOULD NOT BE ACTIVATED UNLESS SUCH ACTIVATION CAN BE DONE WITH REASONABLE ECONOMY AND THE END PRODUCT WILL IN FACT BE USED. ON THIS POINT CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO INCREASING ACTIVITY IN EUROPEAN PLANTS ENGAGED IN THE NATO COORDINATED PRODUCTION PROGRAMS FOR SIDEWINDER AND POSSIBLY BULLPUP.

D. SPEEDING UP OF DELIVERY OF SELECTED ITEMS IS NECESSARY, CLEARLY INCREASES OUR COMBAT POTENTIAL AND SHOULD PROVE IMPRESSIVE TO THE SOVIETS. THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITHIN REASONABLE ECONOMIC LIMITS. SELECTED ITEMS WHICH SHOULD RECEIVE PRODUCTION AND DELIVERY EMPHASIS ARE REFLECTED IN MESSAGE HQ EUCOM ECJCO 9-100889, 151628Z AUG 62, PART III, PARAS 1A AND 3A.

E. BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STOCKS IN BERLIN ARE VERY CLOSE TO PROGRAM LEVELS. MESSAGES A-118 BONN, AMEMBASSY BONN TO DEPARTMENT 7 AUG 62 AND HQ EUCOM ECJDS 9-11838, 260828Z JULY 62, LIMITED STORAGE FACILITIES, PARTICULARLY FOR AMMO, MILITATE AGAINST FURTHER INCREASES.
IF THIS ACTION IS ADOPTED, BUILD-UP SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO CONSUMABLES AND GREATEST CARE TAKEN NOT TO ADD TO OUR WEAKNESS BY STARTING A FLAP IN BERLIN. I HAVE GRAVE RESERVATIONS ON THIS POINT SINCE IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE NECESSARY AND THERE IS A DANGER OF AFFECTING MORALE.

F. THIS COULD BE DONE AND SUCH ACTION WOULD ALSO FURNISH SUPPORT FOR POSSIBLE LIVE OAK OPERATIONS.

G. THIS MIGHT BE DONE. ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF BRIDGING EQUIPMENT ARE IN EUCOM RESERVE STOCKS TO PERMIT ESTABLISHMENT OF BRIDGE PARK.

H. NO COMMENT SINCE THIS IS PRIMARILY A SACLANT RESPONSIBILITY.

I. THIS IS A POSSIBLE ACTION BUT IF UNDERTAKEN SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT WE CAN BREAK IT OFF AT OUR OWN INITIATIVE WITHOUT CAUSING FURTHER SOVIET REACTION.

J. THIS ACTION IS OPERATIONALLY DESIRABLE BUT BECAUSE OF THE COST IN MANPOWER AND FUNDS MAY HAVE TO BE A PHASED OPERATION STARTING WITH SELECTED FIGHTER FIELDS WHICH MIGHT BE NEEDED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE CORRIDORS.

K. ANYTHING THAT CAN BE DONE ALONG THIS LINE WOULD BE MOST DESIRABLE FROM OUR STANDPOINT; HOWEVER, THIS TYPE OF ACTION MAY NOT IN ITSELF BE TOO IMPRESSIVE TO THE SOVIETS.

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L. PLANNED TRAINING ACTIVITIES FOR NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS ARE AT A NORMAL TEMPO. FALLEX 62 IS MAINLY A COMMAND POST TYPE EXERCISE WITH LITTLE LIVE PLAY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT IS NOW TOO LATE TO INITIATE TRULY NATO LIVE EXERCISES IN THE FALLEX TIME FRAME. ANY SUBSTANTIAL US INCREASE, PERHAPS ALONG THE LINES OF LONG THRUST, PROBABLE MIGHT BEST BE EMPLOYED TO A COUNTER SPECIFIC SOVIET ACTIONS. I FEEL THAT THE US SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONDUCT SUCH AN EXERCISE WITH RELATIVELY SHORT NOTICE.

M. THESE ACTIONS CAN BE CARRIED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH THE MORE DETAILED PHASE OF BERCON PLANNING AND CAN BE LAYED ON AT SHORT NOTICE WITHOUT MUCH PREPARATION. THEY CERTAINLY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN CASE OF DETERIORATING SITUATION.

P. THIS WOULD TEND TO DEFEAT THE PURPOSE FOR HAVING THESE CREWS WHICH IS TO BE ABLE TO CARRY ON CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS IN AN APPARENTLY NORMAL MANNER SHOULD THE SITUATION BECOME TOO TENSE FOR CIVILIAN CREWS TO OPERATE.

3. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL IDEAS FOR ACTIONS ARE SUBMITTED:;
A. INCREASE ALERT STATUS OF JACK PINE AIRCRAFT.

B. DEPLOY F-104 SQUADRON TO WEST GERMANY FROM US.

C. EXPEDITE COMPLETION OF LIVE OAK COMMUNICATIONS WITH BERLIN NOW SCHEDULED FOR 1 SEPTEMBER. IN BEYOND THE CAPABILITIES OF THE THEATER WE WILL MAKE OUR NEEDS KNOWN TO WASHINGTON.

4. THE DECISION AS TO ANY ACTION TO BE TAKEN, ITS TIMING AND MANNER OF IMPLEMENTATION, IS AT BEST AN EXTREMELY DELICATE AND SENSITIVE MATTER. THIS ARGUES FOR A REAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM BUT NOT AGAINST BOLDNESS WHERE COLDNESS IS INDICATED. OUR CONCERN SHOULD NOT BE SO MUCH WITH PROVOKING THE SOVIETS AS WITH PROVOKING THEM TO DANGEROUS REACTIONS WITHOUT THE ACTION BEING ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AND WITHOUT A FAIR CHANCE OF OUR GETTING FULL VALUE OUT OF THE RISK INVOLVED.

SCP - 4.

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NLK NSF84

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SECRET

August 20, 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CLIFTON

SUBJECT: The Berlin Wall Incident

With reference to your question concerning the reason the refugee shot last Friday was left unattended on the East side of the Berlin Wall until carried off by the Communists, the fact is that instructions to military border patrols in Berlin specify that assistance will be given refugees only after they reach the West Sector. Under these same instructions, border patrols cannot assist refugees inside the East Sector of Berlin or in the East zone of Germany.

As for assistance in such incidents by West Berlin police, Mayor Brandt several weeks ago attempted to sound out the Commandants on this very question. He was told the Allies would probably look aside and not attempt to restrict such actions by the Berlin police. This, however, did not satisfy Brandt. He wanted a written statement to this effect. This the Commandants refused to give him, although they repeated their earlier assurances that under certain circumstances they would not interfere with the actions of the Berlin police.

Therefore, when Friday's incident occurred, American troops followed their instructions not to cross the Sector line; the West Berlin police, although engaged in a tear gas exchange with East Germans, also did not cross the Sector line; and the East Germans who were taking no risks either would not go in to get the body of the victim until their own reinforcements were brought up.

To deal with future incidents of this kind, Mayor Brandt is proposing that (1) the International Committee of the Red Cross be requested to ask the East German Red Cross to provide the necessary medical assistance to such victims [redacted] and, (2) that the Allies arrange to have an ambulance or an appropriately marked sedan standing by at the Friedrichstrasse crossing point to help future victims caught on the Communist side of the Wall -- if there is no East German Red Cross assistance -- and if necessary deliver the victim to an East Berlin hospital.

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Brandt intends to make this proposal at a Commandants meeting tomorrow, Tuesday, October 21, and if the Commandants approve -- and it now seems likely that all three governments will authorize them to do so -- an announcement will be made -- following the meeting -- that in future incidents of this kind the Allies will give such unfortunate victims whatever assistance may be necessary.

On the diplomatic side, a further protest is going forward to the Soviets -- since the Soviet Commandant returned the latest protest note - either through the Soviet Embassy in Berlin or through the Foreign Office in Moscow. A decision on this will be made later today.

David Klein

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Control: 16561
Rec'd: August 22, 1962
8:31 a.m.

FROM: Bonn

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 545, August 22, noon

EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY.

POLICY

I had frank discussion late yesterday with Schroeder along lines you suggested to me in Washington.

Schroeder said he could appreciate your concern, which he shared. He indicated, however, that he had no specific formula for remedy except to keep working to avoid misunderstandings, and that in any event we would have to live with some alarms and excursions in present period. He hopes we will continue to exercise patience and restraint, explaining that past year had been trying and even frustrating period for Germans, who recognized that theirs was largely passive role in Berlin and German questions, were anxious to conduct themselves in helpful manner in support of Western allies, but were nevertheless prone to doubts, worries and suspicions because they could not foresee future course of events. This attitude must be seen, he went on, against background of ferment in Europe re Common Market and European unity, as well as public debate on nuclear questions. At same time, he said, he had been doing what he could in party circles "to keep things on the track", and was now thinking of one or two major speeches on Foreign Affairs this autumn to put matters into better perspective for German opinion. He want you to know he would continue to do what he could.

-Saying-

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-2- 545, August 22, noon from Bonn

Saying he was speaking quite personally, Schroeder commented that as I knew, Adenauer was pessimistic in nature, and suspicious of everyone -- his colleagues, his fellow citizens and his allies. He needed constant reassurance, which was most effectively exerted in personal contacts. He recalled great value of your visit to Bonn in June, and remarked on Chancellor's great satisfaction with the President's last letter -- satisfaction which he had communicated to meeting of party leaders on Monday. He intimated he was aware this was wearying chore for the President and you, but said there was no substitute for it.

In conclusion, Schroeder spoke of his own desire for talks with you, saying he hoped meeting of four Foreign Ministers in Washington next month would be agreed upon, but if this did not come about he was thinking of asking you whether he might come to Washington for brief visit late in September or early October.

DOWLING

DMB

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FROM: BERLIN - CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 270, AUGUST 25, MIDNIGHT

NIACT

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FROM DOWLING

RE DEPTEL 221

DURING PAST FEW WEEKS MISSION HAS EXAMINED THIS QUESTION AND HAS COME TO CONCLUSION AGREEMENT TO PERMIT OUR MILITARY TO SHOW IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS TO VOPOS ON ENTERING EAST BERLIN WOULD BE DAMAGING TO US PRESTIGE AND WOULD AT SAME TIME SERVE NO USEFUL END. I STRONGLY AGREE, AND CONSIDER THAT EVENTS OF RECENT WEEK HAVE POINTED UP ANOTHER AND PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT REASON, NAMELY THAT A SITUATION IS RAPIDLY DEVELOPING IN WHICH RETAINING OUR ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN RESTRICTING SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF THEIR ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN.

AS I SEE THEM, THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ACCEDING TO IDENTIFICATION REQUEST ARE AS FOLLOWS:

762.54/8-2562

Oct 25

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ADVANTAGES: TO REFUSE TO SHOW IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS WILL RAISE TENSIONS WITHIN BERLIN, AT LEAST TERMPORARILY. IT WILL AGAIN BRING THE BERLIN PROBLEM TO THE FOREFRONT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS NOT ALREADY THERE. IF GDR DEMANDS ARE PERSISTED IN, ALLIED OFFICIALS WILL HAVE NO VEHICULAR ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN (CIVILIAN OFFICIALS COULD CONCEIVABLY CONTINUE TO ENTER ON FOOT OR BY U- OR S-BAHN). MOST IMPORTANTLY, OUR INABILITY TO OVERCOME GDR DEMANDS AND MAINTAIN CIRCULATION IN ALL OF BERLIN COULD CAUSE US MORALE DIFFICULTY HERE OF POSSIBLY SERIOUS IF TEMPORARY PROPORTIONS BECAUSE OF OUR PAST INABILITY TO MAINTAIN FOUR POWER STATUS OF GREATER BERLIN.

DISADVANTAGES: 1) IF THE SOVIETS GDR REQUEST UNIFORMED MILITARY TO SHOW IDENTIFICATION THEY WILL HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE THE NEXT AND POSSIBLY FINAL STEP IN SPLITTING CITY. THEIR PURPOSE WILL NOT PRIMARILY BE TO SEE IDENTITY DOCUMENTS OR EVEN TO GIVE THE ALLIES A PSYCHOLOGICAL SETBACK. IT WILL BE TO KEEP ALLIED OFFICIALS OUT OF EAST BERLIN, OR AT LEAST TO PREVENT THEIR ENTERING BY RIGHT. EVEN TO ACHIEVE THE LATTER, HOWEVER, WOULD REQUIRE MORE THAN MERE DEMAND FOR IDENTITY DOCUMENTS. THUS IF DEMAND WERE ACQUIESCED IN IT WOULD BE LOGICAL AND NECESSARY FOR FURTHER DEMANDS TO BE MADE INCLUDING EVENTUALLY INSISTENCE ON GDR VISAS. IF WE CONSIDER WE DO NOT WANT OUR OFFICIALS TO GO BEYOND SHOWING IDENTITY PAPERS, WE CAN BE CERTAIN THAT ACQUIESCENCE IN THIS STEP WILL PROVIDE ONLY A RESPITE AND PROBABLY NOT A VERY LONG ONE. IN END, ALMOST NO MATTER HOW FAR WE ARE WILLING TO GO, GDR CAN INSIST ON MORE. HAVING ACCEDED TO A FIRST DEMAND, WE SHALL FIND THAT NO SUCCEEDING ONE PROVIDES BETTER GROUNDS FOR DRAWING THE LINE, SINCE PROCESS WILL BE GRADUAL UNTIL SECTOR BORDER IS RECOGNIZED AS STATE FRONTIER.

2) OUR PRESTIGE IS HEAVILY COMMITTED AT FRIEDRICHSTRASSE REGARDLESS HOW PETTY THE ISSUES MAY AT TIMES APPEAR BEYOND BERLIN HORIZON. STRUGGLE WE MADE LAST YEAR TO MAINTAIN RIGHT OF CIRCULATION WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION FOR CIVILIAN OFFICIALS IS VIVIDLY REMEMBERED HERE AND ABROAD. IT WOULD BECOME KNOWN

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2BFBS/3

SECRET

-3- 270, AUGUST 25, MIDNIGHT, FROM: BERLIN

AT ONCE IF THERE WERE CHANGE OF THIS SORT IN OUR PRACTICE AT CROSSING POINT. PUBLIC WOULD QUICKLY NOTE WE HAD IN SPACE OF FEW MONTHS ABANDONED POSITION WE HAD ONCE APPEARED READY TO FIGHT FOR. DOUBT WOULD BE CAST ON OTHER POSITIONS WE HAVE ASSERTED. WEST BERLIN CONFIDENCE WOULD OF COURSE NOT COLLAPSE, BUT CUMULATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF SUCH EVENTS SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. EFFECT OF SUCH APPARENT REVERSAL IN OUR POLICY WOULD CERTAINLY BE GREATER THAN THAT FROM OUR ACCEPTING DENIAL OUT OF UNWILLINGNESS TO PRESS OUR ACCESS RIGHTS TO POINT OF CONFLICT.

3) OUR PRESENCE IN EAST BERLIN IS USEFUL BUT NOTHING MORE. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS OF VALUE, BUT IN VIEW GREAT UNLIKELIHOOD MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST US HERE, ITS VALUE DOES NOT WEIGH HEAVILY IN SCALES AGAINST POLITICAL ASPECTS THIS WHOLE ISSUE. NOR IS OUR "PRESENCE" IN EAST BERLIN, TRUNCATED AS IT IS, OF MUCH PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE. WE SEND ABOUT TEN CARS A DAY OVER AND OUR ALLIES LESS. WE HAVE LITTLE OTHER OFFICIAL TRAFFIC INTO EAST SECTOR.

4) OF MOST PROFOUND IMPORTANCE, I BELIEVE, IS ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF PREVENTING SOVIETS FROM FURTHER EXPLOITING THEIR POSITION IN WEST BERLIN. NOW THAT LAST VESTIGES OF SOVIET OCCUPATION IN EAST BERLIN HAVE BEEN FORMALLY ELIMINATED, THE SOVIETS HAVE IN MY VIEW THE QUITE CLEAR INTENTION OF ASSERTING WITH INCREASING VIGOR A ROLE AND PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN (BERLIN TEL 269). I CANNOT EMPHASIZE TOO STRONGLY HOW SERIOUS IT WOULD BE FOR OUR POSITION HERE IF WE WERE TO PERMIT THIS. EVEN FOR THEM TO MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT ROLE, PARTICULARLY AT THE WAR MEMORIAL, WILL BE INCREASING PROBLEM AS IMAGE GROWS OF FOUR POWER ACTIVITY IN CITY CONSISTING OF THREE WESTERN SECTORS. WE CANNOT MUCH ALTER THIS IMAGE BY CLINGING TO OUR ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN. THE SOVIETS, WHOSE SECTOR IT WAS, STATE THAT IT NO LONGER BELONGS TO FOUR-POWER BERLIN.

IF SOVIETS ARE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE HAVE ENTIRELY FREE ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN, THERE IS ALMOST NO LIMIT TO NUMBER OF PERSONNEL THEY CAN SEND IN AS REPRESENTATIVES OF CINC GSFG OR TO NUMBER

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OF TACTICS THEY CAN USE TO MAKE THEIR PRESENCE FELT. AS THIS PROCESS DEVELOPS THEY MAY SUCCEED IN EQUATING THEIR ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN WITH OUR ACCESS ALONG AUTOBAHN AND OUR POSITION WILL THEN HAVE BECOME DIFFICULT INDEED.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

IT THUS APPEARS ALMOST TO BE QUESTION WHETHER WE OURSELVES SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE IN CUTTING LAST LINK WITH EAST BERLIN IN ORDER BE ABLE TO BEGIN RESTRICT SOVIET ACTIVITIES WEST BERLIN. I AM NOT PREPARED TO RECOMMEND THIS AS YET, BUT I DO MOST STRONGLY BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT PAY ANYTHING WHATEVER TO MAINTAIN OUR EAST BERLIN ACCESS. OUR MOST IMMEDIATE FOCUS MUST BE ON WEST BERLIN, NOT ALL-BERLIN OR EAST BERLIN. WE SHOULD DO NOTHING WHICH WOULD HURT US IN WEST BERLIN MERELY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN OUR INCREASINGLY ILLUSORY RIGHTS IN EAST BERLIN.

HULICK

CC

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762.00/9-162

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic of Germany

I have reviewed the arguments for and against incorporating West Berlin into the Federal Republic by removing the restrictions imposed by the Three Powers against the inclusion of Berlin as a Land of the Federal Republic.

Arguments For

Incorporation of West Berlin into West Germany would provide a more normal political status for West Berlin than its present one. Full political integration into West Germany is what the West Berliners most want for their city if it cannot be the capital of a reunified Germany. As a part of West Germany the city's long-term economic viability would be enhanced. In addition, the city would become clothed with the protection of the Federal Republic. Incorporation would provide a political and propaganda offset to the series of Soviet moves to divide the city permanently and to end Soviet responsibilities for it.

Integration of West Berlin and West Germany could be an initial step toward the eventual substitution of the Federal Republic for the Allied Powers in West Berlin if this were ever considered desirable. Some Germans, including the Chancellor, oppose integration for this reason.

Arguments Against

Incorporation of West Berlin into West Germany would intensify the Berlin crisis. Mr. Gromyko's reaction at Geneva to our mention of this possibility indicates that the Soviets can be expected to take immediate countermeasures to any such action on the Allied side. These counter-measures would presumably include some interference with Allied access.

A separate status for Berlin was created by various Four-Power agreements. Allied access rights derive from these agreements. By changing the separate status of West Berlin to one of incorporation in the

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in the Federal Republic we would undermine the legal basis of Allied access rights. We would also provide the Soviets with a strong legal justification for actions against Allied access. In this connection, it should be noted that East Berlin has not yet been completely integrated into East Germany. For example, East Berlin's representatives in the East German legislature do not have voting rights. (The legal position is discussed in the attached memoranda.)

Incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic would be contrary to the basis on which we have been negotiating with the Soviets on Berlin, i.e. to find a modus vivendi based on the status quo of West Berlin. Further, this action, which is irreversible, if taken at this time, would be a major change in position before our vital interests in West Berlin had been impaired by Soviet action.

By permitting the integration of West Berlin and the Federal Republic we would give the latter some control over our vital interests in West Berlin.

Conclusion

At this time the reasons against incorporating West Berlin into the Federal Republic are substantially weightier than the reasons in favor of doing so.

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachments:

Legal Memoranda --
October 10, 1961
August 30, 1962

S/S-RO
SEP 1 1962
A true copy of signed original

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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SECRET

TO : The Secretary

AUG 30 1962

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : EUR - Richard H. Davis

SUBJECT: Incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic of Germany

At a recent Presidential staff meeting the possibility of incorporating West Berlin into the Federal Republic was discussed. The attached memorandum to the President concludes that the arguments for doing so are outweighed by the arguments against.

Recommendation

I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum.

Attachment:

As stated.

BTF:EUR:GER:GMcCarthy:cbs:agc
8/30/62

Clearance:

R.A.K.

L - Mr. Kearney

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 10, 1961

LEGAL MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Eleventh Land Concept in 1961.

Recent events in Germany have again raised to the forefront the question of possible merger of West Berlin with the Federal Republic as an Eleventh Land. We have, accordingly, reviewed the proposal in light of the current situation. Our conclusions are that (1) the proposal is logical providing it can be negotiated with the Soviets as an aspect of a German settlement with access arranged, and (2) that as an action taken without Soviet concurrence, it is not a panacea for our present difficulties and would result in such substantial modification in the basis for the Western presence in Berlin that our current legal and moral position might well be lost.

Discussion:

The argument in favor of the Eleventh Land proposal is to the effect that the East Germans with Soviet approval have virtually completed absorption of East Berlin into the G.D.R. The possibility of an all-Berlin solution in any German settlement in the near future is largely dissipated. One of the major aims of the Soviet bloc is to cut the ties now between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Such ties are considered absolutely essential to the vitality of West Berlin. The most permanent and significant means of confirming that such a relationship exists would be for the Western Allied Powers to permit the merging of West Berlin with the Federal Republic.

At the time the Federal Republic Basic Law was drafted, the Military Governors addressed a letter dated May 12, 1949, to the German authorities containing a reservation concerning Articles 23 and 144(a) of the Basic Law for the purpose of preserving Four Power Occupation status of West Berlin. The argument now presented is that in view of actions taken by the Soviet bloc, there is no longer any reason for the West to maintain this previous reservation.

It has been further proposed that the special situation of West Berlin with the presence of Allied Forces could be reflected by making its status as a Land subject to "rights" of the Three Occupying Powers

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which would continue to maintain garrisons, have the right of veto over the application of federal laws and to reassume complete control in the event of an emergency.

Background on Relationship Between Berlin and the Federal Republic.

The nature of the relationship between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany is a subject the outlines of which have become blurred by the passage of time and conflicting claims. To bring the picture into focus requires some consideration of the events which have molded the present status of Berlin.

As has been said in the numerous presentations of the Western position regarding Berlin, the status of the city derives from the unconditional surrender of the German Armed Forces and the collapse and disappearance of the German Government in the spring of 1945, coupled with the subsequent assumption of supreme authority in Germany by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The manner in which that supreme authority was to be exercised had previously been determined by agreement among the occupying Powers. With respect to Berlin, the fundamental provision is found in paragraph 1 of the Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of "Greater Berlin", as amended.

The Protocol in its final form provides:

> "1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into four zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the Four Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the Four Powers."

The Protocol then specifies the geographical boundaries of each zone and provides for the division of the territory of Greater Berlin, which "will be jointly occupied by the armed forces" of the Four Powers, into four parts. Paragraph 5 of the protocol provides:

> "5. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Kommandatura) consisting of four Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the 'Greater Berlin' Area."

The interpretation which has been placed by the three Western Powers upon the provision for a special Berlin area under joint occupation by the Four Powers is that Berlin was to constitute an area separate and distinct

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and distinct from the zones of occupation including the Soviet Zone of occupation which completely surrounds the city. On this foundation rests the right of the Western occupation Powers to remain in occupation of Berlin and their corollary rights of access to the city.

The Western Powers have also maintained that the Soviet Union is debarred from affecting these rights of the other three occupying Powers without their consent. This principle was expressed by Secretary of State Herter in the course of the Twelfth Session of the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva on May 26, 1959, as follows:

"...The Soviets have, in violation of their agreements, set up and maintained a separate regime in the sector of Berlin occupied by them.

"The action of the Soviet Union in withdrawing from the joint administration of the city in breach of their obligations has not and cannot affect the status of Greater Berlin as an area under joint occupation which is separate and distinct from any other areas in Germany. The right of the Four Powers to be in occupation of Berlin derives fundamentally from the unconditional surrender of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority by the Four Powers on June 5, 1945. One of the Four Powers acting unilaterally could not impair the rights of the other three."

This principle is of the utmost importance in connection with the Soviet claim that Berlin is on or part of the territory of the East German regime--a claim which bolsters the alleged consequences of a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the "G.D.R.". Secretary Herter in the course of the same session touched upon this aspect of the problem in the following language:

"The so-called German Democratic Republic is entirely the creation of the Soviet Union. It has no authority except that delegated to it by the Soviet Union. It has no mandate except from the Soviet Union. It cannot, therefore, have something which the Soviet Union is powerless to give it. And nothing could be more self evident than that the Soviet Union cannot by itself dispose of the territory of Greater Berlin in whole or in part."

The foregoing position, however, has certain inescapable consequences. One of these is that the Western Powers cannot accept the Soviet Union has no right to take any unilateral action which would

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violate the quadripartite nature of the city if they are not themselves prepared to accept the same limitation. For the three Western Powers to take action which would basically change the status of Berlin without the consent of the Soviet Union would be a breach of the Protocol to the same extent as action by the Soviet Union to disregard the Protocol on its side. This is not to say that the three Western Powers can never take any action respecting the status of Berlin without the consent of the Soviet Union. Circumstances may be envisaged involving a breach of the agreement by the Soviets of so basic a character that the Western Powers would be entitled to take steps which would not be in accord with the requirements of the Protocol in order to protect themselves from the consequences of the wrongful Soviet acts. However, should the Western Powers thus alter their position the legal issues would become more complex and the basis of their rights of access difficult to demonstrate.

Neither the "G.D.R." nor the Federal Republic existed in 1945 when the arrangements regarding Berlin came into force. The relationship between West Berlin and the Federal Republic (as Western Germany) is in effect an artificial creation resulting from the period of the occupation. There has never been in German history for example any special arrangement between those two areas. It cannot be said that this is a "natural" political arrangement in Germany which would be considered as a normal political relationship if the underlying rights of the occupation powers are destroyed.

What is involved here, accordingly, is an effort to create a new political relationship which would derive legitimacy from the special rights previously held by the three Western Powers vis-a-vis West Berlin and West Germany--i.e., a merger of their sectors of Berlin with their zones of occupation. There is no reason to doubt that had this approach been desired in the past by the Four Occupation Powers they could have accomplished it by modification of the Protocol of September 12, 1944. This was not done.

We now have a situation where the Soviet Union, without consultation or agreement by the other powers, and without specific denunciation of the September 12, 1944 Protocol, has taken the position that it has "phased out" its occupation regime in both the Soviet Zone and in the Soviet sector of Berlin, permitting the German authorities in those areas to assume political control.

[redacted] Western Powers should consider that the Soviet action is a wrongful act, or so drastically change their situation in Germany that they are prepared to take [redacted] position

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the position that the Soviet action constitutes a breach of the quadripartite agreements regarding Germany and that they are therefore free to merge the Western sectors of Berlin with the former Western Zones.

The Allied Powers in acquiring supreme authority in Germany expressly stated that the assumption of authority and power "does not effect the annexation of Germany". The Three Western Powers accordingly do not have "title" to West Berlin such as would enable them to legally transfer sovereignty over the area. The relationship of the Federal Republic to West Berlin depends, as has been noted, on the arrangements and presence of the Western Occupation Powers. Assuming the Western Powers now decided they were going to modify the quadripartite agreement of September 12, 1944, they would be moving from the legal foundation on which the Western presence in West Berlin and the relationship between West Berlin and the Federal Republic have been based. What might be salvaged by way of persuasive legal rationale is problematical. It seems almost certain that the result would be a de facto political situation having no legal foundation with the relationships of the parties concerned being based on power rather than on any clear-cut legal rationale.

The aspect most directly involved would of course be that relating to access. A geographical fact of life is that Berlin is in Eastern Germany. In a situation of legal uncertainty such as would ensue if the present legal rationale were abandoned without agreement of the parties concerned, the normal consequence would be that control would revert to the people of the area. The corollary of asserting that the West Berliners should be permitted to join their destiny with the Federal Republic is unfortunately that the East German authorities would claim that they held comparable rights with respect to their area of control. This would include full authority over all traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. Further, they would claim that West Berlin was part of the larger area which they controlled and that the Allied Powers were there illegally on the grounds that by their action they had impaired the special status they formerly held resulting from the conquest of Germany.

In addition, the proposal raises certain practical problems which are not insignificant. For example, it is difficult to conceive of a section of a country to which the country may not send its own troops. If Berlin were made a Land of the Federal Republic, would West German troops be sent there? If so, what type of access would they use? Would West German troops in Berlin pose a serious problem in terms of any possible outbreak of violence?

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In conclusion it may be stated that while technically the Eleventh Land concept could be arranged, the impact of such a development on the legal basis of our presence in Berlin would be drastic and to the extent that our "moral position" in respect to the German problem depends on legitimacy, it would almost inevitably be adversely affected. Apart from this, the proposal would have no practical effect on the physical difficulties involved, since the Berliners would still be 110 miles away from the Federal Republic and the current difficulties regarding access would simply be presented in a more acute form. Accordingly, the Eleventh Land concept is no panacea for our present difficulties.

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 350, SEPTEMBER 5, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

NIACT

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THIS IS PART ONE OF TWO PART MESSAGE CONFIRMING AND AMPLIFYING HULICK-HILLENBRAND TELECON AT 0030 HOURS SEPT 5 ON INFORMAL COMMANDANT AND DEPUTIES MEETING HELD 2100 HOURS SEPT 4. AT SUGGESTION FRENCH CHAIRMAN COMMANDANT, DISCUSSION COVERED FOLLOWING THREE-POINT AGENDA: (1) ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IF SOVS ATTEMPTED TO HAVE WM GUARDS IN APCS ENTER WEST BERLIN THROUGH ANY SECTOR-SECTOR OR ZONAL-SECTOR CROSSING POINTS OTHER THAN SANDKRUG BRIDGE (IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION THIS ITEM WAS AMPLIFIED TO INCLUDE QUESTION OF REACHING A COMMON POLICY ON USE OF FORCE TO PREVENT SUCH SOV ENTRY); (2) POSITION TO BE TAKEN IF SOVS CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO USE APCS FOR TRANSPORT OF WM GUARDS; (3) PRESS LEAK INDISCRETIONS. DUE URGENCY REACH GOVERNMENTAL DECISION, PART 1 COVERS RESULTS OF DISCUSSION ON AGENDA ITEM 2 ONLY.

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UK TOOK POSITION WOULD BE MISTAKE TO PUSH SOVS TOO QUICKLY ON ISSUE OF APCS FOR WM GUARDS. PREMISED ON THEIR BELIEF THAT SOVS HAVE APPARENTLY ACTED REASONABLY AND IN GOOD FAITH, THEY PROPOSED WOULD BE BETTER LET SOVS CONTINUE USE APCS FOR AT LEAST A WEEK TO GIVE THEM OPPORTUNITY SHIFT FROM APCS TO BUSES OF THEIR OWN VOLITION. IF SOVS DID NOT SHIFT AFTER EXPIRATION OF 7 DAYS, UK PROPOSED COMMANDANTS SHOULD MEET AGAIN TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND, IF AGREEMENT REACHED, COMMANDANTS SHOULD PRESENT SOVS WITH SUGGESTION, NOT RPT NOT TIME-LIMITED DEMAND, THAT THEY CEASE USING APCS ON GROUND THAT THEY ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY. FOLLOWING THIS ACTION, IT WAS PROPOSED SOVS SHOULD BE GIVEN ANOTHER WEEK TO REACT. IF SOVS FAILED TO COMPLY, COMMANDANTS SHOULD AGAIN MEET TO ASSESS SITUATION WITH A VIEW TO RECOMMENDING TO GOVERNMENTS A FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION ON ASSUMPTION GOVERNMENTS MIGHT THEN WISH CONSIDER FIRMER POSTURE, TANTAMOUNT TO PRESENTING SOVS WITH ALTERNATIVE OF CEASING USE OF APCS OR FACING RISK OF BEING DENIED ENTRY.

FRENCH CONSIDERED FOREGOING UK PROPOSAL AND RATIONALE BEHIND IT AS REASONABLE AND INDICATED THEY WOULD RECOMMEND IT FAVORABLY TO THEIR GOVERNMENT.

GENERAL WATSON STATED AMBASSADOR DOWLING AND GENERAL NORSTAD ATTACHED UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON COURSE OF ACTION, LEADING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO EXCLUSION OF APCS FROM WEST BERLIN. HE AGREED TO REFER 3-STEP FORMULA PROPOSED BY UK TO HIS GOVERNMENT, INDICATING THAT 3-STEP FORMULA MIGHT BE MOST REASONABLE APPROACH TO ACHIEVE DESIRED OBJECTIVE. GENERAL WATSON STATED HE COULD NOT AGREE WITH PROPOSED TIME SPAN OF POSSIBLY TWO, ONE-WEEK INTERVALS BETWEEN STEPS 1 AND 2. HE STATED HIS GOVERNMENT MIGHT WISH TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION OF TIME INTERVALS TO AS LITTLE AS THREE DAYS EACH BETWEEN STEPS 1 AND 2.

AT REQUEST OF GENERAL WATSON FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ITEMS WERE DISCUSSED: (1) ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF SOVIETS TRY TO USE LARGER,

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EIGHT-WHEELED APCS FOR WM GUARDS; (2) ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF SOVS SHOW UP WITH MORE THAN 3 APCS PLUS 2 SEDANS OR JEEPS (TOTAL OF 5 VEHICLES); AND (3) ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF SOVS TRY TO HAVE BASC, SPANDAU, OR ANY OTHER PERSONNEL ENTER VIA FRIEDRICHSTRASSE IN APCS.

RE (1) - USE OF LARGER EIGHT-WHEELED APCS FOR WM GUARDS; UK TOOK POSITION THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ENTER FIRST TIME WITHOUT QUESTION; AND THAT COMMANDANTS SHOULD THEN MEET TO ASSESS SITUATION AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS AS TO WHAT OUR FUTURE POSITION SHOULD BE. FRENCH WERE NON-COMMITTAL, BUT IMPLIED SUPPORT FOR UK POSITION. US INDICATED PREFERENCE FOR ATTEMPTING TO REACH AGREED GOVERNMENT LEVEL COURSE OF ACTION PRIOR TO CONTINGENCY ARISING.

RE (2) - SOV ATTEMPT TO USE MORE THAN 3 APCS PLUS 2 SEDANS OR JEEPS FOR WM GUARDS; ACCORD WAS REACHED THAT PRESENT AGREED POLICY WOULD BE FOLLOWED; NAMELY VEHICLES IN EXCESS OF 5 WOULD BE HELD FOR 5 MINUTES UNTIL WM GUARD CONVOY HAD BEEN ESCORTED TO DESTINATION.

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 350, SEPTEMBER 5, 8 PM (SET TWO OF THREE)

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 350, BONN NIACT 327, INFORMATION LONDON NIACT 217, MOSCOW NIACT 198, PARIS NIACT 228, SHAPE NIACT 125, USAREUR NIACT 212.

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RE (3) - SOV ATTEMPT TO HAVE BASC, SPANDAU OR OTHER PERSONNEL ENTER WEST BERLIN THROUGH FRIEDRICHSTRASSE IN APCS: UK TOOK POSITION IT WOULD BE PREMATURE ATTEMPT NOW TO DEVELOP AN AGREED POSITION. THEY PROPOSED WE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL CONTINGENCY AROSE, PRESUMPTION BEING THEY WOULD PREFER, AS WITH CASE OF LARGER APCS, TO ALLOW VEHICLES TO PROCEED AND THEN ASSESS SITUATION IN COMMANDANTS' MEETING TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS. FRENCH WERE AGAIN NON-COMMITTAL. GENERAL WATSON EMPHASIZED IT WOULD BE US WHO WOULD BE SEIZED WITH PROBLEM, IF THE CONTINGENCY AROSE AT FRIEDRICHSTRASSE (THE USUAL ENTRY POINT FOR THESE VEHICLES). HE URGED THAT ATTEMPT BE MADE TO REACH AN AGREED COURSE OF ACTION IN ADVANCE OF THIS CONTINGENCY ARISING. UK THEN STATED THEY UNDER STRICT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR GOVERNMENT NOT TO EVEN DISCUSS POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION TO MEET THESE CONTINGENCIES AT PRESENT TIME.

/COMMENT:

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COMMENT: UP UNTIL LAST NIGHT'S MEETING THERE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED HERE IN BERLIN OVER COURSE OF LAST THREE WEEKS A REMARKABLE DEGREE OF TRIPARTITE UNANIMITY IN ASSESSMENT OF (1) SOVIET INTENTIONS RE BERLIN AND (2) NECESSITY FOR RESOLUTE BUT MEASURED COURSES OF ACTION WHICH THREE WESTERN ALLIES SHOULD TAKE TO PRESERVE THEIR POSITION IN WEST BERLIN AND TO FRUSTRATE SOV EFFORTS ADVANCE THEIR OBJECTIVES. THIS INVOLVED PRIMARILY ATTEMPT ARRIVE AT MEETING OF MINDS BETWEEN US AND UK ELEMENTS. AS INDICATED IN OUR PREVIOUS REPORTING, OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS WERE FAR APART TO BEGIN WITH. OVER TIME, AS RESULT CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS, IN WHICH BOTH SIDES EXCHANGED THEIR VIEWS AND ANALYSES IN AS FRANK, DISPASSIONATE AND OBJECTIVE A MANNER AS POSSIBLE, THE GAP WAS GRADUALLY NARROWED TO POINT WHERE UK REPRESENTATIVES APPEARED TO ACCEPT IN LARGE PART IMPLICATION OF LOCAL US APPRAISAL. INSOFAR AS COULD BE JUDGED FROM HERE, IT APPEARED THAT UK BERLIN MISSION HAD SUCCEEDED IN PART AT LEAST IN PERSUADING UK BONN EMBASSY AND IN TURN FOREIGN OFFICE TO GO ALONG WITH THIS COMMON APPRAISAL.

IT IS PERTINENT TO RECORD, HOWEVER, THAT ON DAY PRECEDING INFORMAL COMMANDANTS MEETING OF AUGUST 30, UK REQUESTED AN INFORMAL BI-LATERAL LUNCHEON DISCUSSION BETWEEN US AND UK DEPUTIES AND POLADS. IT BECAME OBVIOUS DURING DISCUSSION THAT THEY WISHED (APPARENTLY UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN OFFICE) TO ATTEMPT PERSUADE US ACCEPT ESSENTIALLY UK THESIS PUT FORWARD TO THE SECRETARY BY LORD HOME AT LAST GENEVA DISCUSSIONS; NAMELY, THAT IT WOULD BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE LET SOVS KNOW WE WOULD ACCEPT STATIONING OF SMALL SOV GARRISON AT WAR MEMORIAL. AFTER LENGTHY DISCUSSION WE WERE GIVEN IMPRESSION WE HAD PERSUADED OUR BRITISH COLLEAGUES AS FAR AS THEY WERE INDIVIDUALLY CONCERNED THAT THIS WOULD BE DANGEROUS COURSE OF ACTION WITHIN CONTEXT OF ACTUAL SITUATION IN WHICH WE FOUND OURSELVES. ON BASIS LAST NIGHT'S EXPERIENCE, IT EQUALLY OBVIOUS THAT FOREIGN /OFFICE

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-3- 350, SEPTEMBER 5, 8 PM (SET TWO OF THREE) FROM BERLIN

OFFICE HAS NOW PLACED OUR BRITISH COLLEAGUES HERE UNDER VERY TIGHT POLICY REINS WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION TO MEET CONTINGENCIES DISCUSSED LAST NIGHT.

WE CONSIDER IT URGENT THAT TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON (1) CONTINUED USE BY SOVS OF APCS TO TRANSPORT WAR MEMORIAL GUARDS TO AND FROM WEST BERLIN AND (2) IF WE SUCCEED IN ELIMINATING USE APCS FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY OF SOVIET ATTEMPT USE APCS FOR ENTRY THROUGH FRIEDRICHSTRASSE OF OTHER SOV PERSONNEL SUCH AS BASC, SPANDAU, ETC.

A SERIES OF DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN LAST 24 HOURS, IN OUR OPINION, IS BOUND TO FURTHER INCREASE THE FRUSTRATIONS AND DEEP EMOTIONAL ENGAGEMENT OF BERLINERS AT LARGE ON ONE HAND AND CITY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES ON OTHER HAND. THE GOVERNING MAYOR IS ENGAGED IN A SERIOUS EFFORT TO PROVIDE POLICY FRAMEWORK AND GUIDANCE TO HELP PEOPLE OF BERLIN: (A) ADJUST TO THE NEW CHALLENGES WITH WHICH THEY ARE CONFRONTED; (B) TO MAINTAIN A SENSE OF BALANCE; AND (C) AS THEY LOOK INTO THE FUTURE, TO RETAIN CONFIDENCE IN THEMSELVES AND IN COMMITMENTS MADE TO THEM BY ALLIES, ESPECIALLY THE US. EVIDENCE SO FAR AVAILABLE INDICATES MAYOR IS HAVING DIFFICULTY IN GAINING NECESSARY SUPPORT OF IMPORTANT OPINION MOLDERS IN BERLIN, NAMELY, THE INFLUENTIAL NEWSPAPER EDITORS. HE HAS NOT YET WON THIS BATTLE. SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS OF LAST 24 HOURS WHICH HAVE ADDED NEW ELEMENTS OF DISCORD AND COMPLICATIONS TO GOVERNING MAYOR'S TASKS ARE:

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55 52
Action

Control: 2557
Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 5, 1962
4:04 PM

UC1

BTF
Info

FROM: BERLIN

SS
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DAC
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IOP
INR
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 350, SEPTEMBER 5, 8 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT 350, BONN NIACT 327; INFORMATION LONDON NIACT 217, MOSCOW NIACT 198, PARIS NIACT 228 SHAPE NIACT 125, USAREUR NIACT 212.

PARIS FOR USRO AND MCGUIRE

SHAPE FOR STOESSEL AND US ELEMENT LIVE OAK

USAREUR FOR POLAD.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(A) THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SOVS WERE ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE BRITISH ACTION OF HAVING OFFICER OF UK CINC GO TO CHIEF OF SOVIET LIAISON MISSION RATHER THAN THE REVERSE AND SUBSEQUENT SUMMONING OF CHIEF OF BRIXMIS TO HQ OF GSFG; (B) NEW SHOOTING OF REFUGEE UNDER ESPECIALLY REVOLTING CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH A DEFENSELESS MAN ENTANGLED IN BARBED WIRE, AND (C) ISSUANCE BY GDR REGIME OF A DECLARATION, IN NEUES DEUTSCHLAND TODAY, GIVING COMPLETELY PERVERTED VERSION OF INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS NEGOTIATIONS WITH RED CROSS AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES FROM BOTH PARTS OF BERLIN ON SUBJECT OF BRINGING IMMEDIATE MEDICAL AID TO WOUNDED REFUGEES, ATTEMPTING DEMONSTRATE IT WAS WEST BERLIN GOVERNMENT WHICH REJECTED ICRC PROPOSALS.

IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE AND FOOLHARDY FOR ANY OF ALLIES - AS WE GO FROM DAY TO DAY INTO THE FUTURE - TO BASE OUR POLICIES ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT EITHER THE GOVERNING MAYOR,

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WITH ALL THE POLICE FORCES AT HIS DISPOSITION, OR THE THREE ALLIED COMMANDANTS, WITH THE RESOURCES AT THEIR DISPOSITION, CAN ASSURE BALANCED BEHAVIOR ON PART OF THE BERLIN POPULATION AND CONTINUED TRANQUILITY IN BERLIN.

IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT OUR THREE GOVERNMENTS MUST SOBERLY DETERMINE WHAT COURSES OF ACTION THEY SHOULD TAKE WITH RESPECT TO CONTINUED SOVIET UTILIZATION OF APCS FOR TRANSPORTING EITHER WAR MEMORIAL GUARDS OR ANY OTHER PERSONNEL. TAKING FULL ACCOUNT, AS BRITISH AND FRENCH EMPHASIZE, OF NECESSITY OF NOT OVER-ENGAGING SOVIET PRESTIGE IN THIS POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE SITUATION, A POSITION IN WHICH WE HEARTILY CONCUR, WE MUST ALSO NOT NEGLECT DEVOTING EQUAL ATTENTION TO MANNER IN WHICH SOVIETS CAN DAMAGE PRESTIGE AND POSITION OF ALLIES IN WEST BERLIN.

RECOMMENDATIONS: IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT EMBASSY BONN SEEK TO OBTAIN TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT TO RECOMMEND TO GOVTS THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION:

1. RE WAR MEMORIAL GUARDS, BY MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, AT LATEST, THE PROPOSED BRITISH ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN, NAMELY, TO SUGGEST TO SOVIETS THAT IT IS NO LONGER DESIRABLE OR NECESSARY FOR THEM TO USE APCS FOR TRANSPORT OF THEIR WM GUARDS. IF THEY DO NOT OF THEIR OWN ACCORD SHIFT TO USE OF BUSES OR SEDANS BY WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT AS OF THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13 THEY WILL NO LONGER BE PERMITTED TO ENTER WEST BERLIN IN APCS.

2. WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET USE OF APCS FOR ENTRY INTO WEST BERLIN OF BASC, SPANDAU OR ANY OTHER PERSONNEL (A CONTINGENCY WHICH WE FRANKLY WOULD NOT ANTICIPATE ARISING SO LONG AS WM GUARDS ARE ENTERING IN APCS), DENIAL AT OUTSET OF ENTRY IN SUCH COMBAT VEHICLES.

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-3- 350, SEPTEMBER 5, 8 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE) FROM BERLIN

3. DENIAL AT OUTSET OF ANY SOV ATTEMPT UTILIZE FOR TRANSPORT OF WAR MEMORIAL GUARDS LARGER APCS THAN THOSE CURRENTLY IN USE.

GENERAL WATSON CONCURS.

HULICK

GDW

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379

Telegram 1406 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, September 20, 1962, 4 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/9-2062.
Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pages of source text not declassified.]

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* (2BFS9(1))

SECRET

M
Action
SS

Info

Control: 19661
Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 25, 1962
1:55 PM

(380)

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 438, SEPTEMBER 25, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 438, INFORMATION BONN PRIORITY 408.

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR

BRANDT AND CLOSE ADVISERS EVIDENTLY HAVE TAKEN HARD LOOK AT WHAT THEY CONSIDER "REALITIES" OF BERLIN SITUATION. THEY NOW SEEM TO BE ENDEAVORING TO ADAPT THEIR THINKING TO THESE REALITIES AND ALSO EXPLAIN THEM TO PUBLIC. THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT PICTURE WHICH PUBLIC HAS OF WEST BERLIN SITUATION AND PARTICULARLY OF ALLIED COMMITMENTS IS TO DANGEROUS DEGREE BASED ON ILLUSIONS. IN ADOPTING THIS NEW COURSE, BRANDT IS MAINLY MOTIVATED BY DESIRE CREATE VIABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS IN BERLIN FOR DIFFICULT TIMES AHEAD, WITH ADDITIONAL AIM OF ESTABLISHING SPD PLATFORM WHICH CAN BE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHED FROM CDU POLICY DURING COMING BERLIN ELECTIONS.

(1)

PRINCIPAL "REALITIES" OF SITUATION WHICH BERLIN SPD LEADERSHIP IS STRESSING ARE THAT ALLIED COMMITMENTS NEITHER EXTEND TO EAST BERLIN NOR FULLY COVER GERMAN ACCESS TO BERLIN. THE REACTION TO FECHTER SHOOTING IN PARTICULAR DEMONSTRATED THAT PUBLIC HAD NOT FULLY GRASPED THAT, GIVEN ALLIED DEFINITION OF THEIR COMMITMENT, GDR/SOVIET POWER IN EAST BERLIN HAD AN ALMOST FREE HAND TO ACT AND THAT WEST WAS NOT IN POSITION TO AFFECT THAT ACTION. IN ATTEMPTING REDUCE PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS AND THUS REDUCE LIKELIHOOD OF OUTBURSTS WHEN FURTHER SOVIET/GDR ACTIONS OCCUR, WHICH HE CONSIDERS INEVITABLE, BRANDT HAS POUNDED HOME THEME THAT THREE-POWER WEST BERLIN IS WHAT COUNTS, NOT FOUR-POWER GREATER BERLIN (BERLINTEL 414). HE HAS IN EFFECT BEEN TELLING PUBLIC THAT WALL MUST BE LIVED WITH IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

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SECRET

-2- 438, SEPTEMBER 25, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM BERLIN

RESPECTING ACCESS, SPD LEADERSHIP BELIEVES ALLIES DO NOT CONSIDER GERMAN CIVILIAN ACCESS AS THEIR PROBLEM. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE ALLIES WOULD COMMIT THEIR RESOURCES TO TAKE COUNTERMEASURES IN EVENT GERMANS FELT OBLIGED TO DENY THEMSELVES ACCESS IN ORDER AVOID ACCEPTING PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT SUCH AS VISA. THIS BELIEF HAS IN TURN LED TO CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD BE POINTLESS FOR BERLIN TO STAKE ITS ECONOMIC WELL-BEING IN ATTEMPTING TO HOLD WAVERING LINE ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS (VISA QUESTION BEING DEALT WITH IN SEPARATE MESSAGE). HERE, TOO, THEREFORE, SOVIETS/GDR HAVE GREATER DEGREE OF UNHINDERED MANEUVERABILITY THAN PUBLIC REALIZES, IN VIEW OF BRANDT AND ADVISERS. AS OPENING MOVE IN CAMPAIGN TO DEFLATE THIS ILLUSION, INTERIOR SENATOR ALBERTZ TOLD LARGE GROUP PROMINENT BUSINESSMEN SEPT 13 THAT SENAT HAD ACCEPTED POSSIBILITY OF VISA AND LOOKED TOWARD SOME SUCH ARRANGEMENT AS ACCESS AUTHORITY AS ANSWER TO PROBLEM OF FREE ACCESS.

BRANDT'S CONCERNS GO DEEPER THAN THESE TWO MORE IMMEDIATE QUESTIONS, HOWEVER. HE FEARS THAT OCCUPATION RIGHTS MAY NOT LONG PROVIDE CONVINCING BASIS FOR WEST BERLIN'S STATUS. HE APPEARS TO BE SEARCHING FOR NEW FORMULATION OF BASIS WEST BERLIN STATUS, AND APPARENTLY CONSIDERS THAT PEACE CONFERENCE HE HAS FOR SOME TIME ESPOUSED WOULD BE STEP IN THIS DIRECTION. HIS ADVISERS OCCASIONALLY RAISE QUESTION WHETHER SOME MODIFIED RECOGNITION OF GDR IS NOT INEVITABLE.

(ON SEPT 22 IN DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO INDUSTRIAL FAIR FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, JR., SENATOR SCHILLER STATED CONFIDENTIALLY THAT HE RECENTLY SUBMITTED PROPOSAL TO GOVERNING MAYOR WHICH LATTER IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING. PROPOSAL ENVISAGES PLEBISCITE IN WEST BERLIN TO PUT FOLLOWING QUESTION TO REFERENDUM VOTE: WHETHER WEST BERLIN SHOULD BECOME LEGALLY AN ELEVENTH LAND OF FEDREP, UNDER ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY THROUGHT CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN FEDREP AND THREE ALLIES LATTER WOULD REMAIN IN BERLIN ON BASIS OF ORIGINAL FOUR-POWER AGREEMENTS, EXERCISING ALL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES THEREUNDER AS

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HERETOFORE. ASSUMING OVERWHELMING AFFIRMATIVE VOTE, CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT WOULD BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THREE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND FEDREP WHICH WOULD CONFIRM BERLIN'S STATUS AS AN ELEVENTH LAND AND AT SAME TIME PRESERVE ALLIED PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN ON BASIS OF QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS. WE SHALL ENDEAVOR OBTAIN PRECISE DETAILS THIS PROPOSAL AND SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH BRANDT INTENDS TO ESPOUSE IT.)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* 2BF89/4

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Action

SECRET

Control: 19603
Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 25, 1962
1:55 PM

SS
Info

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State EYES ONLY

NO: 438, SEPTEMBER 25, 5 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 438, INFORMATION BONN PRIORITY 408.

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR

BRANDT HAS BEEN SEVERELY ATTACKED FOR HIS CAMPAIGN, PRINCIPALLY BY CERTAIN WEST BERLIN NEWSPAPER EDITORS. LATTER AGREE ON DESIRABILITY OF STRESSING NECESSITY OF PREVENTING SOVS FROM TURNING WEST BERLIN INTO QUADRIPARTITE CONTROLLED CITY. HOWEVER, THEY THINK BRANDT WENT TOO FAR IN CONCEDING, OR GIVING IMPRESSION OF CONCEDING, THAT FOUR-POWER AGREEMENTS CONCERNING BERLIN AS WHOLE ARE DEAD LETTER. THEY QUESTION SINCERITY OF HIS ACTIONS AND REJECT HIS PURPOSE OF CONDITIONING THINKING OF BERLINERS TO REALITIES IN ORDER TO PREVENT EMOTIONAL OUTBURSTS AT NEW REFUGEE SHOOTING AT WALL FROM BEING DIRECTED AGAINST THE ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE AMERICANS. THEY BELIEVE, ON CONTRARY, THAT BRANDT IS SIMPLY ENGAGED IN LARGE-SCALE PUBLIC RELATIONS GAMBIT IN WHICH HE IS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN ASSURING HIS OWN ELECTION AND SPD VICTORY IN UPCOMING CITY ELECTIONS AND, WITH AN EYE TO CHANCELLORSHIP IN NEXT FEDERAL REPUBLIC ELECTIONS, KEEPING HIS BRIDGES MENDED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON. WITH RESPECT TO LATTER MOTIVATION, THEY ACCUSE BRANDT OF IDENTIFYING HIMSELF WITH WHAT HE BELIEVES TO BE ACTUAL POLICY THINKING AND ULTIMATE PURPOSES OF AMERICAN POLICY WITH WHICH CHANCELLOR IS IN DISAGREEMENT.

BRANDT'S CONCERN THAT PUBLIC UNAWARE OF LIMITS OF ALLIED COMMITMENT IS JUSTIFIED. WE TOO BELIEVE PUBLIC UNPREPARED FOR POSITIONS CALLED FOR BY ALLIED PLANS IN RESPONSE TO CERTAIN HIGHLY LIKELY CONTINGENCIES. IN HIS METHOD OF ATTACKING PROBLEM BRANDT RUNS

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-2- 438, SEPTEMBER 25, 5 PM; (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM BERLIN

CERTAIN RISKS, HOWEVER. HIS DEPRECATION OF FOUR-POWER STATUS, HOWEVER IT MAY REFLECT THE LIMITS OF PRACTICAL ACTION BY ALLIES, DOES CUT INTO LEGAL BASIS OF ALLIED PRESENCE HERE. IN ADDITION, HIS EMPHASIS ON LIMITS OF ALLIED COMMITMENT AND MANEUVERABILITY COULD REDUCE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN ALLIES BEYOND POINT BRANDT WOULD INTEND.

AT SAME TIME THAT SENAT HAS BEEN WRITING OFF EAST BERLIN AND SEEKING PREPARE PUBLIC FOR CHANGES IN ACCESS MODALITIES, IT HAS BEEN INTENSIFYING PRESSURE ON ALLIES TO TAKE OR PERMIT MORE VIGOROUS STEPS DEAL WITH INTERNAL SECURITY WEST BERLIN. INTERIOR SENATOR ALBERTZ HAS CARRIED BURDEN OF THIS EFFORT, WHICH IS AIMED AT ACHIEVING BETTER WEST BERLIN POLICING OF COMMUNIST-OPERATED S-BAHN AND REICHSBAHN PROPERTIES AND AT SECURING LARGER AND BETTER-ARMED WEST BERLIN POLICE FORCE. ALBERTZ AND GROUP OF ENERGETIC YOUNG MEN AROUND HIM EVOKE CONCERN OF BRITISH AND FRENCH, WHO SEE IN THEIR PRESSURE TACTICS INDICATIONS OF SUSPICIOUS AND DANGEROUS LONG-RANGE PLANS. BRITISH PARTICULARLY SEE SOME INTENTION TO FORM "INDEPENDENT NATIONALIST FORCE" IN WEST BERLIN. ANY REAL FOUNDATION FOR SUCH FAR-GOING ALLEGATIONS ELUDES US, BUT WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED AT SIDE EFFECTS OF ALBERTZ MANEUVERING. ALBERTZ HAS SOUGHT FORCE ALLIED ACTION BY IMPLYING PUBLICLY THAT IT FORTHCOMING, AND HAS WITHOUT CONSULTING ALLIES TAKEN POLICE MEASURES WHICH COULD HAVE LED TO SOME DIFFICULTY (SUBSTITUTION OF WESTERN FOR COMMUNIST POSTERS ON S-BAHN). HOWEVER, WE CONSIDER HIS ACTIONS MOTIVATED BY LEGITIMATE CONCERN FOR SECURITY AND PSYCHOLIGICAL NEEDS IN WEST BERLIN. WE ALSO REALIZE THIS IS SORT OF PRESSURE ALLIES MUST EXPECT IN INCREASING DEGREE AS CONTEXT OF WEST BERLIN'S SITUATION CHANGES RADICALLY WITHOUT WHAT SENAT WOULD CONSIDER ADEQUATE ADAPTATION OF ALLIED POLICIES TO THOSE CHANGES. (WE HAVE IN MIND PARTICULARLY CONTINUED ALLIED ACCEPTANCE OF FREE-WHEELING COMMUNIST CONTROL OF S-BAHN/REICHSBAHN AT TIME SPLIT OF CITY HAS BECOME DIFINITIVE.)

IT THUS EVIDENT THAT BRANDT'S INTRICATE BALANCING ACT, PERSUADING

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-3- 438, SEPTEMBER 25, 5 PM; (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM BERLIN

POPULACE, ON ONE HAND, THAT HE UNDERSTANDS AND SYMPATHIZES WITH THEIR FRUSTRATIONS WHILE EMPHASIZING ON OTHER THAT FATE OF CITY IS INEXTRICABLY TIED TO WESTERN ALLIES, IS GROWING MORE PRECARIOUS AS POLITICAL TENSIONS MOUNT. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (INCLUDING ABGEORDNETENHAUS DEBATE ((BERLINTEL 363)). REBUFF BY STATE SECRETARY VON HASE, VIOLENT ATTACK BY CDU'S MOUTHPIECE, THE POLITISCH-SOZIALE KORRESPONDENZ, FAILURE OF TIERGARTEN DISTRICT SPD TO NOMINATE FOR RE-ELECTION NUMBER OF BRANDT'S STAUNCHEST SUPPORTERS IN THE ABGEORDNETENHAUS) DEMONSTRATE HOW DIFFICULT BRANDT'S ROLE HAS ALREADY BECOME.

HULICK

JTC

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

762.00/9-2762

Memorandum of Conversation

381

DATE: September 27, 1962
PLACE: Mr. Tyler's Office
TIME: 10:30 A.M.

2BF90/1

SUBJECT: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.'s Report on Trip to West Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., U. S. Representative, German Industries Fair
Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, Office of German Affairs
Mr. Frank E. Cash, Jr., Berlin Task Force
Mr. S. Douglas Martin, Office of German Affairs

COPIES TO: American Embassy, Bonn - 1
U. S. Mission, Berlin - 2
EUR - Mr. Tyler - 3
DTF - Mr. Hillenbrand - 5
BTF - Mr. Cash - 6
GER - Mr. Creel - 4

October 1962

Mr. Roosevelt opened the conversation by describing the U. S. Exhibit at the German Industries Fair in West Berlin, which he thought was very well presented and would be successful in terms of sales of American equipment and in convincing viewers that the U.S. is the leader in the field of automation. Good advance publicity by the Department of Commerce generated considerable interest in the Exhibit.

Mr. Roosevelt then reported to Mr. Tyler at length concerning recent developments in Berlin, his impressions of people there, particularly of Mayor Brandt and of Senator Schiller; the latter he regards as an "idea man" for Brandt in addition to his role as Senator for Economics and as a good friend of the United States.

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Mr. Roosevelt also made the following points of special interest:

1) Both Mayor Brandt and Senator Schiller discussed with Mr. Roosevelt proposed plebiscite in West Berlin to be held in November. In the plebiscite West Berliners would be given an opportunity to express their wish for the continuance of Allied presence in West Berlin and to affirm Allied rights in Berlin, and to request that West Berlin be incorporated into the Federal Republic as an Eleventh Land.

Mayor Brandt told Mr. Roosevelt he had discussed the proposed plebiscite on Friday (September 21) with Chancellor Adenauer, who gave his approval.

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Both Mayor Brandt and Senator Schiller mentioned to Mr. Roosevelt that in one of his conversations with the Secretary, Ambassador Dobrynin had said the Soviet government believed its proposals were acceptable to the people of West Berlin. Reportedly, when the Secretary asked Dobrynin if he were willing to let the West Berliners express their opinions, Ambassador Dobrynin backed off. This had suggested to the West Berliners the plebiscite idea. Senator Schiller also believes that holding a plebiscite would be a good thing for the psychology of the Berlin population at this time.

Senator Schiller has a variation on the plebiscite proposal, which Mayor Brandt "wishes him luck" with. He believes it should be followed by a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Allies which would confirm Allied rights in West Berlin and commit the Federal Republic of Germany to support the preservation of those rights.

2) Mayor Brandt asked Mr. Roosevelt if his mother, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, would accept an invitation to come to Berlin to investigate conditions there and possibly to serve on a commission which would work to alleviate the hardships caused by the separation of families which had resulted from the construction of the wall. Mr. Roosevelt replied that his mother would have to have the President's approval before she would undertake such an obligation but that, in any event, she was really too ill to take on such a burden. Mayor Brandt then asked if Mrs. Roosevelt might recommend some person or persons to do this.

In connection with this, Mayor Brandt said that Mr. Leopold, the Federal Republic's negotiator on Interzonal Trade matters, carries on technical trade negotiations with the East Germans and can discuss other matters as well but Mayor Brandt believes that a study by someone of stature might be worthwhile in developing ideas and generating wider interest in alleviating the hardships caused by the wall. Brandt thought that possibly one of the uninhabited exclaves, such as Wuestermark, of West Berlin, might be used as a meeting place where West Germans and East Germans could meet periodically, although this is almost like having prison visiting privileges. A commission might develop other ideas which might serve humanitarian ends and be of help to the East Germans.

3) Mr. Roosevelt stated with regard to the instructions issued after the Fechter case, under which an Allied ambulance will enter East Berlin and take persons wounded at the wall to an East Berlin hospital, that Mayor Brandt accepts them, but that he, Mr. Roosevelt, believes the instructions should be changed so as to permit the ambulance to take wounded persons to the East-West checkpoint and have the driver declare to the East German guards his intention to bring the person to a West

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ZBF90/3

Berlin hospital. The East Germans would thus be forced into an embarrassing position, since a refusal would open them to public criticism.

Mr. Tyler posed the hypothetical case of an East German wounded somewhere along the wall far from a checkpoint. Would it not be better, Mr. Tyler asked, to take the person to a nearby East German hospital than through the checkpoint, since he might die en route. Isn't it our primary intent to help the wounded person? Mr. Roosevelt agreed but suggested that the instructions might be modified to give the ambulance driver discretion to take the wounded person to a nearby East Berlin hospital if his condition were serious, otherwise he would be brought to a checkpoint in an effort to get him to a West Berlin hospital. Mr. Roosevelt also thought the U.S. might consider asking the International Red Cross to maintain an ambulance patrol on both sides of the wall rather than use military ambulances.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Tyler thanked Mr. Roosevelt for calling to report these developments, which are of interest in connection with Mayor Brandt's forthcoming visit. Mr. Roosevelt offered to extend any further help which he might be called upon to give.

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Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 27, 1962
10:06 PM

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 366, SEPTEMBER 28, 1 AM

Downgraded To: SECRET
E.O. 11652: XGDS (2)
Authorized by: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 366 INFORMATION LONDON POLTO 61, BONN POLTO 48, ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS AND BERLIN POLTO UNNUMBERED

REF: A. TOPOL 355 RPTD LONDON 1555 BONN 738
B. TOPOL 413 RPTD LONDON 1757 BONN 844
C. TOPOL 399 RPTD BERLIN 337 LONDON AND BONN UNN

NAC MEETING SEPTEMBER 27 - BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

US PERMREP TOOK OCCASION OF BERLIN AGENDA TO PRESENT AT OUTSET DEPARTMENT ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS ON BERLIN CONTAINED REFTEL . AFTER CHAIRMAN (COLONNA) HAD OUTLINED BERLIN PROBLEMS REQUIRING ACTION, CANADIAN AND BELGIAN PERMREPS POSED CERTAIN QUESTIONS RE BERCON/MARCON PLANS, SEQUENCE PAPER AND NATO-TRIPARTITE RELATIONS PAPER AND ALSO MADE POINTED INQUIRIES RE QUADRIPARTITE PLANS FOR POLITICAL ACTION, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT SIGNING SEPARATE PEACE TREATY. CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION THEN TOOK PLACE ON PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING QUESTIONS AND REACHING AGREEMENT OR CONSENSUS MOST EXPEDITIOUSLY ON BERLIN PAPERS. CONCLUDED THAT FURTHER QUESTIONS BY OTHER NAC MEMBERS WOULD BE SUBMITTED IS FOR REFERRAL TO 4 PERMREPS WHO COULD OBTAIN FURTHER GUIDANCE FROM CAPITALS, HOPEFULLY IN TIME FOR NEXT DISCUSSION ON OCTOBER 3. CHAIRMAN INDICATED SEVERAL MORE MEETINGS MIGHT BE REQUIRED. DISCUSSION ALSO EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE PROGRESS ON ALERTS PLANNING AND ARRANGEMENT. AFTER EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURE FOR DOING SO, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO HAVE

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-2- POLTO 366, SEPTEMBER 28, 1 AM FROM PARIS

HAVE SPECIAL NAC MEETING ON ALERTS WITH SHAPE BRIEFING AND INTENSIVE DISCUSSION FOR CLARIFICATION AFTER WHICH NAC SHOULD DECIDE ON PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING PROBLEM.

(COMMENT: DISCUSSION DID NOT DEVELOP TO POINT WHERE IT SEEMED APPROPRIATE TO DRAW ON GUIDANCE CONTAINED REFTELS A AND B.)

DETAILED REPORT BEING SENT SEPARATELY.

FINLETTER

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ACTION: USMISSION BERLIN 395

INFO: Amembassy BONN 894
Amembassy PARIS 1490
Amembassy LONDON 1896
Amembassy MOSCOW 793
POLAD USMISSION

PARIS FOR EMBO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

REFERENCE: Berlin's 296

Reftel indicated that there continue to be many Communist activities in West Berlin that it would be desirable to reduce or eliminate. In view of Communist attitude re Four-Power status of Berlin, those tracing to that status become increasingly difficult to explain.

We should plan now to use future Communist harassments as occasions for removing these activities. Long-run aim, going beyond existing contingency plans, is to reduce to absolute minimum all such activities. But it would be particularly desirable now, in possible pre-Gov/GER treaty period, to be in position to respond immediately to any new harassments by taking some measure against one or more of these Communist activities in West Berlin.

Before subject is raised in Berlin with British and French we would appreciate Mission's views and suggestions for tidying up anomalies of Communist presence in Western Sector. Following is list of measures that might be considered:

1. Use of [redacted] premises for Communist political activities.

2. Eliminate

EUR:GER:GMcCarthy:mgp 10/3/62

EUR - Martin J. Hillenbrand

EUR - Mr. Cash

[redacted]

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[redacted]

2. Eliminate NATO from Berlin premises.

3. Eliminate GDR operation of canal locks in Spandau and Charlottenburg.

4. Remove Intourist, TASS and/or Sovexportfilm from West Berlin.

5. Change Soviet War Memorial arrangements, e.g., by requiring Sov guard to enter West Berlin at Brandenburg Gate, by requiring reduction in size of Sov guard, or by replacing it with British guard.

6. Expel Czech and Polish Military Missions from West Berlin. (We recognize this measure appears elsewhere in [redacted] present contingency planning.)

End.

RUSK

[redacted]

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NLK NSF 71 France

315

SECRET

384

October 9, 1962

2BF93

McGB

SUBJECT: Problems with the French in dealing with Berlin

The French role in dealing with the Berlin problem has been less than forthcoming. Partly for reasons of policy and partly because of government organization, French participation in the planning and operations of tripartite and quadpartite organs dealing with Berlin has been clearly limited.

In the first instance, the French Government has consistently refused to support "the exploratory discussions" with the Soviets and, therefore, have been playing a passive rather than active role in all matters remotely connected with these talks.

In addition, it is also patently clear that the French Government keeps its Missions in Washington, Bonn and Berlin on a very tight rein, to a point where, in many instances, it is virtually impossible to get any effective cooperation from the French side. This is particularly true in Berlin, where the French Commandant lacks authority to handle even the most routine matters.

And this reluctance to delegate authority has carried over into several important aspects of Berlin contingency planning. Most important is the fact that the French have been reluctant to grant General Norstad the authority which London and Washington have already given him in questions of air access to make decisive responses to Soviet action. This extends from the question of substituting military for civilian crews after Soviet GDR interference to the question of fighter escorts for dealing with problems created by overt Soviet actions against Allied aircraft.

In Berlin itself, all tripartite planning for dealing with contingencies arising within the city itself has come to a virtual halt because of the French Commandant's inability -- because of instructions or lack of instructions -- to participate in these exercises.

David Klein

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Control: 9999
Rec'd: OCTOBER 11, 1962
4:19 PM

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 517, OCTOBER 11, 7 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 517; INFORMATION BONN 474.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: WEST BERLIN PLEBISCITE

ADVANTAGES:

MISSION CONSIDERS THAT WEST BERLIN PLEBISCITE, PROPERLY TIMED AND WITH CAREFULLY WORDED QUESTIONS, WOULD BE USEFUL. ITS PRIMARY VALUE WOULD BE TO PROVIDE WEST WITH MORE COMPELLING PROPAGANDA ARGUMENT THAN 17-YEAR-OLD OCCUPATION RIGHTS TO SECURE SUPPORT OF NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR ITS POSITION HERE. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN ANY UN CONSIDERATION OF BERLIN QUESTION. IN ADDITION, PLEBISCITE COULD HELP CORRECT UNBALANCED IMPRESSION WHICH APPARENTLY EXISTS IN SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES, AS RESULT OF FECHTER DEMONSTRATIONS, THAT THERE IS WIDE AND DEEP CURRENT OF ANTI-ALLIED FEELING HERE. LOCALLY, PLEBISCITE COULD PROVIDE POINT OF FOCUS FOR BERLINERS' SOMEWHAT FRUSTRATED NEED TO PARTICIPATE POLITICALLY AND TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES RESPECTING THEIR OWN DESTINY. FINALLY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ALLIES SEEK EVERY OPPORTUNITY SUPPORT INITIATIVES OF BERLIN LEADERS AT TIME WHEN SO MANY SUCH INITIATIVES MUST PERFORCE BE TURNED DOWN.

DISADVANTAGES:

WHILE MISSION FAVORS PROPOSAL IN GENERAL, IT HAS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION FOLLOWING NEGATIVE FACTORS:

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2BFPH/2

SECRET

-2- 517, OCTOBER 11, 7 PM, FROM: BERLIN

1. IT IS POSSIBLE, THOUGH NOT LIKELY, THAT DISSATISFACTION WITH ALLIED POLICIES (NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH ANTI-ALLIED SENTIMENTS) IS SUFFICIENTLY WIDESPREAD THAT NOTICEABLE NUMBER OF VOTERS WOULD EXPRESS THEMSELVES NEGATIVELY RE ALLIED PRESENCE HERE, OR NOT VOTE AT ALL, AS PROTEST. NEEDLESS TO SAY, ANYTHING SHORT OF OVERWHELMING FAVORABLE VOTE WOULD HAVE UNFORTUNATE EFFECT IN WESTERN COUNTRIES PARTICULARLY;

2. SOVIETS LIKELY ATTEMPT TO MUDDY WATERS BY CONDUCTING OWN PLEBISCITE IN EAST BERLIN ON SOME ISSUE LIKELY TO RECEIVE SUPPORT AND ALSO LEND WEIGHT TO THEIR POLICIES;

3. PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING PUBLIC CRITICISM OF ALLIES IN RECENT WEEKS IN BERLIN, SANCTIONING OF PLEBISCITE COULD BE REGARDED AS EVIDENCE OF ALLIED LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN WEST BERLIN ATTITUDE;

4. FROM JURIDICAL POINT OF VIEW, TO PUT ALLIED PRESENCE HERE TO PUBLIC VOTE, EVEN THOUGH THIS NOT DONE DIRECTLY BY ALLIES BUT ONE SANCTIONED BY THEM, WOULD RAISE QUESTION WHETHER THAT PRESENCE FROM THEN ON RESTED ON PUBLIC APPROVAL INSTEAD OF ALLIED RIGHT. WHILE LEGALISTIC CONCEPTS NOT ALWAYS RELEVANT IN SUCH CASES, IT CONCEIVABLE THAT THIS IDEA WOULD BE RAISED BY JURIDICALLY-MINDED PERSONS AND COULD RETURN IN FUTURE TO HAUNT US.

SUBSTANCE OF PLEBISCITE:

BRANDT HAS NOT AS YET DETERMINED UPON FORMULATION. ORIGINALLY HE HAD ENVISAGED TWO QUESTIONS, FIRST ASKING IF CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ALLIES IS DESIRED AND SECOND ASKING IF PUBLIC WISHES MAINTENANCE OF PRESENT WEST BERLIN-FEDREP TIES. IN OCT 10 TALK WITH AMBASSADOR DOWLING, BRANDT MENTIONED SECOND POSSIBILITY: SENAT WOULD PASS RESOLUTION TREATING ABOVE SUBJECTS IN MORE OR LESS FORM, AND PUBLIC WOULD BE ASKED TO EXPRESS ITS AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH RESOLUTION. LATTER PROPOSAL WOULD IN PARTICULAR AVOID LEGALISTIC OBJECTIONS TO DIRECT QUERY ON ALLIED PRESENCE.

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FORMULATION OF PLEBISCITE AND ADEQUATE EXPLANATION BEFOREHAND TO PUBLIC ARE MOST IMPORTANT IN AVOIDING PITFALLS DESCRIBED ABOVE UNDER DISADVANTAGES. ALSO, IN USING PLEBISCITE RESULTS, ALLIES WILL OBTAIN MAXIMUM BENEFIT IF THEY ARE CLOSELY RELATED TO THEME OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

TIMING:

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT PLEBISCITE BE HELD AT TIME AND IN SITUATION WHICH GIVE SOME PURPOSE AND MEANING TO IT. TO HOLD IT IN SLACK POLITICAL PERIOD, WHERE IT APPEARED UNRELATED TO ANY WORLD DEVELOPMENTS, WOULD BE UNWISE. IF FOR EXAMPLE IT SHOULD COME AS UN BERLIN DEBATE WERE IN OFFING, OR BE ANNOUNCED DURING SUCH DEBATE, IT WOULD HAVE POINT AND MEANING. MOST OF NEGATIVE PRESS CRITICISM HERE (THERE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY LITTLE COMMENT OF ANY KIND) HAS EXPRESSED FEAR THAT THIS POLITICAL WEAPON MIGHT BE THROWN AWAY BY BEING USED AT WRONG TIME.

FOLLOWING TIMING ALTERNATIVES APPEAR TO US TO BE MOST FRUITFUL:

1. PLEBISCITE TO BE SCHEDULED AS SOON AS IT KNOWN KHRUSHCHEV GOING TO UN WITH IDEA OF HOLDING IT PRIOR TO UN DEBATE;

2. SCHEDULE TO BE HELD DURING UN DEBATE;

3. ANNOUNCE AT TIME OF UN DEBATE THAT IT TO BE HELD WITHIN FEW WEEKS (THIS MIGHT PROVIDE EXCUSE FOR GRACEFUL SHELVING OF DEBATE AT LEAST TEMPORARILY);

4. HOLD IT AT SOME TIME FOR RELATIONSHIP TO TIMING OF SEPARATE PEACE TREATY OR CONFERENCE. DISADVANTAGE IS THAT PLEBISCITE OF THIS CONTENT NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO BE RESPONSE TO PEACE TREATY.

5. RELATE IT TO CRITICAL BERLIN DEVELOPMENT OTHER THAN ABOVE TWO, SUCH AS RENEWED HEAVY PRESSURE BY SOVIETS AGAINST ACCESS ROUTES.

[redacted] HULICK

MRJ

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 11, 1962

SECRET

To: The Secretary

From: S/AL - Llewellyn E. Thompson LET

Subject: Memorandum of conversation, Thursday, October 11, 1962, 5:30 p. m.

Participants

France	United States
Ambassador Herve Alphand	Ambassador-at-Large
Mr. Jean-Claude Winckler (Counselor)	Llewellyn E. Thompson

762.00/10-1162

Ambassador Alphand asked yesterday to see me on what was apparently a courtesy call. In the course of the conversation, he asked if I could tell him anything about the rash of reports following Brandt's visit to Washington. He mentioned, for example, the press discussion of the use of German troops in the first stages of a Berlin crisis, and said of course the French position was that they should not be involved in Phase I.

I pointed out that I had just returned to the Department and was not currently well informed. I had, however, not heard this matter discussed. I said that speaking personally, however, an important element in handling the Berlin situation was the psychological effect on the Soviets of any moves we made, and that I hoped our contingency plans would provide for some deployment of German troops early in a crisis, since this would help convince the Russians we meant business. Alphand said he thought this was already provided for.

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Alphand also mentioned reports about a plebiscite and said the French were concerned that we not jeopardize our legal basis in Berlin by implying that the Berliners could decide whether we should stay or leave.

I replied I thought our position on a plebiscite was that this was a matter for the Germans to discuss in the first phase, and that we would be receptive to any suggestions they might have. Regarding the specific point of our legal basis, it seemed to me that this could be handled by the way the question was framed. For example, it could be put in the form of asking whether the Berliners approved of the policy which their Government had followed so far of advocating the retention of Allied troops pending German reunification.

Alphand said that his Foreign Minister had had a most satisfactory discussion with the President. He said they were both agreed that contingency plans needed review and that the period of our reaction should be shortened. He inquired whether an early meeting of the Ambassadorial group was planned and whether it would not be appropriate for the group to instruct the appropriate people to get ahead with revising contingency plans. I replied I had no knowledge of any planned meeting and I was not yet informed about the President's talk with Couve de Murville.

Alphand explained the French attitude on the Berlin talks and I said that while I understood their position, I did not agree with it, and explained why.

Alphand said the French were quite concerned at the British initiative in raising the question of air access separately with Gromyko without prior consultation with the other Allies. I said that so far as I knew, we had also not been consulted, and I had been quite surprised at this initiative.

Copy to: EUR - Mr. Tyler
GER - Mr. Hillenbrand

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

October 18, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - October 17, 1962

Present:

Foreign Minister Schroeder
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Reinkemeyer
Mr. Hermann Kusterer (interpreter)
McGeorge Bundy

Foreign Minister Schroeder began by repeating the concern about the visa problem which he had been expressing to others throughout his visit. He is convinced that if the visa requirement appears to be accepted in substance without prompt and effective reaction it will be a major battle lost, above all in the psychological and the political fields, resulting from a feeling that the control of access by the GDR had been in large measure effective. Mr. Schroeder also repeated his argument that there was a close interdependence between acquiescence on civilian access and small increases in GDR control over military access.

Mr. Schroeder then turned to the problem of the Chancellor's visit. He expressed his hope that the visit would be a successful one and the belief that it should be very carefully prepared for by staff work on both sides. He expressed some dissatisfaction with newspaper suggestions that his own visit had been blanketed by the Chancellor's visit and showed evident curiosity as to how the Chancellor's visit had been arranged. I explained to him that I had intentionally given the Chancellor an opening during our meeting in Cadenabbia by remarking on the danger of misunderstanding when communications between major statesmen were subject to the inevitable distortions of reporting by third parties, and that the Chancellor had at once indicated his own belief that it was high time for another meeting between him and the President. For reasons unclear to me, this explanation

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seemed to give cheer to Mr. Schroeder.

I strongly agreed with his sentiments about careful staff preparation for the visit. In a later passage, Mr. Schroeder made quite a point of urging that the Chancellor be received with a special gesture of pomp and circumstance in the light of his age and distinction, and his sensitivity to this kind of treatment. Mr. Schroeder emphasized how much the Chancellor had been touched by martial ceremonies (at the Tomb of the Unknowns?) in 1953.

Mr. Schroeder also discussed the problem of the plebiscite and indicated his own preference for a single question asking for the opinion of West Berlin on the Soviet proposal for a free demilitarized city. He acknowledged that the difference between this and Mayor Brandt's proposal was one for discussion among the Germans and he indicated that in the end the view of the Berliners should govern. I expressed no preference, saying simply that any plebiscite should serve the double purpose of encouraging the Berliners themselves and showing their conviction to the world at large. We agreed that timing was difficult in the light of uncertainty about Khrushchev's movements.

Mr. Schroeder wound up his opening remarks by expressing some impatience with what he appeared to consider a stream of suggestions that the Germans should "take the initiative." He thought that anyone who asked for ideas ought to be willing to put up some good ones himself, and that one should also be careful to distinguish between good new ideas and unacceptable concessions to the other side.

I told Mr. Schroeder that I was surprised to hear him sounding like a Foreign Minister so soon, and assured him that no one in the U. S. Government expected perfect solutions to the Berlin problem to be dreamed up by our German friends. I said that the concern which we felt was exemplified rather by the difficulties which we had had about the International Access Authority in the early part of this year, and I expressed my satisfaction that this question now seemed to be agreed between us. I remarked that on the question of the conditions of the settlement we might well have real questions to be worked out and might need to ask for the preparation of joint new positions, but only if and when the Soviet Union should

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indicate that a solution is possible which would recognize our vital interests in Berlin.

I then remarked that it seemed to me that the larger question for the present was indeed symbolized by the problem of civilian access, and I thought there was a special responsibility on the Germans in an area like this one. I agreed with Mr. Schroeder that the political and psychological questions were central here, and I said to him that I thought the United States would give most serious consideration to any German proposal on which the German Government and the leadership of Berlin were in solid agreement and which implied a full and appropriate share by the Germans in the responsibilities and costs of carrying out the plan. I said that it was of no value for any of us to look suspiciously at the other as if he was trying not to do his share, but that there was an understandable reluctance in the United States to accept all of the responsibility for reaction in areas in which the crucial problems were political and psychological. (In a later meeting with Schnippenkoetter of the Embassy, I made the point, which seems important to me, that on the military side a corresponding responsibility for formulating basic plans rests with the United States.) In response to a question by Mr. Schroeder, I also remarked that the fact that effective military access could be assured through the air did not mean that there would be no reaction to a surface blockade to such access. I reiterated my incomplete familiarity with the contingency planning, but said that in my judgment such a Soviet action would necessarily trigger many or most of the actions in Phase 2. The distinction which the President had in mind, I said, was simply that military access could in fact be maintained through the air for an indefinite period, while full civilian access could not.

I emphasized to Mr. Schroeder my own conviction that close and effective partnership between Bonn and Washington was the cornerstone of successful action in the Berlin case, and he strongly agreed. We exchanged one or two informal comments about the remarkable character of Chancellor Adenauer and the special problem of his relationship to General de Gaulle. The meeting broke up in a very friendly mood after a little more than an hour of talking.

McGeorge Bundy

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"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

Taylor Papers NDU 38 505 Berlin

TOP SECRET

388

18 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Plans

1. In recent weeks, the President has voiced increasing concern with the status of our Berlin contingency planning. At the *HIGH HEELS* briefing, he questioned the value of mobilization in terms of increasing our capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviets, pointing out they could reinforce Europe faster than we. Later, as the result of seeing a paper showing the degree of allied Berlin planning agreement--drafted by Colonel Legere and Mr. Klein for Mr. Bundy--the President expressed the need to achieve greater agreement with our allies. He is said to believe that the allies could not react fast enough if they could not achieve this agreement before a crisis began.

2. As a result of Presidential interest, Mr. Bundy last Friday talked informally with Mr. Nitze of ISA and Mr. Tyler of State. He asked that their respective departments be prepared soon to discuss Berlin planning with the President. He was evidently fairly vague about what was required, leaving it up to the departments to take whatever actions they believed necessary.

3. Based on his conversation with Mr. Bundy, Mr. Nitze has drafted a memorandum to you (Tab A) which requests that you be prepared to discuss with him (or with the President?) as early as 18 October, certain aspects of Berlin planning. (Obviously the discussions will not take place as early as Mr. Nitze originally thought; they may not be far away, however, given the Adenauer and the possible Khrushchev visits.)

4. The memorandum states that the President may wish very soon to "reassess or reaffirm" our Berlin policy, and then lists some specific areas for possible discussion. Colonel Legere, after reading the memorandum, says that most of it is Nitze, not Bundy, and that Mr. Nitze is trying to guess what the President wants.

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I talked with Colonel Armstrong, ISA's Berlin man, and he told me informally that he felt the result of the coming exercise would be to reaffirm our present policy as outlined in the "Poodle Blanket" and that the principal action resulting probably would be to move some of the military build-up actions from Phase II (when the Soviets block access) to Phase I (when the Soviets merely harrass access).

5. The Joint Staff has prepared (Tab B) a talking paper on Mr. Nitze's questions. I have redlined key portions. Its billboard effect is that (1) some degree of mobilization and reinforcement would be necessary for SACEUR to carry out his plans; (2) that execution of any plans would require some of SACEUR's reinforced alert measures to be implemented for all NATO forces; and (3) any nuclear demonstrations or "sophisticated disarming strikes" within the Soviet Union itself (suggested in the Nitze memorandum) would most certainly lead to general war.

DJSM 1256-62

6. The central question is, however, how well do Mr. Nitze's questions meet the areas of apparent Presidential concern? It would seem that at least two additional matters should be covered. They are discussed briefly below.

a. What do we mean by "mobilization" with respect to Berlin planning; when do we intend to mobilize, and to what extent?

The Joint Staff talking paper refers to a build-up along the lines of last year, although this reference was not made with the intent to define the term mobilization. In a separate JCS action, the Chiefs have defined (Tab C) what they mean to some extent. In addition, we have been discussing mobilization with our allies. In August, Secretary McNamara expected some results in three to four weeks. As yet, however, there apparently has been no substantial progress. Since our range of actions will be greatly affected by the amount of military force to be made available, we should force some commitment from our allies if at all possible.

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b. How do we get greater agreement with our allies?

Several approaches seem useful. One would be to re-emphasize the fact that NATO is developing a "catalog of plans"

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from which it may choose at the time of Soviet blockage of access to Berlin, or Soviet infringement on some other "vital interest." Our emphasis on the Poodle Blanket, with its preferred sequence of actions, has tended to lead us to lose the "catalog" concept, and has made our alternatives appear much more narrow and rigid than our planning intends they be. We should, therefore, play down the Poodle Blanket and play up the catalog with our allies.

Another step to achieve greater agreement might be to recognize and consider telescoping the military action once it begins. The present plan is to determine (by means of up to a platoon probe) in Phase I, that access is blocked; take political and economic actions in Phase II--actions which may make Phase II last some months--and then resume military actions in Phase III, if necessary. The possible telescoping of military actions would mean principally that there would be no interruption of military action once it began. Such a departure from present planning could become particularly pertinent for consideration if we increase our build-up in Phase I, which, as noted in itself, deviates from the present Poodle Blanket. (A derivative of the above question is that of what we can do if we have to act unilaterally. This possibility needs another look.)

7. Recommendations:

a. That, in the initial discussion with Mr. Nitze on this problem, you isolate with him more precisely the areas of Presidential interest so that the Joint Staff work may be profitably oriented. (The initial Nitze letter has left them a little puzzled because of its elliptical nature.)

b. That, based on the discussion, more formal JCS action be initiated. (The Joint Staff plans to do nothing beyond the attached talking paper on the present set of questions from Mr. Nitze.)

MJS
W.J.S.

TOP SECRET

C-959

"DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

2BF91/4

20 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Papers under development dealing with Berlin Contingency Planning.

1. During the past week a series of papers have been under development in State, ISA and the White House dealing with Berlin Contingency Planning. John Ausland of State has developed a paper entitled "Review of Berlin Contingency Planning" (TAB A); Colonel Armstrong, ISA, has drafted a memorandum to the President, "Immediate Military Preparations for Berlin" (TAB B); and Dave Klein of the White House is working on one which reportedly will describe the course we have charted for ourselves.

2. The Ausland paper (TAB A).

a. This paper, apparently approved by Secretary Rusk, will request the Ambassadorial Group to review Berlin contingency planning under the headings of organization, planning, and delegation of authority.

b. The paper supports your contention that all possible steps should be taken to prepare for an emergency. The most interesting facet deals with "organization" (paragraph 4), which states that "the U.S. believes" a full-time integrated, tripartite, political-military staff should be established in Berlin. Further, that it is the U.S. position that a full-time quadripartite political staff with military advisors should be set up in Bonn. If these staffs were forthcoming, they should lead to shortened reaction times and quicker and better political coordination and agreements than currently exists. Of interest to the military side of the house is that State is running with this paper in the Ambassadorial Group arena with Defense and JCS (General Gray) having had only a quick look at the Ausland paper in draft. I called this to ISA's attention and suggested that a Defense position should be established prior to the proposal getting set in concrete by the Ambassadorial Group.

3. The Armstrong Paper (TAB B).

a. This paper lists those military measures which it is believed will convey to the Soviets the message that the Allies are becoming

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increasingly unified and are determined to defend our Berlin interests by force if required. These measures are also expected to improve the Allied military situation and provide a wider range of options.

3. The measures listed are most ambitious and aggressive and, if implemented, should get the message across. However, as is readily recognized, some actions will be next to impossible to accomplish. But, if the President is looking for a continuum of military actions to fill the gap between Phase I and Phase II, this list should be a good one from which he might shop.

4. The paper has no official status at the moment and should (I would hope) be sent to the JCS for consideration before going to SecDef.

B.W.R.

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August 4, 1975

NIACT

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY, TYLER AND CLEVELAND FROM STEVENSON

SUBJECT: BERLIN

1. I BELIEVE DECISIONS MUST BE MADE BEFORE THIS EVENING ABOUT HOW WE WILL REACT IF THE USSR IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS SEEKS TO INTERFERE WITH OUR ACCESS TO BERLIN.

2. DECISIONS NEED TO BE MADE BOTH WITH RESPECT TO OUR PHYSICAL REACTION IN THE AREA AND TO WHAT WE DO IN THE UN.

3. ON THE UN SIDE I RECOMMEND THAT IF THE USSR ANNOUNCES AN IMMINENT INTENTION OR ACTUALLY INTERFERES WITH OUR ACCESS THAT WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PLACE AN URGENT ITEM ON THE SC AGENDA ALONG THE LINES PREPARED IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN 1959. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO PREEMPT THE SC OURSELVES AND TO CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION NOT RPT NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD VIOLATE EXISTING AGREEMENTS.

4. THE DECISIONS MADE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IMMEDIATELY WITH THE UK, FRANCE AND GERMANY WITH A VIEW TO UK AND FRANCE COSPONSORING AN ITEM IN THE SC AS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED. SHOULD EVENTS OVERTAKE US, HOWEVER, I WOULD BE WILLING TO SEE US TAKE THE INITIAILVE ALONE.

STEVENSON

JTC

EYES ONLY
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

390

October 31, 1962

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2BF99/1

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Summits and All That

The only way to test the assumption that the events of the last week have created the potential for a major change in US-Soviet relations and consequently in the international political scene is to act on it. We can act in two directions--Berlin and disarmament. There is reason to believe that these are complementary not competing possibilities.

Discussions on both subjects have been going forward and there exist channels for continuing them; however, disarmament discussions have been languishing and Berlin discussions are almost dead. It seems reasonable as a first hypothesis to assume that in order for a useful initiative to be taken, it must be taken in a new channel. A bilateral summit directed at reaching agreements in principle on Berlin and disarmament, to be followed by foreign ministers' meetings of four powers would seem to be the best way to organize an initiative with a maximum chance of securing big results. The powers involved in the German negotiation include all those that would be required to deal with nuclear test-ban and non-diffusion agreements; if more on the disarmament front is attempted, a wider forum will be necessary. There are two kinds of counter arguments to be made against a bilateral summit. The first is that our allies do not like it. If we assess the probability of a useful outcome as being at all high, we are justified in ignoring this consideration. The other is that the internal turmoil in Moscow is such as to make it unlikely that the Soviets want a bilateral summit now. The assertion of fact upon which this argument rests is probably true; however, the conclusion does not follow. Indeed, it is precisely the existence of turmoil which makes the opportunity for a productive summit. Absent uncertainty and an ongoing prospect of re-evaluation on the Soviets' side, it is unlikely that we could achieve any significant

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change in the terms on which we confront each other. Further, a Berlin summit properly arranged may indeed be a way of avoiding what must be a most difficult problem for the Soviets in entering into any negotiations at the moment--that of appearing to the rest of the world as bowing to U. S. demands. This argument points up in turn another condition of a successful summit, that we view our situation in relation to the Soviets as symmetrical; namely, that recent events have enabled us both to see with greater clarity where our joint interests lie and how it is in our joint interest to limit occasions of conflict and direct confrontation between us and to reduce the potentiality for any remaining occasions to escalate into general war.

On disarmament, the minimum results worthwhile aiming at appear to be a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a nuclear non-diffusion agreement. Some further trimmings could be added to this minimum in a way of an agreement to refrain from putting weapons into outer space and agreement on a list of measures to reduce the dangers of surprise attack. The former appear easy; the latter not particularly significant.

Khrushchev's recent letters to the President suggest that the events have themselves been enough to move the Soviets from their previous position on a comprehensive test ban treaty to an acceptance in principle of inspection, although this is not yet evident in Tsarapkin's statements at Geneva. It will be necessary for us, however, to take some risks with respect to the number of control posts and the number of inspections. This is a problem which we have examined fairly carefully, and we have the bases for decision on this.

On Berlin, our problems are more difficult. The course of events has probably caused the Soviets to abandon any plans they have for cutting off allied military access in a drastic way in the near future. If by the immediate threat in Berlin we mean the threat of a sharp enough interference with allied access to lead to a military confrontation, we can then say that the immediate threat has vanished for some (indefinite) time. If, however, we view the existence of even last Summer's degree of tension and uncertainty and the prospect that it might increase at any time is in themselves undesirable, then we can say that the Berlin crisis is still with us. Moreover, the

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pains of the present situation to the Berliners themselves and the importance of the German problem in intra-European politics, argue that the problem demands a major effort absent a Berlin crisis in the immediate sense.

The minimum results we might seek in Berlin would almost certainly require substantial movement by us from our past positions if we are to do more than ratify the status quo in the narrowest sense which we have failed to do in a year-and-a-half of effort. An international access authority with full control, ideally, of an autobahn, a railway line and a canal route, plus operation of the relevant airways, would be our access guarantee. In addition, we must ask for some provision covering movement of persons, both between East and West Berlin, and East and West Germany. This might well take the form of minimum quotas which can be revised upwards by mutual agreement but not downwards, and with the right to reject specific individuals on the admitting authority of either side. Further, we should seek a clear contractual basis for the presence of western troops. It might be desirable to make West Berlin legally part of the Federal Republic, but subject to certain limitations on the kinds of armaments and the number of troops that can be put into it, on the basis of reciprocal engagements and conditions for East Berlin. This would be useful as a precedent for an arms control agreement. The case against this particular provision in the settlement is the traditional German fear that we would be contracting out of our responsibility for the defense of West Berlin. This is also in large part the case for it. On balance, my judgment leads me to be for it.

In order to achieve so much, what must we be prepared to give? At a minimum, enough recognition of the authorities in East Germany to accomplish some of the Soviet purposes. This would certainly include defining the borders of Germany to the east, as well as the sector borders. It would certainly include allowing the East German membership in the access authority. It would include that degree of recognition implied by East German bilateral negotiations with the Federal Republic on a variety of subjects. It could include an explicit declaration that Germany would be unified on the basis of discussion and agreement between the authorities of the two parts of Germany. If we add renunciation of the use of force to change the boundaries between the two, and mutual declarations

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of non-aggression intent between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, we have the substance of the 10 points which we never succeeded in selling either to the Germans or to the Soviets last year.

The double package of Berlin and disarmament proposals might be negotiable on a bilateral basis. To test its negotiability, however, we would have to take the step of substituting a policy of informing our allies for a policy of consulting them in advance. It is not clear that the week's experience has had a powerful enough effect on the principal ally concerned, the Federal Republic, to warrant the conclusion that we can achieve this result. But here again only the attempt can provide the test.

Having gone so far, it may be worthwhile to go much further. Much further in the Berlin direction would involve trading some kind of all-Berlin solution involving neutralization, with either four-power or UN troops and guarantee, for explicit recognition of East Germany and a German peace treaty. The treaty would provide for ultimate unification and contain the kinds of provisions described above for movement between the two Germanies and between each Germany and Berlin. To make this offer now would certainly offend the West German Government deeply. In my own judgment, the temperature of last week's events was not sustained at a high enough level over a long enough period of time to make this proposal acceptable either to the Russians or the Germans. It might be made more acceptable to the Russians and less acceptable to the Germans by adding to it provisions limiting the number of troops in both Germanies and providing some troop-free zone for a short distance around Berlin and on either side of the boundary between East and West Germany. This would be very difficult for the West Germans to accept unless NATO integration went a great deal further than it has gone to date.

On disarmament it is obvious that the step beyond is a first-stage agreement of some sort. Here again the difference between the U. S. and Soviet positions is very substantial. Even if we are prepared to move a good deal in dismantling bases, and speeding up the rate of disarmament in the first state, we would be very far from the Soviet position, which calls for something like nuclear parity by the end of the first stage. The experience of last week probably reinforces our judgment that we are not now ready for nuclear parity.

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With disarmament, as with Berlin, the conclusion seems to be that a radical change is unlikely. Thus, the final question is: Is there enough in the limited program in two spheres to justify the risks of summit failure and alliance alienation? This writer votes "yes", loudly. (Oxymoron?)

CK
Carl Kaysen

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391

1 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Supplemental Berlin Planning

1. The Nitze Group is now progressing effectively toward a paper which:

(a) Will respond to the President's wish for a look at some radical ideas for long-term stabilization of the Berlin-Germany problem (Nitze view);

(b) Will also include consideration of other approaches, such as:

(1) Leaving Berlin alone while pressing for progress with the Soviets on other fronts (Thompson view);

(2) Working toward a "Solution C" type modus vivendi on Berlin (view of State's Old Berlin Hands).

2. The assumption implicit in the Nitze paper is that the Cuban experience may have rendered the Soviets more receptive to proposals for a fair-minded and stabilizing Berlin settlement in which we and they would both give and take. Even the approaches favored by Thompson and the Old Berlin Hands postulate that now is the time to make real progress.

3. However, this assumption may not stand up, and I therefore suggest a supplemental effort. This effort would, in effect, pick up the hard-nosed review of Berlin military contingency planning where everyone had to abandon it at the time the Cuban crisis struck less than three weeks ago. I say give this one to Nitze also: he has been in the Berlin picture but gets results faster and better than Old Berlin Hands

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because he understands urgency and the need for cutting adrift from stale non-essentials. Also, the preponderantly military nature of the problem should unjoint fewer State noses than his chairmanship of the current subcommittee. Invite him privately to propose a membership slate for the new group (I would think ISA-3, State-3, and Joint Staff-3 would be about right). Also invite him privately to write his own specific terms of reference, based on something like the attached general mission.

L. J. Legere

Attachment
a/s

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(Telegram, Office and Officer)

Approved in S
11/8/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: November 7, 1962
3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Chancellor Adenauer's Forthcoming Visit to Washington

2BF101/1

PARTICIPANTS: German

(1) Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy

Americans

[redacted] The Secretary
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GER

NOV 14 1962

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S/P EUR-2 RPE INR/D-f US Mission Berlin
G GER-2 RPM White House
RM/R-E-1 (25)

Ambassador Knappstein said he wished to express his appreciation to the Secretary for all the information which had been forthcoming during the Cuban crisis, which had proved most useful.

The Ambassador said the real purpose of his call was to review briefly the topics which might be touched on during the talks with Chancellor Adenauer next week. He himself assumed that the first point of interest would be a mutual appreciation of the Cuban situation. The Ambassador commented that on Cuba the Chancellor had taken a strong stand, possibly even stronger than that of the President. In his own personal view the President had handled the situation masterfully, particularly in that he had not fallen for the lure to invade Cuba.

The Secretary commented that the situation in Cuba was not over yet. We had always borne in mind, and would have to continue to do so, that the way we handle Cuba could affect the situation in other places.

The Ambassador said he had just received an interesting report from the German Ambassador in Havana which transmitted information from local contacts regarding intense activity being carried on to move "things" by truck into a series of caves. The Secretary asked Mr. Creel to see that he got a copy of this report right away. The Secretary said we had also received many rumors to this same effect from refugees and that reports of this character highlighted the need to find some way for us to get on the ground to inspect.

The Ambassador said that a second subject for the Adenauer talks would undoubtedly be the repercussions of Cuba on the situation in Berlin. The Foreign

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FORM DS-1254 Prepared by GER

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Office had drawn up a new plan regarding the passport and visa problem which the Germans would wish to discuss with us before submitting it to the Ambassadorial Group. A further aspect of the matter which would probably come up would be the effect of Cuba on the Soviet project for a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

The Secretary said that the President would wish to hear the Chancellor's over-all viewpoint regarding Berlin. The Chancellor had undoubtedly taken a broad and deep look at the situation and developed some ideas of his own over the past several months. From his own standpoint the Secretary did not believe that what had happened in Cuba necessarily made the Berlin situation any easier. The Ambassador responded that whatever Khrushchev's motives might have been, the Cuban experience had been a wholesome adventure for him and in that sense might alleviate the situation in Berlin. The Secretary agreed that it might postpone the matter, but stressed that Cuba alone did not change the Berlin problem.

The Ambassador said he had been struck by the fact that the Soviets had made no moves against Berlin during the Cuban crisis, which indicated a healthy caution on Khrushchev's part. He himself felt it would be desirable to keep the Berlin situation quiet at this time. For this reason it might be advisable to put the proposal for a Berlin plebiscite aside for the time being, although it should be kept in readiness for use at the appropriate moment. He felt this was a subject which might come up during the Adenauer visit. The Secretary agreed that the talks would probably cover a wide range of problems affecting Berlin.

The Ambassador inquired whether the Secretary thought the matter of United Kingdom accession to the European Common Market might come up. The Secretary agreed it probably would, at least briefly. We were counting heavily on Germany's support for this.

The Ambassador said he would like to pass on to the Secretary in confidence a possible reason for the Chancellor's seeming reluctance on this issue. He then developed at some length the thesis that the Chancellor had resented the British action in watering down the original concept for a Council of Europe as a truly parliamentary body to a mere assembly of Foreign Ministers. Whereas the Chancellor had wished the Council of Europe to be the nucleus of a broader and united Europe, the British position had resulted in making the Council of Europe a negligible quantity today. In consequence the Chancellor had switched his support to the Community of Six as the new solid basis for European union, and he might have the feeling that addition of the United Kingdom to this group could lead to a further dilution of the idea of a united Europe. The Secretary

commented

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commented that Britain had changed since those days; the Ambassador agreed that this was true.

The Secretary then asked Ambassador Knappstein to send a brief message to Foreign Minister Schroeder reminding the latter that he would wish to discuss further with him the non-transfer of nuclear weapons, a subject which Schroeder had agreed to think about following his talks with the Secretary several weeks ago.

The Ambassador asked whether there were any other problems which might come up in the Adenauer talks. The Secretary said there might be some in the general defense field which Secretary McNamara might wish to mention to him. The Ambassador asked whether the question of aid to India and the Federal Republic's participation in this might come up. The Secretary replied that he thought it would be useful to devote at least a few minutes to the general subject of the relations between the West and non-Western parts of the world, such as India and Africa, and that we might wish to indicate to the Chancellor some of our concerns regarding Southeast Asia.

The Secretary asked if the Chancellor would be addressing the National Press Club. The Ambassador replied that, despite the conflicting invitation from the White House correspondents, the Chancellor had decided that the National Press Club had become a tradition for him and he had decided to stand by his original commitment to the Press Club despite the special problem which existed.

The Secretary suggested to Mr. Creel that he get together with Mr. Tyler and the Ambassador to draw up, in advance of the Chancellor's arrival, a general list of the particular topics which would be likely to arise during the talks with the Chancellor.

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NLK Chancellor Visit
NSF 79

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2BF102/1

SECRET (393) November 9, 1962

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Main Line of Argument with the Chancellor

At 12 noon today, you will be meeting with the people most involved in Adenauer's visit. The object is to get a clear line of purpose for this visit and to make sure that there is time for preparation of whatever supporting materials you may want. After our discussion the other day I put forward the following outline for discussion: what we hope for from the visit are two things: (1) increased German defense effort, and (2) increased German readiness to join in a possible Berlin modus vivendi.

A. Defense effort

The need for defense effort is clear, and it is plain from recent cables that there is a real slackening in Bonn. The problem here is tactical, and there is a real question whether percentages of gross national product and other technical arguments are as persuasive with the Chancellor as a simple and repeated assertion that the Bundeswehr is not up to its job. The materials on this are being put together, but there is no substitute for your own argument with the Chancellor. He will not listen to military men on military subjects, and his basic reason for acting will be simply that you insist on it.

B. Berlin negotiation

On Berlin negotiations the problem is more complex. The Chancellor really prefers not to talk about terms of agreement, and it is almost certain that discussion of the terms of anything like our 10-point modus vivendi would be very unsatisfactory. What we want, instead, is to get his agreement in principle to the preparation of an agreed proposal for a modus vivendi, and to make it clear that any such new position will have to offer something that Khrushchev can point to with pride.

To get even this much from the Chancellor will not be easy, but the moment is favorable, and the following line of argument is suggested:

1. After the Cuban episode the West is stronger than it has been for many years, and the Soviets somewhat weaker. This is therefore a favorable time for a settlement, if one can be reached at all.

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2. The Soviet Government still has it in its power to sign a separate peace treaty, and to apply miscellaneous minor harassments to West Berlin. While we can certainly survive a merely paper treaty, it will have a certain depressing effect, and we have an obligation to see if something better cannot be worked out.

3. If we do not work out a modus vivendi now while we have time and a high measure of confidence in one another, we may find ourselves making hasty proposals under pressure at a later and more dangerous time.

4. The two countries who must agree -- both in defense and in negotiation -- are Germany and the U. S.

5. This line of argument should of course be surrounded by reiterations of our determination on points of vital interest, but it should also be made fairly plain that if the Germans do not participate in such planning, we shall have to think about making proposals of our own.

If these two objectives seem right to you, the next question is that of timing of the argument. Here I repeat the staff proposal that you should talk about Cuba and its lessons in the morning, butter the Chancellor privately during lunch about his own chance to leave a Berlin settlement as his crowning accomplishment, and turn to matters of defense and Berlin negotiation in the afternoon.

This scenario leaves the problem of Berlin contingency planning to one side. The visa issue is one which I would suggest that you leave to the Secretary. We need progress on the other two issues more than on this one, and the Chancellor can be pushed only so far in one visit.

McG. B.

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OUTGOING AIRGRAM

Department of State

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Amembassy LONDON

Amembassy MOSCOW

USARMEUR FOR POLAD

SHAPE FOR STOESSEL

US ELEMENT LIVE OAK

CINCEUR FOR MCGUIRE

PARIS ALSO PASS USRO

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

REF: A. Berlin's 544

B. Berlin's 514

C. Berlin's 516

D. CINCEUR's ECJCJ 5-13662

We have given thought to complex of issues raised by refbels. Question of future action to assist wounded refugees appears to break down into four parts: (1) Should we continue ambulance watch at Checkpoint Charlie? (2) How do we deal with wounded refugee cases? (3) To what extent should US be prepared to take unilateral action in these cases? (4) What can be done to ameliorate West Berliners' response to border incidents? Following are Department's views on these four aspects of problem.

Ambulance Watch

Being we believe ambulance watch should cont

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Western side of wall but Eastern side of boundary line.

II. Future Incidents

We continue to believe that proper approach to these border incidents is to attempt to reach wounded person through crossing point.

Although we would want to have CINCEUR's comments before taking final position, our preliminary view on cross-the-wall approach is that disadvantages of such approach set forth in reftels B and D seem persuasive. In any event we should insure that in any future case of this type there is not even appearance of threat of danger to any East Berlin personnel who might go to in- assistance.

doubts that sedan should be used to attempt to get to refugee. Even if sedan should get through checkpoint, there question whether it would be allowed close enough to scene to be of any use. Result of use of sedan might only be reprisal against other sedan traffic. In addition, stoppage of ambulance has less dramatic appearance of our denial of Allied access to East Berlin of military sedan would have. (See Part IV, below.)

that if ambulance is denied entry into East measure beyond our protest would probably be

Effect of closing crossing

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point to Sov vehicle during period ambulance is committed UNQUE

to get satisfactory formulation of action to be taken

if no Soviet vehicle should attempt to enter West Berlin during period,

closing of crossing point would have no affect apparent to West

Berliners and might not even be known to Soviets. Moreover, signal

for reopening of crossing point would presumably not be success

of ambulance mission, but its failure, i.e., its being denied entry.

More appropriate action, therefore, might be to bar entry to West

Berlin of one Soviet vehicle (other than one destined for BASC) or

memorial

harass war/ guard relief.

If Soviet vehicle were stopped, believe no Western vehicle

attempt to enter East Berlin until second Soviet vehicle had

Western checkpoint and been allowed to enter West Berlin.

Procedure would make it clear to Soviets that action is intended as

countermeasure, not as beginning of blockage of Soviet access to

Chances of reprisal and counter-reprisal escalating

access to East Berlin would therefore be

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access conjoined with humanitarian motives. We recognize that it can be argued, on other side, that Soviet Commandant is responsible for peace and security of his sector. This obviously would be basis for our preventing any attempt by Soviets to exercise authority/in West Berlin. We do not accept position that Allies limited their rights of access to East Berlin by use of single Friedrichstrasse crossing point. Long-continued acceptance of this course of action could, however, be prejudicial to these rights.

III Unilateral Action

In general our position is that all Western activities respecting Berlin should be carried out on agreed tripartite (or quadripartite, as case may be) basis. On other hand, we appreciate facts that US action in Berlin matters is of particular concern to West Berliners and that West Berlin mood, as set out in reftels B and C, is important factor. We therefore agree that in retaliation to stoppage of ambulance/Berlin may take unilateral action during period of negotiations and before British or French have registered [illegible] objections to that action. But as to taking action unilaterally thereafter to which British or French or both have objected [illegible] decision until they have stated their final position.

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IV. Mood of West Berliners

In discussing how we should handle future refugee shootings both reftels B and C imply mood of West Berliners is of maximum significance. At same time it appears (1) that West Berliners' expectations of what Allies should do in these border incident cases is not altogether in tune with what Allies are in fact able to do re East Berlin, wall and refugees, and (2) that this disparity contributes to volatility of West Berliners' response to border incidents. Mission should consider discussing this point with editors and others in position to influence opinion. Mission, together with British, French and Senat, should also consider and report what other steps in the informational field might be taken to ameliorate West Berliners' response to future shooting incidents.

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SECRET

(395)

November 19, 1962

McGB:

SUBJECT: Today's meeting on Berlin

The Cuban crisis generated some useful reexamination of the Berlin problem. Paul Nitze and his group produced one opus -- "Berlin in the Light of Cuba" (Tab A). Walt Rostow and his group produced another -- "Negotiations" (Tab B). But both of these exercises are now on dead center and need some assistance to move them forward. In the meantime, we have gotten two new sets of ideas -- a German "initiative" (Tab C) and a "new" Soviet proposal on a UN presence in Berlin -- relayed through the British (Tab D).

The problem now is how to organize ourselves to act on the ideas before us. In my view, the first point of this exercise should be discussion in depth rather than decision-taking, with the President being given the benefit of a full and open exchange of ideas on the substantive alternatives and possible tactical courses.

Before this can be done, however, we need some bureaucratic pulling together of the several outstanding pieces. And I would hope your meeting this afternoon would start the machinery going. At the end of today's session I think we should have a consensus on the next steps and responsibility should be clearly assigned to assure that the necessary preparatory work is done.

In brief, I would suggest the following script for your use.

a. During the early part of the Cuban crisis, Paul Nitze and Walt Rostow, each in his own forum, re-examined the basic elements of the Berlin problem and produced some useful and imaginative thinking. dtd 11/3/62

b. The papers which resulted from these exercises, however, have been somewhat overtaken by subsequent events and now have to be brought up to date.

c. Moreover, since the preparation of the Nitze and Rostow papers, we have had some German ideas and some Soviet thoughts transmitted to us through the British which, in turn, have generated British thinking.

d. The problem now is to pull this together into a workable and manageable form to provide the basis for in-house discussions and consideration.

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e. For the most part, the Nitze and Rostow papers are sufficiently consistent with each other so that the job of pulling the thoughts together into a single opus should not be difficult.

f. In addition, however, we now have the German and Soviet suggestions which should also be carefully looked at both as to substantive possibilities and tactical problems.

g. To insure that all the threads are properly tied together, I would suggest that Bill Tyler, working very closely with Paul Nitze and Walt Rostow, undertake to have the necessary staff work done to prepare the ground for discussions of the Berlin problem by the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense sometime soon after Thanksgiving.

h. (If you think it appropriate, you might also want to expose to the group some of the President's reactions to the various Berlin ideas that have been propounded during the past few weeks to give them a flavor of preliminary White House thinking.

David Klein

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per one of ___ copies. Series A

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2BF105/1

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: November 26, 1962
Room 7513, 5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: I. Khrushchev's Proposal re Presence of Western Troops in West Berlin under the UN Flag
II. Roberts-Khrushchev Conversation
III. Relation of Cuban Situation to Berlin Contingency Planning

PARTICIPANTS: British

The Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. John A. Thomson, First Secretary, British Embassy

US

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand - BTF
Mr. Grover W. Penberthy - BTF

NOV 30 1962

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BTF (2)5-6 S/AL (1)18 Amembassy PARIS USRO (1)22
Spare 24-26

I.

Lord Hood said the first thing he wanted to do was to continue with a subject that he had just discussed in the Ambassadorial Group meeting, Khrushchev's proposal on the presence of Western troops in West Berlin under the United Nations flag. He asked if the United States agreed that until the Soviets clarify the terms of the proposal the West should stand firm on the three essentials. Mr. Hillenbrand agreed and said that we are engaged in the internal process of clarifying our thinking as to what might be an acceptable formula and what would not. He pointed out that one problem would be the almost reflex negative reaction we could expect from the French on anything that even remotely involved the UN. He saw nothing in recent days to indicate a softening of this viewpoint, which has been reflected over the years in papers on the UN.

Lord Hood noted that the proposal as such is not inherently inconsistent with the three essentials of the Western position. Mr. Hillenbrand said that the US had not yet come to a conclusion on this point, as the Soviet proposal would have to be clarified. Perhaps in the course of such clarification the basis for

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basis for an arrangement satisfactory to us might develop.

Lord Hood said that one point he had not made in the Ambassadorial Group was that the UK would not rule out a time limit in any such UN arrangement, provided the Western rights would remain as they were before. The idea of a time limit is not itself shocking, he said.

Mr. Hillenbrand noted that there are virtually an infinite number of packages that could be devised. The idea would be to get an acceptable one as a basis for discussion. He asked whether Lord Hood believed this subject would come up for discussion among the Foreign Ministers in Paris. Lord Hood thought the subject would be difficult to discuss, but felt it likely that it would come up. He thought it equally likely that the subject would be raised in NATO. He said that Lord Home is very interested in this subject and that any views the Americans could produce would be appreciated. Mr. Hillenbrand said that it would probably be too early for Mr. Tyler's presentation in Paris on November 30 to go very much into this subject.

Mr. Hillenbrand noted that the French had suggested that on December 11 there be a tripartite meeting in the morning, a quadripartite meeting in the afternoon, and a quadripartite dinner, leaving December 12th open. We told the French that we felt these arrangements are at the disposition of the host country. The Germans do not like the idea of a tripartite meeting. We told them that they should take this point up with the French. Mr. Hillenbrand added that he did not know how the Germans came to know of the suggested French schedule.

As to the question of a senior officers meeting before the Foreign Ministers meet, Mr. Hillenbrand said that no US position had yet been developed. We did not think such a meeting was necessary. Mr. Tyler would, however, be discussing this point with Laloy and Shuckburgh.

II.

Lord Hood's second item was to report that Laloy had been shown the full report of the Roberts-Khrushchev conversation, including the part not yet revealed to the Germans referring to a statement made to Gromyko by the President. Mr. Hillenbrand said that this fact was good to know and that Mr. Tyler would be informed. Lord Hood noted that Laloy had had only a brief look at the report and might not have registered upon this one particular item, Lord Hood felt, however, that Laloy would have gotten the full flavor of the Roberts report.

III.

Finally, Lord Hood noted that Cuba seems now to have become linked with Berlin, apparently even in Khrushchev's mind. Lord Hood asked whether we

were taking

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were taking this fact into consideration in the Berlin contingency planning. He observed that the recent Mikoyan visit to Cuba probably means more Soviet investment in Cuba and therefore a greater necessity for a success of Soviet policy in the island. Mr. Hillenbrand replied that we had not yet focused directly on this question. He said that even before we knew of the missiles in Cuba Ambassador Bohlen had observed that the Soviets had made a heavy investment of prestige in Cuba, and that this gave us a potential point of leverage relative to Soviet good behavior in Berlin. Lord Hood said he had been thinking particularly of naval countermeasures. He thought it might be possible now to apply these to Cuba exclusively, and not to the European satellites. Mr. Hillenbrand said we would probably not want to concentrate our countermeasures on Cuba alone unless we were convinced they would be so potent as to suffice. We would have to think this question over very carefully. Lord Hood noted that such a policy would pose problems for the UK and, if the US found any value in the idea, would like to be informed so that the British could go into this subject more thoroughly.

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Telegram 2251 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, November 28, 1962, 2 p.m.

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(348) NLK NSF85

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ZBF107/1

SECRET November 28, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The Department of State has prepared for your consideration a paper on "Future Negotiations on Berlin." The document attempts to catalogue the various ideas, suggestions and proposals we have on Berlin, including those which emanated from the Nitze and Rostow groups in the Cuban context, as well as the most recent German and Soviet suggestions.

The paper is intended to serve as a vehicle for you and the Secretary of State to review systematically the substantive and tactical questions to be considered in developing a Berlin strategy. The Secretary is prepared to discuss it with you at your convenience.

McGeorge Bundy

Attachment
As stated

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FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON BERLIN

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Future Negotiations on Berlin

I. Introduction

1. This paper is intended to further the assessment of the possible components of a U.S. position for a next round of discussions with the Soviets on Berlin. It provides a framework of analysis within which judgments can be made as to both the desirability and negotiability of specific proposals. A number of package proposals have recently been suggested in several unilateral U.S. papers. There are now also a German proposal of somewhat vague status and a new Soviet formula on the troop issue in West Berlin. None of these approaches are entirely mutually exclusive; a number of package proposals with ingredients from these various sources may be put together. Many of the individual ingredients already have a long history of discussion; only a few are relatively new.

2. The attached ~~memo~~ annex~~s~~ attempt~~s~~ in schematic fashion to show ~~(a)~~ the various ingredients which ~~[redacted]~~ could go into these package proposals, ~~and (b) the balance of advantage and disadvantage to the West and the East in each of the package proposals currently under U.S. consideration.~~

II. Reopening Discussions on Berlin - Some Tactical Considerations

1. Two broad assumptions are possible for the post-Cuba phase: (a) that the Soviets will show by their attitude in other areas such as disarmament that they have embarked upon a radical course of policy change within which eventual discussions on Berlin will fall into natural place ~~(a possibility discussed at greater length in "Post-Cuba Negotiations with the USSR" [Bostom Group paper])~~, or (b) in the absence of such a broad policy change, they will reopen talks on Berlin within the framework of previous exchanges, but with some changes in past positions.

2. There has been some low level intelligence that the Soviets may suggest a formal conference to meet early next year, possibly in Geneva. It seems more likely, however, that in due course, they will either take advantage of a meeting in another context, or specifically request a bilateral meeting, to renew Berlin discussions with us. A likely starting point would be Khrushchev's statement to Sir Frank Roberts on November 13 that the Soviets are now prepared temporarily to accept the continuing presence of Western troops in West Berlin under the UN flag.

3. We see no need to rush into discussions with the Soviets on Berlin once the Cuban question is resolved, but we would presumably also wish to

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wish to avoid giving the impression of stalling or hesitancy by not responding to any Soviet initiatives. The President said to Chancellor Adenauer that, if Khrushchev meets our requirements in Cuba, we might inquire as to Soviet proposals on Berlin without, however, making any of our own for the time being. (The British already interpret the Khrushchev conversation with Ambassador Roberts as a Soviet initiative and do not exclude the possibility that Khrushchev will soon advance his proposals publicly.)

4. Once talks were opened, Moscow's new position on a UN role for Western troops would leave much room for maneuver by the Soviets. They could reach a negotiated agreement, if the West were willing to meet Soviet terms, or they could cause the talks to bog down over one or more of the many issues which would have to be resolved before an agreement could be reached. They thus have given up none of their freedom of action by advancing the UN concept. The State Department intelligence estimate is that the Soviets at this point appear to be aiming for a settlement of an interim nature which would not prejudice the possibility of reopening the Berlin issue at a later date. They would expect in the long run to be able to exploit any alteration in Berlin's status achieved by introducing the UN into the picture to move towards more far-reaching changes, gradually eroding the Allied position in the process. The Western objective would be, of course, to exploit any new flexibility in the Soviet position to achieve a settlement which would have such intrinsic elements of stability that it could not be easily upset by the Soviets.

5. Our traditional approach to negotiations with a basically unfriendly power such as the Soviet Union is to proceed from maximum to minimum positions, falling back to the latter to the degree necessary to achieve agreement. This, in practice, means withholding concessions at the outset and extending them only in return for compensating concessions from the Soviets. This can be done with any negotiating package, but the West must clearly know in advance what the outer limits of the tolerable are. This whole question of negotiating tactics is discussed in more detail under V, below. If we should be faced with a real and favorable change in Soviet intentions on Germany and Berlin the West will, of course, want to be sufficiently flexible not to miss any historic opportunities. One of the more broad-ranging possibilities noted in the annexes might prove relevant in this case.

III. Allied Participation

1. There has been both advantage and disadvantage in the bilateral talks on Berlin over the past sixteen months between the Soviet Union and the U.S. under the label of "exploratory talks to determine whether a

basis

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basis for negotiations exists". Bilateralism was forced upon us by the negative attitude of the French Government. De Gaulle will probably not consider that the Soviet attitude has changed sufficiently to warrant full French participation. He will probably continue to prefer that the U.S. bear the onus for discussions with the Soviets and refuse to associate himself in responsibility for them. As long as we are still in an exploratory stage, where commitments to specific language are not being made, this can continue. At some point, however, a quadripartite agreement will presumably have to be reached (unless there is to be a tacit Solution C-type outcome) since, in a strictly formal and juridical sense, the British and French must agree to any arrangements affecting the three sectors of Western Berlin. Moreover, many of the items included in the usual packages cannot be limited to bilateral US-Soviet agreement. Whether the French would try to upset an incipient agreement reached without them would partly depend on the German reaction to that agreement.

IV. Present Substantive State of Negotiations

1. Nearly Settled Issues. The following elements of a Berlin arrangement have been discussed and seem to offer no insuperable difficulties (however, no specific language has been agreed and the haggling over these points could be protracted).

(a) NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression. The US has been talking in terms of non-aggression declarations; the Soviets have been talking in terms of a pact but would probably accept declarations.

(b) German boundaries. The US has proposed declarations that force will not be used to change external borders or the demarcation line; the Soviets want more status for the external borders and the demarcation line, but would probably accept lesser fare - though without giving much in return.

(c) Mixed German Commissions. The US has proposed that these commissions be set up by the four powers and include a commission to deal with reunification ; the Soviets and the Germans want only economic and cultural commissions, and the Soviets want no reference to the Four Powers. We could presumably accept this.

(d) Non-proliferation. This now seems to be moving into a disarmament context. If something is wanted on non-proliferation in a Berlin context, however, interim US and Soviet declarations could be envisaged while an attempt was being made to work out a more comprehensive agreement as part of arms control.

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on:

2. Disputed Issues. The Soviets and ourselves are now deadlocked

(a) Forces. Up to now, the Soviets have insisted on dilution or removal of our forces. Most recently, Khrushchev has seemed to indicate that the forces might stay ("temporarily") under a UN hat. In 1959, the West was willing to accept a ceiling on Western forces in West Berlin; it has never indicated willingness to reduce their numbers or change their status.

(b) Status. The Soviets have pressed for an end to the "occupation status". The West's posture has suggested that it might accept a ban on inclusion of West Berlin into the FRG, so long as a Berlin agreement was otherwise being observed; but the West has not encouraged any discussion of change of status.

(c) Access. The Soviets have indicated that access could be preserved under a Four Power Arbitral Tribunal, if the West would respect GDR sovereignty and if other Berlin issues would be settled; they have indicated that an agreement along these lines would have to be negotiated with them but accepted by the GDR. The West has not yet surfaced its willingness to accept East German "substitution", and has proposed an International Authority to manage access; the Soviets reject this as a derogation of GDR sovereignty.

3. Submerged Issues. The following issues overhang the discussions, but have not figured actively in them:

(a) Subversive Activities. The Soviets have periodically indicated that they want such activities in West Berlin eliminated, but this point was not explored in any depth with them at Geneva in 1959. They are probably less interested in an agreement (which could embarrass them in East Berlin) than in unilateral Western action to close RIAS, etc.

(b) UN Presence. The Soviets are full of bright ideas on how to tie a Free City to the UN, but they have shown only marginal interest in the concept of UN presence in the absence of any change in the legal status of the city. What the newest Khrushchev proposal on a UN role for Western troops means in this context remains to be seen.

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(c) All-German Solution. The West Germans have suggested to the US what seems to amount to a 10-year stretch-out of the Western Peace Plans: a 10-year stand-still with greatly enhanced GDR status at the end of the rainbow. The Soviets have periodically made noises about the need for enhanced GDR status as part of any Berlin agreement.

4. Allied Attitudes. The British will presumably accept anything we can accept. Franco-German attitudes toward the issues indicated in 1-3 are:

(a) Nearly Settled Issues. They do not have too much trouble with the present US position on non-aggression, boundaries, mixed commissions, and non-proliferation (the Germans do not want the last in a Berlin package).

(b) Disputed Issues. They do not want any change in status (though Brandt seems to have different views on this one), and the French are particularly allergic to any UN link. The allies accept East German substitution in their contingency planning; the Germans would also accept some kind of International Access Authority.

(c) Submerged Issues. The apparent German willingness to contemplate a 10-year stand-still must be viewed with caution; the Chancellor's position is not yet clear. The Germans have obviously not thought this one through. They are touchy about any agreement on West Berlin "activities".

V. Prospect

1. Soviet Move. In any resumed negotiations, the Soviets may surface something like the following re the disputed issues:

(a) Forces to remain temporarily, under UN command.

(b) Status to be changed in setting up the UN command.

(c) Access to be handled by East Germans on the basis of a new agreement, under a Four Power Arbitral Tribunal.

2. Response. Such a proposal would give the Soviets favorable changes in the status quo all along the line. In deciding our response, we face a choice between:

(a) holding both sides' changes to a minimum;

(b) according them some of these favorable changes, in return for comparable changes in our favor.

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3. No Change. If we go for minimum change, we would not seek the International Access Authority or access lease-hold, but rather accept East German substitution under a Four Power Arbitral Tribunal, and would favor essentially Solution C. Both this alternative and the one outlined in paragraph 8 below, could include the items in paragraph 1 under IV, above, (non-aggression, etc.), plus enhanced GDR status through participation in the access arrangements, an agreement on activities in West and East Berlin, a UN presence in West Berlin, a tacit or explicit ceiling on Western forces in Berlin, some dilution of the Wall, and prohibition on incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic so long as the agreement was otherwise being observed.

4. Change. If we go for the second alternative in paragraph 2, this might be done:

(a) By giving the Soviets a change in West Berlin's status (not necessarily involving the UN, - perhaps merely a contract between the Government of West Berlin and the Western Powers, in which the latter would give up their occupation powers, and, therefore, their rights in East Berlin - but agree to stay on as guarantors of West Berlin's security at the request of the West Berlin Government), in return for the Soviets giving us a beneficial change in access (either an International Access Authority or leasing the access routes to West Berlin.)

(b) By giving the Soviets something in the all-German field in return for improved access.

5. Allied Reactions. One could argue that US interests might be better served by one of the proposals in paragraph 4 in the abstract, but there is a large question as to whether these changes could be accomplished without gravely jeopardizing Allied confidence and cohesion. This question can only be answered through inter-allied consultation. The mere process of consultation regarding some of the proposals in paragraph 4, however, could do a good deal of damage, unless it were handled most carefully. The German 10-year proposal could be a useful way of inaugurating such consultation; as we and the Germans talk about its implications, its attraction for the Germans may wane and the possibility of alternative ways (e.g., new West Berlin status) of getting the desired Soviet concessions may come naturally to the surface.

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6. Change of Status. If this process of consultation results in a decision to go for change in status, the Soviet proposal projected in paragraph 1 could serve as a basis for discussion; we could suggest the addition of an Access Authority or leasehold, and could suggest a type of "new status" which might have some acceptable form of UN connection.

7. All-Germany. If it is decided to try to buy improved access with all-German rather than West Berlin changes, the Soviet proposal would not serve as a useful basis for negotiations. Instead our tactic would be to stonewall that proposal and then gradually widen the scope of negotiations to include all-German business.

8. Solution C. If we sought essentially the status quo with the fringe benefits indicated previously, we could respond to the Soviet proposal by refusing change of status (though we might agree to call our troops police or constabulary), and proposing substitution, under a Four Power Tribunal. We might even suggest that such an arrangement not be embodied in a formal agreement, but rather reflected in tacit agreement on certain simultaneous and reciprocal steps, e.g., Communist and Western declarations on access, East German access take-over, declarations re non-aggression and borders, etc. This might make it somewhat easier for the Communists to swallow since they would not then be signing an agreement "perpetuating the occupation status".

VI. Conclusions

1. Although there is a possibility that the Soviets will wish to defer discussions on Berlin, the probability is that they will take some initiative to resume these within the next month or two.

2. They will probably begin by putting forward some version of the new Khrushchev formula on a UN role for Western troop presence.

3. In the light of these considerations, the US Government should determine the course which it wishes to pursue in response, recognising the need for flexibility to take advantage of any further changes in the Soviet position.

4. In any case, during initial talks we will probably want to concentrate on probing the Soviets on what they now have in mind on Western troops in Berlin.

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5. There is no sure formula for success or security against leaks in consulting with our Allies. This will be essential, but pace and method will have to be determined in the light of developments including revelation of the Soviet position.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

SECRET G/PM November 29, 1962

MEMORANDUM

TO: G/PM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen

FROM: G/PM - Mr. Weiss

SUBJECT: Berlin

1. At our Berlin Task Force meeting on Wednesday with General Baker, the principal substantive area of discussion dealt with the problem of advanced notification for convoys going up the Autobahn. I have sent you a number of cables on this subject and you are, therefore, no doubt aware that the Soviets have been giving us trouble on this count. The issue is further complicated by virtue of the differing procedures which exist amongst the Allies, principally between the British (who are more lenient on the issue) and ourselves.

2. At the moment I do not know how the issue between the British and the US is likely to be resolved. We are awaiting recommendations from Bonn.

3. I believe, however, that there is one angle which is not being given adequate consideration, namely whether the Soviets are "probing" the US in order to determine the extent to which our Cuban posture is to be reflected in other areas of the East-West confrontation. (INR staff have considered this possibility.) I have not thought through the full implications of this matter, but my visceral reaction tends toward arguing for a more rigid insistence on our rights on the Autobahn (i.e., by refusing advanced notification) in an effort to convey a firm posture to the Soviets. In a sense this might be viewed as a "counter-probe" on our part; i.e., I would like to see whether the Soviets would not quickly back down if we asserted our rights fairly strongly. Of course, as you know, I am also concerned, as a general principle, that we now not slip back into our previous error of inviting Soviet aggressiveness by responding too cautiously to their efforts to impinge on our rights in Berlin.

4. I will follow up with Marty Hillenbrand as soon as we have the Bonn recommendations. However, in the absence of contrary persuasive argumentation I am inclined to think we should push this issue up to the Secretary in an effort to gain his support for a firm stance.

cc: BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand
EUR - Mr. Tyler
S/P - Mr. Rostow
INR - Mr. Hilsman

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November 29, 1962

McGB

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning

After our discussion on Monday, I arranged with the Department to prepare a memorandum for the President (cleared by the Departments of State and Defense) on outstanding Berlin contingency problems which should be considered before the Secretaries leave for the NATO Ministerial meeting. Among the items to be discussed are:

1. The designation of a single Allied Commander for Berlin.

This subject was just broached with the British and the French in October but we have not had encouraging responses. What we want to suggest now is that the Secretary be authorized to raise the subject directly with Home and Couve in Paris and seek their concurrence to have such an arrangement go into effect the moment Free Style is assembled. This would not really meet our point but would have the advantage of pinning down such an arrangement to a definable set of circumstances and taking it out of the vague context on which the present understanding is based. If we get this far now, we might be able to push forward later.

2. Phase II.

The Secretaries ought to have the opportunity to discuss with the President again the problems connected with Phase II, particularly the importance of having the military forces in place sufficiently early in the exercise so that Governments have the necessary options available to them and do not find themselves bogged down at critical points by logistical military problems. As Phase II is now conceived, it is inflexible to a point where the Allies might be unable to make the necessary counter moves to impress the Soviets with their resolve to act forcefully. The problem is clearly to make certain that the Poodle Blanket is a comforter and not the straight-jacket it could become. The Phase II discussion should also give the President an opportunity to look at the "build-up" paper, already agreed to by State, Defense and JCS but still requiring the President's blessing.

3. The Delegation of Authority to SACEUR.

This question has been dealt with only in the most general terms and clearly all three Governments have had serious reservations about the degree of authority they are prepared to delegate to their field

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning

During recent weeks, the Ambassadorial Group has been reviewing Berlin contingency planning, with a view to improving organization and communications, completing significant planning items, and reviewing delegation of authority to LIVE OAK. While in Paris for the NATO meeting, I expect to be discussing Berlin planning at a working dinner with the other three Foreign Ministers. With your approval, I should like to raise with them the following subjects:

Organization

Following the US proposal contained in BQD-99 (TAB A), a certain number of improvements in organization for Berlin problems have been initiated. The Bonn Quadripartite Group has agreed to establish an Operations Center in the American Embassy. The three Commandants have established a Tripartite Working Group in Berlin, located near the Allied (military) Staff. LIVE OAK has initiated a program to improve communications between Bonn, Berlin, and LIVE OAK and within Berlin. Although these steps fall short of our desires, they are all in the right direction.

I believe it would now be useful for the US to re-raise the question of the Single Commandant in Berlin.

Present plans provide for the appointment of a Single Commandant in "any grave emergency," such as serious disorders in West Berlin or an armed attack. This step requires, however, agreement of the Three Commandants.

The present plans provide for the appointment of a Single Commander too late in the scenario. For example, the implementation of such LIVE OAK plans as FREE STYLE (platoon probe on the autobahn) or JACK PINE II (use of fighters) could warrant the appointment of a Single Commander.

I intend, therefore, to propose to the British, French, and Germans that the Ambassadorial Group request LIVE OAK to re-examine plans for the appointment of a Single Commander, with a view to his appointment at an earlier point in the development of a crisis situation than is provided for at present.

Delegation of Authority

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commanders. However, General Norstad has recommended, and I think there is a greater readiness by the three Governments to grant him certain authority he has not had. These include the option -- in his discretion -- to assemble Back Stroke, Trade Wind, and Lucky Strike. And even though General Norstad has not himself asked for it, there is some feeling that once Free Style is assembled, he should also have the authority to put June Ball together. This would enable him to have in place essential forces for Phase II and Phase III which the three Governments could commit if and when they saw fit. The obvious advantage is that without increased risks, the Governments would be in an improved position to deal with Soviet moves.

The Department plans to have such a discussion paper ready (cleared with Defense) by the middle of next week. This would mean that the two Secretaries would be prepared to discuss these questions with the President at the end of the week.

Is this alright for you.

David Klein

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Delegation of Authority

LIVE OAK has submitted recommendations to governments concerning additional delegation of authority (TAB B).

I intend to urge the French to reconsider the items (concerning air access) on which we and the British have delegated authority but the French have not.

I also recommend that the US delegate to LIVE OAK the authority he has requested to train and assemble BACK STROKE (Berlin equivalent of FREE STYLE) and LUCKY STRIKE (Berlin equivalent of TRADE WIND) and to assemble TRADE WIND. I also propose to urge the British and French to do the same.

I do not believe, however, that the US should delegate to LIVE OAK at this time authority to attach AA or BAM. (From a military point of view, JCS has recommended to Defense that this authority also be delegated to LIVE OAK).

Planning

Now that the NATO Council has approved the BERCON/MARCON plans, the Ambassadorial Group has turned its attention to Phase II planning, including mobilization measures. The Berlin-NATO Subcommittee has previously submitted to the Executive Committee of the NSC a memorandum concerning US plans for a Phase II build-up (TAB C). This memorandum contains a broad outline of a plan which would make available on call during Phase II varying levels of augmentation of forces in three separate increments. I do not plan to raise this subject in Paris but recommend that you approve this paper as a basis for presentation in the Ambassadorial Group of US planning regarding the military build-up in Phase II.

Enclosures:

TAB A - BQD-99
TAB B - SHLO 9-000113
TAB C - NSC/ExCom/BER-NATO #7 (Final)

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 761, JANUARY 12, 1 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

ACTION DEPARTMENT 761, INFORMATION BONN 683, PARIS 482, LONDON 453, MOSCOW 431, USAREUR SHAPE, CINCEUR UNNUMBERED

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO; USAREUR FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR US ELEMENT LIVE OAK AND STOESSEL; CINCEUR FOR MCGUIRE.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF OUTLOOK FOR COMING MONTHS IN BERLIN FROM LOCAL VANTAGE POINT, GIVEN CURRENT INDICATIONS OF SOVIET POLICY:

1. BERLIN MORALE NEVER HIGHER THAN RIGHT NOW, STILL RIDING ON CREST OF CUBAN WAVE. PUBLIC MAY IN FACT PUT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON CUBA AS MARKING WATERSHED IN BERLIN SITUATION AND HENCE VULNERABLE TO DISILLUSIONMENT. VOLATILE NATURE BERLIN CONFIDENCE PRECLUDES FORECAST WHAT IT WILL BE IN FUTURE. IF HIGH LEVEL BERLIN TALKS OR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD APPEAR IMMINENT BERLIN POPULATION HARDLY LIKELY FEAR THAT ALLIES WOULD GIVE IN TO SOVIET BULLYING BUT COULD BE EXPECTED RENEW OLD FEAR THAT GREAT POWERS MIGHT MAKE CONCESSIONS AT BERLIN'S EXPENSE IN ORDER TO HAVE MODUS VIVENDI. IN SUCH SITUATION BRANDT'S INFLUENCE WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. THERE IS ALREADY BUILDING UP SOME CONCERN RE SO-CALLED UN SOLUTION.

2. INDICATIONS ARE THAT BRANDT WILL CONTINUE IN OFFICE AS HEAD OF COALITION. BRANDT AND SPD LEADERSHIP IN BERLIN WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK CREATE POSITIVE IMAGE OF BRANDT HIMSELF AND SPD AS CAPABLE HEADING NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. THEY WILL TRY TO GIVE IMPRESSION OF FLEXIBLE CONFIDENCE, WILLINGNESS TO SEEK NEW WAYS TO SETTLE OLD PROBLEMS, WILLINGNESS TO FIND WAY TO DEAL WITH GDR AUTHORITIES SHORT OF RECOGNITION. THEY WILL BE INTERESTED IN SOVIET-LEOPOLD-BEHRENDT TALKS ALONG AT MORE RAPID RATE AND INCREASING THEIR SCOPE. THEY MAY WELL PRESS MORE VIGOROUSLY AND PUBLICLY FOR PARTICULAR FORMS OF MODUS VIVENDI FOR BERLIN, INCLUDING ACCESS, MOVEMENT WITHIN CITY, ETC. THEY APPEAR TO BE UNDER IMPRESSION THAT ADENAUER DOES NOT FIND FAVOR IN WASHINGTON

SECRET

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AND THEY WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WITH US POLICIES AND ATTITUDES. POSSIBLITY OF GRAND COALITION IN FALL WILL BE ALWAYS IN THE BACKGROUND; BRANDT WILL BE ANXIOUS TO KEEP HIS ROAD TO BONN CLEAR, AND LESSER FIGURES WILL BE JOCKEYING TO BE HIS SUCCESSOR IN BERLIN.

3. TENDENCIES OF BERLIN SENAT TO FREEWHEEL IN RELATION TO ALLIED KOMMANDATURA WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE OWING TO SUCH FACTORS AS CUMULATIVE FRUSTRATIONS OF BEING OCCUPIED AND DESIRE OF BRANDT GOVERNMENT BEFORE AND AFTER LOCAL ELECTION TO APPEAR ACTIVE, FORWARD LOOKING AND INDEPENDENT. MAIN MANIFESTATIONS OF THIS FREEWHEELING ARE TO BE EXPECTED FROM SENATOR ALBERTZ IN POLICE MATTERS AND FROM MAYOR BRANDT IN STATEMENTS TO PRESS.

4. THE WALL WILL INCREASINGLY CAST ITS SHADOW ON ALL ASPECTS OF LIFE IN BERLIN; TENSION AND INCIDENTS WILL CONTINUE. PRIOR TO AUGUST 1961, REDUCTION IN PRESSURE BY COMMUNISTS COULD BRING RELATIVE QUIET TO THE CITY. NOW, HOWEVER, WALL HAS INTRODUCED DYNAMIC FACTOR INTO LOCAL SITUATION WHICH OPERATES REGARDLESS OF OUTSIDE FACTORS. EAST GERMANS WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO ESCAPE, AND WEST BERLINERS WILL CONTINUE TO EXPRESS THEIR PENT UP FRUSTRATIONS BY ATTACKS UPON WALL. NEITHER OF THESE ACTIVITIES CAN REALLY BE CONTROLLED. IN ADDITION THERE IS NEW FACTOR THAT ALSO STIMULATES THIS KIND OF UNREST: IMPATIENCE OF SOME ELEMENTS IN BERLIN -- PARTICULARLY YOUTH -- WITH EXISTING BERLIN POLICIES (BERLINTEL 516).

5. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR WEST BERLIN DEPEND PRIMARILY ON TRENDS IN WEST GERMANY AND ON CONTINUING CONFIDENCE WHICH IN TURN BASED LARGELY ON POLITICAL FACTORS. UNLESS MAJOR SETBACKS THESE AREAS, NO REASON FOR CONCERN. RATE OF GROWTH UNLIKELY SHOW SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE BECAUSE OF LABOR SHORTAGE AND FACT NEW INVESTMENT LIKELY BE LIMITED. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION SHOULD HOWEVER CONTINUE AT PRESENT FULL CAPACITY. IF BOOM OCCURS WEST GERMAN ECONOMY, FAVORABLE EFFECTS WOULD BE FELT WEST BERLIN.

6. EXPECT VIABILITY PROGRAM WILL BEGIN TO SHOW SOME RESULTS DURING 1963 PARTICULARLY IN FIELD OF CULTURAL PROJECTS. CITY WILL GO AHEAD WITH PLANNING, CONSTRUCTION AND STAFFING OF NUMBER OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS AND RECENTLY ANNOUNCED PROGRAM OF FORD FOUNDATION, GREETED WITH ENTHUSIASM, WILL PROVIDE ADDED STIMULUS IN THIS FIELD. WE EXPECT TO SEE SOME PROGRESS MADE ON ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTE FOR AUTOMATION AND FURTHER ACTIVITIES IN FIELD OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES WITH

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INCREASING NUMBER OF VISITORS FROM THOSE AREAS AS WELL AS TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SEMINARS ON SUBJECTS IN THIS FIELD.

7. SOVIET POLICIES WILL OF COURSE BE CLEARER FOLLOWING KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO EAST BERLIN FOR SIXTH SED CONGRESS. APART FROM SOME REALLY DRAMATIC NEW DEVELOPMENT, WOULD EXPECT REITERATION RECENT LINE URGING SUBSTITUTE UN FLAG FOR OCCUPATION AND COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS. WOULD EXPECT NO LET UP IN PROPAGANDA ATTACKS ON ADENAUER, WEST GERMANS AND ALL "ULTRAS". WHETHER EAST BERLIN VISIT LEADS TO NEW TALKS (BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL), BELIEVE SOV/GDR LIKELY FROM TIME TO TIME HEAT UP LOCAL BERLIN ATMOSPHERE. SOVS MAY MAKE FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO EMPHASIZE THEIR PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN, THEIR CONTROL OF ALLIED AUTOBAHN TRAFFIC AND OF AIR SPACE. WE MUST ALSO BE PREPARED DEAL WITH GDR IMPOSITION PASSPORT-VISA REQUIREMENT AND DENIAL ENTRY EAST BERLIN, ALTHOUGH NO PRESENT INDICATIONS EITHER CONTINGENCY IMMINENT.

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Control: 7162
Rec'd: JANUARY 12, 1963
9:59 AM

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 761, JANUARY 12, 1 PM. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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PARIS ALSO FOR USRO; USAREUR FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR US ELEMENT LIVE OAK AND STOESSEL; CINCEUR FOR MCGUIRE.

8. ALLIES HERE EXPECTED BE EVEN MORE CAUTIOUS IN HANDLING LOCAL PROBLEMS. BRITISH IN PARTICULAR MAY WELL FIND SOVIET OVERTURES (E.G., UN FLAG OVER BERLIN) APPEALING AND WILL BE MORE THAN EVER INCLINED TO AVOID FORTHRIGHT ACTION TO NIP IN BUD SOV ENCROACHMENTS ON GROUNDS ALLEGED DANGER OF LOCAL INCIDENTS "ESCALATING". WE OF COURSE HAVE LONG HELD DANGER ESCALATION IN BERLIN MINIMAL AS LONG AS NEITHER SIDE WISHES MAJOR SHOWDOWN AND INCIDENTS CONTINUE TO BE EITHER A) HARRASSING PROBES BY OTHER SIDE OR B) OF TYPE RESULTING FROM ATTEMPTED REFUGEE ESCAPES.

IF BRITISH, FRENCH ATTITUDES FOLLOW TREND INDICATED, CONTINGENCY PLANNING WILL NOT BE VERY FRUITFUL, SINCE ATMOSPHERE WILL NOT BE SUCH AS TO INDUCE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES OF PROPER VIGOR.

9. INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN EAST GERMANY, POSSIBLE EXACERBATED BY SEVERE WINTER, WILL CONTINUE BE A CAUSE FOR CONCERN TO SOVIETS. SINCE PROBLEMS LIKELY TO PERSIST, AND IN VIEW OF NEED CONSIDER QUESTION EVENTUAL SUCCESSOR FOR ULBRICHT (WHO BECOMES 70 THIS YEAR), SOVS MAY BE INCREASINGLY OCCUPIED WITH WORKING OUT ARRANGEMENTS TO INSURE EAST GERMANY WILL PLAY USEFUL ROLE IN BLOC AFFAIRS. UNSTABLE EAST GERMAN SITUATION AND NEED FOR SAFE, GRADUAL TRANSITION FROM PRESENT ULBRICHT LEADERSHIP WILL, IN OUR VIEW, CONTINUE BE RESTRAINING FACTOR ON SOV DECISIONS RE BERLIN QUESTION.

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-2-761, JANUARY 12, 1 PM. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM BERLIN

10. PRINCIPAL TASKS US REPS BERLIN WILL CONTINUE AS IN PAST TO BE TO FOSTER BERLINERS' UNDERSTANDING AND CONFIDENCE IN US POLICIES; SUPPORT EFFORTS TOWARD IMPROVING VIABILITY; MAINTAIN CLOSE WORKING RELATIONS WITH ALLIES AND SENAT, ESPECIALLY BRANDT, ALBERTZ AND AMREHN; KEEP IN TOUCH AND APPRAISE CONDITIONS SOV ZONE; PARTICIPATE CONTINGENCY PLANNING; MAINTAIN READINESS US FORCES. MAIN US OBJECTIVE IN BERLIN WILL BE TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF ALLIED POSITION. OUR EFFORT WILL BE TO LOCALIZE ANY INCIDENTS THAT OCCUR BUT AT SAME TIME MAKE CLEAR TO SOVIETS ALLIED UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT DISADVANTAGEOUS CHANGES AND CONDITIONS. IF WE BECOME ENGAGED IN CONTROVERSY LOCALLY WITH SOVIETS OR GDR, IT MUST BE CLEAR TO ALL THAT OUR POSITION IS REASONABLE AND THAT OUR CHOICE WAS BETWEEN ACCEPTING CONTROVERSY AND ABANDONING OR WEAKENING SIGNIFICANT PRINCIPLE.

11. REGARDLESS OF STATE OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL ALLIED-SOVIET RELATIONS, IT WILL NOT ALWAYS BE POSSIBLE THROUGH LOCAL ALLIED ACTION OR INACTION TO ENSURE THAT THINGS ARE QUIET IN BERLIN ITSELF. SITUATIONS WILL ARISE, EITHER BECAUSE OF DYNAMICS OF THE WALL OR BECAUSE SOVIETS OR GDR CAUSE THEM TO ARISE, WHICH WILL REQUIRE REACTION. NATURE OF REACTION WILL BE WATCHED, AS ALWAYS, BY BERLINERS, SOVIETS AND GDR AS INDICATION OF US WILL. SOME OBSERVERS WILL WATCH FOR INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE DEALS WITH SOVIETS. POST-CUBA CONFIDENCE HERE WOULD BE QUICKLY DISSIPATED BY FEW INADEQUATE RESPONSES BY US. IN ADDITION, KREMLIN'S ESTIMATE WASHINGTON STRENGTH OF PURPOSE CAN BE INFLUENCED BY AMERICAN/ALLIED POSTURE IN BERLIN. THUS SHEER FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WILL CONTINUE BRING US FACE TO FACE WITH DILEMMA OF ACTING FORTHRIGHTLY TO PRESERVE OUR POSITION OR AVOIDING ACTION IN HOPES OF PREVENTING UNWANTED FRICTION. GEN POLK CONCURS.

LIGHTNER

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FJH-Hillenbrand

(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 24, 1963
Hay-Adams House

403

SUBJECT: Berlin

2BF112/1

PARTICIPANTS: Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
(1) Mr. Hillenbrand, EUR

Lim 3.9 1963

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At lunch today with Mr. Hillenbrand, arranged on Mr. Kornienko's initiative, the latter launched into a discussion of Berlin almost before the two were seated by saying that the cold weather in Washington was undoubtedly pleasing to the U.S. Government since it seemed to want to put the Berlin problem in a deep-freeze. This was a mistake, because the basic danger created by the unsatisfactory situation in Berlin remained and had to be dealt with. While he did not intend to say that the Soviet Union was fixing any date, it was wrong to think that the question could remain in its present state indefinitely. There might not be danger today, but tomorrow there might be. The Soviet Union had made a number of proposals, and it was now the turn of the U.S. to make proposals. The impression could not be avoided that the U.S. felt that discussions could be indefinitely postponed.

Mr. Hillenbrand referred to a recent statement made by the Secretary on TV that he expected that during 1963 there would be further discussions about Berlin, since this was one of the most serious and potentially dangerous questions confronting us. However, it was too early to say precisely how these would develop, the Secretary had added. Mr. Kornienko commented that, so far as it went, the Secretary's statement was good, but it was too general. The point now was to resume the discussions on the basis of specific proposals.

After briefly reviewing the history of the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the past 18 months, with particular emphasis on how they had led to an evident impasse on the question of Western troop presence, Mr. Hillenbrand observed that recent statements by Soviet spokesmen

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ZBF112/2

both private and public, did not add up to a clear and consistent picture of the Soviet position. But it seemed to us that, in the various formulae which the Soviets had put forward, and in the various ways of expressing these formulae, they were merely suggesting various ways in which the U.S. could get out or be eased out of West Berlin. Since we had said that our presence there was not negotiable, the next step was not for us to take but for the Soviets. If they were willing to recognize this vital interest of the West and to say so, this would then be something to which a response could be made in due course. However, it did not seem that Soviet statements up to now had indicated such a willingness to accept the Western troop presence.

Mr. Kornienko said that recent Soviet proposals were intended to take account of the Western desire to maintain a troop presence in the city. He pointed out that there had been a considerable change in the Soviet position from March of 1962 to September of 1962 in this direction. Mr. Hillenbrand commented that a Soviet proposal made before March, 1962 had contemplated a token Western presence, accompanied by a Soviet troop presence in West Berlin, something which we had said was unacceptable. It did not seem that the various formulae which had subsequently been put forward by Soviet spokesmen represented any real progression in their position. They all contemplated the withdrawal of Western forces or their significant dilution and then withdrawal after a relatively brief period.

Having made the two points which he was apparently supposed to make: that the present lack of discussions on Berlin cannot be maintained and that it is now the turn of the US to make proposals, Kornienko seemed content to let the subject drop and to move on to such other subjects as Soviet and American literature and music. He did, however, several times return to the point that it was now the turn of the U.S. to make proposals on Berlin. As a parting shot he said he was personally more pessimistic now than last spring about the possibility of reaching agreement on Berlin, but perhaps this was due to the fact that he had gone more than 18 months without a vacation.

(Comment: It may be noted that Kornienko's remarks were delivered in a completely non-vituperative manner, in a tone of regret rather than irritation.)

MJHillenbrand:cmg
1/25/63

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2BF113

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February 3, 1963

Dear Dean:

I noticed, in Chancellor Adenauer's recent letter to you, that he referred to a conversation during the past summer with me in which he says that he told me that he was planning closer relations with France, and that I had encouraged him by referring to our intention to sustain closer relations with Britain. In fact, his reference to his own need for a closer tie with France was related by him to his fear that DeGaulle would "make a trip to Moscow" as a repeat performance of 1944. I did not refer in any way to any special relation with Britain in the context of the most general remarks about the importance of Franco-German reconciliation.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

The Honorable
Dean Acheson,
Covington & Burling,
Union Trust Building,
Washington 5, D. C.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2BF114/1

Memorandum of Conversation

405

DATE: February 4, 1963

SUBJECT: Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary

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After dinner at Mr. Richard H. Davis's house on February 4, Ambassador Dobrynin and I discussed Berlin, among other subjects (see separate memoranda). Dobrynin asked whether Ambassador Kohler was going to be authorized to accept Gromyko's invitation to continue an exchange of views on Berlin. I asked him if the Soviet Government was really interested in a modus vivendi on Berlin. He replied in the affirmative, and went into a rather long but not very clear account of how the Western troops "and some other troops which would be neutral" could be in West Berlin "under the UN flag." I asked the Ambassador what this meant, but he refused to be more specific. However, he said, he was sure that an arrangement could be reached in Berlin "for a limited period." I said to him that it was essential that any arrangement on Berlin should provide for the retention of Western troops in West Berlin, and that these troops should be in a position to provide security for West Berlin. This meant that they must be under Western command. I added that any form of UN presence in West Berlin must be such as not to impair the confidence of the West Berliners in the will and the ability of the Western powers to protect them and to honor our commitments. I also said that if a modus vivendi were to be reached, it should reflect a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to stabilize the situation in Berlin, which had been created by the Soviet Government's pressures over the last

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2BF114/2

five years. I said I did not think it would be desirable to have an arrangement "for a limited period," because this meant that if no final solution to the German problem had been reached by the date of expiration of the limited period, then we would be faced with a choice of either negotiating another agreement, or facing renewed tension and instability. Dobrynin said that there should be a final solution to the German problem and that was why any arrangement on Berlin should only be for a limited period. I repeated that I did not like the idea of our being faced with a deadline in Berlin. It was to the advantage of the Soviet Union as well as the West to reduce friction and tension in Berlin, and this could happen if the Soviet Government agreed to a modus vivendi under which Western troops stayed in West Berlin in such a way as to be able to carry our their responsibilities and commitments.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

Declassified by S/S 2/14/63

406

DATE: February 9, 1963

ZBF115/11

SUBJECT: Discussions with the Soviets over Berlin

PARTICIPANTS:
U.S.
The Secretary
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

France
Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
Bruno de Leusse, French Minister

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Ambassador Alphand said it was French opinion that it was not desirable to have further exploratory talks with the Soviets over Berlin until there is a real change in the Soviet position concerning the status of Berlin. If, however, the U.S. wishes to continue such talks, the French would not object. Alphand asked whether it would not seem strange to talk about Berlin in the light of the current discussion over the Soviet presence in Cuba. He felt it would be better to tell the Soviets that we would talk about Berlin when other problems, such as disarmament and Cuba, are in good shape.

The Secretary replied that the Soviets would be pleased to have us link Cuba and Berlin, and that we have gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid linking Cuba with anything.

Alphand asked whether the U.S. Government had taken a position yet concerning these exploratory talks with the Soviets, to which the Secretary replied that we were awaiting the reactions of the others concerned before reaching a decision. He continued that if we decide to conduct further talks with the Soviets we would

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would be in touch with the Ambassadorial Group with regard to the modalities. The Secretary concluded that he would have supposed that one of the best ways to conduct a dilatory action would be to talk, noting that some take the position that one should not talk when tensions are high since this would appear to be negotiating under duress, while on the other hand, the same people take the position that when there is no pressure there is no need to talk.

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Thompson called meeting Ambassadorial Group today to continue discussion possible US response to Gromyko's oral statement to Kohler on resumption talks on Berlin and Germany as reported DEPTEL 3875.

Ormsby Gore said British saw great difficulty in a US refusal and for this reason alone thought answer should be affirmative. As far as UK participation, it would not expect to be included at this time as the UK regarded these talks as continuation of those already in being before the Cuban crisis.

Alphand gave French position that while tactically there was slight reduction of tension, fundamentally Soviet aims were unchanged. These are to sign a peace treaty with two

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GTF - Mr. Ballenbrand (in draft) S/S - Mr. Lubkeman

SOV - Mr. Guthrie (in substance

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two German states and to settle Berlin on that basis. Soviets view transformation of legal status of Berlin and Germany as a step toward eventual aim of recognizing division of Germany. Thus, French are not in favor of continuation talks as long as Soviets do not modify their position on East-West problems in center of Europe. At same time French have no opposition to US/USSR exploratory talks, although it should be clear France not committed by these talks. French see danger if these talks take up where they left off in 1962, with discussion of wider questions such as German frontiers, Warsaw Pact, NATO non-aggression treaty and disengagement in center of Europe. Better course might be to base talks on revised version Western Peace Plan as prepared for Geneva in 1959. In any event, French would recommend dilatory pace with an opening position that US ready to talk about Berlin if and when problems of substance are solved, namely, disarmament. In summary, French position is (a) not in favor of talks; (b) will not object to talks; (c) if talks do take place, recommend dilatory position.

German position given by Knappstein based on following analysis: (1) Soviets now not more willing to consider concessions than before Cuba; (2) they are taking advantage of post-Cuba relaxation to seek concessions;

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concessions; (3) they have been freed of their own self-imposed deadline by Khrushchev's speech at SED Congress; (4) they are prepared to live on with unfinished business in Berlin for present; (5) they are looking for sanction for signing peace treaty; (6) they are attempting meanwhile to undermine Western position in West Berlin. Thus, Germans see no advantage in reacting swiftly to Gromyko overture. This particularly true in view unsatisfactory state Cuban situation and lack of progress on disarmament and test ban. However, if USG wishes talks, Germans will not oppose, but they would repeat their position that Soviets must recognize Western troop presence in Berlin without time limit or qualification before any negotiations take place on Berlin or Germany.

Thompson said US thought it awkward to say it is not prepared to continue exploratory talks on Berlin. Admittedly, Cuban situation not satisfactory, but this should not prevent Berlin talks. Thompson agreed that relaxed tactics would be best, and that these might first be aimed at finding out Soviet position on troop presence. If Soviets forthcoming on this, then West might consider achieving more advantageous propaganda position by reverting to revised Western Peace Plan. Thompson noted that Soviets are saying that progress

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of telegram to LONDON

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progress on Berlin must precede progress on disarmament, [redacted]

Thompson summary US position was that instructions should be prepared for Ambassador Kohler to [redacted] see Gromyko early next week with suggestion that talks be held in Washington. He emphasized to Alphand that US [redacted] before deciding further tactics. [redacted] would first seek discover Soviet position/

At this juncture, Knappstein gave German position that opening US move in talks should be presentation revised Western Peace Plan. Ormsby Gore challenged this, asking if it were wise to take such initiative. Knappstein then agreed first approach should be exploratory only.

Thompson then referred to press leaks on Gromyko approach in Paris and London papers and noted these were awkward in view pointed remark by Gromyko about leaks. Again stressed need for secrecy.

Next meeting arranged for February 19 to receive presentation from Admiral Dennison on terms of reference for Naval Committee and SEA SPRAY, as well as discussion methods to be used by committee and SEA SPRAY in accomplishing tasks assigned by Ambassadorial Group.

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February 14, 1963

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McGB

SUBJECT: The Chancellor's Complaint to Gilpatric on Berlin

With reference to Bonn's 2095, there are essentially three considerations: (a) the nature of the President's commitment to the Chancellor on the handling of the Berlin problem; (b) Ambassador Kohler's action in this context; and (c) further handling of the matter with the Chancellor.

1. The President's Commitment to the Chancellor. According to our memorandum of conversation between the President and the Chancellor, what the President actually said was: "If Khrushchev agrees to our requests in Cuba then we might inquire as to Soviet proposals without, however, making any of our own for the time-being. If the Soviets put ~~further~~ Ground proposals on Berlin, then we shall try to clarify the status of the Western troops in Berlin. The answer to this will be the decisive one".

Apparently the German record doesn't quite read the same way. It is a doctored one based on notes Carstens took at the meeting and gives the impression of a more categorical negative position than the President actually took.

2. Kohler's Actions in Moscow. However, regardless of how one views the commitment, there is nothing in Kohler's actions which violates it.

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Foy met with Gromyko on January 18 and told Gromyko he was returning to Washington for consultation and would be glad to take back any views Gromyko or Khrushchev wished to give him "for transmission to the President and Secretary" (Moscow's 1764). As reported by Foy, Gromyko launched into a discussion of Germany and Berlin but did not respond to Kohler's offer to convey any suggestions to Washington.

A week later, however, on January 26, just before Foy's departure, Gromyko called him in to give him a message for the President and Secretary to the effect that the Soviet Government desired to continue talks with the U.S. on "the German peace settlement and the normalisation on that basis of the situation in West Berlin". (Moscow's 1840).

In other words, Foy himself did not initiate any discussion on Berlin. He posed the general question of whether the Soviet leadership had had any messages for the American Government, and a week later was given several, including the one on Berlin.

3. Reasons for the Chancellor's Actions. The Chancellor's view of the situation may be due to faulty reporting by the Embassy here. However, in this case, the more likely explanation is that the Chancellor is being his usual suspicious self, and perhaps was aided and abetted by his recent exchanges with de Gaulle. Also, I don't think we should discount the possibility that this is a move by the Chancellor to relieve some of the pressures we have been exerting on him in connection with the French-EEC complex of problems.

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4. Dealing with the Problem. Since we have no formal demarche from the Chancellor, probably the easiest way to deal with him on this matter is to have Dowling, on his return to Bonn, review the bidding carefully with the Chancellor, and remind him that the Germans have been kept fully informed of all of the pertinent developments.

David Klein

Attachments

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Memorandum of Conversation POL 23 BERLIN

409

DATE: February 19, 1963
Westchester Restaurant
1 PM

SUBJECT: German Suspicions of U.S.

2BF118/1

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy
Mr. Hillenbrand

COPIES TO: EUR - Mr. Tyler
BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand
Amembassy Bonn - Mr. Morris

February 26, 1963

During lunch today, Mr. Schnippenkoetter let down his hair on what he said has really been bothering the Germans about our approach to resumed discussions with the Soviets. His thesis essentially was that we have been contradictory and evasive in stating both how we estimated Soviet intentions and what our specific objectives were in any further round with the Soviets on Berlin. He made a great point of arguing that the context within which the Western Powers must approach the Berlin problem had radically changed since last year and that we did not seem to be taking cognisance of this but were still thinking in terms of the situation in 1961 and in pre-Cuba 1962. When Mr. Hillenbrand asked him, however, what specific conclusions he drew from this generalization, he became vague and merely repeated that the U.S. did not seem to be taking account of the basic changes in the general situation.

He then went on to say that at one Ambassadorial Group meeting Ambassador Kohler had expressed the view that the Soviet initiative was the most important on Berlin since November 1958. He had given a number of reasons for this judgment, but they had not seemed very convincing. Then, at a subsequent meeting of the Ambassadorial Group, Ambassador Thompson had seemingly belittled the significance of the Soviet approach and had tried to give the impression that resumption of talks was not much of a step. In a meeting of the Political Section of the German Embassy with Ambassador Knappstein after this second Ambassadorial Group session, they had found it very difficult to put together a coherent report to Bonn. He feared that Bonn must have received the impression either that we were confused in our thinking or were concealing something.

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ZBF118/2

Mr. Hillenbrand observed that there really had not been any contradiction in what the two had said. Each had emphasized a different aspect of the subject. Moreover, Mr. Hillenbrand tried to point out that some of the confusion, if there was any, might derive from failure to distinguish between personal opinions expressed at Ambassadorial Group meetings and positions of governments. It was his distinct impression that both Ambassador Kohler and Ambassador Thompson had made clear when they were speaking in a personal capacity. Mr. Schnippenkoetter commented that he could not believe Ambassador Thompson was speaking in a personal capacity when he said the U.S. Government was inclined to resume talks with the Soviets. Mr. Hillenbrand agreed that this was obviously so, but that this did not mean that everything said thereafter was necessarily a U.S. governmental view, as Ambassador Thompson had taken pains to point out. In any event, it seemed deplorable that we had to operate in this constant atmosphere of suspicion about the motives and objectives of the U.S. This was bound to create a certain amount of resentment, particularly when the suspicion seemed linked to specific press attacks against individuals, such as those which had appeared in the Federal Republic last summer against Mr. Kohler. Mr. Schnippenkoetter denied that a campaign had ever taken place. Mr. Hillenbrand conceded that perhaps there had not been a campaign, but certainly there had been a coincidence of articles in the press in which he was portrayed in an unfair way. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hillenbrand continued, the Germans did not appreciate how staunch a role Ambassador Kohler had played, and, speaking personally, he felt a serious injustice had been done him by certain elements in the German press. In any event, this sort of thing got us nowhere and merely added to the sum total of misunderstanding which unfortunately had crept into the relationship between the U.S. and the Federal Republic. Mr. Schnippenkoetter agreed that this was all very bad, but could not refrain from adding that he still did not think we had very clearly explained our approach to the Soviet initiative for resumption of Berlin talks.

Mr. Schnippenkoetter then went on to complain about what he considered to be inadequate prior four power consultation. Mr. Hillenbrand commented that it was true that the four power mechanism had not functioned as well during the past 18 months as in previous periods, but it should be clear to all concerned that this was primarily due to the virtual French withdrawal from meaningful consultation on a four power basis so far as preparations for discussions with the Soviets were concerned. It was hard to conduct consultations when one of the parties in effect announced in advance that it would not be committed by anything said or done and really had little other contribution to make than to express a generally negative

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ZBF118/3

attitude. In the field of contingency planning, of course, French participation had been better. However, we had always tried to keep the other powers fully informed; this applied even to the French.

Comment by Mr. Hillenbrand:

Mr. Schnippenkoetter's attitude is, I think, fairly typical of the official German state of mind at the present time. It is difficult to know what to do with a peculiar paranoid condition of this sort. The more one argues, the more confirmed the "mental set" becomes, and every point simply becomes additional proof. The constant possibility exists that even innocent remarks will be twisted into having sinister implications. In addition I believe a further psychological mechanism is now operating. The Germans undoubtedly have certain guilt feelings about the timing and side effects of the Franco-German treaty, and it would be normal for them to resort to the time-tried method of shifting the burden by showing that others are likewise not entirely clear and percipient in what they do.

B-1023

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(21)

Memorandum of Conversation

440

ZBF119/1

DATE: Feb. 20, 1963

SUBJECT: Resumption of bilateral talks with the Soviet Union on the German question.

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Herve Alphand (France)
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson
Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

COPIES TO:

S/S-S
G
S/P
Amb. Kohler
DOF-Mr. Tyler
Eur/Sov
S/AL (3)
INR-D
Amb. Bohlen
Amb. Kohn
Amb. Harriman
White House-Bundy

POL 23 BERLIN

Ambassador Alphand said he had informed Paris of the discussion at the meeting of the Ambassadorial group with respect to the resumption of bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the German question but that Paris had asked for further information as to how we envisaged the talks developing.

I replied that we had worked out no specific position and that I understood our intention was simply to see what the Soviets had in mind. I assumed that they would bring up their U. N. flag proposal and that we would probe to see exactly what this meant, but that so far as we had had any indications about it from the Roberts and other conversations, it was entirely unacceptable. If this develops from the talks, it could be that the Soviets would then explore some kind of modus vivendi.

Alphand inquired if this would mean something along the lines of the package which the Secretary had discussed with Gromyko, including an access proposal along with various other matters, including a NATO/Warsaw Pact non-aggression arrangement, some declaration about frontiers and demarcation lines, etc. When I said that this seemed to be one possibility, Alphand said the French Government thought this went too far towards recognizing the division of Germany.

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Control: 16914
Rec'd: February 25, 1963
2:08 p.m.

FROM: Berlin

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 917, February 25.

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 917, INFORMATION BONN PRIORITY 825, PARIS PRIORITY 572, LONDON PRIORITY 536, MOSCOW PRIORITY 510

USAREUR, CINCEUR AND SHAPE FOR INFO VIA OTHER MEANS

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO; USAREUR AND CINCEUR FOR POLADS; SHAPE FOR US ELEMENT LIVE OAK AND STOESSEL

WE HAVE ALREADY DESCRIBED, IN CONNECTION WITH HELICOPTER FLIGHT (BERLINTEL 908), WHAT MORE AND MORE APPEARS TO BE RENEWAL OF SOVIET PRESSURE ON ALLIED RIGHTS HERE. SINCE THAT TELEGRAM WE HAVE HAD ATTEMPT OF SOVIET BUSES ENTER CHECKPOINT CHARLIE AGAINST BRITISH INSTRUCTIONS (BERLINTEL 910). NOT POSSIBLE TELL WHETHER LATTER EVENT MERE ERROR BY SOVIETS AS BRITISH TEND BELIEVE OR CALCULATED PROBE OF OUR ALERTNESS AND FIRMNESS. POSSIBLY OF SIGNIFICANCE THAT ON SIMILAR OCCASION IN NOVEMBER BRITISH ORDERS WERE FOLLOWED ENTIRELY, AND THAT ON FEB 23 PERSONNEL ESSENTIAL TO CEREMONY WERE BROUGHT THROUGH BANDKRUG BRIDGE, APPARENTLY SO THAT CEREMONY COULD PROCEED WITHOUT OTHER GROUP.

RECENT SOVIET MOVES REMINISCENT OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR LAST NOVEMBER ON ADVANCE NOTICE ISSUE ON AUTOBAHN, WHICH SOVIETS MUST CONSIDER AS HAVING HAD SATISFACTORY OUTCOME. ELEMENTS OF OUR POSITION WHICH HAVE BEEN SELECTED FOR PRESSURE ARE, TAKEN ALONE, NOT ESSENTIALS. (HELICOPTER FLIGHTS HAVE CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE USEFULNESS AND RELATED TO VITAL AIR ACCESS, BUT SOVIETS PROBABLY RECOGNIZE THEM AS LEAST IMPORTANT SINGLE ASPECT OF AIR RIGHTS.) AUTOBAHN INCIDENT OF FEB 19 IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING AS ILLUSTRATION OF CURRENT TREND HARASSMENT ON MINOR POINTS (BERLINTEL 909). WE ARE ONLY ONE OF THREE ALLIES TO LUMP PRIME MOVERS AND TRAILERS TOGETHER ON MOVEMENT ORDERS. SUBSTANTIVELY, CHANGE DEMANDED BY SOVIETS WOULD BE OF NO CONSEQUENCE

SECRET

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I said another possibility was that the Soviets might show interest in our General Principles paper or in some similar arrangement which would mean talking the problem to death. I said I personally thought this unlikely.

I pointed out that the German position did not seem to be quite clear on whether or not we should proceed to produce a revised peace plan. I said we were not pushing this at the moment but if we thought that the Soviets were using these talks with us as preparation for some action on Berlin, we might consider trying to improve our propaganda position in this way.

I said I thought a third possibility was that the Soviets might use these talks as preparation for taking some action such as signing a separate peace treaty, but doing so in such a manner as to avoid a military confrontation. I said I did not agree with the view that Khrushchev would simply be content to leave matters as they are. Alphand indicated that this was indeed the view of the French Government and that nothing would really happen. He said he thought the French Government considered that the signature of a separate peace treaty would be a bad thing for the West, and I said that this was my strong personal view.

Alphand asked if instructions had gone to Kohler and I said I understood they would be going out today and would make clear that the talks were confined to ascertaining whether a basis for negotiations existed.

B-1025



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ZBF120/2

SECRET

-2-917, February 25, from Berlin

TO US, AND WE WOULD LIKELY AGREE IF SOVIETS PROPOSED IT FOR MUTUAL CONSIDERATION. IN ADDITION, INITIAL PROBE WAS LIGHT, GIVING SENIOR SOVIET OFFICER AMPLE OPPORTUNITY BACK AWAY WHEN WE RESISTED.

IF WE EXAMINE WHOLE CONTEXT OF BERLIN SITUATION IN WHICH THESE MOVES OCCURRING, THEY APPEAR CONSISTENT AND LOGICAL. OUR APPRAISAL OF RECENT SED PARTY CONGRESS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS RE SOVIET BERLIN POLICY CONFIRMS OUR CONCLUSION THAT BERLIN SOLUTION IS NOT NOW REGARDED BY MOSCOW AS AN IMPERATIVE. MORE IMPORTANT FOR MOSCOW IS NEED SHORE UP GDR ECONOMIC BASE. BERLIN ITSELF, HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY SINCE SOLUTION IS NOT REQUIRED, OFFERS SOVIETS MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MANEUVER -- FOR MANIPULATION TO EXPLOIT CURRENT DISARRAY WITHIN NATO AND EEC BY EXACERBATING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BERLIN (SPD) AND BONN (CDU) BONN AND WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON AND PARIS, ETC.

FAMILIARY, TOO, IS PATTERN OF LOCAL SOVIET PRESSURE COMING SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH MOSCOW MANEUVERS FOR HIGH LEVEL TALKS ON GERMANY AND BERLIN.

EVIDENCE OF NEW SOVIET CAMPAIGN OF CALCULATED ENCROACHMENT AND HARASSMENT IS NOT CONCLUSIVE. HOWEVER, IT IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING IN PRESENT CONTEXT THAT IN OUR VIEW IT WOULD BE ONLY PRUDENT TO ACT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SUCH CAMPAIGN IS IN FACT UNDERWAY.

CONCLUSION:

ESPECIALLY DURING PERIOD OF RESUMED TALKS WITH SOVS, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT DEMONSTRATE TO SOVS, US NOT RPT NOT PREPARED MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS ON MATTERS AFFECTING ESTABLISHED ACCESS RIGHTS AND PROCEDURES. THIS ALL MORE IMPORTANT NOW IN ORDER OFFSET IMPRESSION SOVS HAVE OF EFFECTIVENESS THEIR STRONG WARNING LAST NOVEMBER 14 RE SENDING CONVOYS OF MORE THAN FIVE VEHICLES WITHOUT ADVANCE NOTICE.

HENCE WE CONCLUD: 1) IT IS ESSENTIAL CONTINUE EXERCISE OUR RIGHT TO FLY HELICOPTERS AT SPORADIC INTERVALS WITHIN 20 MILE BERLIN CONTROL ZONE; 2) IN FACE YAKUBOVSKY LETTER AND TIME PASSED SINCE LAST FLIGHT (DEC 19) IT IS IMPORTANT NEXT FLIGHT NOT BE LONG POSTPONED, AND TAKE PLACE BEFORE REPLY MADE TO YAKUBOVSKY (OURTEL 915); 3) OPPORTUNITY SHOULD BE SOUGHT TO CORRECT POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING OUR POSITION ON CONVOYS BY REVIEWING POLICY DECISION OF LAST DECEMBER (DEPTEL 463);

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SECRET

23F120 3

-3-917, February 25, from Berlin

R) RECOMMENDED SOLUTION WOULD BE TO GRANT USCOB DISCRETION SEND CONVOY OF MORE THAN FIVE VEHICLES WITHOUT ADVANCE NOTIFICATION AS RESPONSE TO NEXT RESTRICTIVE ACTION TAKEN BY SOVS/GDT RESPECTING ACCESS. GEN. POLK CONCURS.

LIGHTNER

NCA

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

Approved In S
3/1/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

XR DEF 12 NATO
2941
POL FR-GER

Memorandum of Conversation

412

DATE: February 25, 1963

2BF121/1

SUBJECT: Tour d'Horizon

PARTICIPANTS:
Germans
Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel
Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein
Minister-Director Franz Krapf, German Foreign Office
Mr. Horst Blomeyer-Bartenstein, German Embassy
Mr. Pruedenstein, Interpreter

Americans
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Robert M. Brandin, EUR/GER

MAR 5 1963

Copies to: (see page 6)

18

The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that we had been disturbed by events of the past month or so, but that our compass bearings were being clarified. We were distressed by our problems with de Gaulle. Keeping to defense questions for the moment, we were surprised by de Gaulle's January 14, 1963 press conference. At Nassau we thought it important, after settling the Skybolt question, to get UK support for a multilateral force. If Europe wanted to be partners in this force, we were ready to cooperate. For over a year we had been asking for European views and were perhaps optimistic in expecting that the various European countries could agree on a proposal. Therefore, it seemed to us that the agreement with the UK was an important step. At Nassau it was also our intention to bring the French into the picture. We talked to de Gaulle and thought he would examine the Nassau Agreement in the light of France's own nuclear program, capabilities and requirements. In the meantime, we would have worked out our agreement with the British, which we have been trying to do this past week. It was our thought that on the basis of the agreement with the UK and the French study, we could then have talked with the French. These talks would not have been circumscribed in any way and we had hoped they would develop the relevance of the French nuclear program to the Nassau Agreement. As it has turned out, however, we know very little about the French program, in some ways less than we know about the Russian program, although NATO knows all about ours.

The Secretary

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The Secretary went on to say that since the French had indicated they would study the Nassau Agreement and discuss it further, de Gaulle's press conference came as a shock. We had reason to believe this matter would not be settled without warning at a press conference. De Gaulle's action limited the possibilities even from the French point of view. We did not consider the conversations closed however. We were where we were before January 14, but it is more difficult to proceed now.

Minister von Hassel said the multilateral force had not been discussed in his meetings earlier in the day at the Pentagon, but it would be discussed during his trip to SAC the following day. The discussions at the Pentagon concerned German military procurement in the US, cooperative logistics and cooperative R&D.

Minister von Hassel said State Secretary Carstens had informed the Secretary of the German position on the Franco-German Treaty. As regards de Gaulle's press conference, Germany was also caught by a surprise. The Chancellor attached the greatest importance to UK entry into the EEC. Prior to and during the Franco-German discussions in Paris, the Chancellor tried to influence de Gaulle regarding this matter.

Minister von Hassel emphasized that, as the Chancellor and he had said to Mr. Ball, who happened to be in Bonn on January 14, Germany would fully support the multilateral force. Afterward in Paris de Gaulle said he fully understood the German attitude toward joining the multilateral force, although the French attitude differed. During the Paris talks de Gaulle also said he fully understood the German intention to give 100% support to NATO. The Germans made it clear they supported the NATO strategy and political concepts and that these would be the guidelines of German policy. The Franco-German Treaty would be within the framework of the Alliance and could not be interpreted as affecting NATO or any other treaty commitment of Germany.

Minister von Hassel said the military part of the Franco-German Treaty covered four points. First, an effort would be made to reach as much common ground as possible on strategy and tactics. Second, there would be an exchange of officers, instructors, trainees and units up to the company level (the last for a week or so). Third, there would be joint development of weapons where this was appropriate. Fourth, there would be cooperation on civil defense.

Minister von Hassel acknowledged that the first point raised the question of whether France and Germany intended to develop their own separate strategy. The answer, as the Germans made clear to the

French

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French, is that the German strategic concept will continue to be based on NATO. As the map shows, however, there is a strategic relationship between Germany and France. France is essential to Germany as a rear area, particularly as concerns logistics. Germany is important to France as a forward area. For the first time France has now agreed (in writing) to support the forward defense strategy. France will move one division from Trier to Bavaria and will set down logistic support for a third division inside Germany as a basis for wartime deployment. Another French home division will be moved to Alsace. It is the German view that France now agrees to the concept of forward defense. This change in the French attitude can be attributed to the excellent relations between France and Germany.

Minister von Hassel then turned to the discussions with the French on joint R&D. The French originally proposed that all R&D be on a joint basis, but the Germans would agree only to joint R&D where appropriate. The agreements clearly reflect the German viewpoint. The Germans made it clear that the Franco-German Treaty could not disturb Germany's arrangements with the US and the UK on cooperative logistics and cooperative R&D. Consequently, there would be no sudden diversion of German military procurement from the US to France. The US would continue to be the main source of German foreign military procurement.

Minister von Hassel said Mr. Gilpatric had told him of meeting the Italian Prime Minister Fanfani who had said that all the laws and regulations now being drafted in the Common Market--e.g., common agricultural policy--would make UK entry more difficult. Minister von Hassel said he had discussed this with Hallstein who denied that this was the case. In fact, Hallstein maintained the reverse was true. Minister von Hassel said that in talking to de Gaulle he had made the point that he favored Franco-German reconciliation, but such reconciliation would have a solid basis only if the UK were in the Common Market. De Gaulle, however, thought the UK was not ripe for membership in the EEC. Nevertheless Germany would do everything to bring the UK into the EEC. Public opinion and all political parties in Germany favored this step.

Turning to the NATO nuclear force, Minister von Hassel said he was looking forward to meeting Mr. Merchant to see what could be done in creating this force and how Germany could contribute. From

a political

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a political and military viewpoint, Germany supported the NATO nuclear force as a vital instrument of NATO policy. It was difficult to answer the question of whether France would eventually participate, but a start should be made. When the NATO nuclear force was in being perhaps France would reconsider its attitude, particularly when it saw that there was genuine sharing. De Gaulle was clearly worried about a US-Soviet deal at European expense. The creation of a NATO nuclear force might help dispel this fear.

Minister von Hassel then assured the Secretary that Germany would not do anything to help France develop its own independent nuclear force. This had not been discussed with the French. They were going ahead on their own initiative.

The Secretary said he would like to make a few remarks preparatory to Minister von Hassel's meeting with the President. Concerning our reaction to the Franco-German Treaty, Germany should be aware that Franco-German reconciliation had been an objective of US policy for 17 years. To illustrate the problem in our mind, however, we knew what the German attitude was on the larger issues at stake because we had been in close touch with each other. We did not know what de Gaulle had in his mind; nor did his own Ministers apparently. In this marriage of a known and unknown therefore, we wondered what the children would look like. During 1947-1949 the US made the basic decision that its own defense required concerting US and European defense. US troops in Europe were not there as tourists or as a gesture to Europeans; they were there because it was basic to our own defense and the defense of US and Europe together. It was our impression, however, that de Gaulle intended to participate less and less in NATO. This raised the question of what was in his mind. We had the impression that he made a distinction between the Atlantic Alliance, which he supported, and NATO, about which he had reservations. His reservations about NATO might have something to do with its organization. The French had proposed establishing a tripartite directorate in NATO, which the US had refused in deference to Germany and others. The French had also made some references in Paris to the reorganization of NATO, but had said nothing positive. The central point in our mind was that the US and German lines of policies on defense were clear, but we did not know about the French line.

The Secretary pointed out that if things were said from across the Atlantic which gave the impression that the US was no longer needed in Europe, the instinctive reaction of the American people would be to bring our troops home. This was not yet a serious problem, but it could be one. For this reason, the strong reaction of the Five at Brussels was very important.

Turning

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Turning to the multilateral force, the Secretary said we had noted Paris press stories discounting the Acheson Mission. The fact was, however, that the US has moved from a position of neutrality on this matter. After Nassau we considered we had an obligation to try to develop such a force. We did not intend to be dogmatic and we recognized the necessity of consultation to give Germany and others a chance to express their views. The multilateral force in our opinion could strengthen the Alliance. It would also convey the right signals to Moscow. There was a danger that the wrong signals were being received in Moscow since January 14. There was no real difference in the west regarding the USSR, but the Soviets might get the wrong idea. If a genuine opportunity opened up for discussions with de Gaulle on the multilateral force, we would not reject it. It seemed to be difficult to establish contact however.

The Secretary then asked Minister von Hassel if the Germans thought there was any difference in the French mind between the Atlantic Alliance and NATO.

Minister-Director Krapf said the Foreign Office had never thought about this and he wondered how the two could be regarded as separate.

Mr. Tyler said de Gaulle was opposed to political integration because it diluted sovereignty and to military integration because it diluted the patriotic spirit. Hence, he might be opposed to NATO as a sort of military equivalent of the UN in which national identity was lost. His effort to establish tripartism in NATO was not successful. He did not like the integration aspects of the NATO multilateral force. Although the French had recently been stressing cooperation between Europe and the US and their loyalty to the Alliance, they said nothing about NATO.

Minister-Director Krapf observed that the French seemed to be taking a similar attitude in the European Community toward political integration.

Minister von Hassel said de Gaulle had a problem of restoring the morale of French troops and modernizing the French Army. The French Army in fact had to be rebuilt. This would only be possible by stimulating patriotism. De Gaulle realized Europe would be lost if left alone by the US, but he feared a US-Soviet deal at Europe's expense and wanted to take measures to offset it.

The Secretary said it was important to the Alliance that we try to banish a number of historical ghosts, such as de Gaulle's fear of a US-Soviet deal, the US fear of a European third force, Germany's fear of a Franco-Soviet deal, etc. Ghosts could be manufactured at will, but

if we

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if we all made clear our commitments, they would not materialize.

With respect to negotiations with the USSR, the Secretary said we did not see any basis for any agreement at this time. There was no indication that the USSR was ready to recognize our vital interests in Berlin; the prospects for an agreement on nuclear testing were gloomy; there were difficulties in Laos because the Pathet Lao was not performing as it should; there was no significant movement in the disarmament field; and Cuba would remain a major issue as long as there was a single Soviet soldier there.

The Secretary observed that whenever the Soviet pressure rose, quarrels seemed to break out in the West.

The meeting concluded with Minister von Hassel referring to his forthcoming trip to SAC in Omaha. The Secretary took the occasion to note that there had been a massive increase in nuclear deployment in Europe since 1961. Minister von Hassel responded that this information had been given to the Germans by the Defense Department.

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Amembassy Paris
Amembassy Bonn
Paris for USRO

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NSF 63

413

SECRET

February 26, 1963

ZBF122

McGB

SUBJECT: Berlin's 917 on Soviet Harassment

I talked with several people at State, including Martin Hillenbrand, about this message. The consensus is that Lightner may have something, but thus far the evidence furnished does not support his contention.

Clearly we have more going on in Berlin than in the immediate post-Cuban period, but the separate incidents do not begin to resemble a coordinated harassment campaign.

However, it would not be prudent to ignore Lightner's warnings, and we should continue to follow the situation closely to see what we actually have on our hands.

(My personal feeling, perhaps a little cynical, is that Lightner is a bit miffed by our exchanges on the helicopter flight, and this is his way of attempting to bring us back to "reality".)

David Klein

SECRET

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RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES"

(45)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COURT
☐ CHARGE TO

12673

SECRET
Classification

414

Origin

ACTION: USBER BERLIN 617

Info

INFO: NMR SHAPE FOR STOESSEL
Amembassy BONN 2016
Amembassy PARIS 4080
Amembassy LONDON 4558
Amembassy MOSCOW 1827
USAREUR FOR POLAD
USCINCEUR FOR MCGUIRE
US ELEMENT LIVE OAK

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

REF: Berlin 917

SUBJECT: Soviet Actions Regarding Berlin

1. We have read with interest your analysis of recent incidents. After re-examining the evidence available, we have reached the tentative conclusion that there is insufficient evidence on which to conclude that they form a pattern. We believe, however, that we should remain alert, since the Soviets will be watching our reactions, whatever their intentions. As far as we can judge, you dealt with these recent Soviet moves in a firm, proper manner.

2. We believe that you should continue to meet Soviet moves with a prompt, appropriate response, within the framework of contingency planning and your authority.

3. We would prefer, however, to continue to deal with problem of advance notification on autobahn convoys on its own merits, not as a countermeasure. We are

Drafted by: TF:JCAusland:cbs 2/27/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: BTF - Martin J. Hillenbrand

Clearances: DOD/ISA - Dr. Mountain
JCS - Gen. Gray

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2BF123/1

BERLIN 617

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Classification

2BF123/2,

We are in this regard at present awaiting the results of the British decision to send 4 of 5 vehicle convoys.

END

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State ADVANCE COPY 1549

PRIORITY

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415

MAR 29 7 59 PM '63

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS 4631 ROUTINE

INFO: Amembassy BONN 2335 ROUTINE
USBER BERLIN 674 ROUTINE
Amembassy LONDON 5119 ROUTINE
Amembassy MOSCOW 2060 ROUTINE

POL 15-2 W Ger

POL 15-2 W Ger

2BF124/1

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO

REFERENCE: Bonn's 2328 rptd Paris 654

Department considers that, as case has been since 1958, it would be inappropriate for Bundestag to hold session in Berlin later in Spring or to decide now to hold such a session. While intensity of crisis begun in November 1958 is currently at relatively low level, basic Berlin issues nevertheless remain unresolved and could easily engender another period of acute tension. Of particular importance is fact that first talks with Soviets on Berlin in post-Cuba period have just begun.

Our aim is to protect essential ties between Berlin and FedRep as one of key aspects of maintaining viability of city. But holding Bundestag sessions there is not one of these essential ties. Failure to hold Berlin sessions in past four years has not resulted in any significant disturbance of Berliners' morale or decreased confidence in US. On other hand, Communists have repeatedly stated that holding Bundestag session in Berlin would be considered serious "provocation." Holding of session there, even decision to do so, would certainly cause storm of protests from Communists, and give

Communists

Drafted by: cbs:mgc 3/26/63 The Secretary

U Mr. Tyler S/S Mr. Little

Mr. Willesbrand The White House Mr. Bundy

Mr. Creel CONFIDENTIAL

SOV Mr. Anderson Classification

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Communists tailor-made excuse to impinge upon or threaten other Berlin-FedRep ties that are of vital importance, e.g., access.

[redacted]

British have informed Dept that they likewise do not welcome Bundestag meeting in Berlin. Tensions would undoubtedly be heightened and there would be no net benefit to West. FonOff believes that Bundestag has right (sic) to meet in Berlin, that UK's power to prevent Berlin session is therefore inhibited, but that UK could expect on grounds of alliance that Germans would take UK views into account. But FonOff also believes UK should not take initiative in offering Germans advice on this question.

If advice were requested, however, FonOff believes two points should be developed: 1) Decision to hold Berlin session, or implementation of such decision, might affect [redacted] US-Soviet talks; 2) Sovs might use such decision or its implementation as pretext for reprisal against access routes. British envision that vis-à-vis Germans Three [redacted] use formula of advice similar to that given Brandt when he was considering [redacted] visit to [redacted]

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visit to Khrushchev in East Berlin: We acknowledge decision rests with Bundestag [redacted] but are confident decision will be made bearing in mind responsibilities of Allies. FonOff considers risks from Berlin session would be less now in post-Cuba period than in 1959 when Khrushchev specifically threatened that Bundestag session in Berlin would mean conclusion of separate East German-Soviet peace treaty. (When "right" of Bundestag to meet in Berlin was questioned, British Emboff acknowledged FonOff might have used word loosely.)

Question now is how we should proceed. In this connection we note that both British Ambassador Bonn and German FonOff have already expressed view that Berlin session would be unwise. With these views already on record it seems to Dept unnecessary and inadvisable for US to play major role in heading off Berlin session at this time. Forthright official US statement opposing Berlin session would have effect of assuming for US entire onus of decision not to hold such session at this time.

In past French have traditionally taken most negative position on Berlin sessions of Bundestag and other Fed Rep actions in Berlin that might affect rights and responsibilities of France as occupying Power. We would be very interested to see if this position continues notwithstanding recent developments in Franco-German relations. Therefore, Paris believes it inadvisable Embassy should take earliest opportunity to question views on Berlin session of Bundestag [redacted] If French share our views, Emb should suggest subject should be taken with Germans in Bonn, and [redacted] with [redacted]

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Info
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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: ~~1120~~ 1122, MAY 1, 6 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT ~~1120~~ 1122, INFORMATION BONN 1007, USAREUR UNNUMBERED
USAREUR FOR POLAD

RE DEPTEL 734.

1. PRESIDENTIAL VISIT BERLIN OBJECTIVES.

WE ENVISAGE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO BERLIN AS OPPORTUNITY (A) TO DEMONSTRATE ANEW AND UNMISTAKABLY BREADTH AND DEPTH OF US-BERLIN SOLIDARITY; (B) TO UNDERLINE TRIPARTITE UNITY OF WESTERN RESPONSIBILITY HERE; (C) TO REASSURE THOUGHTFUL BERLIN LEADERS WHO STILL MAY BE APPREHENSIVE OVER LONG-RUN PROSPECTS FOR CITY; AND (D) TO GIVE PRESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE IMPRESSION OF BERLIN SETTING AND SPIRIT. WE BELIEVE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM SHOULD BE DESIGNED WITHIN LIMITS OF TIME AVAILABLE TO SERVE THESE OBJECTIVES IN ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE UNDERLINED AND POINTED UP IN WORDS AS APPROPRIATE.

BUNDY-SMITH
BELK
BURRIS
CHASE
DINGEMAN
DUNCAN
FELDMAN
FORRESTAL
HIRSCH
JOHNSON
KOMER
LEGERE
PARROTT
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER
WIESNER

2. POPULAR PARTICIPATION.

WHILE US-BERLIN SOLIDARITY ALREADY WELL KNOWN, ITS REAFFIRMATION IN IMPRESSIVE AND PERSONALIZED FORM ON JUNE 26 SEEMS LIKELY TO PRODUCE ADVANTAGEOUS POLITICAL IMPRESSION INTERNATIONALLY AND TO GIVE BERLINERS THEMSELVES HELPFUL (ALBEIT AT MOMENT NOT ESSENTIAL) PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFT. THEREFORE, WE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN MAXIMUM (PREFERABLY RECORD) PUBLIC ATTENDANCE. WHILE THERE LITTLE DOUBT BERLINERS WILL WISH TURN OUT IN RECORD NUMBERS TO SEE, HEAR AND CHEER PRESIDENT, IT NECESSARY PROGRAM BE ARRANGED TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO DO SO. THIS REGARD WE NOTE THAT PRELIMINARY PROGRAM SET FORTH IN REFTEL PROVIDES (A) FOR ONLY BRIEF CITY TOUR; (B) FOR ONLY ONE MASS PUBLIC APPEARANCE AT CITY HALL SQUARE WHERE CAPACITY CROWD FREQUENTLY REGISTERED IN RECENT YEARS; AND (C) FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE-THIRD ENTIRE BERLIN VISIT INSIDE CITY HALL. WE CONSIDER PREFERABLE (A) TO PLAN MORE EXTENSIVE CITY TOUR; (B) TO SELECT ADDITIONAL CROWD CAPACITY AREAS ALONG ROUTE SUITABLE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL MASS APPEARANCES; AND (C) TO INCREASE EXPOSURE OF IMPORTANT TARGET GROUPS TO THE PRESIDENT.

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3. SYMBOLIC AND QUALITATIVE ASPECTS.

CAREFUL ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN CERTAIN QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM, SUCH AS APPEARANCES AT IMPORTANT SYMBOLIC SITES AND PARTICIPATION IN SIGNIFICANT REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS. OUR PRELIMINARY VIEWS THIS REGARD ARE REFLECTED IN PROGRAM SUGGESTED BELOW. SEVERAL ASPECTS DESERVE SPECIAL MENTION AT THIS TIME BECAUSE THEY CLOSELY RELATED TO OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, AND THEY COULD IN MEANINGFUL WAY PUT PERSONAL MARK OF PRESIDENT ON OCCASION, THESE ARE (A) SPECIAL FOCUS ON YOUNG LEADERSHIP- WE ARE EXPLORING POSSIBILITY OF COMBINED UNIVERSITY PARTICIPATION AT FREE UNIVERSITY HONORARY DEGREE CEREMONY, WITH REMARKS BY PRESIDENT TO STUDENT AND OTHER YOUTH LEADERS AT SUITABLE SITE; THIS REGARD, WE WOULD PROPOSE LONGER STOP THAN ENVISAGED IN REFTEL AND ALSO SPEECH BY PRESIDENT STRESSING FAVORABLE LONG-RUN PROSPECTS FOR YOUTH AND CULTURE IN BERLIN; (B) EMPHASIS ON TRIPARTITE UNITY BY TRANSIT OF FRENCH AND UK SECTORS AND SUBSTANTIAL TRIPARTITE (PLUS WEST BERLIN POLICE) HONOR GUARDS AT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE CEREMONIES; AND (C) RECOGNITION OF VITAL ROLE OF BERLIN WORKERS THROUGH APPEARANCE AT MAJOR INDUSTRIAL PLANT.

4. PROPOSED TENTATIVE BERLIN PROGRAM (JUNE 26)

IN LINE WITH ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS MISSION PROPOSES FOLLOWING TENTATIVE PROGRAM. AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, MOTORCADE ROUTE UTILIZES WIDE THOROUGHFARES THROUGH POPULOUS AREAS.

1000 - ARRIVE TEGEL AIRPORT (FRENCH SECTOR). GREETINGS BY SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES ALLIES, CITY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND HONOR GUARDS OF US, UK, FRENCH AND WEST BERLIN POLICE.

1030 - DEPART TEGEL AIRPORT IN MOTORCADE. TRAVEL SOUTH ON KURT SCHUMACHERDAMM. PASS FRENCH HEADQUARTERS (NAPOLEON BARRACKS) AND LARGE LOW-RENT HOUSING DEVELOPMENT NEARING COMPLETION, PROCEED PAST SCHERING DRUG FACTORY.

1050 - ARRIVE AEG TURBINE PLANT WHERE PRESIDENT WOULD SPEAK BRIEFLY TO LARGE ASSEMBLAGE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS.

1110 - CONTINUE TO ERNST REUTER PLATZ; HARDENBERGSTRASSE PAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY; DOWNTOWN BUSINESS AREA--AMERICA HOUSE--ZOO STATION; KAISER WILHELM MEMORIAL CHURCH AND TAUENTZIENSTRASSE; THENCE TO VICTORY COLUMN (GROSSER STERN), FOR SWING AROUND HANSA QUARTER (CONTEMPORARY RESIDENTIAL SECTION DESIGNED BY LEADING INTERNATIONAL ARCHITECTS); BELLEVUE CASTLE, CONGRESS HALL, REICHSTAG BUILDING.

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CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 1120, MAY 1, 6 PM, FROM: BERLIN

1140 - ARRIVE BRANDENBURG GATE FOR STOP AND FIRST LOOK AT WALL AND EAST BERLIN FROM PLATFORM.

1150 - ROUTE APPROXIMATES EAST SECTOR BOUNDARY TO CHECKPOINT CHARLIE FOR 10-MINUTE STOP.

1210 - MOTORCADE CONTINUES PAST US MEMORIAL LIBRARY, AIRLIFT MEMORIAL TEMPELHOF) ALONG MAJOR THOROUGHFARES TO WEST BERLIN CITY HALL.

1230 - ARRIVE CITY HALL WHERE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNING MAYOR WOULD SPEAK BRIEFLY TO CAPACITY CROWD IN SQUARE.

1300 - GOLDEN BOOK CEREMONY IN PRESENCE OF LEADING CITY OFFICIALS, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES, DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND PRESS; REMARKS BY GOVERNING MAYOR AND RESPONSE BY PRESIDENT.

1330 - LARGE BANQUET HOSTED BY GOVERNING MAYOR IN GREAT HALL OR ALTERNATIVELY, SMALLER LUNCHEON DURING MEETING WITH GOVERNING MAYOR, HIS CABINET, AND CHANCELLOR.

1430 - LEAVE CITY HALL FOR DRIVE THROUGH DENSELY POPULATED AREAS TO FREE UNIVERSITY.

1500 - PRESIDENT RECEIVES "HONORARY CITIZENSHIP" (HIGHEST AWARD FREE UNIVERSITY CAN BESTOW) AND ADDRESSES REPRESENTATIVE AUDIENCE BERLIN UNIVERSITIES AND YOUTH GROUPS.

1540 - LEAVE UNIVERSITY AND DRIVE TO US HEADQUARTERS.

1545 - PRESIDENT WOULD GREET US HEADQUARTERS STAFF AND TROOPS ASSEMBLED ON SPORTSFIELD OR, IF TIME PROHIBITS, GREET STAFF AT HEADQUARTERS COMPOUND AND DRIVE PAST TROOP UNITS FORMED ALONG ONE SIDE CLAYALLEE.

1605 - MOTORCADE PROCEEDS ALONG HOHENZOLLERNDAMM AND CITY EXPRESSWAY.

1645 - ARRIVE TEGEL FOR FAREWELL CEREMONY.

1700 - DEPARTURE.

3. BERLIN COORDINATION.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

A. US COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT (CHAIRMAN AND CONTROL OFFICER CHARLES HULICK) HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND ALSO A WEST BERLIN CITY COMMITTEE. UK AND FRENCH HAVE DESIGNATED LIAISON OFFICERS.

B. PROGRAM OUTLINED ABOVE REPRESENTS COORDINATED US PRELIMINARY VIEW IN WHICH GENERAL POLK FULLY CONCURS. IT WILL BE REFINED AND IS BEING COORDINATED WITH WEST BERLIN, BRITISH AND FRENCH AUTHORITIES ON CONDITIONAL BASIS PENDING DEPARTMENT ADVICE AND ADVANCE PARTY VISIT.

C. MEANTIME, WE WOULD APPRECIATE VIEWS CONCERNING

(1) TYPE OF CAR FOR PRESIDENT: GIVEN IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENT BEING SEEN AND SINCE ONLY SUITABLE CAR HERE IS WEST BERLIN CITY OPEN MERCEDES 300 (WITH REAR STANDING ROOM FOR ONLY TWO PERSONS) MAY BE NECESSARY IMPORT SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL CAR, WHICH WE WOULD FAVOR IN PRINCIPLE.

(2) USE OF HELICOPTERS; NOT PRESENTLY PLANNED, BUT COULD BE UTILIZED BY LIMITED NUMBER OF PARTY FOR FINAL LEG TO TEGEL IF DESIRED.

(3) SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PRESIDENT'S PARTY; ALSO ACCOMPANYING WHITE HOUSE PRESS.

(4) ETA AND ANY SPECIAL PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS NEEDED FOR ADVANCE PARTY.

(5) PREPARATION OF DRAFTS OF PRESIDENT'S REMARKS IN BERLIN.

SCP-4 HULICK

CC

[redacted]

[redacted]

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B-1053

[redacted]

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THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

May 16, 1963

SECRET

Dear Harlan:

In reply to your letter of May enclosing a memorandum on a United Nations rule in Berlin, I may say we share Ambassador Thompson's belief that the Soviets would not even discuss a United Nations rule in all-Berlin. It would therefore seem, as I suggested in my letter to you of March 9 on this subject, unrealistic and counterproductive to put forward the "all-Berlin" idea as a real negotiating position. There might under certain circumstances be advantage in putting it forward purely as a propaganda "ploy", but the unrealistic character of such a proposal, particularly if one of the United Nations Commissioner's proposed duties were to facilitate freedom of movement between East and West Berlin, would be so transparent as in our view to have relatively little propaganda value.

As suggested in my letter of March 9, we do see distinct advantage in accepting a carefully limited United Nations role in West Berlin, if by doing so we can strengthen and confirm the main elements of the Western position regarding West Berlin, that is, right of access and presence of Western forces. If new arrangements, confirming our presence in Berlin, could be reached by which an International Access Authority would supervise the maintenance of our access rights, that would be an improvement over present arrangements. It is here that a United Nations role could be most useful.

Also a United Nations presence in West Berlin, clearly and definitely supplementary to the Western presence, could have real advantage if in the process of its establishment the Western presence were confirmed. The exact nature of the United Nations role or rules would be less important

The Honorable
Harlan Cleveland,
Assistant Secretary of State
for International Organization Affairs.

OFFICE OF UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS
MAY 17 1963

SECRET

GROUP 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading.

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than their efficacy in meeting two points: (a) that they not weaken our own presence, and (b) that they provide the political "sweetener" that might be needed to secure confirmation of our continued presence. Under these circumstances a Soviet squeeze on West Berlin would be a squeeze not only on the Western Powers but also on the United Nations, and would provide us with that much more support and leverage.

Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson

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Control: 14446

Rec'd: MAY 17, 1963 4:48 PM

FROM: BONN - CORRECTED PAGE 1

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3182, MAY 17, 7 PM

418

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

EMBTEL 3862 POL 7 US/Kennedy

DURING MY INITIAL CALL ON SCHROEDER THIS MORNING, HE MENTIONED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME THOUGHT INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION AT YESTERDAY'S CABINET MEETING OF PRESIDENT POSSIBLY BEING INVITED ADDRESS BUNDESTAG. SCHROEDER SAID HE PERSONALLY FAVORED IDEA, THOUGH ALTERNATIVE MENTIONED IN CABINET WAS FOR ATTENDANCE AT PAULSKIRCHE SPEECH BY REPRESENTATIVE GROUP FROM BUNDESTAG UNDER LEADERSHIP GERESTENMAIER.

I COMMENTED THAT OVERALL PROGRAM FOR VISIT ALREADY AT SUCH STAGE THAT IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT REVIVAL BUNDESTAG APPEARANCE PROPOSAL WOULD PROBABLY BE VIEWED IN WASHINGTON AS IMPRACTICAL. I POINTED OUT FULL SCHEDULE ALREADY ARRANGED.

SCHROEDER INDICATED THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION WOULD PROBABLY TAKE PLACE ON GERMAN SIDE, INCLUDING CHANCELLOR, AND, DEPENDING UPON RESULTS, PRESIDENT'S REACTION MIGHT BE SOUGHT. PROTOCOL CHIEF VON HOLLEBEN, IN EARLIER MEETING, INDICATED CHANCELLOR COOL TO IDEA, HOWEVER, SUBJECT MAY ARISE WHEN I SEE ADENAUER MONDAY, AT WHICH TIME HE HAS INDICATED HE WISHED DISCUSS VISIT. I WOULD, THEREFORE, APPRECIATE URGENT INSTRUCTIONS AS TO POSITION I SHOULD TAKE.

DURING MY EARLIER CALL ON VON HOLLEBEN, I MENTIONED KRONE'S STATEMENT TO PRESIDENT (DEPTEL 2822) REGARDING POSSIBLE PEACE CORPS CEREMONY. VON HOLLEBEN SAID IT HAD BEEN HIS IMPRESSION THAT THIS PROJECT HAD BEEN DROPPED, AND HAD NOT PURSUED IT FURTHER,

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ACTION OFFICER ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	DIRECTIONS TO ACTION OFFICER
NAME OF OFFICER: GEC	Rptel 2849 to Bonn	
OFFICE SYMBOL:	DATE OF ACTION: 17 May 63	

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-2- 3122, MAY 17, 7 PM, FROM: BONN

INTER ALIA SINCE CEREMONY WOULD PRESUMABLY REQUIRE ABOUT TWO HOURS. THUS SOME DOUBT THAT KROME WAS SPEAKING ON BASIS OF COORDINATED FED GOVT POSITION. IN VIEW OF HEAVY PROGRAM ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR PRESIDENT JUNE 24, IS IT DESIRED THAT I INDICATE A FINAL POSITION WITH CHANCELLOR MONDAY.

HAVING IN MIND MY LAST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, I WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE GUIDANCE, PRIOR TO MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR, AS TO WHAT I SHOULD SAY WITH RESPECT TO DEDUCTION TIME PRESENTLY PLANNED ON SCHEDULE (TOTALLING OVER FIVE HOURS) FOR TALKS BETWEEN HIM AND PRESIDENT. PRESIDENT EXPRESSED DESIRE TO REDUCE TO APPROXIMATELY THREE HOURS. IN CONVERSATION WITH VON HOLLEBEN I INDICATED THAT TIME SCHEDULED APPROVED IN EXCESS OF THAT REQUIRED, AND THAT PRESIDENT NEEDED TIME FOR CONSULTATION WITH STAFF. HE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT CHANCELLOR WOULD PROBABLY HOLD OUT FOR AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE.

IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE HALF HOUR BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND BRANDT IN BONN (EMBTEL 3063, BERLIN'S 1156 TO DEPT), SUGGEST, IF DECISION TAKEN IN WASHINGTON THAT MEETING DESIRABLE, THAT WE SIMPLY SCHEDULE IT AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE FOR LATE AFTERNOON JUNE 24 RATHER THAN DISCUSS IT WITH FED GOVT.

PLEASE CONFIRM THAT FINAL DECISION MADE NOT TO ACCEPT JUNE 25 DINNER WIESBADEN HOSTED MINISTER-PRESIDENT ZINN, SINCE WORD SHOULD BE PASSED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. COULD WE PROPOSE RECEPTION INSTEAD? ASSUME PRESIDENT WOULD, AS HE INDICATED, WISH DINE PRIVATELY.

McGHEE

[redacted] ?

SCP-4

MRJ

* AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

May 30, 1963

Meeting with Chancellor Adenauer - May 17, 1963

After an exchange of pleasantries Adenauer asked me what I thought of the appointment of McGhee as ambassador. I said that I did not know McGhee very well but I always thought of him as extremely energetic and industrious. Adenauer smiled and said that it was his intelligence which worried him. He then asked whether I thought McGhee had been sent to Bonn to ease him out in Washington or whether his appointment was due to a desire to establish especially close relations with the Federal Republic. I replied that I had no way of judging McGhee's standing within the Administration having no longer any advisory functions. However, it seemed to me that the closest relations with the Federal Republic were a major goal of the Administration. I did know that McGhee was a close personal friend of Dean Rusk. Adenauer grinned slyly and said that it was the President he was concerned about and he did not think that close relations with Dean Rusk guaranteed influence with the President.

Adenauer then reminisced again about the good old days of Foster Dulles and his own difficulty in establishing communications with the new Administration. Things had greatly improved in the past year. Still we did have a tendency to react more brutally to Germany than to other countries.

[redacted]

Also, he thought our reaction to th[redacted] Franco-German treaty incomprehensible and brutal. The treaty had [redacted] a long time before De Gaulle's press conference in January. De[redacted] the idea when they were together at Rheims the previous summer. It [redacted] dent that the actual [redacted]gning of the treaty coincided with the rejection of Britain's entry into the Common Market. The two events were not related. The

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Franco-German treaty was not directed against the United States. It was designed to end an age-old rivalry to consolidate European unity. He considered it the culmination of his career and he was very happy that it had been ratified the previous day.

I asked Adenauer whether he was very unhappy that Britain had been excluded from the Common Market. He smiled and said that Britain had only itself to blame for its exclusion. De Gaulle had told him that he had expected an offer of nuclear cooperation from Britain at Rambouillet. Instead MacMillan was noncommittal and did not even tell De Gaulle about the decision he had already taken to seek the Polaris from the United States. This was not a loyal policy. Moreover, Britain had haggled for 18 months over trivia and he still could not tell whether Britain wanted to enter the Common Market or not.

I asked why then was it necessary to veto Britain's entry? Would it not have been better to await developments? Adenauer replied that if the negotiations had been protracted much longer all progress on European integration would have stopped. He had offered a face-saving formula according to which the Common Market Commission should report about the state of negotiations. Britain had thwarted this by insisting that the report be made to the Seven instead of to the Six. (This distinction eluded me). Altogether Adenauer made it quite plain that he was not heartbroken about Britain's exclusion.

Adenauer then conducted a tour d'horizon of the international situation. He said that Krushchev's reaction to the Cuban crisis indicated that he would respect superior force--a lesson which applied elsewhere, too, and especially in Berlin. He asked what I thought of statements by high Administration officials making a distinction between U.S. and European interests. I said that I was not aware of any such statements and thought them extremely unlikely. Informed opinion

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in the United States was convinced of the indissolubility of our interests and those of Europe.

Adenauer then asked to what extent our policy over the next 18 months would be affected by the forthcoming elections. I replied that in my judgment the main lines of U.S. policy were not subject to partisan debate. The Administration would not be significantly hampered by the impending election. Adenauer said that in view of America's leadership position in the world a four-year term for the President was too short and placed a great burden on countries dependent on U.S. policy. I said that practically the President's term was eight years. Short of an inconceivable calamity, I thought President Kennedy would be reelected. Adenauer said he had been told Goldwater was a likely candidate and that he had powerful support. I replied that Goldwater's support though vocal represented a definite minority view. Adenauer asked how popular the President was. I replied that professors were ill-placed to judge the popular mood. It did seem to me, however, that he should assume the reelection of the President and in the unlikely event of an overturn, he could be sure of the continuity of the main lines of U.S. policy.

Adenauer then asked my views about the NATO multilateral force. I said that I had published an article criticizing some features of it. I did not want in a visit to a foreign leader to go beyond the points made in the article. Adenauer said that he had read the article. Frankly, technical discussions did not interest him. He doubted whether any of his people were capable of making a judgment about the proposal. He would not have requested such a force. However, once the United States had proposed it only one answer was possible for the Federal Republic. Germany would join the multilateral force in order not to lose contact with America. (Um den Anschluss an Amerika nicht zu verlieren.) Many of his advisors thought that a ship-based force would not provide the final

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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answer. They believed land-based missiles would have to be added. Also the question of control would have to be reexamined once the multilateral force existed. These issues could, however, wait till later.

Adenauer then asked me whether I had read an editorial in the London Times criticizing the multilateral force. What did I think of it? I replied that while I had not thought the multilateral force the best solution, once it became NATO policy I wanted it to succeed. I did not think NATO could afford too many failures of major projects. British participation seemed to me extremely important in order to avoid yet another European grouping. Adenauer indicated that he doubted British willingness to participate. He said Britain would repeat with the multilateral force its performance with the Common Market, i.e., it would haggle for so long that no one knew any longer what the issue was.

Turning to the state of NATO, Adenauer said things had improved in the past year. Stikker still complained about our high-handed practices. I said my impression was that Stikker had been brought much more into our planning. Adenauer replied that he had seen Stikker on his recent vacation in Italy and he still felt he was not being adequately consulted. Another difficulty was that in talking to American officials one never could tell whether they were pushing Administration policy or their private views. Nevertheless he felt much better about NATO than the previous year.

Adenauer made a fleeting reference to the Geneva trade negotiations. He said he thought the forum too large. Also the United States had to understand that it could not act as spokesman for all the underdeveloped countries. Taxing coffee, for example, was a major source of revenue for most European countries. They could not simply abolish this without hurting their financial structure. Moreover, such an act might lead to an overproduction of coffee and then everybody would be back when they started.

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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Adenauer asked his usual question about the readiness of the President to use nuclear weapons in retaliation to an attack on any Washington. I said this was the easiest case. I thought the Russians knew we would retaliate and it was best not to shake their conviction.

Adenauer then returned to the Franco-German treaty. He stressed once more how important for the future of Europe he thought it. The objections of many Europeans were self-serving. For example, Spaak who always attacked De Gaulle was essentially a prima donna who wanted to be wooed. Spaak's major interest was personal. He wanted to play in Europe a role denied to him in Belgium. There was more support for De Gaulle's European conceptions in Europe than the press and certain public figures might lead me to believe. In any event, he thought the Franco-German treaty was in no way inconsistent with Atlantic ties. Both were essential.

NOTE: Though Adenauer repeated many familiar criticisms his mood was much mellower than in previous years. His attitude was as if he were already a spectator. His distrust seemed less pronounced. Physically he seemed fit and mentally very agile.

Henry A. Kissinger

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NLR NSF 318 Wenkel Papers

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

420

June 21, 1963

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Materials for Your Discussion with Vice Chancellor Erhard

1. Materials for your discussion from Secretaries Ball, Dillon and Freeman plus a note from Heller on our economic relations with Germany are assembled in what follows.

2. At Tab A is McGhee's report of a conversation with Erhard which indicates what is on Erhard's mind (Bonn 3544).

3. At Tab B is Walter Heller's note. Although prepared independently of George Ball's, it shows a substantial identity of view.

4. At Tab C is George Ball's memorandum. George, like Walter Heller, stresses three main substantive points: trade negotiations, the special problems of agriculture, and the balance of payments. George also urges the importance of treating Erhard as a political leader and not merely an economics minister.

5. Tab D is the latest from Blumenthal (ECBUS 1496) which shows the current status of the trade negotiations.

At the moment, nothing much is happening. We expect the working committees in which the real business will be done to begin meeting soon. The next round on poultry will take place on June 25, in a discussion between ourselves and the EEC officials. Our present expectation is that they will do no more than listen and go back to their ministers for more instructions. The Trade Negotiating Committee of GATT and its subcommittees on tariff disparities, agriculture and non-tariff barriers begin to function on June 27. Another important GATT committee, the Cereals Committee, begins its discussions on June 25. There is some question whether that Committee can do anything before the Community settles its internal grain price policy. Here, of course, the issue is the German high price versus the French relatively low price.

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6. At Tabs E and F are Freeman's materials on European agriculture. Tab E is a brief rundown on Erhard's agricultural views. Tab F is an excellent analysis of European agricultural problems in general (pp 1 - 5) followed by some specifics on the poultry situation (pp 6 - 9).

The main point in all the agricultural material is the crucial importance of the German decision on the grain price. This is the most important single specific economic point you can make with Erhard. Unless he faces the political problem of agreeing to a relatively low Community grain price, the whole question of agricultural trade relations between the Community and the U.S. will become most difficult to solve, with all the consequences this would have for our broader relations. Erhard can't deal with this problem while Adenauer is still Chancellor. It is one of the early things he should do when he is.

7. At Tab G is Dillon's memorandum on the current balance of payments situation, with special reference to Germany. He points out that the German record of cooperation in monetary matters has been good, but Germany's surplus is again increasing, and therefore Germany must be urged to meet its commitments under the military offset arrangement. Further details on the military offset arrangement are contained in Tab H, which is taken from the State Department briefing book.

8. McGhee reports that Erhard may be interested in talking about the broader problems of international liquidity. Ball and Heller urge, of course, that you seize the opportunity to discuss these questions with him; Dillon says no need.

9. Tab I is Dillon's dismissal of the subject.

10. At Tab J is the extract from the Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements to which he refers and at Tab K is a copy of the Economist's comment on the same report. The Economist lines up with Ball and Heller on these issues, rather than with Dillon and the BIS.

11. At Tab L are excerpts from the concluding chapter, Policy Recommendations, from the forthcoming Brookings

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Report on the Balance of Payments. Ltr 6/6/63 from Balance of Payments.

This chapter makes a strong case for important modifications of the international liquidity arrangements. This is the familiar debate which you have beenhearing for a year and a half. You will remember that when the Europeans appeared to want to take an initiative in discussing this matter at the International Bank and Fund meeting last September, Roosa killed it by the article he published and circulated just at that time. We have always wondered how we could sound out the Europeans. Certainly your listening to what Erhard and Macmillan might wish to say on this subject is as easy a way to do this as I can imagine.

11. The final economic item is Germany's performance on foreign aid. Dave Bell feels very strongly that you should bring this up with Erhard. He quotes Erhard as saying, "No one high up in the U.S. Government has indicated to me any strong interest in the German foreign aid program." Ltr 6/21/63 from Germany

Dave thinks you should make three points to Erhard. They are:

a. Germany needs to plan for a substantial expansion in its foreign aid program. Its development lending authority for 1964 should be doubled, increasing from 1.0 to 2.0 billion D.M.

b. Germany should soften the terms of its aid considerably to take account of the limited debt-servicing capacity of many of the developing nations and to improve comparability with other donors.

c. Germany should increase its pledge at the July meeting of the India Consortium. It has so far pledged only $65 million, compared to the $139 million it offered India for 1962.

At Tab M is a briefing paper that develops these arguments in more detail.

C. K.

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Germany folder

Index

TAB	
	2 cables from Bonn: from Bonn 3267, dtd 6/1, 3283, dtd 6/1
1.	Topics for discussion with German leaders filed with Pres Trip - Germany
2.	Cable from Bonn- von Hassel's speech Telegram #3267 dtd 6/1, filed Germany
3.	WWR memo "How to Handle MLF on European Tour" & McG. B. memo to Pres on MLF and Adenauer filed Pres Trip Germany
4.	Maj Smith's memo on US Nuclear Deployments in Europe dtd 6/1 filed Memo Disk
5.	Chas Johnson's memo "Answers to your questions on Nuclear Expenditures" filed Johnson Memos dtd 6/21/63
6.	May 29-- Opinion polls from Berlin dtd 5/29/63. files Berlin
7.	Memcon Bishop Kunst to the FRG Friedrich Ruth, German Embassy re Pres trip dtd 6/14/63 - Log 3253, filed Pres Trip - Germany
8.	Abbott Washburn's ltr on Freedom Bell in Berlin dtd 6/18 filed Pres Trip - Germany
9.	Thoughts by Willy Brandt which might be incorporated in Berlin speeches dtd 6/20. files Pres Trip Germany
10.	Cable from Berlin on trip Berlin 1214 dtd 6/15/63 - files Pres Trip Germany
11.	Cables--Apprehension of Sov officers in West Berlin to Moscow - 2701 dtd 6/10/63
12.	Goethe Quotation for the Frankfurt speech dtd 5/20/63. files Pres Trip - Germany

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S/S Files ... from June 22,

Approved by 3 ... 6/63 CF 2275 CONFIDENTIAL
PET/MC/12

Approved by White House 7/8/63

421

2 OF 3 Cys

PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRIP
June 1963

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: June 24, 1963
Time:
Place: Palais Schaumburg

Participants:

United States	Germany
The President	Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
The Secretary of State	Vice Chancellor Ludwig Erhard
Ambassador George C. McGhee	Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
Assistant Secretary Tyler	Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel
Assistant Secretary Manning	Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein
Minister Martin Hillenbrand	State Secretary Globke
Mr. Pierre Salinger	State Secretary Carstens
Mr. Robert Creel EUR/GER	State Secretary von Hase
Mr. Lieuanoe (interpreter)	Counselor Weber (interpreter)

Subject: Trade and Fiscal Policy Matters

Action To: C OSD/ISA
S/S White House -2
S/P Treasury - Mr. Dillon
EUR Amembassy BONN
GER Amembassy PARIS
E Amembassy LONDON
INR
CIA

The President said a third subject he wished to bring up, in addition to the MLF and nuclear test ban, was the general area of economic relations, including such matters as monetary policy, offset arrangements and the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations. The President said that these economic subjects were possibly even more important to us now than nuclear matters. This was because our nuclear position was very strong indeed and entirely adequate to discourage any attack on the West.

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Fwd to State

F

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The President said we would not wish to repeat the experience of the 1920's, which had had wide repercussions in Europe. If international trade could be expanded, this would help bring prosperity both to the US and to Europe. It was very important that the coming trade negotiations be successful. While foreign trade was not inherently as important to us as to the Europeans, it was nevertheless important in that it played a key role in enabling us to earn enough to maintain our overseas commitments. The President hoped that the coming negotiations could be conducted at the highest level. They should involve heads of government and Foreign and Defense ministers, and not just be left to technicians such as agricultural experts and tariff commissioners. Unless we could maintain international liquidity and a balanced trade situation, there would be difficulties which could possibly lead to a collapse. For example, he added, had it not been for the constructive role played at the Geneva trade talks by the Federal German Government we would have had a breakdown there.

Continuing on this theme, the President said that in America, we lose $1 ½ billion a year in tourist trade alone. On the other side of the coin, we send more agricultural products to Germany that the Germans sell to us. What was needed was to look to the overall balance of international trade and to make every effort to maintain this balance. At the present time the US economy was in a strong position and the dollar in good shape. The redistribution of assets internationally over the past 10 years had been healthy. The President added: "We must conduct these negotiations at the top level--otherwise we'll be ruined by bookkeepers".

Foreign Minister Schroeder said that the German deficit in tourist trade was running around $700 million a year. The President commented maybe we had better include Directors of Tourism in our discussions. It was in any case important to get the whole balance of trade out on the table. The French, Italians and Spanish had favorable tourism balances. Our overall purpose was to maintain general liquidity and upward movement in the economy on an international scale in a balanced way.

Professor Erhard entered the discussion at this point. He said he wanted to tell the President that the problems of the US in the field of trade and balance of payments were well known to the Germans and they appreciated our concern. He wished to stress, however, that this was not just a US problem but one for the entire free world. Should the dollar encounter difficulties, this would affect us all just as the solar system would be disrupted were the sun no longer to stand still. In Germany, efforts had been made to take our balance of payments problem into account. For example, present German reserves totalled DM 29 billion, with a ratio of DM 15 billion in gold and only DM 14 billion in US dollars. This ratio was the most favorable to the US of all European countries. The Germans did not wish to change this because they laid great stake on their good relations with the US. They were constantly seeking ways of strengthening international liquidity and making better use of available resources.

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For example, the German Central Bank was already taking steps to acquire US Treasury Bonds in large amounts. The Germans were interested in strengthening not only the dollar but the international economic cohesion of the free world. The Germans would do all they could so long as the problem was bilateral in scope. Foreign trade was very important for the Germans---it represented 15% of GNP as contrasted with only 4% for the US ---because it was so large a percentage of the total effort and their own economy was more vulnerable. He felt there was a complete identity of interest with us in this area.

Professor Erhard then said that one of the big difficulties lay in the agricultural field. The German Government had problems with its own farmers, who spoke with a loud voice. He hoped the FRG could grapple with this problem before the end of the year. If they were not successful, it would make the Kennedy Round more difficult. He attached great importance to the success of the Kennedy Round. He thought his efforts with Governor Herter in Geneva had borne witness to this. Many other problems came to his mind in this area, although some of them concerned US internal policies, such as trade and financial policies, tax policies, etc. Maybe he would have a chance to discuss some of these with the President in Wiesbaden tomorrow. In such event he hoped the President would consider him to be speaking not as a German but as an expert in the field of international economics.

The President agreed this might be useful. He cited the valuable contributions the Germans had made in the past on such things as military offset arrangements, general financial and monetary policy, the Geneva GATT negotiations, preparations for the Kennedy Round, etc. He had sometimes wondered why this was called the Kennedy Round and why it should not be called the Adenauer Round or the de Gaulle Round. But whatever it was called, it must be a success. We needed the cooperation of all countries, but the Federal Republic was in a particularly important position. We had been glad to have the views of the Federal Republic and would take them into account. The problems were considerable but it would amount to a failure of will and nerves if we did not solve them successfully.

The Chancellor said he would like to add a word "as a layman but also as a politician". He agreed that these matters should be the responsibility of the leading Ministers. This could cause some difficulties, however; witness the fact that the French Foreign Minister always attended the EEC meetings, and this sometimes had the effect that other countries would listen more to him than to the German technical experts. The Chancellor was not sure the President was fully aware of the great difficulties the Germans were having with the French in the field of agricultural trading matters, particularly as concerned grain prices. The French were producing more wheat than they needed and at a lower price than the Germans because

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they had better soil and better weather. There were problems with the German trade unions, where their boss was not George Meany but Henry Brennan. The metal workers were a very big union with a dominating position, and recent agreements on wages and hours had affected German production. Coal was no longer the source of wealth it had once been, and mining operations were expensive. The Federal Government had to look to its future economic position with some anxiety and ask whether it was going to be in a position to carry out all of its obligations. The Germans wanted to do all they could in the economic and agricultural fields and would work together for the common good. After all, we were all threatened by the same adversary. But the Germans had problems. The days of large German export balances were gone. German exports were coming down closer to imports and the German trade balance was delicate. But the Germans had good will, which was an asset which counted for much. The President could count on German good will in the Kennedy Round. But it should be remembered that the Germans were not as rich as some people believed.

The President said the Chancellor sounded like someone coming to a bank for a loan. The Chancellor smilingly replied that if that were the case he might talk differently.

The President said that a further difficulty was that we spent $800 million a year on bases in France, where there were no offset arrangements. In France we had to earn our money somehow to maintain our bases. The French Finance Minister should know better than to accuse us of trying to dominate the French economy or trying to dump our goods there. Exports were only a small percentage of our total products. Our GNP had increased from $500 billion to $585 billion in recent months. We could lose $20 billion a year in trade without hurting. Trade was important to us only in that it enabled us to earn balances to carry out our world commitments and play a world role.

Erhard said he wished to mention other things which might be done to help the situation. The Germans had revalued their currency not long ago which had helped US exports to Germany. It was important to maintain a stable price level. The problem could not be solved by inflation of currencies all over Europe. He had suggested to Governor Herter the possibility of setting up world commodity agreements for cereals and cattle as we had on coffee and cotton. It was important to work together in GATT. We must open the doors wider to international trade; this would require less manipulation of currencies.

In summary, Erhard said, he had a single request -- for more open-mindedness on our part in developing instrumentalities for handling international trade and business -- instrumentalities to control, direct and supervise international economic development.

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The President said he completely agreed. It was necessary however to make a judgment as to which tools to use. He hoped to talk further with Richard about this tomorrow.

At this point the President excused himself in view of the imminence of his scheduled press conference.

[redacted]:RCCreel:8/24/83

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USNMR SHAPE FOR BURNS "
US ELEMENT LIVE OAK "

Rome deliver Tyler 9:00 a.m.
Paris also for USRO

A. Bonn's 3673 rptd Rome 383

B. Deptel to London TOSEC 35

1. Agree with reftel A; Calhoun should see Brandt immediately re diverting Waltersdorfer Chaussee traffic to Friedrichstrasse in connection with retaliation for security strip. Brandt should also be informed of protest re strip and possible concrete actions as in next paragraph.

2. Appreciate point that diverting of traffic should be included with others as broad response to the several recent East German moves in Berlin situation listed last ~~xx~~ paragraph reftel B. Agree that restricting Soviet entry into West Berlin to certain prescribed crossing points for designated types of vehicles or purposes of travel would be appropriate such companion measure. One argument for tying this measure to diverting of Waltersdorfer Chaussee traffic is that latter would be apparent to

Drafted by: BTF:GWPeterthy:cmg 7/1/63 Telephone extension and clearances approved by: The Acting Secretary

Clearances: BTF: Mr. Cash EUR - Mr. Davis SOV - Mr. Anderson Mr. Hilton
L/EUR - Mr. Meagher ISA - Col. Meacham (substance) JCS - Col. (subst)
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West Berliners and would provide public relations value that restricting points of Soviet access to West Berlin would not have. We could also consider other alternatives, such as imposing comparable one-hundred- and five-hundred-meter zones at sector-sector and sector-zonal boundaries, respectively, which Soviets would not be permitted to enter. Bonn's 3594, paragraphs 3 and 4, indicates British might be willing to consider this measure. We assume Soviet War Memorial does not lie within 100 meters of sector boundary, and that, if it does, it would be excluded from any 100-meter strip in West Berlin.

3. Our preliminary thinking, in absence of full statement of views from Berlin and Bonn, is that it would be unwise to conduct probes of East-German/Soviet willingness to enforce 100-meter security strip against entry by Allied military patrols.

a. It seems to Dept that intentions of other side re entry of Allied patrols are clear right now since directive implementing there is apparently no Bolz-Zorin-like arrangement. East German/decree is specifically applicable to foreign military personnel and makes their entry into zone not only illegal but also punishable. Moreover it will already have been made clear from Roberts' protest to Abrasimov and from Allied notes (to be) delivered in Moscow that Allies have indeed taken East German decree to mean what it says re/foreign military personnel. application

b. If patrols were stopped by East Germans, Allies as political matter would find it difficult to permit patrols to turn around and merely lodge protest later. Allies would have to proceed, as in Lightner case, to point of vindicating their rights by force.

c. We

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c. We have not been entering 100-meter strip, and have no need to do so. Our position on our right to enter is clear from Allied spokesman's statement June 22.

d. Agreement to conduct such probes could not be reached soon, if at all.

We have just learned from Berlin by telephone that Calhoun has appointment with Mayor Brandt mid-day July 2. END

SCP-3

BALL

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INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

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Control: 4288
Rcvd: JULY 5, 1963
2:36 PM

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 24, JULY 5, 7 PM

BERLIN-24

ACTION DEPARTMENT 24, INFORMATION BONN 22, PARIS 17, LONDON 17, MOSCOW 16, VIENNA 2.

PASSED INFO USAREUR FOR POLAD; USNMR SHAPE FOR BURNS; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; USEUMLO; USAFE VIA OTHER MEANS

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO

1. IN PAST FEW WEEKS NUMBER OF ISSUES HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH URGENTLY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY AT MANY LEVELS BY ALLIES. SOME ISSUES HAD INHERENT INTER-RELATIONSHIP, OTHERS BECAME RELATED IN PLANNING RESPONSES. WE BELIEVE IT USEFUL ATTEMPT SORT OUT SPECIFIC ISSUES, WHERE WE HAVE COME OUT ON THEM, AND WHERE WE SHOULD GO.

FILED 9:42 AM '63

2. ISSUES

A. WALTERSDORFER CHAUSSEE CROSSING POINT;
B. NON-ALLIED AIR SERVICE FOR WEST BERLIN;
C. EAST GERMAN SECURITY ZONE DECREE OF JUNE 21;
D. SOVIET-LIETZENBURGERSTRASSE PROJECT;
E. GDR WATER LAW.

3. WALTERSDORFER CHAUSSEE

BRANDT REMAINS OPPOSED TO CLOSING. JUDGING FROM HIS RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH AMB ROBERTS AND ME, WE NOW BELIEVE BRANDT UNLIKELY BE MOVED BY OUR PLACING ISSUE IN CONTEXT LARGER RETALIATORY PROGRAM. HE SEEMS UNIMPRESSED WITH NEED FOR SUCH RETALIATION GENERALLY. IN ADDITION, FRENCH HAVE REJECTED CLOSING OF CROSSING AS RESPONSE TO SECURITY ZONE, BRIT OPPOSE CLOSING

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FOR ANY REASON, US HAS HAD NO CLEAR POSITION AS YET. WE NOW CONSIDER IT POINTLESS TO CONSIDER MATTER FURTHER IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD OF COURSE STILL LIKE TO SEE SCHOENEFELD TRAFFIC DIVERTED TO ANOTHER CROSSING. THIS POSSIBILITY REMAINS OPEN TO ALLIES, HOWEVER, AND SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND AS COUNTERMEASURE OR LEVER FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE USE. MEANWHILE, ISSUE SEEMS LARGELY FORGOTTEN BY WEST BERLIN PUBLIC, THOUGH SOVS/EAST GERMANS CERTAINLY NOTED ALLIED PASSIVITY.

4. NON-ALLIED AIR SERVICE

THIS REMAINS ISSUE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE. APPEARS AUSTRIANS MAY HAVE ABANDONED IDEA OF APPLYING FOR FLIGHTS TO BERLIN (ACCORDING PRESS STORIES) BUT THEY REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING RENEWING INTERFLUG LANDING RIGHTS AT VIENNA (VIENNA'S 30 TO DEPT). IT SEEMS UNLIKELY ANOTHER WESTERN LINE WILL ATTEMPT EXCHANGE WITH INTERFLUG FOR TIME BEING. HOWEVER, SENAT'S, AND ESPECIALLY BRANDT'S, VIEWS REVEAL DIRECTION OF THINKING ON THEIR PART WE HAD NOT FULLY ANTICIPATED AND WHICH WILL BEAR STUDY AND CONSIDERATION (BERLIN'S 1281). IN BRIEF, THEY SEEM TO FAVOR ANYTHING THAT BROADENS BERLIN'S CONTACTS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH OUTSIDE WORLD, EVEN IF IT MAY ENTAIL RISKS TO ALLIED POSITION AND RIGHTS IN BERLIN. INCIDENT HAS ALSO REVEALED FAILURE ON PART AUSTRIANS TO UNDERSTAND NECESSITY OF ALLIED AIR ACCESS AND ITS REQUIREMENTS. HOW WIDESPREAD THIS LACK OF UNDERSTANDING MAY BE ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE WE DO NOT KNOW. WE ALL HAVE FURTHER WORK TO DO IN THIS AREA, AS WELL AS KEEPING WEATHER EYE ON GDR SCHOENEFELD PLANS.

5. EAST GERMAN SECURITY ZONE

ALL THAT HAS SO FAR BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN RESPONSE IS COMMANDANTS' STATEMENT (BERLIN'S 1312). IT APPEARS LIKELY PROTEST WILL BE DELIVERED IN MOSCOW, BUT STRIP HAS NOT APPARENTLY PROVIDED SUFFICIENT STIMULUS TO BRING ALLIED AGREEMENT ON MORE POSITIVE RESPONSE. AS WE KNOW, STIMULUS REQUIRED FOR THIS IS GREAT. DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE THREAT TO ALLIED POSITION IN WEST BERLIN ITSELF.

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ITSELF - AS IN WAR MEMORIAL GUARD INCIDENT OF LAST YEAR - SEEMS NECESSARY. OUR ALLIES ARE NOT ALWAYS IMPRESSED BY NEED TO ACT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERRENCE ALONE.) WE BELIEVE IT FRUITLESS PURSUE POSITIVE RESPONSE FURTHER.

6. LIETZENBURGERSTRASSE PROJECT

THIS REMAINS AN OUTSTANDING THREAT WHICH MUST BE DEALT WITH. BRIT "COUNTER-BUILDING" IDEA SEEMS BEST PROPOSAL YET ADVANCED FOR PERMANENT NEUTRALIZATION OR CONTROL THOUGH IT HAS OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES (BERLIN'S 1326). BONN EMBASSIES ARE PRESUMABLY CONSIDERING. INCLUSION OF BUILDING IN A BARRED ZONE HAS MANY DISADVANTAGES, AS REVEALED BY FURTHER STUDY HERE, AND WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD NOT BE PURSUED (BERLIN'S 9).

7. GDR WATER LAW

PROTEST HAS BEEN AGREED IN BONN AND AWAITS PARIS AND/OR LONDON AGREEMENT TO DELIVER IN MOSCOW (OR TO SOV EMB EAST BERLIN). EVEN AFTER PROTEST WE MUST BE ALERT TO ATTEMPTS APPLY LAW.

8. CONCLUSION

EXCEPT FOR FINISHING UP PROTESTS ON SECURITY ZONE AND WATER LAW, ONLY MATTERS WHICH NEED BE AND CAN FRUITFULLY BE PURSUED NOW ARE NON-ALLIED AIRLINES ISSUE AND LIETZENBURGERSTRASSE. REST IN OUR VIEW SHOULD BE DROPPED AND ENERGIES TURNED IN OTHER DIRECTIONS, INCLUDING EARLY CONSIDERATION OF RESPONSE TO NEW GDR LAW ON RESTRICTED ZONES (BERLIN'S 16).

GP-4.

CALHOUN

DMJ/22

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Control: 3468
Rec'd: AUGUST 5, 1963
1:01 PM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM: SALZBURG

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4, AUGUST 5, 5 PM

ACTION BONN 5, INFORMATION BERLIN 1, DEPARTMENT 9, VIENNA 17.

DEPT PASS SECRETARY MCNAMARA

REF: BONN'S CA-10 TO SALZBURG (DEPT 451, BERLIN 137, VIENNA 57)

AT REQUEST MAYOR BRANDT, SECY MCNAMARA AND ASST SECY NITZE MET WITH BRANDT IN CONSULAR RESIDENCE SALZBURG ON AUG 4. MEETING LASTED ABOUT 45 MINUTES. FOL IS RESUME OF DISCUSSION:

BEGIN RESUME:

BRANDT RAISED TWO MAIN POINTS.

1) WISHED EXPRESS DISAPPROVAL OF CHANCE OF "NEGATIVE RECOGNITION" OF "DDR." SPD WILL NOT OPENLY ARGUE WITH RED REP GOVT ON THIS POINT BUT FEELS STRONG NEGATIVE REACTION BY WEST GERMANS TO EAST GERMAN SIGNING OF TREATY WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF BOOSTING ULBRICHT REGIME.

2) HOPED THAT IN NEXT FEW MONTHS SOME NEW STEPS COULD BE TAKEN TO MITIGATE MOST INHUMAN RESULTS OF PRESENT PARTITION OF GERMANY. PURPOSE THESE STEPS TO SHOW PEOPLE OF WEST GERMANY THAT ALTHOUGH RE-UNIFICATION MANY YEARS OFF, WESTERN ALLIES STILL STRIVING TOWARD THIS FINAL GOAL. THIS CONNECTION HE MENTIONED MEETING ON MONDAY, AUG 5, WHICH HE WILL HAVE WITH REPS OF INTERNATL RED CROSS IN SWITZERLAND. EAST GERMANS SOME MONTHS AGO SUGGESTED MEETING OF LAWYERS FROM BOTH SIDES UNDER ROOF OF IRC BUT RECENTLY HAVE ALTERED THIS TO UNACCEPTABLE DEMAND FOR "COMMITTEE" MEETING. BRANDT FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT IF THREE COMMANDANTS OF WEST BERLIN ORDERED HIM TO CONTACT EAST BERLIN AUTHORITIES, ARRANGEMENT COULD BE CONSIDERED AS HAVING ARISEN FROM PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF BERLIN AND EAST BERLIN CONTACTS CONSIDERED AS CITY CONTACTS, NOT AS REPS OF "DDR." BRIEF MENTION OF LEOPOLD-BAREND TALKS WHICH HAVE MADE NO PROGRESS SINCE DECEMBER

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BRANDT WAS REASSURED THAT KHRUSHCHEV FULLY AWARE OUR POSITION ON "DJR" SIGNING OF TREATY. FURTHER POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAS SAME PROBLEM VIS-A-VIS TAIWAN, ALTHOUGH KHRUSHCHEV HOPES TAIWAN WILL SIGN.

ON MITIGATION EFFECTS DIVIDED GERMANY, SECY MCNAMARA SPOKE OF POSSIBILITY INCREASED SOV PRESSURE ON BERLIN IN COMING MONTHS. BRANDT SAID HE HAD HEARD FEW RUMORS ON ABOUT JULY 29 BUT DID NOT BELIEVE ON BASIS ULBRICHT SPEECH OF JULY 31 THAT THIS TO HAPPEN.

SECY MCNAMARA TOLD BRANDT MLF COULD SERVE USEFUL MILITARY PURPOSE AND WOULD BE MODERN SURVIVABLE FORCE BUT SEEN BY US MORE AS POLITICAL TOOL FOR FURTHER UNIFYING NATO THAN AS NECESSITY, SINCE SAC HAS SUFFICIENT STRIKING POWER DEFEND WEST.

BRANDT IN EFFECT INDICATED THAT SPD SUPPORTS FEDREP GOVT INVOLVEMENT. SAID BEFORE LEAVING FOR US IN JUNE HAD IMPRESSION FROM GERMAN SIDE THAT AMERICANS PUSHING MLF. ON ARRIVAL IN US HEARD AMERICANS SAY GERMANS PUSHING.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, BRANDT SAID HE THOUGHT NO REAL PRESSURE WOULD BUILD UP IN GERMANY IN NEAR FUTURE FOR CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IF FRENCH CONTINUED DEVELOP INDEPENDENT ATOMIC FORCE. CONTINUED BRITISH DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE ANOTHER MATTER AND WOULD CERTAINLY BOLSTER ARGUMENTS OF THOSE IN GERMANY WHO ARGUE FOR INDEPENDENT GERMAN FORCE.

BRANDT CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE FELT THAT NEW PUBLIC PRESSURE IN EUROPE MUST BE GENERATED FOR CLOSER EUROPEAN COOPERATION. HE IS HAVING SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH YOUNG EUROPEANS ON THIS SUBJECT AND EVIDENTLY HOPES TO ARRANGE MORE FORMAL ORGANIZATION WITH INCLUSION YOUNG GAULLISTS EVEN IF ONLY AS OBSERVERS. BRANDT SEEMED TO FEEL THAT EUROPEAN COOPERATION WHICH GOT ITS START AFTER THE WAR FROM STRONG GROUNDSWELL OF PUBLIC OPINION WAS BOGGING DOWN IN TECHNICAL COMMITTEES OF THE EEC.

END RESUME

ALTHOUGH NO PRESS RELEASE MADE HERE, AUSTRIAN PRESS AGENCY (APA) PICKED UP STORY, POSSIBLY FROM MAYOR BRANDT. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM SALZBURGER NACHRICHTEN, WE STATED ONLY THAT MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE AT CONSULAR RESIDENCE. PAPER CARRIED STORY AUG 5. BELIEVE NO FURTHER STATEMENT SHOULD BE MADE SALZBURG.

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NLK NSF 88

Berlin

425

August 9, 1963

ZBF134

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McGB-

SUBJECT: Gromyko's "Partial Measures"

I have started an exercise going to consider how we should deal with Gromyko's proposed "partial measures" in Berlin, which entail such things as new and/or higher tariffs, tolls and other payments and some value arrangements for air communications.

We have now had this proposal in four different contexts so there is little doubt that this is a calculated and serious Soviet move. Ulbricht first sketched the outline of this proposal in his speech before the Volkskammer; Khrushchev raised it with Harriman; Gromyko spelled it out in more specific form for the Secretary and Lord Home; and Behrendt gave it in modified form to Leopold.

This clearly is a mechanism for getting us to provide substantial amounts of hard currency for the Soviet Zone regime. More important, it would also up the price of the Western occupation in Berlin substantially. And if we accept it in principle, we have got to expect that the sky would become the quantitative limit as to how high we might go in keeping the GDR in hard money.

Presumably the Secretary will have more precise idea of what is involved, particularly insofar as the air-corridors are concerned and may have some thoughts of his own on how to proceed. Personally, at first glance it seems to me that little purpose would be served in discussing these proposals in the context in which Gromyko has suggested. If we talk about them at all, and the fact is we probably will have to, it should be done in a broader context of Berlin and Berlin access questions, and it might perhaps be very useful for us to look at the problem in the framework of a revamped access authority concept.

In any event, we will get the discussions under way early next week and I will touch base with you before they go very far.

David Klein

To Berlin 104 - file Sec talks
Bonn 526

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NLK ~~DSF85~~ ✓ file Berlin

426

2BF135/1

August 15, 1963

SECRET

✓McGB-

SUBJECT: Reorganisation of the Berlin Garrison

So that you have the whole picture, I have prepared a brief chronology of the Berlin garrison reorganisation exercise which was announced last weekend and is actually to get under way by September 1.

Plans for reorganising and re-adjusting the size of the Berlin garrison have been under consideration for some time, with the prime movers being the Joint Chiefs. As you remember, the Chiefs first raised this general subject last winter in an effort to eliminate the Augmentation Battle Group which was moved into Berlin in August 1961. The Chiefs were of the view that the Battle Group had long since completed its mission and considered its indefinite stay in Berlin logistically untidy, both because of the numbers tied up and the rotation responsibilities that went with it.

When the question was first raised arguments were mustered on the non-military side of the government against tampering with the size or organisation of the Berlin forces on the ground that the manpower and money involved was relatively negligible and the political risks formidable (Tab A).

However, the project never died. It was raised again in May in a different context. This time the premise was that the Army's ROAD reorganisation made changes in the Berlin garrison necessary and this required some changes in the number of men and kinds of hardware on hand. There were essentially two options. Either the Augmentation Battle Group could be replaced by two augmentation battalions, in which case the garrison would be increased by 140 men, or the Battle Group could be replaced by a single battalion and thereby reduce the garrison by 730 men (Tab B).

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Given the Chiefs' concern about the numbers of men and the Secretary of Defense's concern about balance of payments, the latter option was picked up and concurred in by the Department of State.

The exercise began to pick up some momentum in May, when we intervened to point out that the timing made no sense, since it would run smack into the President's European trip. The upshot of this was an agreement by the Secretaries of State and Defense to postpone the action until September 1, subject to re-examination at a later date after the President returned from Europe.

In July the exercise got under way again and on July 17 Paul Nitze got Alex Johnson's blessing to move ahead on the condition that the question might have to be reconsidered if the situation changed radically in the interim.

It was on the basis of this understanding that the Missions in Bonn and Berlin were instructed to arrange for the necessary consultation and coordination with the British, French and Germans (Tab C). And at our behest, the Embassy in Bonn was told that if the Germans objected to the script, the scenario would be suspended and reconsidered (Tab D).

After some debate it was agreed that consultation in Berlin and Bonn would take place on August 8; in the absence of German objections, the press would be backgrounded on the evening of August 9; and if everything continued according to plan, a formal press announcement would be made on August 10 (Tab E). (The text of the actual release is attached as Tab F).

Timing remained the most important consideration. While it was agreed that there never would be a good time to reduce the Berlin garrison, the period following the signing of the test ban treaty seemed the best of unattractive alternatives -- which included before, during and after the President's European trip; before, during and after the Harriman Mission; and before, during and after the Moscow treaty signing ceremonies.

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Carrying out his part of the script, General Polk handled the consultation exercise in Berlin on August 8 with the British and French Commandants and Acting Mayor Alberts, who reportedly said, "the reorganization appears to be a good development and if queried he would say he was informed in advance and satisfied with the plans (Tab G).

= Pol. Affairs Section Chief =

In Bonn, the consultation channel was Hillenbrand and Krapf of the Foreign Office, who expressed personal misgivings about the timing, but undertook to get a Foreign Office decision. On the morning of August 9, Krapf told Hillenbrand that "the Foreign Office concluded that we should go ahead with the /press/ release as planned." (Tab H).

With apparent agreement on all sides, the Berlin press was backgrounded on the proposed action on Friday, August 9, at 5 p. m., Berlin time, which was noon Washington time.

Then 6 hours later, on Friday evening, at 6 p. m., Washington time, Ambassador Knappstein descended upon the Department to ask that the entire exercise be stopped. Since the information was already in the hands of the press Knappstein was told that for all practical purposes the action would have to go forward as planned.

Clearly, as Krapf himself later seemed to confirm -- the Foreign Office had given the exercise its blessing without first checking with the Chancellor. And when the Chancellor realized what had happened -- after the news had already been given to the press -- he had the Knappstein rocket sent.

This was where the matter stood when the Chancellor met with the Secretary in Bonn on Saturday, August 10.

For purposes of this record, I think it should be pointed out that, except for the Chancellor, there has been no evidence of uneasiness either in West Germany or in Berlin as a result of the announcement. Although there has been some criticism, it has not been sharp or persistent or widespread. And peculiarly enough, the Berlin reaction -- with one or two exceptions -- has been calm and even receptive. (Tab I)

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Some Germans have suggested that perhaps the day of reckoning will come when the troops begin to move. But troop rotation is nothing new for Berlin, and except for the responsible American military authorities and Soviet watchdogs, I doubt that the people in Berlin take a careful head count of what goes out and what comes in.

It seems to me that the way to deal with the Chancellor at this point, now that we have crossed the bridge, is to explain to him in the next communication that although there has been some reduction in the size of the garrison, this has been more than compensated for by new and additional hardware, so that we not only will continue to have an augmented garrison in Berlin, but it will be better armed than before.

David Klein

Attachments

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SECRET August 16, 1963

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KLEIN

The President feels that the consultation of the German Government on the matter of the change of the Berlin garrison was neither sufficient nor timely, particularly in view of the misgivings expressed by Knapf at the meeting. That should have been a sign for us to go more slowly rather than hold rather brief and superficial conversations. The President realizes, he says, the speed is required to prevent news leaks, but the timing was much too quick and as a result has raised difficulties with the Chancellor which could have been avoided.

With the changes made, he has indicated a willingness to sign a letter to the Chancellor. He wanted you to have this information and to express these views on an informal basis to the appropriate people in State and Defense for further guidance.

C. V. CLIFTON

P.S.

As a personal footnote, the President considered very carefully the possibility of delaying this whole action from September 1 to sometime in October and not making any public

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announcement about it, just tell the Germans so that they will feel easier. However in view of your strong recommendation in the last paragraph of your memorandum, he decided to do this.

Further to this subject, if the CBS broadcast and the other leaks out of the German Government on this subject stir up the animals by Monday, we may be the whole matter and we may have to change this course of action. My feeling is that the letter to the Chancellor should not be signed before 6:00 P.M. Monday any way.

The President is going to hold a press conference on Tuesday at 4:00 P.M. and we may have to have a firm answer to a possible question and this should fit on what we tell the Chancellor.

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Approved in S 9/24/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Gibson POF 1 USF 77

14420

428

DATE: September 20, 1963

ZBF137/1

SUBJECT: German Attitude Toward Western Initiatives with the Soviets

PARTICIPANTS: GERMANY
Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister, Federal Republic of Germany
Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
Minister Georg von Lilienfeld, German Embassy
Dr. Albert Reinkemeyer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
Dr. Klaus Simon, Counselor, Personal Aide to the Foreign Minister
CONSULTANT Mr. Heinz Weber, Counselor-Interpreter

AMERICANS
The Secretary
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, S/AL
Ambassador George C. McGhee, American Embassy, Bonn
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GER
Mr. John C. Ausland, Deputy Director, EUR

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After welcoming Foreign Minister Schroeder and his colleagues, the Secretary said he was looking forward to thorough talks with Schroeder both here and in New York. He would be happy to hear Schroeder's comments on the subjects he had in mind.

Schroeder said he wanted to discuss first a basic question -- the German attitude toward the current situation in East-West relations. This posed a number of political and psychological problems from the German standpoint. The policy of trying to arrive at certain agreements with the Soviets on problems on the periphery while leaving the major problems at the center to be attacked later was one which could have a strong effect on public opinion throughout the world, especially if this were to result in the Soviet Union no longer attacking the West as a whole and the US in particular. But a problem would be created if Gromyko in the process concentrated his attack on the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of China; this sort of thing could tend to lead everyone to say that these were the only people making trouble.

Schroeder said he also wished to underscore the danger that by concentrating on problems at the periphery the major problems at the center might tend to get "covered up". There was a real risk that two things might be forgotten: (1) that there had been no change in basic Soviet objectives and basic Soviet demands; (2) that what the West was fighting for was not relaxation of tensions in isolation

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but within the context of the concepts of freedom and liberty for mankind. Although it might be the objective of Western policy to move ahead from problems at the periphery to major problems at the center, the effect on world opinion in the process could be just the contrary of what was desirable. He felt that such a policy could be pursued effectively only so long as (1) basic Communist objectives were kept clearly in mind, and (2) Western objectives on the problems at the center were constantly kept in sight. A relaxation of tensions must not permit us to lose sight of these objectives.

Schroeder said that the German perspective on this whole matter must necessarily be to consider that each and every arrangement with the Soviets which did not have the effect of improving the German situation would create problems for German public opinion. He asked under what conditions Germany could participate in such a policy. He thought there were two criteria to be applied: (1) whether or not a particular step led to a hardening or an amelioration of the status quo; (2) an objective assessment of whether the step worked to the overall detriment or advantage of the West. Application of the second criterion could lead to differences of views, as for example among military experts, but these could be dealt with in an objective way. The first criterion was more difficult. Here he thought two points should be kept in mind: (1) it must be visible at all times to the public that there is complete and thorough consultation on basic problems; (2) it must be clear to all that basic Western objectives are being kept constantly in mind. This concept of keeping Western objectives constantly in mind and out in the open was basic to German support of Western initiatives with the Soviets. In this context Schroeder stated that he was very happy over the President's speech to the UN this morning which had emphasized these objectives, in particular the unification of Germany. It should be consistent Western policy to have all our spokesmen constantly emphasize publicly the basic objectives of the free world. He was confident that Lord Home would do so, and he would be grateful if the Secretary could stress to his other friends the importance of such public statements. It would make it much easier for the Germans to support any initiatives with the Soviets as long as they were conducted within this framework of constant reiteration of basic Western aims and purposes.

Schroeder said he wished to say a few words on the subject of consultation. He felt there were three levels at which this should take place--the bilateral framework, the Four-Power Ambassadorial Group, and the North Atlantic Council. We should try to make the best possible use of these mechanisms. There was always both a formal and substantive aspect to the process of consultation. There was no particular problem about the formal aspect, since this was done by the exchanging of formal information. The substantive aspect was more difficult and he felt this was best done at the bilateral level or in a small group. Schroeder expressed the view that in the months to come, which would see a new German Government, we should study on both sides how we could strengthen contact between leading personalities. At the same time he did not wish to exclude the Ambassadorial Group or the NAC from being used as appropriate in order to avoid difficulties within the Alliance.

Schroeder said he wished to make a further comment on the central problem in East-West relations, the question of the status quo. He was convinced, and his view was widely shared, that the status quo could be consolidated just by doing nothing. A consolidation of the status quo worked to the advantage of that side which

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which was satisfied with the status quo, but this could in turn lead to erosion of the German position. He had tried to make this point clear to the French when he was in Paris.

Schroeder said he could sum up the basic German viewpoint by stating that they were in favor of getting some movement into developments and trying new ways provided the basic objectives and aims of the West were not lost sight of or overshadowed. Within this context the specific problem of Germany should be considered. One specific illustration was the non-aggression pact. In its essence a non-aggression pact should amount to a final solution or confirmation of a situation which was generally satisfactory to all concerned. If this concept were correct, then it was important that within the process leading up to a non-aggression pact a satisfactory solution of the German problem should be found.

Schroeder said he wished to conclude by mentioning the danger that some people in Germany and elsewhere could always criticize any new arrangements being made on the ground they did not take account of German interests. The most effective way to counter this was the repeated and constant affirmation of Western objectives, as has just been done in the President's speech to the UN.

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NLK NSF 77

September 23, 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR

(429)

THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Schroeder's Visit

Foreign Minister Schroeder will be your last formal appointment before your departure Tuesday. He has had very good meetings with a number of Americans over a four-day period, and I think has been pretty well satisfied by what he has heard. He has strengthened the favorable impression which most of us have of him. He is a strong-minded man and much more flexible than the Chancellor or Brentano.

In his talks with the Secretary and with me, he has emphasized three matters:

1. The need for more consultation. He points out that he read the text of the Multilateral text here in the Bonn newspapers, and while there were some good reasons for that, we can and should undertake to do better in the future. Schroeder speaks of the importance of consultation in three groups: the North Atlantic Council, [ ] Ambassadorial Group, and bilaterally. I think you can well emphasize the particular importance of bilateral conversations, and conversations in depth. In particular, you may wish to let Schroeder take back to Erhard a message confirming your hope to see the new Chancellor as soon as he feels he can get away after he takes over the reins (the date for this is now set at October 14).

2. The importance of the German point of view in negotiations with the Soviets. Schroeder has quite a good speech on this subject and he is certain to give it to you as he has to others. His position is that the object of policy must be to improve a status quo which is now unsatisfactory to Germany. Unlike the French, and unlike some of his countrymen, he believes that immobility is damaging to Germany and that, therefore, negotiations should be pursued. What he is

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seeking to lines o: ‹gotiation that may advance th ‹terest of the Germans, and he asks that we consult fully on all subjects so as not to miss any such opportunities. He is cautious about nonaggression arrangements unless they are tied to progress toward reunification, which he and we then agree the Soviets are not likely to accept. On observation posts, he has been noncommittal as far as I know, but I would emphasize the importance of gaining something for our side in this field too.

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Since Schroeder explicitly accepts the usefulness of trying to find advantageous agreements, we have no serious difference with him at the moment. He has withdrawn the ill-considered German version of the Western Peace Plan, and accepted our suggestion that Germany's views be stated in a speech.

3. The Chicken War. On this, Schroeder urges us to a more accommodating position in order not to jeopardize the chances in the Kennedy Round. We have all told him pretty firmly that it is the EEC actions which should be forthcoming for precisely the same reason, in the light of the major political problem which their restrictions on our chickens have created for us. This one is in fact in negotiation at Brussels right this minute, and if we have any clear picture of what has happened, I will try to get it to you before the meeting. George Ball will be with you during the visit, and you may wish to leave the details of this one to him.

* * * * * * *

Schroeder has talked about the MLF, which he continues to support strongly, and it will be important for him to hear of your own support directly from you. You may wish to tell him that the mixed-manned ship is your own idea of a way of keeping up progress, and he will be interested also, in the light of the French statement (attached) in your view of the possibility of accepting the Italian idea of a "European element" in the MLF agreement.

Schroeder also spoke with me about the political hazard of troop withdrawals and I was able to assure him that you are fully alert to this problem. In response to my question, he indicated support for your opinion that withdrawals from other countries would be much less significant to German opinion than withdrawals from the Federal Republic. On the other hand, he did not think there was a great deal to choose physiologically as between combat and supply troops unless the explanation was very carefully worked out and supported by military spokesmen in Europe.

McG. B.

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2BF139/1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

430

SUBJECT: East-West Talks

DATE: September 24, 1963

PARTICIPANTS: GERMANS

Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister, Federal Republic of Germany
Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
Dr. Albert Zeinkemeyer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
Mr. Heinz Weber, Counselor-Interpreter

AMERICANS

The President
Acting Secretary Ball
Ambassador George C. McGhee, American Embassy, Bonn
Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
Mr. Richard B. Finn, Deputy Director, GER

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The President opened the meeting at 10:35 a.m. by saying there were three subjects he would like to talk about: where we go from here with the Soviets, the Multilateral Force, and consultation between the Federal Republic and the US on matters such as US troop reductions in Europe.

Regarding the first point, the President stated that there is no significant prospect of substantial agreement with the Soviets on the three questions of major interest to the United States--Berlin, Germany and Cuba. The US initialled a civil air agreement with the Soviets some time ago, but this has been on the table for over a year. The US will of course proceed in the UN on matters which also have a bearing on its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. The President asked what is the German view on where we go from here.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said that under present conditions there are clear limitations to the possibility of agreements with the Soviets. He referred to the 1959 Peace Plan. This was recently revised by the German Foreign Office, and its presentation would, in the German view, show the public that new initiatives are being taken but that old objectives remain firm. This approach would provide a good psychological basis for talks with the Soviets.

The President

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The President asked how Mr. Schroeder saw the Soviet Union making changes in its policy on Germany and Berlin. Mr. Schroeder replied that no basic changes are evident in the Soviet position on Germany and Berlin. The Soviets wish, however, to have a better relation with the United States and to relax tension. At the same time the Soviets want to bridge over the difficulties posed by Germany and Berlin; they do not wish to go to the core of these problems. Mr. Schroeder said that an example of this is the Soviet approach to a possible non-aggression agreement; such an agreement would be positive and useful if a satisfactory basis can be established. The Soviets have, however, made it clear that they will not make satisfactory agreements which could be the basis of an exchange of non-aggression declarations. The Soviets want to go ahead with their own plans for Germany and Berlin.

The President said he agreed and asked how progress could be made toward German reunification under these circumstances.

Mr. Schroeder replied that he felt an atmosphere of detente would be positive for Berlin since the Soviets would not take military steps involving Berlin in such an atmosphere. This would not, however, solve the basic problem. (At this moment the President received a note giving the Senate vote on ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. He showed the note to Mr. Schroeder, who offered his congratulations). Mr. Schroeder observed that the Chinese are exerting pressures on the Soviets against any relaxation of tensions. He said that the Federal Republic is interested in improving relations with Eastern European countries. A West German trade mission has been established in Warsaw, and negotiations for an exchange of trade missions are now going on with Hungary. The Germans hope to have similar negotiations with other countries in Eastern Europe.

The President agreed that no basic accord with the Soviets appears likely. He said that nevertheless the situation as regards Berlin is better. The Soviets would have to change their present policy before the situation regarding Berlin became less secure. The President said, however, he could not see any agreement in prospect which would improve the chances for reunification. He agreed with Mr. Schroeder that the West should continue to make its objectives clear. The President said that the Federal Republic's policy toward Eastern Europe is in the common interest of Germany and the United States. This policy serves to weaken the Soviet hold and may have an effect on East Germany. This approach is better than an increase of tensions would be.

Foreign Minister Schroeder expressed agreement, commenting that there would be no progress in an atmosphere of tension. It is preferable to bring about a relaxation in tensions and to seek a change in Soviet intentions. At the present time the Soviets must concentrate on China and thus they are unable to keep up the pressure on Eastern Europe.

Mr. Schroeder

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Mr. Schroeder emphasized that a policy of relaxation poses internal difficulties in Germany. If East-West agreements are reached but do not touch on the German problem, it will look as if all problems except Germany are being settled. Gromyko, instead of attacking all Western nations, may attack only the Federal Republic. This would make it seem as if Germany was the only bad nation in the West. Over time such a Soviet approach would have an effect in Germany. To meet this approach, there is need for intensive restatement of Western policy. The Federal Republic therefore appreciated the President's remarks in the UN regarding German reunification. Mr. Schroeder added that he has already predicted that the Parliament of the Federal Republic will approve the Test Ban Treaty by at least as large a majority as the United States Senate and he remains of this view.

Mr. Schroeder said that there are two schools of thought in Germany. One school believes that the cold war makes the situation clear; although there is no prospect of solutions, Western unity remains strong and objectives are held clearly in view.

The President said that this view might be comforting in retrospect but it lost sight of the very real dangers the West had undergone. In 1961 at Vienna Khrushchev had said he would make a peace treaty with East Germany before the end of the year. This had required a very substantial military build-up, which had cost the US $5 billion. Soviet interference with the Allied air corridors to Berlin in 1962 and the Cuban affair had also posed great danger. The President emphasized that the important thing now is that the prospect of Soviet military action has been reduced. This is important for Berlin. We are now farther from the threat of war than we had been.

Mr. Schroeder said that he shares this point of view. He went on to say that the second school of thought in Germany believes that new methods should be tried since former methods had failed. He said that the status quo is valuable only to the side that wants the status quo and profits from it. At the same time it must be clear that if the West tries new methods, it is not certain that there will be early, tangible results. People in Germany might then say that despite considerable negotiations with the Soviets, there had been no progress toward German reunification. This is why it is important to keep stressing Western goals.

Mr. Schroeder then recounted the history of US consultation with the Federal Republic at the time of the Test Ban agreement. Initially the Federal Republic had sought to insure that the Test Ban agreement was disassociated from the idea of a non-aggression pact but was not concerned over the substance of the Test Ban agreement because Germany was not directly involved. It also

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supported the effort of the United States and the Soviet Union to relax tensions. On July 23, 1963, the US Charge at Bonn visited Mr. Schroeder and stated that the US expected the Federal Republic to sign the agreement. Mr. Schroeder asked the Charge about Pankov. The Charge replied that Pankov would also sign. On July 26 Mr. Schroeder read the agreed text of the Test Ban agreement in the Bonn newspapers. He learned then that it was planned to have three depository nations. There were people in Germany who thought that its Government had been caught napping and that its friends had failed to keep it informed.

The President said that he was under the impression Secretary Rusk had communicated with the Federal Republic several times on this subject. Mr. Schroeder agreed that several communications had been received during that period.

The President said that consultation had not been adequate at that time. He commented that he wished Red China would sign the agreement. The President added that he did not believe the status of East Germany had been increased by the Test Ban Treaty although its status may have increased afterwards by the alarm raised over its signature. The President observed that this is now a matter of the past. The important thing is that the Federal Republic receives our views on such matters as soon as we have formulated them and vice versa. The President noted that some people in the US are not sympathetic to the Test Ban agreement.

Mr. Schroeder emphasized that there will always be people in Germany, even in his own party, who will say that solutions are being reached between the US and the Soviet Union behind the backs of the Federal Republic. It is essential, therefore, for the West to restate its objectives and goals.

The President said that he was glad to hear the German viewpoint. He said that the US has objectives which are also vital such as Cuba; the US is no closer to a Cuban settlement than a year ago. Nevertheless steps should be taken to make war less possible. The German problem has not been solved during the last 18 years, nor has the Cuban problem been solved.

Mr. Schroeder commented that it is often easier to take a negative position as regards negotiations with the Soviets. This is why the Federal Republic requires US support.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

431

DATE: October 8, 1963
PLACE: White House

SUBJECT: Germany After Adenauer

PARTICIPANTS: GERMANS

Dr. Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, President of German Bundesrat and Minister-President of Baden-Wuerttemberg
Minister Georg von Lilienfeld, German Embassy
Herr Rundel, Dr. Kiesinger's Chef de Cabinet

[redacted]

AMERICANS

The President
Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, GER

White House S/P G
S/S INR/OD AmEmbassy BONN
~~S/AL~~ EUR c.s. PARIS

Following opening amenities, in which the President inquired about Dr. Kiesinger's wife and daughter (whom he had received at the White House last summer) and made reference to a series of lectures being given in this country by Kiesinger on the subject of Germany after Adenauer, the President asked for Dr. Kiesinger's appreciation of the situation in Germany after Adenauer's retirement.

Kiesinger said he had recently had a long talk with Foreign Minister Schroeder just after the latter's return from his US visit. He had also listened to Schroeder's speech to the Bundestag reporting on his visit, which Kiesinger said was the best speech by a German Foreign Minister he had ever heard. Schroeder held very firm views on the present situation, and the great majority of the CDU membership in the Bundestag stood behind him. Schroeder was also supported by the other parties in Germany. Even Max Brauer, the old SPD Burgermeister from Hamburg, had enthusiastically applauded Schroeder's speech. In the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, no one opposed Schroeder. It was not clear just what the Chancellor wanted from the future, or whether he was angry because he had to leave office. Kiesinger was convinced that if the Chancellor should really try to oppose the foreign policy of Schroeder and Erhard (Kiesinger interpolated that Erhard would have to be careful at the outset "since he had much to learn"), Adenauer "would be called to order". This could do much damage to Kiesinger's own party and hurt Kiesinger personally, since he must face elections next Spring in Baden-Wuerttemberg. He was, therefore, very hopeful that no such split would take place and that peace could be maintained within the CDU. But it was hard for a man like Adenauer to become inactive; he was still astonishingly fresh on the threshhold of his 88th birthday.

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The President commented that most people did not realize what a real phenomenon Chancellor Adenauer was, but this would be appreciated in retrospect. It was remarkable to think of a man of his age retiring and yet not wanting to leave the field of activity.

Kiesinger said that if Adenauer would really go into retirement and tend his roses at Rhondorf, he would gain greatly in respect. But, he added, "He just can't do it. We must wait and see".

The President said he had the feeling there were some differences between the viewpoint of the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister as they looked to the future. While they both fully agreed on the common objective of German reunification, there were some differences in emphasis as concerned dealing with the Soviets. The President said he was not too optimistic over the outlook in this regard. The Test Ban Treaty might lead to some de facto easing of the situation in Berlin, but he doubted that the Soviets would sign any agreement which would make our position in Berlin better. There was no prospect of the threat of any military clash in Berlin as in 1961, to be sure, but he saw no agreements or real detente in the offing. He was aware of some concern in Germany that the Test Ban Treaty marked the beginning of a series of agreements leading to a detente with the Soviets but, the President said, "I don't see it". Nevertheless, we should keep talking to the Soviets.

Kiesinger commented that any agreement with the Soviets would raise the question of de facto recognition of the East German regime.

The President said that in retrospect it appeared that the German alarm over this aspect of the Test Ban Treaty had not been justified. There had in fact been no increase in the recognition of Pankow. We were sensitive to German feelings on this aspect of the matter, the President said, and he wished to emphasize that he did not see in sight any real agreement of substance with the Soviets which would reintroduce the danger of increased stature for the GDR.

The President then asked how Dr. Kiesinger saw German reunification coming about. Kiesinger replied that he "had no idea". Prior to German entry into NATO some Germans used to think the Soviets would prefer a reunified Germany to a Federal Republic in NATO. Others thought that detente with the Soviets might be the best way. In any case nobody in Germany believed in force. Some day, as the President had said in Berlin, the Soviets might see that it was to their real own interest to allow the Germans to come back together.

The President commented that it was possible that some day we might find a gradual thinning out of Soviet troops in East Germany, which could lead to a "change in tempo" of the East German regime. At the same time, he could understand the Chancellor's point of view that it was necessary to maintain tension in order to keep the Federal Republic firmly tied to the West and that a relaxation of tensions might make some Germans prone to seek out the Soviet price for reunification and neutralization.

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Kiesinger said that maybe five years ago some Germans had thought this way but now they could all agree -- SPD, FDP and CDU. There was no real difference of opinion in Germany on this issue today. What the Chancellor really feared was that over the long run a detente could lead to the German problem being neglected and passed over.

The President said he thought there was not much danger of this. The Federal Republic was vital to the survival of NATO. France considered it essential to have good relations with the FRG. No one would be indifferent to Germany's problems. There were further factors such as the MLF. The President had recently stressed to Couve de Murville that we welcomed and wanted improvement in German-French relations. We were of course worried about some aspects of French policy, but most of our differences seemed based on the peculiar psychology of de Gaulle. We had to learn to live with these differences and try to bring France back into the Western Community. We were in favor of French-German friendship, but not outside of NATO and an integrated Europe.

Kiesinger said he thought it would be possible to find a middle way with de Gaulle but it would take a long time. De Gaulle was a stubborn man. The only person who could convince de Gaulle was de Gaulle himself, but the main thing was that de Gaulle could also be convinced by facts. De Gaulle's complex about Western European countries being satellites was a recent development. This feeling had not existed when France needed foreign aid. Whereas the FRG had had its problems right from the beginning, France encountered its real problems only later, as for example, Algeria.

The President commented that it was not quite clear which country was which in this satellite relationship. We had not been able to withdraw 600 troops from Berlin without provoking a big incident. At the present time the US was dependent on German cooperation and assistance in the monetary field. It was true we were contributing six divisions in Germany, although this was maybe more than could be expected at a time when the military threat had been reduced. In any case our relationship at the present time was much more on the basis of a true partnership as compared with ten years ago.

Kiesinger said it was a common task of the Europeans and Americans to overcome ill feeling, and for this realism was needed. For example, Great Britain must realize that its greatness of the past was finished.

The President commented that at the time when Britain was developing an atomic arsenal its real power in the world was declining. The French should realize that the real source of French strength was not the atomic bomb but their increasingly strong monetary position. The only value of the atomic bomb was as a deterrent, and that factor was already there. What the French should do if they wished to play a world role was to build up their conventional forces for dealing with brush-fire situations.

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Kissinger closed the 30-minute talk by stating that his own outlook was not pessimistic. The President agreed we were better off than two years ago, as is witnessed by the situation in Berlin.

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 4 pages
No. 1 of 4 copies, Series A

Memorandum of Conversation

432

DATE: October 10, 1963

ZBF141/1

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: Vladimir Semenov, Deputy Foreign Minister, USSR
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary

COPIES TO:

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EUR - 4		Amembassy PARIS - 12	(16)
SOV - 5		USUN BERLIN - 13	
GER - 6			14, 15, 16

During the Secretary's lunch for Gromyko on October 10, I had a talk with Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov, who is the senior Soviet expert on Germany.

I told him I could not understand what advantage there could be to the Soviet Union to refuse to move toward a mutually acceptable modus vivendi on Berlin, unless it were the case that the Soviet Government wants to use Berlin as an instrument of pressure on the United States, as Chairman Khrushchev is reported to have told Foreign Minister Spaak last May.

Semenov said that we could easily achieve an agreement on Berlin on the basis of three conditions: (1) an increase in rates and charges on communications between West Berlin and the FRG, including cable charges, railroad freight and passenger rates, and upkeep of the Autobahn. Semenov said that if the rates could be brought into conformity with those which we pay to the FRG for comparable services, this would be very helpful to the prospects of a settlement. He himself volunteered the statement that this could be done without being in any way politically beneficial to the GDR. He said the Soviet Union did not intend to use this issue in order to try to raise the political status of the GDR. He said that there already existed arrangements whereby payments for these services were made by the Western authorities into

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a bank in West Berlin for account of the GDR, so such a move by us could be made unilaterally and without any publicity.

(2) The nature of the present commercial air traffic through the corridors to and from Berlin should remain unchanged. He said the status quo should be respected in this field. He said this should apply also to international airlines, e.g., the Austrian airline service which had been started between Vienna and Tempelhof. He said that the present services by British, French and US planes should not be added to by those of other countries. He also referred to a Hamburg air taxi advertisement for flights from Hamburg to and from Berlin through the northern corridor. Semenov said that this kind of thing was very bad.

(3)He complained about what he called "provocations by the West" in East Berlin. He did not refer to propaganda or subversive activities but to alleged actions by cars coming into East Berlin from the West, and causing disturbances by the behavior of the occupants. He mentioned specifically a car with several US soldiers in it which, he said, had driven through the streets of East Berlin shouting at the bystanders and trying to make speeches just ten minutes before Khrushchev was due to pass by. He said that if there were evidence of greater desire on the part of Western authorities to prevent this kind of thing happening, this would also facilitate matters with regard to the possibility of reaching agreement on Berlin.

Comment: This conversation should be read in conjunction with the conversation which Semenov had with Mr. Scott of the UK Foreign Office, in New York (see Memorandum of Conversation dated October 3, 1963). Semenov spoke earnestly and soberly, and avoided both propaganda and ideological arguments. It was possible to infer from the way he presented his views that the Soviet Government would find it easier to move on Berlin if some satisfaction could be given to the GDR by the West, which would however not be expected to go so far as to constitute recognition or significant political advantage.

Attached

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CONVERSATION WITH MR. SEMENOV

I met Mr. Semenov, the senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official dealing with Germany, in the U.N. Delegates' Lounge and we talked for about three-quarters of an hour. The main point he made was that it was necessary to make some progress on the German question which could not be left on ice for much longer. I said that the German problem was the most difficult one with which we had to deal, since the long term interests of the Soviet Union and the West in Germany were much further apart than in other fields. The Western objective was ultimately to end the division of Germany, which was a constant source of tension; the Soviet Union did not seem to want this. Mr. Semenov said that a united Germany had caused nothing but trouble for the rest of the world in the past and, while he admitted that a divided Germany caused tension, he thought that a united Germany, whatever the circumstances of reunification, would be worse. Nonetheless, the situation in Germany must be normalised.

2. I said that the Western right of access was a question of vital interest to us, and that the apparent Soviet unwillingness to give us any assurances on this question was the main point of difficulty about the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact, to which the Russians had seemed to attach much importance during the talks in Moscow. Mr. Semenov said that a non-aggression pact was only a piece of paper, and would not advance matters in any way. If we were worried about access, then the Russians would be prepared to discuss this with us and reach an agreed solution. In connection with the non-aggression pact proposal, Mr. Semenov said that the Soviet Government was putting proposals on various subjects to the West with the object of "taking the temperature," i.e. in order to find out whether the West wished to reach agreements. If the temperature was bad, then they would have to wait until it improved. I said I hoped that, in cases where the West was unable to accept Soviet proposals, the Russians would listen carefully to the reasons we gave and realise that they were genuine reasons and did not mean that we were unwilling to reach agreement. He said he appreciated this, and repeated that the difficulties about Western access to Berlin could be solved.

3. Mr.

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3. Mr. Semenov remarked at one point that "the West had its Chinese too," but that whereas the Soviet/Chinese dispute was now out in the open (He added that it had been going on in private for several years), American and British arguments with their allies were conducted in secret. I said that this could hardly be said of the disagreements between us and General de Gaulle. Mr. Semenov said he was thinking of the Germans. I said that there were signs of a certain evolution in German thinking about East/West relations, and I did not think this was the moment to focus too much public criticism on Germany. The German Government must be given time to work out the consequences of the new situation in East/West relations.

4. Mr. Semenov said he could not understand why the West was proposing to allow the Germans to participate in the control of nuclear weapons. If we once allowed them to be involved in nuclear weapons, they were bound sooner or later to acquire control over them. I said that the Americans and we were determined to retain exclusive control over our own nuclear weapons and not abandon our veto over their use. The object of the multilateral force was to give the Germans a sense of participation in the nuclear defence of the West, thereby educating them in the realities of the nuclear age, without giving them control over the use of nuclear weapons. We thought this was the safest way of bringing them to realise the full implications of nuclear war, and that this would be in the general interests of peace. The Germans were much more likely to co-operate in improving the international situation if they were treated as a responsible and mature nation than if we tried to keep them in leading strings; but this did not mean that they should at any time acquire a nuclear capability of their own. This would be against all our interests.

5. On the possibility of China acquiring nuclear weapons, Mr. Semenov remarked at one stage that if the Chinese manufactured two or three bombs this would cause no trouble to anyone; that situation could be dealt with. In order to be a nuclear power in the full sense of the word, any country required an enormous industrial base and there was no danger of China acquiring this for some time.

(K.B.A. Scott)
October 3, 1963

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6:21 AM

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Bonn 1297

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1297, OCTOBER 11, 11 AM

IMMEDIATE

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WE HAVE HAD NO WORD FROM THE DEPT DURING PERIOD STARTING 1200 YESTERDAY IN WHICH THREE US CONVOYS HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES AT THE BERLIN AUTOBAHN CHECKPOINTS. WE ASSUME THAT THIS MEANS THAT THE DEPT CONCURS IN THE VARIOUS ACTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY GENERAL MCCONNELL, ACTING CINCEUR IN GENERAL LEMNITZER'S ABSENCE, IN WHICH WE HAVE CONCURRED AND OF WHICH WE HAVE KEPT DEPT ADVISED.

IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BE HELPFUL TO US IN EXERCISING OUR RESPONSIBILITIES HERE IF DEPT WOULD KEEP US ADVISED AS TO OTHER EVENTS WHICH MIGHT BE RELATED TO THOSE ACTIONS. WE WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, NOT AWARE IN ADVANCE OF MEETING LAST EVENING BETWEEN GROMYKO AND PRESIDENT AND ONLY LEARNED THROUGH CINCEUR, WHO WAS ADVISED BY MCNAMARA, THAT AS RESULT THIS MEETING GROMYKO APPARENTLY SENT SOME TYPE OF MESSAGE CALCULATED TO INFLUENCE SOVIET ACTIONS AT CHECKPOINT. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ADVISED WHAT TOOK PLACE AT THE MEETING INSOFAR AS IT MIGHT AFFECT SOVIET ACTIONS HERE.

POL 38-8

AS THINGS NOW STAND, WE HAVE AGREED WITH MCCONNELL THE TEXT OF ANOTHER ULTIMATUM ALLOWING ONE HOUR, AFTER DELIVERY, WHICH WILL EXPIRE AT APPROXIMATELY 1145. IF SOVIETS DO NOT, AS THEY DID LAST EVENING, BACK DOWN, A MORE SERIOUS PHASE OF THIS OPERATION WILL ENSUE, POSSIBLY INVOLVING QUADRIPARTITE ACTIONS PURSUANT TO RELEVANT CONTINGENCY PLANS.

FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, IT WOULD SEEM ANOMALOUS TO BE AT THE SAME TIME DISCUSSING SALE OF WHEAT TO SOVIETS. THEY HAVE DELIBERATELY CHOSEN TO IGNORE ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES IN CHECKING U.S. TROOP

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-2- 1297, OCTOBER 11, 11 AM, FROM BONN

CONVOYS IN AND OUT OF BERLIN IN A MANNER MORE FLAGRANT THAN ANY PREVIOUS ACTIONS TAKEN ON AUTOBAHN IN RECENT YEARS. TEN OUT OF THIRTEEN CONVOYS OF THE SAME COMPOSITION AS THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN STOPPED YESTERDAY AND TODAY HAVE GONE THROUGH SINCE MAY 1, WITH ONLY THREE BEING STOPPED BRIEFLY AND THEN RELEASED WITHOUT NECESSITY FOR INTERVENTION BY HIGHER AUTHORITIES.

IT IS NOT JUST THAT THERE MAY BE POPULAR OR CONGRESSIONAL INDIGNATION IF WE SHOULD SELL WHEAT TO THE SOVIETS UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT THESE ACTIONS APPEAR TO BE A FORM OF PRESSURE BEING APPLIED AGAINST THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WHICH I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD TOLERATE DURING A PERIOD OF NEGOTIATION. IT SEEMS TO ME, THEREFORE, THAT THE DEPT SHOULD TAKE THIS MATTER UP WITH GROMYKO IMMEDIATELY ON THIS BASIS.

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Bonn 1033

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Thompson chaired Ambassadorial Group meeting this morning at 9:30 to discuss Autobahn problem.

Thompson reviewed briefly events leading up to present situation. Addressees held LIVE OAK messages detailing this.

Davis reported Secretary's conversation with Dobrynin this morning (see separate tel). Davis also called Ambassador Kohler asking him to reinforce to MFA Secretary's remarks to Dobrynin.

Group was also informed of results of meeting between USMLM and acting SERB.

Thompson then reviewed talks yesterday with Gromyko on Autobahn problem. Neither Gromyko or Dobrynin had information about Sov action, although latter said he had cabled Moscow about our concern. Thompson noted that Autobahn action completely out of character with Gromyko's talks with Secretary and President which had been held in atmosphere of affability. This leads to speculation that Sov actions, particularly second stoppage, are result of deliberate attempt by some [redacted] anti-Khrushchev elements in Moscow by Soviet military authorities in Germany or

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Drafted by: [redacted]alloway:jef 10/[redacted]/63 | Telephone number and authority approved by: S/AL - Ambassador Thompson

S/S - Mr. Read

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Page 2 to Bonn 1033

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to embarrass Khrushchev's attempts to reach a detente. Thompson said we felt it necessary to react strongly to Autobahn stoppage as this could be QTE serious test of intentions UNQTE. Therefore, Ambassadorial Group should consider ordering assembly of FREE STYLE, preferably FREE STYLE C which would give strongest intelligence indicators to Sovs that we are in earnest.

Greenhill asked if there had been any QTE aggravations UNQTE at checkpoints which could have led to Sov military feeling they had been insulted. Thompson said reporting showed no such incident. Greenhill, without instructions, then agreed it would be best to follow through with agreed contingency plans for dealing with Autobahn blockage.

Von Lilienfeld was without instructions but agreed logical attitude was to proceed with ordering assembly FREE STYLE.

French without instructions and did not comment.

Group agreed to meet again at 3:00 p.m. today. In meantime, press would be told of meetings and we will say that they are to discuss Autobahn situation and to consider appropriate measures.

Thompson also briefed Group on other matters covered in Gromyko talks, being reported separately.

End

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Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group met at 3:00 (see Deptel 1033 for morning meeting) with Thompson in chair.

Thompson reviewed the following:

1. Ambassador Kohler's approach to MFA to reinforce points made to Dobrynin (Deptel 1029).

2. Department's assistance to Dobrynin to get phone call to Moscow this morning.

3. Gromyko delay of departure from Washington for New York one hour to send cable to Moscow. Thompson gave personal view that Gromyko genuinely unaware of Sov actions on Autobahn.

4. Reported Sov protest about helicopter flights. (Berlin's 446 to Department).

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S/S - Mr. [illegible] EUR - Mr. Tyler

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5. Instructions to General Baker to offer to meet Sov counterpart. Said Baker instructed to insist on clearance of convoy now blocked, but to remind Sovs that channels for discussing disagreement on Autobahn procedures do exist. Baker is not rpt not to offer such discussions, however.

6. Read recommendations of Berlin Commandants (Berlin's 452 to Department)

7. Read Bonn Quadripartite message (BOMAC 29).

8. Circulated draft three-power protest (being cabled separate tel.)

Thompson thengave US proposal that orders for assembling FREE STYLE should be issued. None of others had instructions, although Ormsby Gore made point that UK believes General McConnell now has authority to order assembling of FREE STYLE. Thompson urged Group to seek instructions soonest as delay in assembly might make it impossible to use FREE STYLE in time to fulfill its function of probing Sov intentions. Assembly of BACK STROKE at this time was rejected as premature in view of short time needed for assembly.

There wad a general discussionof the Commandants' recommendation regarding UK/French solidarity convoys. Consensus was that having

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convoys process and then remain in place was likely engage Sovs prestige unnecessarily and to clog Autobahn unnecessarily. However, at Thompson's suggestion, UK and French agreed consider sending convoys of dismounting size through from FRG to Berlin to demonstrate Allied unity and that access to Berlin was still open.

UK seconded Baker meeting, noting that tail gate issue in 1959 had been resolved through bilateral meeting of higher ranking officers who had not previously been involved in dispute.

Group agreed: 1. NAC should be informed (see separate tel), 2. press would be told Group was meeting to deal with Autobahn problem. 3. Agreed be available meet tomorrow.

Subsequently French Embassy informed Tyler that French Government supported US position and prepared participate FREE STYLE and any other measures considered desirable.

END

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

436

Part 2 of 3 parts:

DATE: October 15, 1963
Time: 11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: The Incident in the Berlin Corridor

OCT 25 1963

PARTICIPANTS: French
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. Bruno de Leusse, French Minister

U.S.
The Secretary
Mr. Johannes V. Isbof, EUR/GE

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POL 33

N 5 pages 14-15-68

Ambassador Alphand referred to the incident last weekend when the Soviets had held up one of our convoys in the Berlin corridor. The Secretary said that Gromyko had called in order to wind up this affair and had made two points: 1) that it was important to adhere meticulously to existing procedures and 2) that we could be sure that the Soviets did not intend to create incidents. The Secretary said that we believed that the incident had arisen locally.

Ambassador Alphand, while not dismissing this possibility, said that there could be other possible explanations. Perhaps the Soviets had attempted to test the alliance; or perhaps the Soviets had wanted to demonstrate that the Berlin problem still existed. The Secretary said that from Gromyko's earlier behavior it appeared that he had no information on the incident when it arose. Apparently the Soviet Foreign Office also had no information. Gromyko had made an attempt to settle the incident from here.

The Secretary said he believed we should make a careful study of procedures and especially of those where Western practices were at variance. For instance, the British practice of disarming differed from ours. It was desirable to avoid a repetition of this kind of incident and to adjust these procedures with a view of reaching a greater degree of uniformity. This did not mean, however, that we would settle for the lowest common denominator.

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The Secretary said that the incident had been settled in time. If it had continued until Monday the wheat agreement and all sorts of other things would have been washed out.

Ambassador Alphand asked whether discussions on bilateral matters were continuing. The Secretary confirmed this. He said that we did not sign the civil air agreement because we felt that certain technical aspects should be studied first.

Ambassador Alphand asked whether Gromyko had proposed a formula for a Non-Aggression Pact. The Secretary confirmed this but pointed out that the approach was not significant in view of the fact that the framework suggested by Gromyko remained unacceptable.

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ZBF146/1

SECRET

October 16, 1963

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: S/P - W. W. Rostow

SUBJECT: Second Berlin Access Incident.

Today's hold up of the British convoy from Berlin makes it difficult to sustain the hypothesis that we are confronted with low-level bureaucratic confusion.

It may be that the Soviets have undertaken these harassments to sustain an image of toughness within the Communist bloc on the eve of the Communist party meetings and to strengthen support in East Germany; it may be that they are testing whether the U.S. and U.K. domestic political commitment to detente has imposed on our leaders such hostages to fortune that we will take a softer view than before with respect to such harassment; it may be that they are trying to create or enhance schisms within the Alliance and notably between the U.S. and U.K., on the one hand, and France and Germany, on the other.

Although it is the most unlikely hypothesis, given Khrushchev's internal position and his own commitment to detente, it is conceivable that they are building up to a third major test of will, having decided that the probe into the Berlin air corridors early in 1962 and the Cuba missile crisis did not exhaust the possibilities open to them. As I say, this is the least likely hypothesis, but it should be listed.

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In any case, they are evidently trying to erode a vital interest -- our access rights to Berlin.

It is my view that we should use this occasion to bring about a change in our stance towards the Communists, which I have long felt to be desirable; namely, that when they thrust into the Free World, we should impose costs upon them other than those involved in their accepting, in the end, a return to the status quo ante. I do not believe we have made limited Communist aggression a sufficiently costly form of enterprise.

Specifically, I recommend that we swiftly but systematically staff out with respect to feasibility and explore with our allies (in the Ambassadorial Group and then in the North Atlantic Council) the following three measures, plus others that might suggest themselves:

a. Minor maritime harassment. Allied naval vessels and aircraft could come in close alongside or over Soviet commercial and fishing vessels and, without violating rules of the road, make their presence felt over a period of hours. This would underline their dependence on our sufferance of their shipping. Sea areas close to the Baltic and Black Sea exits would seem especially appropriate, but we should not do this anywhere near (1000 miles?) Cuba.

b. Minor harassment of commercial air traffic. Aeroflot transports (and perhaps those of other Bloc air lines) touching down at Free World (and especially Western European) airports could be delayed by such means as picayune customs or air-worthiness inspections for periods of some hours, or a day or two, before being cleared to continue.

c. Systematic slow-down of commerce. An organized program to delay by perhaps two weeks all Free World commercial activity with the USSR (or the Soviet Bloc entire?) could be undertaken. This could slow Western deliveries of goods in trade, Western clearance of their shipping from our ports, Western processing of the financial instruments of trade, and Western processing of the travel documents of commercial travelers.

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These three items should, as I say, be regarded as illustrative and not exhaustive.

More generally, I think it is essential to make clear to Moscow in action, since words are apparently not sufficient, that we cannot politically sustain in the United States and with our allies in Europe a policy of detente -- nor do we wish to -- if they are going to feel impelled from time to time, for whatever reasons, to step on the Berlin access corn.

cc: U - Mr. Ball
M - Mr. Harriman
G - Mr. Johnson
S/AL - Amb. Thompson
G/PM - Mr. Kitchen
EUR - Mr. Tyler
Mr. Davis
BTF - Mr. Ausland

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NLK NSF87

Berlin Contingency

19

ZBF147/1

Field

438

October 17, 1963

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McGB-

SUBJECT: Autobahn Convoys and the Rest

Reflecting on the three autobahn incidents of the last week, this is the way I see the situation.

We can probably make the following assumptions.

1. Moscow knows the kind of leverage it has in Berlin and is prepared to use it whenever and as it thinks necessary and desirable. Moscow clearly has a Berlin script which does not coincide with ours -- and which it is prepared to inject into the dialogue somewhere along the way. And Moscow will continue to press towards its goals in Berlin whenever the moment seems opportune from the Moscow end.

2. We can only guess at Moscow's operating guidelines for the field. It is probably reasonable to assume that General Yakubovsky has authority to press on with salami tactics to bring allied access under closer Soviet control, (ultimately transferring this control to the GDR) short of a major confrontation. I would also guess that there is a cultural lag in Yakubovsky's instructions, so that his existing guidelines developed in a colder war atmosphere have not been brought up to date to reflect the current temperature of the dialogue.

This is not intended to suggest that Moscow cannot control its generals in the field. I would expect Moscow keeps a fairly tight leash on them. But it is my guess that Moscow's problems with its Yakubovsky are not unlike those with our Clays, and that sometimes the generals in the field operate on somewhat different wave lengths than the political headquarters at home and the actions of the military are not always fully meshed with the tactical lines of the political leadership.

3. I think we must also recognise that there are shenanigans between our military and their military in the conduct of day-to-day operations at the checkpoints and across the autobahns with one side regularly twitting the other, with the governments at home not always being aware

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or cognisant of these maneuverings; and therefore never able to assess properly the import of these dealings on those incidents which governments must later resolve.

Given these assumptions and the reports of the last incidents, I would reconstruct the convoy dismounting episodes in the following way.

1. The Marienborn incident was probably of local origin in Germany. This comes through clearly from the Zorin dialogue with Kohler [redacted] I am not prepared to quibble whether it was the convoy commander or Yakubovsky who got the machinery going, but I think it would be difficult to establish that this first incident was signalled by a specific Moscow order.

E

2. The Babelsberg affair was a different thing. I doubt that the APC's would have appeared without high political sanction. Moreover, since it occurred after Gromyko, Dobrynin and Zorin were already involved, it certainly did not take place without the knowledge of the Kremlin hierarchy. The question then is why Moscow permitted the second incident after the first one less than 24 hours earlier. Here one must necessarily guess, and it would be my guess that the Soviets hoped to pick up some of the pieces at Babelsberg -- at the Berlin end of the autobahn where we are militarily weaker and out of range of the allied checkpoint -- to offset the losses sustained earlier at Marienborn, and in the process gain some procedural advantages.

In brief, while Moscow probably did not order the affair in the first place, it is reasonable to assume that finding itself in the middle of a contest, felt compelled to retrieve something -- and this took the form of pressing for adjustments in allied procedures. But if this is so, we ought to be clear that it is not quite the same thing as suggesting that Moscow was involved in the convoy harassment from the start. And more important, there is thus far no evidence to suggest that Moscow is prepared at this juncture to change the substance of the broader dialogue it is now conducting with us.

3. Carrying this reasoning down to the British incident, I would be prepared to assert that having been unsuccessful in their moves against us but impressed with obvious uncertainties on the allied side (as indicated by Ambassador Kohler's apparent confusion about the numbers

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game), the Soviets saw some tactical advantage in moving against the British [redacted] For if the British could be separated from us, the Soviets could push successfully for procedural modifications giving them greater control over allied access. In my view, this is the only way one can explain the injection of the five vehicle factor into the numbers exercise, for this formula is just too contrived to have been accidental.

In the British episode I think it is interesting that once again having played the game and discovered more resistance than probably anticipated, the Soviet political authorities, e.e., the Soviet Embassy, stepped into the operation and halted it without much ado.

This, then, raises the question of how to proceed. I am aware of Rostow's approach and suggestions, but frankly do not believe these answer the problem.

I think it is fairly clear that most of our Berlin procedures -- which have grown like Topsy -- if scrutinized carefully, would look silly and irrational, but then the entire Berlin arrangement, if looked at this way, is not one we would devise today and has some seemingly irrational aspects to it. By the same token I am also convinced that if every one of our procedures made sense and was understood by the Soviets, we would still continue to have autobahn problems unless we were prepared to play the way the Soviets wanted. For the problem is not the specific procedure. The problem is the overall arrangement and Soviet determination to change it to its advantage.

The danger of the present situation is that if we lose our heads and over-magnify the separate episodes, we can permit them to mushroom into something larger and more significant than they are, at the expense of more important considerations. And this as I see it is the danger of the Rostow approach.

On the other hand, I do not think we can afford to ignore the Soviet challenge or give the Soviets any reason to believe that we are backing away from their challenge. And therefore, to the extent possible, we ought to keep the focus on the convoy problem. This is something which is controllable on both sides so long as both sides mean to control it. But Moscow ought to be aware that whether the challenge comes out of Germany or Moscow, the pickings will not be easy.

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In these circumstances, therefore, it behooves us to make sure that in the first instance, our procedures are understood by us and can be made intelligible to the Russians. Moreover, I see no reason why in cases such as the dismounting issue we cannot tell the Soviets (as opposed to negotiate with) how we play the game, avoiding thereby any real justification on their part for failing to understand what we are about. On the other hand, I would not let their shenanigans inhibit us from doing what we have to do and what we would have done if we were not challenged. Nor, for that matter, would I give them the option to tell us how to do it, e.g., to tell us how the numbers game should be played. Their injection of the number of five vehicles into the dismounting issue was clearly intended to put them in a position where they could set the numbers for us and I do not think for a minute the hand ought to be played that way.

At the risk of repetition, it is important to emphasize that in the first instance we have to look at our own procedures to make sure that they are intelligible. We ought to try to reconcile them to the extent possible, with those of our allies; that whenever we can do so at no political cost, we ought to be prepared to make the procedures clear to the Soviets; but having given this information to the Soviets, we ought to stick with the procedures even in the face of a Soviet challenge. Thus, in this instance we should continue to dismount on the same basis as we have and not as the Soviets are suggesting, e.g., on the basis of numbers of vehicles.

In this connection, it would also be useful and perhaps urgent that someone sit down with the Soviets soon -- with someone like Dobrynin or Gromyko -- and make it clear that we take a very serious view of the developing convoy situation. While we want to be certain there is no confusion as to what we are about, there should also be no misunderstanding by the Soviets that we shall continue to exercise our access rights to Berlin and therefore careless and reckless tampering with these rights by Soviet forces in Germany could prevent continuing the kind of dialogue we have been attempting to get under way and which we assumed the Soviets were equally interested in getting under way.

David [illegible]

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Taylor papers NWU 27-6M

TOP SECRET

2BF148

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

439

17 October 1963

6a

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion of Berlin Convoy Procedures with the Secretary of Defense, 17 October 1963.

Present: Brigadier General L. D. Clay, Jr.

The Secretary of Defense approved the following actions. General Clay is to contact Mr. Richard S. Davis at State and indicate the following Defense position:

a. We should not send a non-dismounting convoy into Berlin until it is clear that the Soviet military authorities understand US procedures. It is to be suggested to State that Ambassador Dobrynin be contacted and asked whether he has transmitted to his government the information on US procedures given him by Ambassador Thompson on 11 October 1963. Dobrynin should be urged to do so and to indicate to his home government that this information should be transmitted further to USSR military authorities in Germany.

b. It is desirable to reach quadripartite agreement on convoy procedures if it can be done expeditiously.

c. We should not allow the right of access of small non-dismountable convoys to lapse from lack of exercise. Secretary McNamara feels that to wait more than one week before sending such a convoy is undesirable. However, he also insists that by the time the convoy moves we should be certain that the USSR military authorities are aware of our procedures.

d. The Secretary authorized General Clay to use Annex B of CM-954-63 as indicating the kind of information which should eventually be made available to the USSR authorities.

e. It is not desirable ever to communicate to USSR authorities our complete instructions to US convoy commanders. Instead, only a sanitized text such as indicated in subparagraph d above is appropriate for communication to Soviet authorities.

for MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Copy furnished:
Gen Clay
Adm Riley
Col Klingbeil
Admin
Col Wong USA

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11/8/63

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USAREUR FOR POLAD
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Heidelberg

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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SUBJ: Allied Autobahn Incidents

Following assessment of Soviet behavior and intentions in autobahn incidents produced October 17 by representatives CIA, DIA and State/INR:

Subject: Berlin Access and Soviet Intentions

Immediate Soviet Objectives

1. The precise origins of last week's incidents remain obscure, but we believe that Convoy 27's difficulties probably did not arise from a pre-timed Soviet attempt to pose a serious new challenge to Allied access to Berlin. Once the issue was joined, however, the Soviets proved willing to carry it to considerable lengths. The level at which Soviet tactics were determined at various stages remains unclear for the present, but it is almost certain that Moscow itself became involved in the decision to

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RSB/BP:HSchmidt

BTF: John C. Ausland

CIA - Mr. Sherman Kent

INR - Mr. Hughes

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detain Convoy 27 the second time at Babelsberg.

2. Whatever the precise explanation of this episode, however, the subsequent detention of a British convoy and recent statements of local Soviet military authorities indicate that the USSR does not intend to let the issue die. It means to capitalize upon the opportunities inherent in autobahn procedures, demonstrated anew in the dismount squabbles, to resume its pressures upon the Allied position that access to Berlin is, in principle, an untrammeled right.

3. The Soviets have several options for their next moves. They may plug away, via harassments, at enforcing a criterion of their own for dismounting, hoping that the Allies will adjust their convoys in ways which avoid a clear test case and thereby permit the USSR to claim de facto acceptance of its rules. They may seek discussion of access modalities, intending thereby to undermine the occupation concept upon which the Allies base their rights. In the light of Ambassador Kohler's proposal to Zorin along this line, they probably now believe that talks of this sort can be arranged, but we cannot exclude that they will seek to underline the point with further autobahn difficulties; indeed, the holdup of the British convoy seems designed to establish a clear Soviet position toward all the Allies. Finally, we believe that the Soviets will try to use the procedural questions raised in these incidents to initiate a new round of diplomatic talks on larger questions such as the status of Berlin.

Relation to General Soviet Policy

4. How does this course of action on the autobahn relate to the broader framework of Soviet foreign policy? Have the Soviets concluded that tactics of

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detente no longer serve their purposes and should give way to a harsher general line?

5. In an analyzing the phase of Soviet policy set in motion by the test ban, we have noted that Soviet objectives concerning Berlin remained unchanged but that the USSR probably saw little promise in an early resumption of serious pressures. We concluded that the USSR looked upon an atmosphere of relaxed tensions as providing, inter alia, opportunities for moving toward these objectives in other ways. From subsequent talks with the US, however, the Soviets have probably concluded that the Western side is interpreting detente to mean that the Berlin question has lost all urgency and that the USSR will content itself with the status quo indefinitely. The autobahn incidents are thus designed to correct this interpretation and at the same time to demonstrate to the West that the USSR is not so weak, nor so bent upon agreements at any price, that it fears to disrupt the atmospherics of amiability.

6. We do not believe, however, that the decision reflected in the challenge to the British convoy heralds a comprehensive shift in the tactics of Soviet foreign policy. The relaxation of tensions initiated by the USSR last summer stems in large part from economic exigencies and the pressures of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and in neither of these areas do we detect an easing of Soviet problems or any recent change in the manner of meeting them. The Soviets wish to move Berlin to the forefront of issues which must be negotiated in the course of the detente process, and probably now feel that incidents are necessary to promote this objective. They hope that this can be done without damage to their other prospects, and they may believe that the US is by now sufficiently interested in the new atmosphere, and committed to maintaining it, that it will accept an interpretation of detente

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which involves a new round of negotiations on Berlin. We note, however, that the Soviets do not always calculate foreign reactions accurately in the delicate area between reminders and provocations.

Possible Internal Complications

7. While the USSR's recent moves can be readily related to long-standing objectives and familiar tactics, their severity and timing nevertheless seem out of harmony with the present course of Soviet policy as a whole. In particular, the incidents seem singularly ill-timed with respect to prospective purchases of US wheat. This, plus the circumstances suggesting that Convoy 27's initial difficulties may not have been carefully devised to open a major scenario, raise the possibility of some disagreement within the Soviet hierarchy.

8. There is considerable evidence of policy contention within the Soviet regime last winter and spring, covering a wide range of issues. This evidence leads us to believe that the decision to embark on a period of relaxed tensions was a difficult one to reach and was accepted in varying degrees by different elements of the Soviet leadership. Tactics which blur the concept of full hostility toward the West are usually disquieting to many Soviet politicians. One source of disunity must be military displeasure over signs that Khrushchev intends to use detente as a justification for raising civil priorities at the expense of defense. We have no evidence, however, which would enable us to judge how important diverging interests of this kind might be in the Berlin question, nor even whether they figure at all in current Soviet behavior. END

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Berlin Convoy Conference

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22 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

ZBFRD/1

SUBJECT: Quadripartite Meeting on Berlin Convoy Procedures

The quadripartite meeting, chaired by Ambassador Thompson, ended in a shambles with the French having to go back for additional instructions, and the British adopting a position that seemed calculated to place any responsibility for lack of agreement on either the French or the US.

Briefly, the positions taken at the meeting were:

France. They agree to harmonize, but are uncertain about informing the Soviets; they want the Coordinating Committee to draft a protest note for possible use later.

FRG. The Germans prefer to harmonize and then inform the Soviets, making clear that the procedures could be changed at any time according to Allied convenience. They seemed to prefer informal communication to reduce any possibility of having an exchange of letters that could lead to negotiations or which could have any semblance of a contract.

UK. The British insist that agreement on harmonization and notification be linked. On harmonization, their most important modification would have ten or more people in any vehicle dismount. On notification, they propose letters from the CINCs to Yakubovsky, with perhaps communication also through political channels. They wanted also to communicate that the Allies would abide by these procedures as long as the Soviets did.

US. We feel strongly about not using military channels. We are against the ten figure for dismounting proposed by the British. On notification, we prefer oral, and that in abbreviated form. We want to avoid a formal letter. The exact procedures for notifying do not have to be identical, but the substance of the harmonized procedures should be.

The meeting ended with the understanding that the Coordinating Committee would meet as soon as the French had received their instructions and the British had thought over how strongly they felt about their position. Hopefully, the Coordinating Committee will meet later this week.

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The tone of the meeting raised the question as to whether the Allies will be able to reach an agreement on the next steps readily. If, by the end of the week there is no sign of a breakthrough, I would suggest this government should consider whether we should reaffirm our previous notification to the Soviets and, more importantly, consider when to send the next non-dismountable convoy up the Autobahn.

WBS
W. B. SMITH

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

28 October 19-3

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

442

Refer to:
I-27622/63

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Status of Berlin Convoy Matters

Meetings were held today of the Ambassadorial Group, the Coordinating Group, and the State-ISA-JCS working group of the Berlin Task Force, all of which were attended by the undersigned.

Initially, there was considerable confusion about the US position in the light of yesterday's White House meeting. It appeared that there were several somewhat contradictory mandates, e.g., to send a non-dismountable US convoy as soon as possible, but only after communication on procedures to the Soviets; that we should "harmonize" inter-Allied procedures but at the same time not appear to be making any changes in them, so that the Allies should notify the Soviets of their current individual procedures. The Inter-agency Working Group found it difficult to comprehend what "harmonization" would involve in practice, if the standard procedures were not to be the basis of notification, unless all powers ceased sending non-dismountable convoys. On the other hand, if we informed the Soviets of the harmonized procedures but continued to follow previous national practices, there would be inconsistencies.

In the light of this confusion, Ambassador Thompson obtained clarification from the White House which enabled him to propose to the Ambassadorial Group that (1) we accept the standardization proposed by LIVE OAK; (2) we notify the Soviets of these procedures; and (3) we do so orally, at the political level (to follow up on the earlier Thompson-Dobrynin discussion) with minimum formality and no implication of "negotiation."

This US position apparently reflected the consideration that the proposed standardized procedures would not involve a significant change in the US procedures (inasmuch as nothing has ever been said to the Russians about dismounting vehicles with more than 10 men and if ever applied by the US it would be an additional concession to the Soviets in line with the current UK practice).

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In the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group, however, the British indicated that they had received new instructions. They proposed a major change in the LIVE OAK proposal whereby only vehicles with 10 or more persons would dismount, irrespective of the total number of passengers in the convoy. This UK idea, raised informally in the Bonn group, was countered by the US representative on several grounds (see Bonn 1458, Oct 21), among them that it would be a major change for the United States, since we would for the first time refuse to dismount convoys even of several hundred men when there were less than 10 in any one vehicle. Since the British nevertheless have now put this forward as "instructions," they may be seeking to shift the burden of refusal onto the United States, with the full expectation that we would not accept it.

The British have also made clear that their agreement to <u>any</u> harmonization is absolutely contingent upon agreement to communicate the agreed procedures to the Soviet Union. They would prefer notification at the military (i.e., CINC) level, in writing, with a further statement (probably at Ambassadorial level) that these procedures would be followed as long as the Russians avoided incidents, and that we would communicate any future changes in Allied procedures.

The French are opposed to any communication at all, but if notification is to be given, it should be at the lowest possible level. They prefer to implement the standardized procedures through Allied practice at the checkpoints without prior notification, and are willing to harmonize procedures along lines recommended by LIVE OAK. The French also want the Contingency Coordinating Group to prepare draft "stand-by" warnings to the Soviet Union regarding consequences, especially in the economic field, from any further Autobahn delays.

The French indirectly criticized our having notified the Soviets unilaterally about our procedures -- to which Ambassador Thompson replied quite frankly that the decision to do so had been made hastily and perhaps ill-advisedly, but was pursuant to high-level direction, in the light of the talks with Gromyko.

The Germans were also very sceptical about any communication with the Soviets and were especially concerned about any implication of agreement or negotiation. They also raised the dangers of establishing precedents which would facilitate any attempt at East German takeover of the checkpoints.

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Thus the basic impasse might be summarized as follows:

1. The British will agree to discuss harmonization only if an affirmative decision is made on notification. They are reporting back and may get modified instructions as a result.

2. The French are opposed to notification and require new instructions.

3. Even if the inter-Allied hurdles are overcome, it seems unlikely that the US would agree to the new British proposal on dismounting -- although under pressure the British might be persuaded to keep to the original LIVE OAK recommendations. (There are, however, some clarifications of these recommendations which would be required -- on advance notification of convoys to the Soviets, tail gates and ID cards -- both as to communicating procedures on these subjects to the Soviets, and the actual practice which the Allies will follow -- e.g., continuing to avoid 6 and 7 vehicle convoys.)

In summary, it appears that the US may be faced with sending a non-dismountable convoy with notification only of national procedures under an "agreement to disagree" on harmonization. No further action is anticipated until the British and French have instructions, probably on Thursday.

Timothy W. Stanley

Timothy W. Stanley
Chief, Current Projects Division
Policy Planning Staff

cc:
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Rowen
Gen Vogt
Col Meachan

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FROM: PARIS

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

NOVEMBER 5, 7 P.M.

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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DE GAULLE AND I BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE SITUATION ON THE BERLIN SITUTION ON THE BERLIN AUTOBAHN AND HE STATED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE JUST OUT TO MAKE TROUBLE BUT WITHOUT ANY GREAT CONCERN OVER THE EVENTS. I TOLD HIM WE WERE VERY GLAD TO SEE THAT THE FRENCH POSITION WAS SO CLOSE TO OURS IN THIS MATTER AND WE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THE MATTER WOULD BE SETTLED.

IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION ON HOW HE SAW THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE AND THE COMMON MARKET AND PARTICULARLY THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, DE GAULLE VIRTUALLY REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID AT HIS JULY PRESS CONFERENCE. HE SAID THAT THEY WERE DOING SO DO THEIR BEST TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL POLICY BUT IF THEY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN SO DOING THIS HE FELT WOULD MEAN THAT THE COMMON MARKET WOULD "DISAPPEAR." HE INDICATED HOWEVER THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO FIXED TIME LIMIT IN REGARD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION AS TO HOW AN ORGANIZATION WHICH ACCOMPLISHED AS MUCH AS THE COMMON MARKET HAD COULD DISAPPEAR BECAUSE OF THE INABILITY TO AGREE ON AGRICULTURE, DE GAULLE REPLIED THAT YOU COULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE A COMMON MARKET DEALING ONLY IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS WHILE AGRICULTURE WAS COMPLETELY OUTSIDE. HE SAID YOU COULD HAVE A DISAPPEARANCE OF THE COMMON MARKET AND STILL HAVE FREE TRADE. (HE MENTIONED IN THIS CONNECTION OUR DESIRE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND TO HAVE BOTH INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS). I SAID I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A GREAT PITY IF THIS DEVELOPED BUT HE PASSED THIS REMARK OFF WITH A BLAND STATEMENT THAT WE MUST WAIT, AND A SHRUG OF HIS SHOULDERS.

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BOHLEN

Symbol Advance copy to S/S-O at 10:20 pm 11/5/63

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SECRET attachment 17606

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ZBF153/1

RM/R

FILE

November [illegible], 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Enclosed paper on Soviet Motives in the Recent Autobahn Incidents was prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the request of Mr. David Klein of your office.

/s/ Ben Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

RSB-153, 2 copies
(Secret-No Foreign Dissem)

(No drafting info)

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S/S-RO

[illegible] 1963

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum
RSB-153, November 19, 1963

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. h.c.d.

Subject: Soviet Motives in the Recent Autobahn Incidents

While the passage of four Allied convoys of nondismount size and the Soviet statement of November 16 appear to mark the end of a phase, our assessment of the autobahn incidents and the underlying Soviet motives and intentions must still be of a somewhat tentative character. The Soviets still owe the West a reply to the November 6 protest notes, and other possible consequences of the autobahn incidents may still be in the offing.

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ABSTRACT

Local Considerations. While plausible motives for the harassments can be adduced from the autobahn situation itself, these purely local considerations do not, in our view, fully account for Soviet behavior. For Moscow went to unusual lengths in carrying matters to the point of jeopardizing other, broader policy objectives while at the same time showing little interest in securing Western acceptance of specific procedures.

Broader Motives. Examining other possible motives, we draw the following conclusions:

1. On the Berlin issue itself, the Soviets may have hoped that a demonstration of their ability to harass autobahn traffic would soften up the West for a possible round of negotiations on

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access matters perhaps including some of Gromyko's "practical measures." It is also possible that Moscow plans some unilateral action such as the denial of allied military access to East Berlin, and hoped that by reminding the West of its vulnerabilities it would inhibit Western counteraction.

2. To the extent that the Allied statement on harmonized procedures on October 29 and the Soviet response of November 16 served to establish agreed procedures, they could facilitate a Soviet move to introduce East Germans into the autobahn control procedures. However, we have no evidence that Moscow plans such a move in the immediate future, and the East German reaction to the incident suggests more emphasis on the continued Soviet role in control over access to Berlin rather than anticipation of an early change.

3. Beyond the Berlin context, the incidents played a role in the Soviet Union's general posture vis-a-vis the West. Moscow apparently intended to use a limited and controlled show of force to impress upon the West that its detente policy was not the result of weakness. The Soviets wished to warn the West that a detente was not solely or even primarily in the Soviet interest but in the West's; to signal that Soviet participation in steps to ease tension could not be taken for granted; and to serve notice that continuation of a detente would require concessions on the part of the West.

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Military Pressure. We cannot exclude the possibility that the incidents may in part have been the result of pressure from the Soviet military. We have no current indications, however, that Khrushchev is in political trouble, and it appears unlikely that the military would have been able to stage incidents of such length and potential ramifications without the Soviet leader's support.

Prospects. It is possible that the Soviet statment of November 16 could mark the end of the recent round of harassments of non-dismountable convoys. The discovery of a unified Western position may have been an important factor in a Soviet decision to desist. On the other hand, the November 16 statement did not commit the Soviets to refrain from harassments indefinitely. It preserved intact the Soviet claim that the USSR and not the West sets procedures and could serve as the starting point for a new round of harassments at some future time. If so, then Moscow may well seek out an issue on which it hopes to find the Allies split as the ground for any subsequent round of harassments.

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Major Crisis Not Intended

Whatever their motives, the Soviets do not appear to have intended to precipitate a major crisis.

The virtual absence of intelligence indications which would normally appear if the Soviet Union expected severe tension or a high risk of hostilities suggests that the Soviets calculated that their actions were not likely to escalate beyond the level of a local incident.

Moreover, both Soviet propaganda and the remarks of Soviet officials in private conversations generally played down the importance of the incidents. (The noteworthy exception was Khrushchev's November 6 remarks to visiting American businessmen to the effect that the last incident might have resulted in a nuclear war if the US had not backed down. His statement was made only after the fact. Khrushchev spoke in a forum which assured wide dissemination in the free world by Western wire services, but his observations were not published in the USSR.) While the incidents were taking place Moscow apparently sought to carry them out in a manner which would minimize risks of interference with East-West negotiations or of precipitating Allied countermeasures.

At the same time the Soviet Union appeared reluctant to stress the incidents in its domestic propaganda, lest the home audience which is usually sensitive to war danger over-react.

Local Circumstances

In part the Soviet motive for the autobahn incidents derived from the autobahn situation itself, where the Soviets have long used pressure tactics in attempting to gain minor procedural advantages.

The October 10 incident may have begun as an attempt by the Soviets to secure a small procedural gain on the issue of troops' dismounting for a headcount. The fact that the Soviets achieved de facto Western acceptance of demands for advance notification of convoys of five or more vehicles through the use of pressure tactics last autumn may have encouraged them. The Soviets on October 10 may not have understood the precise rules which governed Western dismounting practices and could have believed that the refusal of American convoy commanders to dismount their men in the rain on the previous day was part of a US effort to secure a procedural advantage at Soviet expense.

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If the October 10-12 incident gave the appearance of a Soviet effort to force a concession which ultimately failed, part of the motive for the October 16 incident may have been to save face. For while a single incident might look like a failure to achieve the Soviet objective, a repetition would suggest a pattern of deliberate harassment. In addition the Soviets may have hoped to find some difference between American and British reactions.

The notification of harmonized allied procedures (together with the November 2 US press briefing in Berlin) may well have appeared to the Soviets to be a direct challenge to their role on the autobahn. They may thus have felt called upon to assert their claim that they and not the West would set autobahn procedures.

Access Procedures Not the Goal

While these local considerations would certainly provide motivations for some harassments, we do not believe that they suffice to explain the incidents completely. On the one hand, the Soviets went to unusually great lengths in prolonging the individual incidents for as long as they did, and in the process ran some risk of jeopardizing other, broader policy objectives. On the other hand the Soviets showed remarkably little interest in the purely procedural issues involved.

In retrospect it is clear that the Soviets did not have as their goal the establishment of any specific procedures on the autobahn:

--their demands on the scene varied widely as the Soviets set different criteria for dismounting and shifted from the issue of dismounting to tailgates,

--the Soviets showed no interest in General Freeman's (CinC USAREUR) offer to negotiate on procedures in military channels, and rejected it,

--the Soviets accepted without objection a British refusal (based on the harmonized allied procedures) to lower tailgates of their trucks despite the fact that the British had previously made a practice of dropping tailgates upon request.

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--the Soviets did not follow up indications that they might obtain minor concessions from the US in the form of having troops move to the rear of trucks or of having US officers provide them with the numbers of men in each vehicle instead of the total for the whole convoy. Rather than press for these concessions, the Soviets dropped both questions.

--finally, on November 16 the Soviets stated as their own procedures a set of rules which, while not identical to the allied procedures notified to them on October 29, would not in normal practice occasion disputes.

Possibility of Access Negotiations

As a broader motive but still in the Berlin context, the Soviets may have intended the autobahn harassments to serve as a means of softening up the West for a round of negotiations on access matters. So far the Soviets have not called for negotiations [redacted] but they owe the West a reply to its November 6 protest notes and their response might be an appropriate vehicle for an overture on talks. If the Soviets do in fact seek negotiations, they will probably not wish to confine themselves merely to the nuts and bolts of autobahn procedures. More likely, they would seek a broader discussion of access matters along the lines suggested by Gromyko on August 6 in his list of "practical measures."

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Preparation for Berlin Move

Another hypothesis, which we regard as less likely, is that the Soviets may be preparing for some unilateral move on the Berlin scene. Moscow might have wished to remind the West of its vulnerability to harassment beforehand in the hope of discouraging possible

[redacted]

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Western counteractions. While we have no conclusive evidence that any unilateral move is imminent, continuing East German references to the alleged abuses of Western military patrols in East Berlin suggest that denial of Western military access to East Berlin might be under consideration.

Potential retaliations against the Soviet presence in West Berlin and the possibility of some Western action to alter the status of West Berlin appear to have deterred a move to deny Western military access to East Berlin in the past. However, if the recent French defector Pacques compromised the relevant portion of Western contingency planning, the deterrent may have lost its effectiveness.

East German Role in Access

To the extent that the Western statement of October 29 and the Soviet statement of November 16 constitute de facto agreement on procedures they could have the incidental effect of making it easier for the Soviet Union to attempt to introduce East Germans into the autobahn-control process prior to a peace treaty. The Soviets might estimate that once the procedures were established and possibilities for misunderstanding reduced, the West would be less likely to object to East German participation and at the same time the danger of an incident which might force the Soviets to return to the scene would also be lessened.

We have no evidence that the Soviets intend to make such a move at this time, and, indeed, evident Soviet disinterest in the purely procedural side of the autobahn incidents would seem to argue in the other direction. Moreover, the East German reaction to the autobahn incidents appear to us to be symptomatic of East German frustration at incidents which emphasize Soviet tutelage rather than an anticipation of any early change.

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Projecting an Image of Strength

In a broader context, and quite apart from Soviet intentions on the Berlin scene, the Soviets probably fear giving an appearance of weakness at this time. Moscow's problems -- an unfavorable strategic balance vis-a-vis the US, economic difficulties intensified by a poor harvest, and inability to cope with Chinese Communist opposition within the communist movement -- have grown more acute. The Soviets are probably concerned lest the West seek to exploit these difficulties and probably considered it prudent to remind the West of its vulnerabilities by stepping on the "corns" of Berlin.

If so, the autobahn incidents appear to fit into a pattern of Soviet statements and actions over the past month which have sought to impress the West that the Soviet Union was not acting out of weakness. These included:

-- statements on Cuba, setting US recognition of the status quo as a condition for a continued detente and denying the existence of an understanding with the US on the withdrawal of Soviet troops;

-- emphasis on the theme that the Soviet Union would not buy American wheat under discriminatory terms;

-- the arrest and detention for two weeks of Professor Barghoorn.

Moscow apparently wished to warn the West that a detente was not solely or even primarily in the Soviet interest but in the West's; to signal that Soviet participation in steps to ease tensions could not be taken for granted; and to serve notice that continuation of a detente would require concessions on the part of the West. At the same time, Khrushchev probably wished to show his critics in the communist world that he knew how to carry out negotiations with the West without losing his own freedom of action vis-a-vis the US.

Soviet sensitivity to giving an impression of weakness could also be related to decisions which will be announced when the Central Committee plenum meets in December. If Moscow has decided to increase investments in agriculture at the expense of the military establishment, it might well wish to set the stage for the announcement by a show of strength.

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The Role of the Soviet Military

We have examined the hypothesis that the incidents were the result of pressure from the Soviet military. Certainly, the Soviet military in East Germany are the Soviet element most directly concerned with access details, and probably the most sensitive either to seeming Western efforts to obtain procedural advantages or to opportunities to press the West for procedural advantages. They may well have been the first proponents of the autobahn harassments. However, we doubt that the military would have had either the ability or the inclination to stage incidents of the length and potential ramifications of those on the autobahn without Khrushchev's knowledge and backing.

Conclusion -- Prospects for Further Harassments

Passage today of a French nondismount convoy (the fourth Allied nondismount convoy since the November 4-5 incident) and the Soviet statement of November 16 appear to mark the end of the recent round of harassments. We cannot, however, be certain that they do. Since the purpose of the incidents appears to have been to demonstrate (a) that the Soviets set procedures and (b) that the West is vulnerable to arbitrary harassment, we have no assurance that the harassments will not continue either on the autobahn or on the other access routes.

If in fact the recent series of autobahn incidents has ended, Moscow's discovery of a firmly unified allied position may have been the most important element in the Soviet decision to desist. It would appear likely that the Soviets will attempt to carry out any future round of incidents over an issue where they can hope to find fissures in the Western position.

Even if the Soviet statement of November 16 was intended to close out the recent series of incidents, it does not commit the Soviets to refrain from harassments indefinitely and, indeed, some of its obscurities (the question of whether or not co-drivers will be counted as drivers, for example) could well serve as the basis for a new round at some future time.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)

445

8 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William R. Tyler
Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Soviet Motivations and
Objectives in Autobahn
Harassments

In the attached memorandum, senior Agency analysts have sought to analyze the motivations, intentions, and objectives behind Soviet harassment of Berlin convoys. While this memorandum was prepared for Mr. McCone's use and is based on quite sensitive materials, I am passing it to you in the hope that it may be of value in dealing with this problem.

Ray S. Cline

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Attachment

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OCI No. 3211/63

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
8 November 1963

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet Motivations and Objectives in Autobahn Harassments

1. We believe the Soviet leaders do not regard sporadic and controlled harassment of Allied autobahn convoys as being incompatible with the prevailing "detente" atmosphere in East-West relations. Their concept of detente does not imply a period of consistent relaxation of tensions in which both sides forego attempts to upset the status quo everywhere. In Khrushchev's view, a period of relaxation does not require the complete abandonment of efforts to advance major objectives, but merely a shift in tactics away from the sharp pressures that characterized Soviet policy in 1961 (a deadline for a German peace treaty) and 1962 (the Cuban missile venture).

2. The Russians look upon these incidents as a useful and timely reminder to the West that the failure of the Cuban venture, Soviet economic exigencies, and the pressures of the dispute with China have not diminished the USSR's ability to confront the West with a serious challenge over Berlin at any time. Khrushchev is extremely sensitive to any indication that the West is trying to capitalize on his domestic and intrabloc problems. The Soviets have been careful to maintain close control over the incidents in order to minimize damage to other foreign policy aims, such as further agreements with the US on matters of secondary importance. Khrushchev, however, undoubtedly feels the need from time to time to serve notice to both the West and his own allies that the Soviet Union remains a strong, confident world power and that it is under no compulsion to reach agreements at any price.

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3. Another important feature of Moscow's current outlook is the belief that the US Government is sufficiently committed to a policy of relaxing tensions to allow considerable room for maneuvers of this kind. The Russians have always calculated that detente tactics would tend to inhibit strong Western responses to Soviet initiatives and increase the difficulties within the Western alliance of devising unified responses to Kremlin maneuvers.

4. We believe there was some possibility that the incidents last month could have been prompted by factors other than foreign policy calculations, such as disagreements within the Soviet hierarchy. We find no evidence, however, that considerations of this nature had any significant bearing on Soviet behavior in November; the latest incidents bear all the earmarks of careful preparation and coordination between Moscow and Soviet military authorities in East Germany.

5. In the context of current Soviet tactics, pressures on Allied access to Berlin are essentially a form of political leverage in pursuing a revised strategy with respect to the Berlin and German questions. Khrushchev seems to expect a protracted period of stalemate with regard to his original demands for a German peace treaty and a Berlin settlement. He is acutely aware that the failure of his Cuban operation last year not only weakened the USSR's relative power position but raised the Western price for a Berlin agreement.

6. While the Russians thus see no early prospects for winning Western concessions to their major demands regarding Berlin, they hope that a detente atmosphere will provide opportunities to move toward these goals by indirect, piecemeal means. Their present course of action, in our view, is directed toward gradually altering the status of West Berlin by a series of modest, seemingly unimportant steps.

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Immediate Soviet Objectives

7. By deliberately creating confusion and impasse on the issue of procedures for processing Allied convoys, the Russians are seeking to underscore the urgency of negotiations at the political level to remove this source of a potentially dangerous confrontation. We believe they would try to use talks on access as an entering wedge for moving on to broader questions such as the status of West Berlin, German frontiers, and "respect" for East German sovereignty.

8. Moscow's decision to exert pressure on the sensitive point of Berlin access probably reflects a judgment, based on talks with American and British leaders over the past three months, that the Allies are interpreting the post-test ban treaty "detente" atmosphere to mean that the Berlin question has lost all urgency and that the USSR has no choice but to accept the status quo indefinitely. In his conversations with Secretary Rusk and Lord Home last month, Gromyko tried to draw them out on the meaning of their allusion in August to the need for a "fresh look" at the Berlin problem. After listening to Rusk's exposition during the White House meeting with President Kennedy on 10 October, Gromyko commented that this was "not much of a fresh look." He complained that the US now appeared to believe the Berlin and German problems were no longer urgent.

9. Although we cannot determine the precise origins of the autobahn incident on 10 October, there is no question that the Moscow leadership quickly recognized the opportunity to "step on our corns." Khrushchev had warned Undersecretary Harriman in July that the Soviets from time to time would step on President Kennedy's foot in West Berlin "so he could realize he should cut out his corns." The detention of the US convoy on 4 November clearly was the result of a high-level Soviet decision to challenge the Allied "harmonized procedures" for processing convoys. Soviet checkpoint authorities obviously were fully prepared to stage a test over the first nondismountable convoy to appear after the Allies had conveyed their procedures to the Soviets on 29 October.

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10. Khrushchev's remarks to visiting American businessmen on 6 November suggest that he intends to stage further incidents in the belief that the Allies eventually will agree to talks on the immediate issue of access modalities. He probably was encouraged in this view by the assurances conveyed last month by Ambassador Kohler and Lord Home that the US and Britain would be prepared to discuss disagreements on access procedures if the existing incidents could be resolved.

11. We believe the Soviets may offer--as some Soviet diplomats have hinted privately--to negotiate new access arrangements with the Allies. Such an agreement, in Moscow's view, would not only confirm the USSR's claim to a voice in establishing access rules but would undermine the fundamental Western position that the right of unrestricted access is based on the occupation of Berlin and is not subject to negotiation. A new agreement, moreover, would provide a valuable precedent for subsequent steps toward something akin to a "free city" in West Berlin. We believe that Soviet efforts to draw the West into such arrangements will be supplemented by further moves to engage West Berlin leaders in direct talks which would also tend to change the character of the city in the direction of an independent political entity.

12. Although autobahn difficulties are the most dramatic means of applying pressures for talks on Berlin, other specific issues are available to the USSR. In talks with US and British representatives in August, for example, Khrushchev and Gromyko referred to the need for (1) new tariffs on Western military and civic rail transport; (2) autobahn tolls for Allied troops and military supplies; (3) payment for the use of cable communications crossing East Germany; and (4) rectification of the abnormal situation in the air corridors, particularly the use of air routes by airlines of countries other than the Allies. Some of these have significant political implications and might be agitated to underscore the Soviet desire for talks.

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13. Even if these maneuvers to draw the West into negotiations prove to be unsuccessful, the Soviet leaders probably hope that continuing pressure on the convoy dismounting issue will oblige the Allies to avoid test cases in the future and thereby permit the USSR to claim de facto acceptance of its regulations.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: BONN, LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW, USAREUR POLAD, CINCEUR POLAD, USNMR SHAPE BURNS, USELMLO

EUR INDEX KBF

FROM : USBER, BERLIN

DATE: DECEMBER 13, 1963

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation.

REF : Berlin Tel 756 to Dept., 687 Bonn, 453 London, 396 Moscow, 460 Paris.

Paris also for USRO

Attached is a memorandum of a conversation held December 4, 1963 at US Headquarters, Berlin, between Ambassador George C. McGhee and Pyotr A. Abrasimov, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in East Germany.

For the Assistant Chief of Mission:

Francis J. Meehan
Acting Chief
Eastern Affairs Section

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CC
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JJC

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JACalhoun

CFL-Mr. Johnson 12/19/63 Notes file

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Page 1 of Enclosure to Berlin Airgram 388.

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Note: This MemCon was not cleared with Ambassador McGhee but is based on the Ambassador's reporting telegram on the meeting.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Wednesday, December 4, 1963
Time: 11 a.m. - 1:30 p.m.

PLACE: United States Headquarters, Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: United States: Ambassador George C. McGhee
Francis J. Meehan, Acting Protocol Officer, USBER

U.S.S.R.: Ambassador Pyotr A. Abrasimov
Oleg S. Panin, Second Secretary, Protocol Officer, Soviet Embassy, East Berlin
Genrik V. Orlov, Second Secretary, Interpreter, Soviet Embassy, East Berlin

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As soon as Abrasimov entered the Ambassador's office, and while still standing, he expressed his condolences on the death of President Kennedy. Abrasimov said he spoke not only on his own behalf, but also in the name of his government and the whole Soviet people. After the Ambassador had thanked Abrasimov, and those present had taken their seats, Abrasimov expressed the hope that the improvement in US-Soviet relations which had taken place during President Kennedy's administration, especially during the past few months, would continue under President Johnson. In this connection he referred especially to the importance of the nuclear test ban treaty.

The Ambassador said that he felt sure that President Johnson would meet the Soviets halfway in efforts to reduce tension and find areas of agreement. The Ambassador added that he had known President Johnson personally for over 20 years and could speak with assurance on the President's desire for good relations between the US and the USSR. The Ambassador further remarked that he wished to assure Abrasimov of his own continuing intention of trying to reduce tensions between the US and the USSR within his responsibilities, especially on Berlin. The Ambassador then asked Abrasimov if he had any points that he wished to discuss arising out of developments since their last meeting in August.

Abrasimov remarked that in general things were going well, yet there were a number of issues which had caused his concern.

Abrasimov referred briefly to the autobahn incidents of October and November without, however, going into detail. He implied that unreasonableness on the part of the US military had been the prime cause of the difficulties. His treatment of

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the autobahn incidents was, however, very generalized, and he gave the impression of wishing merely to note them before passing on to other topics. The Ambassador indicated agreement with Abrasimov's remarks on the need to prevent such incidents from developing into matters of serious concern.

Abrasimov then turned to a recent incident involving several Soviet jockeys and trainers who had not been permitted to reside in West Berlin--although they had taken part in horse races there. (The case is discussed in Berlin's A-330, November 19, 1963.) Abrasimov accused the US authorities of an unsporting attitude. He also charged that there had been infringements on the rights of diplomatic personnel of the Soviet Embassy, in that they too had not been permitted to stay overnight in West Berlin in connection with the jockeys' case. The Ambassador replied that he understood that the Soviet jockeys and trainers had taken up residence in West Berlin without prior application for temporary residence permits, thus clearly violating Allied regulations. The Soviets concerned had, it was true, submitted applications after they had been told they could not further remain in West Berlin without permits. It was necessary, however, to submit applications in an orderly way, ahead of time of proposed visits, in order to permit adequate consideration. The Ambassador urged Abrasimov to ensure that in future cases of the sort, Soviet nationals complied carefully with Allied regulations. If they did, difficulties and unpleasantness could be avoided. Applications for residence permits submitted properly and in good time would be considered on their merits. As for Soviet diplomatic personnel, the record showed that they were able to move freely under normal circumstances between East and West Berlin. Difficulties had arisen only because the diplomats concerned had become involved in an apparent attempt to circumvent Allied regulations.

Abrasimov's next point concerned US military vehicle circulation in East Berlin. He remarked that in recent months there seemed to have been a marked increase in US military traffic there, and there had been a large number of incidents involving, for example, the removal of East German flags by US personnel, speeding, and other violations of traffic regulations. Abrasimov then read from a paper giving details of five alleged incidents in November alone. (Most of these involved alleged penetration by US military vehicles into closed streets in the vicinity of military installations.) Abrasimov also complained about what he described as a West Berlin press campaign against Soviet military traffic in West Berlin. The Ambassador remarked that he himself had intended to bring up this issue since we had noted an East German press campaign against our vehicles. The Ambassador showed Abrasimov clippings from the East German press describing a number of alleged incidents involving Allied military vehicles in East Berlin. The Ambassador said that, according to US records, there had been three minor US traffic accidents in East Berlin during 1963 so far. In this same period, there had been six minor Soviet traffic accidents in West Berlin and fifteen recorded incidents of speeding by Soviet vehicles in the US sector alone. The Ambassador continued that it seemed pointless to exaggerate the importance of such minor incidents, and the East German press campaign was disproportionate and harmful. The Ambassador assured Abrasimov that US military drivers were carefully trained and instructed to observe traffic regulations.

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Nevertheless, there would always be the possibility of mistakes and incidents, and it was in the interest of both sides to keep such matters at a low pitch. Abrasimov replied that obviously US and Soviet records on the matter were different. Perhaps he and the Ambassador were both under-informed about what actually happened. Abrasimov suggested that in future the US and Soviets inform each other of incidents in the two sectors through protocol channels. The Ambassador agreed with this proposal.

Abrasimov took up once more the question of the Soviet Lietzenburgerstrasse property in West Berlin. He repeated much of the case he presented during the August 5, 1963 meeting with the Ambassador. The building was Soviet property. The Soviets had a clear legal right to recondition it. Abrasimov strongly disputed the point made in the Allied Ambassadors' letters that the concentration of Soviet activities in the property constituted a potential threat to public order in West Berlin. He asked how was it possible to consider the activities of Intourist, Sovexportfilm, and a few Soviet journalists as a threat to public order, whether these activities were conducted from separate buildings or in one place. Abrasimov stressed the high cost of renting the various separate properties used by the Soviets in West Berlin. He told the Ambassador that he wished for the present to consider only the question of reconditioning the property (both internally and externally), leaving aside until later the question of use of the building after reconditioning. Abrasimov said it was essential to repair the exterior of the building in order to protect it from the weather. However, there was little point in repairing the exterior unless there was assurance that the interior could be properly reconditioned. Abrasimov urged the Ambassador to use his influence to insure that authorization for internal repairs was given. He said that if a favorable decision were not forthcoming at the Ambassadorial level, he would recommend that the matter be taken up at Foreign Ministry level. The Ambassador noted that the building was in the British sector, and the British were, therefore, primarily responsible on the Western side. The Ambassador stressed that the Allies had ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of public order in West Berlin. In view of West Berlin public feeling, which was understandable, it was still felt that the concentration of Soviet activities would constitute a threat to public order. There was complete agreement among the three Allies on the subject. The Ambassador did not believe that Abrasimov's presentation had changed the main issue. The Ambassador understood that there was a pressing need for external repairs and that permission would be given for the necessary work. The question of internal reconditioning was another matter since eventual use was involved, and use raised the basic Allied position on the matter. Abrasimov remarked that the USSR did not object to the carrying out of extensive reconditioning work on the US Embassy in Moscow. The Ambassador noted that the respective embassies in Moscow and Washington were a wholly separate issue.

The Ambassador then raised several points with Abrasimov.

The Ambassador referred first to the case of Gabriele Hammerstein, a US citizen imprisoned in East Germany since January 1962 and given a six years' sentence for alleged espionage. The Ambassador noted that Miss Hammerstein had a clear record of mental disturbance--substantiated by East German doctors during the period of her imprisonment. The East German charges of espionage

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seemed contrived and ridiculous. The Ambassador urged Abrasimov to use his influence to bring about Miss Hammerstein's speedy release. The case could become the subject of unfortunate publicity. Abrasimov said he was familiar with the case. He undgrstood that a medical commission was now reviewing Miss Hammerstein's record. Should the outcome of the investigation confirm mental instability, he would do what he could to bring about Miss Hammerstein's release. He added that he hoped to be in touch with the Ambassador further on the case in the near future.

The Ambassador next referred to the question of visits by the US Commandant to East Berlin. The Ambassador recalled that he had discussed this issue with Abrasimov at their August 5 meeting. The Ambassador continued to attach importance to a satisfactory solution. The question was not whether the US Commandant had a right to visit East Berlin. This was self-evident. It was a matter of ensuring through consultation with the Soviets that the East Germans would not cause irresponsible incidents in connection with the Commandant's visit. To begin with, Abrasimov reacted negatively to the Ambassador's presentation. He argued that the East German authorities were not fond of General Polk because of the latter's anti-GDR statements. (The Ambassador made the point that access to the respective sectors could hardly be made dependent upon statements by individual officers.) Abrasimov then changed the tenor of his remarks. He said that the Soviets had no objections to General Polk or to his visiting East Berlin. They certainly did not want to take revenge on General Polk for incidents which had taken place before his arrival in Berlin. The Ambassador asked if Abrasimov s statement could be regarded as an assurance that there would be no difficulties on the part of the East Germans when General Polk entered and left East Berlin. In reply, Abrasimov said that the Soviets would inform the East Germans of their views on the matter.

The Ambassador told Abrasimov that he would like to introduce General Polk to him. Abrasimov said he would be glad to meet the General who then joined the group and remained until the end of the Ambassadors' meeting.

Abrasimov returned to the question of Soviet-US relations in general, emphasizing the point he had made earlier concerning his hopes that there would be further improvement under President Johnson. The Ambassador repeated his earlier comments on the subject. Abrasimov again adverted to the theme that he and the Ambassador should do everything in their power to assist in the improvement of relations and in reducing differences. The Ambassador again agreed. Berlin was a point of tension and more could be done between Washington and Moscow than by the Ambassadors themselves. However, the Ambassador said, he wished to assure Abrasimov of his desire to help reduce tensions.

Abrasimov then launched into a lengthy monologue on activities in West Berlin on the part of the Bundestag and other FRG agencies and spokesmen. He remarked that while presumably the US did not actively support such activities, it apparently did nothing to prevent them. The Soviet people were concerned by revanchist speeches and activities in Berlin. They felt especially sensitive on the question of the use of the Reichstag building by the Bundestag. The building had been fought over in the war and had caused the loss of much Soviet blood.

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The Ambassador remarked that the East German Volkskammer met regularly in East Berlin, and it was difficult for the West Germans to appreciate why there should not be Bundestag activities in West Berlin. (Abrasimov expressed great astonishment and asked rhetorically if anyone expected the Volkskammer to meet anywhere else than in East Berlin.) The Ambassador continued that the US too had fought and suffered. It did not, however, believe in fighting the battles of World War II forever. It was important to look to the future, not the past. The US had pursued a policy of reconciliation with its former enemies. In the case of France and Germany too, there had been a successful effort to end old hatreds. The US hoped that the Soviets would act towards the Germans in a similar spirit. Abrasimov countered that a treaty between deGaulle and Adenauer could not be equated with the wishes of the French and German peoples. He enlarged on the dangers from a militarily strong, revanchist Federal Republic. It was a matter of concern and regret that the US had taken a leading role in the rebuilding of Germany's military strength. The Soviet Union felt that it was its duty to continue to call the attention of the world to past German wrongs and present German dangers.

Abrasimov then passed to the question of FRG and Berlin Senat official attitudes to the East German government. He said the Soviets believed the Germans should settle their own problems, but the Federal Republic continued to avoid responsibility and tried to put the onus for a solution on the four powers. The GDR authorities made repeated offers to the West Germans for talks on problems of mutual concern, such as travel. The West Germans complained continuously about these problems but would do nothing to try to solve them in the only way possible, namely through discussion withthe East Germans. Abrasimov referred in this connection to East German proposals for the establishment of FRG-GDR joint commissions in a number of fields, looking to the eventual establishment of a confederation. He moved on to a lengthy criticism of Federal Vice Chancellor Mende's recent offer of credits to the GDR. Mende had tried, Abrasimov said, to make a great show of desire to help the West Germans' "poor brothers" in the GDR. In fact, the "poor brothers" were in some respects much better off than the West Germans. Mende had pretended that the credit offer had no conditions attached to it, yet he had in fact laid down very serious conditions, some affecting the internal political structure in the GDR, others the question of travel between the FRG and the GDR and between East and West Berlin. Abrasimov then criticized Berlin Mayor Brandt for his refusal to deal with the East German authorities on the subject of intra-Berlin travel. Abrasimov asked rhetorically did Brandt think he was likely to find another government in East Germany with which he might settle the question. Such an attitude was naive and unreal. Abrasimov urged that the Allies suggest to Brandt the need for a more realistic approach. The Ambassador remarked that the question of travel was in the US view a basic human right which hardly required inter-governmental negotiations. The Ambassador said he understood that during 1963 so far there had been 1.2 million visitors from the FRG in the GDR. During the same period there had been only 1,200 visitors from the GDR to the FRG. It was clear that the obstacles to travel had not been created on the West German side. As for Abrasimov's comparison of conditions in the FRG and the GDR, the most eloquent comment was given by the statistics on refugees from the Zone prior to the Berlin Wall. Abrasimov intervened to say that he had heard before the whole argument about the Germans' "voting with their feet." However, the situation now was different. There had been only 3,000 illegal departures from the GDR in

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1963, and at the same time 19,000 persons had been permitted to leave legally. This was not a bad situation. The Ambassador said that, as for Abrasimov's remarks on Brandt, the basic consideration was that the intra-Berlin travel situation was totally unnatural. It was not hard to understand why Brandt and the Berliners felt the way they did. The Ambassador added that he was sure the Soviets could solve the problem easily if they chose to do so.

At this point word was brought into the meeting that a team of doctors (including a Soviet) had earlier in the day discovered a blood clot condition in Spandau prisoner Baldur von Schirach considered serious enough to warrant his removal to hospital. (There is a standing plan that prisoners would be moved under such circumstances to a British hospital.) Although the Soviet doctor and the Soviet prison director favored von Schirach's removal, they could not act without seeking prior approval from higher authority. The Ambassador conveyed this information to Abrasimov and urged him to take the necessary steps to effect von Schirach's quick removal. Abrasimov gave instructions that the Soviet doctor concerned report to him immediately at the Soviet Embassy. (Soviet approval for von Schirach's removal was received later in the day.)

Abrasimov said that arrangements were going forward for a concert appearance in West Berlin by the Soviet pianist Richter. He invited the Ambassador to go with him to the concert, remarking that their joint appearance would create a good impression on the West Berliners. Abrasimov added that he hoped there would be no difficulties put in the way of the Richter concert by the Allies. The Ambassador avoided giving a direct reply to Abrasimov's invitation, but said that the US authorities would not stand in the way of the Richter performance.

As he was leaving, Abrasimov presented the Ambassador with two books, one on Soviet ballet, and the other on Moscow.

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In accordance with the Department's instructions, Abrasimov's vehicle was met at the sector-sector crossing point (Checkpoint Charlie) and escorted by the Mission Acting Protocol Officer to US Headquarters. After the Ambassadors' meeting, Abrasimov's vehicle was similarly escorted from US Headquarters back to Checkpoint Charlie.

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FROM: BONN
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

2865, DECEMBER 9, 12 NOON

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2865; INFORMATION BERLIN 618, LONDON PARIS MOSCOW USUN.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS COVERED IN TWO-HOUR PRIVATE LUNCHEON CONVERSATION I HAD WITH MAYOR BRANDT IN BERLIN DEC. 7.

(1) PASSES FOR WEST BERLINERS' CHRISTMAS VISITS TO EAST BERLIN. BRANDT EMPHASIZED HIS EMBARRASSMENT AT INITIAL PRESS STATEMENT FROM FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CREATING IMPRESSION OFFER HAD BEEN ACCEPTED AND PASSES WOULD BE ARRANGED WHEN THIS WAS NOT YET THE CASE. HE RECOGNIZED PROBLEM WHICH WOULD BE CREATED BY GDR OFFICES IN WEST BERLIN, NOTING EDITORIAL OPINION ALREADY GENERALLY OPPOSED TO THEM, BUT THOUGHT USE OF THREE S-BAHN STATIONS DIRECTLY ON BORDER OR POSSIBLE USE BY GDR OF PRIVATE TOURIST AGENCY FOR ISSUANCE PERMITS MIGHT BE FEASIBLE. HE HAD FOUND PUBLIC OPINION TO BE MORE PRESSING, AND LESS SCRUPULOUS AS TO MEANS EMPLOYED, THAT PRESS. BRANDT WAS HIMSELF NOT OPTIMISTIC AS TO OUTCOME. HE CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD NOT FAVOR ANY FORMAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN HIMSELF AND GDR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. BRANDT RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS SOME CHANGE IN SITUATION SINCE 1961 WHEN SENAT HAD REQUESTED ALLIED ASSISTANCE BLOCKING GDR REPRESENTATION IN WEST BERLIN, BUT DID NOT INDICATE HE WAS GOING TO REQUEST ALLIES TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION ON GDR STATIONS. HIS INSTINCT SEEMED TO BE TO REMAIN FIRM BUT HE RECOGNIZED ADVANTAGE GDR HAD GAINED BY JUMPING GUN ON WEST.

(2) EAST-WEST TALKS IN BERLIN. BRANDT REFERRED TO BAHR'S TUTZING SPEECH AND SAID LATTER HAD BEEN AMBIGUOUS IN HANDLING QUESTION EAST-WEST TALKS, RATHER THAN HE (BRANDT) CHANGING HIS VIEW. HE NOTED PROBABLE PRESSURE FOR HIM TO MEET WITH MAYOR OF EAST BERLIN AND SAID HE MIGHT IF SITUATION DEMANDED BUT WOULD PREFER MEETINGS AT LOWER LEVEL. BRANDT ASKED FOR MY REACTION IF ABRASIMOV WISHED TO MEET HIM, OR IF, FOR THAT MATTER, EAST BERLIN MAYOR WISHED TO SEE ME. I GAVE AS MY OPINION THAT WE BOTH SHOULD DECLINE. EAST BERLIN MAYOR HAD NO AUTHORITY EXCEPT THAT FROM GDR. ABRASIMOV HAD INDICATED TO ME INTEREST ONLY IN MATTERS WEST BERLIN, CLAIMING NO AUTHORITY IN EAST BERLIN.

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(3) ALLIED-SENAT RELATIONS. MAYOR INDICATED NO REAL PROBLEMS EXISTED AND SPECIFICALLY NONE WITH U.S. ELEMENT. HE NOTED ON PERSONAL BASIS THAT FRENCH ARE MORE RIGID AND MORE CRITICAL OF HIM THAN OTHER TWO ALLIES. REPORTEDLY, DE GAULLE HAS REFUSED TO VISIT BERLIN HIMSELF OR PERMIT FURTHER VISITS BY OTHER HIGH FRENCH OFFICIALS BECAUSE THEY WOULD THUS BE FORCED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE WALL. I HAZARDED VIEW THAT DE GAULLE ALSO MIGHT NOT WISH TO RISK CONTRAST WITH ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION GIVEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

(4) SENAT-FEDREP DIFFERENCES ON FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO BERLIN. I RAISED THIS SUBJECT IN CONNECTION HIS TALK WITH ERHARD FEW DAYS EARLIER. BRANDT INDICATED THAT ERHARD WAS MUCH MORE CONSCIOUS OF NEED TO HOLD FINANCIAL LINE THAN ADENAUER HAD BEEN, AND THAT ERHARD ALSO RELATED BERLIN FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO HIS HOLDING LINE ON VETERANS' PENSIONS IN FEDREP. BRANDT SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN RAISING THE FUNDS THROUGH LOANS ON CAPITAL MARKET BUT THAT HE FEARED EFFECT ON FUTURE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR BERLIN IN SENSE FEDREP MIGHT INCREASE SUCH LOAN FINANCING AND MAINTAIN LOWER LEVEL DIRECT BUDGETARY SUPPORT. I NOTED OUR OWN GOVERNMENTAL POLICY OF DEFICIT FINANCING. BRANDT SEEMED OPTIMISTIC THAT MATTER WOULD BE WORKED OUT. SITUATION WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM SITUATION IN 1958 WHEN AMBASSADOR BRUCE'S ASSISTANCE HAD BEEN SOUGHT WITH FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. AMOUNTS INVOLVED THEN WERE FOR HOUSING AND MUCH GREATER, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN HIMSELF AND FRG ON OVERALL SIZE OF BUDGET.

(5) AGREEMENTS WITH SOVIET BLOC INCLUDING BERLIN. BRANDT EXPRESSED HOPE THAT FUTURE SOVIET-FEDREP TRADE AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT SO AS TO REFER TO THE PREVIOUS AGREEMENT, THUS INCLUDING BERLIN WITHOUT HAVING TO MENTION IT. HE HOPED ALSO THAT A CULTURAL AGREEMENT, INCLUDING BERLIN BY A SIMILAR REFERENCE, COULD ALSO BE NEGOTIATED. WEST BERLIN SUFFERS UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM WHEREBY BERLIN SCIENTISTS ARE UNABLE TO GO TO SOVIET UNION. HE DID NOT SEE ANY EVIDENCE FOR CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD BASIC BERLIN OR REUNIFICATION PROBLEMS.

(6) BRANDT STATEMENT RE COMPROMISE OF BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANS. RE BERLINTEL 691 TO BONN, INFO DEPARTMENT 762, I MENTIONED THIS MATTER LIGHTLY TO MAYOR AND SAID I ASSUMED HE HAD THOUGHT THE INFORMATION WAS ALREADY FAIRLY WELL KNOWN.

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BRANDT COMMENTED THAT THE REPORTER WHO HAD TALKED TO HIM ORIGINALLY HAD ABUSED HIS CONFIDENCE FOLLOWING SUBSEQUENT INNOUCOUS PUBLIC REFERENCE, AND THAT HE HAD NOT INTENDED THAT IT BE REFERRED TO IN THE WAY IT WAS.

(7) CHANGE OF U.S. ADMINISTRATION. BRANDT SAID HE HAD NO QUESTION ABOUT CONTINUITY OF USBERLIN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT JOHNSON. HE NOTED THAT IT WAS THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF WHO HAD RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A BERLIN VISIT. MAYOR COMMENTED HE UNDERSTOOD FULLY THAT PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE 1964 ELECTIONS TO VISIT EUROPE IN VIEW OF THE PRESSING DEMANDS UPON HIM. WHEN HE DID VISIT EUROPE, HOWEVER, HE VERY MUCH HOPED HE WOULD COME TO BERLIN.

(8) EUROPEAN UNITY AND ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP. BRANDT EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH PRESENT STATUS OF MOVEMENT TOWARD EUROPEAN UNION AND LATTER'S RELATIONSHIP TO U.S. IN ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP. HE AND SPD INTENDED PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN STIMULATING PROGRESS AND WOULD BE COOPERATING CLOSELY WITH JEAN MONNET'S COMMITTEE. HE DID NOT RAISE ANY QUESTIONS RE MLF.

(9) MEETING WITH ABRASIMOV. I HAVE HIM A GENERAL RUNDOWN ON SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WITH ABRASIMOV, NOTING THAT ON LIETZENBURGERSTRASSE I HAD INDICATED FIRMNESS OF OUR POSITION -- TO WHICH HE AGREED. I OBSERVED THAT ABRASIMOV APPARENTLY WISHED TO ESTABLISH GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS BY MAKING A FEW MINOR CONCESSIONS. IN TERMS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS RE BERLIN I TOLD BRANDT THAT I DID NOT ANTICIPATE SOVIET HARASSMENT FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE. I BELIEVED SOVIETS WOULD OBSERVE A WAITING PERIOD FOLLOWING ATZ PRESIDENT'S DEATH AND WOULD GIVE PRESIDENT JOHNSON OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH HIS ADMINISTRATION AND ITS POLICIES. GP-3. MCGHEE

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C. BERLINTEL 788 TO DEPT, 728 TO BONN
D. BERLINTEL 996 MARCH 28 TO DEPT, 886 TO BONN
E. BERLINTEL 625 NOV 1962 TO DEPT, 566 TO BONN

SUBJECT: LONG-RUN IMPLICATIONS OF CHRISTMAS PASS POLICY

I. AS EMB BONN HAS POINTED OUT, SUCCESSFUL CHRISTMAS PASS NEGOTIATION CAN WELL CONSTITUTE QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN BERLIN SITUATION. THIS RESULTS BOTH FROM ITS POSSIBLE MEANING FOR FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN FEDREP/WEST BERLIN AND GDR AND FROM THE DIRECTION IT MAY POINT FOR FUTURE FEDREP/SENAT-ALLIED RELATIONS. IN BOTH RESPECTS DEVELOPMENT IT APPEARS TO PRESAGE WOULD HAVE MOST IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES FOR ALLIED POSITION IN BERLIN. NEXT STAGE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE EFFORTS TO MAKE MORE PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR WEST BERLINERS TO TRAVEL TO EAST BERLIN. SUCH EFFORTS HAVE PROBABLY ALREADY BEGUN. SUBJECT TO EMBASSY'S VIEWS, THEREFORE, MISSION BELIEVES OCCASION OF TALKS WITH MEMBERS ERHARD'S PARTY MIGHT BE USED TO EXPLORE FEDGOVT ATTITUDE ON THESE QUESTIONS. FOLLOWING BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS IS PROVIDED WITH THIS IN MIND:

II. PHILOSOPHY OF BERLIN LEADERSHIP

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A. CHRISTMAS PASS NEGOTIATION REPRESENTS FIRST SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY DEVELOPED BY BRANDT AND HIS ASSOCIATES IN BERLIN AND EXPOUNDED BY BRANDT AND SENAT PRESS CHIEF BAHR AT TUTZING IN JULY 1963. BAHR HAS IN FACT TOLD US THAT THIS IS THE CASE. THIS POLICY IS EXPRESSED BY BAHR'S PHRASE "CHANGE THROUGH RAPPROCHEMENT."

B. POLICY HAS ITS SOURCES IN FAILURE OF ALLIES PREVENT ERECTION OF WALL IN 1961 OR REACT EFFECTIVELY TO PETER FECHTER INCIDENT AND SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF SOV KOMMANDATURA IN 1962. THESE EVENTS HAVE LED BERLIN SPD LEADERSHIP CONCLUDE WITH SOME BITTERNESS ALLIED POSITION BASED ON WARTIME AGREEMENTS HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY ERODED. LEADERS BELIEVE ALLIED MILITARY PRESENCE CAN BE COUNTED ON ONLY TO GUARANTEE CITY AGAINST MAJOR COMMUNIST SUBVERSION OR AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK--GERMANS THEMSELVES MUST SEEK AMELIORATION OF HARDSHIPS IN BERLIN AND PROGRESS TOWARD REUNIFICATION BY ACHIEVING MODUS VIVENDI WITH SOVS AND EAST GERMAN REGIME. GERMAN POLICY SHOULD THEREFORE BE TWO EXTEND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO EAST GERMANY AND DEVELOP NEW CHANNELS OF CONTACT WITH GDR REGIME, WHILE AT SAME TIME FEDREP WOULD INCREASINGLY TAKE OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR BERLIN FROM ALLIES. END RESULT THIS LATTER MOVEMENT WOULD BE ACQUISITION BY BERLIN OF ELEVENTH LAND STATUS WITH ALLIES PRESENT IN CITY ON PROTECTIVE CONTRACTUAL BASIS. (POLICY AS APPLIED TO GDR HAS BEEN QUITE EXPLICITLY DESCRIBED BY LEADERSHIP HERE; THAT CONCERNING RELATIONSHIP WITH ALLIES HAS BEEN DEDUCED BY MISSION FROM LESS DIRECT INDICATIONS.)

C. POLICY TOWARD GDR HAS BEEN DESCRIBED TO MISSION BY BAHR IN FOLLOWING MORE PRECISE TERMS:

1. THE LEVEL OF CONTACT, RANK AND POSITION OF GDR REPRESENTATIVE IS OF NO SIGNIFICANCE SO LONG AS FEDREP OR SENAT OFFICIAL IS BELOW RANK OF MIN (FEDGOVT) OR SENATOR (BERLIN CITY GOVT). BRANDT PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE MEET WITH EBERT, LORD MAYOR OF EAST BERLIN.

2. FEDREP SHOULD INCREASE INTERZONAL TRADE AND SWING CREDITS TO GDR WITHOUT REQUESTING SPECIFIC POLICTICAL CONCESSIONS AS QUID PRO QUO. IN SAME WAY THAT US EXPECTS ITS AID POLICY POLICY TO TIE YUGOSLAVIA AND POLAND CLOSER TO WEST AND IN TIME TO BRING LIBERALIZATION INTERNAL POLICIES, FEDREP CAN EXPECT SUCH RESULTS WITH GDR.

3. FEDREP AND NATO MUST PROVIDE CREDIBLE ASSURANCES TO MOSCOW THAT THEY WILL COOPERATE WITH SOVS IN PREVENTING REVOLUTION IN GDR. THIS IS NECESSARY IN ORDER ACHIEVE LIBERALIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN GDR.

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4. UNDER MORE LIBERAL GDR REGIME AND IMPROVED LIVING STANDARDS, FEDREP COULD CONSIDER SOME FORM CONFEDERATION AS INTERIM SOLUTION TO GERMAN PROBLEM.

III. ATTITUDE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

IN FALL OF 1962, WHEN WE FIRST BECAME FULLY AWARE OF DIRECTION SENAT'S THINKING, RELATIONS BETWEEN SENAT AND FEDGOVT WERE NOT GOOD AND LATTER DID NOT AL ALL SHARE BASIC POLICY OUTLOOK OF BERLIN LEADERS. IN RECENT MONTHS SITUATION HAS APPEARED TO CHANGE RADICALLY. BEGINNING WITH WALTERSDORFER CHAUSSEE ISSUE IN JUNE 1963, AND CULMINATING IN CHRISTMAS PASS OPERATION, WORKING COORDINATION AND RAPPROACHEMENT IN VIEWS OF BONN AND BERLIN HAVE DEVELOPED RAPIDLY. ACCORDING TO BAHR, SPD NATIONAL LEADERSHIP ACCEPTS BRANDT'S POLICY THESIS WHILE FDP CHM MENDE AND FONMIN SCHROEDER ARE RECEPTIVE TO ITS BASIC CONCEPTS. WE ASSUME IT WOULD BE TOO MUCH TO SAY THAT FEDGOVT HAS ADOPTED TUTZING POLICY TOWARD GDR. IT IS, FOR EXAMPLE, DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE WHETHER BONN'S ATTITUDE IN CHRISTMAS PASS OPERATION WAS ONE OF ACTIVE PURSUIT OF COMMON GOALS OR MERELY PASSIVE GOING-ALONG OF NEW ADMIN WITH BRANDT INITIATIVE. BAHR CLAIMS THAT ERHARD APPROVES FURTHER ADVANCE ALONG SAME LINE IN PASS ISSUE BUT WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS. WE WSTIMATE ONLY THAT ERHARD ADMIN IS MUCH MORE WILLING THAN ADENAUER WAS TO EXPERIMENT IN RELATIONS WITH EAST AND IS RECEPTIVE TO CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING BRANDT'S POLICY BUT IT HAS NOT ACCEPTED WHOLE FABRIC OF THAT POLICY WITH ALL ITS IMPLICATIONS.

IV. SOV/GDR REACTION

IN ADDITION TO WHATEVER ATTITUDE BONN MIGHT DEVELOP CONCERNING FURTHER PURSUIT OF THIS POLICY, SOV/GDR REACTION IS CRITICAL FACTOR. PRIOR TO CHRISTMAS PASS QUESTION, BRANDT AND COMPANY HAD BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN CARRYING FORWARD THEIR IDEAS EVEN ON LIMITED SCALE SIMPLY BECAUSE EAST WOULD NOT COOPERATE. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER SOVS WILL SEE IDENTITY OF INTEREST IN BRANDT APPROACH. ASSUMING THEY WISH OVER TIME TO DECREASE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL BURDEN OF UNDULY OPPRESSIVE EAST GERMAN SYSTEM THEY COULD SEE CERTAIN ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED IN DIRECTION BRANDT WANTS TO GO. WHILE THIS TEREFORE REMAINS SPECULATIVE FACTOR, WE MUST ASSUME FOR PURPOSES FORMULATING ALLIED POLICY THAT SOV/GDR REACTION WILL IN LONG RUN BE SUFFICIENLY POSITIVE TO PERMIT MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION.

FOR EXAMPLE, IN EXCHANGE FOR AGREEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY, TO RELAXING TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS WITHIN BERLIN AND BETWEEN FEDREP AND GDR, AND FOR ACCEPTANCE DE FACTO INCORPORATION

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WEST BERLIN IN FEDREP, SOVS COULD BE OFFERED ATTRACTIVE INDUCEMENTS. IN ADDITION NONAGGRESSION ARRANGEMENT, IT MIGHT INCLUDE GENEROUS FEDREP ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO GDR AND USSR, CERTAIN DE FACTO RECOGNITION GDR, INCLUDING IMPLICIT ACCEPTANCE CONCEPT OF CONFEDERATION AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH SOVS COULD PERHAPS LOOK WITH GREATER EQUANIMITY ON DEMISE OF ULBRICHT AND SOME LIBERALIZATION OF INTERNAL POLICIES IN GDR UNDER COMMUNIST GOVT WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING SOV NATIONAL SECURITY.

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V. QUESTIONS POSED FOR ALLIES

A. AS WE HAVE SEEN IN CHRISTMAS PASS OPERATION, ALLIES FACE TWO KINDS OF QUESTIONS IN THIS AREA: WHAT THEIR VIEWS SHOULD BE CONCERNING SUBSTANCE OF EVENTS AND TO WHAT DEGREE THEY SHOULD INTERVENE TO CONTROL THEM. AS SITUATION DEVELOPS FURTHER, IF IT DOES, ALLIED REACTION WILL BE BOUNDED BY TWO EXTREMES: REFUSAL PERMIT ANY CHANGE IN RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ALLIES AND SENAT/FEDGOVT OR BETWEEN SENAT/FEDGOVT AND GDR; AND ACCEPTANCE OF ANY COURSE OF ACTION DEVISED BY SENAT AND SUPPORTED AT LEAST TACITLY BY FEDGOVT. FIRST EXTREME IS IN ANY CASE NOT FEASIBLE GIVEN STRONG CURRENTS THAT ARE RUNNING HERE AND GIVEN ALLIED DESIRE TO SEE IMPROVEMENTS IN SITUATION. SECOND EXTREME COULD EVENTUALLY BRING ABOUT SITUATION WHERE ALLIES COULD NO LONGER FULFILL THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BERLIN, OR WHERE THEIR POSITION IN CITY ON CURRENT BASIS WOULD EVEN SEEM REDUNDANT. AT SOME POINT THEREFORE STAGE WOULD BE REACHED WHERE FURTHER MOVEMENT IN DIRECTION OF BRANDT'S GOALS WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH ALLIED ROLE AS PRESENTLY CONCEIVED, AND ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE TO HALT DEVELOPMENT OR ALTER THEIR ROLE. MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF THIS POINT WILL REQUIRE FURTHER ANALYSIS, WHICH WHOULD BE PRESSED FORWARD BY ALLIES. IT WILL INVOLVE ISOLATING FUNDAMENTAL AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ALLIED POSITION, AND WAYS IN WHICH THESE ELEMENTS WOULD BE AFFECTED BY MOVEMENT TOWARD BRANDT'S GOALS.

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B. IF DECISION IS MADE TO MOVE TOWARD THESE GOALS, ALLIES WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW TO ADJUST THEIR POSITION IN BERLIN. FORM OF ALLIED REPRESENTATION IN BERLIN WOULD HAVE TO BE CHANGED TO REFLECT CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS. NEW FORM OF REPRESENTATION AND AUTHORITY IN BERLIN, AND NATURE OF GUARANTEE UNDERLYING INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY (WHICH WE ASSUME WOULD IN SOME FORM BE ESSENTIAL PART OF ANY MODUS VIVENDI) WOULD BE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN REASSURING BERLINERS THAT NEW ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE THEIR BASIC FREEDOM. THIS WOULD CERTAINLY INVOLVE THE CONTINUED STATIONING OF SUBSTANTIAL WESTERN FORCES IN THE CITY EVEN IF CERTAIN GOVERNING POWERS WOULD BE SURRENDERED. AGREEMENT AMONG WESTERN ALLIES AND GERMANS ON ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS WOULD BE ONE OF MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS TO BE FACED.

VI. TALKS WITH ERHARD'S PARTY

A. WE RECOMMEND AS INITIAL STEP IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH TIS SITUATION THAT FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BE EXPLORED:

1. TO WHAT EXTEND DOES FEDGOVT SHARE BRANDT POLICY GOALS (PARA II C ABOVE); MOST IMMEDIATELY, WHAT IS BONN'S VIEW ON EXTENSION OF PASS SYSTEM, POLITICAL PRICE TO BE PAID, ETC.;

2. WOULD FEDGOVT BE WILLING JOIN WITH ALLIES IN PRESSING IAA PROPOSAL WITH SOVS, MAKING IT ONE OF QUID PRO QUOS FOR NONAGGRESSION ARRANGEMENT.

B. WE RECOMMEND FURTHER THAT FOLLOWING CAUTIONARY REMARKS BE MADE IN DISCUSSIONS:

1. FURTHER MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION DEEPLY AFFECTS COMPLEX ALLIED-GERMAN RELATIONSHIPS AND CAN HAVE SERIOUSLY DIVISIVE EFFICTS UNLESS MOST COMPLETE AND FRANK COORDINATION TAKES PLACE AT ALL STAGES, AND UNLESS IN PROCESS OF OF CONSULATATION AND ECISION-MAKING THE PATTERN OF THESE RELATIONSHIPS IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT (BERLINTEL 788 TO DEPT).

2. ACHIEVEMENT OF MAJOR GOALS, SUCH AS IAA, REQUIRES THAT PRESSURE BE MAINTAINED ON SOVS TO ACCEPT LESS THAN THEY WISH. GERMANS, ESPECIALLY SENAT, MUST BE CAREFUL AVOID GIVING AWAY IMPORTANT BARGAINING COUNTERS, OR SELLING THEM CHEAPLY, IN ORDER OBTAIN THEREBY SOME MINOR IMPROVEMENT IN BERLIN SITUATION. WE HAVE IN MIND, FOR EXAMPLE, DESIRE OF SENAT TO PROLIFERATE AIR ACCESS BY ACCEPTANCE NON-ALLIED AIR SERVICE TO TEMPELHOF. ANOTHER CASE IN POINT WOULD

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-3- 850, DECEMBER 24, 7 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM BERLIN

BE ABANDONMENT AT THIS STAGE OF IZT TREUHANDSTELLE AS CHANNEL ON BERLIN MATTERS OR CHANGE IN PRESENT LEVEL OF FEDREP NEGOTIATOR, WHETHER OR NOT LEOPOLD HIMSELF REMAINS.

3. WITH SPECIFIC RESPECT TO PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT EAST GERMAN PASS ISSUING OFFICES IN WEST BERLIN, CAREFULLY DEVISED AND DELIMITED ARRANGEMENT NEED NOT SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE WESTERN POSITION. HOWEVER, IF RASHLY OR HURRIEDLY ENTERED INTO, OR IF MOMENTUM DEVELOPED IN REACHING ARRANGEMENT WAS ALLOWED TO PULL US FASTER ALONG THE ROAD THAN WE WERE PREPARED FOR, EFFECTS COULD BE DAMAGING. THEREFORE, IT MOST IMPORTANT CAREFUL CONTROL BE EXERCISED AND THOROUGH CONSULTATION BE HELD AT EVERY STAGE.

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(449)

Germany - Berlin

December 26, 1963

2BF159/1

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Christmas Passes for West Berliners to Visit the Eastern Sector

The initiative for the Christmas pass project was taken by the East Germans in a letter addressed by Alexander Abusch, the Deputy Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, to Berlin's Mayor Willy Brandt (Tab A).

In raising the pass project the East Germans picked a human issue designed to give them a breakthrough they had long been seeking -- direct West Berlin-GDR negotiations designed to enhance the status of their satellite regime, and separate West Berlin from the Federal Government, supporting the Communist thesis of three Germanies, a concept they have been pushing since this Berlin crisis got underway in 1958. The West German and West Berlin governments were aware from the outset that, barring impossible Communist conditions, they had little choice but to come up with some arrangement that would permit West Berliners to visit East Berlin during the Christmas holidays. They were also fully alert to the political pitfalls inherent in the situation.

The specific points at issue in the negotiation were: (1) the locus for the negotiations -- East or West Berlin; (2) the level of representation at the negotiations; (3) the location of the pass issuing offices; and (4) the identity of the political authority concluding the agreement.

After some thrashing about and several threatened breakdowns, the following arrangements were agreed upon:

1. Negotiations would take place alternately in East and West Berlin, with East Berlin being the cite of the first meeting.

2. The West Berlin government would be represented by Senatsrat Korber, who in the hierarchial arrangement is two levels below the rank of Senator -- and therefore a "technician".

3. The pass applications and the passes themselves would be issued from West Berlin school buildings by East Berlin "postal clerks", working under the supervision of West Berlin postal authorities. The passes themselves, however, would be "issued" in East Berlin and West

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Berlin mail trucks would be used to transport the applications and passes between East and West Berlin.

4. The agreed minute concluding the negotiations would be signed by Korber himself, "on the instruction of the head of the Senat Chancellery (Spangenberg), given by authority of the governing Mayor" (Tab B).

After agreement was reached, the East German and the West Berlin authorities put out separate press releases with the East Germans claiming that the agreement had been signed by plenipotentiaries of the GDR and the West Berlin Senat, and asserting that this was a hopeful step toward the "establishment of normal relations between the GDR and West Berlin"(Tab C).

Brandt's press chief, Bahr, on the other hand emphasized that the "arrangements did not alter Berlin's legal status and did not imply departure from the policy of not recognizing the Soviet Zone regime". He also added that the pass arrangements served "solely humanitarian objectives" (Tab D).

After the negotiations were completed, the Allied authorities as well as the Bonn government agreed that although they had been informed of what was taking place, they had not really been consulted! (Tab E). This assertion might salve their consciences but the record does not support it, least of all the fact that the Federal Government was not consulted. The Allies knew of each step taken and could have intervened at any time to propose, revise, and veto. But everyone realized that, barring a heavy-handed Communist act making agreement absolutely impossible, the enterprise could not be permitted to die. It was always known to Willy Brandt clearly the attitude and view [illegible] for any unfavorable political fall-out. One further note emerges in the exchanges which follow the conclusion of the agreement -- the Allies seem most concerned that the close Berlin-Bonn relationship which manifested itself during the pass negotiations could undermine the Allied authority and position in Berlin. This may be true, but if it is, it is an issue which transcends the pass question and is not a consequence of it, and any moves to deal with it must take place in a different and broader context.

My own belief is that the Christmas passes have been a net gain for our side rather than a loss. If the East German Communists had their way, West Berliners would not be visiting East Berlin during the holidays.

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This kind of movement would not contribute to East Berlin stability and the consensus is, and this includes Brandt too, that it was Soviet orders and not Pankow's wishes that made this possible.

There is no question but that once this operation is over, we have to sit down and figure out what happened, and where we might be going. But I don't think we should let ourselves get bogged down by narrow legalisms which could prevent us unnecessarily from penetrating the wall and getting around it.

Given the Federal Government's involvement in the pass question and the fact that Erhard and Schroeder gave it their blessing, I think the issue of humanizing the Soviet Zone ought to be pursued at the Ranch and endorsed by the communique so that following the Johnson-Erhard meeting we can sit down with the Germans to pursue this subject constructively. For, as you know, until now all discussions of it have bogged down because it had an SPD blessing and no equivalent CDU endorsement.

David Klein

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ZBF1601/1

Memorandum of Conversation

LBJ Ranch, Texas

DATE: December 28, 1963

SUBJECT: Erhard Views on Various European Problems

PARTICIPANTS: Chancellor Erhard
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary

JAN 6 - 1964

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At dinner tonight I asked the Chancellor what he felt about the Berlin Christmas passes. He said he thought that Brandt had seized the opportunity to play a role which would satisfy the West Berliners emotionally and which would benefit the SPD politically. He said that matters had gone much faster and much further than the Federal Government had anticipated, or had been able to control. By the time the Federal Government had found itself in a position to have to take a decision, it was too late and they had no alternative but to go along with what the Berlin Senat had already conceded. I told the Chancellor that whatever political advantages the GDR might appear to have gained, there was no doubt that the surge of West Berliners to be reunited with their families and friends in East Berlin had heightened the ugliness of the image of the Wall, and of its futility.

I asked the Chancellor whether he was in favor of a Western diplomatic initiative with regard to West Berlin and Germany and he said he was. I told him we were giving this matter priority attention and would press for urgent study in the Ambassadorial Group as soon as the German proposals had been officially submitted.

The Chancellor gave me an informal and very frank account of his talks with de Gaulle. He said that de Gaulle and Adenauer had

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built up their relationship on a sentimental basis, as though they were both conscious of playing an historic role in shaping the relations of their two peoples. They had avoided coming to terms with the political and strategic realities which faced them and had avoided taking positions on issues involving their responsibilities as Chiefs of Government. I asked the Chancellor whether he thought that de Gaulle had influenced Chancellor Adenauer in doubting the firmness of the US commitment to defend Europe. He answered vigorously in the affirmative. He said that de Gaulle had defended his strategy to Adenauer by maintaining that it was impossible to foretell what America would do in the event of Soviet aggression against Germany. De Gaulle had told Erhard himself that if Germany were attacked, he, de Gaulle, would be able to destroy the Soviet Union with his "force de frappe," even though France might be destroyed ten times over. Erhard commented that even if de Gaulle's claim were true, which he doubted, he had less confidence in de Gaulle's decision than in the commitment of the United States to defend Europe. De Gaulle had said that it was the American intention to withdraw from Europe rather than expose itself to Soviet thermonuclear retaliation.

I asked the Chancellor whether he had any idea what kind of reorganization de Gaulle wanted to achieve in NATO. The Chancellor replied that he had not been able to obtain any indications from de Gaulle, other than the repeated assertion that Europe's defense must not depend on a strategy which permitted the US to decide unilaterally whether nuclear weapons should be used or not in any particular military situation. The Chancellor added that while he had been most careful to keep on good terms with de Gaulle, he had been completely unable to understand de Gaulle's reasoning, and felt that he was only motivated by an urge to claim for France a more important military role in the future.

Chancellor Erhard said with great emphasis that the present visit had been extremely valuable and that he felt confirmed in his confidence in the United States and in his feeling that the security of Germany lay in the closest cooperation with us in our efforts to maintain and build up the Alliance.

The Chancellor turned to future European developments and indicated he thought that de Gaulle might be prepared to make

some

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some concessions with regard to the political unification of Europe. I asked him whether he thought de Gaulle meant European unity in the true sense of the word or only an alliance between national political units. The Chancellor conceded that from everything de Gaulle had said to him and publicly, he was only thinking of "political union of Europe," which suggested that de Gaulle had not changed his conception of what that union should be.

Comment: From this talk with Chancellor Erhard which was conducted in German, I gained the impression that he is in no doubt that Germany's interests lie in the closest cooperation with the United States, and that while he attaches great importance to maintaining the German rapprochement with the French people, he considers de Gaulle to be a permanent liability and danger to Germany's security interests.

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